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THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL UNIVERSE

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
Haverford College

In the infancy of a science the use even of fairly crude methods of analysis and description can produce surprisingly large increments of knowledge if new perspectives are brought to bear upon available data. Such perspectives not infrequently require both a combination of methodologies and a critical appraisal of the limitations of each. The emergence of American voting-behavior studies over the last two decades constitutes a good case in point. Studies based on aggregate election statistics have given us invaluable insights into the nature of secular trends in the distribution of the party vote, and have also provided us with useful theory concerning such major phenomena as critical elections.1 Survey research has made significant contributions to the understanding of motivational forces at work upon the individual voter. As it matures, it is now reaching out to grapple with problems which involve the political system as a whole.2

Not at all surprisingly, a good deal of well publicized conflict has arisen between aggregationists and survey researchers. The former attack the latter for their failure to recognize

¹ The leading work of this sort thus far has been done by the late V. O. Key, Jr. See, e.g., his "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, Vol. 17, pp. 3–18 (1955), and his American State Politics (New York, 1956). See also such quantitatively oriented monographs as Perry Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 1812–1952 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957).

² The most notable survey-research effort to date to develop politically relevant theory regarding American voting behavior is Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), especially ch. 20.

the limitations of an ahistorical and episodic method, and for their failure to focus their attention upon matters of genuine concern to students of politics.3 The latter insist, on the other hand, that survey research alone can study the primary psychological and motivational building blocks out of which the political system itself is ultimately constructed. Not only are both parties to the controversy partly right, but each now seems to be becoming quite sensitive to the contributions which the other can make. As survey scholars increasingly discover that even such supposedly well established characteristics of the American voter as his notoriously low awareness of issues can be replaced almost instantaneously under the right circumstances by an extremely pronounced sensitivity to an issue, the importance of the time dimension and factors of social context so viewed become manifest.4 Students

³ V. O. Key, Jr., "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 24, pp. 54-61 (1960); V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 281-99.

⁴ Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this Review, Vol. 57, pp. 45–56 (1963). The authors observe that in the 1958 Hays-Alford congressional race in Arkansas, the normally potential nature of constituency sanctions against representatives was transferred under the overriding pressure of the race issue into an actuality which resulted in Hays' defeat by a write-in vote for his opponent. The normally low issue- and candidate-consciousness among the electorate was abruptly replaced by a most untypically intense awareness of the candidates and their relative postions on this issue.

of aggregate voting behavior, on the other hand, are turning to the data and methods of survey research to explore the structure and characteristics of contemporary public opinion. A convergence is clearly underway. One further sign of it is the construction of the first national election-data archive, now underway at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The completion of this archive and the conversion of its basic data into a form suitable for machine processing should provide the material basis for a massive breakthrough in the behavioral analysis of American political history over the last century and a half.

If controversies over method accompany the development of disciplines, so too does the strong tendency of the research mainstream to bypass significant areas of potential inquiry, thus leaving many "lost worlds" in its wake. One such realm so far left very largely unexplored in the literature of American politics centers around changes and continuities in the gross size and shape of this country's active voting universe over the past century. Key, to be sure, made contributions of the greatest significance to our understanding of the changing patterns of party linkage between voters and government. Moreover, he called attention to the need for quantitative analysis of political data other than the partisan division of the vote for leading offices. 7 E. E. Schattschneider's discussion of the struggle over the scope of political conflict and his functional analysis of the American party system remain a stimulus

For an excellent cross-polity study of voting behavior based on comparative survey analysis, see Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963).

⁶ V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1961), based largely on survey-research data at the University of Michigan.

⁶ This effort, to which the author was enabled to contribute, thanks to a Social Science Research Council grant for 1963-64, has been supported by the Council and by the National Science Foundation. This article is in no sense an integral part of that larger project. But it is proper to acknowledge gratefully here that the S.S.R.C., by making it possible for me to spend a year at the Survey Research Center, has helped to provide conditions favorable to writing it. Thanks are also due to Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller for their comments and criticisms. They bear no responsibility for the defects of the final product.

⁷ V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics, op. cit., pp. 71-73, 197-216.

to further research—not least in the direction of examining the aggregate characteristics of the American electorate over time. Other recent studies, for example of the turnout of voters in Canada and Indiana, have added to our knowledge of contemporary patterns of mass political involvement. The fact remains, however, that no systematic analysis over lengthy time periods has yet been made of the massive changes of relative size and characteristics in the American voting universe, despite their obvious relevance to an understanding of the evolving political system as a whole.

This article does not purpost to be that systematic study. It is, rather, a tentative reconnaissance into the untapped wealth of a whole range of political data, undertaken in the hope of showing concretely some of the potentialities of their study. The primary objective here is the preliminary exploration of the scope of changes since the mid-19th century in turnout and other criteria of voting participation, and the possible substantive implications of such changes.

There is also a second objective. The day is not far distant when a major effort will be undertaken to relate the findings of survey research to contemporary aggregate data and then to examine the aggregate data of past generations in the light of these derived relationships. Before such inquiry is undertaken, it will be a matter of some importance to ascer-

⁸ E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York, 1942) and The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960), pp. 78-96.

⁹ Howard A. Scarrow, "Patterns of Voter Turnout in Canada," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, pp. 351-64 (1961); James A. Robinson and William Standing, "Some Correlates of Voter Participation: The Case of Indiana," Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, pp. 96-111 (1960). Both articles—one involving a political system outside of but adjacent to the United States-indicate patterns of contemporary participation which seem at variance with the conclusions of survey studies regarding the behavior of the American electorate. In Canada rural turnout is higher than urban, and no clear-cut pattern of drop-off between federal and provincial elections exists. Voter participation in Indiana apparently does not increase with the competitiveness of the electoral situation, and does increase with the rurality of the election jurisdiction. With the possible exception of the relationship between competitiveness and turnout, all of these are characteristics associated with 19thcentury voting behavior in the United States; see below.

tain whether and to what extent the basic findings of survey research about the present American electorate are actually relevant to earlier periods of our political history. Firm conclusions here as elsewhere must await much more comprehensive and detailed study. Even so, enough can be learned from the contours of the grosser data to warrant posting a few warning signs.

T

Several criteria of voting participation have been employed in this analysis: (1) estimated turnout; (2) drop-off; (3) roll-off; (4) splitticket voting; (5) mean partisan swing. Turnout, the most indispensable of these criteria, is also unfortunately the "softest." A number of errors of estimate can arise from the necessary use of census data. For example, interpolations of estimates for intercensal years can produce significant error when abnormally large increases or decreases in population are bunched together within a few years. Estimates of the alien component in the total adult male population must also necessarily remain quite speculative for the censuses from 1880 through 1900, and are impossible to secure from published census data prior to 1870. No doubt this helps explain why students of voting-behavior research have avoided this area. But we need not reject these admittedly imprecise data altogether, because of their imperfections, when secular changes in turnout levels and variabilities from election to election are of far too great a magnitude to be reasonably discounted on the basis of estimate error.10

Moreover, the other criteria employed in this study not only share a very similar directional flow over time, but are directly derived from the voting statistics themselves. Free from the estimate-error problem, they are ordinarily quite consistent with the turnout data.¹¹ What

10 In computing turnout data, note that until approximately 1920 the criteria for eligibility to vote differed far more widely from state to state than they do now. In a number of states west of the original thirteen—for example, in Michigan until 1894 and in Wisconsin until 1908—aliens who had merely declared their intention to become citizens were permitted to vote. Woman suffrage was also extended piecemeal for several decades prior to the general enfranchisement of 1920. The turnout estimates derived here have been adjusted, so far as the census data permit, to take account of such variations.

¹¹ If one computes the off-year total vote of the years 1950-62 as a percentage of the total vote cast in the preceding presidential election, a

is called "drop-off" here is the familiar pattern of decline in the total vote between presidential and succeeding off-year elections. The drop-off figures usually presented below are reciprocals of the percentage of the presidential-year total vote which is cast in the immediately following off-year election. If the total vote for the two successive elections is the same, drop-off is zero: if the total vote in the off-year election exceeds that cast in the immediately preceding presidential election, drop-off is negative. Secular increases in the amplitude of drop-off could be associated with such factors as a declining relative visibility or salience of off-year elections, or with an increasing component of active voters who are only marginally involved with the voting process as such.

"Roll-off" measures the tendency of the electorate to vote for "prestige" offices but not for lower offices on the same ballot and at the same election. If only 90 per cent of those voting for the top office on the ticket also vote for the lesser statewide office receiving fewest votes at the same election, for example, the roll-off figure stands at 10 per cent. Secular increases in this criterion of voting participation could be associated with such variables as a growing public indifference to elections for administrative offices which might well be made appointive, or with a growing proportion of peripheral voters in the active electorate; or with changes in the form of ballots. Split-ticket voting has been measured rather crudely here as the difference between the highest and lowest percentages of the two-party vote cast for either party among the array of statewide offices in any given election. Zero on this scale would correspond to absolute uniformity in the partisan division of the vote for all offices at the same election. The amplitude of partisan swing is computed in this study without reference to the specific partisan direction of the swing, and is derived from the mean percentage of the twoparty vote cast for either party among all statewide races in the same election. Both of these latter criteria are more directly related to

virtually identical correspondence is reached with estimated off-year turnout as a percentage of turnout in the immediately preceding presidential year:

	Total Off-Year	Estimated Off-
37	Vote as % of Vote	Year Turnout as
Year	in Last Presidential	% of Turnout in
	Year	Last Pres. Year
1950	82.9	80.4
1954	69.2	67.5
1958	73.9	72.1
1962	74.4	73.6

changes in the strength of partisan linkage between voters and government than are the others employed in this study.

Two major assumptions underlie the use of these criteria. (1) If a secular decline in turnout occurs, and especially if it is associated with increases in drop-off and roll-off, we may infer that the active voting universe: (a) is shrinking in size relative to the potential voting universe; and (b) is also decomposing as a relative increase in its component of peripherally involved voters occurs. Opposite implications, of course, would be drawn from increases in turnout accompanied by decreases in these rough indices of voter peripherality. (2) If split-ticket voting and the amplitude of partisan swings are also increasing over time, we may infer that a decline in party-oriented voting is taking place among a growing minority of voters. Reductions in these criteria would suggest a resurgence of party-oriented voting.

A recent study by Angus Campbell tends to support the view that the above criteria are actually related to the component of marginal voters and voters with relatively weak partisan attachments in today's active electorate.12 Campbell argues that surge and decline in voting participation and in partisan distribution of the vote result from two major factors: the entrance into the active electorate of peripherally involved voters who tend to vote disproportionately for such beneficiaries of partisan surges as President Eisenhower, and then abstain from the polls in subsequent lowstimulus elections; and the temporary movement of core voters with relatively low levels of party identification away from their nominal party allegiance, followed by their return to that allegiance in subsequent low-stimulus elections. Campbell's study reveals that splitticket voting in the 1956 election tended to be heavily concentrated among two groups of voters: those who voted Republican for President in 1956 and did not vote in 1958, and those who voted Republican in 1956 but Democratic in 1958—in other words, among those with peripheral involvement in the political process itself and those with borderline partisan commitments. Moreover, roll-offthe failure to vote a complete ticket in 1956was heavily concentrated among the non-voters of 1958. It is also suggestive that the level of drop-off in Campbell's panel from 1956 to 1958, 23 per cent, very closely approximates the level of drop-off as measured by the aggregate voting data 13

II

Even the crudest form of statistical analysis makes it abundantly clear that the changes which have occurred in the relative size and shape of the active electorate in this country have not only been quantitatively enormous but have followed a directional course which seems to be unique in the contemporary universe of democratic polities. In the United States these transformations over the past century have involved devolution, a dissociation from politics as such among a growing segment of the eligible electorate and an apparent deterioration of the bonds of party linkage between electorate and government. More precisely, these trends were overwhelmingly prominent between about 1900 and 1930, were only very moderately reversed following the political realignment of 1928-1936, and now seem to be increasing once again along several dimensions of analysis. Such a pattern of development is pronouncedly retrograde compared with those which have obtained almost everywhere else in the Western world during the past century.

Probably the best-known aspect of the changing American political universe has been the long-term trend in national voter turnout: a steep decline from 1900 to about 1930, followed by a moderate resurgence since that time. ¹⁴ As the figures in Table I indicate, nationwide turnout down through 1900 was quite high by contemporary standards—comparing favorably in presidential years with recent levels of par-

TABLE I. DECLINE AND PARTIAL RESURGENCE:
MEAN LEVELS OF NATIONAL TURNOUT AND
DROP-OFF BY PERIODS, 1848–1962*

Period (Presidential Years)	Mean Estimated Turnout	Period (Off-Years)	Mean Estimated Turnout	Mean Drop-Off
	(%)	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(%)	(%)
1848-1872	75.1	1850-1874	65.2	7.0
1876-1896	78.5	1878-1898	62.8	15.2
1900-1916	64.8	1902-1918	47.9	22.4
1920-1928	51.7	1922-1930	35.2	28.7
1932-1944	59.1	1934-1946	41.0	27.8
1948-1960	60.3	1950-1962	44.1	24.9

^{*} Off-year turnout data based on total vote for congressional candidates in off years.

¹² Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24, pp. 397–418 (1960).

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 413. The percentage of drop-off from 1956 to 1958, as computed from aggregate voting data, was 25.6%.

¹⁴ See, e.g., Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 18-26.

ticipation in Western Europe—and was also marked by very low levels of drop-off. A good deal of the precipitate decline in turnout after 1896 can, of course, be attributed to the disfranchisement of Negroes in the South and the consolidation of its one-party regime. But as Table II and Fig. 1 both reveal, non-Southern states not only shared this decline but also have current turnout rates which remain substantially below 19th-century levels. 15

The persistence of mediocre rates of American voting turnout into the present political era is scarcely news. It forms so obvious and continuing a problem of our democracy that a special presidential commission has recently

¹⁵ There are, of course, very wide divergences in turnout rates even among non-Southern states. Some of them, like Idaho, New Hampshire and Utah, have presidential-year turnouts which compare very favorably with European levels of participation. A detailed analysis of these differences remains to be made. It should prove of the utmost importance in casting light upon the relevance of current forms of political organization and partisan alignments to differing kinds of electorates and political subsystems in the United States.

TABLE II. SECTIONALISM AND PARTICIPATION:
MEAN TURNOUT IN SOUTHERN AND NONSOUTHERN STATES IN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, 1868–1960

Period	Mean Turnout: 11 Southern States	Period	Mean Turnout: Non- Southern States
	(%)		(%)
1868-1880	69.4	1868-1880	82.6
1884-1896	61.1	1884-1896	85.4
1900 (transit	ion) 43.4	1900	84.1
1904-1916	29.8	1904-1916	73.6
1920-1948	24.7	1920-1932	60.6
1952-1960	38.8	1936-1960	68.0
1884–1896 1900 (transit 1904–1916 1920–1948	69.4 61.1 ion) 43.4 29.8 24.7	1884–1896 1900 1904–1916 1920–1932	82.6 85.4 84.1 73.6 60.6

given it intensive study.¹⁶ Two additional aspects of the problem, however, emerge from a perusal of the foregoing data. In the first place,

¹⁶ Report of the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation (Washington, 1963), esp. pp. 5-9. Hereafter cited as Report.



FIGURE 1. Patterns of Turnout: United States, 1860–1964, by Region, and Selected Western European Nations, 1948–1961.

it is quite apparent that the political realignment of the 1930s, while it restored two-party competition to many states outside the South. did not stimulate turnout to return in most areas to 19th-century levels. Even if the mere existence of competitiveness precludes such low levels of turnout as are found in the South today, or as once prevailed in the northern industrial states, it falls far short of compelling a substantially full turnout under present-day conditions. Second, drop-off on the national level has shown markedly little tendency to recede in the face of increases in presidential-year turnout over the last thirty years. The component of peripheral voters in the active electorate has apparently undergone a permanent expansion from about one-sixth in the late 19th century to more than one-quarter in recent decades. If, as seems more than likely, the political regime established after 1896 was largely responsible for the marked relative decline in the active voting universe and the marked increase in peripherality among those who still occasionally voted, it is all the more remarkable that the dramatic political realignment of the 1930s has had such little effect in reversing these trends.

At least two major features of our contemporary polity, to be sure, are obviously related to the presently apparent ceiling on turnout. First, the American electoral system creates a major "double hurdle" for prospective voters which does not exist in Western Europe: the requirements associated with residence and registration, usually entailing periodic reregistration at frequent intervals, and the fact that elections are held on a normal working day in this employee society rather than on Sundays or holidays.¹⁷ Second, it is very probably true that 19th-century elections were major sources of entertainment in an age unblessed by modern mass communications, so that it is more difficult for politicians to gain and keep public attention today than it was then.18 Yet if American voters labor under the most cumbersome sets of procedural requirements in the Western world, this in itself is a datum which tends to support Schattschneider's thesis that the struggle for democracy is still being waged in the United States and that there are profound resistances within the political system itself to the adoption of needed procedural reforms.19

Moreover, there are certain areas—such as all of Ohio outside the metropolitan counties and cities of at least 15,000 population—where no registration procedures have ever been established, but where no significant deviation from the patterns outlined here appears to exist. Finally, while it may well be true that the partial displacement by TV and other means of entertainment has inhibited expansion of the active voting universe during the past generation, it is equally true that the structure of the American voting universe—i.e., the adult population—as it exists today was substantially formed in the period 1900-1920, prior to the development of such major media as the movies, radio and television.

III

As we move below the gross national level, the voting patterns discussed above stand out with far greater clarity and detail. Their divergences suggest something of the individual differences which distinguish each state subsystem from its fellows, as their uniformities indicate the universality of the broader secular trends. Five states have been selected for analysis here. During the latter part of the 19th century two of these, Michigan and Pennsylvania, were originally competitive states which tended to favor the Republican Party. They developed solidly one-party regimes after the realignment of 1896. These regimes were overthrown in their turn and vigorous party competition was restored in the wake of the New Deal realignment. In two other states, Ohio and New York, the 1896 alignment had no such dire consequences for two-party competition on the state level. These states have also shown a somewhat different pattern of development since the 1930s than Michigan and Pennsylvania. Our fifth state is Oklahoma, where a modified one-party system is structured heavily along sectional lines and operates in a socioeconomic context unfavorable to the classic New Deal articulation of politics along ethnicclass lines of cleavage.

Michigan politics was marked from 1894 through 1930 by the virtual eclipse of a state Democratic Party which had formerly contested elections on nearly equal terms with the Republicans. The inverse relationships developing between this emergent one-partyism on the one hand, and both the relative size of the active voting universe and the strength of party linkage on the other, stand out in especially bold relief.

A decisive shift away from the stable and substantially fully mobilized voting patterns of the 19th century occurred in Michigan after

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-14, 31-42.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Stanley Kelley, "Elections and the Mass Media," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 27, pp. 307-26 (1962).

¹⁹ E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, op. cit., pp. 102-3.

Period	Mean turnout		34	2.5	Mean	Mean	Mean % D
	Pres.	Off- years	Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off	split- ticket voting	partisan swing	of 2-party vote
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
1854-1872	84.8	78.1	7.8	0.9	0.8	3.2	43.9
1878-1892	84.9	74.9	10.7	0.8	1.6	2.2	48.0
1894-1908	84.8	68.2	22.3	1.5	5.9	4.7	39.6
1910-1918	71.4	53.0	27.2	3.0	9.8	4.1	40.4*
1920-1930	55.0	31.5	42.9	6.0	10.0	7.3	29.8
1932-1946	63.6	47.3	25.9	6.7	6.0	7.4	47.9
1948-1962	66.9	53.6	19.1	4.1	5.8	4.9	51.0

TABLE III. MICHIGAN, 1854-1962: DECAY AND RESURGENCE?

the realignment of 1896, with a lag of about a decade between that election and the onset of disruption in those patterns. The first major breakthrough of characteristics associated with 20th-century American electorates occurred in the presidential year 1904, when the mean percentage Democratic for all statewide offices reached an unprecedented low of 35.6 and the rate of split-ticket voting jumped from almost zero to 17.1 per cent. A steady progression of decline in turnout and party competition, accompanied by heavy increases in the other criteria of peripherality, continued down through 1930.

The scope of this transformation was virtually revolutionary. During the civil-war era scarcely 15 per cent of Michigan's potential electorate appears to have been altogether outside the voting universe. About 7 per cent could be classified as peripheral voters by Campbell's definition, and the remainder-more than three-quarters of the total—were core voters. Moreover, as the extremely low 19th-century level of split-ticket voting indicates, these active voters overwhelmingly cast party-line ballots. By the 1920s, less than one-third of the potential electorate were still core voters, while nearly one-quarter were peripheral and nearly one-half remained outside the political system altogether. Drop-off and roll-off increased sixfold during this period, while the amplitude of partisan swing approximately doubled and the split-ticket-voting rate increased by a factor of approximately eight to twelve.

For the most part these trends underwent a sharp reversal as party competition in Michigan was abruptly restored during the 1930s and organized in its contemporary mode in 1948. As the mean Democratic percentage of the two-party vote increased and turnout—especially in off-year elections—showed a marked relative

upswing, such characteristics of marginality as drop-off, roll-off, split-ticket voting and partisan swing declined in magnitude. Yet, as the means for the 1948-1962 period demonstrate, a large gap remains to be closed before anything like the status quo ante can be restored. Our criteria except, of course, for the mean percentage Democratic of the two-party vote-have returned only to the levels of the transitional period 1900-1918. As is well known, exceptionally disciplined and issue-oriented party organizations have emerged in Michigan since 1948, and elections have been intensely competitive throughout this period.20 In view of this, the failure of turnout in recent years to return to something approaching 19th-century levels is all the more impressive, as is the continuing persistence of fairly high levels of dropoff, roll-off and split-ticket voting.21

The Michigan data have still more suggestive implications. Campbell's discussion of surge and decline in the modern context points to a cyclical process in which peripheral voters, drawn into the active voting universe only under unusual short-term stimuli, withdraw from it again when the stimuli are removed. It

²⁰ Joseph La Palombara, Guide to Michigan Politics (East Lansing, Mich., Michigan State University Press, 1960), pp. 22-35.

²¹ This recalls Robinson and Standing's conclusion that voter participation in Indiana does not necessarily increase with increasing party competition. Of the eight Michigan gubernatorial elections from 1948 to 1962 only one was decided by a margin of 55% or more, while three were decided by margins of less than 51.5% of the two-party vote. Despite this intensely competitive situation, turnout—while of course much higher than in the 1920s—remains significantly below normal pre-1920 levels.

^{*} Democratic percentage of three-party vote in 1912 and 1914.

follows that declines in turnout are accompanied by a marked relative increase in the component of core voters in the electorate and by a closer approximation in off years to a "normal" partisan division of the vote.22 This presumably includes a reduction in the level of split-ticket voting as well. But the precise opposite occurred as a secular process—not only in Michigan but, it would seem, universallyduring the 1900-1930 era. Declines in turnout were accompanied by substantial, continuous increases in the indices of party and voter peripherality among those elements of the adult population which remained in the political universe at all. The lower the turnout during this period, the fewer of the voters still remaining who bothered to vote for the entire slate of officers in any given election. The lower the turnout in presidential years, the greater was the drop-off gap between the total vote cast in presidential and succeeding off-year elections. The lower the turnout, the greater were the incidence of split-ticket voting and the amplitude of partisan swing. Under the enormous impact of the forces which produced these declines in turnout and party competitiveness after 1896, the component of highly involved and party-oriented core voters in the active electorate fell off at a rate which more than kept pace with the progressive shrinking of that electorate's relative size. These developments necessarily imply a limitation upon the usefulness of the surge-decline model as it relates to secular movements prior to about 1934. They suggest, moreover, that the effects of the forces at work after 1896 to depress voter participation and to dislocate party linkage between voters and government

²² Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline," op. cit., pp. 401-4.

were even more crushingly severe than a superficial perusal of the data would indicate.

Pennsylvania provides us with variations on the same theme. As in Michigan, the political realignment centering on 1896 eventually converted an industrializing state with a relatively slight but usually decisive Republican bias into a solidly one-party G.O.P. bastion. To a much greater extent than in Michigan, this disintegration of the state Democratic Party was accompanied by periodic outbursts of third-party ventures and plural party nominations of major candidates, down to the First World War. Thereafter, as in Michigan, the real contest between competing candidates and political tendencies passed into the Republican primary, where it usually remained until the advent of the New Deal. In both states relatively extreme declines in the rate of turnout were associated with the disappearance of effective two-party competition, and in both states these declines were closely paralleled by sharp increases in the indices of peripherality.

As Table IV demonstrates, the parallel behavior of the Michigan and Pennsylvania electorates has also extended into the present; the now-familiar pattern of increasing turnout and party competition accompanied by marked declines in our other indices has been quite visible in the Keystone State since the advent of the New Deal. On the whole, indeed, a better approximation to the status quo ante has been reached in Pennsylvania than in Michigan or perhaps in most other states. But despite the intense competitiveness of its present party system, this restoration remains far from complete.

A more detailed examination of turnout and variability in turnout below the statewide level raises some questions about the direct role of immigration and woman suffrage in de-

TABLE IV. VOTING PATTERNS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1876-1962: DECLINE AND RESURGENCE?

Period	Mean turnout		3.6	3.6	Mean	Mean	Mean % D
	Pres.	Off- years	Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off	split- ticket voting	partisan swing	of 2-party vote
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
1876-1892	78.5	69.3	9.4	0.6	0.6	1.4	47.7
1894-1908	75.7	64.7	12.2	5.2	1.3	6.3	38.5
1910-1918	64.0	51.4	20.0	4.3	4.7	5.8	43.6*
1920-1930	50.4	39.5	28.0	5.2	8.9	7.1	32.8
19321948	61.5	51.9	14.9	2.2	1.4	6.1	49.0
1950-1962	67.5	56.3	12.2	1.8	3.1	3.3	49.3

^{*} Combined major anti-Republican vote (Democrat, Keystone, Lincoln, Washington).

G	%		1876-1896		1900-1916		1920–1932		1936-1960	
County and Type	N	Foreign stock, 1920	Mean turnout	Coef.	Mean turnout	Coef.	Mean turnout	Coef.	Mean turnout	Coef.
		(%)	(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)	
Urban:		,	****		.,,,		,		(, 0 ,	
Allegheny	1	56.6	71.8	6.75	56.7	2.45	43.8	10.11	68.9	5.82
Philadelphia	1	54.3	85.2	4.61	72.9	6.42	50.5	12.57	68.8	4.40
Industrial-										
Mining:	4	49.0	88.1	4.48	72.8	4.41	54.2	11.63	64.7	10.88
Rural:	8	13.5	88.5	3.12	76.4	3.63	56.0	8.09	65.2	13.20

Table v. differentials in aggregate turnout and variations of turnout in selected pennsylvania counties: presidential elections, 1876-1960*

pressing voter participation. It also uncovers a significant transposition of relative voter involvement in rural areas and urban centers since about 1930.

It is frequently argued that declines in participation after the turn of the century were largely the product of massive immigration from Europe and of the advent of woman suffrage, both of which added very large and initially poorly socialized elements to the potential electorate.²³ There is no question that these were influential factors. The data in Table V indicate, for example, that down until the Great Depression turnout was consistently higher and much less subject to variation in rural counties with relatively insignificant foreign-stock populations than in either the industrial-mining or metropolitan counties.

Yet two other aspects of these data should also be noted. First, the pattern of turnout decline from the 1876–1896 period to the 1900–1916 period was quite uniform among all categories of counties, though the rank order of their turnouts remained largely unchanged. It can be inferred from this that, while immigration probably played a major role in the evolution of Pennsylvania's political system as

²³ Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior* (Stockholm, Stockholm Economic Studies, No. 7, 1937), pp. 10–36. See also Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *Non-Voting* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 26, 109–22, for a useful discussion of the effect of woman suffrage on turnout in a metropolitan area immediately following the general enfranchisement of 1920.

a whole, it had no visible direct effect upon the secular decline in rural voting participation. Broader systemic factors, including but transcending the factor of immigration, seem clearly to have been at work. Second, a very substantial fraction of the total decline in turnout from the 1870s to the 1920s-in some rural native-stock counties more than half-occurred before women were given the vote. Moreover, post-1950 turnout levels in Pennsylvania, and apparently in most other non-Southern states, have been at least as high as in the decade immediately preceding the general enfranchisement of women. If even today a higher percentage of American than European women fail to come to the polls, the same can also be said of such population groups as the poorly educated, farmers, the lower-income classes, Negroes and other deprived elements in the potential electorate.24 In such a context woman suffrage, as important a variable as it

²⁴ Survey-research estimates place current turnout among American women at 10% below male turnout. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, op. cit., pp. 484–85. This sexrelated difference in participation is apparently universal, but is significantly smaller in European countries which provide election data by sex, despite the far higher European level of participation by both sexes. The postwar differential has been 5.8% in Norway (1945–57 mean), 3.3% in Sweden (1948–60 mean), and 1.9% in Finland (1962 general election). While in 1956 only about 55% of American women went to the polls, the mean turnout among women in postwar elections was 76.1% in Norway and 79.4% in Sweden.

^{*} The coefficient of variability is a standard statistical measure; see V. O. Key, Jr., A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists (New York, 1954), pp. 44-52. Since secular trends, where present, had to be taken into account, this coefficient appears abnormally low in the period 1900-1916. During this period many counties registered a straight-line decline in turnout from one election to the next.

TABLE VI. URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES IN STABILITY OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT: 1936–60 MEAN
turnout and variability of turnout as percentages of 1876–96
MEAN TURNOUT AND VARIABILITY OF TURNOUT, PENNSYLVANIA

O	NT	1936-60 Turnout	1936-60 Variability	
County and Type	N	1876-96 Turnout	1876-96 Variability	
Urban:		(%)	(%)	
Allegheny	1	95.9	86.2	
Philadelphia	1	80.8	95.4	
Industrial-Mining:	4	73.4	249.6	
Rural:	8	73.7	447.4	

certainly has been in our recent political history, seems to raise more analytical problems than it solves.

Particularly suggestive for our hypothesis of basic changes in the nature of American voting behavior over time is the quite recent transposition of aggregate turnout and variations in turnout as between our rural sample and the two metropolitan centers. In sharp contrast to the situation prevailing before 1900, turnout in these rural counties has tended during the past generation not only to be slightly lower than in the large cities but also subject to far wider oscillations from election to election. In Bedford County, for example, turnout stood at 82.5 per cent in 1936, but sagged to an all-time low of 41.2 per cent in 1948. The comparable figures in Philadelphia were 74.3 and 64.8 per cent, and in Allegheny County 72.5 per cent (in 1940) and 60.6 per cent.

A major finding revealed by survey research is that the "farm vote" is currently one of the most unstable and poorly articulated elements in the American electorate.25 It is said that since rural voters lack the solid network of group identifications and easy access to masscommunication media enjoyed by their city cousins, they tend to be both unusually apathetic and exceptionally volatile in their partisan commitments. As rural voting turnout was abnormally low in 1948, its rate of increase from 1948 to 1952 was exceptionally large and-fully consistent with Campbell's surge-decline model—was associated with a one-sided surge toward Eisenhower. A restatement of the data in Table V lends strong support to this evaluation of the relative position of the rural vote as a description of the current American voting universe.

But the data strongly imply that virtually the opposite of present conditions prevailed during the 19th century. Such variables as education level, communications and nonfamily-group interaction were probably much more poorly developed in rural areas before 1900 than they are today. Not only did this leave no visible mark on agrarian turnout; it seems extremely likely that the 19th-century farmer was at least as well integrated into the political system of that day as any other element in the American electorate. The awesome rates of turnout which can be found in states like Indiana, Iowa and Kentucky prior to 1900 indicate that this extremely high level of rural political involvement was not limited to Pennsylvania.26 As a recent study of Indiana politics demonstrates, the primarily rural "traditional vote" in that state was marked prior to 1900 by an overwhelming partisan stability as well.27

Perhaps, following the arguments of C. Wright Mills and others, we can regard this extraordinary change in rural voting behavior as a function of the conversion of a crackerbarrel society into a subordinate element in a larger mass society.²⁸ In any event, this rural movement toward relatively low and widely fluctuating levels of turnout may well be

²⁶ The estimated rates of turnout in presidential elections from 1876 through 1896, mean turnout in the period 1936–60 and estimated turnout in 1964 were as follows in these states:

State	1876	1880	1884	1888	1892	1896	1936-60	1964
							(Mean)	(Prelim.)
Indiana	94.6	94.4	92.2	93.3	89.0	95.1	75.0	73.3
Iowa	89.6	91.5	90.0	87.9	88.5	96.2	71.7	72.0
Kentucky	76.1	71.0	68.0	79.1	72.6	88.0	57.6	52.6

²⁷ V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision," op. cit., pp. 282-88.

²⁸ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 298-324. See also Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (New York, 1960), pp. 5-15, 202-27, 297-320.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 402-40.

indicative of an emergent political alienation in such areas. It is suggestive that these movements have been accompanied generally in Pennsylvania as in states like West Virginia by a strongly positive Republican trend in these agrarian bailiwicks during the last thirty years.²⁹ The impression arises that the political realignment of the 1930s, which only imperfectly mobilized and integrated urban populations into the political system, had not even these limited positive effects in more isolated communities.

The behavior of the Ohio electorate down to about 1930 closely paralleled the patterns displayed in its neighbor states, Michigan and Pennsylvania. Since then a marked divergence has been manifest.

Two-party competition here was far less seriously affected by the sectional political alignment of 1896–1932 than in most other northern industrial states. Of the eighteen gubernatorial elections held in Ohio from 1895 to 1930, for example, Democrats won ten. But here as elsewhere are to be found the same patterns of decline in turnout and sharp increases in indices of voter peripherality after 1900. Indeed, while turnout bottomed out during the 1920s at a point considerably higher than in Michigan or Pennsylvania, it had also been considerably higher than in either of

²⁹ John H. Fenton, *Politics in the Border States* (New Orleans, Hauser Press, 1957), pp. 117-20.

TABLE VII. PATTERNS OF VOTER PARTICIPATION IN OHIO, 1857–1962: DECLINE WITHOUT RESURGENCE?

Period	Mean	turnout	Mean drop- off	Mean roll- off	Mean split- ticket voting
	Pres.	Off~ years			
	(%)	(%)			
1857-1879	89.0	78.4	9.7	0.6	0.5
1880-1903	92.2	80.5	11.2	0.8	0.6
1904–1918	80.4	71.2	9.2	2.5	3.3
1920-1930	62.4	45.8	24.1	7.9	9.9
1932-1946	69.9	49.1	27.2	7.6	6.5
1948-1962	66.5	53.3	19.0	8.2	11.1

them during the 19th century. Here too such variables as woman suffrage seem to have played a smaller role as causal agents—at least so far as they affected the growing tendencies toward peripherality among active voters—than is commonly supposed. Drop-off from presidential to off-year elections began to assume its modern shape in Ohio between 1898 and 1910. As Figure 2 shows, roll-off—an especially prominent feature in contemporary Ohio voting behavior—emerged in modern form in the election of 1914.

Ohio, unlike either Michigan or Pennsylvania, has demonstrated only an extremely limited resurgence since the realignment of the 1930s. Presidential-year voting turnout in the period 1948-60 actually declined from the




FIGURE 2. Increases in Roll-Off: The Case of Ohio, 1872-1962.




FIGURE 3. Increases in Split-Ticket Voting: The Case of Ohio, 1872-1962.

mean level of 1932-44, and was not appreciably higher than it had been in the trough of the 1920s. If mean drop-off has declined somewhat in recent years, it still stands at a level twice as high as in any period before 1920. Moreover, roll-off and the rate of split-ticket voting have actually increased to unprecedented highs since 1948. By 1962 the latter ratio touched an all-time high of 21.3% (except for the threeparty election of 1924), suggesting that Ohio politics may be becoming an "every-man-forhimself" affair. This pattern of behavior stands in the sharpest possible contrast to 19thcentury norms. In that period turnout had reached substantially full proportions, drop-off was minimal and well over 99 per cent of the voters cast both complete ballots and straight party tickets—an achievement that may have been partly an artifact of the party ballots then in use.30 The political reintegration which the New Deal realignment brought in its wake elsewhere has scarcely become visible in Ohio.

Two recent discussions of Ohio politics may shed some light upon these characteristics. Thomas A. Flinn, examining changes over the past century in the partisan alignments of Ohio

³⁰ However, Ohio's modern pattern of splitticket voting, formed several decades ago, seems to have been little (if at all) affected by the 1950 change from party-column to office-block ballot forms. See Figure 3.

counties, concludes that until the first decade of the 20th century the state had a set of political alignments based largely on sectionalism within Ohio-a product of the diverse regional backgrounds of its settlers and their descendants. This older political system broke down under the impact of industrialization and a national class-ethnic partisan realignment, but no new political order of similar coherence or partisan stability has yet emerged to take its place.31 Flinn's findings and the conclusions which Lee Benson has drawn from his study of New York voting behavior in the 1840s are remarkably similar.32 In this earlier voting universe the durability of partisan commitment and the extremely high levels of turnout appear to have had their roots in a cohesive and persistent set of positive and negative group referents. These, as Flinn notes, provided "no clear-cut class basis for statewide party following from the time of Jackson to that of Wilson."33

John H. Fenton, discussing the 1962 gubernatorial campaign, carries the argument one

³¹ Thomas A. Flinn, "Continuity and Change in Ohio Politics," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 24, pp. 521-44 (1962).

³² Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 123–207, 288–328.

33 Flinn, op. cit., p. 542.

step further.34 Basic to Ohio's social structure. he argues, is an unusually wide diffusion of its working-class population among a large number of middle-sized cities and even smaller towns. The weakness of the labor unions and the chaotic disorganization of the state Democratic Party seem to rest upon this diffusion. Ohio also lacks agencies which report on the activities of politicians from a working-class point of view, such as have been set up by the United Automobile Workers in Detroit or the United Mine Workers in Pennsylvania or West Virginia. The result of this is that to a much greater extent than in other industrial states, potential recruits for a cohesive and reasonably well-organized Democratic Party in Ohio live in an isolated, atomized social milieu. Consequently they tend to vote in a heavily personalist, issueless way, as the middle and upper classes do not. Such a state of affairs may provide clues not only for the relative failure of voter turnout to increase during the past generation, but for the persistent and growing indications of voter peripherality in Ohio's active electorate as well.

The development of the voting universe in New York is more analogous to the situation in Ohio than in either Michigan or Pennsylvania. In New York, as in Ohio, two-party competition was not as dislocated by the 1896–1930 alignment as a hasty survey of the presidential-election percentages during that period might suggest. Democrats remained firmly in control of New York City, and this control helped them to capture the governorship eight

³⁴ John H. Fenton, "Ohio's Unpredictable Voters," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 225, pp. 61-65 (1962).

out of eighteen times from 1896 through 1930. There were other parallels with Ohio as well, for here too this persistence of party competition did not prevent the normal post-1896 voting syndrome from appearing in New York. Nor has there been any pronounced resurgence in turnout levels or convincing declines in the other variables since the 1930s. Drop-off, rolloff, split-ticket voting and partisan swing are not only quite high in New York by 19thcentury standards, but have been twice as great as in neighboring Pennsylvania during the past decade. This relative failure of political reintegration is revealed not only by the data presented in Table VIII but—in much more dramatic fashion—by the rise and persistence of labor-oriented third parties which are centered in New York City and have enjoyed a balance-of-power position between the two major party establishments. The existence of the American Labor and Liberal Parties, as well as the continuing vitality of anti-Tammany "reform" factions, are vocal testimony to the failure of the old-line New York Democratic Party to adapt itself successfully to the political style and goals of a substantial portion of the urban electorate.

Curiously enough, examination of the data thus far presented raises some doubt that the direct primary has contributed quite as much to the erosion of party linkages as has been often supposed. There seems to be little doubt that it has indeed been a major eroding element in some of the states where it has taken root—especially in states with partially or

³⁵ This would seem to suggest a limitation on Key's findings, American State Politics, op. cit., pp. 169-96.

TABLE VIII. NEW YORK VOTING PATTERNS, 1834-1962: DECLINE WITHOUT RESURGENCE?

Period	Mean turnout (Pres. years)	Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off	Mean split-ticket voting	Mean partisan swing	Mean % D of 2-party vote
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
1834-1858	84.8	3.3	1.6	1.2	1.7	50.9*
1860-1879	89.3	7.9	0.4	0.6	2.6	50.1
1880-1898	87.9	10.4	1.2	1.6	5.0	50.5
1900-1908	82.5	8.3	1.1	2.2	3.7	47.2
1910-1918	71.9	10.9	5.1	3.3	3.8	46.2
1920-1930	60.4	17.3	5.5	9.5	8.3	49.6
1932-1946	71.3	22.5	4.9	3.4	3.2	53.2†
1948-1962	67.8	20.6	3.6	6.5	5.8	47.3

^{*} Elections from 1854 to 1858 excluded because of major third-party vote.

[†] The American Labor Party, 1936-46, and the Liberal Party, 1944-62, are included in Democratic vote when their candidates and Democratic candidates were the same.

fully one-party systems where the primary has sapped the minority party's monopoly of opposition. But comparison of New York with our other states suggests the need of further concentrated work on this problem. After a brief flirtation with the direct primary between 1912 and 1921, New York resumed its place as one of the very few states relying on party conventions to select nominees for statewide offices, as it does to this day. Despite this fact, the post-1896 pattern of shrinkage in turnout and increases in our other indices of political dissociation was virtually the same in New York as elsewhere. To take a more recent example, New York's split-ticketvoting ratio was 16.1 per cent in 1962, compared with 21.3 in Ohio, 7.1 in Michigan and 6.8 per cent in Pennsylvania. The overall pattern of the data suggests that since 1932 the latter two states may have developed a more cohesive party politics and a more integrated voting universe with the direct primary than New York has without it.

If the data thus far indicate some link between the relative magnitude of voter non-participation and marginality with the cohesiveness of the local party system, even greater secular trends of the same sort should occur where one of the parties has continued to enjoy a perennially dominant position in state politics. Oklahoma, a border state with a modified one-party regime, tends to support such an assumption.³⁶ The relatively recent ad-

³⁶ This designation is given the state's political system in Oliver Benson, Harry Holloway, George Mauer, Joseph Pray and Wayne Young, Oklahoma Votes: 1907-1962 (Norman, Okla., Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1964), pp. 44-52. For an extensive discussion of the sectional basis of Oklahoma politics, see *ibid.*, pp. 32-43, and V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics, op. cit., pp. 220-22.

mission of this state to the union naturally precludes analysis of its pre-1896 voting behavior. Even so, it is quite clear that the further back one goes toward the date of admission, the closer one comes to an approximation to a 19th-century voting universe. In Oklahoma, curiously enough, the secular decline in turnout and increases in the other indices continued into the New Deal era itself, measured by the off-year elections when—as in a growing number of states³⁷—a full slate of statewide officers is elected. Since 1946 very little solid evidence of a substantial resurgence in turnout or of major declines in drop-off, roll-off or splitticket voting has appeared, but there is some evidence that the minority Republican Party is atrophying.

The magnitude of drop-off and roll-off has become relatively enormous in Oklahoma since the 1920s, with a very slight reduction in both during the 1950–1962 period. While turnout has correspondingly increased somewhat since its trough in the 1934–1946 period, at no time since 1914 have as many as one-half of the state's potential voters come to the polls in these locally decisive off-year elections. Still more impressive is the almost vertical increase in the proportion of uncontested elections since the end of World War II. The 1958 and 1962 elections, moreover, indicate that the trend toward decomposition in the Republican party organization and its linkage with its mass base

³⁷ In 1936, 34 states (71%) elected governors for either two- or four-year terms in presidential years, and the three-year term in New Jersey caused major state elections to coincide with every fourth presidential election. By 1964, only 25 of 50 states (50%) still held some of their gubernatorial elections in presidential years. Two of these, Florida and Michigan, are scheduled to begin off-year gubernatorial elections for four-year terms in 1966.

TABLE IX. VOTER PERIPHERALITY AND PARTY DECAY? OKLAHOMA, 1907-1962

Period	Mean turnout (Off-years)	Mean drop-off	Mean roll-off*	Mean split-ticket voting*	% of State and Congres sional elections uncon- tested by Republicans	
					Per cent	Mean N†
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
1907–1918	52.9	12.1	6.1	3.6	2.1	32
1922-1930	40.1	13.0	13.9	9.7	2.1	31
1934-1946	37.1	32.2	16.4	8.1	14.8	32
1950-1962	44.5	26.3	14.0	10.5	41.3	29

^{*} Roll-off and split-ticket voting are computed for contested elections only.

[†] Mean number of state and congressional races in each off-year election.




FIGURE 4. Patterns of Political Evolution: The Case of Oklahoma, 1907-1962.

is continuing. In 1958 the party virtually collapsed, its gubernatorial candidate winning only 21.3 per cent of the two-party vote. Four years later the Republican candidate won 55.5 per cent of the two-party vote. The resultant partisan swings of 34.2 per cent for this office and 22.0 for all contested statewide offices was the largest in the state's history and one of the largest on record anywhere. But while 1962 marked the first Republican gubernatorial victory in the state's history, it was also the first election in which the Republican Party yielded more than half of the statewide and congressional offices to its opposition without any contest at all. Even among contested offices, the Oklahoma electorate followed a national trend in 1962 by splitting its tickets at the unprecedented rate of 17.3 per cent.


As Key has suggested, the direct primary has almost certainly had cumulatively destructive effects on the cohesion of both parties in such modified one-party states as Oklahoma.³⁸ The rapidly spreading device of "insulating" state politics from national trends by holding the major state elections in off years has also probably played a significant role. Yet it seems more than likely that these are variables which ultimately depend for their effectiveness upon the nature of the local political culture

²⁸ American State Politics, op. cit., pp. 169-96.

and the socio-economic forces which underlie it. Pennsylvania, for example, also has a direct-primary. Since 1875, it has also insulated state from national politics by holding its major state elections in off years. Yet since the realignment of the 1930s, both parties have contested every statewide office in Pennsylvania as a matter of course. Indeed, only very infrequently have elections for seats in the state legislature gone by default to one of the parties, even in bailiwicks which it utterly dominates.³⁹

These five statewide variations on our general theme suggest, as do the tentative explorations below the statewide level in Pennsylvania, that an extremely important factor in the recent evolution of the voting universe has been the extent to which the imperatives of the class-ethnic New Deal realignment have

³⁹ In the period 1956-62 there have been 840 general-election contests for the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. Of these all but six, or 0.7%, have been contested by both major political parties. No Pennslvania state Senate seat has been uncontested during this period. Despite the 1962 Republican upsurge in Oklahoma, however, there were no contests between the parties in 11 of 22 Senate seats (50.0%) and in 73 of 120 House seats (60.9%). All the uncontested Senate seats and all but two of the uncontested House seats were won by Democrats.



been relevant to the local social structure and political culture. In the absence of an effectively integrating set of state political organizations, issues and candidates around which a relatively intense polarization of voters can develop, politics is likely to have so little salience that very substantial portions of the potential electorate either exclude themselves altogether from the political system or enter it in an erratic and occasional way. As organized and articulated in political terms, the contest between "business" and "government" which has tended to be the linchpin of our national politics since the 1930s has obviously made no impression upon many in the lowest income strata of the urban population. It has also failed to demonstrate sustained organizing power in areas of rural poverty or among local political cultures which remain largely pre-industrial in outlook and social structure.

IV

The conclusions which arise directly out of this survey of aggregate data and indices of participation seem clear enough. On both the national and state levels they point to the existence and eventual collapse of an earlier political universe in the United States—a universe in many ways so sharply different from the one we all take for granted today that many of our contemporary frames of analytical reference seem irrelevant or misleading in studying it. The late 19th-century voting universe was marked by a more complete and intensely party-oriented voting participation among the American electorate than ever before or since. Approximately two-thirds of the potential national electorate were then "core" voters, one-tenth fell into the peripheral category, and about one-quarter remained outside. In the four northern states examined in this survey the component of core elements in the potential electorate was even larger: about three-quarters core voters, one-tenth peripherals and about 15 per cent non-voters.

In other ways too this 19th-century system differed markedly from its successors. Class antagonisms as such appear to have had extremely low salience by comparison with today's voting behavior. Perhaps differentials in the level of formal education among various groups in the population contributed to differentials in 19th-century turnout as they clearly do now. But the unquestionably far lower general level of formal education in America during the last century did not preclude a much more intense and uniform mass political participation than any which has prevailed in recent decades. Though the evi-

dence is still scanty, it strongly implies that the influence of rurality upon the intensity and uniformity of voting participation appears to have been precisely the opposite of what survey-research findings hold it to be today. This was essentially a pre-industrial democratic system, resting heavily upon a rural and smalltown base. Apparently, it was quite adequate, both in partisan organization and dissemination of political information, to the task of mobilizing voters on a scale which compares favorably with recent European levels of participation.

There is little doubt that the model of surge and decline discussed above casts significant light upon the behavior of today's American electorate as it responds to the stimuli of successive elections. But the model depends for its validity upon the demonstrated existence of very large numbers both of peripheral voters and of core voters whose attachment to party is relatively feeble. Since these were not pronounced characteristics of the 19th-century voting universe, it might be expected that abnormal increases in the percentage of the vote won by either party would be associated with very different kinds of movements in the electorate, and that such increases would be relatively unusual by present-day standards.

Even a cursory inspection of the partisan dimensions of voting behavior in the 19th century tends to confirm this expectation. Not only did the amplitude of partisan swing generally tend to be much smaller then than now, 40 but nationwide landslides of the 20th-century type were almost non-existent. 41 Moreover, when one party did win an unusually heavy majority, this increase was usually associated with a pronounced and one-sided decline in turnout. Comparison of the 1848 and 1852 elections in Georgia and of the October gubernatorial and November presidential elections of 1872 in Pennsylvania, for example,

⁴⁰ Mean national partisan swings in presidential elections since 1872 have been as follows: 1872–92, 2.3%; 1896–1916, 5.0%; 1920–32, 10.3%; 1936–64, 5.4%.

⁴¹ If a presidential landslide is arbitrarily defined as a contest in which the winning candidate received 55% or more of the two-party vote, only the election of 1872 would qualify among the 16 presidential elections held from 1836 to 1896. Of 17 presidential elections held from 1900 through 1964, at least eight were landslide elections by this definition, and a ninth—the 1924 election, in which the Republican candidate received 54.3% and the Democratic candidate 29.0% of a three-party total—could plausibly be included.

makes it clear that the "landslides" won by one of the presidential contenders in 1852 and 1872 were the direct consequence of mass abstentions by voters who normally supported the other party. Under 19th-century conditions, marked as they were by substantially full mobilization of the eligible electorate, the only play in the system which could provide extraordinary majorities had to come from a reversal of the modern pattern of surge and decline—a depression in turnout which was overwhelmingly confined to adherents of one of the parties. 43

This earlier political order, as we have seen, was eroded away very rapidly after 1900. Turnout fell precipitately from 19th-century levels even before the advent of woman suffrage, and even in areas where immigrant elements in the electorates were almost nonexistent. As turnout declined, a larger and larger component of the still-active electorate moved from a core to a peripheral position, and the hold of the parties over their mass base appreciably deteriorated.

⁴² The total vote in Georgia declined from 92,203 in 1848 to 62,333 in 1852. Estimated turnout declined from about 88% to about 55% of the eligible electorate, while the Democratic share of the two-party vote increased from 48.5% in 1848 to 64.8% in 1852. The pattern of participation in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial and presidential elections of 1872 is also revealing:

Raw Vote	Governor, Oct. 1872	President, Nov. 1872	Absolute Decline
Total	671,147	562,276	-108,871
Democratic	317,760	213,027	-104,733
Republican	353.387	349,249	- 4.138

Estimated turnout in October was 82.0%, in November 68.6%. The Democratic percentage of the two-party vote was 47.3% in October and 37.9% in November.

43 The only apparent exception to this generalization in the 19th century was the election of 1840. But this was the first election in which substantially full mobilization of the eligible electorate occurred. The rate of increase in the total vote from 1836 to 1860 was 60.0%, the largest in American history. Estimated turnout increased from about 58% in 1836 to about 80% in 1840. This election, with its relatively onesided mobilization of hitherto apolitical elements in the potential electorate, not unnaturally bears some resemblance to the elections of the 1950s. But the increase in the Whig share of the twoparty vote from 49.2% in 1836 to only 53.0% in 1840 suggests that that surge was considerably smaller than those of the 1950s.

This revolutionary contraction in the size and diffusion in the shape of the voting universe was almost certainly the fruit of the heavily sectional party realignment which was inaugurated in 1896. This "system of 1896," as Schattschneider calls it,44 led to the destruction of party competition throughout much of the United States, and thus paved the way for the rise of the direct primary. It also gave immense impetus to the strains of anti-partisan and anti-majoritarian theory and practice which have always been significant elements in the American political tradition. By the decade of the 1920s this new regime and business control over public policy in this country were consolidated. During that decade hardly more than one-third of the eligible adults were still core voters. Another one-sixth were peripheral voters and fully one-half remained outside the active voting universe altogether. It is difficult to avoid the impression that while all the forms of political democracy were more or less scrupulously preserved, the functional result of the "system of 1896" was the conversion of a fairly democratic regime into a rather broadly based oligarchy.

The present shape and size of the American voting universe are, of course, largely the product of the 1928-1936 political realignment. Survey-research findings most closely approximate political reality as they relate to this next broad phase of American political evolution. But the characteristics of the present voting universe suggest rather forcefully that the New Deal realignment has been both incomplete and transitional. At present, about 44 per cent of the national electorate are core voters, another 16 or so are peripheral, and about 40 per cent are still outside the political system altogether. By 19th-century standards, indices of voter peripherality stand at very high levels. Party organizations remain at best only indifferently successful at mobilizing a stable, predictable mass base of support.

The data which have been presented here, though they constitute only a small fraction of the materials which must eventually be examined, tend by and large to support Schattschneider's functional thesis of American party politics. We still need to know a great deal more than we do about the specific linkages between party and voter in the 19th century.

⁴⁴ The Semi-Sovereign People, op. cit., p. 81.

⁴⁶ Ibid., esp. pp. 78-113. See also his "United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government," in Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 194-215.

Systematic research remains also to be done on the causes and effects of the great post-1896 transition in American political behavior. Even so, it seems useful to propose an hypothesis of transition in extension of Schattschneider's argument.

The 19th-century American political system, for its day, was incomparably the most thoroughly democratized of any in the world. The development of vigorous party competition extended from individual localities to the nation itself. It involved the invention of the first organizational machinery—the caucus, the convention and the widely disseminated party press-which was designed to deal with large numbers of citizens rather than with semiaristocratic parliamentary cliques. Sooner than the British, and at a time when Prussia protected its elites through its three-class electoral system, when each new change of regime in France brought with it a change in the size of the electorate and the nature of le pays légal, and when the basis of representation in Sweden was still the estate, Americans had elaborated not only the machinery and media of mass politics but a franchise which remarkably closely approached universal suffrage. Like the larger political culture of which it was an integral part, this system rested upon both broad consensual acceptance of middle-class social norms as ground rules and majoritarian settlement (in "critical" elections from time to time), once and for all, of deeply divisive substantive issues on which neither consensus nor further postponement of a showdown was possible. Within the limits so imposed it was apparently capable of coherent and decisive action. It especially permitted the explicit formulation of sectional issues and—though admittedly at the price of civil war-arrived at a clear-cut decision as to which of two incompatible sectional modes of social and economic organization was henceforth to prevail.

But after several decades of intensive industrialization a new dilemma of power, in many respects as grave as that which had eventuated in civil war, moved toward the stage of overt crisis. Prior to the closing years of the century the middle-class character of the political culture and the party system, coupled with the afterglow of the civil-war trauma, had permitted the penetration and control of the cadres of both major parties by the heavily concentrated power of our industrializing elites. But this control was inherently unstable, for if and when the social dislocations produced by the industrial revolution should in turn produce a grassroots counterrevolution, the party whose clienteles were more vulnerable to the appeals of the counterrevolutionaries might be captured by

The take-off phase of industrialization has been a brutal and exploitative process everywhere, whether managed by capitalists or commissars.46 A vital functional political need during this phase is to provide adequate insulation of the industrializing elites from mass pressures, and to prevent their displacement by a coalition of those who are damaged by the processes of capital accumulation. This problem was effectively resolved in the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin by vesting a totalitarian monopoly of political power in the hands of Communist industrializing elites. In recent years developing nations have tended to rely upon less coercive devices such as non-totalitarian single-party systems or personalist dictatorship to meet that need, among others. The 19th-century European elites were provided a good deal of insulation by the persistence of feudal patterns of social deference and especially by the restriction of the right to vote to the middle and upper classes.

But in the United States the institutions of mass democratic politics and universal suffrage uniquely came into being before the onset of fullscale industrialization. The struggle for democracy in Europe was explicitly linked from the outset with the struggle for universal suffrage. The eventual success of this movement permitted the development in relatively sequential fashion of the forms of party organization which Duverger has described in detail.47 In the United States—ostensibly at least—the struggle for democracy had already been won, and remarkably painlessly, by the mid-19th century. In consequence, the American industrializing elites were, and felt themselves to be, uniquely vulnerable to an anti-industrialist assault which could be carried out peacefully and in the absence of effective legal or customary sanctions by a citizenry possessing at least two generations' experience with political democracy.

This crisis of vulnerability reached its peak in the 1890s. Two major elements in the population bore the brunt of the exceptionally severe deprivations felt during this depression decade:

⁴⁶ Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick S. Harbison and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 47–76, 98–126, 193, 233. Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 17–58.

⁴⁷ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 2d. ed., 1959), pp. 1-60.

the smaller cash-crop farmers of the Southern and Western "colonial" regions and the ethnically fragmented urban working class. The cash-crop farmers, typically overextended and undercapitalized, had undergone a thirtyyears' decline in the prices for their commodities in the face of intense international competition. With the onset of depression in 1893, what had been acute discomfort for them became disaster. The workers, already cruelly exploited in many instances during this "take-off" phase of large-scale industrialization, were also devastated by the worst depression the country had thus far known. Characteristically, the farmers resorted to political organization while the workers sporadically resorted to often bloody strikes. The industrializers and their intellectual and legal spokesmen were acutely conscious that these two profoundly alienated groups might coalesce. Their alarm was apparently given quite tangible form when the agrarian insurgents captured control of the Democratic Party in 1896.

But the results of that great referendum revealed that the conservatives' fears and the anti-industrialists' hopes of putting together a winning coalition on a Jacksonian base were alike groundless. Not only did urban labor not flock to William Jennings Bryan, it repudiated the Democratic Party on an unprecedented scale throughout the industrialized Northeast. The intensity and permanence of this urban realignment was paralleled by the Democrats' failure to make significant inroads into Republican strength in the more diversified and depression-resistant farm areas east of the Missouri River, and by their nearly total collapse in rural New England. The Democratic-Populist effort to create a coalition of the dispossessed created instead the most enduringly sectional political alignment in American history-an alignment which eventually separated the Southern and Western agrarians and transformed the most industrially advanced region of the country into a bulwark of industrialist Republicanism.

This realignment brought victory beyond expectation to those who had sought to find some way of insulating American elites from mass pressures without formally disrupting the pre-existing democratic-pluralist political structure, without violence and without conspiracy. Of the factors involved in this victory three stand out as of particular importance. (1) The depression of 1893 began and deepened during a Democratic administration. Of course there is no way of ascertaining directly what part of the decisive minority which shifted its allegiance to the Republican Party reacted

viscerally to the then incumbent party and failed to perceive that Cleveland and Bryan were diametrically opposed on the central policy issues of the day. But contemporary survey findings would tend to suggest that such a component in a realigning electorate might not be small. In this context it is especially worth noting that the process of profound break with traditional voting patterns began in the fall of 1893, not in 1896. In a number of major states like Ohio and Pennsylvania the voting pattern of 1896 bears far more resemblance to those of 1893-1895 than the latter did to pre-1893 voting patterns. Assuming that such visceral responses to the Democrats as the "party of depression" did play a major role in the realignment, it would follow that the strong economic upswing after 1897 would tend to strengthen this identification and its cognate. the identification of the Republicans as the "party of prosperity."

(2) The Democratic platform and campaign were heavily weighted toward the interests and needs of an essentially rural and semi-colonial clientele. Considerably narrowed in its programmatic base from the farmer-labor Populist platform of 1892, the Democratic Party focussed most of its campaign upon monetary inflation as a means of redressing the economic balance. Bryan's viewpoint was essentially that of the smallholder who wished to give the term "businessman" a broader definition than the Easterners meant by it, and of an agrarian whose remarks about the relative importance of farms and cities bespoke his profound misunderstanding of the revolution of his time. Silver mine owners and depressed cash-crop farmers could greet the prospect of inflation with enthusiasm, but it meant much less to adequately capitalized and diversified farmers in the Northeast, and less than nothing to the depression-ridden wage-earners in that region's shops, mines and factories. Bryan's appeal at base was essentially Jacksonian—a call for a return to the simpler and more virtuous economic and political arrangements which he identified with that bygone era. Such nostalgia could evoke a positive response among the native-stock rural elements whose political style and economic expectations had been shaped in the far-away past. But it could hardly seem a realistic political choice for the ethnically pluralist urban populations, large numbers of whom found such nostalgia meaningless since it related to nothing in their past or current experience. Programmatically, at least, these urbanites were presented with a two-way choice only one part of which seemed at all functionally related to the realities of an emergent industrial society. With the Democrats actually cast in the role of reactionaries despite the apparent radicalism of their platform and leader, and with no socialist alternative even thinkable in the context of the American political culture of the 1890s, the Republican Party alone retained some relevance to the urban setting. In this context, its massive triumph there was a foregone conclusion.

(3) An extremely important aspect of any political realignment is the unusually intense mobilization of negative-reference-group sentiments during the course of the campaign, 1896 was typical in this respect. Profound antagonisms in culture and political style between the cosmopolitan, immigrant, wet, largely non-Protestant components of American urban populations and the parochial, dry, Anglo-Saxon Protestant inhabitants of rural areas can be traced back at least to the 1840s. Bryan was virtually the archetype of the latter culture, and it would have been surprising had he not been the target of intense ethnocultural hostility from those who identified with the former. He could hardly have appeared as other than an alien to those who heard him in New York in 1896, or to those who booed him off the stage at the Democratic Convention—also in New York -in 1924. Moreover, his remarks about the Northeast as "the enemy's country"— anticipating Senator Goldwater's views about that region in 1964—could only intensify a broadly sectional hostility to his candidacy and deepen the impression that he was attacking not only the Northeast's industrializing elites but the Northeast itself. Both in 1896 and 1964 this region gave every visible evidence of replying in kind.

As Schattschneider has perceptively observed, the "system of 1896" was admirably suited to its primary function. One of its major working parts was a judiciary which proceeded first to manufacture the needed constitutional restraints on democratic political action—a development presaged by such decisions as the Minnesota railroad rate case of 1890⁴⁸ and the income tax cases of 1894–1895⁴⁹—and then to apply these restraints against certain sensitive categories of national and state economic legislation.⁵⁰ Another of the new system's basic

components was the control which the sectional alignment itself gave to the Republican Party. and through it the corporate business community, over the scope and direction of national public policy. Democracy was not only placed in judicial leading-strings, it was effectively placed out of commission—at least so far as two-party competition was concerned-in more than half of the states. Yet it was one of the greatest, if unacknowledged, contributions of the "system of 1896" that democratic forms, procedures and traditions continued to survive. 51 Confronted with a narrowed scope of effective democratic options, an increasingly large proportion of the eligible adult population either left, failed to enter or-as was the case with Southern Negroes after the completion of the 1890-1904 disfranchisement movement in the Old Confederacy—was systematically excluded from the American voting universe. The results of this on the exercise of the franchise have already been examined here in some detail. It was during this 1896-1932 era that the basic characteristics associated with today's mass electorate were formed.

These characteristics, as we have seen, have already far outlived the 1896 alignment itself. There seems to be no convincing evidence that they are being progressively liquidated at the present time. If the re-emergence of a competitive party politics and its at least partial orientation toward the broader needs of an urban, industrialized society were welcome fruits of the New Deal revolution, that revolution has apparently exhausted most of its potential for stimulating turnout or party-oriented voting in America. The present state of affairs, to be sure, is not without its defenders. The civicsminded have tended to argue that the visible drift away from party-oriented voting among a growing minority of voters is a sign of increasing maturity in the electorate.52 Others have argued that mediocre rates of turnout in the United States, paralleled by the normally low salience of issues in our political campaigns, are indicative of a "politics of happiness." It is

⁴⁸ Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890).

⁴⁹ Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895); (rehearing) 158 U. S. 601 (1895).

⁶⁰ The literature on this process of judicial concept-formulation from its roots in the 1870s through its formal penetration into the structure of constitutional law in the 1890s is extremely

voluminous. Two especially enlightening accounts are: Benjamin Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1942), and Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crises and the Rule of Law (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960).

⁵¹ Paul, *ibid.*, pp. 131–58.

⁵² See, among many other examples, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 22 (May 1, 1964), p. 801.

⁵³ Heinz Eulau, "The Politics of Happiness,"

further contended that any sudden injection of large numbers of poorly socialized adults into the active voting universe could constitute a danger to the Republic.⁵⁴

But there is another side to this coin. The ultimate democratic purpose of issue-formulation in a campaign is to give the people at large the power to choose their and their agents' options. Moreover, so far as is known, the blunt alternative to party government is the concentration of political power, locally or nationally, in the hands of those who already possess concentrated economic power.55 If no adequate substitute for party as a means for mobilizing non-elite influence on the governing process has yet been discovered, the obvious growth of "image" and "personality" voting in recent decades should be a matter of some concern to those who would like to see a more complete restoration of the democratic process in the United States.

Moreover, recent studies—such as Murray Levin's examinations of the attitudes of the Boston and Massachusetts electorate—reveal that such phenomena as widespread ticket splitting may be associated quite readily with pervasive and remarkably intense feelings of political alienation.⁵⁸ Convinced that both party organizations are hopelessly corrupt and out of reach of popular control, a minority which is large enough to hold the balance of power between Republicans and Democrats tends rather consistently to vote for the lesser, or lesser-known, of two evils. It takes a mordant variety of humor to find a kind of emergent voter maturity in this alienation. For Levin's data are difficult to square with the facile optimism underlying the civics approach to independent voting. So, for that matter, are the conclusions of survey research about the behavior of many so-called "independent" voters.⁵⁷

Findings such as these seem little more comforting to the proponents of the "politics of happiness" thesis. Granted the proposition that most people who have been immersed from birth in a given political system are apt to be unaware of alternatives whose explicit formulation that system inhibits, it is of course difficult to ascertain whether their issueless and apathetic political style is an outward sign of "real" happiness. We can surmise, however, that the kind of political alienation which Levin describes is incompatible with political happiness, whether real or fancied. A great many American voters, it would seem, are quite intelligent enough to perceive the deep contradiction which exists between the ideals of rhetorical democracy as preached in school and on the stump, and the actual day-to-day reality as that reality intrudes on his own milieu. Alienation arises from perception of that contradiction, and from the consequent feelings of individual political futility arising when the voter confronts an organization of politics which seems unable to produce minimally gratifying results. The concentration of socially deprived characteristics among the more than forty million adult Americans who today are altogether outside the voting universe suggests active alienation-or its passive equivalent, political apathy—on a scale quite unknown anywhere else in the Western world. Unless it is assumed as a kind of universal law that problems of existence which can be organized in political terms must fade out below a certain socio-economic level, this state of affairs is not inevitable. And if it is not inevitable, one may infer that the political system itself is responsible for its continued existence.

Yet such an assumption of fade-out is clearly untenable in view of what is known about patterns of voting participation in other democratic systems. Nor need it be assumed that substantial and rapid increases in American voting participation would necessarily, or even probably, involve the emergence of totalitarian mass movements. The possibility of such movements is a constant danger, to be sure, in any polity containing so high a proportion of apolitical elements in its potential electorate. But it would be unwise to respond to this possibility by merely expressing the comfortable hope that the apoliticals will remain apolitical, and by

Antioch Review, Vol. 16, pp. 259-64 (1956); Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1960), pp. 179-219.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 216-19; Herbert Tingsten, Political Behavior, op. cit., pp. 225-26.

⁵⁵ V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York, 1949), pp. 526-28; E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, op. cit., pp. 114-28.

⁵⁶ Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter (New York, 1960), pp. 58-75, and his The Compleat Politician (Indianapolis, 1962), esp. pp. 133-78. While one may hope that Boston and Massachusetts are extreme case studies in the pathology of democratic politics in the United States, it appears improbable that the pattern of conflict between the individual's expectations and reality is entirely unique to the Bay State.

⁵⁷ Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, op. cit., pp. 143-45.

doing nothing to engage them in the system in a timely and orderly way. It is much more to the point to seek a way, if one can be found, to integrate the apolitical half of the American electorate into the political system before crisis arises. Such integration need not be out of the question. The United States, after all, enjoyed intense mass political involvement without totalitarian movements during the last part of the 19th century, as do other Western democracies today.

No integration of the apoliticals can be carried out without a price to be paid. Underlying the failure of political organizations more advanced than the 19th-century middle-class cadre party to develop in this country has been the deeper failure of any except middle-class social and political values to achieve full legitimacy in the American political culture. It may not now be possible for our polity to make so great a leap as to admit non-middle-class values

58 The line of reasoning developed in this article-especially that part of it which deals with the possible development of political alienation in the United States-seems not entirely consistent with the findings of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 402-69, 472-505. Of course there is no question that relatively high levels of individual satisfaction with political institutions and acceptance of democratic norms may exist in a political system with abnormally low rates of actual voting participation, just as extremely high turnout may-as in Italybe associated with intense and activist modes of political alienation. At the same time, the gap between American norms and the actual political activity of American individuals does exist, as Almond and Verba point out on pp. 479-87. This may represent the afterglow of a Lockean value consensus in an inappropriate socio-economic setting, but in a polity quite lacking in the disruptive discontinuities of historical development which have occurred during this century in Germany, Italy and Mexico. Or it may represent something much more positive.

to political legitimacy and thus provide the preconditions for a more coherent and responsible mode of party organization. But such a leap may have to be made if full mobilization of the apolitical elements is to be achieved without the simultaneous emergence of manipulative radicalism of the left or the right. The heart of our contemporary political dilemma appears to lie in the conflict between this emergent need and the ideological individualism which continues so deeply to pervade our political culture. Yet the present situation perpetuates a standing danger that the half of the American electorate which is now more or less entirely outside the universe of active politics may someday be mobilized in substantial degree by totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian appeals. As the late President Kennedy seemed to intimate in his executive order establishing the Commission on Registration and Voting Participation, it also raises some questions about the legitimacy of the regime itself.59

⁵⁹ "Whereas less than sixty-five percent of the United States population of voting age cast ballots for Presidential electors in 1960; and

"Whereas popular participation in Government through elections is essential to a democratic form of Government; and

"Whereas the causes of nonvoting are not fully understood and more effective corrective action will be possible on the basis of a better understanding of the causes of the failure of many citizens to register and vote . . . " (emphasis supplied) The full text of the executive order is in Report, pp. 63-64. Compare with Schattschneider's comment in The Semi-Sovereign People, op. cit., p. 112: "A greatly expanded popular base of political participation is the essential condition for public support of the government. This is the modern problem of democratic government. The price of support is participation. The choice is between participation and propaganda, between democratic and dictatorial ways of changing consent into support, because consent is no longer enough." (Author's emphasis)

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PREVISION*

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The political scientist is a teacher of public men in the making, and an adviser of public men in activity; "public men," that is, men who are taught, invited or assumed to feel some responsibility for the exercise of political power; "political power," that is, concentrated means of affecting the future.

Ι

Obviously we can not affect the past, or that present moment which is now passing away, but only what is not yet: the future alone is sensitive to our actions, voluntary if aimed at a pictured outcome, rational if apt to cause it, prudently conceived if we take into account circumstances outside our control (known to decision theorists as "states of nature"), and the conflicting moves of others (known in game theory as opponents' play). A result placed in the future, conditions intervening in the future, need we say more to stress that decisions are taken "with an eye to the future," in other terms, with foresight?

Thucydides puts this utterance in the mouth of Archidamos, addressing the Assembly of Lacaedemonians on the eve of the Peloponnesian War: "For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them."

This can serve as our text: the greatest of hist rians warns us that we are the authors of our fate. It is levity in an individual to make a decision fraught with serious consequences to himself without forethought; but such levity turns to guilt in the case of the magistrate or citizen participating in a public decision the consequences of which will fall upon a great many. The political scientist then must recognize in foresight a moral obligation, to be felt and taught.

But saying that public decisions *ought* to be taken with foresight is a precept: how can we follow this precept unless we develop the corresponding *skill?* Knowing that foresight is required, the political scientist must therefore seek to develop that skill in himself, and in his

- * A paper presented at the Congress of the International Political Science Association, Geneva, Switzerland, September 1964.
- ¹ Thucydides I, 83. From Hobbes' version, republished by the University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor, 1959), vol. I, p. 48.

pupils, and offer it to statesmen he has to advise. Foresight is an expertise required in the political scientist: that is my first point.²

Need I stress that expertise does not mean infallibility? A political scientist will often misread the course of events or miscalculate the consequences of a decision, but the frequency of his successful forecasts should be higher than that of the average politician or lay citizen; this is not a great deal to ask, and whoever denies that it can be achieved, thereby denies any practical value to political research. The moral philosopher who deems it his function to teach discrimination of what is best in an absolute sense, does not need to prove himself a good forecaster. But it is otherwise for one who presents himself as a student of behavior. Such a study must be called idle or unsuccessful unless it results in an increasing ability to state what is to be expected.

There is in every science a well known relationship between factual investigation and marshalling hypotheses, meant to account for the facts and assumed to have some predictive worth. It is true that there can be no certain knowledge but of the past: indeed the past is the realm of the "true or false," with which the future contrasts as the realm of "possibles," which are neither true nor false. Therefore only probable statements can be uttered regarding the future, but it is solely through such utterances that the sciences are of practical utility. As I shall stress, it pertains to the nature of the object that such statements should be least reliable in matters political. But if they are not to be attempted, the term "science" should be rejected: nor can we then think of the discipline as conferring positive boons upon the body politic.

 Π

Since probable statements concerning the future are an outcome of factual investigations, they can, of course, concern only the realm of those phenomena which the student investigates. It is a verbal convention of our time that of two once synonymous terms, one of Latin, the other of Greek origin, both designations.

² For a more extended discussion of the general topic see my *L'Art de la Conjecture* (Editions du Rocher, Monaco, 1964); eight of the SEDEIS studies in conjecture have been collected, in English, in *Futuribles* (Droz, Geneva, 1963).

nating originally the whole of human relations, the word "social" has been retained to mean the whole, while the usage of the word "political" has been narrowed down to a part of these relations. In the meantime, however, the functions of government have grown more embracing: therefrom a non-congruence between the field of studies of the political scientist, and the field of concerns of the political magistrate. It follows that the kind of foresight which the political scientist may provide refers to but part of the phenomena the political magistrate has to deal with. This immediately suggests that it falls to other departments of the social sciences to provide complementary varieties of foresight, arising from their specific investigations, and relevant to some kinds of public decisions. It is indeed the practice of governments to consult experts other than political scientists, for the preparation of decisions concerning what Cournot very aptly called "the social economy." When it is future "traffic in towns" which forms the subject-matter of the decision, forecasts regarding the automobile population, the location of industry, the grouping of people, etc., are required of specialists quite other than political scientists.

This need not be labored and forms my second point. Public decisions require a variety of foresights other than that of the political scientist. We may well think of these diverse foresights being brought into play as each occasion demands. But there is a problem here, of no mean importance.

III

I shall introduce this problem by means of a concrete instance: the quotations here are from the Survey of International Affairs for the year 1930.3

Dr. Brüning became Chancellor of the German Reich in March 1930: "the Budget problem was by far the most untractable of all the problems with which Germany had to deal. . . up to the time of writing [the Summer of 1931] it was only under the Chancellorship of Dr. Brüning that measures were taken of such a character as to promise real improvement. . . . The cumulative deficit was . . . the prospective deficit was. . . . Action was therefore urgent. Dr. Brüning met his immediate necessities by an emergency decree promulgated in July 1930, and, as the situation was not righted by this measure, it was succeeded by two further emergency decrees issued respectively in December 1930 and in June 1931." While

³ Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1931), pp. 531-6.

drastically cutting down expenditure, these decrees also raised taxes. "Such were the draconian measures to which Dr. Brüning was obliged to resort. Their effectiveness in practice remained to be seen: their value as proof of the changed attitude of responsible German statesmen in the matter of public finance was beyond question or cavil."

Let me add that, on taking office, Dr. Brüning found three million unemployed: after two years of "draconian measures," he had six million; that he found 12 Nazis sitting in the Reichstag: after six months in office he saw their number raised to 107 (Sept. 30 elections), and soon after he left office (May 1932) the Nazis obtained 230 seats (July 31, 1932).

Now let us imagine a political scientist addressing Dr. Brüning in April 1930: "Ignorant as I am of public finance. I must assume that the measures which have been recommended to you by financial experts are the best for balancing the budget (which in fact they were not); ignorant as I am of economics, I cannot tell you what measures would effectively reduce unemployment: these are matters for different specialists. But it is my office to tell you that unemployment is a more serious evil than budgetary deficit, constitutes a more pressing problem, and that you should give it priority. Further it is my office to warn you that you will put the country in great political peril if you fail to address yourself to the major problem."

There is indeed a very heavy bill to be paid for the misinvestment of public attention, which is a very common fault of politicians. Consider the sad case of Dr. Brüning, an earnest and honorable man, who conscientiously and courageously addressed himself to what he deemed the major problem: but his ranking was quite mistaken, so that his virtuous efforts led to political disaster. This brings out the utility of properly ranking problems. Here I am not thinking of a lasting hierarchy in terms of values (however important that is) but of a here-and-now order of priorities, in terms of the costs of letting various problems fester and come to a crisis.

Politicians having proved remarkably poor judges of such priorities, a better judge is needed to redress their assessments: and this is a role for the political scientist, who to this end must operate as a "generalist," not only as a "specialist" among others. No matter that he is competent to deal only with certain problems, he must also be competent to appraise them all. And this role of "generalist" is logically linked with his role as specialist:

3

because any social problem which is left inadequately attended will ultimately land in
that court of passions and conflict which is
his particular concern. He can be compared to
a suzerain of the social field, who runs but a
small part of the realm, but must oversee the
whole, as any trouble arising in any other part
must seep into his own. He is competent to
request attention for a problem, and demand
that experts competent therein be called. More
than that, he is competent to state what questions they should answer, because he must be
aware of interrelations between problems.

Another instance will serve to stress that aspect. Left alone after World War I to maintain the new map of Europe which Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George had taken so large a part in drawing, France formed alliances with four Eastern Europe states, of which two, Poland and Czechoslovakia, were immediate neighbors of Germany. These alliances committed France to military intervention should Germany attack Poland or Czechoslovakia. Military intervention in what form? A mere glance at the map made it clear that effective intervention could occur in no other form than the invasion of Germany. Therefore these alliances required that the French army be shaped as an offensive instrument: exactly the reverse was explicitly decided, and a purely defensive apparatus was set up. So it was quite easy to foresee a good ten years in advance what happened in 1939: while practically the whole of the German forces was thrown against Poland, the French army sat uselessly on its defensive positions, having been designed for nothing else.4 Not only was it easy to foresee but it was foretold behind closed doors by certain military leaders, and openly by some young civilians without authority. Now is this not again a clear case for the political scientist? Was it not proper for him to point out the discrepancy between the diplomatic policy and the military policy?5

And not well designed even for that, as commandant Souchon noted in 1929, uttering this prophecy: "our future army will be dissociated, pushed around and cut to pieces before having struck the least blow." In Feu l'Armée Française, published without signature (Paris, 1929).

⁵ One might elaborate upon the consequences of this inconsistency. First, the discovery of the impotence of the French army was a major cause of the French government's attitude at the time of Munich; but as they could not believe this impotence, the Soviet leaders quite understandably interpreted our shameful desertion of Czechoslovakia as inspired by a machiavellian

I have chosen two instances of fatal mistakes, of which I can bear witness that they were perceptible at the time. Mistakes, one of which proceeded from a wrong priority of policies, the other from an incoherence of policies. Is it not the political scientist's role to take a view sufficiently panoramic to call attention to such blunders? That is my third point. The political scientist is competent to appreciate priorities and consistency in policies the details of which he is incompetent to judge.

IV

The foregoing statement means that the political scientist has to keep track of current and impending changes in non-political fields. and for this purpose to achieve a continual exchange of forward looking views with experts in these other fields. To take a simple instance, suppose that the balance-of-payments specialist foresees the necessity of slowing up the rate of wage increases. Some economists feel that this cannot be achieved otherwise than by a "squeeze," diminishing, as they put it, the pressure on the labor market—in more common parlance, maintaining a certain percentage of unemployment. Others, shocked by this prospect, reject that method and advocate an "incomes policy." Now the political scientist, informed of these views, foresees from the one procedure unpleasant political consequences; while the second poses a problem of political feasibility. Therefore such views are very germane to his concerns: indeed it may be the case that one policy seems to him inadvisable and the other impracticable, which may cause him to ask the economists for some other way: would a flexible exchange rate achieve the object?

As every change assumed to occur has repercussions in many fields, as every change devised has a variety of implications and calls for a variety of adjustments, it is clear that in a society characterized by rapid transformation, there is need for what I have called elsewhere a Surmising Forum where anticipations are

desire to orient Germany toward an attack upon Russia, which was thought of by no responsible Frenchman. Second, as the Poles trusted the French army—as I found while attending them in the 1939 campaign—they thought it quite unnecessary to agree in the previous Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations to the entry of Russian troops upon their soil, which the Soviets quite understandably made a condition of their military support. And this increased the Soviet suspicion of our good faith, which may have determined the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.

confronted, and where incoherences discerned indicate measures to be taken, or alternatives to be considered. I do not propose to restate here the case for the Surmising Forum; all I need is to make the fourth point: the political scientist must seek to coordinate anticipations.

This attempt to overlook the whole field is useful for the long term, but it also meets a pressing need of the political scientist.

V

This overall watching allows him to detect sources of future political perturbances. The political scientist should be a detector of trouble to come: that is my fifth point.

Trouble is indeed his business. Who would deny that he is at his most useful if he warns of war or advises how to avoid it? That the foresight of the foreign policy expert revolves around the possibility of war, will be readily granted; but not so easily that the domestic equivalent of war must play the same central role in the speculations of the domestic expert. The contrast is understandable enough: the international system is thought of as a system of antagonism, the national system as one of cooperation. The very accent of words changes as we move from one system to the other. If we speak of a system of Powers (international), we use the capital to denote independent actors by their factual resources, their means; while if we speak of the system of powers (national), the powers we now refer to are rights to be exercised functionally in the service of the national whole.

"Home affairs," as the British tellingly put it, are supposed to be altogether quieter than foreign affairs. It is assumed that the institutions set up to take care of home affairs are and will remain adequate to cope with any problems arising: there is a political division whenever people strongly disagree as to what should be done, but this division is thought of as overcome when the matter has been settled by an established procedure of decision (such as a parliamentary "division").

The political scientist should be keenly aware that things are not so simple, but his function as teacher of institutions leads him to convey and therefore to adopt an optimistic vision. His first and foremost function is to address future citizens and potential magistrates, and fit them for participation in the management of public affairs, a management organized according to a certain system. This system must be described and explained to them, so that they shall feel "at home" in it, in the two senses of knowledge and acceptance; and it is surely of great importance to a republic that its

citizens should have confidence in and respect: for the form of its government. Political institutions, inherently precarious, are made solid and stable by belief, which must therefore be fostered; but, in the process of so doing, it is easy to become overconfident. It improves mores to think that what may not be done can not be done, but it deteriorates prudence. It is good that actions should run between the banks of established procedures, but it is dangerous that the imagination of the expert should be confined between these banks. To cite an admittedly extreme and caricatural instance of such confinement, it was apparently believed by those who called Hitler to the Chancellorship at the end of January 1933, that he would find himself quite paralyzed in this position by article 58 of the Weimar constitution, which stated that all government decisions should be taken by a majority of the members of the cabinet, wherein he was placed in a minority, having only two ministers of his own party! As I warned, this is an extreme and caricatural instance; it is not suggested that political scientists are prone to such mistakes. But it is true, surely, that, not only as teachers of good civic behavior, but also as law-abiding and reasonable men, they are not inclined to lend any great likelihood to strong departures from regular courses.

They are not prone to foresee dramatic events. Surely the United States is the country far the best endowed in political scientists—indeed possibly as many as nineteen out of twenty political scientists operating in the world today are Americans. It would be interesting to know what proportion of these political scientists foresaw—and how early—the sensational rise of McCarthy and his no less sensational collapse. Or again, what proportion foresaw the capture of the Republican Party by the Goldwater group.

This is not meant as a criticism: first, it is in any realm difficult to be a good forecaster; second, the difficulty is at its greatest in politics; last, and chiefly, political scientists have not, in general, deemed it their function to forecast, and when so doing they are apt to stress that they do so as citizens, not as scientists. The only purpose of my remark, therefore, is to note a psychological disposition, which I think would still be operative if political scientists were willing to adopt the view here advanced, that they should regard it as pertaining to their function to forecast, and should indeed regard such forecasting as a practical end-product of their science. Under such conditions, they would still, I think, be reluctant to foresee perturbation, disturbance, trouble. So, if this foresight of trouble is, as I think, the most important, a psychological effort will be required to overcome the tendency to project a relatively smooth course.⁶

That tendency is to be found also in other fields of social science: everywhere prevision resorts to projection of current trends and to reproduction of periodic changes. Economic prevision, to whatever degree of complexity it may be worked out, ultimately rests upon the assumption that certain structural relations are relatively invariant over time. It is natural enough that prevision should assume continuity and recurrence. Therefore it takes an effort to predict discontinuity, a break—in short, trouble.

VI

Political foresight requires study of political behavior: this sixth point is self-evident; every science studies the behavior of those objects about which it proposes to make statements of general and lasting validity, and therefore capable of being used for prediction, or anticipation. Nor is it necessary to advocate study of political behavior: this is presently the most esteemed compartment of political science. Nonetheless something is to be said on this point.

"Behavioral studies," as they are called, are apt to deal with ordinary behavior: the word "ordinary" denotes at the same time, and very properly, what is not uncommon, and what fits into an order. Now times of trouble are characterized by extraordinary conducts: the behavior of the "force publique," when the independence of the Congo was proclaimed, came as a great surprise; no better, and no less surprising, was the behavior of the "gardesfrançaises" on the Fourteenth of July, 1789. Quite recently, some meticulous and respected German bureaucrats have been found out, to the shocked surprise of their colleagues, as the

⁶ In his masterly treatment of economic forecasting, H. Theil, *Economic Forecasts and Policy* (Amsterdam, 1961), Pt. V, notes that changes to come are generally underestimated. If our mind tends to underestimate shifts in a continuous course, breaks in this continuity are even less acceptable to it.

⁷ See the ranking of the different compartments of political science given by Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Trends in American Political Science," this Review, Vol. 57 (Dec. 1963), pp. 933, 941. The authors asked political scientists in what compartment of the science the most significant work was being done and "behavioralism" came an easy first.

authors of most abominable actions in the days of the concentration camps: but for these historic events they might have lived irreproachable lives and no one would ever have imagined them capable of what they have done. Of course, saying that people would not have been criminal but for the occasion is not, as it is all too commonly taken to be, an excuse: the actions are their own and their features then made manifest were potentially there before. But it is a warning that the behavior we presently observe is not the only behavior of which the subjects observed are capable.

The instability of behavior is a great difficulty for political prevision. We know of course that a man's behavior is variable but in no realm is it as variable as in the political. And we get no inkling of behavior under "heated" conditions if we merely observe people under "cold" conditions, when they vote this way or that, attend meetings or not, move resolutions or raise their hands. Under heating, we observe that the same people are not then behaving in the same way; and further we must note that it is not the same people who then claim most of our attention. At all times, if people are ranked according to their degree of political activity, we find that such activity is high only in a limited number and falls off very rapidly as we consider greater numbers. "Heated" conditions are apt to increase the total surface included under such a curve, but they also substitute, for the most active minority under cold conditions, a minority made up of quite different persons.

Whatever the equality of political rights, so small is the share of total political activity performed by the great majority and so great that performed by a small minority, that the total hue and character of national political activity reflects that of the active minority. If that leading company then changes, the whole character of politics changes. And though the heat which changes behavior in the same people does pass away, the change in the people who impart their character to the total system may endure.

The great merit of an effective two-party system is that no man can rise to political importance otherwise than by a slow progress within one or the other party, a progress in the course of which he finds himself subject to screening by monitors at different stages of his rise. It is a major contribution to stability that the two parties conspire to persuade the public that between themselves they exhaust the possibilities. But the political scientist must be aware that, however salutary this belief, it does not correspond to reality: there are

people floating in outer darkness who can, if the occasion arises, irrupt upon the scene, casting out both of the small armies that have been engaged in a civilized duel. The heads carried away in the baskets attending the French guillotine represented the whole spectrum of opinions preceding the Revolution (also those which appeared in its course); the same has been true in the concentration camps of Soviet Russia and of Nazi Germany.

All this pertains to the process of "heating." To this, political scientists have given, if I may say so, quite inadequate attention; they have been very prone to regard this as inevitable when it has happened and unthinkable where it has not. That where it has happened it had sufficient cause, is of course true, but uninteresting; what is useful is to pin-point, if we can, what would have made a difference. It is now out of fashion for historians to stop their relation of events when they come to what seems to them a cross-roads, and to note that, from a different decision or action at this point, a different course of things might have followed. It may be that such exercises are unbecoming to historical science; they are surely in the highest degree suitable to political science.

Our science stands in great need of a systematic study bearing upon the occurrence of these "changes of state" here called "heating." Unless I am much mistaken, such a factual study would not confirm the breezy theory that they occur when necessary to allow the coming forth of a predetermined new order—that is, if and only if they serve a providential purpose; strange indeed is the unquestioned providentialism of agnostic philosophers of history.

I have noted that studies of behavior tend to disregard changes in behavior which attend "heating," and that too little attention is paid in them to what leads up to such "heating." Another remark is now called for, relative to normal conditions.

Political phenomena have by nature a tempo different from that of social phenomena. Let us take, for instance, people's attitudes toward the consumption of alcohol. Let us suppose that over time the proportion of teetotalers increases from a small minority to a majority. As a social phenomenon this can be continuous and carried to any degree without a break. But now consider teetotalism as politically militant. Then, as soon as the teetotalers have reached a majority, they will forbid drinking to the minority: a discontinuity, a break, and an occasion of "heating." Thus the diffusion of a political attitude gives rise to distinct events, as it does not in the case of a social attitude.

But the above illustration assumes a perfect democracy, where decisions are made by a popular majority; such is not the practice of any modern state. Indeed, the present trend is to entrust the major decisions to a single person: thus in the United States, while the Congress decides on the President's proposal how much financial aid should be given to South Vietnam, a military operation on North Vietnam can be decided upon by the President alone.

It follows therefrom that the political scientist, operating as "predictor," must pay to individual character an attention which is not called for in the case of the social scientist. A social phenomenon is the outcome of a very great number of individual decisions, an aggregate which reflects individual attitudes in proportion to their frequency. Social prediction can therefore safely neglect attitudes of a small minority—thus, for instance, Amish rejection of the motor-car is insignificant for estimates of future automobile sales-and the social predictor need not (as, indeed, he cannot) pay attention to idiosyncrasies. If interested in estimating the number of divorces next year, he will wave aside as irrelevant a tidbit of information regarding John's disposition to quarrel with Mary. It is not so in politics: an attitude relatively infrequent, such as rabid antisemitism, acquires momentous importance if it pertains to a man who rises to the highest place. More generally, in the absence of any such extreme peculiarity, every little trait of the Prince's individuality acquires great importance, due to the "multiplier" of great power.

This has ever been recognized. We have centuries-old records of political forecasts in the form of diplomatic dispatches. While the ambassador owes his public character to his being the empowered spokesman of his sovereign, as soon as permanent missions abroad were established, they functioned mainly as listening posts, whence information was sent home, concerning political developments occurring or impending in the country of residence. These are the earliest "political surveys," of enormous value for the historian in that each describes a state of affairs, but also a source as yet untapped for the study of political surmising. The message of the political reporter is the more valuable the more it foretells; therefore, while conveying accomplished facts, the writer must also use them as raw material to convey a "transformed product," his surmise. The abundant diplomatic sources in existence are still to be used for the analysis of the surmising procedures they reveal. But it needs only the barest familiarity with them to remark the place occupied in such dispatches by the description of personal characteristics: the character of the Prince, those of his ministers and favorites, those also of possible successors.

What a change the simplest substitution of persons can make. Consider Frederick the Great in January 1762: he writes to the marquis d'Argens: "If Fortune continues to pursue me, doubtless I shall sink," and suggests that unless a turn for the better occurs, he may next month, take Cato's course: "Cato, and the little glass tube I have." But as he writes the turn has already occurred: Czarina Elisabeth has died, her nephew Peter has become Czar; a fanatical admirer of Frederick, he immediately relieves the pressure upon him by recalling the Russian troops. Peter's bare six months on the throne suffice to turn the tide.

Can we confidently say that personalities matter less in our own day? Why then did a shudder run through the West when the false news of Mr. Khrushchev's death was flashed? Even in the case of a liberal democracy, did we not find the very same men who interpret politics as a working-out of impersonal forces, expressing the utmost alarm at the prospect of a Goldwater presidency?

Personalities always matter in politics, and never have they counted for more than in our century, which has, at one and the same time, tended to collectivize the individual and to individualize collective power. From this has come, as it seems to me, an improved predictability in matters pertaining to the social economy, and a deteriorated predictability in matters specifically political. Far be it from me to exaggerate the freedom of action of the man who sits at the top of a nation. He is always "riding a tiger," but the way he rides it makes a very great difference indeed.

From these remarks it seems to follow that the methods which serve us well in the prevision of social change, which is continuous and insensitive to idiosyncrasies, cannot be suitable for political phenomena, which have different properties.

\mathbf{v} II

It is a great ambition of modern social science to study phenomena without "insight"; an understandable ambition, this being the way which has led the human mind to phenomenal success in the physical sciences, which serve as the model and basis of all others. Standing in the way of such progress was the "pathetic fallacy," our apparently innate propensity to lend quasi-human personalities to objects. It is not helpful toward the control of floods to regard them as fits of

anger in the river genius, who should therefore be appeased by gifts, perhaps human sacrifices. Our knowledge and mastery of nature have progressed as we have ceased to regard natural objects as whimsical persons, who behave according to their mood, and have come instead to regard them as "things" which behave as they are made to by circumstances. Containing as it does a most vigorous repudiation of animism, a depersonalization of objects, the Bible can be said to have helped open the way for Western science.

We find the eviction of "genii" historically associated with a procedure of inquiry which seeks to ascertain how the object behaves under varying conditions, and to derive from observed regularities assertions of predictive value. The procedure has its utmost practical value when it leads us to foretell with certainty how the object will behave under certain future conditions as they occur, and therefore also, what conditions we must create in order to make it behave as suits us. These great practical rewards of the method are fully attained when the object studied is a "thing" which must perforce "behave" in perfectly passive compliance to the conditions wherein it is placed. This being so, it is understandable that the method was extended to animals in consequence of Descartes's assertion concerning their "machine" character, and that Condillac and La Mettrie should have, by their views of man, encouraged its extension to him.

Whatever historical role the inclination to regard man as also a "mere thing" may have played in the extension to him of this method of inquiry, it is surely a mistake to regard the validity of the method, applied to his case, as dependent upon this ontological assumption. In fact the very first finding from such an

⁸ It is here beside the point that "the death of the Great Pan" or depersonalization of natural objects, has implied a great loss of reverence and sensitive enjoyment of them.

⁹ This mistake gives rise to heated quarrels between those who, being revolted that man should be thought of as a "mere thing," therefore needlessly repudiate the scientific method and those who, addicted to this method, therefore needlessly champion the "mere thing" notion. Justification or condemnation of the method does not rest thereupon but depends upon its efficiency. Here I would like to digress to say that the true danger of a scientific approach, but shared with any other form of intellectual outlook, is that excessive enthusiasm for general statements, however useful, should impair our appreciation of the particular and unique.

application is that men do not display that uniformity of behavior which we expect from "things." Thus an application, scandalous to some who regard it as debasing man to the status of "mere thing," in fact demonstrates that he is not such. But the method is not, in consequence, valueless: though we find in a number of men different conducts in the same circumstances, if we note the distribution of such conducts and its mode, and if we can find that over time this distribution and its mode change but little or shift but slowly, we have therefrom a predictive tool, as stressed by Quételet.¹⁰

Now a few words about "outwardness." The scientific method in respect to things has substituted for interpretations of their "genius" the examination of their performances. We attempt no sympathetic "understanding" of the thing's spirit but proceed by watchful "overstanding." In the metaphysical squabbles of social science, there is much argument for and against such "outwardness."

I can see no harm in observing a nation as one would an ant-heap; this just happens to be a hampering method. Were it the best, ethnologists who go out to investigate so-called "primitive peoples" should be strictly forbidden to learn the language of their hosts; for conversation conveys some insight into people's feelings, intentions, values. Thereby you lose the outwardness which some deem so essential.

Outwardness has indeed been used as a literary artifice by eighteenth-century wits, foremost among them Voltaire, to ridicule social behavior. If you look at conducts from an angle which annuls the values inspiring them and thus robs them of meaning, it is easy enough to make them appear nonsensical; thereby also they are made unpredictable. This is a clear warning not to press outwardness too far. The social scientist has to set the tangible behaviors he observes within the framework of prevailing beliefs and interests. An economist may dislike motor cars, he may, as a joke in the common room, describe weekends as an aimless buzzing of urbanites out of the hive, arising from a periodic perturbation of the regular courses therein: his forecasts must nonetheless rest upon men's known desires for cars. No forecasting is possible unless data about what people do are complemented with data about their feelings, wants, aspirations, judgments. These data may figure but implicitly in a model, which then assumes

either their invariance over time, or that their changes will follow a certain ascertainable course.

But it is quite otherwise for the political forecaster: he has to focus upon feelings, attitudes, judgments, because these, in his field, undergo swift and vast changes, with major factual consequences. How soon, how very soon it was after Hitler's last stand in Berlin, that I heard an ADA group in New York acclaim Mayor Reuther's formula: "Berlin is the outpost and symbol of freedom!" What a reversal of significance! Did it occur because the national interest of the United States demanded it? I have no patience with those who explain the emotional attitudes of actual people by the rational interest of collective entities: it is rather the other way round. Is it credible that the anti-Soviet revulsion of the United States soon after the end of hostilities was inspired by the national interest? If so, surely, in the last weeks of the war, the American troops should have been urged to gain as much ground in Germany and in Czechoslovakia as was possible, and to keep it. But no, the policy of containment came as an aftermath of a change in the affective valuation of Stalinist Russia.

History would be different-indeed there would be very much less of History as commonly understood—if policies corresponded to a relatively stable conception of the national interest. For instance, consider Britain's "war or peace" relations with Hitler over a period of less than five years. March 1936: Hitler's troops march into the Rhineland, demilitarized under the Locarno treaty, to which Britain is a party; all that Britain needs to do is to give backing and encouragement to the wavering French, who then can easily reoccupy the Rhineland, thus dealing to Hitler's prestige a possibly decisive blow. The British choose the opposite attitude. Summer of 1938: after the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia is threatened, the French make ready to march on its behalf, the British government invents the Runciman mission which leads to Munich, "peace in our time." The strategic situation is now much deteriorated, but the takeover of Czechoslovakia, which was made helpless by amputation, scandalizes British opinion and Britain waxes militant. No matter that the hoped-for alliance with Russia falls through, it is war; the now reluctant French follow unwillingly, and, as it proves, ineffectively. October 1940: France has been utterly overcome; the only Power left standing in Europe, the Soviet Union, is presently Germany's ally; Hitler offers peace to England, at no cost to

¹⁰ A. Quételet, Sur l'homme et le développement de ses facultés ou essai de physique sociale, 2 vols. (Paris, 1835).

her—let her attend to her Empire, which Hitler admires. The offer is not even considered; by now the hearts of the British have been so turned against Hitler that, regardless of relative resources and chances, he must be fought, come what may.

The terrible ordeal was unnecessary; such mistakes will not be repeated: nonsense! Of course they are repeated all the time-though let us hope with no such dramatic consequences-and naturally so: because, at any moment, "the present situation" is appreciated in terms of the present feelings and evaluations. It is not like a chessboard problem which different onlookers can be unequally competent to solve but which they must all see alike; it is a different situation according to the onlooker, not the same to Baldwin or to Chamberlain as to Churchill. Nor are the policies of a nation the outcome of one man's reading of the situation but of an aggregate of visions. Doubtless the United States could have prevented the Munich capitulation, and Roosevelt saw it should be prevented; but if he expressed it as a private opinion instead of throwing the weight of his nation in the balance, it is presumably because he felt that the nation's mood did not allow him to do so.

What appears as a glaring mistake in a game of strategy may be a natural outcome of a psychological context which "gaming" ignores, and vice versa. The last war would have been won by Germany and Japan had the latter Power attacked Russia instead of making the capital blunder of outright aggression against the United States fleet. It was so obviously good strategy for Japan to make sure that Russia was counted out, and so obviously a bad move to bring in the United States, that the unravelling of the psychological motives for such conduct should be very instructive.

There is a political context to strategic situations; situations which are much the same in strategic terms are very different in political terms. An instance is afforded by very recent news. Taking it as a datum that, throughout the period considered, the United States has been interested in precluding the spread of communism in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, we note that, a little more than ten years ago, American aircraft carriers were in the Gulf of Tonkin, available to the American President for an air-strike. In the spring of 1954, great results could be hoped for from an air-strike at Dien-Bien-Phu. Results then likely (not of course certain) were: the French army saved, Giap's army (then offering a concentrated target) crippled, the State of Vietnam (not then partitioned) relieved for a time from

communist pressure and communist infiltration in Laos and Cambodia precluded. President Eisenhower decided against making the air-strike which might have had such consequences; an air-strike was made in early August 1964 when it held out no such promises. In terms of strategy, it cannot be explained that it was done in 1964 rather than 1954. It has to be explained in political terms; not of course in terms of formal politics, for an airstrike in 1954 would have been made at the request of a formally sovereign state on its own territory against those who were formally rebels, while the air-strike of 1964 was made against the territory of a sovereign state. The explanation is not then to be sought in "politics" understood as "public law." The explanation is to be sought rather in terms of a far different emotional context.

Explanation and a fortiori prediction are impossible in politics without understanding of affective attitudes. "The springs of politics are the passionate movements of the human heart," says Cournot.11 Tragedy is meant to display the swiftness and amplitude of such movements, a lesson which statesmen forget to their undoing. It so happens that France in early 1848 had for Prime Minister an eminent political scientist, indeed the restorer of our Academy of Political and Moral Sciences, Guizot. A rare feature in France, the parliamentary opposition acknowledged a leader, Thiers, who was a distinguished historian. Neither of these men had an inkling of the revolution which was to sweep away the regime in a few days of February. What is more, neither of them took seriously the massing of a crowd on February 22d-a crowd which indeed, according to students of those fateful days, showed as yet no signs of violent excitement.

Up to the last moment these eminent men did not foresee the revolution, and had they been told that within a few years Louis Bonaparte would be Emperor, they would have taken it as a joke. Now let me add that the history Thiers had written was that of the Revolution and Empire. He was familiar with such events as were to be repeated, but he must have felt, "It can't happen now"—another version of "It can't happen here." This instance stresses that the political forecaster must guess how people will come to feel (my seventh point) and also that this is no easy thing.

¹¹ A. Cournot, Traité de l'enchaînement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire, para. 460, p. 525 of the 1911 edition.

To this concern the study of public opinion corresponds, but it may be asked whether adequate attention has been paid to the dynamic of moods.

$\mathbf{v}\mathbf{III}$

Consider "the body politic" as a vast army "making its way" in a literal sense; this raises a variety of problems, to be foreseen by a variety of social scouts, the political scientist a coordinator, wary of mix-ups which would generate excitement and anger. Such is the rough sketch of the picture which has been presented in the preceding sections. This so emphasizes policy expertise as to be possibly shocking, relatively to the established idea that the political scientist is an expert on institutions. But far from there being a conflict between the two conceptions, on the contrary the role of the political scientist as detector of problems breathes life into his role as student and designer of institutions.

Institutions are of instrumental value, good in so far as they efficiently cope with problems arising, and operate toward the achievement of social goods. If the machinery of government proves such that no timely action can be taken to ward off some visibly impending harm, a vice in the institutions can be presumed. Of course I do not mean that any bad policy is proof of bad institutions; none are so excellent as to exclude the possibility of foolish decisions. What I do mean is that frequency of failure to cope or achieve is a judgment upon what is in essence a coping-and-achieving machinery and nothing else.

Now this is precisely where institutional expertise is needed. Left to itself, public opinion will be apt to reject the whole system, throwing away what is good therein-and thus, for instance, turn from a "government by discussion" regime which is not working well, to a more efficient tyranny. It is for the institutions expert to indicate the more modest adjustments required. But, as a forecaster on how people will come to feel (point seven), he must be aware also that by the time public opinion has been aroused against the inefficiency of the system, its disposition will be to repudiate it altogether, so that minor adjustments, however well they might serve, will not be acceptable to it. These therefore must be made before the public has been aroused; and this is no easy thing, as the public does not then demand it and the wielders of the government machinery bask in complacency.

Indeed the political scientist should foresee the deficiencies of the institutional system not only before these have excited popular discontent and brought it into discredit, but even before these deficiencies have been made manifest by faulty performance. For this purpose he will rely to a considerable degree upon the assumed stability of social trends, ask himself how their estimated course will alter the demands made upon the "coping machinery," seek to assess its adequacy to such different demands, and thereupon look for the adjustments which can improve such adequacy.

To be sure, social change by itself has a direct impact upon the institutional machinery and tends to weaken or atrophy some institutions, to strengthen or hypertrophy others. Such direct impact may happen to work toward an improvement of the machinery: but it would be most unwise to take this as a postulate. Quite the reverse can be the case.

I do not propose to develop here my eighth point: the political scientist should foretell the adjustments suitable to improve the adequacy of the institutional system to cope with changing circumstances. Of the different points made here, this is the only one which is sure to be accepted by all; therefore the case for it need not be argued. If it comes here as the last point, it is because the institutional preoccupation is made most meaningful when derived from more immediate and concrete preoccupations. The future inflow of public business, its increasing volume, its new varieties, must be vividly pictured by the expert: only thus can he recommend adjustments in the public machinery, adequate to a liberal democratic handling of heavier and shifting burdens.

Any maladjustment enhances attitudes which amount to regarding political and private freedoms as conflicting with progress. It is for rulers who alone are far seeing, to lead their people in the way of progress, untrammelled in their decisions by lengthy discussions, and riding rough-shod over individuals: such is the immanent doctrine sugar-coated in different ideological colors. This nefarious doctrine is rendered plausible thanks to the fact that the ancient bulwarks of liberty are often used as defensive fortifications by the very people who would in previous times have opposed their erection, and the character of such defenders provides an argument for the flattening out of these bulwarks. It seems a most urgent preoccupation for people committed to political forecasting to see what can be done for the progress of liberty in a materially progressing society, the features of which could not be imagined in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

POLITICS AND PSEUDOPOLITICS: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SOME BEHAVIORAL LITERATURE

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A curious state of affairs has developed within the academic discipline that bravely calls itself Political Science—the discipline that in a much-quoted phrase has been called "a device, invented by university teachers, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science." A growing and now indeed a predominant proportion of leading American political scientists, the behavioralists, have become determined to achieve science. Yet in the process many of them remain open to the charge of strenuously avoiding that dangerous subject, politics.

Consider a recent essay on the behavioral persuasion in politics. The conclusion stresses the purpose of political inquiry: "The Goal is Man." There is to be a commitment to some humane purpose after all. But what kind of man? A democratic kind of man, a just man, or perhaps a power-seeking man? The answer follows: "These are philosophical questions better left to the philosophers."2 Behavioral students of politics should, as scientists, engage in no value judgments concerning the kind of man or society their researches ought to serve. This is the general inference to be drawn, not only from this particular essay, but from much of the contemporary literature on political behavior.

As Heinz Eulau, the author, points out in the same essay, the area of behavioral political science includes a particular domain called policy science, in which empirical inquiry is geared to explicitly stated goal formulations; within this domain "political science, as all science, should be put in the service of whatever goals men pursue in politics." Any goals? Not quite; in this context Eulau points out that the choice of what goals to serve is a

* I am indebted to my friend Herbert H. Hyman, who has been generous with advice for improvements on an earlier draft. It should not be inferred that he is in agreement with opinions expressed in this paper, or that he might not once again find much to criticize in it. At a later stage I have received helpful suggestions also from Sidney Verba and Andrew Hacker.

¹ Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 48 (1953), p. 335.

² Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York, 1963), p. 133 and pp. 133-37.

matter of personal ethics, and incidentally reminds us that behavioral research can be readily utilized also for purposes conflicting with the original ones. "In this sense, at least, science is value-free. I don't think the scientist can escape this dilemma of having his work misused without giving up his calling." And the author concludes with these words: "Only if he places himself at the service of those whose values he disagrees with does he commit intellectual treason."

In these pages I am concerned with sins less serious than intellectual treason; perhaps intellectual indolence is a more accurate term. My argument will be that much of the current work on political behavior generally fails to articulate its very real value biases, and that the political impact of this supposedly neutral literature is generally conservative and in a special sense anti-political. In conclusion I propose to develop a perspective on political inquiry that would relate it more meaningfully to problems of human needs and values; in that context I will suggest some important but neglected problems lending themselves to empirical research.

Î am not about to argue that our investments in political behavior research have been too large; on the contrary, we need much more work in this area. But my principal concern is to argue for a more pressing need: an intellectually more defensible and a politically more responsible theoretical framework for guiding and interpreting our empirical work; a theory that would give more meaning to our research, even at the expense of reducing its conceptual and operational neatness.

T

It is necessary first to clarify some basic terms in which my concern is stated.

The prevailing concepts of "politics" in the literature under consideration are surely an important source of the difficulty. Definitions gravitate toward the most conspicuous facts and shy away from all reference to more normladen and less easily measurable aspects of social life. For the sake of brevity, let us consider only the most recent formulation by one of the unquestionably most influential political scientists of the present generation: "A political system is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a sig-

nificant extent, power, rule, or authority." My objection is not primarily to the extension of the reference of "political" to private as well as to public associations, and even to clans and families as well; rather, it is to the absence of any reference to a public purpose. Research work on power, rule, or authority can contribute significantly to our political knowlege, even if the data come from contexts not ordinarily thought of as political. But its significance must be gauged in relation to some criteria; until these are articulated and justified, or at any rate chosen, we can only intuit whether our researches on, say, power behavior are tackling significant or trivial issues.

"Politics" should refer to power, but the term should also refer to some conception of human welfare or the public good. The achievement of Plato and Aristotle is in part a result of their starting out by asking some of the right questions; above all, what is politics for? Their limitations were logical and methodological or, if you prefer, conceptual: they had not learned to distinguish between verifiable descriptive statements, statements of normative positions, and (empirically empty and normatively neutral) analytical statements, including definitions and other equations.

Once these distinctions had been developed, a process that began with David Hume, it became easy and fashionable to expose fallacies in Plato and Aristotle; but instead of attacking the ancient and perennial problems of politics with our new and sharper conceptual tools, recent generations of political scientists appear to have sought safety in seeking to exclude the normative realm altogether from the scope of their scientific inquiry. "Politics" has consequently been defined in a simple institutional or behavioral manner, unrelated to normative conceptions of any sort. Ironically, most modern behavioralists are back with the Greeks again in their assumption that political inquiry can be pursued by much the same methods as natural science inquiry; they have adjusted to David Hume and the modern logical positivists by the neat device of definitions that limit the scope of their inquiry to observable behavior.

This surely is a stance of premature closure. The alternative proposed here is to insist on the need for a political theory that deals with basic human needs as well as overt desires and other observable aspects of behavior. The task of improving concepts and methods toward

establishing a stricter science of politics is formidable; but let us avoid establishing an orthodoxy that would have the whole profession contract for a fainthearted purchase of rigor at the price of excluding much of the meat and spirit of politics.

As a modest and fragmentary beginning toward a more appropriate theory, let me suggest a distinction between "politics" and ✓ 'pseudopolitics.' I would define as political all activity aimed at improving or protecting conditions for the satisfaction of human needs and demands in a given society or community. according to some universalistic scheme of priorities, implicit or explicit. Pseudopolitical in this paper refers to activity that resembles political activity but is exclusively concerned with either the alleviation of personal neuroses or with promoting private or private interestgroup advantage, deterred by no articulate or disinterested conception of what would be just or fair to other groups.

Pseudopolitics is the counterfeit of politics. The relative prevalence of the counterfeit variety of democratic politics presumably depends on many ascertainable factors, including a society's degree of commercialization and the degree of socio-economic mobility (or the size of the stakes in the competitive struggle); on the other hand, the proportion of pseudopolitical activity would correlate negatively with the amount of psychological security, the amount of social welfare-type security, and the amount of political education effectively taught.

For present purposes it is not necessary to demonstrate in detail how the distinction between politics in the narrower sense and pseudopolitics can be made operationally useful. Suffice it to say that only a saint is pure from the taint of pseudopolitics and that hardly any pseudopolitician would be wholly without concern for the public welfare; mixed motives, in proportions varying from one person to the next and from one situation to the next, pervade all actions. It is a difficult but surely not an impossible task to develop indices for assessing the relative prevalence of political versus pseudopolitical incentives in voters and other political actors; the only essential prerequisite

✓ 4 "Priorities" here refers to norms for guiding the choice among conflicting needs and demands. Political ideals and visions of the good life enter in here, and would do so even if our knowledge of needs and of human nature were as extensive as our knowledge of demands and of social determinants of "public opinion."

³ Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), p. 6.

is to decide that the task must be tackled.

Without attempting to make this kind of distinction, untidy as it may at first appear to many a behavioralist, I dont see how we can begin to approach a condition of tidiness in our discussions of the political significance of research, or of the political responsibility of political scientists. But what should we mean by these two highly eulogistic terms; might we not be better advised to shun them altogether? The bulk of this paper seeks to demonstrate some sorry consequences of the latter course. We cannot avoid the realm of normative issues unless we really wish to disclaim all political significance for our work. Probably very few in our profession would adopt this position.

Although explicit cognizance of normative assumptions in his theoretical frame of reference is likely to entail some inconvenience for the researcher, he will by no means be blocked from continuing much of his present work. It should be clear that all competent research on pseudopolitical behavior illuminates political behavior as well, as the relative presence of one signals the relative absence of the other. In the real world the two aspects of behavior always coexist. My quarrel is not with research on pseudopolitics per se, but with the way findings are usually reported and interpreted. I object to the tendency in much of the behavior literature to deal with the pseudopolitical aspects of behavior almost exclusively, and to imply that the prevalence of pseudopolitics is and always will be the natural or even the desirable state of affairs in a democracy. Consequently, I object also to the absence of interest in research that could reveal some of the determinants of the relative prevalence of pseudopolitical behavior on our political arena, by which we might learn more about how we may advance toward a more strictly politically consciousness, in the sense of concern for the public interest and for the future, in our population.

Now, how should we define political significance and political responsibility? In my conceptual world the two terms are tied together; I would judge degrees of political significance of research studies in the same way that I would judge degrees of political responsibility of political scientists (in the role of theorist-researcher, as distinct from the role of citizen). A research report is politically significant to the extent that it contributes to the kinds of knowledge most needed by politically responsible political scientists.

"Political responsibility" in this paper refers to the extent to which the social scientist observes the canons of rationality on two levels, which I shall call formal and substantive.^{4A} Formal rationality refers to the familiar notion of clarifying the objectives first and then paying heed to the best available knowledge when seeking ways and means to implement them. Competent behavioral research in political science is highly rational in this formal sense; this is what the extensive work in theory and methodology is for.

The lack of political responsibility that I ascribe to much political behavior literature relates to the other level of rationality, the substantive level, which involves articulate attention to questions of fundamental commitment in social and political research literature. Problems of human welfare (including justice, liberty, security, etc.), the objects of political research and of politics, can be adequately studied, and dealt with, only if their oughtside is investigated as carefully as their is-side. Ought-side inquiry must pertain to wants (or desires or, if insisted on, demands) as well as needs. Political communication must be analysed carefully so that we may learn what aspects of wants are most salient and could be frustrated only at the cost of resentment. alienation, or upheaval. Yet, only analysis of data on wants in terms of a theory of needs will permit us to evaluate wants and aspects of wants with a view to longer-term consequences of their relative satisfaction or frustration.

There will be more to say about wants and needs in the concluding section. At this point it should only be added that the student of politics, once he has adopted a conception of human needs, should proceed from there to make explicit his inferences about political objectives and his choice of commitments with the utmost care. If this kind of inquiry is neglected, as it certainly is in the political science curricula in most of our universities, the danger is that the political scientist unwittingly becomes the tool of other people's commitments. And theirs may be even less responsibly arrived at; conceivably, the expertise of the political scientist may come to serve the irrational purposes of genteel bigotry in domestic policies or of paranoid jingoism and reckless gambling with our chances of survival in foreign policies. If advice-giving social scientists dont feel called on to invest their best

^{4A} Karl Mannheim employs a similar dichotomy of terms, though with different concepts, in his Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York, 1954), pp. 51-60.

intellectual energies in studying the ultimate ends of our national policies, it is unlikely that anyone else of influence will; most active politicians have, after all, more immediately pressing worries, and these are anyway the kinds of concerns they are best trained to handle.

Intellectual treason, to return to Eulau's phrase, is probably a remote hazard in our profession. For, rather than placing himself in the service "of those whose values he disagrees with," the political scientist usually will by natural, uninvestigated processes come to agree with the prevailing values of his profession, of the major foundations and of his government, at least on the more basic public policy objectives and assumptions. His training and career incentives focus on formal rationality. It is fortunate that many social scientists for other reasons tend to be humane and liberal individuals. We will be far better off, however, if we can make it respectable or even mandatory for many more of our researchers to be guided in their choice of theory and problems by their own articulated values, instead of acting willy-nilly on the supposedly neutral values impressed on them by the conventional wisdom of their profession.

 Π

In the contemporary political science literature it is by no means unusual to see the articulation of political norms begin and end with a commitment to "democracy" in some unspecified sense. Fifteen years ago a respected political scientist suggested a more critical orientation: "The democratic myth is that the people are inherently wise and just, and that they are the real rulers of the republic. These propositions do have meaning; but if they become, as they do even among scholars, matters of faith, then scientific progress has been sacrificed in the interest of a morally satisfying demagogy."5 This advice has not been generally heeded. Even today many political scientists are writing as if democracy unquestionably is a good thing, from which unquestionably good things will flow, while at the same time they profess a disinterest in settling value issues. "The only cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy," is still the implicit slogan of quite a few social scientists, who seem unaware of even the conceptual difficulties involved in developing generally useful criteria, let alone a rationale, for "more democracy." To put it

⁵ Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), p. 4.

bluntly, it appears that a good number of otherwise able political scientists confuse a vaguely stated conventional "democratism" with scientific objectivity.

That behavioral research not explicitly related to problems of democracy tends to be vague in its implications for normative democratic theory is perhaps to be expected. It is paradoxical that some of the leading behavioral writers on democracy continue to write as if they want to have it both ways: to be rigorously value-neutral and at the same time be impeccable champions of conventional pluralist democracy. To straddle on a sharp issue would not be comfortable; if we want to write as good democrats and as logical positivists, too, it is perhaps necessary to be obtuse on issues like "why democracy?" or "what is democracy for?" and, indeed, "what is democracy?"

For a first example, take the late V. O. Key's most recent book on Public Opinion and American Democracy.7 Here we are presented with an admirably organized survey of what is now known of the characteristics of contemporary public opinion and of the extent of its bearing on American governmental decision processes. Yet for all these facts about public opinion. there is hardly a hint of their implications, in the author's judgment, for any of the relevant normative issues of democracy; what little is said on this score is uninformative indeed. For example, the point is made toward the end that political deviants "play a critical role in the preservation of the vitality of a democratic order as they urge alterations and modifications better to achieve the aspirations of men. Hence the fundamental significance of freedom of speech and agitation" (p. 555). There is no elaboration of this point, which one might take to be an important issue, considering the book's title and general subject. And there is no other discussion of what purpose all this political knowledge should serve. Is it the "preservation of the vitality of a democratic order" as far as we can articulate the criteria for the best possible government, or for trends in the best direction? What does "vitality" mean here, and what aspects of our democracy are most in need of it? Is free speech valuable solely as a means to this rather obscurely conceived end?

Or take the volume on Voting, by a team of

⁶ The term is from Leo Strauss. See his "Epilogue" in Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York, 1962), p. 326.

⁷ New York, 1961.

top-notch political sociologists. One of the book's two themes, we are told (p. x), is the social problem of how political preferences are formed, while the "confrontation of democratic theory with democratic practice is the second implied theme that runs throughout the book." There is much about certain kinds of practices, yes; but democratic theory is limited to a few examples of "impossible" demands of "traditional normative theory" on the role of the citizen: that he should be politically interested, knowledgeable and rational. These investigators find that most voters are indeed politically apathetic, ignorant and far from rational in their political behavior.

Given the second theme one might have expected the authors to raise some pertinent questions concerning the sense, if any, in which we nevertheless do have a democracy, or possibly the sense in which we nevertheless ought to be able to have a democracy, if what we have now does not fit this concept. Or perhaps an attempt toward reformulating democratic norms in better accord with political realities, if the term "democracy" should be saved for new uses.

Nothing of the sort happens. Instead, the authors make the happy discovery that the system of democracy that we have "does meet certain requirements for a going political organization"; indeed, as it is said just before, "it often works with distinction" (p. 312). What is good and bad about the system is left in the dark, as is the question of criteria for "distinction." Instead, we are given a list of dimensions of citizen behavior, and are told that the fact that individuals differ on these various dimensions (e.g., involvement-indifference) somehow is exactly what the modern democratic system requires. It all ends well, then; and in parting the authors leave us with this comforting if question-begging assurance: "Twentiethcentury political theory—both analytic and normative-will arise only from hard and long observation of the actual world of politics, closely identified with the deeper problems of practical politics." (p. 323. Italics supplied.) Only?

Turn now to a widely and deservedly praised book with the promising title, A Preface to Democratic Theory. Robert Dahl explains his choice of title by asserting that "there is no democratic theory—only democratic theories. This fact suggests that we had better proceed

by considering some representative theories in order to discover what kinds of problems they raise . . . "9 And in the landscape of behavioral literature this work does stand out as an impressive exercise in logical analysis. Excellent critical evaluations of the Madisonian and the populist-type democratic theories are offered; but subsequently Dahl changes his tack to what he calls (p. 63) the descriptive method: under "polyarchal democracy" he seeks to develop empirical criteria for a concept of democracy based on our knowledge of existing species. As we would expect of a competent behavioralist, the author develops some enlightening perspectives on how "the American hybrid" in fact appears to be functioning.

Penetrating as this account of the basic operating procedures of the American democracy is, the author's criteria for evaluating the result are surprisingly inarticulate and ad hoc. He will not try to determine whether it is a desirable system of government, he assures us toward the end of the book; and then proceeds to do just that, but vaguely:

it appears to be a relatively efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in a restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified, and incredibly complex society. This is no negligible contribution, then, that Americans have made to the arts of government—and to that branch, which of all the arts of politics is the most difficult, the art of democratic government.

These are Dahl's parting words.

Having subjected the assumptions, hypotheses, implied definitions, and even the presumed value axioms of two theories of democracy to painstaking analysis, the author's ambition not to discuss the desirability of the American system of government would be difficult to understand for someone unacquainted with the currently prevailing fashions among behavioralists. To study the definitional characteristics of this hybrid species of government and of the genus, "polyarchal democracy," is a worthwhile endeavor, to be sure, but would in my opinion assume far greater significance if pursued within a framework of value assumptions, however tentatively presented, from which could be derived operational criteria for judging what aspects of a functioning democracy ought to be valued and strengthened, as against other aspects that should be deplored and, if possible, counteracted. Why does the

⁸ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954).

⁹ Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 1.

author never say clearly whether in *his* view democracy is something to be valued in itself, and maximized (as he takes Madisonian theory to assert), or as valuable for some specified ends (for example, for maximizing political equality, after the fashion of populists)?

In a Preface to democratic theory, and one which demonstrates a high order of rigor in analyzing other theories of democracy, the author's reluctance even to begin to develop operating criteria toward making meaningful the present system, or to provide pointers toward its more meaningful further development, is as astounding as it is disappointing. Reluctantly one concludes that Dahl in this particular context behaves like most political behavioralists: he feels he can permit himself to write normatively about political purposes, it would seem, only if they are stated in terms of "democracy" and are reasonably indeterminate, lest the suspicion should arise that he is pleading for some politically partisan position. Thus, a demeanor of scientific objectivity is maintained, and so is a persistently implied commitment to a certain political bias, which favors democracy roughly as it now exists in the West, or in this country.

III

Leo Strauss charges the behavioralists with a bias toward liberal democracy, and rightly so, in comparison to his position. Yet in some respects the bias of much behavioralist political literature is profoundly conservative, although this is a species of conservatism rather different from Strauss's. Philosophically speaking, this behaviorally oriented conservatism frequently includes an anti-political dimension which is not found in Strauss's work. 10 What is anti-political is the assumption, explicit or implicit, that politics, or at any rate American politics, is and must always remain primarily a system of rules for peaceful battles between competing private interests, and not an arena for the struggle toward a more humane and more rationally organized society.

Consider S. M. Lipset's recent suggestion that the age-old search for the good society can

10 This is not to deny that the Straussian position is more authoritarian and far less respectful of the right to radical dissent, as is to be expected when a corner on objective truth is being claimed. Cf. especially Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy and Other Studies (Glencoe, 1959); and his "Epilogue" in Herbert J. Storing, ed., op. cit. See also Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Sciences and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's The Structure of Freedom," this Review, Vol. 55 (1961), pp. 550-59.

be terminated, for we have got it now. Democracy as we know it "is the good society itself in operation." Not that our democracy cannot still be improved upon, but roughly speaking, it appears, "the give-and-take of a free society's internal struggles" is the best that men can hope for. Our society is so good that Lipset welcomes, at least for the West, what he sees as a trend toward replacing political ideology with sociological analysis.¹¹

This is an extreme statement, although by a leading and deservedly famous political sociologist. We cannot saddle behavioralists in general with responsibility for such phrasing. But in substance, as we shall see, the same tendency toward affirming the status quo and, what is worse, toward disclaiming the importance and even the legitimacy of political ideology, and ideals, is discernible in other leading behaviorally oriented works as well.

Let us note incidentally that all the behavioral works referred to so far wind up affirming that American democracy on the whole works well, while failing to articulate the criteria on which this judgment is based. In fairness it should be added that probably all these writers would make an exception for the place of the Negro and certain other underprivileged groups or categories for whom our democracy admittedly does not work so well; there are flaws, then, but fundamentally all is well or else will become well without any basic changes.

What is more troublesome than this somewhat conservative commitment to a somewhat liberal conception of democracy¹³—whether ac-

¹¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, 1960), esp. pp. 403 and 415.

¹² An interesting attempt to evaluate the 1952 Presidential election in terms of five criteria of democratic consent (as opposed to non-rational responses to manipulated processes) is reported in Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent (Ann Arbor, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1956). The five criteria are chosen somewhat haphazardly, but they are carefully and ingeniously operationalized and brought to bear on available data. The study shows what could just as well be done, in years to come, within a more carefully and systematically stated framework of political objectives and norms.

¹³ Though perhaps paradoxical, the statement is not self-contradictory. A democracy that guarantees many liberties to people of most persuasions, and in theory to everybody, may well be considered a liberal democracy. Freedom of speech and related freedoms have a strong appeal to most intellectuals, many of whom may be-

knowledged or surreptitious—is the antipolitical orientation referred to a moment ago; the failure to see politics as potentially, at least, an instrument of reason, legitimately dedicated to the improvement of social conditions.

Within a brief space that allows no extensive documentation perhaps the next best thing to do is to consider for a moment a recent example of a behavioralist approach in which, for a change, the underlying assumptions are spelled out with commendable clarity, and then let the reader judge to what extent other literature referred to above may not implicitly rest on similar starkly anti-political premises.

James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock have called their book The Calculus of Consent, with subtitle Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. The task set for the book, we are told in the Preface, is "to analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice"; the authors, both of whom have most of their training in economics, intend to develop what they take to be the rationale for group action in the public sector in a free society—i.e., for political action.

The authors take pains to assert the value-free nature of their approach to the science of politics. True, they choose to go along with "the Western philosophical tradition" in so far as they consider the human individual "the primary philosophical entity" (p. 11). From here on, supposedly, we are dealing with the political processes that flow from the desire of all individuals to try to maximize whatever they may value. "The grail-like search for some 'public interest' apart from, and independent of, the separate interests of the individual participants in social choice" (p. 12) is not the concern of these authors.

Only in one limited sense do the authors recognize a sort of collective interest in a free society: "it is rational to have a constitution" (p. 21), or a set of rules for deciding how decisions in the public sector are to be arrived at; constitutional issues are in principle to be settled by unanimity, while operational issues—all other political issues—must be settled according to constitutional provisions. The authors see no rationale for majoritarianism as a way of deciding, unless a constitution happens to

come staunch conservatives because they believe in preserving their liberal democracy. Some, indeed, will become fixated on the need for defense of the social order to the point of ignoring the plight of poverty-stricken fellow-citizens whose formal liberty may seem worthless to themselves. require it in given contexts; consequently, constitutions can be changed only by unanimity, according to this 'individualistic theory of political process," as one of the authors has lately named the theory. 15

In his more recent statement, Buchanan recognizes as an "entirely reasonable interpretation" (p. 7) that this approach to political processes can be seen as a model for the defense of the status quo. His most important rejoinder is that "analysis must start from somewhere, and the existing set of rules and institutions is the only place from which it is possible to start" (p. 7).

The previously cited writings of leading behavioralists have been less explicit and also less bold in showing the way from assertedly value-free premises toward a conservative and in my sense anti-political orientation. Yet, in all the works given critical attention above, there are normative ambiguities wide enough to make room for a theory such as the one offered by Buchanan and Tullock. This is not to say that Eulau, Key, Berelson et al., Dahl, or Lipset would concur with Buchanan and Tullock in their normative position. But their approach to politics is philosophically similar in its emphasis on prevailing behavior patterns here and now as the thing to study and in its rejection of the legitimacy of normative positions as frameworks for research (except in a normatively ad hoc policy science context). Buchanan and Tullock have been able to explicate in considerable detail one rationale for an implicit stance that appears to be widely shared by students of politics today.

If a similar orientation were to be adopted in medical literature, its scope would in the main be confined to studying how patients choose to cope or at any rate do cope with their pathologies, while omitting or neglecting fundamental study of conditions for possible treatment and prevention.

IV

Unlike other behavioral literature, modern works in comparative politics almost always focus on real political problems; when political institutions are compared cross-nationally or cross-culturally, pseudopolitical behavior can more readily be seen as dysfunctional in terms of some conception or other of the public good; usually such conceptions are couched in terms of "modernization" or "development," at least

¹⁵ James M. Buchanan, "An Individualistic Theory of Political Process." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Commodore Hotel, New York City.

¹⁴ Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962.

if comparisons are cross-cultural as well as cross-national. The point is that developmental perspectives and therefore political purposes are ever-present in this literature, even if they are not often well articulated. Yet, what is particularly impressive in some of this literature is its conceptual and theoretical scope, including the stress on psychological as well as social component explanations of political behavior, and on the need for integrating microanalyses of personalities and small groups with macro-analyses of large collectivities. 16

Concerned as the modern students of comparative politics have been with substantive problems, they have resisted temptations to pursue their inquiries according to immediately practical considerations such as the availability of operational indices and techniques of measurement.17 On the contrary, insistent efforts have been made to innovate concepts that would take account of variables which are not as yet accessible to observation and quantification—concepts such as political culture, political socialization, political identity, and political style, for example. The long-term strategy appears to be to start out with concepts broad enough to encompass all significant aspects of political reality, and then work toward parcelling out component concepts which come closer to corresponding to variables that can be observed, perhaps indirectly and by tentative indices at first. Thus the theoretical working hypotheses can gradually, it is hoped, be subjected to increasingly direct and stringent tests. This is a far cry from the piecemeal approach to political (or pseudopolitical) reality in many other works, which almost exclusively pays attention to disparate empirical

¹⁶ Some of the milestones in this literature are Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 391-409; Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960); Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).

¹⁷ For contrast, consider this statement on the ways of other behavioralists: "The focus of the political behaviorist, however, does not seem to be a result of the state of political theory. Elections have been intensively studied because they lend themselves to the methodology of empirical research into politics." Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delany, Public Administration and the Public—Perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community (Ann Arbor, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1958), p. 2.

relationships while neglecting to consider the possible systematic-theoretical reasons we might have for taking an interest in them.

There is also this to be said about the modern comparative politics literature, however, that its conceptual and theoretical innovations have as yet failed to make a significant dent in the same democratic myth that Almond himselfthe leader in this field—has warned us against years ago (above, p. 42). The dilemma already discussed, of desiring to support democracy and adopt a stance of value neutrality, too, has not as yet been satisfactorily resolved in this literature, either. And this failure is paradoxical in this particular context, in part because the ostensible chief concern is with "development" or "modernization" as the dependent variable, so that the question of development toward what immediately suggests itself. The failure is paradoxical also because these scholars have coined bold new concepts on the independent side of the ledger, and some have written extensively about concepts as far removed from realms of observation as "political culture" and "political identity." Yet a concept such as "human need" has not been touched, and discussions of key terms like "political development" or "modernization" have been hampered, it would seem, by an unwillingness to question whether democratic ways or what kinds of democratic ways are most conductive to satisfying human needs.19

In the most extensive recent discussion of these concepts La Palombara begins well with a warning that what many scholars appear to have in mind "when they speak of a modern or developed system is one that approximates the institutional and structural configuration that we associate with the Anglo-American (in any event, the Western) democratic systems" (p. 10). He calls this conceptualization culture-bound; yet in the same and the following chapter he goes to considerable lengths himself in arguing for the use of the same kinds of culture-bound criteria to evaluate development or modernity abroad. While he contributes a use-

¹⁸ Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., and Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962).

19 Concepts of modernization or development are discussed by James S. Coleman in Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., pp. 532-36; by Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communication and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 14-20; and by Joseph La Palombara in his (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963), chs. 1 and 2.

ful discussion of different dimensions along which political change can be measured, he never inquires whether in other countries there might be other criteria of development of equal or greater significance than his own essentially Anglo-Saxon criteria. "One of the great dilemmas of many of the developing countries," he writes, "is that they seem to want economic development more than freedom" (p. 41), and the last term he takes as a matter of course to refer to pluralist institutions. "Why should it not be possible to raise a belief in and desire for democracy to the same level?" (p. 58). And in conclusion La Palombara asserts that we Americans must expand our efforts to export not only technical know-how "but our political ideology and reasonable facsimiles of our political institutions and practices as well." Without such an effort, he adds, he is reasonably confident that "the probability of attaining democratic configuration in most of the newer states is very low indeed" (pp. 60-61).

The main difficulty with this reasoning is that men are motivated, also politically, by their immediate needs and wants, and not by foreign orthodoxies. La Palombara speculates "whether it would not be possible to manipulate demands so that goals of political development enjoy a status equal to that of economic change" (p. 30), and suggests the encouragement of private as against collectively oriented enterprise for this end. The answer is surely a flat no: it is not possible, in most countries in which most people are economically underprivileged, to create a broad popular interest in pluralist democratic institutions. "Acceptance of the norms of democracy requires a high level of sophistication and ego security," writes Lipset, on the basis of a variety of loosely connected empirical data.20 An active concern for the public welfare presupposes a liberation both from anxiety neuroses and from realistic fears concerning one's own and one's family's physical sustenance, welfare and security. To put it more succinctly, needs for food and safety take precedence over political interest; no amount of political manipulation could be expected to alter such priorities.

To be sure, individuals can be lured into "the game of politics" as advantageous careers under the right circumstances; but is this the kind of political development that the West should desire? If budding western-democracy-type pluralist institutions turn out to benefit only the middle and upper classes—as in many Latin American countries—then we should not be surprised if idealistic students and others

with a passion for social justice, or for politics as distinct from pseudopolitics, may become disposed to reject the forms of pluralist democracy altogether.²¹

Nevertheless, the trend among political behavioralists, including students of comparative politics, appears to be toward a clean break not only with Plato's concern with justice as something above democracy, for the true philosopher; also, it seems that the classical conception of democracy as a system of rational deliberation for settling issues of justice and welfare is on its way out, even as a political ideal. Reference has been made to the ad hoc attempts of Berelson et al. to bring the norms of democracy in better accord with the facts of what I have termed pseudopolitical behavior. In The Civic Culture Almond and Verba present and discuss a variety of usefully differentiated survey data collected in five countries (United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy and Mexico). "What we have done in this book," they conclude, "is to spell out methodically the mixture of attitudes that support a democratic system. If it can create a more sober and informed appreciation of the nature and complexity of the problems of democratization, it will have served its purpose."22 But what kind of democracy? The theoretical point of departure is neither in a conception of human needs nor in the classical theories of democracy, but in such literature as has been discussed above—notably Dahl's Preface to Democratic Theory and the last chapter in Berelson's Voting. In fact, Almond and Verba emphatically reject the classical "rationality-activist" ideal of democratic citizenship in favor of a more balanced "parochial-subject-participant" orientation; in a healthy, stable democracy as they conceive it (and American political culture comes close even though it does not quite embody this ideal), "the democratic citizen is called on to pursue contradictory goals; he must be active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential."23

Perhaps so, if the ultimate goal is democratic stability. And there is no denying, from mynormative position, that democratic stability is valuable, and that many nations ought to have more of it. But is it the most important goal for political development; is it the goal that should serve as the basis for evaluating all other goals (whether wholly, in terms of instrumentality, or partially, in terms of compati-

²¹ Fidel Castro's wide following in Latin America can be plausibly explained in these terms.

²² Op. cit., p. 505 and ch. 15.

²³ Ibid., pp. 478-79 and 440-41.

²⁰ Political Man, op. cit., p. 115 and ch. 4.

bility)? Should we not instead hold, in Eulau's phrase, that "The Goal is Man?"

v

In the study of political behavior, "analysis must start from somewhere, and the existing set of rules and institutions is the only place from which it is possible to start," according to Buchanan. Students of comparative politics have nevertheless demonstrated the feasibility of analysing political developments in some countries in terms of valuable outcomes achieved in others.²⁴ It remains to be shown that political behavior and institutions can be analysed also in terms of normative assumptions to the effect that the purpose of politics is to meet human needs and facilitate human development.

Contrary to an apparently prevailing assumption among political behavioralists, psychological phenomena are just as real as economic and voting behavior phenomena, even though admittedly less accessible to observation and measurement. Some more of the same conceptual boldness displayed in the recent literature on comparative politics is required if political inquiry is to become related to important human wants and needs. For one thing, we need to distinguish more clearly between pseudopolitical and more strictly political behavior, if we want to learn how to encourage the latter at the expense of the former.²⁵

A major conceptual and theoretical task is to develop a satisfactory theory of human needs and of the relationships between needs and wants—here referring to perceived or felt needs. Wants (or, synonymously, desires) and demands can be observed and measured by way of asking people or observing their behavior. Needs, on the other hand, can only be inferred from their hypothetical consequences for behavior or, more manifestly, from the actual consequences of their frustration. Whenever superficial wants are fulfilled but underlying needs remain frustrated, pathological behavior is likely to ensue.

Prior to the development of a viable theory of political development is at least a beginning toward a theory of individual human develop-

²⁴ See especially Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, *The Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1964).

²⁵ However, we should not assume without inquiry that *all* pseudopolitical behavior is dysfunctional for all high-priority human wants and needs; not, of course, that all varieties of political behavior are to be preferred to pseudopolitical self-seeking or neurotic striving.

ment. Such a beginning exists in psychological literature, but it has so far been inadequately drawn on by students of political behavior. Let me very briefly suggest the direction of this theorizing, and some of its implications for the study of political behavior.

Basic human needs are characteristics of the human organism, and they are presumably less subject to change than the social or even the physical conditions under which men live. Wants are sometimes manifestations of real needs, but, as Plato and many other wise men since have insisted, we cannot always infer the existence of needs from wants. Wants are often artificially induced by outside manipulation, or they may be neurotically based desires whose satisfaction fails to satisfy needs, or both. Emphasis on a civic-culture type of democracy as the goal for political development may well perpetuate a state of affairs in which human needs as seen by the political-minded (in my strict sense of "political") will remain in the shadow of much-advertised human wants as promoted by pseudo-politicians and other enterprisers whose horizons do not extend beyond their own occupational or career interests and status anxieties.26

I say may, for I am raising a question rather than adopting a position. In order to investigate the relationship between needs and wants as they pertain to political functions we must start out with a tentative conception of priorities among human needs. The best available point of departure, in my opinion, is in A. H. Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of human needs; this theorizing ought to be drawn on until a more plausible and useful theory becomes available.

Maslow lists five categories of needs in the order of their assumed priority: (1) physical needs (air, water, food, etc.); (2) safety needs (assurance of survival and of continuing satisfaction of basic needs); (3) needs to love and be loved; (4) need for esteem (by self and others); and (5) need for self-actualization and growth. This list presents a hierarchy, according to Maslow, in the sense that the "less

²⁶ Joseph Tussman also stresses the danger of destroying the integrity of political communication when the modern bargaining approach to politics enters the "forum or tribunal" that a democratic electorate ought to constitute, according to classical theories of democracy. "We teach men to compete and bargain. Are we to be surprised, then, at the corruption of the tribunal into its marketplace parody?" Obligation and the Body Politic (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 109 and pp. 104–21.

prepotent needs are minimized, even forgotten or denied. But when a need is fairly well satisfied, the next prepotent ('higher') need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscious life and to serve as the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs are not active motivators."27 Note, however, that whenever in the course of a human life the "higher" needs have become activated, they are not necessarily extinguished as a result of later deprivation of "lower" or more basic needs. For example, some individuals, provided they have once known physical safety, will unhesitatingly sacrifice all of it for love, or for standards of right conduct tied in with their selfesteem, etc.

In a recent volume, James C. Davies has suggested the utility of Maslow's theory as a generator of propositions regarding political behavior, and he illustrates the plausibility (without demonstrating the validity) of such propositions with a wealth of historical and contemporary political behavior data. For example, according to Davies's theorizing it is impractical to suggest, with La Palombara, that it might be "possible to manipulate demands" in economically underdeveloped countries so that widespread loyalties to democratic institutions could emerge: "Long before there can be responsible or irresponsible popular government, long before the question of dictatorship or democracy can be taken up, the problem of survival must be solved so that a political community itself can develop, so that people can direct some of their attention to politics."28 In another context he says, "Propaganda cannot paint a picture which conflicts with reality as it is seen by individuals in the light of their basic needs" (p. 134); the picture can be painted all right, but it will be a wasted effort. And Davies quotes Kwame Nkrumah, whose implicit rejoinder to La Palombara's argument is hard to improve on: "We cannot tell our peoples that material benefits in growth and modern progress are not for them. If we do, they will throw us out and seek other leaders who promise more... We have to modernize. Either we shall do so with the interest and support of the West or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat, but a straight statement of political reality" (p. 135).

One shortcoming in Davies's as well as Maslow's work, in my judgment, is that both authors seek to relate events and behavior directly to the elusive concept of "need," without the use of an intermediate and more manageable concept such as "want." Both concepts are badly needed, and their interrelations and their application in hypotheses must be developed if we want to move toward a more adequate knowledge of political behavior. It must be granted that manifest wants are important aspects of our political reality, especially in democracies; what matters is that we also keep remembering, unlike many behavioralists, that there also are genuine needs to worry about, elusive though they may be to the researcher's conventional tools. The volume of competing loudspeakers, if I may use a metaphor, is in a pluralist democracy perhaps more likely to depend on the power of the purse than on the urgency of the need. Even the most democratic governments are likely to come to a bad end-to say nothing of the individuals living under them—unless they learn to become at least as responsive to the basic needs of all their citizens as they are to the most insistent wants of the various articulate and influential interest groups and parties.

Most of Maslow's as well as Davies's discussion is highly speculative; only a beginning has been made. But their theory does lend itself to the production of testable hypotheses. For example, Almond's theory of political "input functions" (political socialization and recruitment; interest articulation; interest aggregation; political communication) and "output functions" (rule making; rule application; rule adjudication),29 would seem to provide a fertile field for exploring what the participation in or other ego-involvement with each type of function can mean, in satisfying individual personality needs as well as wants. Moving in this direction we can perhaps get away from the customary clichés about the value of democracy, toward research-based knowledge on what (aspects of) democratic institutions have what kinds of value for human development.

I have argued elsewhere that the human goals of politics should be conceived in terms of maximizing individual freedom—psychological, social and potential. Democracy and indeed every law and constitutional clause should be judged as a means to this end. A comprehensive treatment of norms of liberty with interrela-

²⁷ Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 50 (1943), p. 394 and pp. 370-96. See also his *Motivation and Personality* (New York, 1954).

²⁸ Human Nature in Politics (New York, 1963), p. 28. Davies does not refer to La Palombara.

²⁹ Cf. his introduction to Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit.

³⁰ The Structure of Freedom (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958, and New York, 1965).

tionships and empirical consequences is necessary for this purpose, and so is a theory of human needs such as Maslow's, which in effect predicts that with increasing satisfaction of sustenance and security needs men's tendency will be to become less anti-social, more capable of respecting and eventually perhaps insisting on respect for the basic needs and liberties of others.

The normative research³¹ to be recommended can be done with far more precision than was attempted or achieved in the work on freedom just referred to. Perhaps philosophers working with political scientists can be expected to be active on this research frontier in future years. One good example of normative research of this kind, even though its reference to empirical data is for purposes of normative interpretation only, is Naess's study of Gandhi's ethics of conflict resolution.³²

The burden of this paper, then, is to plead for an expansion and a more systematic articulation of the psychological and the normative perspectives of political behavior research. I propose as a normative basis the proposition that politics exists for the purpose of progressively removing the most stultifying obstacles to a free human development, with priority for the worst obstacles, whether they hit many or few-in other words, with priority for those individuals who are most severely oppressed; as Harrington points out with respect to the poverty-stricken in the United States, they are also the least articulate, and the least likely to achieve redress by way of the ordinary democratic processes.33 It is argued in this paper that

In the term "normative research" may be puzzling to some, who think of research exclusively as systematically re(peated) search for empirical data, in the real world or in contrived experimental worlds. And "research" has been one of the empirical social scientist's proud banners in his uphill fight against the sometime supremacy of armchair speculators. In our time a less parochial use of "research" is called for, as a way of recognizing the close interplay between the empirical, normative and logical aspects of inquiry that, as the present paper argues, is necessary for the further development of our knowledge of political as of other human behavior.

² Arne Naess, "A systematization of Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2 (1958), pp. 140-55; and also Johan Galtung and Arne Naess, *Gandhis politiske etikk* (Oslo, Tanum, 1955).

³³ Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1963; New York, 1962).

the current preoccupation with pseudopolitical behavior carries conservative and anti-political implications, and that the best hope for a more politically useful reorientation of behavioral research—in addition to and beyond the comparative politics perspective—is to study how the various functions of government bear, and could bear, on the satisfaction of basic needs as well as conscious wants.

Among the questions to ask are these: What kinds of enduring satisfactions tend to be associated, for example, with particular participant and subject roles established by alternate forms of centralized or decentralized decision processes? Under what socio-cultural and socio-economic circumstances are majoritarian decision processes, of given types, likely to produce substantive satisfaction of the basic needs of, in Harrington's phrase, society's "rejects"?

As so often in our human condition, the dimensions of our ignorance appear to grow larger the closer we come to the most enduringly important issues of our social life. Much conceptual as well as basic psychological work remains to be done before our technical proficiency in the study of the relation of political forms to basic needs and to liberty can come to match the current work on analysis of voting patterns. But in this work political scientists should participate; our stakes in its progress are as high as anyone else's.

One particular type of research that should be pushed, as a much needed complement to the large supply of data on pseudopolitical behavior, is work that would focus on just how some citizens "graduate" from the role of pseudopolitical actor to that of political actor. Or, more accurately—for surely there are more pseudopolitical actors in the older age groups, "hardened in the school of life"—how it is that some categories of individuals (or individuals in some categories of situations) manage to remain concerned with ideals and with politics, i.e., with the welfare of their fellow men, all their lives?

A theory of human development is implied in the research approaches here recommended. It asserts that man is likely to become increasingly capable of being rational, or intellectual,³⁴ to the extent that he no longer needs the services of his beliefs and attitudes for the purpose of keeping his various anxieties in check. Deepseated neurotic anxieties about one's worth as a human being predispose to right-wing or oc-

²⁴ Cf. my "A Social Theory of Intellectual Development," in Nevitt Sanford, ed., The American College (New York, 1961), pp. 972-1005, esp. pp. 978 and 1000-1005.

casionally leftwing extremism, with glorification of ingroups or individuals, living or dead, along with hatreds against outgroups and deviants. Neurotic status anxieties predispose to eager adherence to whatever views appear expected in one's reference groups. Realistic fears about employment or future career prospects predispose against maintaining the luxury of political opinions at all, unless they are "safe." Only for individuals whose main anxiety problems have been faced and in some way resolved is it generally possible to think of and care about problems of politics in terms of standards of justice or the public interest, independently of personal worries.

The development of strictly political incentives in the individual, then, depends on a gradual process of liberation from a preoccupation with personal anxieties and worries. Stages in this process can be identified by research, although our concepts and instruments need some improvement before we can with confidence relate specific categories of political irrationality to (repressed or acknowledged) anxieties associated with specific levels in a hierarchy of human needs. Human nature being complex, so is the task of fully comprehending the dynamics of political behavior. My essential argument here is that we must face up to but not complacently accept, as the pseudopolitical outlook does, the fact that most of our citizens live too harassed lives or lack the education or opportunities for reflection to permit them the real satisfactions and the full dignity of democratic citizenship. We must pose the empirical problem of how the more stultifying pressures on adults and pre-adults can be reduced. A premature ruling out of the classic democratic citizenship ideal, with its stress on reason as a crucial factor in politics, would seem particularly inappropriate in our age of rapid technological change; never was the need for politics in the strict sense greater.

It is conceivable that our prospects for developing much larger proportions of political-minded citizens will improve substantially if or when the "cybernetics revolution" does away with our omnipresent worries about making a living. 5 On the other hand, unless educational

35 W. H. Ferry and 25 associates have recently

and cultural resources can be expanded as rapidly, so that more people may be enabled to base their sense of identity and self-esteem on their own attributes or ideals rather than on their occupational roles, status anxieties and despair about lack of purpose in life might remain at present levels, and become aggravated for some. But the over-all prospects surely would be brighter, to the extent that more of the principal real worries on which our current anxieties feed were removed.

In any event, let us not as political scientists rule out the possibility that a real polity may emerge eventually-a community of people capable of giving some of their energies to political as distinct from pseudopolitical reflection and activity. A less utopian first step that may be hoped for is that many more political scientists will adopt a more political (or a less pseudopolitical) perspective in their theorizing and research. As the horizons of behavior research expand to encompass latent need-behavior as well as manifest want-behavior, our political science will not only produce a new order of intellectual challenge; it may also become a potent instrument for promoting political development in the service of human development.

issued a statement that received front-page attention in the New York Times and other newspapers, under the title "The Triple Revolution: An Appraisal of the Major U.S. Crises and Proposals for Action" (Washington: Maurer, Fleischer, Zon and Associates, 1120 Connecticut Ave., 1964). Referring to the revolutions in cybernetics, in weaponry, and in human rights, but particularly to the first of the three, Ferry et al. argue that there "is an urgent need for a fundamental change in the mechanisms employed to insure consumer rights" (p. 9), now that the problem of production has been solved and the problem of full employment has become impossible to solve with our present system. "We urge, therefore, that society, through its appropriate legal and governmental institutions, undertake an unqualified commitment to provide every individual and every family with an adequate income as a matter of right. This undertaking we consider to be essential to the emerging economic, social, and political order in this country" (p. 16).

CONDITIONS FOR PARTY LEADERSHIP: THE CASE OF THE HOUSE DEMOCRATS

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Political power in Congress, all observers agree, is highly decentralized. The factors chiefly responsible for this are also well known: weak national parties (in the Congress this results in strong constituency ties and weak leadership sanctions over members) and a highly developed division of labor through the committee system. A leadership endowed with few opportunities to punish and reward, coupled with specialization by policy area, inevitably produces an institution with numerous and disparate centers of power. Just as inevitably the politics of such an institution is compounded of persuasion, bargaining, and log-rolling.¹

As weak as the legislative parties are, however, they still provide the major organizing force in Congress. Roll-call vote analyses have demonstrated this,² and a recent study of the

- * This is, in every sense, a joint endeavor. Both authors served as interns in the Office of the House Democratic Whip at different times during the 88th Congress, and thereby had access to the House floor. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., wishes to thank the Congressional Fellowship Program of the American Political Science Association and the Graduate Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin for making a year in Washington possible. The authors jointly wish to thank Robert Peabody, Raymond Wolfinger, Leroy Rieselbach, Charles Jones, Theodore Lowi. Nelson Polsby and Richard Fenno for criticisms of an earlier draft. The findings and conclusions are those of the authors and do not purport to represent the views of the Brookings Institution, its trustees, officers, or other staff members.
- ¹ See Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," this Review, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 333-344, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., People and Politics: An Analysis of the American Political System (Englewood Cliffs, 1962), ch. 6.
- ² Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951); Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958), I, 203-390; David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York, 1959), and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congress-

House Whip organizations also bears it out.³ Generally speaking, the single most important variable explaining legislative outcomes is party organization.

The extent of party leadership on the thousands of bills and resolutions which come before Congress each year, nevertheless, is itself variable. Julius Turner has provided us with documentation of this point for the inter-war years. We still sense this variability in leadership control over issues when contrasting the legislative process surrounding such bills as civil rights and poverty.

An appropriate question to ask, therefore, and one heretofore left mostly unanswered, is: under what conditions is party leadership likely to be relatively strong, or relatively weak? Turner has taught us a part of the answer: party control is likely to vary with issues. Class issues generate the sharpest differences between the parties; moral and "neutral" (in the sense of not redistributing wealth) issues cut across them. But the nature of the issue is only part of the story. Even within certain classes of issues party control is likely to vary from one specific issue to the next. Even on the same issue, leadership control is likely to vary from stage to stage in the legislative process. To these considerations this paper is addressed.

BACKGROUND FOR THE STUDY

The data which will be brought to bear upon the question of variability of party leadership control will be a mixture of objective measures (such as roll-call votes) and more casual empiricism. All the data, however, will refer to the Democrats in the United States House of Representatives when in the majority and with a Democratic President.

The identity of the leaders in the House is for the most part institutionally established. Among House Democrats the Speaker, Major-

men and Their Constituencies (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963).

- ³ Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this Review, Vol. 58 (September, 1964), pp. 561-576.
 - ⁴ Turner, op. cit., pp. 14-15, 69-70.

ity Leader, and, to a lesser extent, the Whip are undeniably leaders in virtually all that goes on legislatively in the House. On specific pieces of legislation relevant committee and subcommittee chairmen and senior members of committees and subcommittees may also become leaders.

Conditions are sets of circumstances of two major types: those which promote and those which hinder outcomes desired by the House Democratic leaders. Six conditions have been selected for analysis. A few obvious ones, however, were purposely excluded. One is the relationship of committee chairmen to the leadership. Another is the character and personality of the leaders themselves. Most students of Congress would argue, for example, that even though any set of leaders operates within rather definite institutional boundaries, it makes a difference in legislative outcomes whether there is a forceful and dynamic personality (such as Lyndon Johnson) at the helm, or a more mild, less aggressive personality (such as Mike Mansfield). One of the differences in styles, for example, seems to be that Mansfield has an uncanny knack of cooperating with the enemy and being firm and unyielding with his friends. Hence, when trouble is brewing in the Senate it is often between Mansfield and those with whose position he is usually sympathetic. Lyndon Johnson's style, on the other hand, was to be cooperative when it paid to be cooperative, and firm when it paid to be firm, regarding almost everyone as antagonists (and hence almost everyone as friends).

The conditions we will discuss, then, will not be exhaustive. But they are important and help to provide a picture of the institutional restraints under which leaders operate. Although the conditions are not, themselves, entirely outside the control of the leaders, they are, for the most part, "givens" in the political system of Congress. This paper is an exploration of the limits on leadership in the majority party in the House of Representatives.

FIRST CONDITION: LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT, KNOWLEDGE, AND ACTIVITY

First, success in leadership is likely to vary with the extent to which the leaders themselves are in agreement. It is a rare occasion when the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Whip are not one-hundred percent behind a presidential program, but it happens more often that an

⁶ See, for example, the stir caused when Hale Boggs, the Democratic Whip, attacked one title of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill during floor debate. *Cong. Rec.*, vol. 110, no. 23 (daily ed.), Feb. 7, 1964, pp. 2406–2408.

important committee member, even the chairman, does not support the President's request. A number of instances come to mind. It was long and widely felt, for example, that until Wilbur Mills, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, supported some version of the President's medicare bill, no program of the type the President sought would be enacted. So influential is Mills in his own committee that he was able effectively to shunt aside this top-priority program until after the 1964 election returns transformed the situation. Otto Passman provides another example. A consistent opponent of foreign aid legislation. this chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee handling funds for that purpose succeeded in cutting the Administration's program drastically, until early 1964 when he encountered a new full committee chairman who was more sympathetic with the President's wishes. We can say, then, that the more united the leadership behind a program, the greater the likelihood the program will win.

Beyond this rather obvious point, however, leadership commitment is crucial in other ways. Leaders, like other members, have a limited number of resources which they can devote to any given bill. In the 88th Congress two of the most complete commitments were made on the cotton bill in December, 1963, and on the wheat-cotton bill in April, 1964. On these bills the leaders worked long and hard and won narrow victories both times. We may contrast with these the role of the leadership in the defeat suffered by the Administration in March, 1964, on a bill to authorize a United States contribution to the International Development Association. The bill was scheduled in a haphazard fashion at the last minute. No whip poll was started until it was too late to be useful. The Treasury, a partner in this venture with AID. was not even brought in to help lobby for the bill. These factors, along with the unpopularity of the chairman of the committee from which the bill came, helped defeat it. The latter element, however, was not decisive, as was shown two months later when the same bill was brought up again and passed by a comfortable margin, after a careful whip poll and considerably more work by the leadership. We can say, then, that the greater the leadership's commitment of its scarce resources, the greater the chances of success.

Even when the leadership is fully committed to a bill, however, there are limits on what it can do. This problem can be explored in part by reference to data stemming from the polls conducted by the Office of the Democratic Whip in the House. The bills on which these polls are conducted represent nearly all of the legislation on which the leadership is fully committed. The polls sought to ascertain how every Democrat would cast his vote on the pending legislation.

An effective limit on the results which the leadership can produce even when fully committed is the pattern of reliability among the membership as revealed by the whip polls. This determines, in part, the knowledge of the leaders about the members. That is, if the members report honestly through the whip organization then the leadership can quickly identify weak spots and concentrate their persuasive efforts on those spots. On the other hand, if reporting is not accurate, a good deal of effort can be wasted on members who are either hopelessly lost or already won. An analysis of the 1963 whip polls, compared with the final rollcalls on the issues on which the polls had been taken, offers some evidence on patterns of reliability among House Democrats.

Ten polls were taken during 1963.8 The leadership won nine of the roll-calls that followed, losing only on the Area Redevelopment Act amendments in June. On each of these ten votes the Democratic Whip's Office attempted to ascertain how 256 Democratic members (excluding the Speaker) would vote.

⁶ The exceptions include bills that are complex and subject to numerous amendments—like foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills. In these cases it is difficult to frame a question for polling. Another exception was the civil rights bill in February, 1964. This was a complex issue, subject to many amendments, and it was impossible to forecast how the bill would be amended. Furthermore, unlike all of the other issues polled in the 87th and 88th Congresses, this bill could not be won by Democratic votes alone. Republican votes were absolutely indispensable.

⁷ See Ripley, op. cit., for a discussion of the role of the polling process in the work of the Democratic Whip organization.

8 Members were polled on the following issues: (1) the permanent enlargement of the Rules Committee, (2) an amendment adding \$450 million to the public works program, (3) a recommittal motion deleting student loan provisions from a Health Professions Assistance Bill, (4) final passage of the Feed Grains Bill, (5) final passage of an increase in the amount of the national debt limit, (6) final passage of a bill giving more money to the Area Redevelopment program, (7) final passage of an extension in time of the debt limit, (8) a recommittal motion on the tax bill tying it to a cut in governmental spending, (9) final passage of another increase in the amount of the debt limit, and (10) final passage of the cotton bill.

The Whip's Office was successful 90.5 percent of the time in ascertaining exactly whether a member would be present and, if so, how he would vote. In 242 cases, 9.5 percent of all votes, the Whip's Office did not have the correct information on the individual's behavior before he actually voted. These 242 cases deserve further analysis, for clues to patterns of reliability.

The leadership in 1963 always knew how 123 Democrats would vote. One hundred thirty-three (52 percent) of the Democratic members surprised the leadership one or more times. Table I shows the distribution of these surprises.

TABLE I. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSE DEMOCRATIC VOTING CONTRARY TO WHIP POLL REPORT AND LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS ON 10 ISSUES, 1963

Number of times voting contrary to report	Number of members			
6	2			
5	1			
4	7			
3	19			
2	36			
1	68			
0	123			

	256*			

* Total Democratic membership, except the Speaker.

Who were more reliable and who were less? Table II shows the average Presidential Support and Presidential Opposition Scores of the members, according to their degrees of reliability, as well as their Leadership Support and Leadership Opposition Scores.¹⁰

Evidently, members who were reported inaccurately two times or more exhibited little difference in average support and opposition scores. Those inaccurately reported only once were considerably more consistent in their party support and those who were never re-

⁹ "Surprises" can come for a number of reasons, including faulty work by the Assistant Whips. But the vast majority of these surprises occurred because the individual member had changed his mind, without prior notice.

¹⁰ The first index is that used by Congressional Quarterly. The second is of our own devising and is based on pro-leadership votes on the ten issues which were the subject of whip polls in 1963.

TABLE II. PRESIDENTIAL AND LEADERSHIP SUPPORT
AND OPPOSITION SCORES FOR HOUSE DEMOCRATS
BY CATEGORY OF RELIABILITY ON
10 WHIP POLLS, 1963

Number of times reported in- accurately on whip poll	Pres. Support score	Pres. Opposition score	Leadership Support score	Leadership Opposition score
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
6	59.0	36.5	65.0	35.0
5	63.0	31.0	70.0	30.0
4	59.1	26.0	58.6	32.9
3	53.8	29.5	50.5	35.8
2	57.8	26.3	58.3	31.1
1	71.3	15.2	75.7	17.1
0	82.2	5.1	94.4	1.8
Average	72	14	80	14

ported inaccurately were the most loyal of all.

Table III shows the regional breakdown by category of reliability. Southern Democrats were over-represented increasingly in categories containing larger numbers of inaccurate reports. Except for the few members in the most unreliable categories, Western Democrats were represented roughly in accordance with their numbers in all of the other categories. Northern Democrats were relatively under-represented in all categories except the one reflecting complete accuracy and reliability.¹¹

Table IV demonstrates that the members

¹¹ For our purposes the South includes all the States of the Confederacy; the West includes all States west of the Mississippi River except Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; the North includes the rest.

TABLE III. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSE DEMOCRATS BY CATEGORY OF RELIABILITY ON 10 WHIP POLLS, 1963

Number of times re-	Per cent of all House Democrats				
ported inac- curately on whip poll	Southern (N = 95) 37%	Western (N = 59) 23%	Northern (N = 102) 40%		
	(%)	(%)	(%)		
6	100.0	0	0		
5	100.0	0	0		
4	71.4	14.3	14.3		
3	79.0	21.0	0		
2	58.4	19.4	22.2		
1	44.1	26.5	29.4		
0	17.1	22.7	60.2		

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF STRONG HOUSE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL OPPONENTS BY CATEGORY OF RELIABILITY ON WHIP POLLS, 1963

Number of times re- ported in- accurately on whip polls	No. of all Democrats	No. of strong opponents	Per cent of strong opponents in category	Av. Pres. opp. score of strong opponents
6	2	2	100.0	36.5
5	1	1	100.0	31.0
4	7	5	71.4	30.2
3	19	13	68.5	38.2
2	36	14	39.0	47.2
1	68	14	20.6	49.5
0	123	2	1.6	26.0

most consistently opposing the leadership were more predictable and were reported more reliably and more accurately than the members who had a moderate record of support and opposition. That is, those most difficult to report prior to an actual vote tended to be ideologically uncommitted members who wavered from vote to vote with their perceptions of how much loyalty to the Democratic program their constituencies would tolerate. Table IV shows the average Presidential Opposition Score of the 51 Democrats (one in five) who in 1963 had an Opposition score higher than 25.12 The concentration of the most consistent Democratic opponents of the President came in categories of fairly great reliability-especially among those where only one or two mistakes were made.

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from this table is that the strongest opponents of the leadership can be identified and reported accurately, if the leadership wishes it. The most consistent opponents' reports can be taken at face value, if time is limited and can be devoted to only a few members. Identifying the unreliables is an economical first step for the leadership in efforts to persuade them to vote in the desired direction.

We can say, then, that the activity of leadership is limited by a ten percent unreliability in the whip polls on bills to which the leadership is fully committed, and that the unreliables in 1963 consisted predominantly of uncommitted Southern Democrats.

Once the waverers are known, how successful is the leadership in lining up votes? This question is difficult to answer by more than speculation. Data obtained on four issues in 1963, how-

¹² This comes from *Congressional Quarterly*. An opposition score of 25% means that the members opposed the President on a quarter of the issues on which the latter took a position.

ever, support some tentative conclusions. These data are of two kinds—lists of doubtful Democrats whose support for specific legislation was earnestly solicited by the Speaker and lists of those Democrats who were willing to give the Speaker a pledge to vote with him if he absolutely needed them. The four bills were those enlarging the Rules Committee permanently, in January 1963, and those involving the national debt limit in May, August and November, 1963.¹³

These data show that the Speaker seriously endeavored to change the votes of about twenty Democrats on each of the roll calls. He received varying answers from them, ranging from flat refusals to all-out promises of support. On each of the debt-limit bills he was successful in getting about eight to ten "pocket" or reserve votes, which he could call upon if absolutely needed. The members he approached were generally from the South or from the Border States, with a few lukewarm Administration supporters from the North included. They were not bitter opponents of the Administration but rather members who wanted to support the Administration when they felt their consciences and their constituencies would allow it. The Speaker did not always approach the same men. Between 35 and 40 percent of those contacted on any one impending vote were also contacted on at least one of the other four votes; or putting it the other way around, the majority on each vote was approached directly by the Speaker only on that one vote of the four.

Nor did the Speaker seem to press the same people too often for "pocket" vote commitments. Only three members gave more than one pocket vote to the Speaker on these four roll calls. These men, two Southerners and one from a border state, were among the most unreliable on the whip polls and had records of somewhat greater than average opposition to the Administration. But, apparently their feelings of party loyalty prompted them to cooperate with the party leadership when possible, or else they hoped for some future favor from the Speaker in exchange.

The polls help to identify waverers, then; and when the leadership so desires it can probably change, at the minimum, ten votes. On

¹³ Note that the debt limit bills all came from the Committee on Ways and Means. Chairman Wilbur Mills of this Committee is an unusually powerful and influential House member and helped the Speaker contact the doubtful members. On the Rules Committee issue Majority Leader Albert also helped make some of the contacts.

the cotton bill in December, 1963, for example—a bill which engendered more than a usual amount of opposition—the Speaker seems to have changed as many as 40 votes in the effort to pass the bill. The cotton bill was the first major piece of legislation to come to the House under President Johnson, and the leadership was exceptionally anxious to win.

SECOND CONDITION: PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

We have already seen that party cleavages are likely to vary with issues. From the data now to be reported, it appears that party cohesion on roll-call votes depends also on whether the issue is procedural or substantive.

Most votes, of course, involve both procedural and substantive questions. Even a motion to adjourn can sometimes be partly a substantive issue, if the motion is directed at postponing action on a bill. For example, a few months before House consideration of the Civil Rights Bill in 1964 the Republicans attempted to bring the bill up for floor consideration under the procedure of Calendar Wednesday. Carl Albert immediately moved to adjourn, a motion that carried along party lines. This was a procedural motion contaminated by substantive considerations. Only at the extremes are issues either purely procedural or purely and identifiably substantive. Other motions may be viewed as on a continuum between the extremes.

The hypothesis offered here is that the Democratic leadership can count on total cohesion among Democrats in the House on the most procedural issue—the election of the Speaker—and relatively low cohesion on the votes that are most specifically and narrowly substantive—those on conference reports and on specific amendments to legislation. But in between these three categories lie at least four other types of votes which present various "mixes" of substance and procedure.

The first of the four mixed categories we have labeled "miscellaneous procedure." This includes maneuvers by the majority leader, minority leader, leaders of disgruntled blocs, and even unhappy individuals, to stall in order to prevent certain substantive actions from being taken or to affect their timing. Some of these procedural motions result merely from pique. Others can be important in determining the fate of legislation, as the Calendar

¹⁴ For example, on April 9, 1964, after the Democratic leadership had kept the House in session until almost 1:00 A.M. the preceding day, the Republicans stalled the House for four hours, using various procedural delays.

Wednesday adjournment example has already suggested. The second of the mixed categories comprises roll calls on rules granted by the Rules Committee for the consideration of legislation. The third category is recommittal motions—procedural motions that are almost wholly substantive in intent. Finally, there are roll calls on final passage.

The data on these seven categories of roll-call votes for the years 1961, 1962 and 1963 are presented in Table V. Similar data for the Republicans are also included for contrast. All roll calls taken during these three sessions are included in this analysis except those on which there were less than ten dissenters. Thus, "hurrah" roll calls on matters involving defense and communism—which are taken merely for the purpose of establishing an almost unanimous record of support—are excluded because they involve no party leadership. These few exclusions leave about 100 roll-call votes per session to be examined for these three years. 15

Analysis of the data in Table V yields both findings and problems—problems because the rank order of party cohesion varied somewhat

¹⁶ In 1961 there were 101 votes to be examined, not counting 15 "hurrah" votes. In 1962 there were 100 to be examined and 24 of the hurrah variety. In 1963 there were 105 to be examined and 14 hurrah votes.

from year to year. This in itself, however, is a finding of some consequence. For the House Democrats, for example, we find cohesion on the election of the Speaker and on final passage remaining about constant, while on more nearly procedural questions of the "mixed" varieties (miscellaneous procedure, adoption of rules and conference reports) it was increasing, on recommittal motions decreasing, and on amendments low but somewhat variable. In a post hoc fashion we can interpret this to mean that over the course of the first three years of the new Democratic Administration the Democrats were able to increase cohesion on procedural questions.

Generally, however, the data bear out our expectations. Taking the average for the three years, as one moves from procedural to narrowly substantive questions, cohesion decreases. Election of the Speaker, adoption of rules, and miscellaneous procedures are generally the highest in cohesion, with final passage, recommittal motions, conference reports, and amendments following in descending order.

Contrasts with the Republicans are also instructive. Generally speaking, substantive alternatives proposed by the Democrats enlist higher degrees of Democratic cohesion. Thus on adoption of rules, final passage, and conference reports, Democrats obtain higher cohesion than Republicans. On the other hand, on

TABLE V. PARTY COHESION ON ALL CONTESTED HOUSE ROLL CALLS, BY CATEGORY, 1961-1963*

Category	Democrats							
	1961	Rank.	1962	Rank	1963	Rank	Average	Rank
	(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)	
Election of Speaker	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1
Rules	83.7	4	90.2	2	94.0	2	90.6	2
Misc. Procedure	81.2	5	83.3	5	89.2	3	84.5	4
Final Passage	84.3	3	85.9	3	85.6	5	85.2	3
Recommittal Motions	86.9	2	85.6	4	80.9	6	84.1	5
Conference Reports	77.2	7	82.2	6	89.2	4	82.6	6
Amendments	77.4	6	73.6	7	79.8	7	76.6	7
	Republicans							
Election of Speaker	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1
Rules	80.0	4	75.7	7	79.0	6	77.9	6
Misc. Procedure	91.8	2	87.2	2	97.6	• 2	91.9	2
Final Passage	77.9	5	77.1	4	78.8	7	78.0	5
Recommittal Motions	87.7	3	85.4	3	89.9	3	87.8	3
Conference Reports	76.1	6	77.0	5	81.8	5	78.1	4
Amendments	72.5	7	75.9	6	89.0	4	77.7	7

^{* &}quot;Contested roll calls" are those with more than ten dissenting votes. The figures in this table represent the percentage of Democrats and the percentage of Republicans voting alike on the roll calls analyzed.

Republican proposals of substantive alternatives to Democratic measures, and on miscellaneous procedures, we find Republicans cohering better than Democrats. Thus on recommittal motions (almost always proposed by Republicans, often with instructions incorporating a different program), and amendments (usually making the bill more "conservative") Republicans have higher rates of cohesion. This can be partly explained very simply, we feel, by looking at which party is leading at the particular time. Rules, final passage. and conference reports are motions of the majority party. Recommittal motions and, to a lesser extent, amendments, are motions of the minority party. Generally we can conclude that defections in either party are more likely to occur on motions sponsored by the opposition. On motions sponsored by their own party, defections are less likely to occur. These results may also be partly explained by a selective bias underlying the cohesion scores in roll calls demanded by the minority. The minority leadership may not press for a record vote on motions it offers or sponsors unless the prospects are good that the minority members will make a respectable showing of cohesion, or that the majority forces will be vulnerable to a split, or both.

Successes by the Democratic leadership, then, vary with the substantive nature of the issue. The more substantive the issue, the harder the leadership must work to be successful.

THIRD CONDITION: VISIBILITY OF THE ISSUE

The effects of party leadership may also vary with the visibility of the specific matter under consideration. In general we hypothesize that as an issue becomes more visible to the general public, the chances decrease that the leadership will have its way with the members of the party. This is grounded on the proposition that the influence of party can be relatively great in the absence of contrary pressures. Most members want to support the party. It is only when party pressures run contrary to other pressures that defections are likely to occur. We would expect other pressures to increase as the visibility of the issue increases.

The major qualification that needs to be made is that the President obviously chooses to make some issues more visible than others by including them in his legislative program. He hopes that public opinion will eventually be mobilized behind these proposals and make Congressional passage easier. Whether an issue is part of the President's program or not is probably the single most important factor in

determining visibility. The tax cut, civil rights, poverty, education, and other such major bills are visible because the President makes them visible. We are suggesting, however, that inside the House the popular opinion factor does not generally work to the leadership's advantage. Unless there is an overwhelming national consensus on some important proposal (and this is rare) members of the House tend to be timid about voting for something that is both controversial and highly visible. Thus the difficulty of the leadership's task is increased by greater visibility.

A second important factor in determining visibility of issues, a factor which may be independent of Presidential support, is press coverage. For example, although the proposed prayer amendment and the attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in apportionment cases were not part of the President's program, nor on the list of things that he talked about, they gained wide currency as important issues, primarily because of their nature, but also because of extended press coverage. It is worth remarking, in this respect, the way in which newspapers attempt to foment conflict. Numerous times during both the prayer amendment hearings and the reapportionment question newspapermen would gather around the important figures (such as Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Judge Howard W. Smith, chairman of the Committee on Rules, and others), and attempt to get them to take positions, state them strongly, and then carry these statements to opposing leaders and so "manufacture" a personal as well as an issue

Another factor affecting the visibility of an issue is its complexity. Generally speaking, simple issues are more visible than complex ones. One of the strategies, therefore, of those opposed to a bill is to oversimplify the issue, or dramatise a single feature of it that will be understandable to the general public. A good example of this was the recent passage of a pay raise for appointed executive officials, civil servants, judges, congressional staff, and congressmen. Only a very small portion of the pay raise bill involved congressional salaries. Yet press coverage and public understanding of the issue tended to focus on this one item to the exclusion of all others. This tended to make that aspect of the bill quite visible and aided the opponents of a pay raise. Of course, the

¹⁶ See Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 54-104.

tactic of oversimplification may on occasion be available to a bill's sponsors, too; but ordinarily they carry the broader burden of explaining and justifying it in all its complexity. It is enough for the opponents to find and exploit one visible objection.

Another good example of a superficially simple and visible issue is that of keeping a limit on the national debt. This issue was voted on five times in 1962, 1963, and 1964, three times in 1963 alone. Although the issue is often characterized as "phony," the Democratic leadership had to labor very hard for passage. Making the issue simple and visible tends to work against the leadership and for the opponents.

The leadership can usually do little to control the visibility of an issue. If it strongly wants a bill, that will automatically make it visible. If the bill is part of the President's program it will by its very nature become visible. The leadership can then attempt to make the issue seem complex. In general, however, increasing the visibility of an issue is a potent weapon in the arsenal of those who oppose the leadership.¹⁷

FOURTH CONDITION: VISIBILITY OF THE ACTION

House procedures guarantee that every major piece of legislation will pass through numerous stages which vary in their visibility to the voting public, the press, the political leaders at home, and even to other members of the House. The hypothesis here is that the Democratic leadership will ordinarily have a greater chance of convincing the "followership" to act in the desired manner on matters that require less visible rather than more visible actions.

The rationale for this hypothesis is similar to the preceding one. Generally speaking, party loyalty is a strong bond. Members prefer, when possible, to go along with the party rather than court the disapproval of leadership. This is not simply a reward and punishment mechanism, primarily because the leadership has few rewards and punishments. It is also a state of mind. To invoke loyalty to the party is a strong sanction in itself.

Although party loyalty is a strong bond, in any given situation it is not necessarily the strongest. For most Southerners, for example, to vote for the civil rights bill is courting disaster at home. However, during the Judiciary Committee's deliberations on the civil rights bill in 1963 one Southerner found him-

self able to vote with the party leadership in committee at a crucial stage, although he later opposed the bill on the floor. What we are suggesting here is that party loyalty will vary with the visibility of the action which the party leadership expects.

The types of action about which the leaders might make specific requests are numerous. The most visible type of action is voting. But the only fully visible kind of voting is roll-call voting on final passage of measures. Roll calls on most recommittal motions are somewhat less visible because the electorate, at least, is likely to have difficulty in understanding what is involved in such a vote. Roll-calls on specific amendments and on procedural questions usually attract much less attention, being interim moves. The other types of voting (usually in Committee of the Whole)—teller, division, and voice—are still less visible. The possible options for a member who does not wish to vote at all-giving a live pair, giving a regular pair on a legislative question, or purposely absenting himself with no indication of position, as well as promising the Speaker to change a vote if needed—have very low degrees of visibility. Voting in Committee, which often goes unreported, is another largely invisible activity open to leadership requests. Finally, speaking and not speaking on the floor, as well as the general line of argument to be taken there, are less visible activities subject to the requests of the leadership.

The Democratic leaders have to worry most consistently about losing substantial numbers of Democrats on the roll-call votes on recommittal motions and final passage of fairly major pieces of legislation. The reason why recommittal motions may rank relatively high in visibility is that they often carry instructions to the Committee to report back immediately a lesser bill. Conservative Democrats can thereby get credit for voting for legislation, but for a more modest program than desired by the leadership. Occasionally, the recommittal vote will become the most important House vote on a bill. The two most recent notable examples came in 1962 on the Republican motion to recommit the Trade Expansion bill with instructions simply to continue the existing reciprocal trade program for another year, and in 1963 on the Republican motion to recommit the tax bill and tie the \$11 billion tax cut to reduced governmental spending.18

¹⁸ The votes on both recommittal motions were substantially closer than on final passage, although the Democratic leadership position was successful on all four roll calls.

¹⁷ For a similar point, see E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960), ch. 1.

On some important votes Democratic leaders can count on a higher level of party support on the recommittal motion than on final passage. This was true, for example, of the 1964 votes on the poverty program. Even members unwilling to vote for final passage will try to retain the good will of the leadership on some recommittal motions.

Division and voice voting, because they happen so quickly, and because few members may be on the floor, or know the nature of the choice being made, are very often simply party votes. Many members scurry from the cloakrooms to the floor to vote in support of their party's side, as defined at the moment by the majority and minority floor managers from the substantive committee in charge of the bill. In informal discussions on the floor overheard by both authors, all that many members wanted to know was the position which the floor manager (usually the committee or subcommittee chairman) was taking.

Teller voting, because it takes longer (and makes it easier therefore to identify members as they queue up to vote), and because members are notified by the bell system, is subject to more strenuous efforts by the leadership to keep members in line. More members are likely to vote on teller votes, and a surprisingly large number of reversals of voice and division votes occurs because the leadership has the time to call members to the floor. These exertions are rewarded by a substantial amount of party unity on most teller votes even by members who, if forced to a roll call, would vote against the Democratic leadership.

In August, 1963, the leadership lost two relatively important teller votes on the foreign aid authorization bill. Rather than risk a rout, the leadership adjourned the House and worked much of the evening and next morning in making sure that sufficient numbers of Democrats willing to vote with the leadership would be present for the resumption of the amending process. The leadership also persuaded many Southern members who did not like the aid programs at least to avoid voting on the teller votes.19 Similarly, on the Food Surplus bill in August, 1964, the House actually reversed itself on a number of teller votes after an intervening day in which a highly influential member was requested to, and did, change his vote. Again, in early April, 1964, the Democratic leadership held a solid party front against Republican efforts to amend by tellers

¹⁹ See the Washington Post, August 22, 1963, A1:1, and the Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1963, 2:3.

a bill establishing a permanent food-stamp plan. Even when the Republicans attempted to inject the race question into the amending process the Southerners held firm. They could act with the party if they so chose because their votes would not be known at home.²⁰

At times the teller votes of specific members can serve as the cues for the voting of other members. In April, 1963, for example, when the Republicans tried to insert a "Powell-type amendment" requiring non-discrimination as a prerequisite for participating in a program of loans and grants for medical and dental education, the Democratic leaders were successful in getting four of the five Negro Democrats in the House (all except Powell) to vote against the amendment on a teller vote. This made it much easier to keep other Northern, liberal Democrats with the leadership.

The success of the leadership in getting members purposely to absent themselves from the House floor varies with visibility of the action. It is rare when more than two or three Democrats can be persuaded deliberately to miss a final roll call. (Although it did happen, for example, on the second pay bill in 1964—in this case a whole committee, made up largely of opponents of the pay bill, was convinced of the wisdom of taking a trip at that particular time.) But it is not unusual for four to eight members to be so persuaded on a recommittal motion, and for many more to disappear during teller votes.

In the relatively less visible activity of speaking (or not speaking) on legislation on the floor, the leadership can control in part even some of the most recalcitrant members, as well as more moderate "mavericks" from the party position. In December, 1963, the leadership was instrumental in persuading one of the senior Southern Democrats on the Agriculture Committee (and an ultra-conservative) to keep quiet during the debate on the cotton bill because they feared his personal unpopularity in the House would jeopardize the bill (he had planned to speak in favor of the bill). In the fight to defeat the Republican recommittal motion on the 1963 tax bill the leadership was able to persuade George Mahon, then secondranking on the Appropriations Committee and a highly respected Southerner with a moderateto-conservative voting record, to speak against the Republican motion. This occurred shortly shortly after the then chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon, had

²⁰ See the Washington Post, April 9, 1964, A3:5, and the Baltimore Sun, April 9, 1964, 8:3.

double-crossed the leadership and spoken for the Republican motion despite an earlier commitment to Wilbur Mills to speak against it. The fact that Mahon spoke, and made such an effective argument, is credited with convincing a sufficient number of wavering Democrats to help carry the vote.

In summary, then, the less visible the action, the better the leadership's chances of holding the line against defectors. More visible actions can more easily become contaminated by other pressures which reduce the chances for leadership success.

FIFTH CONDITION: CONSTITUENCY PRESSURES

Perhaps the most important single factor which helps to explain why a member deviates from positions taken by the party leadership is the kind of constituency he represents. Members like to vote with the party, to be sure, but they also wish to be re-elected. For some members, on some issues, voting against the party leadership is perceived as a necessary step to re-election.

For a general measure of the extent of party bolting on roll-call votes, we may start with the 58 roll-calls in the House in 1963 in which a majority of Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans. On these votes, the average Democrat in the House supported his party 73 percent of the time, and opposed the party leadership 13 percent of the time; absenteeism, in its various forms, accounts for the remaining 14 percent. The average, however, does not tell the story; individual members varied widely in the degree of support they gave their party. For example, eight Democrats (mostly from the North) supported the party leadership at least 98 percent of the time, while five Democrats (all from the South) opposed the party leadership at least 65 percent of the time.21

Constituency influences show up in characteristic regional and ideological cleavages that result in many departures from the party leadership's line. For example, in 1961 Northern Democrats supported the party 92.7 percent of the time on a series of ten roll-call votes having to do with extending a larger federal role, while Southern Democrats supported these same issues, on the average, only 56.4 percent of the time.²² A number of demographic factors, more specific to each constituency, such as percentage of owner-occu-

pied dwelling units, percentage of non-white population, and percentage of urban population, also relate to roll-call votes and help to explain deviations from party voting.23 The well known affinity among conservatives on both sides of the aisle is a further manifestation of constituency influences working against party leadership. For example, of the 58 rollcall votes in 1963 mentioned above, notwithstanding that a majority of Democrats voted against a majority of Republicans, the Democrats won only 47 and lost 11. Out of the eleven lost, eight were lost to the so-called "conservative coalition" (a majority of Republicans and a majority of Southern Democrats voting against a majority of Northern Democrats).

Although the Southern wing of the Democratic party is the most troublesome area for the leadership (and is, as we saw in discussing the Whip polls earlier, well represented among those whom the leadership must aggressively pursue), a significant number of Northern Democrats also, from time to time, bolt the party position. Sometimes this is because they see their constituents as overwhelmingly opposed to the party position. Sometimes they are probably right in this, and sometimes, to their own peril, they are probably incorrect. For example, Congressman John Lesinski, from a relatively blue-collar district in Wayne County, Michigan, was the only Northern Democrat to vote against the Civil Rights Bill; he apprehended that the so-called "white-backlash" might be severe in his district. Congressman Dingell, also a Democrat from the same area, voted for the Civil Rights Bill. As it turned out, the Republican legislature in Michigan reapportioned the state's congressional districts in such a way as to throw Lesinski and Dingell into the same district in the succeeding Democratic primary. Ninety percent of the new district, however, came from Lesinski's former district. In the primary Dingell won handily. Although it is hazardous to attribute defeat to a single issue, a plausible argument can certainly be made that Lesinski seriously overestimated the amount of white-backlash in his district.

We can say, then, that constituency factors, however useful they may be in accounting for inter-party differences, also help to differentiate among members within the Democratic party, and so to explain deviations from party leadership positions. And, since party representation in the House stems from state and local organizations, whenever a member pleads

²¹ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, No. 14 (April 3, 1964), pp. 649-653.

²² Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituencies, op. cit., p. 91.

²³ Ibid., chs. 7 and 9; see also Turner, op. cit., and MacRae, op. cit.

that his district will not allow him to go along with the leadership, the argument is usually understood and accepted. Constituency factors, therefore, are a powerful force in conditioning the extent of party leadership among the House Democrats.

SIXTH CONDITION: THE ACTIVITY OF STATE DELEGATIONS

We have lately begun to learn more about the function of state delegations as informal groups in Congressional politics—and hence legislation. Alan Fiellin and John Kessel, for example, sketch out the informal relationships among members of the New York and Washington congressional delegations respectively.²⁴ Fiellin suggests that informal groups such as state delegations are the principal socializing agencies for the members and provide them with important cues. David Truman, on the basis of an investigation of 23 state delegations, concluded that

the delegation thus tends to constitute a communication structure whose repeated use results in a heightened consensus and similarity of voting among its members. In short, the state party delegation in the House may be a significant alternative cue-giving mechanism within the legislative party, especially on matters whose political implications are ambiguous. Uncertainty is misery and misery loves company.²⁵

One of the implications of this generalization is that state delegations provide important protective mechanisms whereby members of the same state delegation, when voting on an issue ambiguously related to their districts, can partially explain their vote, especially if they perceive their district sentiment incorrectly, as a matter important for the state. "After all," a member might say, "every congressman from this state voted that way."

The support or opposition of state delegations can be of significant help or a hindrance to the leadership. A number of examples will help to illustrate this point.

The first pay bill in 1964 contained a provision for a \$10,000 increase in congressional salaries. This bill, on a roll-call vote, went

²⁴ Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago, 1963), pp. 59-78, and John H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8 (February, 1964), pp. 1-21.

²⁵ Truman, op. cit., p. 250.

down to defeat in March. The pay bill was again brought up in June with only slight changes, the most significant of which cut the increase to congressmen to \$7,500. The California Democratic delegation caucused three times during this interim and voted, in each case unanimously, to oppose the bill unless it retained the original \$10,000 raise. Since the California delegation is so large, and since the bill was defeated even with its support in March, to lose the California Democrats on the second bill would be a serious blow to the leadership. A compromise was worked out. however, assuring the delegation that every effort would be made to get the Senate to support a \$10,000 pay increase: then the conference might accept the Senate figure. A good deal of time and effort on the part of the leadership was expended in these sets of negotiations.

Another example of the crucial activity of a state delegation occurred just before the voting on the poverty bill, early in 1964. The North Carolina delegation exacted as its price for support of the program a promise from the Administration that Adam Yarmolinsky would not be appointed to help run it. Yarmolinsky, an able and liberal-minded lawyer who had been borrowed from the Defense Department for the purpose, had been one of the President's main lieutenants in working out the details of the program. For a number of reasons, however-mainly having to do with his activity in helping to integrate southern military installations—he was not acceptable to a number of Southerners in general, and to the North Carolina delegation in particular. After the leadership promised that Yarmolinsky would not be appointed, the delegation gave its support to the program.

Much of the discussion within state delegations does not take place in formal caucus. Members from the same state tend to sit near one another on the floor, to travel together, eat together, etc. Moreover, in a situation where the natural inclination of the majority of a delegation would be to oppose the leadership on a particular piece of legislation, the delegation will not generally caucus unless its leaders think there is a chance that they will derive an advantage by voting with the House leadership after exacting some concession. On the 1962 tax bill, for instance, activity within three southern delegations was crucial in changing a possible Administration defeat into victory. One of these same delegations caucused on the farm bills (feed grains) in both 1962 and 1963 and as a result gave the leadership 75 percent of its votes, whereas the normal pattern was for only 12 percent to 50 percent of the delegation to support the leadership on most important issues.

At the other end of the spectrum are delegations that almost always support the leadership. They generally do not caucus unless they suspect a substantial feeling among them against the leadership position. The activity of the California delegation on the pay bill just discussed is a good example.

Aside, then, from the usual informal communication and cue-giving which state delegations provide for their members, they are also important as bargainers because in numbers lies strength. If the members of a large delegation can all agree on a position, and all agree on what they are willing to settle for, they may be able to get their price from the leadership in return for their support.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to explore six factors which are likely to influence the success of the House Democratic Party leadership: (1) leadership commitment, knowledge, and activity; (2) the nature of issues (procedural vs. substantive); (3) visibility of the issue; (4) visibility of the action; (5) constituency pressures; and (6) the activity of state delegations.

Generally, we have concluded that leadership victories are more likely to occur when (1) leadership activity is high; (2) the issue is more procedural and less substantive; (3) the visibility of the issue is low; (4) the visibility of the action is low; (5) there is little counter pressure from the constituencies; and (6) state delegations are not engaged in collective bargaining for specific demands. Each of these conditions may range widely from high to low. The number of combinations, therefore, is potentially quite large. And as one moves along the continuum from high to low (or low to high as the case may be), it becomes increasingly more difficult for the leadership to prevail.

For analytical purposes we have considered each factor in isolation. It is not to be supposed, however, that each operates independently of the others. It is appropriate to conclude, therefore, with a few observations about their interrelationships.

The most important of these is that leadership activity is a counter-weight to the other five factors: it is integrative, while the rest are divisive. Accordingly, it will be most needed, and is likely to be evoked most strongly, when one to all of the other five are actively operating against the leadership. This situation obtains when most major bills reach the floor, and continues until the vote on final passage. The leadership intervenes only intermittently prior to floor action on legislation, but floor business is leadership business and it rises to its highest intensity at the stage of recommittal and final passage.

Next, since the leadership is at the greatest advantage in dealing with procedural issues, it can afford to relax when only these are at stake: and if it runs into trouble on one of them, otherwise than from carelessness or ineptitude, the likelihood is that one or more of the countervailing factors is strongly in evidence. If it wins, that will be because fewer factors are working against the leadership than on a substantive issue. Correspondingly, when the visibility of an issue is high, it is likely to be more substantive then procedural, and to entail high activity by state delegations, constituents, and the leadership. Under this condition, the leadership is more likely to win when the visibility of the action is low. When the visibility of the action is high (on a roll-call vote), and is combined with a highly visible, substantive issue (as a major proposal of the Administration's usually is), then it will also be combined with high leadership, constituency, and state delegation activity.

Constituency influences operate irregularly, depending upon the nature and visibility of the issue and of the action. Because constituencies also vary a good deal across the country, few issues will arouse interest in every district. Hence, defections from party leadership on that account will vary considerably from one issue or action to the next. We can say, however, that widespread and intense constituency reactions are symptomatic of high visibility, and with visibility go a number of other problems for the leadership.

Finally, the bargaining power of state delegations—and hence the likelihood of their intervention—is low unless other factors in our review are high. State delegations may be quite active in gaining projects for their states, but on more general bills their appearance is a good deal less predictable. This condition seems genuinely independent of the others.

DEEDS UNDER A DOCTRINE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 1963 TERM*

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Judged by any standards the 1963 term of the United States Supreme Court was one of momentous importance to the future of the American political system. Most immediately, the Justices once again found themselves embroiled in political controversy, their decisions attacked by the Republican party platform, by the Republican presidential candidate and by many members of Congress.

Among the more notable deeds of the 1963 term were decisions writing into the margins of the Constitution the formula "one man, one vote" as the proper rule for apportioning electoral districts for the House of Representatives and for both houses of state legislatures. The Court also invalidated two acts of Congress, and in the field of criminal justice introduced several new principles while overturning supposedly settled law. In addition the Court again struck down officially sanctioned prayers in public schools.

For its part, Congress seriously considered constitutional amendments to reverse the school prayer decisions of this and previous terms, and to modify the doctrine of the reapportionment cases.¹ The House went so far as to pass a bill to remove from federal courts jurisdiction to hear apportionment suits. After a quasi-filibuster by liberal senators had beaten down a stronger measure, the Senate then adopted a resolution urging federal judges to allow state legislators ample time to redistrict their states. This resolution was adopted as an amendment to the foreign aid bill, but was deleted in conference.

The most personal and perhaps the most

* I am indebted to my colleagues, William M. Beaney and Robert K. Faulkner, and my research assistant, Irving Faber, for reading the manuscript and making many helpful suggestions.

1 For the school prayer amendments see Edward Beiser and William Beaney, "Prayers and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Governmental Process," 13 Journal of Public Law (1965). Among the more important of the proposed amendments to modify the reapportionment decisions were: H. J. Res. 1055 (McCulloch), S. J. Res. 181 (Stennis), and S. J. Res. 185 (Dirksen), all 88th Cong., 2d sess. Within a few weeks of the term's reapportionment decisions, at least 51 modifying constitutional amendments were introduced in Congress.

stinging congressional rebuke to the Justices came on a money matter. In June 1964 the House passed a general pay raise for federal employees, including \$7500 for the Justices. Four days later the Court handed down the bulk of the term's state legislative districting cases. During floor debate in the Senate, Gordon Allott, Republican of Colorado-and Colorado was one of the states whose districting had just been declared unconstitutionalproposed cutting the Justices' raise to \$2500. While Senator Allott disclaimed any effort "to slap them in the face, or anything of that sort,"2 some of his colleagues were more candid about their intention to punish judicial law-making. In any event, the Senate adopted Allott's amendment, 46-40. The conference settled on a \$4500 increase, and much to the disgust of some Court foes both houses agreed to the compromise. Three thousand dollars a year poorer because of their work in recent terms, the Justices were reminded of one use for congressional control of the purse strings.

This paper will first summarize the more important deeds of the Court's 1963 term in the field of civil liberties. The second section analyzes the divisions among the Justices on these issues, and the third section examines some of the larger doctrinal implications of recent decisions as well as their possible political effects.

I. DEEDS

As has typically occurred in the last quarter century, questions of civil liberties formed the most significant part of the business of the 1963 term of the Court. These decisions will be analyzed here under three sub-headings, Criminal Justice, Freedom of Political Expression and Association, and Discrimination against Insular Minorities. Reasons for the choice of these categories will be fully explained in Section III of this paper.

Criminal Justice. A large number of cases related to procedural and substantive guarantees in criminal trials, and these were generally decided in favor of the rights of the accused.³ Two

² 110 Cong. Rec. 15312 (daily ed.).

³ The major exceptions were: Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575 (1964); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); United States v.

cases reversed convictions because of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries; another overruled Stein v. New York and held that, in a state court, the voluntariness of a confession must be determined by the trial judge and may not be submitted to the jury along with the question of guilt or innocence. Malloy v. Hogan buried the 56-year-old doctrine of Twining v. New Jersey and applied to the states the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination. On the other hand, six Justices held that protection against double jeopardy does not bar the federal government from retrying a defendant who was earlier coerced into entering a guilty plea.

The Court also rejected Governor Ross Barnett's request for protection of his asserted civil rights. A five-judge majority, over dissents from Warren, Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, reaffirmed the old rule that a defendant accused of contempt may be tried without a jury. However, some of the majority Justices undermined much of the effect of this traditional rule by adding the Delphic qualification that the punishment imposed under such circumstances could not exceed that usually accorded to "petty" offenses. In another

Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95 (1964).

In this article I have not tried to summarize every civil liberties decision of the 1963 term. Tables I, II, and III below list all of these decisions, at least those decided by full opinion. For a more complete discussion see Note, "The Supreme Court, 1963 Term," 78 Harvard Law Review 177 (1964).

⁴ Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964).

⁶ Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Except for two sentences in White's majority opinion, one might have said that constitutional standards would be met if a state required a jury to return a special verdict regarding the voluntariness of a confession. The two sentences read: "Jackson's position before the District Court, and here, is that the issue of his confession should not have been decided by the convicting jury but should have been determined in a proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt and innocence. So far we agree and hold that he is now entitled to such a hearing in the state court." Ibid., at p. 394.

⁶ 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).

- 7 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
- ⁸ United States v. Tateo, supra note 3.
- 9 So Justice Clark said in his opinion for the

contempt case, six Justices found no violation of due process where the judge who presided at the contempt trial was the same judge who had presided over the main trial at which the defendant had been cited for contempt. A third contempt decision held that before trial in a federal court, a defendant was entitled to a hearing on his attorney's allegation that he had been mentally ill during the period in which the contemptuous acts were committed. In

In three state search-and-seizure cases, the Justices tried to make it clear that Mapp v. Ohio¹² imposed on state courts an obligation to follow the same rules as federal courts in denying admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.¹³ A fourth search-and-seizure decision reversed a conviction obtained in a federal court on the basis of evidence secured by state officials in a search without a warrant.¹⁴

Two right-to-counsel cases established new protections for defendants. Massiah v. United States¹⁵ held inadmissible in a federal court incriminating statements voluntarily made by a man under indictment. Federal officers, the majority said, could question a defendant under such circumstances, but they could not use evidence so obtained against him unless his lawyer had been present at the interrogation. Escobedo v. Illinois tried to begin to solve one of the problems raised by Gideon v. Wainwright:16 at what stage of a criminal prosecution does the right to counsel begin? In essaying an answer, the majority reverted to a "special circumstances" rule. After stressing that in this case the accused was a young man of Mexican descent with no previous record of experience with the police, the Court said: "We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawver."17

In reversing a series of sit-in convictions,

Court. United States v. Barnett, supra note 3 at 695 n.

- 10 Ungar v. Sarafite, supra note 3.
- ¹¹ Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963).
- 12 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
- ¹³ Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963);
 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964);
 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
 - ¹⁴ Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
 - 15 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
 - 16 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
 - 17 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).

three Justices (Clark, Brennan and Stewart) demonstrated considerable virtuosity not only in avoiding basic constitutional issues themselves, but also in preventing any official Court pronouncement on those issues, even though six of their colleagues wanted the Court to rule on the fundamental questions of constitutional law. In two cases the Court found state action in the form of official encouragement of segregation policies by merchants;18 in another the Court applied the ex post facto prohibition to judicial interpretations of law and set aside the convictions because South Carolina courts had changed their interpretations of South Carolina's criminal trespass law.19 In still another case from South Carolina the Court again used the ex post facto rationale to reverse criminal trespass convictions and found there was insufficient evidence to justify charges of breach of peace.20 In Bell v. Maryland the Court reversed other sit-in convictions to permit the Maryland courts to reconsider the cases in the light of subsequent state passage of an equal accommodations law.21

Avoidance of fundamental issues did not appeal to the Chief Justice or to Justices Douglas and Goldberg. They joined in the Court's opinion, but in concurring opinions written by Goldberg and Douglas these three put forth an argument that, if ever successful in commanding a majority of the Court, would render redundant the controversial public accommodations title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Reasoning along lines similar to the first Justice Harlan's dissent in the old Civil Rights Cases,²² Goldberg and Douglas concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids innkeepers to discriminate on the basis of race.

Black, Harlan, and White would also have reached the basic constitutional issues. These Justices dissented in four of the five sit-in cases; three of their dissents were written by Black, one by Harlan. They rejected the theory of the elder Harlan's dissent in the *Civil Rights Cases*, denied that anyone could have been misled by previous state court interpretations of state law, and found no state action

¹⁸ Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964). The ability of three Justices to impose their will on the other six may be the result of the so-called paradox of voting. See my *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 85-7.

- 19 Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
- ²⁰ Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
- ²¹ 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
- 22 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

in a merchant's obtaining police assistance—absent an official policy commanding or actively encouraging segregation—in removing unwanted persons from his property.

Freedom of Expression and Association. The 1963 term had more than its annual share of voting and speech cases. In the 1962 term, a majority of the Court had held in NAACP v. Button that an interest group had a First Amendment right to use—and to urge its members to use the judicial process to accomplish its policy aims.23 Brotherhood v. Virginia24 extended the Button doctrine by ruling that a union had a constitutionally protected right to advise its members to seek, in employer liability cases, the counsel of particular lawyers. Three decisions sustained the right of unions to picket in labor disputes;25 two other decisions, based largely on Edwards v. South Carolina,26 upheld the right of Negro demonstrators to protest publicly against state-sanctioned segregation policies.27 Two cases involving allegations of obscenity and counter-allegations of police censorship found the Justices coming down once more in favor of freedom of expression.28 But on neither occasion could a majority agree on an opinion for the Court, and one of these cases produced the odd result of Warren and Clark joining in protest against a libertarian decision.29

In a series of decisions more directly related to political expression, a unanimous Court once again affirmed the right of NAACP members to freedom of association and for the fourth time reversed Alabama's efforts to prevent the NAACP from doing business in the state.³⁰ The Court also held that provisions

- ²³ 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For a full analysis of this case, see Robert Birkby and Walter Murphy, "Interest Group Conflict in the Judicial Arena," 42 Texas Law Review 1018 (1964).
 - ²⁴ 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
- Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); NLRB
 Fruit & Veg. Local, 377 U.S. 58 (1964);
 United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964).
- 26 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
- ²⁷ Henry v. Rock Hill, 375 U.S. 6 (1963); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963).
- ²⁸ A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
 - ²⁹ Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 28.
- ³⁰ NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964). This time the Court's decision stuck and the injunction was lifted. Southern School News (October 1964), p. 7. For a discussion of the background of this litigation see Birkby and Murphy,

of Washington loyalty oaths were void for vagueness. Where the "sensitive" field of dissemination of ideas was involved, so White wrote for a seven-judge majority, restrictive regulations must meet high standards of definiteness.³¹

New York Times v. Sullivan reversed a libel judgment against the Times for publishing an advertisement that accused Montgomery, Alabama, officials of interfering with the civil rights of Negroes. The Times, though claiming the advertisement was generally accurate, admitted it contained some false information. Black, Douglas, and Goldberg would have conferred absolute immunity on newspapers to criticize public officials, but the other six Justices would not go so far. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the majority held that in order to be outside the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments a newspaper's criticism of a public official had to be malicious as well as false. "The constitutional guarantees require," Brennan said, "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."32

In a democratic society, one of the principal uses of freedom of expression and association is to influence electoral behavior, and the Court made the most significant decisions of its 1963 term in this area. The Justices decided eleven districting cases, nine involving apportionment of state legislatures and two congressional districting. Felix Frankfurter had earlier warned that to enter the reapportionment controversy was to throw the Court into a political thicket. His brethren, however, accepted that risk, realizing perhaps that like nine Br'er Rabbits they have historically thrived in that briar patch.

In all nine of the state cases³³ and the one

congressional case³⁴ where the proper apportioning formula was at issue, a six-judge majority-Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan, White, and Goldberg-firmly endorsed the principle of "one man, one vote." These Justices also interpreted that principle to require substantially equal populations in electoral districts for the national House of Representatives and for both houses of state legislatures. Stewart and Clark preferred a more flexible approach than the one man, one vote formula, but both agreed in four of the nine state cases35 that the legislatures were sufficiently malapportioned to warrant correction by judicial action. Clark came to this conclusion in two of the other cases.36 Only Harlan adhered to the view that legislative districting is a political rather than a justiciable

The eleventh apportionment case, Wright v. Rockefeller, 37 revolved around the question whether New York had gerrymandered some congressional districts. Over dissents from Douglas and Goldberg, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove deliberate rigging of district lines for forbidden purposes. In a relatively minor decision, Anderson v. Martin, 38 a unanimous Court ruled that it was a denial of equal protection for Lousiana to require that a candidate's race be indicated on the ballot.

Discrimination against Insular Minorities. The term "insular minority," discussed in Section III below, is not easily defined. Whatever criteria one might use, however, would probably bring under this rubric cases involving Indians, aliens, denaturalized citizens, members of relatively small religious sects holding to controversial beliefs or practices, conscientious objectors to prayers in public schools, procedural rights of alleged security risks, rights of Communists (at least other than those in the First Amendment), and possibly school integration in the Deep South. The 1963 term settled no cases involving the civil rights of Indians, but representatives of each of these other beleaguered minority groups

op. cit. supra note 23 and my "The South Counter-Attacks," 12 Western Political Quarterly, 371 (1959).

³¹ Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).

³² 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), and Harry Kalven, Jr., "The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,' " 1964 Supreme Court Review 191.

Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland Commission v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Roman v.

Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964).

³⁴ Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

²⁵ Davis v. Mann, Reynolds v. Sims, Roman v. Sincock, Williams v. Moss, all supra note 33.

³⁶ Maryland Commission v. Tawes and Meyers v. Thigpen, both *supra* note 33.

³⁷ 376 U.S. 52 (1964).

^{38 375} U.S. 399 (1964).

had their day—and with only one exception³⁹ a successful day—in court.

Even when they did not have a day before the Supreme Court, these minorities sometimes won. United States v. Communist Party, for instance, denied review of a Court of Appeals decision that communist party officers could not be required to register under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because the government had failed to prove that any party official could carry out the registration procedure without incriminating himself under the clause of the Smith Act that makes knowing party membership a crime. 40

Chamberlin v. Dade County upheld the claim of those offended by public prayers, by invalidating Florida's Bible-reading requirements for public schools. Schneider v. Rusk42 reversed a denaturalization order, and in so doing held unconstitutional as an unreasonable discrimination against naturalized citizens that section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 providing for denaturalization of a naturalized citizen who resides in his former country for seven years. In another denaturalization case, a six-judge majority halted the deportation of the notorious Frank Costello. The Court interpreted the congressional statute authorizing deportation of an alien twice convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude as not applying to a denaturalized alien when the criminal acts had been committed while he was a citizen. 43 On a more technical but less obscure point, Foti v. Immigration Service ruled that Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review administrative denials of suspensions of deportation proceedings.44

A third deportation case brought back to the Court the troublesome question of when an American national can be held to have lost his citizenship. At issue was the constitutionality of that portion of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which provides that an American national loses his citizenship by serving in the armed forces of a foreign nation

- ³⁹ Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560 (1964), held that an alien had interrupted his residence in the United States and did not qualify as a permanent resident.
- ⁴⁰ Communist Party v. United States, 331 F. 2d 807 (1964); cert. den., 377 U.S. 968 (1964). Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
 - 41 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
 - 42 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
- ⁴³ Costello v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 376 U.S. 120 (1964).
 - 4 375 U.S. 217 (1963).

without obtaining authorization from the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had reluctantly ruled that Herman Marks was a deportable alien because he had lost his citizenship by serving as a captain in Castro's army after the revolutionaries had taken over the Cuban government. With Brennan not participating, the Justices divided 4–4 and thereby affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. 46

The alleged security risk seeking judicial protection was William L. Greene, whose earlier litigation had been the occasion for a 1959 Supreme Court decision that neither Congress nor the President had authorized in the Industrial Security Program a denial of the right of confrontation of hostile witnesses. This time Greene asked that the government be ordered to give him monetary restitution under the regulations in effect when he began his initial action rather than under later and more restrictive regulations. Seven Justices, over dissents by Harlan and White, agreed that Greene was entitled to collect under the earlier regulations.

On the final day of the term, a group of Communist Party officers succeeded in their efforts to strike down the passport provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. Justice Black would have held the entire act unconstitutional, but the majority invalidated only the passport section. For the Court, Goldberg wrote that in excluding members of communist-dominated organizations from passports and in making it a crime for them even to apply for passports, the statute "too broadly and indiscriminantly restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment." Clark, Harlan, and White dissented.

Earlier in the term the Justices in a unanimous per curiam opinion again emphasized their growing impatience with the slow progress of school desegregation. And in what promises to be one of the last stages of the Prince Edward County case—one of the original school suits brought in 1951—seven members of the Court held that a federal district judge could: (1) enjoin state officials from paying tuition grants to parents of children attending "pri-

- ⁴⁵ 315 F. 2d 673 (1963). See John P. Roche, "The Expatriation Cases," 1963 Supreme Court Review 325.
 - 46 Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
 - ⁴⁷ Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
 - 48 Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964).
 - 49 Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964).
 - 50 Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964).

vate" schools established to avoid integration; and (2) order those officials to reopen the county's public schools, closed since 1959. Justices Clark and Harlan dissented against the latter part of the ruling but otherwise agreed with the majority that Virginia was denying Negro children equal protection. ⁵¹

In Cooper v. Pate a Black Muslim in the Illinois state penitentiary tried to sue the warden for denying him his civil rights. The Muslim claimed that he was in effect segregated from the rest of the prisoners, and while they were allowed religious literature he was not permitted to obtain a copy of the "Quran." Illinois replied that the Muslims were more than a religious group: they were also a political organization dedicated to "Black Supremacy." More particularly their record in instigating prison riots justified special treatment. The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with state officials and dismissed the case as not stating a cause of action. In ruling that there had been no abridgment of civil rights, both courts relied heavily on what they described as sociological evidence—a study by the Chicago police department linking Muslims to prison disorders. 52 In a terse and unanimous per curiam opinion the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for a trial on the merits.53

II. DIVISIONS

The decisions of the 1963 term were overwhelmingly libertarian. Whatever the number and range of factors the Justices weighed in making their decisions, they usually managed to tip the scales in favor of the claim of civil liberties, as the data in Tables I, II, and III demonstrate. Of the 64 cases⁵⁴ involving civil liberties claims, 56 (over 87 per cent) were decided in favor of the claimant, and 21 of these

56 decisions (37 per cent), were unanimous.

In recent years Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan have tended to vote together. In 1962 Arthur Goldberg came to the Court and immediately joined the libertarian wing. Even on the more difficult cases, this group of five Justices was often able to pick up an additional vote from Stewart or White and not infrequently from Clark. Thus in more than half of the decisions that divided the Court, there were six or more votes for a libertarian result.

No matter what the specific nature of the case, Justice Douglas voted for the civil liberties claim in all but two instances and Justice Goldberg in all but three. In contrast, in all but two of the cases that divided the Court, Justice Harlan found a compelling reason—considerations of federalism or the doctrine of political questions, for example—for voting against a libertarian result.

The data in Tables I, II, and III also qualify any characterization of Justice White as being relatively unsympathetic to civil liberties. In criminal justice and insular minority cases only Harlan was less apt to decide for the claimant; but in cases involving freedom of expression or association, White voted for a libertarian result as often as Black or Brennan and more often than Warren.

One of the more interesting sidelights of these voting records is Hugo Black's relatively frequent votes for what is here classified as a non-libertarian result. Part of the problem, of course, as with all schemes of classification, lies in categorizing a particular vote as for or against civil liberties. In many instances a vote may clearly fall within one or the other category; but in other instances the choice is not so obvious. The issue may not be for or against civil liberties, but rather for or against one of two competing claims to personal freedom. The most salient examples of the latter situation were the sit-in cases. There Black several times voted against Negroes' claims to freedom

55 In Jackson v. Denno, supra note 5, for example, I have counted Black as voting for the civil liberties claim even though he filed a dissenting opinion. I did so because Black said he would have ruled the confession inadmissible because it was obtained under inherently coercive circumstances. Black also dissented from the majority view that a judge would be a better protector than a jury, in such cases, of the civil rights of a defendant. He took a similar position on the question of whether the judge or the jury should determine the existence of a clear and present danger. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

⁵¹ Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).

⁵² Cooper v. Pate, 324 F. 2d. 165 (1963).

^{53 378} U.S. 546 (1964).

⁶⁴ Marks v. Esperdy, supra note 45, is not counted here since it was a 4-4 decision, nor is Dresner v. Tallahassee, 378 U.S. 539 (1964), because it was not a decision on the merits, only a determination that there had not been a final decision by the highest state court. The cases in these three tables may be found in volumes 375-378 of the U.S. Reports. I have not listed here those decisions listed under "Memorandum Cases" by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. This classification does not always coincide with that used by the official reporter of the Supreme Court.

TABLE I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES

Case	Vote	Do	Go	Wa	Br	Bl	St	Cl	Wh	На
Coleman v. Alabama	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Arnold v. No. Car.	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Preston v. U.S.	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith v. Pa.	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+-	+	+	+
Leonard v. U.S.	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nagelberg v. U.S.	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Michaels v. U.S.	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
U.S. v. Behrens	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Murphy v. Commission	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Robinson v. Florida	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fallen v. U.S.	90	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Stoner v. California	8-1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Corey v. U.S.	8-1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Hardy v. U.S.	8-1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Panico v. U.S.	7-2	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	
Aguilar v. Texas	6-3	+	+	+	+	-	_	_	+	+
Massiah v. U.S.	6-3	+	+	+	+	+	+	_	_	
Bartone v. U.S.	6-3	+	+	+	+	+	+		_	
Bouie v. Columbia	6-3	+	+	+	+	******	+	+	-	
Barr v. Columbia	6–3	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	_	
Bell v. Maryland	6-3	+	+	+	+	*****	+	+		
Griffin v. Maryland	6-3	+	+	÷	+		+	+		
Jackson v. Denno	6-3	+	+	+	+	+			+	
Fahy v. Connecticut	5-4	+	+	+	+	+			_	
Malloy v. Hogan	5-4	÷	+	+	÷	+		_	_	
Escobedo v. Illinois	5-4	+	+	÷	÷	+	_	_		
Rugendorf v. U.S.	4-5	+	+	+	+			-	_	_
Barnett v. U.S.	4-5	+	<u>.</u>	+		+		_	_	
Ungar v. Sarafite	3-6	+	+	<u>.</u>	-	+		_	_	_
U.S. v. Tateo	36	+	+			<u> </u>		_		
U.S. v. Welden	2-7	+	<u>.</u>	_		÷		_	_	
U.S. v. Healy	0-9	<u>.</u>	_	_			_	_	_	

Pro civil liberties in nonunanimous decisions:

 $20-0 \quad 19-1 \quad 17-3 \quad 16-4 \quad 14-6 \quad 10-10 \quad 7-13 \quad 6-14 \quad 1-19$

from discrimination in eating places open to the public and in favor of the freedom of restaurant owners—in the absence of statutory prohibitions—to select their own clientele.

There is room for reasonable men to differ about which result in the sit-in cases was truly libertarian. Through Black's dissents in these cases, however, runs a theme of deep concern for the effect on public order if a state could not enforce criminal trespass laws against civil rights demonstrators who remain on private property after being told by the owner to leave. Usually when demands of public order have clashed with demands of freedom of ex-

pression—and basically these sit-ins are political expression cases, though the majority of the Court did not choose to treat them as such—Black has finally voted in favor of freedom of expression. 56 Moreover, Black's insistence on the primacy of private control

56 See his position in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). See also "Justice Black and First Amendment 'Absolutes': A Public Interview," 37 New York University Law Review 549 (1962).

⁺⁼ Vote for civil liberties claim.

^{- =} Vote against civil liberties claim.

^{0 =} Took no part in decision.

TABLE II. POLITICAL FREEDOM CASES

Cases	Vote	Go	Do	Bl	\mathbf{Br}	$\mathbf{W}\mathbf{h}$	Wa	$\operatorname{\mathbf{St}}$	Cl ·	Ha
Liner v. Jafco	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	, +
Anderson v. Martin	9-0	+	+	+ .	+	+	+	+	+	+
N.Y.T. v. Sullivan	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Henry v. Rock Hill	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
NAACP v. Alabama	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Steelworkers v. NLRB	8-0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Roman v. Sincock	8-1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Davis v. Mann	8-1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Williams v. Moss	8-1	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Reynolds v. Sims	8-1	+	+	+	. +	+	+	+	+	
Md. Comm. v. Tawes	7-2	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	-
Meyers v. Thigpen	7-2	+	+ .	+	+	+	+		+	
Baggett v. Bullitt	7-2	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	
Books v. Kansas	7-2	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	_	
NLRB v. Packers	6-2	+	0	+	+	+	+	_	+	
Trainmen v. Virginia	6-2	+	+	+	+	+	+	0		
Wesberry v. Sanders	6-3	+	+	+	+	+	+	_	_ `	
WMCA v. Lomenzo	6-3	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	_	
Lucas v. Colorado	6-3	+	+	+	+	+	+	_		
Jacobellis v. Ohio	6-3	+	+	+	+	+		+	-	
Wright v. Rockefeller	2-7	+	+						_	
Rabinowitz v. Kennedy	0-9		-							
Pro civil liberties in non- unanimous decisions:		15-0	14-0	14-1	14-1	14–1	13-2	7–7	7-8	. 0–15

diminions deconstants.

TABLE III. INSULAR MINORITY CASES

Case	Vote	Do	Bl	Go	Wa	\mathbf{Br}	St	Cl	$\mathbf{W}\mathbf{h}$	На
Calhoun v. Latimer	9–0	+	+	+	+	+	****	+	+	+
Cooper v. Pate	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Foti v. Immigration	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Griffin v. Pr. Edw.	9-0	+	+	+	+	+	÷	+	+	+
Chamberlin v. Dade	8-1	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+
Greene v. U.S.	7-2	÷	+	+	4	+	+	+		
Costello v. Immigrat'n	6-2	+	+	+	+	+	+	_	_	0
Aptheker v. Rusk	6-3	+	+	+	<u> </u>	+	+	_		
Schneider v. Rusk	5-3	+	· +	÷	+	. 0	+	_		-
Mrvica v. Esperdy	3-6	+	+	+			<u>.</u>	_	_	
Pro civil liberties in non- unanimous decisions:		6-0	6-0	6-0	5-1	4-1	4-2	2–4	1–5	1-5

⁺⁼Vote for civil liberties claim.

^{+ =} Vote for civil liberties claim.
- = Vote against civil liberties claim.

^{0 =} Took no part in decision.

^{- =} Vote against civil liberties claim.

^{0 =} Took no part in decision.

over property open to the public does not evidence the same sort of value hierarchy as did his opinion for the Court in Marsh v. Alabama.⁵⁷

Black's votes in earlier cases tell a story of a consistent preference, one that makes his sit-in votes seem somewhat strange. But Black's votes do not reveal the entire man; nor do his published opinions. Apparently there has been for some time a strong tension within his jurisprudence. For instance, in Martin v. Struthers, 58 the 1943 Jehovah's Witness case involving the constitutionality of an anti-doorbell ringing ordinance, Black originally voted to sustain the ordinance. At conference and in the opinion he first circulated—as senior majority Justice, Black had assigned to himself the task of writing the opinion of the Court-he stressed that the case involved a conflict of rights, and that the ordinance was a valid means of protecting the privacy of the home. At conference he had emphasized the necessity of guarding the integrity of private property and had expressed fear that the Witnesses would soon be invading Catholic churches to distribute their literature—with predictable results. Black later had second thoughts, withdrew his opinion, and switched his vote. Stone then graciously allowed him to write a new opinion for the Court, this one vindicating Stone's position at conference that the ordinance was an abridgment of freedom of speech. 59

III. DOCTRINES

Protesting against what he felt was too rigid a solution to problems of legislative districting, Potter Stewart charged that the majority Justices were pursuing a particular political theory. Ondoubtedly Stewart was correct, though candor should have required him to add that he, too, was following a political theory, albeit a different one from the majority's. The great difficulty, given the vagueness of many Supreme Court opinions on fundamental principles of jurisprudence and political theory, is to discover the precise nature and implications of doctrines currently dominant within the Court.

Thus it should be said at the outset that problems of evidence require a cautious approach to any jurisprudential interpretation of Supreme Court decisions. The student of judicial behavior is at least as apt to impose

his own categories, substitute his personal judgments, and construct subjectively attractive causal links between concepts when he is analyzing opinions as when he is classifying votes. Determining the significance of a pattern of dicta is no less difficult than categorizing, for example, the reapportionment decisions as basically involving questions of protection of "minority" rights or of free access to the political processes. The willingness of the Justices to compromise their views-and occasionally to change their votes of to gain in intra-Court bargaining or to cope with matters of power politics complicates both kinds of analysis, as do problems of literary style and the pragmatic approach to legal issues that American judges so often take.

One might even go so far as to question whether Supreme Court Justices have a jurisprudence in the academic sense of that term. Perhaps "doctrine" would be less pretentious as well as more descriptive, but as Cardozo once observed, each judge is subject to "a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction in thought and action." ¹⁶²

Insofar as the majority Justices of the Warren Court, more particularly Black, Douglas, Warren, Brennan and Goldberg, can be said to have accepted any jurisprudential doctrine, it is a revision of that of Harlan F. Stone. ⁶³ Widely known as the Preferred Position Theory, Stone's ideas were first articulated in a footnote to the Carolene Products case in 1938. ⁶⁴ The doctrine was originally drafted by Stone's clerk, Louis Lusky, and edited and amended by Charles Evans Hughes. ⁶⁵ In later cases Stone elaborated his ideas; and after his death, his biographer, Alpheus T. Mason, brought the Justice's thoughts together into a more coherent theory than Stone had had an

^{57 326} U.S. 501 (1946).

^{58 319} U.S. 141 (1943)...

⁵⁹ The Frank Murphy Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan.

⁶⁰ Lucas v. Colorado, supra note 33 at p. 748.

⁶¹ See my Elements of Judicial Strategy, supra note 18.

⁶² The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, 1921), p. 12.

⁶³ Arthur Miller contends that it is the political theory of Thomas Hill Green that is now triumphant on the Court. "An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law," 30 George Washington Law Review 399, 416–19 (1962). While I do not agree with Miller on this point, I would like to express my general intellectual debt to this very suggestive article.

⁶⁴ United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

⁶⁵ The details are given in Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (New York, 1956), ch. 31.

opportunity—or an inclination—to do during his own life. 65

As published in 1938, Stone's doctrine listed three kinds of cases in which the Court would relax its usual presumption that challenged legislation is constitutional: (1) where a statute appears to fall within the specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights itself or as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) where a statute restricts access to the political processes; (3) where a statute is directed against specific religious, national, or racial groups, or against any "insular" minority so subject to prejudice that it could not have a meaningful voice in the political process.

The civil liberties decisions of the 1963 term can be viewed as falling under these three categories, and they were so arranged in the first section of this paper, though the titles of the categories were somewhat changed. Not only can the decisions be placed in the pattern prescribed by Stone, but much of the language of recent opinions is reminiscent of the Roosevelt Court in its libertarian prime. In the 1962 term NAACP v. Button spoke of First Amendment freedoms as "supremely precious" as well as "delicate and vulnerable" and therefore demanding and deserving the most careful judicial protection.67 In the 1963 term Baggett v. Bullitt, 68 in striking down Washington's loyalty oaths, emphasized the sensitivity of "basic First Amendment freedoms." In Wesberry v. Sanders, Black paraphrased his earlier panegyric69 of the First Amendment to describe the right to vote: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws. . . . Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." In Schneider v. Rusk, Douglas quoted with approval the statement by a lower court judge—who in turn was quoting Justice Goldberg speaking for the Court—that citizenship is "a most precious right."71

There appears to be either some confusion

⁶⁶ See especially Alpheus T. Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1958), chs. 5-6, and The Supreme Court: Palladium of Freedom (University of Michigan Press, 1962).

- 67 Supra note 23.
- 68 Supra note 31.
- 69 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1941).
 - ⁷⁰ Supra note 34 at p. 17.
- ⁷¹ 377 U.S. 163, 167 (1964). Goldberg had made this statement in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963).

about which rights are most precious or overgenerous use of the superlative. Moreover it is difficult to distinguish rights under the first eight amendments (category 1 of Stone's doctrine) from First Amendment rights under freedom of access to the political process (category 2). The Perhaps the Justices could reduce the problems if they never again used the misleading title "Preferred Freedoms" (to my knowledge the Warren Court Justices have not used it in recent years) and if they restated Stone's doctrine along the following lines:

First, as the highest tribunal in the nation the Supreme Court must be alert to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, to insure that, where officials from other branches of government undertake to use the judicial process to achieve policy aims, judges will proceed with a scrupulous regard for procedural fairness.

Second, if judges are to presume constitutional legislation affecting economic arrangements, they have a heavy obligation to insure the truly democratic nature of the political process by which such laws are enacted. Courts must thus play a special role in guarding the right to vote and more broadly ensuring that freedom of communication—speech and press—as well as freedom of association are available equally to dissidents as to those espousing currently popular causes.

This rephrasing eases rather than eliminates problems.⁷³ Stone's third category, for instance, is the vaguest of the three. How does a judge determine that a group in a highly pluralistic society is an insular minority? Numbers alone would hardly constitute an adequate criterion of insularity. The du Ponts, Harrimans, Rockefellers, and Kennedys taken together form only the tiniest fraction of the population; yet from time to time they give evidence of being able to stand on their own feet politically.

Race may not be a very useful criterion either. At one time it might have made sense to put most of the Negro cases under this third rubric. Since 1954, however, much racial litigation could just as logically be classed under the Court's role of protecting the democratic nature of the political process. Indeed, one authoritative commentator has suggested that the basic justification for judicial action to end publicly sanctioned segregation can be found under Stone's second category: free access to

⁷² The reason for this overlap is explained in Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone*, ch. 31.

⁷³ For a perceptive critique of Stone's doctrine, see George Braden, "The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law," 57 Yale Law Journal 571 (1948).

political process can have no real meaning in a society where government authority imposes caste lines among citizens.⁷⁴

Some of the difficulties of this third category could be lessened if it were rephrased to read:

Courts have a third special obligation, that of making sure that regulations affecting social or political freedom, particularly where the freedom of specific groups is immediately involved, meet the highest standards of equal protection of the law. In applying these standards the Court will be obliged to look carefully at the actual impact of a regulation, as Yick Wo v. Hopkins 15 so eloquently promised.

There are still other problems inherent in any rejuvenation of Stone's doctrine. First, it does not provide a set of objective standards to guide decision-making. Even those who accept the doctrine may differ fundamentally about important kinds of decisions it requires. Stone, for instance, was adamant in insisting that courts should keep out of the apportionment controversy. At the conference discussion of Colegrove v. Green, 78 so Justice Murphy recorded in his notes, Stone said that judicial intervention in legislative districting "would create confusion in each state. It isn't court business." Again according to Murphy's notes, Justices Black and Rutledge at first agreed with Stone. The original vote on Colegrove was 6-1, with Murphy "passing," Jackson not participating and Douglas dissenting alone.77 Black and to some extent Rutledge later changed their minds. Stone did not live to do

A jurisprudence is not, to be sure, a rigid set of formulae designed to supply quick answers to specific and complex social conflicts. It is to a large extent a means of ordering values—and hopefully shaping attitudes and behavior—in terms of ends that are justified by relatively abstract, morally desirable, and intellec-

⁷⁴ Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren, chs. 5-6.

75 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).

76 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

⁷⁷ Murphy Papers and the Harold H. Burton Papers, the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. I am indebted to Mr. Edward Beiser of Princeton for this latter reference. My interpretation of Murphy's notes was that he first voted with Stone; but Burton's docket book records Murphy as passing and Burton's conference notes report Murphy voted with Douglas. These discrepancies indicate the difficulties the Justices must face in determining their colleagues' views, and serve also as a warning about the historical value of notes jotted down during a lively debate.

tually defensible principles. Nevertheless one may charge that, even as restated here, Stone's doctrine is still defective: insofar as it orders values it does so more in terms of desired procedures than of general goals. If this is a defect, it is one shared by much of American political thought.⁷⁸

A more practical difficulty is that Stone's doctrine offers a role for the Court in only one part, although an important part, of its work. The doctrine offers no help at all in fields where the questions do not involve basic constitutional issues, where for example Congress has formulated only vague general statements of policy and left it to judges or administrators to fill in the wide policy gaps. Does deference to Congress require the Court to make such policy, or does self-restraint require the Justices to override congressional judgment? A complete role theory would have to offer guidelines here, for this kind of problem arises rather often, and it goes to the heart of the function of the Court in the political system.79

Whatever the shortcomings of Stone's doctrine, if the Justices have decided to accept it, scholars can do little beyond writing critical articles and books in an effort to steer the Court onto more promising jurisprudential paths. Other public officials, however, may make the Justices pay a high price for following Stone's doctrine, for it prescribes a very controversial role for the Court, one beset with political no less than with intellectual pitfalls.

Most responsible people would concede that protecting the integrity of the judicial process is a proper task for an appellate tribunal, though there might be—and with the Supreme Court there often is—deep and widespread doubt that a particular court is playing that role properly. On the other hand, there is more widespread and far deeper doubt that protecting the democratic character of the political process is a proper role for the judiciary. Moreover, protection of unpopular and insular minorities—however insular is defined—is by definition likely to be itself an unpopular task. By embarking on a libertarian course that to many people appears to be unduly technical

78 Yves Simon, The Philosophy of Democratic Government (University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 123, says that in a democratic society "deliberation is about means and presupposes that the problem of ends has been settled."

79 See Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court (New York, 1964); and my "Congressional Reliance on Judicial Law-Making," a paper delivered at the 1963 meetings of the American Political Science Association.

in protecting the rights of persons accused of crime, by being solicitous of the political rights of "radicals" and "subversives," and by being acutely sensitive to the civil rights of minorities who wish to rise above their "place" in society, the Justices may invite, as they did in 1954–58, the formation of a powerful coalition determined to overturn a number of individual decisions if not to curb the very authority of the Court. ⁸⁰

One might speculate, therefore, that a libertarian Justice or group of Justices might recognize the dangers confronting their doctrine and might decide that the most prudent course would be to alter the political climate within which the Court operates. In a sense every judicial opinion is an effort to create or maintain a favorable climate of opinion by offering a reasoned explanation for a given decision. The Justices have open to them other means of influencing public opinion, 81 but they might also decide to strike directly at their opponents. Thus a brash observer might see the reapportionment cases as both a part of the Court's general libertarian orientation and as a means to translate that orientation into viable public policy. The majority Justices, this observer might reason, have decided to alter in a drastic way the power of the people most likely to oppose the Court's policies. That is, by their reapportionment decisions, the Justices may have deliberately set out to revamp the political processes and to change the character of the interests and segments of opinion that a majority of legislators are likely to represent.

First of all it must be said that the direct evidence in support of this power-politics interpretation is just about nonexistent. It is true that the reapportionment decisions endorsing the one man, one vote formula occurred only after Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan had experienced severe difficulties with Congress and state legislatures and had seen their majority within the Court on some civil liberties issues temporarily wither away. It is also true that as men of considerable political experience—and acumen—the majority Justices must have been aware of the hostile attitudes of many other public officials toward recent libertarian decisions and aware as well of the potential effect of the reapportionment decisions on the structure of political power in this country.

Nevertheless, experience and awareness are

not sufficient of themselves to prove or even strongly indicate intent. There is also a time problem here. For years before the Warren Court's problems with other public officials, Black and Douglas had been urging the Court to decide reapportionment cases on their merits.82 And for some time the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan had been indicating that they, too, thought the Court should be hearing such cases.83 Furthermore, Justice White, who joined in the reapportionment decisions and in most of the other political freedom rulings, was much more often than not opposed to a libertarian result in non-unanimous criminal justice and insular minority cases. One would not, therefore, expect him to be anxious to join in an effort to weaken the chances of some of his own views becoming viable public policy, unless of course those particular views were relatively unimportant to him.84

While this power interpretation has no direct evidential support at this time, it is worth pursuing because considerations of political power can never be very far removed from analysis of Supreme Court decisions. This explanation has at least the merit of directing attention to the impact of judicial decisions on public policy and more particularly to the ability of a court to change the nature of the political system within which it operates. That change may be no less significant because the judges did not think through the implications of their decisions and did not deliberately plot a revolution by judicial fiat. No serious student of public law has ever doubted the immense power of the Justices. but this power has usually been viewed in terms of a capacity to limit the authority of other public officials or, less frequently, of increasing their authority by validating controversial courses of action.85 These are significant exer-

⁸² For example: Colegrove v. Green, supra note 76; MacDougal v. Green, 325 U.S. 281 (1948); and South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950). The other decisions are summarized in Jo Desha Lucas, "Dragon in the Thicket," 1961 Supreme Court Review 194.

83 Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958).

⁸⁴ It is very possible that in the sit-in cases White's values in the criminal justice field clashed with his values in the political freedom field. White voted to affirm the sit-in convictions in each decision that divided the Court.

⁸⁵ See Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," 6 Journal of Public Law 279 (1957); and Charles Black, The People and the Court (New York, 1960).

⁸⁰ See my Congress and the Court (University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁸¹ See my Elements of Judicial Strategy.

cises of power, but hardly as significant as the capacity of the Court to change the character of our entire system of representation.

Without denying the potentially revolutionary effect of the reapportionment decisions-again whether intended or not-one might question whether that effect may not be so gradual as to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. At the outset, one cannot say with any degree of certainty what immediate impact these cases will have. No doubt urban and suburban areas currently are badly underrepresented in Congress as well as in most state legislatures. But how much and exactly how these areas will gain politically depends on how electoral lines are redrawn. Linking of suburban and rural areas in the same districts could have a very different effect from linking suburban and urban areas, or from carving new districts from within urban or suburban regions.

It must also be remembered that new electoral lines will be drawn by legislators chosen under the old-and unfair-system. And it is possible to gerrymander districts of equal population. Indeed, given a pluralistic society, it is probably impossible to construct any representation lines that do not give advantages to one party or to one kind of interest over another. How judges can distinguish inevitable advantage from subtle deliberate rigging, and what they will be able to do about gerrymandering if they detect it, remain to be seen. Here, certainly, is an area in which there are few established judicial standards of judgment.86 Gomillion v. Lightfoot87 did invalidate a crude effort by Alabama officials to gerrymander Tuskegee, but in that situation race was the sole criterion for districting used by the state. When legislators are less crass, judicial difficulties will increase, as indicated by the Court's refusal to grapple with gerrymandering in Wright v. Rockefeller.88

Second, insofar as the Justices have increased urban political power, they may have

. 86 State courts have applied such standards as contiguity and compactness to districting, but these would hardly seem to make gerrymandering very difficult. See Anthony Lewis, "Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts," 71 Harvard Law Review 1057, 1066-70 (1958). For an analysis of some of the more commonly used apportioning formulae and suggestions for improvement, see: Alan L. Clem, "Measuring Legislative Malapportionment: In Search of a Better Yardstick," 7 Midwest Journal of Political Science 125 (1963).

weakened or at best have done nothing to increase political support for civil rights. Put quite simply, support for the welfare state does not automatically carry with it respect for the rights of dissenters or tolerance toward other minorities. Available evidence, while hardly conclusive, indicates that although urban working classes may be economically liberal, they are hardly libertarian. 89 They may be somewhat more so than farmers; but by being more exposed to political communication, blue collar workers may also be more vulnerable to rabble-rousing and may choose representatives who are less sympathetic to civil liberties than rural conservatives would be. Cries like "Wipe out crime in the streets!" may strike closer to home in the cities and are not likely to generate support for libertarian decisions in the criminal justice field. The Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,90 while it did free the Times from what was clearly political oppression, formulated a general doctrine of constitutional law that will make it more difficult to control political smears and reckless campaign charges. In fact one of the first uses of the Times decision was to reverse a libel judgment growing out of an irresponsible campaign slur. Washington state representative John Goldmark had obtained a \$40,000 verdict against a group who had called him a subversive during the 1962 campaign, but the superior court judge ordered a new trial on the ground that the instructions to the jury had not conformed to the standards laid down in the Times opinion.91

On the other hand, it is probable that the reapportionment decisions will also increase the political influence of the suburbs, perhaps more so than that of the old urban centers. In the middle and upper income groups that

⁸⁹ Much of the available evidence is summarized in Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), ch. 4.

90 Supra note 32.

⁹¹ New York Times, December 10, 1964, 23: 1. See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), invalidating a Los Angeles ordinance requiring that handbills disclose the name of the publisher and the distributor. For discussions of the serious nature of the problem of securing intelligent and thoughtful political debate, consult the two books by Stanley Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), and Political Campaigning (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1960); and Frank Jonas, "The Art of Political Dynamiting," 10 Western Political Quarterly 374 (1957).

^{87 364} U.S. 339 (1960).

⁸⁸ Supra note 37.

populate the suburbs, the Justices may well find greater support for libertarian decisions, especially for those whose impact does not immediately occur next door. But the Justices are also children of the New Deal-in one or two cases the relationship is avuncular-and economic liberalism is almost as much a part of their background as is devotion to civil liberties. Insofar as the reapportionment decisions increase the political influence of the suburbs, their effect may run counter to economic liberalism in many respects. Suburbanites are apt to back government spending policies from which they benefit, such as improved highways and subsidies to commuter railroads. It is questionable how these people will react to other aspects of the welfare state.92

Third, it does seem very probable that Negro political influence will be increased, particularly in the South, since it is apparently more difficult to discriminate against Negro voters in urban areas. 33 This change may to some extent cut down the incidence of race-baiting, though alone it will by no means end such demagoguery. And while increased representation in southern state legislatures will not automatically bring about the collapse of resistance to integration, such representation will at least turn these legislatures into a forum in which both sides will be heard. 34

Increased Negro political influence will certainly help ease some racial problems; but, judging from past experience, it is not at all improbable that Negroes will be as callous toward the rights of other minority groups as whites have been toward those of the Negro. Perhaps more significant than scattered indications among Negroes of anti-semitism⁹⁵ and

⁹² See James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this Review, Vol. 58 (Dec. 1964), pp. 876-887.

93 See 1961 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1961), Bk I.

⁹⁴ Georgia, for instance, in 1962 elected to its state legislature the first Negro since Reconstruction. Albert Saye, "Revolution by Judicial Action in Georgia," 17 Western Political Quarterly 10 (1964).

⁹⁵ The New York office of the Anti-Defamation League has a thick file of newspaper reports and analyses of anti-semitism among Negroes. While this evidence is not conclusive in proving the widespread existence of anti-semitism among Negroes, it is still disconcerting to those who had hoped that the Negro would learn and profit from the experience of his white brethren. These reports would come as no surprise to those who

more overt hostility toward Puerto Ricans, is the past behavior of white ethnic groups. A recent status as a member of a lower caste group does not appear to have made whites more tolerant of newer immigrants into American society. Irish resentment of Poles and Italians has been as bitter as Yankee disdain for the Irish; and outside the South, white opposition to civil rights legislation—though obviously not against Lyndon Johnson—seems to have its strongest emotional base in working class neighborhoods of first and second generation Americans.⁹⁶

Fourth, it is naive to think that changing the nature of electoral districts will immediately change the nature of the legislative process. Because of public ignorance and apathy on many issues, legislators have considerable leeway in voting for or against measures and far wider freedom in allowing themselves to be placed in a position not to vote at all. The fundamental fact here may be that a legislature is a social system as well as a political institution, a social system in which the character of constituents is an important factor, but only one of many operative factors. 97

Furthermore, although dramatic civil liberties issues are occasionally fought out in the legislative arena, probably the more usual context for these problems, whether of discrimination against minorities, criminal justice, or political freedom, is within the jurisdiction of local police and local prosecutors. It is true that these officials may be applying statutes formally passed by state legislatures or ordinances that technically owe their legality to legislative sufferance; but these regulations typically allow broad administrative discretion,

accept the thesis of E. Franklin Frazier in his Black Bourgeoisie (New York, 1957).

For discussions of Negro-Jewish relations, see especially: Kenneth B. Clark, "Candor about Negro-Jewish Relations," 1 Commentary 8 (Feb., 1946); James Baldwin, "The Harlem Ghetto: Winter 1948," 5 Commentary 165 (Feb., 1948); Nathan Glazer, "Negroes and Jews: The New Challenge to Pluralism," 38 Commentary (Dec., 1964); and R. C. Hertz, "Rising Tide of Negro-Jewish Tensions," 20 Ebony 117 (Dec., 1964).

⁹⁶ Direct evidence here is lacking. I say "seems" and base this statement on numerous newspaper stories in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post and Times-Herald* during the fall of 1964 and on my own experience in working for the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in New Jersey.

⁹⁷ See John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962).

and it is difficult to see how they could be otherwise drawn, given the complexity of the problems with which they deal. Ordinary breach of the peace regulations provide ample discretion for local officials to do a thorough job of curtailing civil liberties.

It is also true that strong legislative support for or against certain actions may influence police and prosecutor decisions. This influence, however, may trickle down rather slowly, and a few strategically placed legislators who are hostile to libertarian judicial decisions may encourage police to persist in practices of which judges disapprove.

IV. TOWARD A NEW JURISPRUDENCE

The work of the 1963 term reveals a libertarian majority solidly in control of the Court. Insofar as these Justices have adopted a revised version of Stone's jurisprudence, they are applying it in a more positive fashion than Stone envisioned.98 Instead of merely checking governmental action—though they are doing that in many instances—the Justices are also pushing and shaping governmental action to cope with the problems of twentieth century American society. They have accepted the necessity of big government to help run the complex economy of an urban, industrialized society. But as intellectual heirs of a liberal tradition, the Justices have not lost their fear of government as an oppressor of personal freedom. Nor have they lost their fear of the dangers to personal freedom from non-governmental action.

Edward S. Corwin once showed that historically the basic doctrine of American constitutional law had been one of vested rights99 -a doctrine that eventually asserted an almost unrestricted liberty to use, dispose of, and contract for property and labor. That doctrine died in 1937. Since then the Justices have been formulating, not always deliberately or perhaps even consciously, a new jurisprudence for the welfare state. This new jurisprudence has many facets, but its core, I believe, is composed of two concepts: freedom and social equality. "Freedom" here has been modified to mean political not economic freedom, for the Court has encouraged-not merely tolerated-government regulation of the economy.100 For its part, the concept of equality includes but goes far beyond the old common law standard of equal justice within the courtroom between rich and poor. The new concept is much broader in scope and more activist in effect. It requires judges as well as other government officials to foster equality within society as a whole. 101 The Justices have deemed this aspect of constitutional law so important as to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause into the Bill of Rights. 102

The old jurisprudence was subject to serious tensions, and judicial inability to adjust the doctrine of vested rights to a mass, industrialized society led to its downfall. The new jurisprudence, too, is not without its tensions, as the discussion of the possible impact of the reapportionment decisions tried to illustrate. A more fundamental tension, despite a recent denial by Mr. Justice Goldberg, 103 is that between social equality and political freedom. In a society of men of unequal talent, ambition, and character, political freedom may be as dangerous to social equality as economic freedom was. This is not to deny that the Justices may be able to find a way that will allow much of both values to become operational, only to caution that their mutual existence may depend on a delicate process of reconciliation.

The Justices may lack a fully articulated theory of politics to explain and justify their role, or their variety of roles, in the American

100 For example: American Power & Light Co.
v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963); Interstate Natural Gas Co.
v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

¹⁰¹ See, for example: Steele v. L. & N. Rr., 323
U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323
U.S. 210 (1944); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948); Graham v. Brotherhood, 338 U.S. 232
(1949); Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768
(1952); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
Brown v. Board, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

102 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

103 "Equality in Governmental Action," 39 New York University Law Review 205 (1964). At one point Goldberg stated that he believes the framers of the Constitution "naturally assumed that [equality] was encompassed within the concept of liberty." Ibid., p. 207. On this point, Philip Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government," 78 Harvard Law Review 143 (1964), has angrily lashed back at Goldberg in particular and the recent work of the Court in general.

⁹⁸ For a related but somewhat different thesis, see Miller, op. cit., supra note 63.

⁹⁹ "The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law," 12 Michigan Law Review 247 (1914).

political system. They may also lack a coherent philosophy of law to balance liberty against equality and to direct governmental action into socially beneficial channels with a minimum of flooding onto the plains of personal freedom. Yet the Justices do not seem to lack

a sense of political direction. Their positive approach to problems of law and policy may mean that they are making different kinds of law than they were thirty years ago; they are hardly making less important law—or less important policy.

MAO TSE-TUNG'S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND PEKING'S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR*

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Despite its political implications, the recent explosion of an atomic device has not greatly altered China's present military position vis-àvis the West. By all standards except population and size. Communist China is still not a first-rate power. But she has nevertheless proceeded to engage the two superpowers simultaneously in a contest from her position of military and economic weakness. What is equally undeniable is that the success of Peking's foreign policy in the struggle with both superpowers, though limited and perhaps only temporary, has considerably exceeded anticipations based on her military and economic strengths. It is the contention of this paper that an explanation of these two striking facts must be sought in the nature of Mao's revolutionary strategy in the Chinese internal political-military struggle and his belief in the applicability of this strategy to the international arena and to other countries, particularly those in the underdeveloped areas. Mao dared to challenge the militarily and economically strong United States because his revolutionary experience proved to his own satisfaction that his integrated and comprehensive strategy would enable him presently to score political gains from a position of military inferiority, and ultimately enable him to achieve highly ambitious objectives with initially meager means in a protracted struggle. This conviction also explains in part his willingness to challenge the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" even at the cost of losing Soviet economic aid and at the risk of an open split in the international communist movement.

The key to the understanding of Communist China's foreign policy lies, accordingly, in Mao's revolutionary strategy and its projec-

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tion abroad. This paper begins with a brief examination of the various factors facilitating the Chinese Communists' projection of their revolutionary strategy abroad and with the enumeration of some items of evidence of this relationship between international behavior and revolutionary strategy. It then seeks to define the nature of Mao's revolutionary strategy by an end-means analysis and to show how the various elements of that strategy form a unified and intelligible structure. This reconstruction of Mao's revolutionary strategy on the basis of his writings and his actions is carried out with the hope that it might serve as an initial step in, and a provisional guide for, intensive research on the Chinese Communist revolution. It might also help in future attempts to interpret Peking's foreign policy. This interpretation, if correct, will in turn raise certain theoretical questions about the foreign policy of revolutionary regimes and perhaps even about the international behavior of nations in general.

I. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR

All violent political revolutions start with a group of men who are initially weak in numbers and strength. But in the modern world, no other group of successful revolutionaries was confronted with greater odds, waged a more protracted armed struggle, and survived greater defeats than Mao Tsetung and his comrades. In his tortuous road to ultimate victory, Mao followed a pattern of action and adopted a set of principles which, on many occasions, helped him to achieve political gain from a position of military weakness and which, over a period of time, enabled him to bridge the enormous gap between his highly ambitious goal and his early militarypolitical impotence.

This pattern of action and set of principles followed in time and in logical sequence Lenin's substitution of the conquest of political power for socialism as the end-in-view of the Communist movement and his use of military analogy for the analysis of the revolutionary situation and for the development of a theory

of political strategy. This military analogy obliterated the analytic difference between political and military forms of the class struggle and called attention to the relevance of military analysis as a method of formulating programs to deal with political conflict.1 But unlike Lenin, Mao was engaged in an intermittent civil war over a period of more than twenty years before the seizure of power. Thus, Mao went beyond Lenin in his emphasis on the importance of military power, laid down precepts for coordinating its use with political policies, developed the doctrine of protracted war, pursued a military strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside, and exemplified in his strategies and tactics a combination of prudence with revolutionary enthusiasm. While Mao's doctrines and precepts are by no means profound, they were perfectly adapted to the objective conditions confronting him² and were in the best tradition of Realpolitik and the age-old military-political wisdom of China. They helped the Chinese Communists to win the most bitter and most protracted internal war in the twentieth century.

Furthermore, the Communists' theory of revolution, as Janos pointed out, is the theory of world revolution. To them the analytic categories relevant to domestic and international politics are identical.3 From their viewpoint their revolution to overthrow the Kuomintang government was, among other things, a fight against the lackeys of Western imperialism, particularly American imperialism in the last few years of the struggle; and they have seen their attacks on the West, particularly on the United States, after their capture of power as merely a continuation of their previous struggle. The precarious balance of power in the Far East and Southeast Asia within a world-wide context of American military superiority must have seemed to them analogous to the situation during the larger part of the civil war, when over-all Nationalist superiority was juxtaposed to local Communist strength in particular areas. Moreover, these long-standing principles which brought about ultimate success have a sacrosanct quality. They are immune from challenge by most of the now largely discredited traditional rules.

³ Janos, loc. cit., p. 40.

They are not checked by any principles of the newly established social order, which they themselves helped to bring into existence. Their projection into the international arena is also helped by the relatively short but highly traumatic experience of China as a member of the family of nations. This experience militates against wholehearted acceptance of the system of national states and the rules governing nations in that system. The moral unanimity among the leaders who claim to know the absolute and universal truth reinforces the proverbial Chinese ethnocentrism and strengthens the tendency to view the foreign scene in the Chinese image and to judge alien things by Chinese standards. Thus, it is not surprising that many of Mao's principles and precepts of political-military actions have underlain Peking's policies, strategies, and tactics in the international arena and in each specific encounter with other nations.

As early as August, 1946, Mao set down four theses on the international situation which, with some modifications, continued to guide his foreign policy. First, an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union in the immediate future was improbable. Second, the struggle in the immediate future between the socialist and imperialist camps would take place in "the vast zone" separating the United States and the Soviet Union which included "many capitalist, colonial and semicolonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa." This thesis was the origin of the controversial concept of the intermediate zone. Third, the atomic bomb is a "paper tiger" because "the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons." Fourth, all reactionaries, including "the United States reactionaries" are paper tigers. "In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful from the long-term point of view."4 These four theses in what amounted to Mao's first independent assessment of the global situation confronting the international Communist movement⁵ re-

'Mao Tse-tung, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," Selected Works, IV (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 97-101. Hereafter cited as Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), in order to distinguish it from the fourth volume of Mao's selected works published by Lawrence and Wishart which covers the period from 1941 to Aug. 9, 1945.

⁵ Prior to that time, Mao's pronouncements on international questions generally followed the twists and turns of the Soviet line. See Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 209-16.

¹ Andrew C. Janos, "The Communist Theory of the State and Revolution," in *Communism and Revolution*, ed. Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 32-6.

² Thomas P. Thornton, "The Foundations of Communist Revolutionary Doctrine," *ibid.*, p. 66.

flected his unified strategy in the Chinese revolution, particularly in the period between 1937 and 1945, which will be described later. This assessment of the global situation constituted Mao's justification of his acceptance in July, 1946 of all-out war with Chiang from the viewpoint of the international Communist movement as a whole and placed his revolutionary war within the context of the struggle between two camps.

Soon after the establishment of their regime, the Chinese Communists began to apply Mao's political-military strategy outside of China. In November, 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i, already the second ranking leader in the Chinese Communist Party, declared that the peoples of various colonial and semicolonial countries should follow the "path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys." He specifically identified this path as consisting of Mao's three magic weapons: the united front, armed struggle, and party building.6 In defeating General MacArthur's drive to the Yalu, the Chinese Communist forces successfully carried out Mao's strategy of retreating deep into one's base area, waiting for the enemy to commit mistakes and fighting a battle of quick decision as a prelude to a general counteroffensive.7 In Indo-China, the Viet Minh applied to its own revolutionary war those Chinese methods and precepts suitable to Vietnamese conditions, perfected some new tactics of its own, and ultimately defeated the modern, fully trained, and excellently equipped French Expeditionary Corps. In the Quemoy

6 "Opening Speech by Liu Shao-ch'i at the Trade Union Congress of Asian and Australian Countries," For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, December 30, 1949, p. 14; H. Arthur Steiner, The International Position of Communist China (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), pp. 8–15; A. M. Halpern, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model," The China Quarterly (July-Sept., 1961), pp. 1–16.

⁷ For Mao's doctrine on this point, see Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," Selected Works, I (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), pp. 210–53. On the actions of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea, see Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, G.P.O., 1961), pp. 667–776; S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York, 1953). For an interpretation, see Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York, 1960), pp. 130–50.

⁸ George Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," in Black, ed., op. cit., pp. 207-209; George K.

crisis of 1958, a timely retreat, an early offer to negotiate, and a unilateral declaration of ceasefire kept the military risks and political cost to a minimum and achieved some political gains.9 In the military clash over the border with India in 1962, China inflicted a stinging defeat on Indian forces, and then declared a unilateral cease-fire, thereby exhibiting Mao's strategy of limited victory and restraint. The strategy and tactics of the Pathet Lao both in the coalition government and on the battlefield remind one of Mao's principles and precepts. Whether or not the Chinese Communists have given aid and advice to the rebels in the Congo, they certainly believe that their revolutionary experience holds important lessons for the Congolese. 10 Several documents issued in the dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China show that Mao is pursuing the global, long-term strategy against the West of encircling the developed areas from the underdeveloped areas, which is a projection abroad of his strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside in the Chinese civil war.11

The Chinese Communist leaders are highly self-conscious of their revolutionary mission. The late Marshal Lo Jung-huan told the cadres in the Political Academy in October, 1960: "At present, revisionism is spreading. The world revolution relies on the thought of Mao Tse-tung... [The thought of Mao Tse-tung] belongs not only to China but also has its international implications." Another recent

Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, the Viet Minh in Indo-China (New York, 1961), pp. 23-8.

⁹ Robert W. Barnett, "Quemoy: the Use and Consequences of Nuclear Deterrence" (mimeographed) (Cambridge, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1960); Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962), pp. 119-30; Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 213-215; John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958," Orbis (Spring, 1962), pp. 38-9; Tang Tsou, The Embroilment of Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles (Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1959).

¹⁰ Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, June 24, 1964, p. 1. ¹¹ Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," Orbis (Spring, 1964), pp. 36-51. For an interpretation of the struggle for power in China, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp. 48-56, 127-141, 186-92, 300-311, 401-40.

11a Kung-tso t'ung-hsün [Work Correspondence]

official analysis of the international situation contains the following prognosis: "Peaceful co-existence [with many countries other than the United States] or coexistence through stalemate [with the United States] is a transitional form. So is pacifist neutralism. The life of imperialism will necessarily come to an end; socialism will one day be realized throughout the world." Marshal Yeh Chien-ying declared:

No other nation in the world has more experience [in fighting a war] than we.... The nations which have not yet been liberated also want to overthrow imperialism and feudalism... and to wage armed struggle. They very much need our experience. Therefore, we should sum up our experience to hand it down to posterity and to present it to our friends. 110

As this experience is most relevant to the struggle of the "national liberation movement" in the underdeveloped areas, Peking accords a high priority in her foreign policy to the support of these movements. A military journal explained it this way:

Toward national liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries, there are two different attitudes. One makes the improvement of relations with the West a primary concern and does not support or gives small amount of support to the national liberation movements. The other makes support for national liberation movements a primary concern. It permits some proper dealings with the Western countries but considers this a secondary question. Our country adopts the latter attitude, firmly supporting the national liberation movements and opposing colonialism and imperialism. We may have dealings with Western countries but do not bargain away our support for national liberation movements. 11d

So Peking's policy is actively to cultivate close relationships with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but not the Western countries, particularly the United States. In 1961, Africa was regarded as the center of the anti-colonial struggle. "When the time is ripe, a revolutionary upsurge will engulf the African continent." Even the Taiwan question is viewed in the broad context of the world-wide struggle

no. 8 (Feb. 2, 1961), pp. 16, 17. The Work Correspondence is a secret journal, designed for reading by the cadres of the People's Liberation Army at the regimental level and above. Hereafter cited as Work Correspondence.

against the United States in which "one incautious move will cause the loss of the game."11f If Communist China, "a newly emerging socialist country," should yield to the United States and allow imperialist forces to hold her territory, Taiwan, "her international prestige will drop ten thousand feet."11g By refusing to compromise on the issue of Taiwan and by keeping Sino-American relations in a stalemate, "we can keep the anti-imperialist banner, freely support the national liberation struggle in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, preserve our ability to attract political support, and stimulate our morale.11h Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, summed up Peking's approach to international affairs neatly when he affirmed in September, 1964. that Mao's strategical and tactical thinking, together with the policies and general lines of the Party center, were the principal guides for Communist China's analysis of international problems in the past fifteen years.11i It is clear that Mao's revolutionary strategy in the struggle in China is a recurrent element in Peking's international behavior.

II. THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN CHINA

To understand Mao's doctrines and precepts of political-military action in the civil struggle, one must begin with Mao's firm grasp of the contrast between his highly ambitious goal and his initially meager means—a contrast which is relevant to our analysis of his foreign policies, strategies and tactics. This highly ambitious goal of seizure of power as a first step toward the eventual establishment of a communist society was defined for him by ideology. But he was realistic enough to recognize that for a long time to come, the balance of social forces would not be in his favor. He described the Chinese society as having "a shape bulging out in the middle while tapering off towards the two ends."12 In more concrete terms, this imagery meant that the proletariat, on the one hand, and the "reactionary big landlords and big big bourgeoisie," on the other, formed a small minority of the population, while the peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie and the other intermediate classes constituted the

¹¹b Ibid., no. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 20.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., no. 12 (March 10, 1961), p. 4.

¹¹d Ibid., no. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 22.

¹¹a Ibid., p. 23.

¹¹f Ibid., p. 20.

¹¹g Ibid., p. 25.

¹¹h Ibid., p. 24.

¹¹ⁱ Chen Yi, "Commemorating the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Publication of the Shih-chieh chih-shih," Shih-chieh chih-shih, Sept. 10, 1964, p. 1.

¹² Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, III (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), p. 239.

vast majority.¹³ Within this social structure, the balance of power between the "two ends" favored the "landlord class and big bourgeosie," with the intermediate classes under the influence of the counterrevolutionary forces.¹⁴ Thus, two of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war in its early stages were the "great strength of the enemy" and "the weakness and small size of the Red Army."¹⁵

But in spite of its military strength and its cunning, the enemy had its congenital weakness which was political, social and economic in character. Based on a frail capitalist system and a preponderantly "semi-feudal" economy, it could not effectively mobilize its resources. Presiding over a vast territory, it could not effectively govern every part of the country. Rent by numerous internal contradictions, it was split into factions perpetually fighting one another. Monopolizing political power, it could not win the cooperation of non-Kuomintang political groups. Exploiting the masses, it could not enlist popular support. Thus, it was vulnerable to the challenge of the revolutionary forces.

III. AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE AMBITIOUS GOALS WITH MEAGER MEANS

In making this successful challenge, Mao's genius consisted in combining an ability to face reality squarely and a determination to change that reality. On the one hand, he fully realized the gap between his goal and his means. harbored no illusion about the relative strength of the Kuomintang and the Communists, and correctly detected the contrast between the Kuomintang's military might and political weakness. On the other hand, he gradually evolved a set of doctrines, principles and precepts governing his political-military actions which would in the first instance enable him to survive the attack of the vastly superior Nationalist forces, then to expand his own power, and finally to transform the balance of social forces in his favor, and to attain ultimate victory in the revolution.

He stressed the indispensability of military power to achieve political purposes and implement political policies. He emphasized the primacy of political purpose and policies to provide military power with the necessary foundation and direction and to exploit the political weakness of the Kuomintang in order to compensate for his own military inferiority.

As his grand strategy, he evolved the concept of surrounding the cities from the countryside. Concerning the duration of his revolution, he formulated the doctrine of protracted war. Concerning the form of military operations, he developed a doctrine of guerrilla warfare and its gradual transformation into mobile warfare. In military tactics, he followed the idea of retreat and dispersal of forces to avoid defeat, but concentration of forces to win battles of quick decision. As his objective on the battlefield, he subordinated the aim of defending or gaining territory to the goal of annihilating the enemy's effective strength and preserving his own forces. For evaluating the decisive factor in military success, he advanced the notion of the importance of men over weapons. For appraising the strength of the enemy, he proposed the principle that with regard to each particular struggle the Communists should not underestimate their enemies, while with regard to the whole situation the Communists should not overestimate them. He stressed the need to combine prudence with the revolutionary spirit. To avert irreversible defeat, he turned the united front doctrine into a rationale for seeking peace with the Kuomintang. To expand his influence while avoiding an all-out conflict, he practiced limited war. To transform military gains into legitimate authority, he sought political settlement through negotiations in a favorable climate of opinion created by astute propaganda and a moderate political program. To clinch final victory when the balance of forces could be changed in his favor by largescale fighting, he accepted an all-out war. These doctrines, principles, precepts, and practices were consistent with one another and formed a coherent whole. They were in accord with the political, military, and psychological demands of the objective situation. They helped the Communists to overcome tremendous difficulties and eventually to bridge the gap between the bold objective of seizing power and the modest means in the hands of the revolutionaries.

IV. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF MILITARY POWER

Mao realized at an early stage of his career that military power was an indispensable means to attain his revolutionary objective. To Mao, "a revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another." It is, he warned, "not the same as inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing fancy needlework; it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle, or so mild, kind, restrained and magnan-

¹³ Ibid., p. 260; id., IV, p. 25.

¹⁴ Mao, Selected Works, I, 88-9, 164.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 195-6.

imous."16 Chiang's ruthless suppression of the Communists in the spring of 1927 and the failure of the Communists to arm themselves against his sudden attack dramatized the fact that sheer survival, if nothing else, depended on the possession of military power. After he established his bases in Kiangsi, he came to recognize that revolutionary violence in China would take the form of armed insurrections and protracted civil war,17 and that the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength was a necessary condition for the survival and expansion of the Red political power.18 He characterized the formation and development of the Red Army, the guerrilla units, and the Red areas as "the highest form of the peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China."19 After having fought a series of campaigns against encirclement and annihilation by the Kuomintang forces, he arrived at the view: "In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organization. Other forms such as mass organization and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war."20 Mao urged every Communist to grasp the truth that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."21 He pointed out that

having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army [i.e., one of the two Communist military formations during the Sino-Japanese War] has created in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been created by having guns. All things grow out the barrel of a gun.²²

Looking beyond the horizon of China, he

- ¹⁶ Mao Tse-tung, "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Works, I, p. 27.
- ¹⁷ Mao, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *ibid.*, p. 100; "Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism," *ibid.*, pp. 164-165; "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *ibid.*, pp. 192-9.
- ¹⁸ Mao, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" ibid., p. 67.
- ¹⁹ Mao, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," ibid., p. 117.
- ²⁰ Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Military Writings (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 269.
 - ²¹ Ibid., p. 272.

said: "Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords; in this sense we may say that with guns can the whole world be transformed."²³ From this, he concluded: "The seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally for China and for all countries."²⁴

V. THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS

To seize power by armed force required a military power superior to the Kuomintang. But the Kuomintang's greatest strength was precisely its military power, while its weaknesses were political, economic and social. To develop a military power in the service of the revolution, it was necessary to adopt certain policies to exploit the political chaos, economic stagnation, social ferment, and nationalistic sentiments fostered by foreign encroachments. These policies, directed at the vulnerable chinks in the Kuomintang's armor, would provide the Communists with a political foundation on which to build their military power and compensate for their military weakness with their political influence. Thus, necessity and political expediency reinforced the imperatives of a revolutionary ideology in

²³ Ibid.

24 Ibid., p. 267. These two sentences are followed by a paragraph in which Mao discusses the application of this principle to capitalist countries. He expresses the opinion that it is the task of the parties of the proletariat there to build up their strength through a long period of legal struggle, and thus to prepare for the final overthrow of capitalism in an insurrection and civil war. This paragraph is omitted in the English version of Mao's selected works published in England in 1958. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II (new edition, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), p. 223. For the Chinese version see Mao, "Chancheng yü chan-lüeh wen-ti" ["Problems of War and Strategy,"] Hsüan-chi ["Selected Works"], II (Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1952), p. 529. The omission in the version published in England in 1958 seems to have been related to the debate between him and Khrushchev over the question of peaceful transition, which was the subject of a statement given by the Chinese Communist Party to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, expounding the former's dissenting view. See Peking Review, July 26, 1963, p. 28.

²² Ibid., pp. 272-73.

stressing the paramount importance of the political purpose and policies which military power was employed to achieve.

At the beginning of the first civil war with the Kuomintang, the political purpose, or in Marxist terminology the content of the revolution, was defined as the overthrow of the rule in China of imperialism and warlords, the completion of the bourgeois-democratic, national revolution under the leadership of the proletariat, and the carrying out of the agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landed gentry.²⁵ "The Chinese Red Army," Mao wrote, "is an armed force for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution."²⁶

The political purpose gave direction to the armed struggle, differentiated the real friends from the real enemy, legitimized the political leadership of the armed forces, and pointed to the political foundation on which military power must be built. "Without a political goal," Mao warned, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained."27 "Any tendency . . . to belittle politics, to isolate war from politics, and to become advocates of 'war is everything,' is erroneous and must be corrected," Mao wrote.28 A strong Communist party, in theory the party of the proletariat, must take command of the army.29 The agrarian revolution must be deepened to secure the support of the peasants.30 A workers' and peasants' political power must be established in the base areas, to carry out social and economic reforms, to mobilize the masses and to give support to the army. During the Sino-Japanese War, nationalism was used as a powerful tool to mobilize the masses.31 For its part, the army must not only fight to

- ²⁵ Mao, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" Selected Works, I, p. 64.
- ²⁶ Mao, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *ibid.*, p. 106.
- ²⁷ Mao, "On Guerrilla Warfare," trans. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith (New York, Praeger, 1961), p. 43.
- ²⁸ Mao, "On Protracted War," Selected Works, II, p. 158.
- ²⁹ Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," *ibid.*, p. 228.
- ³⁰ Mao, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," Selected Works, I, pp. 74, 80; "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," ibid., p. 117.
- ³¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962).

destroy the enemy's military strength, but also "shoulder such important tasks as agitating the masses, organizing them, arming them, helping them to set up revolutionary political power and even establishing organizations of the Communist Party.32 In this manner. Mao created the political foundation for his military power, which was in turn his chief weapon in his political revolution. This chief weapon must, however, be employed in conjunction with other instruments and only to gain political objectives within the framework of the balance of military and political forces.33 Thus, the use of military power must be subordinated to political policy, and military action could succeed only when the political policy was correct. As Li Wei-han, the Director of the United Front Work Department points out in an authoritative article, "to win a war we must rely first on politics and we must first win the political war."34

While the political strategy of the Chinese Communists to win the political war went through many twists and turns, its essence was to "develop the progressive forces, to win over the middle-of-the-road forces, and to isolate the die-hards." Or to use Li Wei-han's formulation,

the working class must, on the basis of the consolidation and expansion of the worker-peasant alliance, win over all the forces that can possibly be won over and unite with over 90 per cent of the country's population; only so can it establish a strong, over-all leadership, keep the enemy completely isolated and win victory for the revolution.³⁵

Once the intermediate classes were won over and the arch-enemy isolated, the revolutionary forces would enjoy such overwhelming popular support that their military power could be progressively developed and the balance of military power would be tipped in favor of the revolution. Mao's mobilization of the peasants and his attempt to win over the

- ³² Mao, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," Selected Works, I, p. 106.
- ³³ See Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China and Nuclear Force (RAND Corporation, P-2719-1), p. 9.
- ³⁴ Li Wei-han, "The Chinese People's Democratic United Front: Its Special Features," *Peking Review*, Aug. 25, 1961, p. 17.
 - 35 Mao, Selected Works, III, p. 194.
- ²⁶ Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New Democratic Revolution in China," *Peking Review*, Feb. 23, 1962, p. 5.

intermediate classes drew new groups into the political arena, extended the base of political participation, and eventually created a coalition of social forces larger and stronger than the political elements supporting the Kuomintang. In turn, military success helped him to win over those who wanted to join the victorious side.

VI. FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO THE CITIES IN A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE

While political policies could provide the foundation for the development of military power and give it general direction, they furnished no specific guidance as to how this military power could be used. In the course of his struggle for survival and power, Mao evolved a series of strategic ideas in the light of the objective conditions confronting him. He built his first base area in the border region between two provinces, Hunan and Kiangsi, where the peasants were aroused to revolutionary actions during the Northern Expedition of 1926 and 1927. The terrain being mountainous, it was easy to defend. Being far away from the big cities, the centers of Nationalist power, it was situated at one of the weakest points of local control. Wedged between two provinces, it enabled the Communists to exploit the clashes of interests between provincial authorities. When a split took place within the ruling class and civil war developed among the Nationalist generals, Mao would consider the feasibility of "a strategy of comparatively venturesome advance and expand the independent regime over a comparatively large area by fighting."37 When warfare among the Kuomintang leaders stopped and when peace and stability prevailed in one or several provinces, he would adopt only a strategy of gradual advance while concentrating his personnel to consolidate his political power and military position in the central districts in the red border area. He would pursue a defensive strategy in Hunan where the ruling power was strong, but an offensive strategy in Kiangsi where the ruling class was comparatively weak. In all his military operations during this period, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character were the main forms. The location of his base area, his selection of targets, and the form of military operations enabled him to use his inferior armed forces to his maximum

³⁷ Mao, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," Selected Works, I, p. 71. See also "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" *Ibid.* pp. 67-8.

advantage by exploiting the political weakness of the Kuomintang.

On the basis of his experience in the early successes of the Red Army and the lessons learned from the defeat in the Kuomintang's fifth campaign of encirclement and annihilation, Mao systematized his views into the strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside and the doctrine of protracted war.

Some of these views he had adopted or advocated in opposition to the Li Li-san line of organizing armed uprising in major cities and concentrating the Red Army's forces for attacking them.38 Others stood in conflict with the policy inaugurated by Ch'en Shao-vü and followed by Ch'in Pang-hsien, which in September, 1931, again called for the seizure of major cities by the Red Army to win victory first in one or several provinces and which during the Kuomintang's fifth campaign of encirclement and annihilation led to a decision to fight the Nationalist forces in positional warfare instead of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare.39 Since both the Li Li-san line and the policies of Ch'en Shao-yü and Ch'in Pang-hsien had the support of the Communist International and were based in part on Soviet experience, Mao found it necessary to point out that mechanical application of Soviet military doctrines would lead to defeat. He urged the Chinese Communists to cherish the experience of China's revolutionary war because of conditions special to the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Red Army.40 His simple yet effective military doctrine was a systematization of his experience in fighting the civil war in which his instinct for survival, earthly wisdom, and the long tradition of Chinese military thinking were his principal guides. It was a product of progressive refinement of his initially rudimentary views formulated in the day-to-day military struggle. It was the realm in which Mao first "creatively

ss "Resolution of Some Questions in the History of our Party," appendix to Mao, Selected Works, IV (London, 1956), p. 179; Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 141-4; James P. Harrison, "The Li Li-san Line and the CCP in 1930," China Quarterly (April-June, 1963), pp. 173-94; (July-Sept., 1963), pp. 140-59. For an account of the disagreement between Mao and the Comintern in 1927, see Stuart R. Schram, "The Military Deviation of Mao Tse-tung," Problems of Communism (Jan.-Feb., 1964), pp. 51-2.

39 Mao, Selected Works, IV, p. 204.

40 Mao "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," Selected Works, I, pp. 177, 192.

applied Marxism-Leninism to China" and declared his independence from the Soviet Union. It is also a basic source of his dispute with the Soviet Union today. 41

In Mao's view, a basic characteristic of the Chinese revolutionary war distinguished it from revolutions in capitalist countries, including the October Revolution in Russia. In these the first step was to seize the cities, and then advance into the countryside. In China, the reverse was the correct sequence. Mao's strategy was "to employ our main forces to create rural bases, surround the cities from the countryside and use the bases to expedite the nation-wide revolutionary upsurge." The rationale of this strategy he explained in these words:

Since powerful imperialism and its allies, the reactionary forces in China, have occupied China's key cities for a long time, . . . they [the revolutionary forces] must build the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural revolutionary bastions, so that they can fight the fierce enemy who utilizes the cities to attack the rural districts, and, through a protracted struggle, gradually win an over-all victory for the revolution.44

The vast rural areas were the "home of the broad masses of peasants" where the Kuomintang's control was weak. Devoting themselves "mainly to rural work," the Communists exploited a fatal weakness of the Kuomintang and gradually developed their own military strength to defeat the Nationalists.

Mao realized that the strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside could not soon defeat the Kuomintang. Thus he developed his doctrine of protracted struggle, of which protracted war was one form. As Mao envisaged it in 1936, this would take the form of the prolonged alternation between the Nationalist campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation" and the Communists' countercampaign. This pattern, Mao predicted, would come to an end when the Red Army became stronger than its enemy, because the Kuomintang lacked the political prerequisites

- ⁴¹ Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence," Orbis (Spring, 1964), pp. 36-51.
 - ⁴² Mao, Selected Military Writings, p. 268.
 - 43 Mao, Selected Works, IV, pp. 178, 193-4, 197.
- ⁴⁴ Mao, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," Selected Works, III (London, 1954), p. 85.
 - 45 Mao, Selected Works, IV, pp. 190-5.
- ⁴⁶ Mao, "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," Selected Works, I, pp. 198-203.

for fighting a successful counter-campaign against the Communists' campaign of encirclement and annihilation. This forecast was borne out in late 1948 and 1949.

The notion of a protracted war was applied to the Sino-Japanese War with some modifications to fit the new domestic and international situation. Instead of a prolonged alternation between the enemy's campaigns of encirclement and annihilation and the defenders' counter-campaigns, the protracted war would, Mao predicted in June, 1938, pass through three stages: first, Japan's strategic offensive and China's strategic defensive; second a prolonged strategic stalemate; and third, China's counter-offensive. In the first stage, mobile warfare should have been the principal form for the Chinese forces to adopt, with guerrilla and positional warfare the secondary forms. In the second stage, guerrilla warfare should be raised to the principal position, supplemented by mobile warfare and positional warfare. In the third stage, mobile warfare would again be raised to become the principal form, supplemented by positional warfare and guerrilla warfare.47

In the all-out civil war which began in the second half of 1946, Mao again envisaged a protracted struggle, in which the Communist forces would annihilate the Kuomintang's attacking forces one by one over a number of years.48 He discarded the strategic principle, adopted during the larger part of the Sino-Japanese War, that the dispersal of forces for guerrilla warfare should be primary and the concentration of forces for mobile warfare should be secondary—a principle which had given due credit to the mobility and strength of the Japanese forces and had taken advantage of the strategic stalemate created largely by the confrontation between the Nationalist and Japanese armies. He reverted to the rule, developed during the latter part of the first civil war with the Kuomintang, that the concentration of forces for mobile warfare should be primary and the dispersal of forces for guerrilla warfare should be supplementary.

This uncomplicated doctrine of protracted war was developed out of simple principles regarding military tactics and battlefield objectives. Once developed, it gave the latter greater operational significance. Mao's original military tactics were governed by the now famous formula: "The enemy advances, we

⁴⁷ Mao, "On the Protracted War," Selected Works, II, pp. 128, 139, 180-1.

⁴⁸ Mao, Setected Works, IV (Peking), pp. 89-92, 103-6, 113-25.

retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." He cautioned: "Fight when we can win and run away when we cannot." He admitted that "few people run away as much as we do." He urged that "a belated retreat causes more damage than a premature retreat." The battlefield objective implicit in this tactic was the priority given to the preservation of his own forces over the defense of territory under his control.

As the guerrilla bands grew into regular units, a greater stress was put on the annihilation of the enemy forces. Mao's formula was to execute a strategic retreat deep into the base areas in order to facilitate the concentration of his forces and to create an opportunity to defeat the enemy there in a battle of quick decision followed by a strategic counteroffensive. 50 In the second civil war, the Kuomintang army had acquired new and more powerful weapons from the United States but its numerical superiority over Communist forces declined. Mao now laid special stress on the method of concentrating a superior force in each engagement to wipe out the enemy forces one by one and placed less emphasis on the need for strategic retreat deep into his base areas.51 Complete annihilation of Nationalist units in battles of quick decision enabled him to seize American weapons and capture Nationalist soldiers to replenish his own forces. In less than three years, it transformed the five-toone Nationalist superiority into overwhelming Communist superiority.

The doctrine that men are more important than weapons fully reflected the nature of guerrilla war in which popular support was the essential ingredient of military success. It was in full accord with the needs of a struggle in which politics played an important role in deciding the final outcome. It was in perfect harmony with the strategy of mobile warfare in which a poorly equipped army sought to defeat an opponent with vastly better weapons by concentrating locally a numerically superior force to annihilate the latter's units piecemeal and seize its weapons.

This doctrine required a complementary set of attitudes. The psychological complement had to cultivate realism in estimating the enemy's present strength, but at the same time bolster confidence in its ultimate vulnerability. It had to foster patience in the face of current difficulties but at the same time sus-

tain high morale in the course of the revolution. It had to inhibit impulsive actions leading to defeat but at the same time kindle courage to seize every available opportunity to win a local victory. It had to nourish prudence during the prolonged period of military weakness but maintain the revolutionary spirit which in the long run argued for a basically offensive strategy. It had to promote cool calculaton in the choice of means, but at the same time inspire revolutionary enthusiasm in the pursuit of goals. In short, a synthesis of two constantly opposed attitudes had to be achieved before the doctrine of protracted struggle could be successfully applied.

From the very beginning, Mao's programs of action showed that he realized this necessity. But the synthesis was not easy to attain. Realism, patience, restraint, prudence, and cool calculation are frequently incompatible with the ultra-revolutionism of young idealists and rebels with a cause. Mao had to oppose his cautious military strategy and tactics to what he called "adventurism." His strategic and tactical views did not govern the program of the Party until the "'Left' line of reckless action" under Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's leadership, the strategy of concentrating the Red Army to attack the major cities under Li Li-san's leadership, and the strategy of waging positional warfare to defend the Soviet area under the leadership of the Returned Student group all led to disastrous defeat.

But prudence must not be equated with a tendency to conservatism. The purpose of acting cautiously was to create conditions for a series of local victories until the over-all balance of forces shifted in the Communists' favor. Mao asserted:

... a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive yet has also its defensive phase and retreat. To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to take a flanking action in order to take a frontal action, to be devious in order to go direct—these are inevitable occurrences in the process of development of many things, and military movements cannot be otherwise.

He synthesized the prudential and the aggressive elements in his program of action in 1948 as follows:

If, with regard to the whole, we overestimate the strength of our enemy and hence do not dare to overthrow him and do not dare to win victory, we shall be committing a Right opportunist error. If, with regard to each part, each specific prob-

⁴⁹ Mao, Selected Works, I, pp. 124, 222, 244.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 203-48.

⁵¹ Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), p. 105.

⁵² Mao, Selected Works, I, p. 202.

lem, we are not prudent, do not carefully study and perfect the art of struggle, do not concentrate all our strength for battle... we shall be committing a "Left" opportunist error.⁵³

Later, in 1957, he stated this thought concisely in these words: "Strategically we should take all enemies lightly, but tactically take them seriously." ⁵⁴

VII. ARMED STRUGGLE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE—THE QUESTION OF WAR AND PEAGE

1. Changing One Form of Struggle to Another

The strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside and the doctrine of protracted war provided only guidance on the prosecution of war. But the overriding questions of political-military policy in a protracted struggle were when to seek peace, when to fight a war, and what form the war should take. In his revolutionary struggle with the Kuomintang, Mao was confronted with three different political-military situations and adopted three different policies which, in a sense, parallel the usual choices of a state in the international system under analogous circumstances: to seek peace, to fight a limited war, or to accept an all-out war. But on a deeper level of analysis, Mao's policies can be shown to be quite different. The peace he sought meant merely the cessation of an all-out war and did not preclude limited armed clashes. Conversely, his limited war was waged under the concept of "peaceful struggle." The threat or use of force on a limited scale as one of several instruments of policy was a fairly constant feature of Mao's practice rather than a last resort when nonviolent measures failed.55 In his all-out war, political, economic and psychological measures played a much more important role in deciding the outcome than in conventional war between states in the past.

Mao analyzed the question of war and peace with the Kuomintang in terms of the notions of "unity" and struggle and the concepts of "peaceful struggle" and "armed struggle." During the period of the united front with the Kuomintang against Japan, Mao wrote:

An important part of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is to unite with as well as to struggle against the bourgeoisie...

- 53 Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), pp. 181-2.
- ⁵⁴ Comrade Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers" (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 25-6.
- ⁵⁵ Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China and Nuclear Force, p. 9.

Unity means the united front with the bourgeoisie. struggle means the "peaceful" and "bloodless" struggle waged along ideological, political and organizational lines when we unite with the bourgeoisie, a struggle which will turn into an armed struggle when we are forced to split with the bourgeoisie. If our Party does not understand how to unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, it cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not understand how to wage a resolute and serious "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with the bourgeoisie, it will disintegrate ideologically, politically and organizationally, and the revolution will fail; and if our Party, when forced to split with the bourgeoisie, does not wage a resolute and serious armed struggle against the bourgeoisie, it will also disintegrate and the revolution will also fail.56

Mao's thought and practice have since been succinctly explained by Li Wei-han in the following words:

In order to defeat the enemy we must . . . be adept at choosing the most advantageous forms of struggle. The working class party must arm itself to the teeth ... with all the means and methods of struggle so as to be able to make timely changes in the form of struggle to suit changes in the situation. The forms of the struggle can be divided into main or secondary, and which should be the main and which should be secondary. differs under different historical conditions in different countries. The working class and the Communist Party must be good at mastering the main form of struggle under the historical conditions of the time and properly coordinating it with other forms of struggle; only by so doing can they deal the enemy effective blows or firmly maintain the leadership of the revolution.57

⁵⁶ Mao, "Introductory Remarks to The Communist," Selected Works, III, pp. 59-60.

⁵⁷ Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," Peking Review, March 2, 1962, p. 12. The first instalment of this article appears in the Feb. 23, 1962 issue of the same journal. This is one of the most significant, as well as one of the most revealing articles published in recent years by the Chinese Communists on their revolutionary strategy and tactics. For two other revealing articles by Li, see "The United Front-A Magic Weapon of the Chinese People for Winning Victory," Peking Review, June 9, 1961, pp. 13-6; June 16, 1961, pp. 17-21; "The Chinese People's Democratic United Front: Its Special Features," ibid., Aug. 18, 1961, pp. 11-5; Aug. 25, 1961, pp. 12-8; Sept. 1, 1961, pp. 10-4. For

Taking the twenty-two years from 1927 to 1949 as a whole, armed struggle, as Li points out, was the main form of struggle against the Kuomintang and all other forms were meant to serve it. But, as Li goes on to explain, "This does not exclude cases where peaceful political struggle became the main form of struggle in a certain field and in a certain period."58 From 1927 to the establishment of the second united front in 1937, the main form of struggle was armed struggle, which was originally an instinctive response to the Kuomintang's policy of suppressing the Communists by force. From 1937 to July, 1946, it was "peaceful political struggle." In the transition from armed struggle to "peaceful political struggle" as the main form, Mao's policy and initiative played a large role, as we shall see. From July, 1946 onward, it reverted to armed struggle. This reversion was mainly a response to the Kuomintang's policy of driving the Communists from the strategically important regions and using relentless military pressure to force the Communists to accept a political-military fait accompli. But the Kuomintang's policy was itself a response to Mao's strategy of employing limited military actions to expand the territory under his control. Mao accepted all-out war when his policy of seeking a favorable settlement failed and when he saw a good chance of defeating the Kuomintang in a prolonged war despite the superiority of the Nationalist forces in number and arms. Limited war escalated into all-out war. The transitions in both 1937 and 1946 marked the culmination of a series of fluctuating events and Communist moves over a fairly long time during which Mao was preparing for the next main form of struggle.

In Mao's thinking, politics is one form of class war, while open warfare or armed struggle is another. "Politics is war without bloodshed," Mao said, "while war is politics with bloodshed." The transition from one to another was one of the numerous manifestations of the dialectical principle of the identity of contradictions. To Mao, this principle means not only that two contradictory aspects of a thing can coexist in an entity, but also that each "tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself into the opposite position." "War and peace," he wrote, "transform them-

the relevance of this doctrine to the situation in the Congo, see *Jen-min jih-pao*, editorial, June 24, 1964, p. 1.

selves into each other," "because in a class society such contradictory things as war and peace are characterized by identity under certain conditions." 60

2. Coordinating One Form of Struggle With Another

Waging both political and military struggles to win "peace," 1935-1937. Mao was not only adept in alternating the main form of struggle in the light of changing conditions to advance his revolution, but also very skillful in integrating the two forms and blending force and diplomacy in dealing with the Kuomintang. The coordination of two forms of struggle to achieve a political objective is one corollary of the general rule that military power is an indispensable means to accomplish a political purpose and that conversely, political purpose must govern the use of military power. It also meant that force was one of the constant instruments to be used in conjunction with other measures. In the period between 1927 and 1937 when armed struggle was the main form, political struggle-in the specific form of appeals and agitations for the cessation of the civil war-was intensified and broadened as the military fortunes of the Communists ebbed or as the possibility of total defeat drew progressively closer.61 In this political struggle, the task of the Communists was facilitated by the political conditions in China created by Japan's aggressive actions: the rising Chinese nationalism demanding internal unity in order to oppose foreign aggression, the opposition of non-communist groups to Chiang's policy of suppressing the Communists first before resisting Japan's aggression, and the divisions within the Kuomintang over policy toward Japan.

During the Long March when the fortunes of the Red Army were at their lowest ebb, Mao in August, 1935, called for the cessation of the civil war. He appealed not only to the Kuomintang armed forces but also to all political groups in China to join with the Communists to form a broad united front against both Japan and Chiang. While Mao's declaration was in perfect accord with the policy of establishing popular anti-Fascist fronts throughout the world proclaimed formally by the Communist

⁵⁸ Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," loc. cit.

⁵⁹ Mao, Selected Military Writings, p. 227,

⁶⁰ Mao, Selected Works, I, pp. 329-30. See Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Mao Tse-tung's Materialistic Dialectics," China Quarterly (July-Sept., 1964), pp. 3-37.

⁶¹ Mao, Selected Works, I, pp. 153-74, 354-7, 368-74; Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1936 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 64-5.

International at the Seventh Congress in August, 1935,62 Mao could not have failed to realize that his policy would appeal to the nationalistic sentiments of many political groups and individuals who were not sympathetic to Chiang's policy of "internal pacification before resistance to foreign invasion." If successful, it would help the Communists to break out of their military and political isolation and to neutralize the Kuomintang's military power by political means. Before the year was over, it scored its first success when more than ten thousand students in Peiping took part on December 9 in a demonstration in opposition to the Kuomintang's policy of fighting a civil war and appeasing Japan.63

At the time when he intensified his political maneuvers to end the civil war, Mao also sought to use his military power to bring about the same result. In February, 1936, he made an intriguing military move. He ordered a strong contingent to cross the Yellow River into Shansi province with the aim of driving into Hopeh to engage the Japanese troops directly. This maneuver can plausibly be interpreted as an attempt to trigger a war between China and Japan which would automatically terminate the civil war. It was foiled by Chiang when he dispatched a strong force to block the Communists' eastward drive and ordered his other armies to attack the Shensi-Kansu Red area from the south and the west. Confronted by the overwhelming strength of Chiang's forces, Mao withdrew his contingent to the west of the Yellow River. To derive political advantage from his military retreat, he covered up his withdrawal with clever propaganda and accompanied it with a political offensive. In a circular telegram on May 5 addressed for the first time to the Kuomintang government as well as to other groups, Mao announced the "voluntary" withdrawal of the Red forces, giving as its reason the Communists' desire to avoid fratricidal strife and to keep intact China's strength for national defense. 64 He called for the cessation of the civil war and offered to hold cease-fire and peace negotiations with the Kuomintang army units attacking the Red Army. He abandoned the anti-Chiang slogan and merely urged Chiang to change his policy. Thereby he greatly facilitated the Communist efforts to influence the Nationalist leaders who wanted to stop the civil war and to fight the Japanese. The capability of the remnants of the Red Army to prolong the civil war and to inflict losses on the Kuomintang armies—thus weakening the over-all strength of the nation in the face of Japan's threat—was a strong argument for the establishment of the united front. Beginning in June or July, secret contacts were established between the Communists and Chang Hsüeh-liang and other high commanders of Manchurian and Northwestern armies of the Kuomintang forces surrounding the Communist area. In the field, the Communists conducted an intensive campaign to win over the Nationalist soldiers by using the slogan, "Chinese should not fight Chinese."

Mao's peaceful offensive and propaganda succeeded in inducing Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, respectively the commanders of the Manchurian and Northwestern armies, to accept the idea of forcing Chiang to change his policy. Political support for peace and unity was thus engendered to compensate for Mao's military weakness, and political influence was transformed into military power. This political-military maneuver culminated in the detention of Chiang by Chang and Yang in the Sian Incident.

The respective roles of Moscow and Mao in obtaining the release of Chiang and effecting a peaceful settlement of that incident have not been clearly established by available evidence. In any case, the Chinese Communists themselves subsequently took credit for its peaceful settlement, just as Moscow did. It is described by Li Wei-han as "a great victory for comrade Mao Tse-tung's thinking regarding the united front at a decisive moment in history." In analyzing the reasons for the ensuing cessation of the ten-year civil war, Mao attri-

65 Ibid., p. 140. In August, Mao made further concessions. See Edgar Snow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-tung, Communist Leader," The China Weekly Review, Nov. 14, 1936, p. 378. In this interview, Mao said that the Chinese Communists held the same attitude toward Korea and Formosa. "... if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies to Formosa." Ibid.

cit., p. 62, and Edgar Snow, Random Notes on China (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 1-2. For a contemporary report on the Sian Incident, see Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York, 1961), pp. 431-78.

⁶⁷ Mao, Selected Works, I, p. 259; Li Wei-han, "The Struggle for Proletarian Leadership in the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution in China," Peking Review, March 2, 1962, p. 13.

⁶² McLane, op. cit., p. 51.

⁶³ For the role played by Liu Shao-chi in organizing this demonstration, see Mao, Selected Works, IV, p. 200.

⁶⁴ Mao, Selected Works, I, p. 371.

butes it not to "the appeals of public figures throughout the country who desired peace and feared war" but to "the armed demands of the Communist Party of China and the armed demands of the Northeastern Army under Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Northwestern army under Yang Hu-cheng."68 The implication is that the civil war was stopped and peace was achieved not through polite appeals or pressure of public opinion but through military strength and armed struggle, although the political struggle in mobilizing political opinion to oppose the continuation of the civil war did contribute to the staging of the "armed demands." This appraisal of the Sian Incident forms a part of Mao's teaching on the transition from military struggle to "peaceful" political struggle as the main form of struggle and on the coordination of the two forms.

Waging military struggle within the framework of "peaceful political struggle," 1937-1946. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July, 1937, the informal truce between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists that followed the Sian Incident developed into the anti-Japanese united front. It was formally established in September, 1937. To outside observers, relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists deteriorated so rapidly after August, 1938, and particularly after the armed clashes in Hopei and Shantung in late 1938 and 1939 that a united front as the layman understood the term no longer existed. But to the Communists, their policy toward the Kuomintang was still that of maintaining the anti-Japanese united front. Even after the military clashes flared up in the famous New Fourth Army Incident in 1941, Mao continued to affirm the policy of a national united front. This policy found expression in the call in 1944 and 1945 for the formation of a coalition government. In theory, it was in existence until Japan's surrender. 69 The key to this paradox lies in an understanding of Mao's policy of the united front in his own terms and of his practice of coordinating and integrating armed struggle with "peaceful political struggle."

The united front meant, on the surface, unity or alliance with the Kuomintang against the Japanese invaders. But for Mao, unity or alliance with the Kuomintang did not signify wholehearted cooperation with or unconditional obedience to the authority of the Nationalist government. Instead, it was an alliance

based on the principle of the "independence and autonomy" of the Chinese Communist Party. 70 The absolute leadership and exclusive control by the Chinese Communist Party over the Communist units and base areas were always strictly maintained. The Communist armies were instructed from the very beginning to carry out a guerrilla warfare on their own initiative and independently of the Nationalist government." Moreover, Mao's policy of the united front did not exclude "struggle against the Kuomintang." On the contrary, it called for an intense struggle within its framework. In the over-all relations with the Kuomintang, this struggle took the form of "'peaceful' and 'bloodless' struggle waged along ideological, political and organizational lines."⁷² In specific situations, it took the form of limited armed struggle, as for instance in the clash between the Communist general, Ho Lung, and the Nationalist general, Chang Yin-wu, in 1938-1939 and the activities of the New Fourth Army in 1940.

Thus, the united front meant merely that "peaceful political struggle" was for the time being the main form of struggle and armed struggle the secondary or subordinate form. Behind it a series of limited armed conflicts ensued which nevertheless did not lead to an all-out war. This policy of expansion by limited conflicts without provoking all-out war was in full accord with the demands of the objective conditions. While the Kuomintang was strong enough to win an all-out war, the Sino-Japanese War rendered an all-out Nationalist attack improbable, though not entirely impossible. Thus, limited conflicts did not raise serious risks of all-out war for the Communists. Whatever the risks, they could, in Mao's view, be minimized, on the one hand by a policy of carefully controlling his own military actions and on the other by relying on his developing strength and limited retaliations to deter the Kuomintang. The limited armed struggles were justified by Mao "as a means to prolong the die-hards' resistance to Japan and the cooperation with us, thereby averting the outbreak of a large-scale civil war."73 However, it did not always exclude the intensification of limited armed struggle. Indeed, it sometimes called for a greater military effort because the strengthening of his bargain-

⁶³ Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), p. 44. Italics added.

⁶⁹ Ibid., IV, p. 240; Li Wei-han, "The Role of the United Front in the Chinese Revolution," Pexing Review, June 16, 1961, pp. 17-8.

⁷⁰ Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II (new ed., London, 1958), pp. 67, 69, 218-22. For a discussion of this principle in its historical context, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950, op. cit., pp. 137-41.

⁷¹ Mao, Selected Works, II, p. 67.

⁷² See note 56, above.

⁷³ Mao, Selected Works, III, p. 198.

ing position by military means and the preparation for the possible outbreak of an all-out war were two other features of the political-military struggle.

At the same time, Mao consistently practiced what is now known in the West as a policy of unilateral arms control. In doctrine, the defensive nature of the limited armed struggle was stressed. The concept of "justifiability" imposed a restraint on the frequency of armed clashes. The requirement of gaining an advantage in every engagement restricted the scale of the armed conflict, since the Communist troops could not fight a large Kuomintang force with assurance of victory. The aim of picking out the "most reactionary section" of the "diehards" to strike at first, limited the targets of attack. The injunction to seek "truce" after the achievement of victory in a limited armed clash controlled the duration of each specific engagement. The policy of taking the initiative to seek unity and conclude a peace agreement with the opponent sometimes punctuated the intermittent armed conflicts with periodic negotiations and sometimes made talks at the conference table a form of political struggle paralleling the armed struggle on the dispersed battlefields.74 The four-fold objective of nego-

⁷⁴ In a highly significant passage, Mao wrote: "[W]e must pay attention to the following principles in waging struggles against the die-hards. First the principle of self-defense. We shall never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we shall certainly counterattack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation; but once we are attacked, we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. As to the military attacks of the diehards, we must resolutely, thoroughly, utterly and completely smash them. Secondly, the principle of victory. We do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome. We should know how to utilize the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; we must pick out the most reactionary section to strike at first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Thirdly, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows we should make a truce with them. Then we should on our own initiative seek unity with the die-hards and, upon their consent, conclude a peace agreement with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become

tiation for a political settlement was to prevent the escalation of the limited conflict to an allout war by holding out the possibility of a political settlement; to seek formal recognition of some of the gains already achieved by the force of arms; to influence public opinion; and finally to win time and political support for an all-out civil war, if it did come. To Political bargaining was an intrinsic part of the military and political struggle. This policy of seeking a political settlement while using military power to strengthen one's bargaining position and preparing for an all-out war was continued during the period between the summers of 1945 and 1946.

Supplementing armed struggle with political struggle, 1946-1949. The Communists' shift to armed struggle as the principal form can be traced to the inner-party directive of July 20, 1946, drafted by Mao, in which the Central Committee called on the Communists to smash Chiang's offensive. Mao obviously placed little hope on the negotiations in Nanking between Chou En-lai and Chiang with Marshall as the mediator. He wrote: "Only after completely smashing Chiang's offensive in a war of selfdefense can the Chinese people regain peace."76 In contrast to the military conflicts in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, the present fighting was no longer defined as "waging struggles against the die-hards," but as "a war of self-defense." In August, the Chinese Communists ordered a general mobilization.77 In September, Mao called on the Communists to concentrate superior force to destroy the enemy units one by one in battles and campaigns of. quick decision under the general strategy of a protracted war. 78 In so doing, he reverted to the overall strategic concepts he had developed

dizzy with success. Herein lies the temporary nature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are 'justifiability,' 'expediency' and 'restraint.' Persisting in such justifiable, expedient and restrained struggles, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, isolate the die-hard forces and make the die-hards chary of heedlessly attacking us... or heedlessly starting a large-scale civil war. And we can in this way win a favorable turn in the situation." Ibid., p. 199.

75 This use of negotiations gave rise to the familiar pattern of "fight, fight—talk, talk."

⁷⁶ Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), p. 89. Italics added.

77 New York Times, Aug. 20, 1946, p. 4.

⁷⁸ Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), p. 101.

during the first civil war to deal with the Kuomintag forces and during the first and third phases of the Sino-Japanese War to deal with the Japanese. These concepts had been fashioned and applied when armed struggle was the principal form of struggle. Now that armed struggle again was the main form and he was confident of ultimate victory, Mao abandoned the principle of truce he had laid down during the period of the united front when "peaceful political struggle" was the main form. He no longer asked the Communists to "stop at the proper moment" and bring a "particular fight to a close," after repulsing the Nationalist attack. He no longer entertained the idea of seeking on his own initiative a truce and then a peace agreement with the Kuomintang. Instead, he anticipated the possibility that after having halted the Nationalist offensive and recovered part of the lost territory, the Communist forces would seize the strategic initiative and go over to the offensive, and that the destruction of additional Kuomintang units one by one over a period of time would bring about a tremendous change in the relative strengths of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. When this momentous change in the military situation materialized after the Communist victory in the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in Manchuria in November, 1948, he contemptuously dismissed the Kuomintang's overtures for peace and issued a call "to carry the revolution through to the end" by advancing south of the Yangtze River, overthrowing Chiang's regime, and establishing a new government.79 Thus, armed struggle as the principal form meant protracted and all-out war.

Yet even armed struggle as the main form was not incompatible with negotiations, provided they could be turned to the Communists' advantage. In the four months following the shift to all-out war in July, 1946, the negotiations between the Communists and the Kuomintang with Marshall as the mediator continued. Mao's objectives in these negotiations were to put the onus of starting the civil war on the Nationalists, to show the partiality of the United States toward the Chinese government and to rally the minor parties and groups around the Communist Party in opposition to the Kuomintang. Even after the "total na-

tional split" occurred in November, 1946, the Communists did not refuse the Kuomintang initiative to reopen negotiations. But they shrewdly attached unacceptable preconditions to the resumption of talks, thus making the Kuomintang appear responsible for the continuation of the civil war. 81 After military defeats in Manchuria, North China and Central China forced Generalissimo Chiang to step down from the presidency in January, 1949, Mao took up Acting President Li Tsung-jen's overtures for peace and turned the negotiations to his own purpose of imposing his own terms, dividing the opponents, weakening the morale of the Nationalist forces, and winning over those who were ready to cooperate with the victor in the civil war.82 Negotiations were accompanied by active preparations for crossing the Yangtze. After Li rejected Mao's terms, the Communist forces swept across the river, fully prepared for the task. These negotiations were obviously one form of "peaceful political struggle" waged simultaneously as the secondary form to supplement armed struggle, the main form.

Another form of political struggle was to induce defections by establishing secret contacts and understandings with Kuomintang officers.83 The government's fear of defection of its troops became, as the American White Paper on China noted, "a restraining influence in the planning of operations and tended to constrict government forces even more deeply in their defensive positions."84 One variation of this form was to secure surrender by negotiating separate peace agreements with local commanders. Another variation was the vigorous application of the long-standing policy of giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war and inducing them to join the Communist forces. In the two years after July, 1946, the communist army absorbed into its ranks some 800,000 former Kuomintang soldiers, which amounted to one third of the total number of

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 114, 299-306.

⁸⁰ In discussing the events from July to October, Mao asserted, "More and more people now realize the truth that Marshall's mediation is a fraud and that the Kuomintang is the arch enemy." *Ibid.*, p. 117. See Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China op. cit.*, pp. 421-436.

⁸¹ Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), pp. 123, 127. Department of State, U.S. Relations with China (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1949), pp. 230-2.

⁸² Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), p. 372. For the negotiations between Mao and Li and their proposals and counter-proposals, see Liang Sheng-chün, Chiang-Li two-cheng nei-mo ["The Inside Story of the Struggle between Chiang and Li"] (Hong Kong, Union Asia Press, 1954), pp. 69-104. This book was written by a confidant of Acting President Li.

Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), pp. 75, 79,
 U.S. Relations with China, p. 318.

new recruits.85 Still another form of political struggle was to incite anti-war, anti-government, anti-American sentiments among the population in the enemy's territory, as in the case of the movement "against hunger, against civil war, against persecution" in May, 1947, and the movement in opposition to the alleged American policy of supporting Japan in May and June of 1948.86 Mao had no illusions that these measures in the political struggle would by themselves enable him to defeat the Kuomintang; they could bring results only if he could win victories on the battlefield. But to a degree difficult to ascertain, the various forms of political struggle played a part in enabling the Communists to conquer the Chinese mainland much more quickly than their initial estimate of five years of hard fighting.

Fundamentally the political struggle in this period of civil war consisted in building up a "very broad united front of the whole nation" against Chiang's government. This united front was to be developed by winning over "all those who can be won over." It was to consist of 90 per cent of the people and isolate a small group of reactionaries. It was to be led by the Communist party.87 In line with this policy, he resisted every tendency on the part of some cadres to follow an ultra-left and adventurist line in relying too exclusively on the poor peasants, in neglecting the task of winning over other elements in the population, and in taking actions which would damage their interests or alienate them. Instead, he endeavored to win over all social elements with the exception of "the feudalists and the bureaucratic capitalists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices."88 Beginning in early 1948, the land reform program which had mainly benefited the poor peasants was moderated, its target

of attack was narrowed, and its tempo was slowed down.89

This policy of winning over more and more social groups was adjusted to the progress of the war. In its first year, the Communists had to attract a hard core of fighters, mainly from poor and lower middle peasants, who had received economic benefits through land redistribution. But as the military situation changed and an economic crisis developed in the Kuomintang areas, various groups that had chosen to side with the Kuomintang or had been vacillating became disaffected with the government and turned toward the Communists. To exploit this change in sentiment, the Communists broadened their appeal to an ever larger number of groups. In announcing its large-scale counter-offensive in October, 1947, the People's Liberation Army declared that its first policy

to unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and business men, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and to establish a democratic coalition government.⁹⁰

As the counter-offensive moved forward, these categories of social groups were given broad definition. "'Businessmen' means all the national bourgeoisie who are persecuted and fettered, that is, the middle and petty bourgeoise," Mao told his cadres in an inner-party directive. "Other patriots" referred "primarily to the enlightened gentry." "The category of working people" included not only "those engaged in manual labor," but also "those engaged in mental labor who are close to those engaged in manual labor and are not exploiters."

The inclusion of the enlightened gentry as a group to be united is particularly interesting because it consisted of landlords and rich peasants—two groups which were the targets of attack during the period of land reform from May, 1946, to the fall of 1947. Now a political criterion was explicitly introduced to differentiate the enlightened gentry from the rest of the landlords and rich peasants. The enlightened gentry were "ordinary landlords and rich peasants with democratic leanings." Emphasis was now placed on winning them over to support land reform, instead of forcing them to accept it. The political motive in this change in emphasis is made clear by Mao's remark

<sup>Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), p. 271.
Ibid., pp. 120, 125; U.S. Relations with China, pp. 906; Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp. 451-2, 477-8.</sup>

⁸⁷ Mao, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Selected Works, IV (Peking), pp. 171-2. This report by Mao to the Central Committee in Dec., 1947, was widely publicized. It was published in the U. S. under the title Turning Point in China (New York, New Century Publishers, 1948). See also Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), pp. 187, 183, 238, 369, 417. For the changes in the public position of the Communists on the question of Communist leadership, see Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp. 184 n. 27, 186 n. 33; Mao, Selected Works, IV, p. 116.

⁸⁸ Mao, Selected Works, IV (Peking), p. 407.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 175, 183, 194, 201-2, 236-7, 251, 337-8.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 150.

that if some of the enlightened gentry support land reform,

it will help win over the intellectuals (most of whom come from landlord or rich peasant families), the national bourgeoisie (most of them have ties with the land) and the enlightened gentry throughout the country (who number several hundred thousand) and help to isolate the chief enemy of the Chinese revolution, the Chiang Kaishek reactionaries. 91

This re-emphasis on the role of the enlightened gentry, the intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie was obviously related to the intensified effort made in early 1948 to enlist and solidify the support of the small parties and groups, and the dissidents in the Kuomintang. In January, the Democratic League, which had been dissolved by the Kuomintang in October, 1947, was re-established in Hong Kong; and the Nationalist dissidents formed the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. Both groups voiced their support for the Communist Party. By the time when the Communists were making preparations for convoking a new Political Consultative Conference to organize a central government, Mao could declare with some justification that "The Chinese revolution is a revolution of the broad masses of the whole nation. Everybody is our friend except the imperialists, the feudalists and the bureaucratcapitalists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices."92 He had long ago called the united front, armed struggle, and partybuilding the three magic wands of the Communists in the Chinese revolution. There is little doubt that the united front helped him defeat Chiang in armed struggle. At the same time, the broadening and deepening of the "revolutionary united front" was made possible by the success in armed struggle.

In waging political struggle as a supplement to military struggle, Mao was also preparing for the transition once again from war to peace or from armed struggle to political struggle as the main form. The united front during the period of armed struggle rallied support for the Communists, enlisted non-Communist participation in the regime, helped to retain Kuomintang personnel in running various agencies, reassured the business men and industrialists, and limited economic and administrative dislocation to a minimum. It played a part in bringing to China in the next few years a political stability and solidarity unprecedented in the modern era.

VIII. COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE SYSTEM. OF NATIONAL STATES

A salient feature of international politics in the past fifteen years is Communist China's impact, greater than a nation with similarlylimited military and economic resources would normally have outside its immediate borders. It is quite true that her influence has been bought with great sacrifices and at the cost of many setbacks. But there have been enough successes to sustain her in the belief in the applicability of Mao's revolutionary strategy and tactics to the international arena. Furthermore, the doctrine of protracted struggle cannot be proved invalid by the mixed record of Peking's foreign policy or by the disproportion between costs and gains. The "thought of Mao Tse-tung," having as its basic injunction the "creative adaptation" of universally valid principles to concrete situations, permits flexibility in strategy and tactics while at the same time facilitating the attribution of failure to its incorrect application.

Thus, a basic problem in the evaluation of Peking's foreign policy is the extent to which the revolutionary experience of the Chinese Communist Party constitutes a useful example for other revolutionary movements to emulate. This depends in part on whether the objective conditions which made Mao's success possible exist or will emerge in other countries. One of these conditions is the political weakness of the government in power. There is little doubt that the existing regime in many underdeveloped countries is weak. But as the Nationalist government in China prior to 1937 shows, a politically weak government can still progressively consolidate its rule because of the feebleness of its opponents. What undermined the foundation of the Nationalist government in China and enabled the Chinese Communist Party to build up sufficient strength to defeat the Kuomintang was the Sino-Japanese War. Thus, a prolonged external war, a national liberation war, or a civil war between two non-Communist groups will enhance the applicability of the Maoist model. This is perhaps the reason why the Chinese Communists profess to detect a progressive intensification of the contradictions everywhere in the non-Communist world: the conflicts among the capitalist countries, the conflicts between the newly independent nations and the Western powers, the conflicts between the colonial and semi-colonial countries and the imperialist powers.

A much less important but by no means totally negligible factor contributing to Mao's victory was the acquisition of the captured

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 207, 209-10.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 220, 225-6, 407.

Japanese arms from the Soviet forces in Manchuria after Japan's surrender. Here the geographical contiguity of the revolutionary forces to other Communist states comes into play. In a small country like Vietnam, this factor has a strong impact on the outcome. Finally, American policy placed very few obstacles in the way of Mao's march to power. In South Vietnam from 1954 to 1963, the United States placed too much emphasis on conventional military power and is learning only too late the paramount importance of the political factor in counter-insurgency warfare; we have so far failed to fashion a workable program for gaining popular support for a government assisted by the United States. But the absence of these four conditions will render it difficult for China to apply Mao's strategy successfully.

If one looks beyond individual nations to the global situation, there are other formidable obstacles which Mao must overcome or face eventual failure of his foreign policy. Unlike the Kuomintang, his two chief antagonists at the present time, the United States and the Soviet Union, represent two dynamic forces in the world arena. Both are politically and militarily strong. Mao's military strategy and tactics were developed for guerrilla and mobile warfare with conventional weapons. They are totally inapplicable to an all-out war in the nuclear age even for the defense of the Chinese mainland. Official Chinese doctrine has been modified to take account of nuclear weapons and in particular the nuclear threat from the United States. Some Chinese military leaders, however, have argued that this adaptation has not gone far enough.93

But the most basic source of the difficulties confronting Mao's attempt to apply his political-military strategy to the international arena is the system of national states itself. The confrontation between the international movement and the nation-state system, which in the first place produced Mao's "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China, has now resulted in his insistence on the correctness of a revolutionary strategy for the Communist camp which is based largely on his experience in the Chinese revolution. This in turn has disrupted the unity of the camp. Nationalism which helped Mao

93 Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York, 1965), pp. 24-82. See also Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962); David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," China Quarterly (Oct.-Dec., 1961), p. 65.

to power in China will become a formidable obstacle to Mao's ambition when the fear of Chinese influence and domination grows with the increase in Chinese power. Mao has worked out a program to turn nationalism against the West in general and the United States in particular. But nationalism can also be turned against him. National borders sometimes coincide with cultural, linguistic, and racial boundaries. The further Mao tries to move beyond the area of traditional Chinese cultural hegemony, the more formidable will be the difficulties imposed by cultural, linguistic, and racial differences.

Thus, the projection of Mao's revolutionary strategy into the international arena constitutes a factor which, quite apart from the Marxist-Leninist ideology, complicates Peking's adjustment to the system of national states. Peking's leaders are undoubtedly aware of the necessity for Communist China to live with the international system for a long period. But their tendency to understand the international situation and to fashion their program abroad in the light of their revolutionary experience cannot but make it difficult for them to understand the rules and customary conduct governing national states. For their revolutionary strategy was developed in a civil war in which the contending groups were not separated by any international boundary. Actions, strategy, and tactics employed in a civil war or political conflict within a nation are not always acceptable in the international arena, no matter how moderate or cautious they are. Frequently, the same strategy or tactics have quite different implications and consequences. in the two spheres of political conflict. The tendency to project their revolutionary strategy abroad prevents the Chinese Communists from drawing a sharp line of demarcation between two types of actions and two spheres of activities. They do not fully realize the incompatibility between the rules governing national states and their revolutionary strategy.

Many of the discrepancies between Peking's profession and actions arise not so much from hypocrisy as from this conflict between the need to live with the system of national states and the tendency to project Mao's revolutionary strategy abroad. Thus, on the one hand, Peking proclaims loudly that revolution cannot be exported and on the other hand, gives diplomatic support or advice and aid to "national liberation movements" everywhere. On the one hand, she proclaims the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" which embody the generally recognized rules of the system of na-

tional states and on the other hand her actions constantly violate the spirit and the letter of these principles. The Chinese Communists challenge the two superpowers simultaneously instead of playing the one against the other. Their understanding of war and peace is filtered through their revolutionary experience, their concept of armed struggle, and their propensity to use force as a constant instrument of policy. Peking denounces solutions of international issues based on the concept of spheres of influence, even if Communist China is given her share. It thus rejects a widely used method of resolving conflicts within the nation-state system.

The Chinese Communists' projection of their revolutionary strategy abroad is a more systematic and self-conscious expression of the general tendency of many peoples to project their way of life abroad, to judge foreign things by their own standards, and to understand alien affairs in terms of their image of themselves. This general tendency usually creates disturbances in international politics and has at one time or another brought about diffi-

culties of some sort for the originators themselves. In the nineteenth century, Western traders and missionaries, backed by their governments with forcible measures, projected their way of life into China and disrupted the Confucian order. The total disintegration of the traditional social and political system in China doomed all Western hopes of seeing the emergence of a China fashioned after the image of a Christian, democratic nation in the West. Instead, a hostile, totalitarian regime issued from the social, political and economic chaos. While a fundamental force of social progress, cultural diffusion in any of its forms has its political and human costs. The tendency of a successful revolutionary elite to project its way of life abroad, to view alien things in terms of its self-image, is even more pronounced. Such an elite often finds adjustment to its international environment difficult. It frequently creates disturbances in the system of national states, and especially in the balance of power. The Chinese Communist Party is no exception to this rule. Mao's revolutionary strategy as reinforced by China's traumatic experience with the system of national states will make Communist China a disturbing influence in international politics for a long time and will render her adjustment to the international system a more protracted process than in other examples that come to mind. Meanwhile, Communist China will be a formidable force to reckon with and Mao's strategy will pose a serious challenge to world order.

⁹⁴ Marshal Lo Jung-huan claimed that no better discussion of the question of war and peace is to be found than in a speech by Mao in 1945 which dealt with CCP-Kuomintang relations and the civil war in China. Work Correspondence, no. 8 (Feb. 6, 1961), p. 17.

⁹⁵ Ibid., no. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 19.

RESEARCH NOTES

THE ILLUSION OF JUDICIAL CONSENSUS: ZONING DECISIONS IN THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

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In some American courts of last resort, dissent is free and frequent; in others the judges vote unanimously for months, even for years at a time—a difference in judicial behavior which tempts inquiry and speculation. Although social scientists generally focus on dissenting courts and feed the human and scientific appetite for open controversy, the operation of every type of court is clarified by an examination of the ways and pitfalls of ostensible consensus among the judges. The purpose of this study of one supreme court and one body of law-zoning law in the Maryland Court of Appeals—is to demonstrate that under certain conditions unanimity in voting is illusory.

I. FINDINGS

Of the fifty-one high courts in the American system of government, the Supreme Court of the United States, with a reputation for airing crucial differences, is fittingly the most measured and probed. Dissent is less frequent in all the remaining fifty. In half, dissent is noted no oftener than in one case in twenty, on the average, as contrasted with expressed disagreement, often with several dissenting opinions, in some two-thirds of the cases decided with full opinion by the federal high court in recent years. Occasionally, behavioral analysis has been directed at the courts of the states and notably the Supreme Court of Michigan, which exhibits a level of dissent well below that of the Supreme Court of the United States yet high enough to invite study. The voting in such courts shows statistically significant individual, bloc, and coalition patterns. But in a majority of the courts of last resort, dissent is so rare that the usual analysis of aye and nay voting fails. A sampling of recent cases (Table I) clearly indicates this infrequency of dissent. The average rate of dissent for the states as a

¹ Glendon Schubert, "The Michigan Supreme Court," in Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (New York, 1959), pp. 129-142; and S. Sidney Ulmer, "Leadership in the Michigan Supreme Court," in Glendon Schubert, ed., Judicial Decision-Making (New York, 1963), pp. 13-28.

whole is only one case in ten.² The Maryland Court of Appeals, with no dissents in the cases sampled, is unlike the Michigan and United States Supreme Courts.³ It is one of those at the peaceful end of the range.

² At the .01 level, 10.6 ± 2.6 per cent.

³ Schubert, Quantitative Analysis, p. 134, contrasts rates of dissent in 1956-57: .79 in the United States Supreme Court and .16 in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Whatever the dissimilarities then and now, these two courts may be said to share a penchant for lively dissent, never a characteristic of the Maryland Court of Appeals.

TABLE 1. FREQUENCY OF DISSENT IN THE FIFTY-ONE
SUPREME COURTS: CASES WITH ONE OR MORE
DISSENTING VOTES IN SAMPLES
OF TWENTY-FIVE*

Number of Cases with Dissent	Jurisdiction						
0	Ala., Ariz., Del., <i>Md.</i> , Mass., Nev., N.C., R.I., S.C., Tenn., W.Va.						
1	Ga., Id., Ill., Ky., Me., Minn., Miss., Mo., N.M., N.D., Vt., Wash.						
2	Conn., Fla., Ia., Neb., N.J., S.D., Va., Wyo.						
3	Ark., N.H., O., Ore.						
4	Col., Kans., Mont.						
5	Alaska, Okla.						
6	Hawaii, Ind., N.Y., Ut., Wis.						
7	Calif., La.						
8	Mich.						
9	Tex.						
10	Pa.						
• • • •	• • • • •						
17	United States						

* For each court, the 25 most recent cases from the most recent regional reporters and the *United States Reports*, as of May, 1964, less unsigned orders and memorandum opinions, advisory opinions, reprimands of counsel, and suspensions from the bar. Decisions with full *per curiam* opinions included. 373-4 U.S.; 193-4 N.E. 2d; 190-5 A. 2d; 377-86 P. 2d; 369-72 S.W. 2d; 157-8 S. 2d; 131-3 S.E. 2d; and 122-5 N.W. 2d. State frequencies significant ±5 at the .05 level or beyond.

The reasons for consensus and dissensus are buried in the political culture of each jurisdiction, to be unearthed with respect for the endless uses of law. Still, it is possible a priori to sketch some of the broad alternatives. In courts such as Michigan's the judges express some or all of their legal disagreements in the voting, and often in the authorship of opinions as well. In courts acknowledging little or no dissent, however, either substantial agreement actually prevails or there is disagreement not evident in the record of voting. In the latter event, at least two possibilities suggest themselves. Both sacrifice the expression of the real feelings of judges who find themselves in a minority on a particular issue, for the sake of the collectively felt needs for maintaining the prestige of the court and for gaining the advantages of collective bargaining, by presenting the outward appearance of a solid front. One possibility is that the court operates like a caucus, with an informal understanding that. except for the most exigent reasons, all the judges will be bound by the unrecorded vote of a majority, taken in camera. Such an understanding admits of variations in degree. Where a practice of this sort prevails, consistency in the disposition of cases is on the whole maintained until the majority viewpoint changes, by the replacement of judges or otherwise. But the outcome of zoning cases in Maryland cannot be reconciled with this explanation, as will presently be seen.

Another possibility is a log-rolling understanding that the entire court will go along with the judge assigned to write the opinion in a particular case, coupled with a system of rotating case assignments from member to member. The effective result then is one court acting as several one-man courts. The court, by division of labor, is in the hands of the judge who writes the opinion rather than the members who subscribe their perfunctory concurrence. Such is the case in Maryland.

Since the passage in 1960 of a constitutional amendment reorganizing its judiciary, Maryland has had the equivalent in another way of

⁴ It was ostensibly against such a possibility, threatened by Franklin Roosevelt's court reorganization plan, that Chief Justice Hughes argued in a letter to Congress in March, 1937, "The Constitution does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts or two or more parts of a supreme court functioning in effect as separate courts." U. S. Senate, Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937), S. Rept. 711, p. 40. The real disagreement was over the Court's policy, of course, not its procedure.

several Courts of Appeals with overlapping memberships. The amendment increased the number of judges from five to seven and provided that:

Five of the judges shall constitute a quorum, and five judges shall sit in each case unless the Court shall direct that an additional judge or judges sit for any case. The concurrence of a majority of those sitting shall be sufficient for the decision of any cause....⁵

But this overt division of the Court has had less practical impact than the informal division which remains hidden by the rarity of dissent.

What of the possibility that the members of the Court of Appeals are in genuine agreement? They have little of the diversity of background, philosophy, and temperament of the justices of the United States Supreme Court. A common outlook on zoning would not seem implausible. Case by case, the opinions of the state judges reiterate a body of law composed of familiar leading cases; the judges defer to the Court of yesterday by upholding precedent and to their colleagues of today by concurring.

Maryland judge-made zoning law is not only stable, it is distinctive. The judicial gloss on the state enabling acts and local zoning ordinances has followed the other states with respect to the meaning of the basic mechanisms of zoning—original zoning, special exceptions, variances, and nonconforming uses—but it has assumed an unusually strong stand against rezoning (zoning amendment) by attaching strict conditions to the enactment of rezoning ordinances. According to the Maryland view, imitated in a few other courts, proponents of a rezoning ordinance must show an error in the original zoning or a basic change in neighborhood conditions.

A second theme in this body of judge-made law is judicial restraint, boldly advanced in concert with the error-or-change rule with which the Court undertakes the review of the merits of a large segment of the legislative decisions of local zoning authorities. The theme takes the form of a disclaimer of responsibility to intervene so long as there is room for debate. Stated the other way, the Court feels justified in imposing its own judgment only when the action of a zoning body is deemed

⁵ Laws of Maryland, 1960, Ch. 11, ratified the same year.

⁶ See, for example, the citations in Arden H. Rathkopf, *The Law of Zoning and Planning*, 3d ed. (New York: Clark Boardman Co., 1962), vol. I, sec. 27, p. 15.

"arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and illegal."

Protestations notwithstanding, the tools of activism are well honed and ready at hand in Maryland. The frequency of their use refutes the Court's claim of judicial restraint and the distribution of their use refutes the claims of unanimity and consistency. The probability that a rezoning or other local zoning action will be struck down rises and falls from the mean as the assignment of the writing of opinions rotates from one judge to another. At the extremes of probability, zoning actions are practically certain to be upheld by Judge Hall Hammond and to be voided by Judge William Henderson. Concurrences prove illusory; what matters is the authorship of the opinions of the Court.

The stark polarity of these positions is obscured by two groups of cases in which the unanimity of the judges is real and not merely nominal. First, all the judges are reluctant to direct a local authority to grant a zoning dispensation, as contrasted with their willingness to reverse an affirmative local action. Appeals from denials of zoning actions are therefore relatively noncontroversial. Second, a number of cases each year are decided on procedural grounds, such as timeliness of appeal, unrelated to substantive questions of zoning. The disparity between word and deed occurs in the remainder: appeals on the merits from local grants of zoning amendments, special exceptions, variances, and permits for nonconforming uses. Since its first in 1926, the Maryland Court of Appeals has decided 211 zoning cases,7 including only nine dissents. Of this number, 69 have been appeals from denials of zoning action by local authorities, decided 52 to 17 in favor of the zoning authority. Another 53 have been decided on procedural grounds, leaving a core of 89 cases: 42 upholding and 47 reversing the local zoning body.

Twenty-one of the 89 core cases in this period of nearly four decades have been decided by the two most divergent members, Judges Hammond and Henderson. Each has a record of opinions which deviates significantly from the average for the Court: Judge Hammond has written opinions of the Court nine to one in favor of sustaining the local zoning action⁸ and Judge Henderson has recorded nine cases to two against the local authority.⁹ If cases have been assigned to the two judges at ran-

dom, the disparity in the outcomes cannot be attributed to chance alone. It appears that the two judges simply have different inclinations in zoning matters—one favoring flexibility and the other stability—and that the difference is reflected in the pattern of their opinions. A heavy work load may not permit the two and their brethren to conform to the model suggested by the state bar association in cooperation with members of the Court:

At the conferences on opinions each opinion is read in its entirety by the judge preparing it and only after comment, discussion, criticism and revision is it finally released as the opinion of the Court. Thus the opinions are truly opinions of the Court and not "one-man opinions."

Another possible explanation for the divergence between Judges Hammond and Henderson, that cases are assigned not at random but with such selectivity that Judge Hammond has received a set in which the zoning authority has acted with manifest good sense and Judge Henderson a set of patently bungled cases, is at variance with the semi-official assurance that "opinions are assigned essentially on a rotation basis."

The Court of Appeals has acquiesced in a system of decision which rests on the vicissitudes of case assignment rather than the consensus of a majority.

II. DISCUSSION

Two implications of this judicial behavior may be noted, one practical and one theoretical. Practically, it suggests the value of testing for divisions of labor beneath the surface consensus of state supreme courts-for judges who tend to find the written opinions of their colleagues more persuasive than the records of the cases at bar. The proposal is more radical than it might seem. Courts in their opinions and the professional digesters who furnish anonymous case headnotes and summaries to the legal community keep alive a presumption against the significance of judicial individuality. The usual summaries of opinions of the United States Supreme Court are equally impersonal, but in this instance an abundance of offsetting commentary circulates in the law reviews, the press, and in the opinions of the Court themselves. In the states, by contrast, the law reviews and the press as often reinforce

⁷ To April, 1964. Tables of cases are available from the author.

⁸ Significant at the .01 level.

⁹ Significant at the .05 level.

¹⁰ Maryland State Bar Association, "Report of Committee to Study the Case Load of the Court of Appeals," *Transactions* (Baltimore: Maryland State Bar Association, 1958), p. 307.

¹¹ Ibid.

the presumption of impersonality. To the press, mention of authorship of opinions of the Maryland Court of Appeals apparently is as unseemly as it is appropriate for the reporting of activities of the United States Supreme Court, the Maryland General Assembly, or a county council. A vital bit of data is withheld from lay and professional readers alike.

If there is a division of labor, the litigant in particular has an interest in knowing details of its operation in order to take advantage of the variations from one judge to another. Judge-shopping is an ancient if not altogether honored legal stratagem. But the Maryland Court of Appeals frustrates the effort by taking care that the rotation of assignments is "varied from time to time so that it is not possible to determine in advance just which judge will write the opinion in a particular case" an unnecessary precaution unless the assignment is crucial to the outcome.

The second implication of this pattern of decision is more in the nature of an asset than a liability, and more theoretical: a collegial court functioning as a plural court provides a new and different test of the determinacy of legal rules. Good tests for courts other than the United States Supreme Court are in short supply. With that court as its prime example, American jurisprudence has passed through the stages of asserting absolutely and denying absolutely the efficacy of general propositions in application to hard facts, and has abandoned the quest for the experimentum crucis in favor of a cautiously empirical middle position. There is fair agreement that judges, some conscious of their power and some not, have broad discretion within the rules of law and of their constitutions, statutes, and precedents-Holmes's "play in the joints"—and students of the United States Supreme Court know now the mechanics of rationalizing virtually any judgment pro or con in constitutional law, an exercise in which they have had ample instruction from the opinions of the Court. But whether a given court in a given area of law is judging with consistency and in some recognizable relation to the rules of positive law is an empirical question for which more refined operational phrasing for courts exhibiting little or no dissent is elusive.

The feasibility and form of a test of the efficacy of general propositions depend on the make-up and the performance of the court or courts under observation. In the case of a single court with a single judge, no direct test is readily available. The court affirms rules of law

and disposes of cases. It may be unclear, comparing one case with another, whether similar decisions involve the consistent application of the rules to similar facts or an inconsistent application to dissimilar facts, and conversely whether dissimilar decisions are attributable to the facts or the process of applying the rules. Indirect tests are possible in theory, but impracticable to the degree that they require long time series or experimental retrying of the cases by the observer.

In the analysis of more than one court applying the same rules to equivalent facts, the efficacy of the rules can be tested simply and successfully. A significant difference in the decision patterns of two courts which is not traceable to differences in the facts of the cases before them can be attributed only to the indeterminacy of the rules of law.

The best known situation is the collegial court with two dimensions of expressed disagreement: dissenting opinions and the overturning of precedent. Since the facts available to the majority and the dissenters are identical, there is no need for statistical inferences or investigations of the comparability of the facts; and when a majority overrules old interpretations it of course is openly demonstrating to that extent the indeterminacy of the underlying legal propositions.

A court such as the Maryland Court of Appeals-collegial, nearly free of dissent, and inconsistent internally in so far as members concur in decisions they would decide differently on assignment-is functionally more akin to a system of courts applying the same rules than to one court like the United States Supreme Court. Observers of judicial behavior will find it profitable to watch for the possible operation of indeterminacy in this unlikely context. Overlooking concurrences, tabulating the authorship of opinions in a defined field of law, and testing for significant deviations from the average, they can contribute a note of realism to the literature of the law. Focusing on one field of law is necessary for accuracy, but it need not imply triviality of subject matter. Zoning decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals, for example, often have made momentous differences in land use.

III. SUMMARY

The opinions of the judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals reflect an uncomplicated faith in legal rules and their literal application by traditional judicial methods. Whatever their private views, the judges do not recognize a need to interrupt their flow of work with a basic examination of the role of the judiciary.

Maryland has been untouched by the logical skepticism that has disturbed and divided some courts for several decades: the idea that "general propositions do not decide concrete cases" or that rules are only predictions of "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious." Neither has it been touched by the psychological skepticism suggesting that legal principles sometimes function as defensive incantations—that ritual protestations of judicial restraint in activist opinions, to take one instance, may serve to reassure judges who value the principle of restraint while they also feel obliged to depart from it.

At least in their zoning decisions, the members of the Maryland Court of Appeals have striven for consistency of doctrine rather than consistency of decision. Because of the rotation of assignments for the writing of opinions and the automatic nature of concurrence in these cases, their nearly unanimous acceptance of a

remarkably stable set of rules has resulted in a low level of determinacy and predictability from the point of view of the litigant, whose interest is in results.

It is entirely possible for a detectable consistency of decision, procedural or substantive, to be associated with a given set of rules and to lend predictability to the operation of courts of law. Procedurally, for example, a court may approach predictability by genuine judicial restraint in the manner of Felix Frankfurter, to whom other forms of consistency seemed either illusory or presumptuous, and substantively it may adopt the policy of activism in a known direction, as the United States Supreme Court has at different times in the areas of property and civil rights.

Compared to the Maryland high court, the Supreme Court of the United States is highly consistent in the general run of its business, because the tendencies of each of its members are known with some accuracy and the prediction of majority positions often follows by simple arithmetic. But the positions of members of the Maryland Court of Appeals are not additive and the position of the Court as a whole in a zoning case therefore is set by one man at a time.

¹³ Holmes, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 at 76 (1905).

¹⁴ Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 10 (1897), p. 461, reprinted in his Collected Legal Papers.

DOES A "DIVISIVE" PRIMARY HARM A CANDIDATE'S ELECTION CHANCES?

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It is a rare election year when the nation's attention is not focussed on at least one party primary where the struggle for the nomination is highly competitive and the result a matter of doubt until the last precincts are reported. In many such cases the other party has settled on its own standard-bearer and thus sits back contentedly while the opposition wages its internecine battle before a rapt public. In recent years as varied personages as Estes Kefauver, Richard Nixon, and Charles Percy found themselves engaged in a hard-fought primary campaign to secure their nomination or renomination for state office.

Nixon's subsequent defeat in the 1962 race for the California governorship, and in a lesser degree Percy's 1964 experience in Illinois, served to illustrate the conventional view that the party whose candidate is obliged to fight a hard primary campaign has an important strike against it upon entering the general election. Common sense, if nothing else, suggests that the very existence of such a primary produces or symbolizes fissures among a party's supporters. The supposition also arises that those who backed the primary loser in the Spring may be less than enthusiastic about aiding his vanguisher in the Fall. And there is reason to believe that voters who are committed to neither party may wonder whether the party that needed to go to the polls to resolve its own leadership problems is fit to hold public office.

The validity of these common sense assumptions can be tested by juxtaposing the experience of candidates in their primary and general elections. The period to be considered here runs from 1956 through to 1964, and the offices contested are those of governor and senator.

Not all of the 50 states are sufficiently competitive to warrant inclusion in this analysis. If a single party dominates the election for state offices then the occurrence of a divisive

¹ This study starts with 1956 because that was the year for which Richard Scammon began to collate primary figures in his America Votes series (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1964). Most of the primary and election statistics for 1964 were obtained from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports and, in a few instances, by personal correspondence with state officials.

primary within the already weak second party will hardly be the efficient cause of its going down to defeat in the November election. In such states the opposition party has little or no chance of winning either the governorship or a Senate seat anyway, so a primary fight within its own meager ranks makes little difference.

Accordingly, the following 15 states will, for present purposes, be considered "one-party" states and so excluded from the ensuing calculations: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. This list has been drawn notwithstanding that many of these states have had vigorous two-party competiton for their Presidential electoral votes. It also acknowledges that Oklahoma has elected a Republican governor. Texas a Republican senator, Vermont a Democratic governor, and Alabama and Mississippi Republican congressmen in recent years. Nevertheless 14 of these states are quite solidly Democratic; and if Vermont is no longer a safe Republican enclave, its shift to the two-party column is a relatively late development in the 1956-1964 period. Finally, four states-Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, and New York-hold no primaries for senatorial and gubernatorial nominations. The remaining 31 states are left to form the basis for this study.

Some of these 31 states are, of course, more competitive than others. Republican candidates for statewide office usually seem to be on the losing end of a near-miss in Nevada and Washington; and only two Democrats have been able to win a majority in Utah in the last eight years. Moreover some states have meaningful two-party competition for the governorship while their Senate seats do not change partisan hands. In Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa Republicans invariably won the Senate race during this period, and in New Mexico that office is pretty much a Democratic monopoly. Nevertheless these states are sufficiently competitive to deserve inclusion in the two-party category.

I. "DIVISIVE" PRIMARIES

A "divisive" primary is here defined as one where the winning candidate received less than 65 per cent of the total votes cast. In "token" primaries, correspondingly, the winner received 65 per cent or more of the ballots cast, or ran as a single candidate unopposed. This arbitrary cut-off point was decided upon as most appropriate for purposes of this study after first trying various alternative percentages. Put the other way around, in a "divisive" primary at least 35 per cent of the voters who participated cast their ballots for someone other than the candidate who ultimately won the nomination.

Between 1956 and 1964 there were 220 elections for senator and governor in the 31 states. In 94 of these both candidates had token primaries; in 27 both had divisive primary contests; and in 99 one candidate had only token opposition while the other had a divisive fight in the primaries. Lumping together the first two categories, it may be assumed that in 121 of the 220 elections, at least so far as their primary experience was concerned, the candidates entered the general election on an equal footing. These elections can be used as a "control" group, and it will be referred to again in the concluding section. But in order to analyze the influence of a divisive primary, our attention should first be directed to the 99 elections where one of the two candidates had had only a token primary.2

In these 99 cases, the opponent who underwent a divisive primary was the loser in the general election in 68 instances and the winner in only 31. Thus in almost 70 per cent of these elections it was the candidate who had to fight for his nomination who went down to a November defeat. From these figures it is easy enough to jump to the conclusion that the candidate emerging from a divisive primary stood a better than two-to-one chance of being defeated at the general election. On the other hand it appears that almost one-third of the divisive primary candidates managed to pick up the pieces and emerge victorious over an opponent who had had little or no trouble at the primary stage himself. Hence some inquiry must be made into the conditions under which

² Thus the total number of hard-fought primaries amounted to 153, of which 54 arose from the 27 occasions when both candidates had to struggle for their nominations, and 99 from the cases where only one of the two candidates had a strenuous fight. This figure is only 35 per cent of 440, the total number of November major-party candidacies in this period. In other words, almost two-thirds of the senatorial and gubernatorial candidates in 1956 through 1964 were either unopposed or received only token primary opposition in their quests for the nominations.

some candidates with a divisive primary behind them went on to subsequent victory while others suffered defeat.

In dealing with almost 100 elections spanning almost a full political decade it is obvious that a wide range of causal factors are operative, many of them not amenable to measurement. When one candidate wins and another loses the reasons may have to do with such matters as personality, campaign organization, party swings, or other peculiarities of time and place. What is being undertaken here is, for all intents and purposes, an empirical exercise in model-building. The major variable is the primary experience of the candidate, and this factor will be held constant while surrounding and accompanying conditions are ranged against it.

II. THE OFFICE

Senatorial and gubernatorial elections differ in just about as many respects as they are similar. It is well understood, for example, that an incumbent senator stands a far better chance of re-election than does an incumbent governor. The senator can make his public reputation on national and international issues; most of his enemies on these have no vote in his state. The American governorship is a highly visible and vulnerable office locally, and the man who occupies it is often the scapegoat for all manner of parochial political grievances when he is so temerarious as to request a renewed vote of confidence. Of the 68 incumbent governors seeking re-election between 1956 and 1964, only 42 (or 62 per cent) succeeded in this bid. In contrast, of the 85 senators up for reelection no fewer than 71 (or 84 per cent) were returned to Washington. The high visibility of the governorship is also made evident by looking at the 75 occasions when the voters in a state happened to cast ballots for both senator and governor at the same time. In these 75 twin elections the total votes cast were higher in the gubernatorial contest on 60 (or 80 per cent) of the occasions. While the differences were seldom appreciable it is significant that, much more often than the other way around, some voters made a choice for governor and then left the senatorial places on their ballot unmarked. Moreover, in these twin contests no fewer than 31 (or 41 per cent) of them found a majority of the electorate choosing one party's candidate as governor and the other's as senator. It is clear, at any rate, that many voters are careful to distinguish the two statewide offices from each other.

Looking at their previous primary experience it develops that a gubernatorial candidate who

TABLE I. OFFICE AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	NO CARROLO A	Governor $(N = 50)$	Total (N = 99)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
\mathbf{Lost}	73	64	69
\mathbf{Won}	27	36	31
	******	***************************************	
	100	100	100

fought a divisive primary stood a better chance of winning the general election than a senatorial candidate with a similar fight behind him. In absolute numbers this means that 18 candidates won the governorship even after a hardfought primary whereas only 13 senatorial candidates survived to victory. What is noteworthy, and this will be amplified later on, is that no less than eight of the winning governors were challengers facing incumbents, while this was the case with only 3 of the senatorial aspirants. In other words the experience of a divisive primary behind a gubernatorial candidate can be compensated for, at least in part, by the fact that his opponent is an incumbent governor who, despite his own token primary, stands a good chance of being defeated just because he is governor.

III. THE STATE

A variety of schemes and systems have been used to classify states by party, each with its own criteria and merits. To classify the 31 states here being studied as either "Democratic" or "Republican" it was simply asked how many of the statewide elections between 1956 and 1964 were won by each party's candidate in each state. If a majority of these elections were won, say, by Republicans then the state was listed as "Republican." This was the case with eleven states, and the "Democratic" label was assigned to 16 others. Four states were, for present purposes, put to one side since both parties there won an equal number of statewide contests.

³ The best known are Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this Review, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 477-485 and Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," ibid., Vol. 49 (1955), pp. 1120-1128. For a recent summary and criticism of the major classification systems, see Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. 26 (1964), pp. 550-567.

Using this classification the candidates may be categorized as running in "friendly" or "hostile" territory. Any Democrat campaigning in Utah, for example, obviously has an uphill road to travel, no matter what kind of primary experience he had; and the same is true for any Republican aspirant in Washington or Nevada. Of the 99 elections being examined, ten took place in the four states where the parties struck an even balance, leaving 89 to be analyzed here.

What is most striking in Table II is that only eleven percentage points separate the electoral outcomes of candidates running in friendly as opposed to hostile states. It is not surprising that three-quarters of the candidates who had survived divisive primaries then went down to defeat in a general election in unfriendly territory—the surprise here is rather that as many as 25 per cent of such candidates won at all. However, 61 of the 89 candidates were running in states already sympathetic to their party and this presumed advantage did not prevent almost two-thirds of them from being defeated anyway. Apparently, then, the advantage of running in a friendly state is not sufficient to compensate for having undergone a divisive primary. It should be noted, further, that of these candidates who lost in friendly territory about equal proportions were aspirants for the governorship and a seat in the Senate.

The key difference between those who won and those who lost in friendly states lies in

TABLE II. STATUS OF STATE AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	"Friendly" (N = 61)	"Hostile" (N = 28)	Total (N = 89)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lost	64	75	67
\mathbf{Won}	36	25	33
	100	100	100

⁴ The "Republican" states are: Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. "Democratic" states: California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. "Evenly Balanced" states: Colorado, Maine, Montana, and Nebraska.

whether or not the candidate was an incumbent. Table III. computed in absolute figures rather than percentages as the numbers are small, makes this clear. (Only 67 elections are tabulated as the other 22 did not involve an incumbent.) Thus the losers, whether they ran in friendly or in hostile states, were chiefly challengers who were running against incumbents. This condition of incumbency, or its lack, will be examined next. It only remains to remark that primary contests are twice as apt to occur in a party situated in friendly territory. Only on 28 occasions out of the 89 did the underdog party, already at a disadvantage in terms of popular appeal, have a divisive primary.

IV. INCUMBENCY

It is a rule of thumb that in elections where a challenger faces an incumbent the latter begins the race with an advantage. Thus if the survivor of a divisive primary is subsequently defeated the reason may have less to do with his primary experience than with the status of the opponent he faced at the general election. An incumbent was involved in 75 contests, and Table IV indicates how the candidates who had had "divisive" primaries fared in these. Most of these candidates were challengers and most of them went down to defeat. Indeed only eleven of these aspirants, faced with the double disadvantage of a divisive primary and of running against an incumbent, managed to win at all. In contrast, most of the 15 incumbents who had had divisive primaries won. It has already been noted that being or not being an incumbent has more to do with a candidate's electoral chances than the friendliness or hostility of the state in which he is running. By the same token there may be some value in inquiring whether the office involved makes any difference in the security apparently offered by incumbency.

For the same reason as before, absolute numbers will be used. What emerges from Table V is that of the six incumbents who lost five were sitting governors and only one was a senator. At the same time, of the eleven double-disadvantaged challengers who won, only three were senators and eight were aspirants for a governorship. This of course goes far toward underlining the volatile character of the office of governor: if it is relatively easy for a challenger to come by, it is also quite easy to depart from once he is there.⁵

⁵ By the same token a gubernatorial aspirant who had had a divisive primary even in a friendly state had less than a 50-50 chance of success. While a state's voters may be sympathetic to one

TABLE III. STATUS OF STATE, STATUS OF CANDIDATE, AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate	Number of candidates					
of "di- visive" candi-	In "Friendly" States		In "Hostile" State			
date	Incumbents	Challengers	Incumbents	Challengers		
Lost	2	29	4	12		
Won	7	7	2	4		
		• •	-			
	9	36	6	16		

TABLE IV. STATUS OF CANDIDATE
AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	Incumbent (N = 15)	Challenger (N = 60)	Total (N = 75)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lost	40	82	73
Won	60	18	27
	100	100	100

TABLE V. OFFICE, STATUS OF CANDIDATE,
AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	Number of candidates				
	Incur	nbents	Chall	lengers	
	Senators	Governors	Senators	Governors	
Lost	1	5	30	19	
Won	5	4	3	8	
		-			
	6	9	33	27	

V. THE PRIMARY

Some primaries are more competitive than others; some are a veritable free-for-all while others are well structured contests between two prominent contenders. There were, for example, no less than nine aspirants for the Kansas Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1964, and the front-runner received less than 30 per cent of the primary vote. In contrast the Illinois Republican gubernatorial primary ballot that year had only two names and the winner, Charles Percy, secured more than 60 per cent of the votes.

of the parties, their friendship does not always extend to supporting that party's choice for governor. Thus of the 31 candidates running for governor in friendly territory, only 14 managed to win. On the other hand, 22 of the 30 similarly situated senatorial candidates did win.

Hence it might be thought that candidates who gain their nomination by securing a majority of the primary vote would fare better at the general election than their counterparts who won the candidacy with only a plurality. (None of the 31 states except Idaho had a run-off primary.) This, however, was not the case. Of the candidates who won their nominations with a majority vote in the primary, 71 per cent went on to lose in the general election; whereas of those who secured only a plurality in the primary, 68 per cent lost their general election. The difference, only three percentage points, is insignificant and it suggests that there are equal disadvantages in either leading a large field by a small margin (which shows that no one has a commanding popularity) or in running ahead of one or more competitors by a relatively larger margin (which, if the margin is less than 65 per cent, shows a polarized opposition).

Rather more interesting is the influence of the extent of voter turn-out in the primary on subsequent election results. The absolute number of people turning out to vote is not a very meaningful measure due to the differential standards of Presidential and mid-term years. Moreover local or national personalities and issues can be the cause of high primary participation; once in the booth, voters will usually go ahead and cast a ballot in any senatorial or gubernatorial contests that are in progress at the same time, even though these alone might not have brought them out. What can be evaluated, however, is the relation between the number of voters participating in a party's primary and the number who vote for that party's candidate in the general election. Thus the November vote may be used as a norm against which to measure the size of the primary turn-out in the preceding spring. Voting in the general election, to be sure, varies markedly as between Presidential and other years. However, of the 99 elections being examined here, half were in each category: 45 took place in 1956, 1960, and 1964, while 44 were in the intervening years.

Turn-out at a primary was classed as "high" if the total number of primary voters-regardless of which contender they voted for in the primary—was over 50 per cent of the primary winner's subsequent election showing. A "low" primary turn-out consisted of fewer than 50 per cent. Thus if the total vote for all the names entered in a party's primary was 120,000 and if that party's candidate got 200,000 votes in the election, then the primary turn-out was 60 per cent, and hence rated "high." The figures in Table VI reveal that candidates who survived divisive primaries where the turn-out

TABLE VI. PRIMARY TURN-OUT AND ELECTION OUTCOME

Fate of "divisive" candidate	"Low" Turn-Out (N = 35)	"High" Turn-Out (N = 64)	Total (N = 99)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Lost	74	66	69
\mathbf{Won}	26	34	31
	100	100	100

was high actually went on to do better in the general election than those who won in primaries having low participation. Over a third of those in the high turn-out primaries fared well, compared with just about a quarter of those who emerged from primaries with low turn-outs. This may seem curious, as a higher turn-out might suggest a greater degree of interest and therefore the potentiality of greater intra-party tensions.

As a matter of arithmetic, a high primary turn-out of, say, 70 per cent may simply denote that the party's candidate did very poorly at the general election. If the 70 per cent stands for 70,000 primary voters in relation to 100,000 general election voters—while the opposition party was getting, say, 200,000 votes at that election—then a highly participative primary is not very impressive. But the point is that 34 per cent of the high primary candidates did in fact win, so the high turn-outs in their primaries are to be measured against what were majorities at the general election. At all events it appears that a high primary turnout, despite the divisive character of that balloting, is a better augury for a candidate than one that is sparsely attended. For despite the struggle taking place in the primary a high turn-out seems to indicate wide interest in the party's fortunes and thus some likelihood that this interest will be translated into support of the primary winner.

Finally it should be noted that turn-outs are higher in gubernatorial than in senatorial primaries. The average participation in contests for Senate nominations was 55.1 per cent whereas when the candidacy for a governorship was at stake the primary turn-outs averaged 64.0 per cent. Even when we allow for the years in which these races took place-for a slightly higher proportion of the Senate elections were in Presidential years—the contest for the governorship still aroused more public interest in the primaries. Indeed the difference of nine percentage points just noted remained steady in both Presidential and off-years.

TABLE VII. TYPES OF ELECTIONS AND OUTCOMES

	Elections With One Candidate Having a "Divisive Primary"	Elections With Both Candidate on Equal Terms
A Office Controlled	(%)	(%)
A. Office Contested	(N = 99)	(N = 121)
Governor	51	48
Senator	49	52
	100	100
B. Status of State Winner in "Friendly"	(N = 89)	(N = 104)
State	69	68
Winner in "Hostile" State	31	32
State	91	
	100	100
C. Status of Candidate		
	(N=75)	(N = 78)
Winner the incumbent	77	72
Winner the challenger	23	28
	100	100

This is more evidence of the governors' higher visibility, and it shows that he is a figure of interest at the primary stage no less than at the general election.

VI. A CONTROLLED CONCLUSION

Does a divisive primary place a candidate at a disadvantage as against an opponent who had smooth sailing in securing his nomination? The record as thus far reported would seem to suggest that a prior experience of a hard-fought primary is a handicap. For in the 99 elections examined, 68 were lost by the candidate with a divisive primary behind him. The tabulations, to be sure, showed that gubernatorial candidates, candidates running in friendly states, candidates who won their nominations in primaries with high turn-outs, and-most particularly—candidates who were incumbents. were all more apt to win. The winners; however, constituted only 31 per cent of the group being studied whereas, ceteris paribus, they would have constituted about 50 per cent.

It is therefore in order to compare these 99

elections with a parallel set of such contests where "other things" were, as near as may be, equal. These are the 121 elections where both candidates were at an equal advantage, at least so far as their experience in the primary was concerned. In this group, either both candidates had undergone a divisive primary or both had had token primaries. Table VII compares the status of the winners in the two groups of elections. It should, first of all, be indicated that an approximately equal number of senatorial and gubernatorial elections were in both groups. In the group of 99 where one candidate was presumably disadvantaged, 51 per cent of the elections involved the governorship; and among the 121 where neither candidate was handicapped, 48 per cent were gubernatorial elections. This difference of three percentage points is relatively insignificant.

More important is the fact that in the 89 and 104 contests taking place in states that could be classified as being either friendly or hostile to the respective candidates, the records are virtually identical. Therefore it would appear that the sympathies of the state constitute a persisting influence that remains unaffected by what occurred or did not occur at the primary.

Respecting the influence of incumbency, we have 75 elections pitting an incumbent against a challenger in the group with one presumably handicapped candidate, and 78 elections in the group where both candidates were on a par. While the challengers won in only 23 per cent of the former contests they managed to win in 28 per cent of the latter. This gap of five percentage points is not strikingly high, and it is difficult to know how much importance to ascribe to it. On the whole, it seems fair not to make too much of this difference.

Accordingly, it appears that a divisive primary, in and of itself, bears little relation to a candidate's prospects at the general election. The sorts of candidates who win and lose are much the same in contests where one or neither or both of the contenders have first undergone a divisive primary. Every election inexorably produces one winner and one loser. The conditions associated with victory and defeat are chiefly the traditional ones of incumbency and the party-orientation of the state in which the election is held. This study has sought to throw some light on which candidates who have had divisive primaries are more likely to win or to lose. But its chief conclusion is that their prospects would have been much the same even if they had had no difficulties at all in securing their nominations.

CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND VOTER TURNOUT IN A LOCAL COMMUNITY: A PROBLEM IN SPURIOUS CORRELATION

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This paper presents an attempt, in a case study, to infer causal relationships between contests for local elective office and voter turnout—an attempt which required, in turn, the use of a recently developed mathematical technique for identifying and eliminating spurious correlations. The method no doubt has wider applications.

The case study involves a small New England town and its annual February town elections over the period 1947-1963. The town was chosen as one of the six affected by the newly established Cape Cod National Seashore. The time period was chosen to cover the interval during which the town was faced with the rapid increase in tourism which transformed it from a declining agricultural town to a service-based town. The policies and methods by which the town dealt with this basic change in its economic structure were of immediate interest, especially in the latter years when the National Park Service became involved in the problems the Cape has faced in this postwar period.1

The study raised the question of who was making the various types of governmental decisions that could be made locally. Qualitative interviews, supported by archival data, indicated that the Board of Selectmen and usually a Selectman made and carried out the town's necessary decisions, although it was generally recognized that this ability was restricted by prior decisions, decisions made elsewhere (public and private), and lack of technical knowledge. This decision making process was evidently not too taxing a burden prior to World War II, as the town and its agricultural base declined. But following the war, the dynamic growth in tourist use of the town and its facilities necessitated a broadened scope of town government activity. This was espe-

¹ The data for this study were obtained in conjunction with the author's unpublished dissertation, "The Cape Cod National Seashore: A Study in Conflict" (University of Illinois, 1963). The author wishes to acknowledge special indebtedness to Professors Phillip Monypenny and Bernard Lazerwitz of the University of Illinois and Professor Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. of the University of North Carolina.

cially true in such problem areas as town services to the summer folk, land-use regulation and building codes. In early and partial response, the town meeting established a Planning Board in 1946, to plan and implement regulatory measures in these latter two fields. In other areas, existing governmental units were strengthened in various ways and temporary committees and governmental units were made permanent. To outward appearance, the town responded during the whole period by maintaining its basic governmental structure and relationships and by adding functions or enlarging units only where there was a felt need.

If this were true, then the members of the Board of Selectmen should still retain their high position as the decision makers in the town notwithstanding changes, trends or outside influences. However, the town's initial response in establishing a Planning Board and the obvious land-use thrust of the National Seashore issue, 1957-63, suggested the possibility that the Planning Board had become an important decision maker in the community, equal to or even supplanting the Board of Selectmen. This possibility was further heightened by the conflict over the National Seashore, which found the Board of Selectmen approving the concept, at least, of a National Seashore, while the Planning Board, almost from the day of the initial proposal, acted as its most ardent antagonist. What body, then, really made the town's decisions? Qualitative interview data gave mixed answers on the role of the Planning Board in this process, depending on the respondent's viewpont. Those with pro-Seashore feelings saw the Planning Board as obstructionist and weak, while those with anti-Seashore feelings saw it as constructive and having some power in making and directing decisions. More objective data and other techniques were needed to test the hypothesis that the Planning Board was an important decision maker in the community and was so recognized by citizens of the town.

One of several quantitative checks available,2

² Another possible quantitative check involves the warrant articles which form the agenda for the town meeting. Ascertaining who backed the

voting behavior in the annual town election, was used to measure the relative turnout in the voting for various offices, and thereby presumably the prestige in which they were held. These town elections involve all the elected offices in the town which are open for contest in that particular year and are held in February, at town meeting time. Because of the date, it seemed unlikely that extraneous state or national "noise" would interfere with the voting results. Also, so far as could be ascertained, these offices have not been overtly contested on a partisan basis.3 Therefore, the national, state and party variables would not seem to be possible "outside" intruders capable of causing any systematic bias in the February town elections. These elections should show what offices attract most attention.

I. THE DATA

The specific variables related were "voter turnout," or the per cent of the eligible voters who actually voted, and "office contests," or

articles and how these articles fared over time should give some indication as to whose will tends to prevail. This approach would focus directly on the Board of Selectmen since most articles funnel through their office as they make up the final warrant. Thus it would tend to be a test of the ability of the Board of Selectmen to get their way and not an equal test of all town institutions, official roles, groups or individuals. A further question arises, which seemed unanswerable: what about those articles that did not make the final warrant? Incomplete records as to article sponsorship and non-warrant articles allowed too great a chance for error in the findings by this route of inquiry.

⁸ This assertion is based on examination of nomination papers for candidature for local office, newspaper accounts during the period, and the overwhelming dominance of the Republican Party in the Town. To demonstrate the last point two sorts of evidence are at hand. First, between 1947 and 1963 there were 100 candidates for local public office, defining candidature arbitrarily as anyone who received more than five votes for a particular office. The party registration of these candidates was: Republican 72; Democrat 7; Independent 18; Unknown 3. Of the seven Democrats who ran, only two were successful. Second, the town's per cent Republican vote for the gubernatorial candidate during the period was: 1946-92.7%; 1948—84.8%; 1950—83.7%; 1952—89.7%; 1954—88.9%; 1956—85.2%; 1958— 83.1%; 1960-81.7%; 1962-78.5%. While there is a decline in the Republican percentage over the period, it remains high enough to classify the town as one-party, Republican.

the winning candidate's percentage of the total vote cast for the candidates for that office. Five "office contest" categories were distinguished-four of them specific offices (Board of Selectmen, Moderator, School Committee and the Planning Board) and a fifth residual category for all "other elective" offices. The working hypothesis used to relate the variables was that the greater the contest for an office—the nearer the vote for it came to an even tiethe higher the voter turnout would be.4 If this proved to be so, and the filling of any one office was consistently contested and thereby created a higher voter turnout for it, this finding should indicate which office was perceived as most important in the town by those who run for office as well as by those who vote.

Table I presents the data on which the following analysis is based. Table II is a matrix that presents the interrelationship of the variables. A multiple correlation run with "voter turnout" as the dependent variable and the five "office contests" as the independent variables produced a correlation coefficient of .87. This means that the variations in the office contests explain over 75 per cent of the variation in the voter turnout—which further substantiates the assertion that little "outside noise" was impinging on these data.

In analyzing the matrix to ascertain which contest variable was causing the most changes in voter turnout, the data indicated that Board of Selectmen contests (+.84), "Other office" contests (+.49) and Moderator contests (+.38) correlated most closely with increases in voter turnout, while School Committee contests (+.13) affected voter turnout only slightly and Planning Board contests (-.52)actually correlated with a decrease in voter turnout. In the face of these results—particularly the high correlation between the Board of Selectmen contests and "Other office" contests (+.63), a spurious correlation seemed more than a possibility. The Board of Selectmen contests, that is to say, were perhaps causing covariation between voter turnout and "Other office" contests, which made the latter two variables appear to be highly related. It seemed possible also that Board of Selectmen contests were causing a spurious negative relationship between the Planning Board contests and voter turnout (-.52), since the former were related inversely to the Planning

⁴ Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia and New York, J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 18 and Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 308-11.

TABLE I. TOWN ELECTIONS, 1947-1963

	W. tau	Per	r cent of office	vote cast for wi	nning candidat	e for:
Year	Voter turnout⁴	Board of Selectmen	Moderator	School Committee	Planning Board	Other offices
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1947	41.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	62.3^{b}	100.0
1948	49.6	86.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1949	40.0	100.0	100.0	80.4	100.0	87.80
1950	74.2	42.3	100.0	100.0	53.5	53.2^{d}
1951	67.9	65.0	100.0	38.3	$52.4^{ m e}$	100.0
1952	17.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1953	72.6	49.0	100.0	95.9	38.7	100.0
1954	21.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1955	54.3	74.6	82.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
1956	54.3	71.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1957	15.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1958	75.8	78.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1959	80.7	47.0	24.6	100.0	72.7	52.1^{d}
1960	52.9	68.5	100.0	100.0	44.4	57.8f
1961	41.7	76.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1962	67.3	32.2	100.0	49.1	100.0	71.8^{g}
1963	32.3	100.0	100.0	51.1	100.0	100.0

^{*} Per cent of eligible voters who voted.

Board contests (-.43) and highly positively to voter turnout (+.84). How could these surmises be confirmed?

II. THEORETICAL BASE

In order to test whether these apparent

interrelationships were actually spurious, the author turned to a technique currently being developed in statistical analysis. The technique has developed in part from attempts to reduce the possibility of spurious correlations. Initially, these efforts were concerned with a

TABLE II. TOTAL CORRELATION MATRIX

	Voter turnout	Board of Selectmen contests	Moderator contests	School Committee contests	Planning Board contests	Other office contests
Voter turnout		+.84	+.38	+.13	52	+.49
Board of Selectmen						
"office contests"	+.84		+.33	+.18	°43	+.63
Moderator "office						
contests"	+.38	+.33	**********	16	46	+.49
School Committee						
"office contests"	+.13	+.18	16	_	+.01	04
Planning Board						
"office contests"	52	43	46	+.01		56
Other "office contests"	+.49	+.63	+.49	04	56	

b Average of five contests; winning candidates' votes ranged from 52.9 to 67.4 per cent.

c Office of Constable.

^d Office of Tree Warden.

e Two contests; one with 100.0 per cent winning vote, one with 52.4 per cent.

¹ Office of Recreation Commissioner.

g Office of Library Trustee.

two-variable relationship (x, y), in which some unexplained covariation appeared—unexplained in the sense that no logical connection between the two variables was evident, or, though some logical connection did exist, there was reason to suppose that both might be effects of some unknown cause (t). In either case, a third or test variable (t) was suspected of causing the covariation measured in the two-variable relationship (x, y) under investigation. The test variable (t) was therefore introduced into the system to measure accurately its relationship to the rest of the system.

If the relationship in the two-variable system (x, y) is indeed spurious, and the test variable is its cause, the original relationship will disappear (i.e., be reduced to zero) by the introduction of the test variable (t). Conversely, genuine relationship in the two-variable system will be reflected by the fact that it will be more clearly specified according to the test variable. Simon presented the mathematical foundations of this procedure and thereby laid the basis for expanding it to include more than three variables. Blalock has extended the procedure to include analysis of the relationships of four and five variables in a predictive system.

The initial step in carrying out this analysis is the intercorrelation of all variables in the system under study, with no assumptions as to any possible causal arrows. In the six-variable system, there are 15 pairs of relationships or 30 possible interrelationships. (See Table II.) At this point several assumptions are needed. The first underlies ordinary correlation analysis and assumes the relationships involved are linear. The others are more specific

⁵ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical Relation as a Research Operation," Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds., *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe, 1955), pp. 115-125.

⁶ Herbert A. Simon, "Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation," Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 49 (September, 1954), pp. 467-479.

⁷ Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York, 1960) and Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

⁸ For the purposes of simplicity and clarity, the following symbols are used in this portion of the presentation: Board of Selectmen contests (t); voter turnout (y); Moderator contests (x₁); School Committee contests (x₂); Planning Board contests (x₃); and, "Other office" contests (x₄).




FIGURE 1. Diagram of relationships in six-variable system.

to the problem under study: there is a time precedence in the variables involved and all other "outside" or "extraneous" variables are random in their effect on the particular variable system under study. With these assumptions, the number of possible causal arrows is reduced and the system becomes a potentially predictive model in which the relationships between variables can be derived from the original correlation matrix.

In this particular six-variable case, one further assumption was made in order to test the interrelationships for possible spuriousness. This is that "voter turnout" was the dependent variable and that the causal relationship or arrow, if any, was uni-directional, from the several independent "office contest" variables to the dependent "voter turnout" variable. This was derived from the working hypothesis specified above.

The original system, containing 30 relationships between the six variables, was reduced to 25 when the uni-directionality of the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable was assumed (Figure 1). By suggesting that one office contest variable may be causing spurious relationships between the remaining contests variables and voter turnout, the possible relationships are reduced to 5 (Figure 2). In this case, it appeared that the Board of Selectmen contests were the possible cause of spurious correlation, but to fully test the hypotheses of spuriousness each of the other office contest variables (t, x₁, x₂, x₃, x₄) was also placed in the causal position, in turn.

⁹ If it becomes apparent that a specific "outside" or "extraneous" variable is not random in its effects, this variable should be brought into the system of variables to aid in explaining the relationships under investigation. Simon, op. cit., pp. 471–473 and Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 339–340.




Figure 2. Diagram of source of spurious relationships.

The model of spuriousness (Figure 2) yields the following predictive equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{x}_1 \mathbf{y})} &= \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_1)} \cdot \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{y})} \\ \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{x}_2 \mathbf{y})} &= \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_2)} \cdot \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{y})} \\ \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{x}_3 \mathbf{y})} &= \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_3)} \cdot \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{y})} \\ \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{x}_4 \mathbf{y})} &= \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_4)} \cdot \mathbf{r}_{(\mathbf{t} \mathbf{y})} \end{aligned}$$

Table III contains predictive equations and computations based on the correlation coefficients in Table II.

III. ANALYSIS OF DATA

The model of spurious correlation which introduced the Board of Selectmen contests as the test variable into the original relationship

TABLE III. OFFICE CONTEST VARIABLES AS TEST VARIABLES

Model	Office contests variable being related to voter turnout	Correlation be- tween contests variable and voter turnout*	Predicted correlation by test variable†	Correlation not predicted by test variable‡
A. Test	Variable is the Board of Selectmen	contests		Washington Co.
	Moderator	+.38	+.28	+.10
	School Committee	+.13	+.15	02
	Planning Board	52	36	16
	Other	+.49	+.53	04
B. Test	Variable is the Moderator contests			
	*Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.13	+.71
	School Committee	+.13	06	+.19
	Planning Board	52	17	35
	Other	+.49	+.19	+.30
C. Test	Variable is the School Committee co	ontests		
	Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.02	+.82
	Moderator	+.38	02	+.40
	Planning Board	52	.00	52
	Other	+.49	01	+.50
D. Test	Variable is the Planning Board con	ntests		
	Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.22	+.62
	Moderator	+.38	+.24	+.14
	School Committee	+.13	01	+.14
	Other	+.49	+.29	+.20
E. Test	Variable is "Other office" contests			
	Board of Selectmen	+.84	+.31	+.53
	Moderator	+.38	+.24	+.14
	School Committee	+.13	02	+.15
	Planning Board	52	27	25

^{*} These correlation coefficients are taken directly from Table II.

[†] These correlation coefficients are derived from the predictive equations as related to each of the models. The reader may check these computations by fitting the correlation coefficients from Table II to the formulas involved.

[‡] This represents the difference between the values in column 1 and column 2.

(Model A in Table III), did produce very close predictions in two of the relationships—between the School Committee contests and voter turnout (+.13 vs. +.15), and between "Other office" contests and voter turnout (+.49 vs. +.53). In these relationships it can therefore be asserted that the Board of Selectmen contests caused a spurious statistical relationship between both the School Committee and "Other office" contests and voter turnout. In other words, any apparent effect of these contests on the turnout was almost entirely due to the relationship of all three to the Board of Selectmen contests. Reasonably close predictions were also produced in the other two relationships between the Moderator contests and turnout (+.38 vs. +.27), and between the Planning Board contests and turnout (-.52 vs. -.36). In these cases too, the Board of Selectmen contests caused a spurious statistical relationship in a major portion of the original relationships observed among these three variables.

The alternative hypotheses of spuriousness (Models B, C, D, E in Table III), were not able to predict the original correlations to the extent Model A did and so these were eliminated as alternative hypotheses and Model A is retained as the best explanatory model which fits the data. It is not the only possible model of explanation because it is impossible to rule out all other logical alternatives, such as an intervening model (Figure 3). But it is, at this point, the best explanatory model tested.

IV. CONCLUSION

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident the hypothesis that the Board of Selectmen contests were the cause of spurious correlation between the remaining office contests and the level of voter turnout in the February town elections was upheld. In more general terms, contests for the office of the Board of Selectmen will cause variations in voter turnout, while contests for the other elected offices in the town will not significantly affect the voter




FIGURE 3. Alternative model of intervening variable.

turnout unless in interaction with a contest for the Board of Selectmen.

It must be concluded the Board of Selectmen was the office perceived as most important in the town by those who ran for office and by those who voted. It appears the Planning Board did not become the focus of decision making power, as measured by people contesting the election of Planning Board members and by these contests in turn increasing the turnout of voters. While the postwar problems raised the possibility that the opposite might have happened, evidently the main decisions were still being made by or at least through the Board of Selectmen. Further, while the Planning Board's area of interest was extremely important and the focus of much activity during the period, it was evidently only part of the total problem facing the town for which the Board of Selectmen had greater responsibility. When the Planning Board acted as the most vocal and ardent antagonist of the National Seashore, it again spoke as and for a relatively narrow segment of interest as opposed to the Board of Selectmen, who spoke from a broader viewpoint. The use of the Simon-Blalock methodology aided in eliminating possible explanatory hypotheses derived from qualitative data which might have led to incorrect though plausible conclusions.

TYPES OF PRIMARY AND PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

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A chief criticism of the American party system is the lack of party responsibility. In the view of some students, one characteristic of our political system that contributes to this irresponsibility is the practice in some states of allowing individuals to vote in primaries without regard to their partisan allegiances. In such an open primary Republicans may, if they wish, vote in the Democratic primary. and vice versa. The contrasting, and more common, practice is the closed primary, in which participation is restricted to party "members." Some political scientists think that the closed primary, by subjecting legislators to the presumed discipline of periodic scrutiny by their party's members, induces a greater measure of party regularity than the open primary, in which the official has to satisfy a more motley clientele.2 This position was taken in the best-known statement of the "party government" school, the 1950 report of the APSA Committee on Political Parties:

The closed primary deserves preference because it is more readily compatible with the development of a responsible party system. . . . on the other hand, the open primary tends to destroy the concept of membership as the basis of party organization.3

1 "As a matter of fact, membership in a political party has none of the usual characteristics of membership in an association. In most states the party has no control over its own membership. Any legal voter may on his own initiative and by his own declaration execute legal formalities before a duly designated public official making himself a registered member of the party. The party as such is not consulted. It does not accept the application; it does not vote the applicant into the association; it may not reject the application; and, finally, there is usually no recognized and authoritative procedure by which the party may expel a member." E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York, 1942), pp. 55-56.

² This proposition is based on an assumption about the electorate's information level that does not appear to be confirmed by voting behavior research, which indicates that most voters do not even know their Congressman's name, much less his voting record. See Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly (Winter, 1962), pp. 531-546.

3 Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System (New York, 1950), p. 71.

Other political scientists have expressed doubts about this presumed relationship between primaries and party responsibility,4 but there has been no systematic empirical evidence on the point. This paper will examine the relationship between primaries and party responsibility by comparing the party regularity of senators from open primary and closed primary

The Book of the States lists the type of primary operative in each state: seven states use the open primary, four states nominate their senators by convention, and twenty-six states use the closed primary, outside the South. The Southern states (all of which use the closed primary) are excluded from the comparison, or are tabulated separately, because southern Democrats tend not to go along with northern Democrats on many issues, thus beclouding the final results. That is, apparent differences between senators from both types of primary systems may be masking other differences due to special conditions in the South. Alaska and Hawaii are also excluded; they gained statehood at the end of the period covered.

The computations in the following tables are based on the Party-Unity Index in the Congressional Quarterly,5 which records each individual senator's roll-call votes cast with

4 The initial impetus for this study came from an article by Austin Ranney, "Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System," this REVIEW, Vol. 45 (June, 1951), pp. 488-499. The article was a critique of the then recently published report by the Committee on Political Parties, and notably, of the Committee's recommendation that only one major reform was needed in the primary laws of the United States—the abolition of all primaries except the closed variety. On this proposal Professor Ranney commented in a footnote: "Is there any evidence to suggest for example, that Senator Knowland (from a crossfiling state) and Senator Magnuson (from a blanket-primary state) disagree with and stray from the programs and positions of their respective parties more than say, Senator Morse, Senator Tobey, or ex-Senator Elmer Thomas (all from closed-primary states)?" (p. 490).

⁵ Computations taken from the following volumes of the Congressional Quarterly: Vol. 2, p. 786; Vol. 4, pp. 38-39; Vol. 6, p. 59; Vol. 8, p. 67; Vol. 10, p. 72; Vol. 12, p. 126; Vol. 14, p. 126; and

Vol. 16, p. 142.

TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF PARTY-UNITY INDEX FOR SENATORS FROM OPEN AND CLOSED PRIMARY STATES, 1945-1960

Non-Southern States Southern States Congresses Open primary Closed primary Closed primary Index N* Index Index % % 79th 82.7 12 79.6 65.2 21 72.8 22 SOth 91.1 14 82.9 52 77.3 22 81st 83.4 14 78.1 52 82d 85.9 77.9 52 75.1 22 14 87.8 84.3 51 70.0 20 83d 14 84th 76.9 74.6 63.3 85th 76.9 13 67.0 51 65.7 52.0 S6th 75.5 68.5 76.7 68.9 82.5 Mean

* Total number of senators upon which the percentage is based; the maximum number of senators from open primary states is fourteen, and from closed primary states fifty-two. States which nominate by convention (New York, Connecticut, Delaware, and Indiana) are excluded.

and against the majority of his party. Eight Congresses (1945-1960) were examined to determine the effect of party unity over a period of time. Coincidentally, the survey covered four Congresses under a Republican President (the 82d, 83d, 84th and 85th), and four under a Democratic President (the 79th, 80th, 81st and 86th). From Table I it appears that over a fifteen-year period a slightly but constantly higher percentage of party unity is evidenced by senators from open primary

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF PARTY-UNITY INDEX OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC SENATORS (EXCLUDING THE SOUTH) 1945-1960

	Open pri	imaries	Closed primaries		
Congresses	Republi- cans %	Demo- crats	Republi- cans %	Demo- crats %	
79th	75.2	88.0	79.9	82.9	
80 th	91.8	89.5	83.9	86.6	
81st	80.1	89.4	75.3	82.4	
82d	85.0	88.0	76.0	82.1	
83d	86.9	89.4	87.0	77.7	
84th	71.3	84.5	73.6	74.1	
85th	74.0	79.4	65.0	70.5	
86th	71.7	76.5	69.6	66.7	
Mean	79.5	85.6	76.3	77.9	

states than from closed primary states. This would indicate that the closed primary does not improve party responsibility in the Senate. In no Congressional session do the open primary senators display less party unity than their closed primary colleagues. Table II confirms this conclusion by showing that controlling for party does not affect the resultsopen primary senators still exhibit a greater degree of party responsibility.

This paper is addressed to a simple but still significant question: "Do open primaries tend to produce more irresponsible legislators?" Our conclusion is that whatever the causes of party irresponsibility among United States senators, the type of primary does not appear

to be among them.

COMMUNICATION

THE USES OF NEUTRALISM

TO THE EDITOR:

There is an historical experience which needs to be put alongside Francis Low-Beer's article (this REVIEW, June, 1964), "The Concept of Neutralism." It is the experience of the old Swiss Confederation before the French conquest of 1798. Political parallels are dangerous, yet surely any successful experience in building inter-state peace is worthy of study in a world threatened by mutual nuclear annihilation. As sovereign political units, the early Swiss cantons easily bear comparison with the nationstates of today. Each canton issued its own currency, levied its individual duties on commerce, and controlled its own military organization. The group was held together by a complicated series of treaties and by frequent sessions of the Diet-in reality, a council of ambassadors.

Swiss external neutrality has been examined and discussed at length, but very few—even among political scientists—are familiar with the phenomenon of internal neutrality: that is, the assumption of a neutral or non-aligned role by certain states or cantons within the Confederation, in order to facilitate peaceful settlements of disputes among themselves by means of conciliation, mediation and arbitration.

In the Pact of Lucerne (1332), the three original rural cantons (which had sworn eternal mutual support in the famous ceremony of 1291) enlisted a peacemaker. In the case of disputes among the original cantons (and there had already been many) Lucerne was bound by the terms of the pact to work for an understanding through conciliation and mediation. During the two centuries that followed, the device of permanent neutrality was applied more widely, and had some failures but more successes, with the result that a more definite and comprehensive commitment to neutrality plus active conciliation and mediation was applied in the treaties by which Basel, Schaffhausen and Appenzell joined the Confederation in 1501-13.

Swiss government representatives were so convinced of the relevance of their country's experience that in 1920 they alluded to this active neutrality clause in asking for a similar role of neutrality within the League of Nations

(the request was refused by the Allies)....

The recurrent danger of conquest by neighboring empires showed the Swiss that peace between the cantons was a matter of survival for their independence. Thus active peacemaking served the long-range interests of the adversaries in a dispute between cantons, as well as the interests of the conciliators.

Nuclear weapons now mean that preventing general war is a matter of survival for all countries. Thus conciliation and mediation by the non-aligned can similarly serve the longrange interests of the people of the United States, of the USSR, and of the non-aligned nations.

Low-Beer holds, as I understand it, that in a great-power dispute form and content cannot be separated, and therefore that the claim of the non-aligned to be concerned not with the merits of the dispute but with finding a peaceful settlement must fall to the ground. But if and when "form" reaches the stage of mass obliteration and social disorganization, it becomes more important than "content"; this logically supports the case of the non-aligned.

Insofar, moreover, as two or more "blocs" might succeed in dragooning non-aligned nations into their respective camps, they would be violating the principle of self-determination for the latter. Therefore non-alignment, although seemingly indifferent or even opposed to some immediate policies of the West, helps to safeguard the long-range Western value of national independence.

If one recognizes that the great problem of world affairs is to combine substantial stability with peaceful change, then one must, it seems to me, concede that non-alignment can perform an extremely valuable function: that of offering to new nations bristling against injustice another avenue for seeking change besides aligning themselves with the communist bloc. World society is too complex for its future evolution to be handled adequately by an oversimplified struggle between black and white. Thesis and antithesis are important, but synthesis is vital.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CONTRIBUTION

FOREIGN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHY*

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The past few years have witnessed a steadily increasing interest on the part of political scientists in the comparative study of local government, although productive research is still rather limited in scope. The scholar contemplating study in this field commonly faces serious difficulties even in determining what work has been done to date, as well as in finding that the writings are widely scattered and extremely variable in nature. Much can be gained in the broader and more realistic understanding of politics through comparative study at the local level, and the customarily parochial treatment of local government in American college classrooms can be improved by a greater injection of the experience of other peoples.

This compilation is an attempt to pull together for the first time the most comprehensive possible bibliography of writings-books, articles and some documents-in English dealing with the organizational structure and functioning of local government in countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom. This would appear to be a logical starting point, providing an indication of areas where work needs to be done and the types of study in short supply, as well as a guide to basic information on many countries. Most writing up to this time has in fact focused on governmental organization and operation, which quite naturally precedes more behaviorally oriented studies. A sizeable body of literature also deals with certain specialized aspects of foreign local governments, notably finance and physical planning, but that is in sufficient quantity for a separate specialized bibliography.

This particular bibliography is confined to publications in English to keep it within manageable scope, and on the assumption that anyone investigating deeply into the experience of an individual country will of course need to develop his own bibliography of publications in the language of that country. Materials on the United Kingdom are not included because of their vast scope, ready availability and more general familiarity. Items dealing with colonial periods of areas that have recently become independent countries have also been ex-

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cluded except in a few instances where they make a definite contribution to an understanding of the present. Textbooks on comparative government and general studies of the government and politics of individual countries, which often touch briefly upon local institutions, are not cited. The time span of publications covered is from 1950 to the present, in recognition of the need to keep the listings reasonably contemporary and the fact that the great bulk of the writing on this subject has been published within the last dozen years.

For easy use the bibliography, after some general listings, is arranged by major areas of the world, and then by countries within those areas. The geographical classification is arbitrary, purely for convenience. In the case of each of the broad areas there is first an indication of publications having general significance for that region or items that deal with more than one country, followed by the materials concerned with individual nations. Books and pamphlets are listed first, then periodical articles. Items are classified as "most useful" and "generally useful." There are obviously serious problems in value classifications, since "usefulness" is relative to the special needs of the researcher; the term is used here as relative to the above mentioned purposes of this bibliography. Each set of categories applies only to the materials on the country under consideration, with no attempt at comparative evaluation between items dealing with different countries. A considerable amount has been written on certain countries, very little on others. For some there have been no publications in English, and not uncommonly very little in the language of the country itself.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. By Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 200. \$5.00.)

This is a highly instructive book in a field where political scientists need instruction. Blalock takes us well beyond the considerations introduced in ordinary statistics texts by concentrating on several difficult and important problems in quantitative social analysis. His emphasis is on the development of more rigorous procedures for rejecting causal arguments and on a variety of complications in the use, collapsing and combining of variables and controls. The arguments presented are drawn from a number of articles that have appeared mainly in sociology journals during the past few years.

Blalock is interested in developing more systematic procedures for evaluating causal models, and he argues that mathematical or statistical procedures are too flexible in their present condition for this discrimination. But somewhat more restrictive assumptions about relationships permit deductions that offer arguments for rejecting particular chains of causal relationships. These procedures and restrictive assumptions—what will probably be called the Simon-Blalock technique—are not applicable to most fields in political science where quantification of relevant variables has not been achieved.

The controversy that has developed among social statisticians over these techniques hinges on a disagreement over the extent to which these arguments provide a basis for causal inferences—a contention which Blalock would not support. A more critical question for social scientists is how much confidence we would have in a conclusion that a particular causal argument is inferior to another, i.e., how readily would we reject a causal argument dear to us? It is impossible to anticipate what qualms and considerations might occur to us if we were to regularly test our causal arguments with the technique advocated by Blalock, but it would promote analytic sophistication to face up to these problems whether we accept the conclusions of the Simon-Blalock technique or not. Described very briefly the technique depends on two points, our willingness to assume that among a given set of variables not all possible interrelationships are causal, and the argument that with a given set of correlations among the variables not all lines of causal relationship are equally convincing.

While doubtless the possibilities of more rigorous evaluation of causal models are of great consequence over the long run, for the immediate needs of political science Blalock's many observations on the effects of collapsing variables may be of greater assistance. Especially as we move into the early phases of quantification in various areas of political analysis we can expect to be forced into unhappy compromises in developing variables, and Blalock reveals a staggering array of pitfalls associated with grouping and collapsing dimensions. By generating artificial data with appropriate characteristics, he shows the impact on measures of association of grouping by high and low scores and of changing the unit of analysis or clustering units with respect to random and related third factors. The problems of interpreting relationships controlled or partialed by such variables are especially severe. While Blalock usually confines himself to artificial data, there is no reason to believe that these criticisms could not be applied throughout the quantitative analysis in social science with devastating impact.

Blalock takes for granted a sophisticated dissatisfaction with quantitative techniques but an unquestioned perseverance which may be missing in political science. If one were to rewrite the book for political scientists, far greater emphasis on the analytic weaknesses of unsystematic causal arguments would be appropriate, but Blalock addresses a more limited and specialized audience. The immediate application of this volume is limited to those areas of analysis where quantification permits the correlation of all or most relevant variables. Beyond this it joins that very small list of books that provide worthwhile background for courses in quantitative analysis and scope and method.

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Internal War. EDITED BY HARRY ECKSTEIN. (New York: The Free Press of Glenoce, 1964. Pp. 339. \$6.50.)

Harry Eckstein has presided over one of the most exasperating books to face a reviewer in some time. The title, *Internal War*, is intriguing because it suggests a serious and timely subject. The roster of contributors—Gabriel Almond, William Kornhauser, Lucian Pye, Alexander Gerschenkron, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Talcott Parsons, S. M. Lipset, Karl W. Deutsch, T. P. Thornton, Sidney Verba, Arnold Feldman, and

Andrew Janos—constitutes a dazzling constellation of authoritative commentators. The volume is a product of a research project of some years standing at Princeton's Center of International Studies. The writers were assigned the task of writing papers for a symposium "on the application of contemporary social theories for the study of internal wars..." (p. 4). In short the reader infers a promise of penetration, illumination and substantial enlightenment on a pertinent and difficult matter. There is noticeable shortfall.

Moreover, I am disarmed by the editor's splendid candor in saying: "Whatever their merits in other respects, there is no use pretending that the essays here achieve the end intended. Some of them avoid any direct confrontation of the subject, others attack it, but without any considerable use of social science theory" (p. 5). I can only agree to that.

The editor faced with this situation and constrained to publish the results of a symposium has written an agile introductory essay on a novel subject—namely pre-theorizing. Since it is not within my power to discuss twelve very disparate essays in the present space I will attend principally to this introduction. The editor arrives at his topic by asking himself: What went wrong with the symposium? He poses the issue in this manner: There have been in the world a variety of events-coups d'état, terrorist campaigns, revolutionary wars, strikes and riots with political motives, and so forth-which we feel must have some relationship to each other in the realm of social behavior. If there is validity in social theory, then these phenomena must be susceptible to common theoretical management. At the same time here are the efforts of a number of the most notable social theorists of our time and these efforts have not achieved theoretical illumination. The possible faults might be found in the theorists as men, the theories, or the phenomena. In other words (1) the theorists may in fact be lazy or inept, or (2) the theories may be closed to these kinds of phenomena, or (3) the relationship between the various events which are grouped in the category may be so obscure and tenuous as to confound even the most brilliant and hard working of theorists, or (4) there may be no relationship among the events, theoretically or otherwise. Professor Eckstein cordially opts for the third alternative which lets everyone off the hook but him. He could, of course, have opted for the fourth alternative and given it up as a bad job. I, as will appear further on, am inclined toward the second.

Professor Eckstein then plunges into a discussion of pre-theoretical concerns. What he is actually talking about is theorizing, but since he restricts theory to the proposing of "testable (that is, falsifiable)" (p. 8) hypothetical generalizations, we can accept "pre-theoretical" as sufficient. This kind of work we are to understand involves four "operations."

- Delimitation, which is a combination of definition and identification of the phenomenon
- 2. Classification, which is the same as delimitation, only in a more refined way.
- Analysis, which is the identification of elements that combine in the classes of events.
- 4. "Problemation," an "ugly" neologism which means stating what it is you want to know in terms of what is (in some way or other) knowable.

All this obscures the issues aroused by juxtaposing contemporary social science theory to the occurrence of political violence. These issues capsulate the drama of scientific thought. There are theories but they fail to explain the new data. In such a situation, what do we do? We can amend the theories to accommodate the new data or we can discover new theories which explain the old and new data. What we must not do is rework the data until they fit into the old theories. In Professor Eckstein's situation I would have been more sceptical about the theories.

The dominant themes of contemporary social science theory are structural functionalism and systems analysis with emphasis on equilibrating or homeostatic activity. The fact that the tendency of this theory is to draw attention to stability rather than change, and to order rather than conflict has become a commonplace criticism of it. But the fact remains that this body of theoretical material is, at least in its present state, confounded by the event of organized political violence, by major transformation processes, by persistent conflict, and by permanent and pervasive disorder. I suspect that the difficulty which the contributors to this volume experienced in penetrating theoretically the events of social violence is to be found in a pre-fabricated blindness to the phenomena.

It is striking that the articles which approach the subject ad hoc—for example Lucian Pye on "Roots of Insurgency" or Thomas Thornton on "Terror as a Weapon"—are the more successful in confronting issues involved in political warfare. These successes are not cited as arguments in favor of ad hoc theorizing but are adduced as symptoms of general

theoretical deficiency. This deficiency is genuine and should be recognized.

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Organizational Authority: Superior—Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizations. By Robert L. Peabody. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. 163, \$5.50.)

Robert L. Peabody's Organizational Authority reinforces the usefulness of behavioral analysis in public administration, which makes it a valuable addition to a slim literature. And the study supports a multiple-factor approach to authoritative relations, thereby contributing to a body of contemporary efforts with a similar point.

The volume presents major difficulties, however. Its methodology and design are troubled; the presentation suffers in many particulars; and the interpretations of results are problematic.

Methodologically, Organizational Authority does not respect its own promises. The study is exploratory, and proposes to utilize a sample of 76 employees from three small public agencies to test the usefulness of conceptual and operational definitions of authoritative relations derived from an analysis of the literature. Four reasonable "types of authority" are chosen for nominal and operational definition and for empirical testing: authority of position; authority of competence; authority of person; and authority of legitimacy.

The types of authority do not get the proposed natural-science treatment, however. The case is clearest for codings of interview responses as "authority based on legitimacy." An analytical flow-chart reveals the volume's characteristic approach. The variable is barely mentioned on p. 49 as "developed from responses by organization members." On p. 119, a brief and very general discussion appears. On p. 126, a table lists without comment four sub-classes of "authority of legitimacy," one of which is "generalized legitimacy." None of this gives specific information about the conventions for coding interview responses as one type of authority or another. Indeed, the few examples given suggest considerable overlap of responses scored as "legitimacy" and "position."

The treatment of "authority of legitimacy"

The treatment of "authority of legitimacy" reflects little conceptual and operational care, then, and this datum stands in puzzling contrast to the volume's public purposes. At least the demands of space do not explain the slippage between intention and execution. Thus, some 30 pages of a short book are devoted to

elementary descriptions of the local police force, the school, and the welfare office from whose members interviews were obtained. These descriptions add little to the analysis. Moreover, much of the extensive review of the "authority" literature takes the form of a sketchy annotated bibliography organized around (for example) the various institutional contexts within which authoritative relations have been studied. The misallocation of resources is multiple. Conceptual and operational problems are neglected. Moreover, the volume's early chapters are but weakly related to the study's empirical focus. Similar and more exhaustive reviews also are available.

The interpretations of the results in *Organi*zational Authority also are problematic. This is a function of both presentation and design. In presentation, for example, verbal conclusions often are unsupported by the sparse data offered. Consider Table 5, p. 90. It reveals no obvious differences by "eyeball inspection" between data from three agencies, except in one case where N=1. But the reader is assured on p. 91 that, in general, "expected differences did occur." No judgmental criteria are specified. Nor were statistical tests run. Table 4 presents similar difficulties, but the issues are broader. In addition, the curious N chosen as the base for the calculations in Table 10 inflates the percentages reported as the major findings by some 50 to 75 percent.

The volume's underlying research design also discourages clear-cut interpretations. Basically, the four kinds of authority were used only to classify interview responses to this very openended question: What does authority mean to you? At best, the design permits showing that some of the types of authority were useful for coding some aspects of some of the interview responses of some proportion of the sample of low-level operatives in small public agencies. This is a very limited design, even for an "exploratory study."

The results obtained do not somehow overcome the design limitations. Some 22 percent of the respondents could not be scored as mentioning even one of the four kinds of authority. The remaining 59 interviews contributed in unspecified ways only 122 scored responses, moreover, if we calculate from the data presented. Peabody concludes that this establishes the usefulness of the four kinds of authority. The data permit many interpretations, however, and particularly since little is reported about the scoring procedure. Three hundred and four responses would have been scored if each respondent had touched on each of the four kinds of authority in his interview and if

double-counting were not allowed. The paucity of responses actually scored may indicate that the four kinds of authority have a limited usefulness in the analysis of all populations. Or the data may simply indicate that the design posed the wrong question to the wrong people in one particular case.

The design limitations of Organizational Authority reflect the neglect of the crucial point that the usefulness of the four kinds of authority can be established only by the test of hypotheses derived from them. Some "working hypotheses" are "advanced" on p. 49 of the volume, but they never reappear. Even so, conceptual unclarity prevails. Thus it is proposed that: "Authority of position is strongest when supported by both authority of competence and authority of person." The meaning is obscure. Since "authority of position" is said to inhere in hierarchical office, two similar formally-defined positions are neither "stronger" nor "weaker" given other conditions. The incumbents of these similar formal positions may be more or less effective or authoritative. Thus a more useful hypothesis would be: When authority of position is reinforced by high rank on (for example) competence, formal superiors will be more likely to have subordinates who are high producers and/or who are more satisfied at work. Such a hypothesis has been tested many times, in fact, with positive results. Very little additional data would have been required to test such a hypothesis in Organizational Authority.

The mention and subsequent neglect of the several awkward "working hypotheses" in Organizational Authority testify that the volume has not conceptually integrated the several types of authority as multiple co-varying factors in authoritative relations. The mention and neglect also illustrate how the development of suitable operations in the volume was complicated by conceptual inelegancies. Indeed, these inelegancies may reflect a detachment from the very elements upon which useful operations depend.

ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
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Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. By SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964. Pp. viii, 613.)

Congressman Neil Staebler, Chairman of the Michigan State Democratic Committee once said that Samuel J. Eldersveld gave up a promising political career when he left the mayor's office of Ann Arbor to return to his researches into party membership and organization in Michigan, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. The present volume gives the author's academic colleagues, at least, ample reason to approve his choice. Although the data of the study are confined to Detroit and Wayne County, its theoretical perspective and analytical categories are applicable to almost any political system. They consist of interviews with 70 county and congressional district leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties, 149 precinct leaders, and 596 residents drawn from a stratified sample of 87 precincts out of 2007 in the county's six congressional districts. The study design explicitly focuses upon the characteristics, perceptions, attitudes. communications and intra-organizational relationships between the county-district and precinct leaders of the two parties, as well as the mutual impact of these two levels of party organization upon the adult citizen public in the Detroit metropolitan area.

Part I investigates four attributes of political party organization: membership policy, the group affiliations of party members and officials, the effective authority relationships between levels of party structure, and the social origins and career patterns of party activists throughout the organization. Part II presents what is by all odds the most thoroughgoing analysis of local party leaders' political orientations to be found anywhere in the literature, classified by (a) awareness of party organization goals, (b) public policy preferences, (c) personal motivations, (d) personal, intra-party role perceptions, (e) environmental and value perspectives toward the political system as a whole. Part III analyzes the personal interactions of local party leaders and activists as an organizational system from the standpoint of three operational requirements: (a) efficiency as a task group, (b) the frequency, direction, style and content of the communications network, (c) patterns of participation and consent in organizational decision-making. Part IV analyzes the functional-dysfunctional effects of party activity in satisfying: (a) individual needs inside the party organizations (political socialization and recruitment), (b) the parties' organizational needs (consistency of voter perceptions, identifications with and support of the party), and (c) the needs of citizens generally and the larger political system. The latter are revealed by measures of popular belief and confidence in the system, by the extent of political interest, involvement and information among the voters, and by individual incentives (careers) and group rewards (benefits in public policies) to persons who come to realize their stake in the larger political system through their interactions (support, bargaining, alliances) with the party association.

Specialists will particularly appreciate the degree to which Eldersveld consistently employs the concepts of contemporary empirical theory. The book will have to be read to appreciate the progress it represents in systematic development and testing of hypotheses about party voters, members, officers and leaders. Generalists will be interested in what he does to advance the "general theory of parties" for which M. Duverger pleaded so eloquently a decade ago. Here, apart from the title, the book is modest and unpretentious. It claims to be no more than a study in depth of the American party system in one metropolitan area; its concepts and research tools are only potentially adaptable to comparison with parties in a wide variety of cultural and demographic contexts. Secondly, its focus is on the local electoral party organization; it has very little to say about the relations of local and national parties, or about the relations of electoral party personnel with those in legislative and executive policy-making, either locally or nationally. Thirdly, the study contains almost no data on the actual selection (nomination) of candidates or the control of elected representatives by party organization officials. In short, Eldersveld has produced an analytical model for American electoral party organization, not a complete picture of "political parties in the modern state."

He explicitly recognizes that his conception of party closely approximates that of Merriam and Gossell in their work of 1923. But whereas their contribution was literary rather than quantitative, insightful rather than demonstrative, unique rather than connectible, Eldersveld's model will be understood and respected by theorists everywhere, regardless of their commitments or preconceptions. It is not a mere deviant case of Michels' elitist hierarchy, Weber's mirror of the society's particular form of social domination, Selznick's combat group, Duverger's bureaucratized, mass-educational movement, or Downs' team-coalition of individuals in complete agreement on party goals and election policies, acting in full knowledge, perfect communication and complete involvement with organizational decisions. Eldersveld's image of the party is best set forth in his own words (pp. 525-28):

an open, clientele-oriented structure, permeable at its base as well as its apex, preoccupied with the recruitment of deviant as well as established social categories, willing to provide mobility and access for political activists into the major operational and decisional centers of the organization. It is a "stratarchical" rather than an elitist command structure, with power and decision-making devolved to and autonomized at lower levels. Deference is not exclusively upward, but reciprocal. The party must also be visualized as a tenuous alliance of socio-economic subcoalitions, having a mutually exploitative relationship to the party, with varying degrees of cohesion, identification and interaction, and with varying potentials for disloyalty and disaffection. Finally, the party is not a hierarchy of subelites whose admission, power and status are closely determined by the top leadership group, but an aggregate of differential career types with highly varying aspirations and rates of mobility and turnover . . . [sic]

AVERY LEISERSON

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Political Parties in the American System. By Frank J. Sorauf. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1964, Pp. xiii, 194.)

This is a sophisticated, literate, and succinct survey of the American party system. It is far more than a paraphrase of the works of others. It is a creative and, on the whole, successful attempt in brief compass to make sense out of the American political kaleidoscope. The author is skilled in analytic theory building. He is extremely wise about political motivations. He is versed in comparative political systems. He writes with enviable clarity.

The book begins with a definition of party based upon function and role. According to the author, the primary job of the American party is to organize, inclusively, for the winning of elections. The overriding party function, however, operates within a social system and an historical tradition which shapes and conditions the party role. Federalism, separation of powers, economic and social pluralism leave American parties decentralized, only intermittently organized, and largely pragmatic and non-ideological in character.

By far the most brilliant parts of the book are Chapters V & VI: "The Structure of Incentives," and "The Contest for Office." I do not know whether Mr. Sorauf has ever been actively engaged in practical politics. No matter. He understands the carrots and sticks of politics, who wields them, and why. He also understands what he calls the art and craft of campaigns.

It is no real criticism of the book to point out that the Goldwater candidacy has been as embarrassing to political scientists as it has been to the Republican Party. (e.g. "The voices of the far right in American politics—some of whom do disagree on the fundamentals of the

economy, the Constitution, and social equality—have been muted by the electoral majoritarianism of the two major parties" p. 31.) Who of us has not been thrown off base by this political aberration?

It is a real criticism of the book to say that the final three chapters are in part unfair, simplistic, and contradictory. Mr. Sorauf's disdain for the "party responsibility" boys leads him to erect a series of straw men and to consume the straw with the fire of his scorn. It causes him to overstate the pluralism of American politics; to underplay the role of reformers in establishing the climate of opinion in which structural changes in our political system occur (e.g. the currency of ideas surrounding the apportionment decisions in the Supreme Court; the institutionalization of the two national committees; or the Kennedy "packing" of the Rules Committee); to ignore an important part of the political logic of the nationalization of American politics; and to defend the proposition that "major changes and reform within political parties most often take place as a response to the changing environmental circumstances" while accepting a view of that environment which is closer to the world of Calhoun or Coolidge than to the world of Lyndon Johnson.

Reformers out of phase with their times make little immediate sense. But they often construct a series of ideas and procedural options which assume growing importance as environmental conditions change the necessities of an age. A review of the Congressional Quarterly proves a clustering of legislative party votes over time which, although not rigorously disciplined, is far more ideological and programmatically consistent than Mr. Sorauf's book admits. There is far more dependence of state and local organizations upon national political activity and finance—especially during a Presidential election—than Mr. Sorauf suggests. In a world of nuclear war and national and international economic interdependencies, questions of survival and security become ubiquitous and frequently override more limited regional and parochial interests. The party that forgets this is doomed to fail in its electoral function. Reapportionment and the impending death or retirement of some old timers in Congress are bound to affect the partisan structure and behavior of the legislative branch.

America will not end up adopting in toto the recommendations of the American Political Science Association committee on a more responsible two-party system. But the Committee's recommendations are less out of tune with the observable present and the foreseeable future than Mr. Sorauf implies.

Perhaps it is time that analytically oriented and normatively oriented political scientists had an ecumenical conference. The extreme positions have been defended so long and so outrageously that a new sorting out of where we are and where we should be going may well be in order. The normative fellows must be prepared to deal with the brilliant analysis of the first two-thirds of Mr. Sorauf's book. The analytic fellows must be prepared to wrestle with the structural and behavioral implications of observable and predictable changes which have emerged in American national politics since World War II.

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The Politics of the Budgetary Process. By Aaron Wildaysky. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964. Pp. xi, 216.)

To deal with budgeting is to deal with the concrete payoffs of the political process, and this book analyzes budgetary policy-making in political terms. It is a sophisticated study of the political system that the direct participants in federal appropriations decisions comprise: of the simplifying devices they employ to make possible a modicum of rationality in handling decisions too complex to be tackled whole; of the aids used in calculating budgetary demands and grants; of the interlocking system of roles and the differing perspectives and strategies to be observed in bureaus, departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and the appropriations committees.

The author makes a strong case for the thesis that by and large the system serves the nation fairly well and that the most popular targets of its would-be reformers are precisely the devices that make it work with an acceptable measure of rationality and self-correcting feedback. Reform proposals are typically based upon concern that the entire budget is never examined as a whole and that decisions about specific programs are accordingly made without a weighing of their relative merits. But this view ignores the fact that there is no consensus on a ranking of programs; that an organic budget would therefore inevitably mean an explicit and visible triumph of particular values in a way that is not now necessary; that a program budget emphasizes ideological differences and makes agreement more difficult. In short, these reform suggestions are really prescriptions for political conflict and for a change in the values realized through politics and not merely prescriptions for a change in the methods of budgeting.

The present system, moreover, does produce

more opportunity for alternative views to be expressed and greater assurance that major errors in calculation will be corrected than any alternative proposed. In an area in which the limits of rational decision making are fairly quickly reached decision-makers must satisfice, considering only a small number of alternatives at one time, paying most attention to changes from the last budget, and assuming that interests they ignore or underestimate will make themselves felt at some other point in the balkanized budgetary process. To pretend that budget makers can consider all possibilities is bound to be illusory and to amount to propaganda for a particular result.

The study is especially perceptive in demonstrating that the various roles of the agencies involved in budgeting ("the agency as advocâte, the Budget Bureau as Presidential servant with a cutting bias, the House Appropriations Committee as guardian of the Treasury, The Senate Appropriations Committee as responsible appeals court") permit each one to reduce its burden of calculation because it can assume that it can play its own role militantly, confident that others will balance it by playing the other politically necessary roles.

Any book that makes a significant contribution to conceptualization is bound to raise questions as well as answer them, and the Wildavsky study leaves this reader wondering whether something systematic can now be learned about some issues with which he deals only casually.

Can something more rigorous be said about the political and social correlates of decisions about incremental changes from previous budgets? Wildavsky deplores the unwillingness of budgetary reformers to face the larger political implications of their suggestions, but insofar as he takes the role of advocate of the current system he sometimes falls into the same trap. It is not self-evident that all significant bodies of opinion, particularly the advocates of drastic change, are represented by the role-players, and to ignore the possibility they are not is to advocate the status-quo by indirection. If there is anything systematic about the way in which the system responds to, slows down, or speeds up social change, we should know it.

Second, can something systematic be learned about the relative effectiveness of the strategies the author has identified? Any statement of social phenomena in terms of an inventory of influences falls short of explanation, though it is possible that anything more than an inventory is impossible at this time. When this question is explored, it will almost certainly be tied to rates of social change as well.

Wildavsky's book is encouraging evidence that our increased exposure to organization theory, game theory, and social psychology is producing a more powerful and explanatory political science.

MURRAY EDELMAN

University of Illinois

World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. By Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 373. \$10.00.)

Not many years ago, the study of comparative government in most American universities consisted largely of serial, descriptive appraisals of the "major foreign powers"—usually European, with occasional reference to non-European powers such as India, China, and Japan. By the mid-1950's, responding to the everlengthening membership of the United Nations and to strictures against the "traditional approach" by Roy Macridis and others, both researchers and class-room instructors began shifting their attention to generalized types and components of political systems. More recently, thanks to the increasing availability of "hard data" of the sort collected and disseminated by the Statistical Office of the United Nations. wholly quantitative cross-national comparison has become both feasible and fruitful. The acknowledged leader of the "quantitative revolution" in comparative studies has been Karl Deutsch, who, in association with Harold Lasswell and others, was instrumental in organizing the Political Data Program at Yale University. The World Handbook is the first major product of the program. Principal author of the Handbook is the Program's Director, Bruce M. Russett, with important methodological contributions in a concluding section by Hayward Alker, Jr.

The greater bulk of the *Handbook* consists of 75 data series "selected with reference to existing theories of international and comparative politics" and representing, in each case, "an attempt to operationalize a variable central to several important theories of political or social change" (pg. 2). The series are grouped into "Distribution Profiles" under the following headings: Human Resources, Government and Politics, Communications, Wealth, Health, Education, Family and Social Relations, Distribution of Wealth and Income, and Religion. Summary measures accompanying each series include the range, mean, median, standard deviation, case and data deciles, and modal decile.

It should not detract from the importance of

the Handbook to note that few of the data series represent original compilations. As the authors themselves point out, "our data-gathering efforts have been unavoidably influenced by availability.... We tried, however, to go considerably beyond the original sources in processing the data in order to bring out important characteristics of the distributions" (p. 4).

Since the primary criteria for selection of the data series are stated to have been "theoretical importance," "accuracy," and "availability," one may be permitted to cavil at certain of the more obvious omissions. Why, for example, were Telephones Per Capita or Energy Consumption not included?

The full case list for the Handbook embraces 141 independent nations and dependent territories. The number of cases for each series, however, ranges from a low of 12 to a high of 133. (The authors state, incorrectly, that their basic list is composed of 133 countries, with the number of countries represented in each table "varying between 11 and 134.") The mean is 74.9, or 53% of the possible maximum. The fluctuation in case content and size will present problems for those using Handbook data for certain types of multivariate analysis. "Missing data" computer programs exist, however, for simple linear correlation purposes and such a program was evidently used by the authors in assembling the correlation matrix included in Part B: The Analysis of Trends and Patterns.

The compilers of the *Handbook* are to be commended for their painstaking and instructive handling of the "reliability" problem. It is somewhat surprising therefore that a spot check reveals far more errors of their own commission than one might wish for. One may scarcely be accused of nit-picking in taking Table 9 (Percentage of Population in Cities Over 20,000) as an example. The figures given for at least 15 out of the 120 cases on this list either are not to be found in the sources cited or fail to agree with the figures given therein.

Another type of error, illustrative of the difficulty of relying on secondary sources which themselves rely on secondary sources, is also exhibited in Table 9. Much of the data offered in this table is taken from Norton Ginsburg's Atlas of Economic Development, rather than from UN sources. Much of Ginsburg's data, in turn, is taken from an "unpublished manuscript" by Leo F. Schnore, with the notation that "Data are from 1955 except as otherwise noted." But it may easily be demonstrated that a sizeable proportion of the items from Schnore (identified as being 1955 data) are actually of earlier vintage. The authors simply accept Ginsburg's assertion (who presumably

accepted Schnore's) that "Data are for 1955" without checking into its accuracy.

A somewhat less serious difficulty concerns the use of transformations to help normalize excessively skewed distributions. Increasingly, quantitative data analysts are recognizing the need for such transformations, but few indulge in other than logarithmic manipulation of their data. Thus the present authors, while transforming somewhat over a third of their variables before computing correlation coefficients restrict themselves exclusively to logarithms. Now it happens that many (though by no means all) of the data series relevant to contemporary cross-national research are of a "right skew" character, viz., a "bunching" of scores at the lower end of the scale, with progressively fewer entries as one moves to the higher values of the scale. Under such circumstances a logarithmic transformation may, indeed, be appropriate (a square root transformation may, however, be even more appropriate, depending on the exact configuration of the skew). For an extreme left skew, on the other hand, a square or cubic transformation will usually be called for. Additional transformations may be required for other distributional patterns.

For purposes of this review, a Chi-Square distribution analysis was performed on the data for Tables 8, 9, 51, and 64, four distributions that the authors did not transform but which, from their graphs, seemed to be somewhat non-normal. Distributions 8 and 9 are both right skewed, but a square root rather than a logarithmic transformation proved appropriate in each case. Distribution 51 (left skewed) proved to be relatively normal (Chi-Square = 7.1) but with an outlier (South Africa) at -3.6 S.S. A cubic transformation resolved the problem of the outlier, while reducing the Chi-Square value to 1.8. In the case of Distribution 64, an arcsin square root transformation improved the distribution somewhat, though admittedly not much.

It would, in this writer's opinion, have added immensely to the final product if analyses such as the foregoing had been performed for each data series, with the Chi-Square value for each raw distribution (based on 0.1 probability regions or deciles of the normal curve), together with the most appropriate transformation (if any) specified in each case.

The purist might wish to take issue with a number of "side" comments. For example, the authors state (pg. 292) that "percentage Roman Catholic seems not to be highly correlated at the worldwide level with anything (except percentage Christian), not even . . .

negatively with economic development or development rates or achievement motivation as the famous Weberian 'Protestant ethic' theory would indicate."

The obvious reason for this finding is the prevalence of Catholicism as the dominant religion in Latin America, which tends, by and large, to exhibit "transitional" developmental status. If, on the other hand, predominantly Catholic countries and predominantly Protestant (or Mixed Christian, or Muslim) countries are compared along various "developmental" dimensions, more truly "Weberian" patterns will be seen to emerge.

In an interesting discussion of "'Stages' of Economic and Political Development," as defined by Handbook data, the authors frankly acknowledge the perils of indulging in diachronic inference on the basis of synchronic or "cross-sectional" evidence. They rightly point out that "a more direct and dependable method for examining stages [of development] would be to look at . . . data for many countries over long periods of time." But the necessary "hard" data are most assuredly lacking, and this reviewer is inclined to agree that it may indeed be useful in the absence "of better longitudinal data, to use the cross-sectional data we have as if they in some way applied to development over time" (p. 299).

An informative presentation of curvilinear regression is included under the topic "Changing Relationships Between Variables," and the more sophisticated reader will find the discussion of "Regionalism Versus Universalism in Comparing Nations" highly stimulating. A large number of the *Handbook* series are in the form of percentages, and Alker displays considerable finesse in coming to grips with the problem of ecological correlation.

If the Russett-Alker *Handbook* does not wholly measure up to what it may become in succeeding editions, it is nonetheless a most impressive beginning. This is not intended as damnation by faint praise. Pioneering efforts are seldom perfect. Despite its flaws, the *World Handbook* is unquestionably one of the more significant publications of the year in political science.

ARTHUR S. BANKS

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Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas. By Robert E. Ward, Frank Bonilla, James S. Coleman, Herbert H. Hyman, Lucian W. Pye, and Myron Weiner. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964. Pp. vii, 245. \$2.50 paper.)

Sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, this book is addressed particularly to political scientists who are embarking on research projects in the developing areas. Although the authors want to interest younger scholars in doing field research in the developing areas, their primary concern is efficiency and effectiveness in the field. They hope to sensitize the prospective field researchers to likely methodological and practical problems. to suggest some of the ways previous researchers have coped with the problems, and to assure novices that the problems are not "the result of some peculiar malevolence" toward them and their projects (p. 2). The level on which the authors propose to accomplish these tasks is the strategic, which is said to lie between general theory and specific tactics.

Lucian Pye begins these efforts by recommending a cross-disciplinary approach and a return to the fundamentals of theory-building and data-collection. Here and elsewhere in the book, the need for flexibility in the planning and data-collection stages of research is stressed. The chapter concludes by identifying some of the characteristics of most developing political systems and suggesting consequent research needs. The characteristics include cleavage, ambivalence, fragmented identities, personality politics, omnifunctionality, and instability. The theoretical bases for selecting the characteristics and the research which has already been completed are not noted.

The opening sentence of Robert Ward's contribution leads one to hope for an analysis of the social system of research. "The relationship between scholars, their working environment, and the type and quality of their research output," he writes, "is complex and poorly understood" (p. 26). However, separate topics are taken up in his two chapters. These include different conceptions and statuses of scholarship and scholars, linguistic and design preparations, the advantages of a straightforward and comprehensible identification of self and project, disruptions of the researcher's time schedule, nonprofessional involvements, and suitable payment of debts.

The book's introduction indicates that documentary research, interviews, survey research, and observation will be the methods of data-collection examined. All but the last of these are covered. In the chapter on documentary research, written by James Coleman of UCLA, a realistic assessment of document availability (existence and use policy) is made and access strategies are suggested. In addition, several types of studies which could profitably use

documentary research are noted and, in five valuable appendices prepared with Gülgün Karal, facilities, sources, and bibliographies are identified.

Myron Weiner begins his chapter on political interviewing by commenting on the influence the researcher's background and training have upon the conduct of inquiry. Perceptively, he states that the researcher "may all too often compare the *practice* of government abroad with the *theory* of government at home" (p. 109). Other matters discussed include the use of interpreters, reconstructing an event through interviews, access, evaluating responses with the respondents' purposes in mind, and group interviewing.

The chapter on survey techniques, written by Frank Bonilla, begins with an examination of three fundamental issues: Does "public opinion" exist in developing countries? If so, what are its functions? What methods are appropriate for its study? The author indicates the desperate need for analyses of interviewer-respondent interaction and the meaning of cross-cultural comparisons, and he comments on some problems of field administration and public relations. Unfortunately, the prospective field researcher is not assisted with probability sampling in uncharted areas with unenumerated populations.

The concluding chapter, by Herbert Hyman, includes descriptions and evaluations of research designs related to comparison and the study of change. The scientific reason for comparison is also given: "Actual cross-national comparisons, based on equivalent methods, provide an accurate empirical norm for evaluating a descriptive finding from one country" (p. 172).

Studying Politics Abroad is, for the most part, successful in what it sets out to accomplish. It interests, sensitizes, suggests, and assures; in addition, it makes some attempts to provide the student with a necessary technical background. Most important, professors will no longer have to spend hours with departing field researchers passing on the folklore of research in the developing areas.

In two ways, this book reflects the underdeveloped condition of political science. The first is that the presentation is at the level of common sense. Unfortunately, the dangers of common sense are present: explanations and justifications are often not given for suggestions, and many of the boundaries between application and non-application are not specified. The second reflection of political science underdevelopment is the assumption the authors implicitly make throughout the book that the prospective field researchers have virtually no background either in the politics of the developing areas or in field research methods. But can it be that students are being dispatched from American pillars of higher education to do research in developing areas without having read Almond, Pye, and Riggs? Can it be that students will plan to interview without having read Hyman, and Kahn and Cannell? An equivalent question could be related to each of the chapters in the book. Therefore, if the pillars of higher education are doing their job, a short sensitizing-suggesting-assuring booklet would have been sufficient. If the pillars are failing, we desperately need a more complete book, at least the equivalent of the Handbook of Social Psychology.

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Financing the United Nations System. By John Stoessinger and Associates. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964. Pp. 348. \$6.75.)

The noble ideas embedded in the United Nations Charter, as well as its crisp constitutional structure, often make the breathless enthusiast for world peace forget that the UN is a political system. Money is both the root of all evil and the goad to much good. This excellent book cogently and coherently puts the problem of financing the United Nations into political perspective by examining the dilemma of apportioning the costs of the Organization among states with conflicting national policies and by analyzing possible scurces of new international revenues.

Ten distinguished scholars of United Nations affairs have collaborated with the author in producing a remarkably lucid study, considering the intrinsically tedious matter of statistical compilations, and the skewering of gross national products usually intended to deny art and exalt science. Indeed, Dr. Stoessinger has kept the sprawling materials of international organization research within neatly hemmed boundaries, leading in logical order from a first chapter postulate that the present "financial crisis" of the UN is in reality a political crisis over the role of the Organization as translated by divergent national policies of member states to a conclusion that international political consensus must be nurtured with all the crafts of statesmanship in order to invigorate the financial health of the United Nations.

Between the sheets of this sensible approach to the construction of world order lies a short historical examination of the fiscal problems of the League of Nations and contemporary regional organizations, details on the costs of UN membership, and a description of the procedures to estimate, assess, and appropriate the regular budget of the United Nations. Quite rightly almost a third of the book is devoted to the financial impact upon the United Nations of the peace and security operations in Korea, the Middle East, the Congo, and other peace-keeping interventions, for these political activities, not the studies, conferences, and recommendations of the UN in economic, social, legal affairs—really account for the fiscal "crisis."

The heart of the problem of UN solvency does not lie in the magnitude of the costs or in the poverty of the membership, but in the unwillingness of states to support UN peace-keeping operations that they find politically unwelcome. Failing to find international consensus to back the costs in the Middle East and the Congo, some members of the UN pressed for a legal opinion to bolster a political point of view and one chapter of this volume deals with a World Court advisory opinion of 1962. By a fractured majority of 9-5 the Court found that the expenditures authorized by the General Assembly resolutions for UNEF in the Middle East and the UN Congo Force constituted "expenses of the Organization" under Article 17, but, as the authors note, the political import of the opinion was reflected in each of the ten different statements made by the judges as they labored to apply legal tools to a controversial political issue.

In succeeding chapters that treat the fiscal problems of the UN voluntary programs, such as UNICEF, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and the Special Fund, the shift of the budgetary battle lines is emphasized, for tension generally lies between aidgiving and aid-receiving states, marking the perennial rift between debtors and creditors. The amounts of money involved are relatively small and quite voluntary for every state. No problem of assessment exists although there are other problems of increasing donations and collections. Attention is drawn to the proposals to merge some of the programs or incorporate them into the regular budget of the United Nations, with the authors wisely coming down on the side of developing a vigorous consensus for support of the programs rather than expecting some procedural alteration to transform their image or effect.

Similarly, the budgets of the Specialized Agencies are examined, with their receipts

from assessed governmental contributions, grants for carrying out EPTA and Special Fund projects, and donations. The lament for a lack of funds to cover needed programs and the complaint of arrears mark the budgeting problems, but the Agencies face no serious plight as they trim their plans to fit revenues. For eighteen years criticism has been vented upon the lack of coordination between the specialized agencies and the UN, with inconclusive findings and little action. Nothing remarkable has been added to the debate here, while the World Bank and its affiliates, together with the International Monetary Fund are perforce treated in a few pages.

Finally, the authors turn to the possibility of raising revenues for the United Nations outside the present assessment-of-states system and the voluntary donations by states to certain economic and social programs. Their conclusion that private contributions can only provide a very modest increment to UN activities seems correct, perhaps understated in light of the record of private contributions coming almost entirely from the United States, except for specific refugee and humanitarian programs. UN levies on international activities, such as mail, canal, sea, and air traffic, and UN exploitation of Antarctica, the seabed, and communications in outer space are examined succinctly to determine their potential for raising money for the UN, but the general conclusions are that the proposals are either too controversial to be accepted, too small in their yield to be worthwhile, or too remote in return to meet the present demands for the development of the UN system. There can be no substitute for the failure of states to meet their financial obligations to the UN here and now.

Overall the combined work of the authors of this tidy volume, so pertinent to the contemporary financial impasse and the future expansion of international organization activities, deserves high marks for a judicious investigation of an important public issue. Calm balance marks its character. Policy makers dealing with UN affairs will have much fact and figure to digest, while ordinary men will be reminded that all organizations, even those designed to achieve the most noble aims of mankind, can move no further and faster than the political consensus that binds them.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. By Daniel J. Boorstin. (New York and Boston: Harper Colophon Books, 1964. Pp. iv, 315. \$1.75.)

First, this is a most entertaining book, written with wit, sparkle, and a knack for the quotable phrase. "What ails us is not what we have done with America, but what we have substituted for America." "The great forward strides of American civilization have blurred the edges of reality." "We imagine ourselves masters of a plastic universe." "How surprising if men who make their environment and fill experience with whatever they please could not also make their God!" "The wonderful pliability of human nature, in a society where anyone can become a celebrity." Second, the book creates concepts which should become by-words as much as Riesman's "other-directedness": (a) the "pseudo-event" which, unlike the genuine, spontaneous event, is planted for reporting purposes, stands in an "ambiguous relation to the underlying reality," and tends toward a self-fulfilling prophecy; (b) "well-knownness" which is replacing fame. Once there was admiration for the "flash of divinity" in a great man, now people are "known for their well-knownness." (c) "Celebrity" substitutes for the hero, but the concept is not confined to people. "A best seller is a celebrity among books." (God) "is the Celebrity Author of the World's Best Seller." (d) The "image" takes the place of the ideal. Unlike the American "dream" which "was here to be reached for and not to be lived in," "images" are synthetic, passive, and ambiguous. Third, Boorstin as good as asserts that this unreality is all of our life. His third chapter, "From Traveler to Tourist," pushes the scope of the study from mass communications into a sketch of our entire existence. "We are threatened by a new and peculiarly American menace, . . . the menace of unreality. The threat of nothingness is the danger of replacing American dreams by American illusions." Fourth, Boorstin has something to say about the causes of this danger which roots in the "Graphic Revolution," i.e. electronic and photographic technology. He has almost nothing to say, though, about the consequences of living in unreality; no word about foreign or domestic policies, or family relations, ethics, education. This may be because of his bluntly admitted inability to "describe reality," even though he keeps referring his

"pseudo-events" to what he calls an "underlying reality." More than once he suggests that our "dreams" are real while our illusions are not. At other times, he attributes the modern American "menace" to "our strengths" rather than our weaknesses.

This book is not a study of life, it merely describes the doxa that stand between us and reality. It is a good to call attention to them, and a courageous look into their blurred face may have a healing effect. Boorstin, however, has confined himself to the relatively amiable self-delusions of the public relations world. He has passed over, in silence, the far more dangerous deceptions of the modern ideologies, as, e.g., Positivism, Historicism, Marxism, Racism, which put a contrived "Second Reality" between man and the knowledge of his own condition. These "dreams" of man's selfcreation, self-redemption, self-perfection cause indeed a "thicket of unreality" that intervenes between our policy makers and the real situation. One can only shout "Amen" as Boorstin counsels, at the end: " . . . each of us must prepare himself to receive messages from the outside." Boorstin himself, however, does not help much as long as he can manage no more than "suspect that there may be a world out there, beyond our present or future powers to image or imagine." The scientist, after all, is called to penetrate through the doxa to aletheia. -- GERHART NIEMEYER, University of Notre Dame.

Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideals. By Mary P. Mack. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiii, 482. \$7.50.)

If a statuary Hall of Fame in political theory were to be created, Jeremy Bentham's likeness would no doubt be assigned a modest niche in a secondary wing. This volume—the first of a projected 2-volume work by an historian—is dedicated to the cause of moving Bentham's statue at very least out into the main hall. The author tells us that she began her study of Bentham troubled by the usual interpretation of him as a shallow "rationalist," a "comic philistine," and a "trivial and defective thinker." She concludes—although part of the supporting evidence and argument are yet to come in the second volume—that the usual interpretation is dead wrong: Bentham was in fact a "great man who

has often been misunderstood and therefore undervalued" (p. xi).

The evidence and the argument of this first volume are divided into three parts: Part I sets the familial and intellectual background (1748–1769); Part II outlines the fundamentals of Bentham's Utilitarian "science" (1768–1782); and Part III shows Bentham venturing, somewhat hesitantly to be sure, out into the political world to test and refine his science. The volume ends in 1792, just after Bentham became a "democrat," as a result of, among other things, his enthusiasm for the first stages of the French Revolution; and just after old Jeremiah Bentham died, leaving Jeremy and his brother Sam a fortune sufficient to permit them to indulge in certain projects based on Jeremy's science.

The author's claim that Bentham has been grossly and unjustly undervalued rests essentially upon three points. The first is that no one can justly judge Bentham's thought without fully digesting the apparently considerable mass of his unpublished writings, as well as the numerous volumes which have already seen the public light. (The author computes that "almost every day of his adult life, from 1770 to 1832, he wrote about fifteen folio pages" [p. 5].) The second point is that nearly all the critics have imputed a sterile. narrow and static "doctrine" to Bentham, when in fact he was the "creator of a general method"; the core of that method was "a 'logic of the will' that covers every human action and not merely a limited ethical or political theory" (p. xi). The third, and really crucial, point is that Bentham's system is never judged properly because it is never seen as an uncompleted system, the key portions of which center upon the unfinished "logic of the will." The argument, here, reduced to its bare elements, is as follows: Utilitarianism, as a "method," required the mass of men to adopt a totally new vocabulary to replace their conventional, and therefore hopelessly ambiguous, language. Bentham sought to supply that new vocabulary by the creation of ponderous Greek-root neologisms. But when he found, early on, that his readers refused to accept this new vocabulary, he began, about 1782, to write in two different ways: private analyses of the logic-of-the-will variety; and public works of a polemical and popular kind. And what is most crucial, his disappointment at the rejection of the early specimens of the new vocabularly caused him never to completeindeed, says the author, he never really wrote, let alone published-his "most important work" (p. 162). In short, the vital middle of Bentham's whole system—the "logic of the will," meant to serve as a bridge between the principle of pleasure (an "empirical generalization") and the principle of happiness (a "normative injunction")-failed

to be completed because the mass of his contemporaries refused to accept the first morsels they were asked to digest (p. 223).

We are led, then, to this conclusion: Benthamite Utilitarianism cannot possibly be rejected as unsound because it has never been tried. But in order for it to be tried, two things would be necessary: first, the vital middle, the "logic of the will," would have to be available in completed form; and second, the mass of men would have to be willing to be converted by it. Since the first of these conditions cannot, in the nature of things, ever be realized exactly as Bentham intended itunless we are to suppose that he might come back to earth to complete that which he left undonethe second seems to be irrelevant. The author might object, of course, that someone else might complete the vital, missing part; in which case Bentham would be given credit for providing the inspiration and outlining the method. Possibly. But we would still want to see whether the necessary conversion is any more likely now, or in the future, than it was when Bentham provided his own first public samples. I have my doubts; but perhaps Miss Mack will silence them in the second volume of this work, the first of which is, in spite of my skepticism regarding substance, a valuable complement to the texts considered by the political theorist.—RICHARD H. Cox, State University of New York (Buffalo).

Three Tactics: The Background in Marx. By STANLEY MOORE. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963. Pp. vii, 96. \$2.25.)

Discussions of Marxism, as of theology, have generally been conducted better in Europe than in North America. But time has wrought changes, and whatever the situation may be in theology, so far as Marxism is concerned, contemporary American writing on the subject sometimes equals the best that Europe can produce.

This slight book, Three Tactics, is a case in point. The author obviously knows his material and can plunge straight into a theoretical discussion and sustain it at a sophisticated level. I would judge the author is sympathetic to Marxism, yet he is free of dogmatism and asks shrewd and important questions.

The general question which he sets out to answer is whether, corresponding to the conflicts in the Marxist movement, there is a similar conflict of principles in the writings of Marx himself. He finds there is such a correspondence and that Marx in fact enunciated three theories for the ending of capitalism and never committed himself wholly to one.

In his earlier days Marx talked of the permanent revolution. This was a prescription for a conspiratorial minority revolution, allegedly in

the interest of the majority. This Marxist aberration became Leninist orthodoxy, but today is adhered to only by the Chinese.

The second, or main line, of Marxist theory stressed increasing misery and a majority proletarian revolution. This was the "iron law" of historical materialism, which guaranteed the overthrow of capitalism. Tactical support has not been drawn from the doctrine from the time of Lenin's Two Tactics in 1905, until the Russians tried to revive it about 1960.

The third theoretical model may be called that of competing systems. As feudal society became penetrated by capitalist institutions, so capitalist society becomes permeated by socialist institutions. Piecemeal reform takes the place of revolution. This strain of thought ante-dates Marx and has a mixed ancestry. It was expressed in the tactics of the Revisionists. Although Marx gave it little support, Engels backed it more heavily.

Since three competing models can be found in Marx and Engels, it is not surprising that the Communist movement should be divided on tactics. Today the Russians have dropped the Leninist orthodoxy and have moved to a tactical position somewhere between that and Revisionism. Fortunately, this tactic is more suited to co-existence in the atomic age, and has the advantage of being in the mainstream of Marx's writings.

The author conducts his discussion lucidly, and with an economy of words, although there is a certain caution and inconclusiveness about his work. Yet the book as a whole sharpens the conflicting theoretical and tactical tendencies in Marxism, and may usefully be recommended to students.—H. B. Mayo, University of Western Ontario.

The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age. By Melvin Richter. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1964. Pp. 415. \$7.50.)

One of the more curious aspects of nineteenth century English history is the profound political and social influence exerted by Green and Idealism. For despite the almost impenetrable character of Green's writings and his uncompromising lecture presentation, he had a considerable impact on Liberal thought. Richter's study seeks to discover the factors which made Green so influential and, also, to account for the rapid decline of that influence.

Richter contends that Green's thought, as well as that of other Liberal reformers, was a reaction to the severe attacks on his traditional Methodist religion. Green was faced with a "great crisis of faith precipitated by science and scholarship. . . . an acute crisis of conscience which troubled those Christian believers who at the same time regarded

themselves as thinking men." Higher biblical criticism and Darwinian evolutionary theory made it necessary to give to religion "a compelling restatement in the style of abstract thought respected by the educated" or to abandon religion to the lower classes where it would never exert "the full force upon the whole society that comes from uniting faith with a creed formulated by first-rate minds on the highest intellectual level" (pp. 15-16). While rejecting the dogmas of Methodism, Green sought to save its ethical teaching and above all its "philanthropic humanitarianism" by turning to Idealism. Thus a priori philosophy was to provide "the secure base on which to build a new structure of belief embodying the essentials of Christianity" (pp. 310, 180). This "unassailable foundation" would withstand any further advances in empirical knowledge. Methodism with its emphasis on individual responsibility, social activism, voluntarism, and reform was wed to Idealism with its concepts of the progressive unfolding of history and the selfrealization of the individual. Self-realization was to mean the active life of the good citizen working toward the betterment of his society. "In politics as in theology, the doctrine of citizenship and reform developed by Green can best be understood as a surrogate faith appealing to a transitional generation" (p. 19).

But Idealist philosophy soon proved to be radically insufficient. It became evident that Green's a priori arguments were certainly not the necessary conclusions of any thinking man. Moreover, two apparently opposing tendencies quickly added to the decline of Idealism. On the one hand, the statism latent in Idealism began to assert itself, especially in Bosanquet, Green's own common sense and his commitment to freedom and voluntarism had protected him from taking the steps which some of his (perhaps more consistent) followers could not resist. On the other hand, the principle of voluntarism itself was undermined, just as was the Liberal party, by the rise of the Labor party and Labor's increasing demands for positive governmental action. Indeed, Richter maintains persuasively that Green was certainly not a precursor of the modern welfare state.

Many of the merits and demerits of Richter's study may be traced to his methodological approach. His study is designed to demonstrate the usefulness of studying political and social thought by combining the method of sociology of knowledge with that of the history of ideas. The former approach "is highly suggestive" but "contains many discrepant hypotheses not always supported by convincing evidence," while the latter approach "tends in practice to be meticulous in detail, but insignificant and mechanical in general theory" (p. 10). Just as Green must be admired

for seeking to steer between the Charybdis of moral relativism and the Scylla of dogmatism so frequently associated with Idealism, Richter must be admired for his endeavor to combine two such different and demanding methods. Yet it cannot be said that he has always avoided their dangers nor succeeded in thoroughly harmonizing them. Richter claims that the "emphasis" of his "book falls, not upon what was personal, striking or eccentric about its subject, but upon those patterns of piety, of family and social life, of politics, education and voluntary association which formed Green and others like him." But in the sequel he insists that he sought "to read with care all of Green's texts; to accept provisionally the meaningfulness of his problems and the validity of his method" and only to turn to "non-intellectual considerations-sociological, economic, psychological . . . in certain instances" (pp. 9, 11). Accordingly, the chapters on Green's background tend to overgeneralize while those on his ideas tend to be "meticulous" and sometimes repetitious. Throughout it is difficult to know whether Richter is maintaining that Green consciously attempted to blend Idealism and Methodism or whether he was subconsciously reacting to the crisis of his time.

But whatever the limitations Richter's study nevertheless demands our attention for it is a significant contribution to the understanding of an important man and his times. Richter's orderly and intelligent presentation indicates a considerable mastery of some rather difficult material.—

James Steintrager, University of Texas.

Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power. By Ervin Laszlo. (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1963. Pp. 172. 19.80 guilders.)

This book is divided into two parts: (1) a philosophical analysis of "sociopolitical principles" and (2) a description and analysis of political power, as embodied in Democratic individualism and Communist collectivism. The subtitle, "A Relational Analysis of Ideological Conflict," suggests that Laszlo intended to show the interrelations between the social and political principles described in Part I, and the uses of political power in the individualist and collectivist systems covered in Part II. Laszlo identifies "theories built upon an ontology of being" with "the individualist idea of society"; and "theories built on the ontology of existence" with "the collectivist idea of society" (p. 28). This is as close as he comes to uniting the two parts of the book. This study falls short of its apparent intention in two ways. First, the two sections of the book are too separate and quite unrelated; there is almost no application of the principles described in Part I to the two basic political systems discussed in Part II. Second,

the author is concerned in Part II almost entirely with "the impact of Soviet ideological collectivism on the evolution of contemporary political thought" (p. 151), and Democratic individualism is brought in only here and there and is used as a foil to describe and analyze Communist collectivism in theory and practice, rather than being given consideration in its own right. The author is aware that "institutionalized collectivism is a relatively novel phenomenon on the scene of civilization," and that "the tradition of all people has had more of an individualist than a collectivist content . . . " (p. 152). The title and structure suggest that this study is concerned with a comparison of these two basic systems in their struggle for supremacy. But almost the whole of Part II is concerned with the origins and development of Marxian Communism. and with the present status and appeal of Soviet ideological collectivism in theory and practice throughout the world.

Laszlo clearly states his intention and thesis in Part I: "Our intention is to deal merely with the cognitive processes which play a predominant role in the ontological evaluation of societal (and by implication, of general) reality, and which may thus be shown to have influenced the political thought of our contemporaries" (p. 20). "Our thesis is that there are two types of concepts ascribable to every apprehended object, resulting from two different modes of comprehending it" (p. 21). His main purpose—"to investigate the genesis and qualification of the patterns of ontological concepts"-is pursued from "the sceptical epistemological position of conceptual nominalism" (p. 21). In brief, the author is painfully aware of all the complex philosophical problems and practical difficulties confronting political science from the time of Locke to the view of the universe propounded by Einstein, which he accepts as his own. Unfortunately, this leads him to adopt an esoteric, technical, complex and needlessly abstract philosophical vocabulary, centered in "epistemology" and "ontological concepts." Together with his discursive style, this diction makes much of the first section of his book a series of semantic problems in abstract and wordy phrases, which at their worst are almost meaningless cant and jibberish. Much of Part I reads like a satirical parody of modern political theory written in unreadable doublethink. By "empirical factors of differentiation among social strata" (p. 146), the author means private property. Surely sentences such as the following could have been written in more concrete and concise language: "Finally collectivist states have shown a tendency to explicate their ontological principle by defining a particular set of heuristically functioning theoretical concepts serving to reinterpret concepts of being in the light of a dominant ontology of existence" (p. 52). This example can be matched by others on almost every page of Part I. Almost the only clear writing in the first section is the comparison between Fascism and Communism, and the description of totalitarian dictatorship (pp. 52-56).

In Part II a remarkable change is evident in the style of the book. The author's description and analysis of the historical origins and development of the structure of Communist ideology is concise and clear. He presents an excellent summary of how Marx and Engels adapted Feuerbach's materialism and Hegel's philosophy and dialectics. He subjects Communist dialectics and its institutionalized theory to a very perceptive analysis. His chapter on popular political thought under Communism is especially well done. The chapter on national revisionism includes perhaps the best account to date of the nature and spirit of the Hungarian revolt of October, 1956, from the viewpoint of non-Soviet Marxism. Laszlo's thesis is that the revolt was not for "freedom" as understood in Western constitutional Democracy, but for "freedom" under Hungarian national socialism; that it "was not counter to the collectivist principles of Communism" (p. 134), but only against Russian dominance of Hungarian national unity (pp. 130-136). The thesis is too simple, but if the rest of the book were as well written as this section even sceptical readers would find much of value for understanding and insight.—Peter J. STANLIS, University of Detroit.

In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. By Benjamin Schwartz. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 298. \$5.95.)

More than a decade ago Professors John Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng wrote in a pioneering volume (China's Response to the West), "the field of modern Chinese intellectual history has lain fallow far too long." Until "trained and competent Asian and Western scholars... spend long periods of time in translation and research... we shall never know what has really happened in China since the opening to the West."

They might have added the responsibility for penetrating thought and reflection to the burdens of translation and research. All these functions have combined to produce the brilliant study under review in which Mr. Schwartz, a Harvard colleague of Professor Fairbank's, opens a broad new vista into "what really happened" as China confronted and reacted to Western ideas. In the process he has both enlightened and challenged us with the highest standards of scholarship in this field. Plainly only a scholar with a command of the relevant Chinese literature plus a seasoned

knowledge of Western philosophic thought could have undertaken so successfully a comparative analysis of Eastern and Western intellection.

Students of 19th century European liberalism will find this as absorbing a study as will those of modern Chinese thought and social development. Yen Fu's life-long struggle to reassess central Chinese issues in the light of Western thought holds a mirror to still unresolved questions in the West regarding the real roots of liberalism and the causal relations between liberalism and modernization.

The primary focus, however, is upon the relation between these Western speculations and the questions that dominated Yen Fu's consciousness: What was the secret of Western wealth and power? What did the West have that China lacked? Where did the crucial difference between the two lie?

Why Yen Fu and why these particular questions? Professor Schwartz traces the crystallizing of these concerns in late 19th century China as Confucian, pseudo-Legalist, and inchoate nationalist sentiments coalesced in a new amalgam of ideas among the literati. These notions were a response partly to rising domestic forces, more directly to impinging Western and Japanese power. Thoughtful Chinese were inclined, by the turn of the 20th century, to acknowledge that wealth and power were no longer inconsistent with traditional values. Indeed, power was indispensable to their perpetuation. But how were these dynamic forces in their alien Western forms to be analyzed and understood, much less appropriated? Following the humiliation of 1894-95 these questions stood somewhere near the forefront of the Chinese mind.

Yen Fu emerged, by a set of fortuitous circumstances, as one of the first literati to penetrate to the core of these questions. With a rare combination of classical training and the English language, acquired at the Foochow School of Navigation, he was sent to England (1877) for advanced naval training. But naval science was already incidental to his greater concern over the spectre of China's weakness in the face of Western aggressive dynamism and overwhelming vitality. His two years in England set the direction of his career as essayist, translator, and publicist extraordinary. Convinced, now, that the secret of Western wealth and power lay hidden in the writings of English social philosophers, he undertook a program of prodigious investigation and, later, translation. Herbert Spencer-whose A Study of Sociology he read in 1881-became his intellectual lodestar. He went on to Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Huxley, John Stuart Mill, and others, translating major works of each and interlarding them with copious commentary. With Professor Schwartz' complete command of this literature and his obvious appreciation of philosophic subtleties in both the Eastern and Western traditions, he takes us step by step through Yen's relentless search for the key to Western strength. His reflections center, of course, on social Darwinism, individualism, equality of opportunity, scientific social engineering, the essence of freedom-all considered as instrumental values contributing to the overarching Western achievement, in Yen's view, of releasing vast human intellectual and physical energy. Chinese cultural norms, by contrast, had never stirred the "energy of faculty" and China would remain weak, Yen concluded, until it learned to trigger these dormant vitalities. The great sages "shrank back from the actualization of men's potentialities, settling for peace, harmony, and order on a low level of human achievement." They had "succeeded in their attempt to freeze the process of evolution at a given stage of social equilibrium." Here, in the last analysis, was the crux of the difference between East and West.

Professor Schwartz describes the changing cast of Yen's declining years (to the end he was excluded from the inner circle of governmental authority) and concludes with a penetrating comment on the wider implications of his findings. The enduring influence of Yen's career on his own and the succeeding generation will have to be traced in other studies. Such studies and all future

work in modern Chinese intellectual history, however, will be deeply indebted to Professor Schwartz for so searching and lucid an analysis of this crucially important bridge-figure standing between the intellectual gropings of the expiring Ch'ing on the one hand and British liberalism on the other.

Professor Louis Hartz comments in the Introduction on the significance of this work for students of modern Western political and social thought.—Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., Bryn Mawr College.

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- 4. Wayne State University
- 5. Johns Hopkins University
- 6. University of Chicago
- 8. University of California, Berkeley
- 9. Queens College, New York
- 10. University of California, Santa Barbara
- 11. University of Wisconsin
- 12. Yale University
- 13. University of California, Davis
- 14. University of London
- 15. Stanford University

- 17. University of Texas
- 18. Queen's University, Ontario
- 19. Technion, Israel Institute of Technology
- 21. Fort Hays Kansas State College
- 22. University of California, Los Angeles
- 23. North Texas State University
- 24. Bowling Green University
- 25. West Virginia University
- 26. Victoria University of Wellington
- 27. Oklahoma State University
- 28. University of Florida
- 29. Boston University
- Postgraduate Center for Psychotherapy, New York City
- 31. University of Colorado

- Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico
- 35. Duke University
- 36. Cornell University
- 37. Florida State University
- 38. Mary Baldwin College
- 39. State University of Iowa
- 40. California Lutheran College
- 42. University of North Carolina
- 43. University of Nebraska
- 44. University of Cincinnati45. University of Hawaii
- 45. University of Hawan
- 46. University of Washington 47. Harvard University
- 48. University of Kentucky
- 49. University of Michigan

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

See How They Run: The Making of a Congressman. By Paul Allyn and Joseph Greene. (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964. Pp. xv, 176. \$4.50.)

Upon finishing this little book, the reader has the uncomfortable feeling that he has been hoodwinked. Surely See How They Run must be some kind of spoof-perhaps a satire on recent political novels like Convention. No serious effort could possibly be so bad. It must have been done tongue in cheek. The use of pseudonyms by the authors would tend to confirm this hypothesis. On the dust jacket, the reader is solemnly informed, "Like the characters in their book, Allyn and Greene are real, though their names are fictional," Yet somehow the gnawing suspicion persists that the authors are in earnest. The preachy pronouncements on congressional reform in the prologue lend credence to this idea. And further substantiation is provided by the thirty-two pages of appendices containing a brief history of the nominating process reprinted from a National Municipal League publication, excerpts from a Democratic Congressional Campaign Manual, and lengthy quotations from Wesberry v. Sanders (which has no discernible relevance since the story concerns electoral contests wholly within a single congressional district).

If the authors are playing it straight—as most of the evidence seems to indicate—they are the most unintentionally hilarious bunglers outside of the fictional character, Police Inspector Jacques Clouseau, so deftly portrayed by Peter Sellers in A Shot in the Dark. Indeed, the book reads as if written by the good inspector himself. Pompous phrases with vaguely ominous overtones and trite metaphors abound. In the prefatory materials, every effort is made to create an atmosphere of

suspense, as this excerpt from the jacket blurb exemplifies:

In real life, as in this book, the election of a Congressman is the final scene—the anticlimax, in fact—of a suspenseful drama that begins long before Election Day. It is a drama with a large supporting cast, including not only the voters, but also the Congressman-makers, whose work is largely done behind the scenes. This book takes you backstage to show you how this drama is produced.

Then the authors promptly proceed (on the second page of the prologue) to rob their "real-life drama" of any suspense whatsoever by divulging which candidate wins the congressional primary subsequently depicted.

Mere description is inadequate to convey the style in which this book is written. It must be savored to be fully appreciated, as in this representative passage:

Then the telephones jangle again and, as in a kaleidoscope, the room is alive with motion. Always there is tension; waiting for a phone to ring, waiting for the message, waiting for another ring.

No one feels the tension more than Walt Morin. Twenty-eight years old and an attorney for four years, he wore his patience and his shoe leather thin for the party, doing canvasses, distributing campaign literature, chauffeuring candidates and their aides, even going out for coffee and crullers to nourish the campaign strategists. (p. 5.)

Characterizing the substance of this book is less difficult. As the authors avow at the outset, "What you are about to read is not a novel." (p. ix.) Actually, it is a greatly elongated version of the "Mr. Smith Runs for Congress" mythical case study which is a standard ingredient of the chapter on political campaigns in most introductory textbooks on American government.

Firmly subscribing to the principle that any appraisal should be balanced, I searched every page for a redeeming feature. This proved to be a futile quest. But it did afford a plausible explanation of why the authors chose to remain anony-

mous: to protect their reputations as writers.— KENNETH KOFMEHL, Purdue University.

Voting Patterns in a Local Election. By Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler. (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott. 1964. Pp. 153. n.p.)

The local election examined is a bond issue election in Georgia's DeKalb County, a part of the Atlanta metropolitan area. Until recently a predominantly rural county, DeKalb has more than doubled its population since 1950. Moreover, the modern world has invaded the county in the form of considerable industrial growth. Yet it is no mere bedroom suburb. Many of its residents are employed in the county, and thousands of Atlanta residents "commute" to work in DeKalb.

This is a study of voting behavior in the tradition of the studies of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and the Michigan Survey Research Center. The authors call attention to the declining emphasis on ecological determinism in studies of presidential voting since socio-economic status may be less determinative of voter choice in some presidential elections than others. In recent studies of presidential elections, greater stress has been placed on the psychological basis of group or individual voting decisions, but this psychological emphasis has not yet appeared in studies of local elections. The authors seek to bring this approach to the study of a local election.

The authors chose an election in which the voters supported by a two-to-one majority a bond issue to finance a number of services which are standard for a rapidly urbanizing county, e.g., an incinerator plant, expanded library service, more fire stations, parks, water mains, sewers, and roads. The authors classify voting districts into high and low support districts, then subdivide each category into urban, suburban, and rural. Within two weeks after the election, interviews were conducted in each of these twelve voting districts with a systematic sample of respondents chosen from among persons who had actually voted. The total number of persons interviewed in DeKalb County was 136.

Income, perceived socio-economic status, and the 40-60 year age bracket appear to be the factors most closely associated with support or rejection of the bond issue. In terms of type of precinct, the greater support came from the suburban and urban areas, especially the suburban areas, and the greatest opposition came from the low-income, rural fringe. When asked their chief reason for supporting the bond issue, the "yes" voters referred to "progress" or asserted the need for a particular expanded public service. Opponents either denied the need for the services or registered a hostile attitude toward county government, often making dark references to graft.

Although support for the bond issue was highest among a socially homogeneous group of upperincome suburbanites, the authors insist that status did not directly effect the voting decision. Rather they feel that they have isolated

...strong and pervasive differences in outlook between two categories of county residents. On the one hand was found a willingness to face, and finance some solutions to, problems of growth and expanded service. This attitude is most clearly found in residents of ... suburban areas, in middle and high income categories, among professionels, large proprietors and managers, among relatively recent residents, and among persons forty to sixty years of age. An opposing viewpoint approaches county government ... as a necessary evil that should neither be changed nor trusted. This attitude stems fundamentally from an inability to accept the dramatic changes fostered by increasing industrialization, population expansion, and the spread of urban values. Consequently, its adherents have understandable apprehensions about the future and a reluctance to "invest" in a world they have not made and do not admire. (pp. 72-73)

"Civic responsibility" is the term applied to this willingness to face and finance solutions to the county's problems. This attitude was not inculcated by a propaganda campaign; communications could not alter voters' basic predispositions. Possibly this civic responsibility can be traced to the socialization process which transmits conceptions of community needs to particular social groups. The authors conclude cautiously that other studies would be necessary to reach a firm conclusion that civic responsibility could not emerge from a different kind of status group.—Donald S. Strong, University of Alabama.

Congress: The Sapless Branch. By Senator Joseph S. Clark. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. xviii, 268. \$4.95.)

It is heartening to note that members of the United States Congress suddenly have discovered the book-reading public. As in many other things, the late John F. Kennedy led the way. His Profiles in Courage was so successful-whether judged in literary, financial, or political terms-that many of his former colleagues on "The Hill" have been emboldened to try their hands, and the hands of their staff assistants, at writing books. A recent count by the New York Times Book Review found Senators Clark, Dodd, Douglas, Ervin, Fulbright, Goldwater, Hartke, Humphrey, Jackson, Javits, Keating, Kefauver, McCarthy, Muskie, Mundt, Pastore, Proxmire, Tower and Young either awaiting their first royalty checks or putting the final touches on book manuscripts. Members of the House, while fittingly less prolix than Senators, include quite a number of actual or fledgling authors: the late Clem Miller, John Brademas, Fred Smith, Jim Wright and others. "Publish or perish" seems to be becoming a rule of congressional as well as academic life.

Judging by Senator Joseph S. Clark's Congress: The Sapless Branch this extraordinary development is not likely to result in many books of value to political scientists. Perhaps it is unfair to judge this book, and those to follow, by such a standard: they are being written for a general, not a professional, audience. But it would be even more unfair to the readers of this Review to apply any other measure of value.

Senator Clark's book is a mixture of autobiography, institutional history, and polemics. On the first count, the book is a failure. Perhaps no incumbent politican should be expected to bare his soul to the world—and thereby to his constituents and future political rivals. But Senator Clark carries prudence to the point where almost nothing is revealed about Joseph S. Clark, the man. Political scientists interested in the recruitment and motivation of legislators will have to look elsewhere for data. Senator Clark is justly famous as a Senate maverick, but the book tells us nothing about why the chamber's methods for socializing new members did not work in his case.

As history, the book is trivial. We are told, in all seriousness, that "the assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed job holder forced Congressional action" on civil service reform. Over twenty years of history are dismissed with the words "Van Buren, Harrison, Tyler, Fillmore, Pierce and Buchanan abode their destined hours and went their way." We are informed that "... the so-called Jazz Age produced nothing from Congress save two really bad tariffs, a long inconclusive squabble over farm legislation and a long-delayed investigation of the Teapot Dome Scandals, as a result of which former Senator Albert B. Fall went to jail. . . . " These thumbnail clichés add little to anyone's historical perspective.

But Senator Clark's main objective is to argue the case for Congressional reform. Both his critique of Congress as it now operates and his prescriptions for it ills are familiar. Senator Clark pays our profession the ultimate compliment; he seems to have read what we have written on congressional reform and to have adopted much of it as his own. The Congress is not sufficiently responsive to the "will of the majority"; it is controlled by an "irresponsible," conservative, bi-partisan "Establishment"; it is a stumbling block to Presidents seeking to implement "progressive" national policies. Disciplined, programmatic, national parties; an end to the filibuster; a dilution of the seniority system; a revamped Rules Committee; a large increase in presidential influence over Congress; these and other well-worn reforms are needed if Congress is to adapt to the exigencies of the twentieth century.

This is not the place for a full scale discussion of the merits of this package of reforms. In recent years, however, many political scientists have become disenchanted with these one-time articles of faith. Senator Clark chooses to ignore this new mood in the scholarly literature on Congress. But the record of the 88th Congress is harder to overlook. During two years, the creaky and juiceless old branch on Capitol Hill has written an historic Civil Rights Act, a nuclear test ban treaty, a college construction act, land conservation and wilderness bills, a mass transit act, and an antipoverty program into the statute books. Viewed in the light of these major legislative accomplishments and the change in professional opinion, Senator Clark's charges and proposals seem strangely outdated.

But perhaps the fault is as much ours as his. While disillusionment with old "solutions" is rife among us, few political scientists are willing to embrace the congressional status quo. As a profession, we need to supply Senator Clark with new and better ammunition.—Donald R. Matthews, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

The Democrat's Dilemma. By Philip M. Crane. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Pp. xiv, 376, \$4.95.)

The implicit thesis of this book is that a small band of dedicated persons have captured control of the Democratic party. The overt thesis is that ideas first popularized by the Fabian Society in Great Britain and the Intercollegiate Socialist Society in the United States have become the new orthodoxy.

Either of these propositions would require better marshaled evidence than Mr. Crane presents before they could be fully accepted. He has written a history of socialist thought which barely mentions Karl Marx. He has written an account of the Democratic party which ignores the South except for a suggestion that C.O.P.E. is about to become the dominant political force in that region. His characterization of his protagonists is usually limited to hints that they are untrustworthy. (His total description of Graham Wallas: "Wallas was one of the most intemperate of the lot in his attitude toward religion. He left Highgate School, where he had been teaching, after refusing to lead the boys to chapel.") Mr. Crane often avoids even a hint of a consecutive time base, treating as one "simultaneous" event a number of occurrences which vary in significant respects. On pages 136 and 137, for example, he moves from 1927 to 1929 to 1925 to 1946 to 1948 to 1947 to 1955 to 1959 to 1960 to 1953 to 1960 to 1948 to 1925. And he reintroduces essentially the same data in slightly different guises in chapter after chapter.

Nonetheless, The Democrat's Dilemma is important to political scientists. Mr. Crane has gathered

considerable information about what the late V. O. Key called "a partisan cluster of interest groups." He discusses many organizations associated with the liberal-trade union coalition which constitutes the left wing of the Democratic party: the A.D.A., the Fund for the Republic, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Rand School of Social Science, the New School for Social Research, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., C.O.P.E., the I.L.G.W.U., and Group Research, Incorporated. Mr. Crane is an historian, and apparently unfamiliar with David Truman's concept of overlapping membership or Lester Milbrath's use of communication networks to analyze the activities of lobbyists. The political scientist, however, will find many hints of ways in which these concepts can be applied. Certainly the massive political activity of labor unions is one of the most important features of the current American political scene. They have some 4,000 publications of their own, and spent \$2,278,000 on the 1960 election. We do need to know more about their political

Another reason for the importance of this book is that it typifies feelings which had important political consequences in 1964. Philip Crane is a militant young conservative. He has a firm commitment to "the free enterprise system, national sovereignty, republican government, individual liberty, and natural rights." The Democrat's Dilemma apparently was written to sound an alarm about what he and his colleagues regard as a perilous threat to these values. It was industry resulting from such passionate belief which enabled militant conservatives to gain control of the Republican party. Hence a careful examination of their attitudes deserves a high place on the agenda of political science.—John H. Kessel, University of Washington.

Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence. By Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964, pp. xii, 164, \$1.95.)

Though the disciplines of Law and Political Science are old partners with overlapping interests, the roles of lawyers and bar groups in the political process have never been subjected to adequate empirical or theoretical analysis. Happily, this void in the literature is being filled and this volume represents an important—though modest—step in that direction. Professors Eulau and Sprague are concerned generally with the "consequences of a professional group's presence for the functioning of a political system." Using interviews carried out for The Legislative System project, the authors present some very interesting data on the comparative backgrounds and role perceptions of lawyers and non-lawyers in the

legislatures of New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio, and California.

They conclude that despite the numerical dominance of lawyers among occupational groups represented in these legislatures, lawyer-legislators do not differ significantly from non-lawyer-legislators in their perceptions of the legislative-political role or (as has been shown in other studies) in their actual role behavior. Where lawyers do seem to differ from non-lawyers in the legislative setting are in those few roles which emphasize lawyers' pre-political occupational skills and experiences. Or to put it differently, only where lawyer-legislators are recognized as such, rather than simply as legislators, can their perceptions and behavior be differentiated.

The strength and utility of this volume lies in the clear and cogent manner in which the information is presented. Though limited in scope and by the fact that they were originally collected for other purposes, the data shed new light on the potential influence of occupation on legislative role behavior. Furthermore, they should prove to be a viable stimulus to further hypothesis testing.

But perhaps even more interesting than these basic findings—and certainly likely to be more controversial—is the authors' attempt to generalize from their data to a middle range theory of the relationship between law and politics. If the road they traverse is the correct one, presumably it will also lead to explanations of other occupational impacts on legislative behavior.

Professors Eulau and Sprague accept the notion that the polity constitutes "an autonomous system of role relationships" which, in turn, makes for values and styles of behavior which distinguish the political from other social systems. And they further accept the influence of the political culture in socializing all practitioners regardless of background. But since they assume as well that occupational background is a critical determinant of political behavior, they must create a theoretical formulation which will both accept this notion and still account for data which does not demonstrate its applicability to lawyer-legislators.

Briefly, they hypothesize the existence of a convergence, or isomorphism, between the professions of law and politics. Members of these professions are said to acquire similar skills and to play roles which can be described as functionally equivalent and potentially interchangeable. Law and politics "are distinct and structurally independent of each other as professions," but similar in role structure because of a continuous process of convergent development. An isomorphism between the two professions is said to exist when professional membership ceases to differentiate any important aspect of behavior. As this takes place, and as the two professions become increas-

ingly integrated into the political system, "their members find opportunities that facilitate the actual interchange of institutional positions, careers, and professional roles more than is the case with other occupations."

The reason, therefore, why lawyer-legislators do not demonstrate identifiably distinct role perceptions is that the roles they must play as legislators do not differ greatly from those which they have learned as lawyers. Consequently, they bring few new perspectives and have little impact, as lawyers, on the legislative process.

It seems to me, however, that this theory is not entirely satisfactory for several reasons. It purports to explain similarities between lawyers and non-lawyer legislators by reference to a functional equivalence of occupational roles. But the data in the book do show some differences, and these are also explained, though in less theoretical terms (p. 121), on the basis of the prepolitical skills which lawyers bring with them to the legislature. This discrepancy could be rationalized by saying that it represents the difference between the perfect convergence of the model and the imperfect convergence in reality of law and politics. But this would detract, proportionately, from the explanatory power of the model.

A second criticism stems from this same discrepancy. In positing the functional (or role) equivalence of the professions of law and politics -which seems quite plausible—the authors may be overlooking the crucial fact that in many other respects the lawyer-politician is alienated from the dominant norms of the legal profession. There are, of course, very few available data on which to base a comparison of lawyers in and out of politics. But what information we have surely supports the notion that the gap between "professional" and "political" lawyers over adherence to the basic values and perspectives of the legal profession is important if not unbridgeable. Lawyers in a legislative setting are not likely to be prototypes of the "typical" lawyer; and within that setting there is a possibility that differences among lawyer legislators will be equally acute. If this is true, then the question of where these particular lawyers learned the appropriate roles becomes critical. It is possible that this learning came after they joined the legislature. If so, then they may be viewed in the same light as other occupational groups, whose members were socialized within the political culture.

The fact of the matter is that these data permit of several interpretations. The authors have chosen one, but others could and should be explored.—JOEL B. GROSSMAN, University of Wisconsin

The Cause is Mankind: A Liberal Program for Modern America. By The Hon. Hubert H.

HUMPHREY (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 172. \$4.95.)

Having appeared in 1964, this volume must be taken as a campaign tract. Nevertheless, it tends to reveal the man who is now Vice-President of the United States. It was composed by the publisher from recent speeches by the candidate on a wide variety of subjects. There is no point in reviewing all the subjects. Since the book sets out to be a personal, popular exposition of modern liberalism, the interesting question is whether a consistent theme can be found in it, to which this reviewer's answer is affirmative.

The latent theme is that "liberalism" rightly has two aspects, intellectual and spiritual. Its proper intellectual method is flexible and eclectic in service of the moral content, which is liberation and enlargement of human potential. These two sides of liberalism are applied to a number of subjects, beginning with some textbook historical perspective in which two current academic emphases appear: that Americans have never before had as much freedom as widely generalized as they presently enjoy; and that the early, relatively easy advent of popular government in America helped produce a flexible liberalism free of rigid European doctrines. Thus implicitly are liberalism and democracy related.

In this volume some topics seem to be covered dutifully, others enthusiastically. The more dutiful subjects are "groupy" and distributive—the "mixed economy" and the roles of public intervention and welfare expenditures; largeness and smallness in economic enterprise; the history, contributions, and deserts of labor, agriculture, and business. The enthusiasm shows most clearly in discussion of substantive policy to promote human potential, rather than of political, social, and economic structure. In domestic policy, this means civil rights, of course-and 1964 was an appropriate time for recognition of Humphrey's national role in this issue since 1948. But the enthusiasm now runs well beyond civil rights and social welfare legislation to newer problems and policies: technology and manpower, public aid to education and training, where economic and benevolent aspects seem to meet in complementary ways. Similarly, in foreign policy Humphrey's emphasis is on ways in which it deals directly with people: economic and technical aid, Public Law 480, world trade, and the Peace Corps -again merging commercial and humanitarian concerns in an apparently conscious adaptation of older liberalisms. Individual education and training-public investment in human resources-is the link relied upon.

Those who know the author—as many political scientists do—will recognize his consistent interests in this speech material, including his legisla-

tive sponsorship of many of the current policies on which he comments. In doctrine, the equation of liberalism and popular democracy, the emphasis on positive freedom and the spiritual-even spirited-side of liberalism are also characteristic. This is not a mind happy or content with antinomies; the man would obviously rather broaden opportunities than scan priorities. If there is still room for crabbed, academic concern with issues of planned priority, public accountability and private control in federal subsidy of education, investment in human development, and "manpower policy," Humphrey is likely to leave these for academic analysis and, as politician, press for action. This seems a better division of labor than one in which professors are activists and politicians are conservatives; though fortunately a rough balance seems to hold in both fields. And political scientists who read this book or know its author may reflect that group pluralism, governmental structure, legal rules all surround the core principle of individual opportunity and development which, if a vague political standard by itself, is perhaps the least dispensable standard of any and is Hubert Humphrey's usual, ebullient, instinctive concern.—Charles E. Gilbert. Swarthmore College.

The American South in the 1960's. Edited by Avery Leiserson. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964. Pp. xiii, 242. \$6.00.)

This symposium volume represents a quick reprinting, under auspices of a commercial publisher, of the 25th anniversary issue (February, 1964) of The Journal of Politics, to which has been added a brief introduction by Alexander Heard. As occurs frequently with symposia, the title is overlarge (nine of the eleven articles deal with orthodox political science subjects) and the contributions are uneven. The chief virtue of the work -and presumably this fulfills its major intent-is to provide guideposts or benchmarks in portraying dominant political trends in the South since 1948, the date of the last symposium on the South conducted by The Journal of Politics. Even so, several articles are rather surface surveys, and there is much overlap among chapters of attention and speculation on such themes as legislative reapportionment, greater Negro voting, and developing Republicanism. The volume is further weakened in its thematic strength by the absence of any chapter seeking to pull the main points together and in its reference utility by the omission of an index. (One might also question the difference of \$4.05 between the publisher's hardback and paperback editions, and deplore the substandard physical appearance of the book, especially as to skimpiness and unevenness of margins.) In sum, the symposium succeeds better in communicating the importance of current changes and ongoing continuity than it does in presenting an orderly, cumulative, or complementary appraisal of those factors.

In the lead chapter, Leslie W. Dunbar argues that race relations and attitudes comprise the critical elements in Southern change. In his view, the character of white response to the irreversible fact that the initiative in shaping race relationships has passed from white to Negro hands will determine the South's ability to align itself with the rest of the nation and yet to maintain a constructive regional identity as well.

Four chapters rely on a broad overview approach. O. Douglas Weeks sets forth the several paths of regional resistance in national politics and Samuel DuBois Cook treats, with some heat, of the activities of segregationist and conservative organizations in the post-1954 period. William H. Nicholls details both the extent to which the South has advanced economically the past few decades and the important gaps that remain between the Southern and non-Southern economies. Nicholls, too, is sensitive to the adverse impact on economic growth of regional, racial and rural traditions. George W. Spicer assesses the initiatory role played by federal judicial action. through a review of case law and subsequent patterns of compliance and resistance. While noting that delays in effectuating educational desegregation derive in part from the procedural and substantive weaknesses in the Supreme Court's implementation decree of 1955, he concludes by justifying judicial intervention in this area because of the marked unwillingness or incapacity of the more overtly political branches and levels of government to handle the problem.

Political overviews with a more particularized focus are offered by Malcolm E. Jewell and Coleman B. Ransone, Jr. In the former's chapter, state legislative patterns are examined, with special reference to the implications of reapportionment for urban, Negro, and Republican strength and to associated trends toward heightened legislative factionalism and conflict. Ransone concentrates on political factors sustaining gubernatorial power in the Southern states, but this once again leads to an emphasis on the nature of rejuvenated Republicanism and on the effects of the arousal of racial anxieties.

Two other chapters apply more specialized perspectives. Lawrence Logan Durisch advocates the necessity and desirability of far greater planning and development programs, within each of the Southern states and among them as a region. Robert H. Connery and Richard H. Leach present a case for preventive planning and advance action so that Southern metropolitan areas can develop effective governmental forms adequate to deal with their emerging needs before the latter become virtually unsolvable problems.

The two remaining chapters, involving competent narrower empirical investigations, are among the volume's stronger contributions. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro apply samplesurvey methods to uncover the image of the major parties held by Southern whites and Negroes. Their findings and commentary are helpful to the problem of assessing the durability and strength of Republicanism and in determining its group basis of support. Alfred Clubok, John De Grove, and Charles Farris report on several community situations where the Negro vote has been encouraged and manipulated by whites. Their discussion serves to remind that there need be no automatic correspondence between Negro possession of political rights and Negro securing of political benefits, a viewpoint often lost sight of in the current stress on the centrality of Negro suffrage for Negro advance. In much the same way the Matthews-Prothro article, in common with several of the other chapters, reminds that a strengthened presidential Republicanism need not be rapidly or inevitably reflected in competitive two-partyism at the state/local levels. The South is changing, but neither as swiftly nor as discontinuously with its past as conservatives fear or liberals hope.—Allan P. Sindler, Duke University.

The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo. By Sidney Lens. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1964. Pp. 256. \$5.00.)

The Futile Crusade is a sensible or a naive book, depending on whether you are a softboiled or a hardboiled egghead. The postwar stance of American foreign policy, Mr. Lens argues, has been almost exclusively negative. Not only have we failed to develop a positive alternative to communism, but we have sanctimoniously judged other nations on the basis of their outlook towards the Soviet bloc. The result has been a propping up of governments that pass our test of purity and the alienation of new states wishing to sit out the Cold War.

Most of what Mr. Lens has to say is familiar, much of it is consciously exaggerated, and hardly anything he says will persuade the reader who is not already convinced. While the book is chiefly about our problems in the international arena, the most revealing parts deal with the ideological schism besetting liberalism right here at home. Mr. Lens has a soft spot for the "soft" liberals: for those who are, in a word, soft on communism and other of the more ruthless regimes of our time. To understand is to excuse; and Mr. Lens is nothing if he is not understanding. We may be told that Sukarno and Nkrumah have quashed opposition parties, that Algeria and the United Arab Republic are a far cry from being democra-

cies, that Cuba and China are dictatorships pure and simple. Mr. Lens' reply is:

All of this is true for the most part, yet it is only an episodic phase of the world revolution. No revolutionary nation can fulfill its promise without great difficulties, without setbacks, without spurts and spasms. (p. 223)

And then follows the not surprising reminder that our own revolutionary birth was succeeded by a Shays Rebellion, Alien and Sedition Laws, and acts of disorder and oppression.

The real villains of this tract are not to be found on the right. If Dulles' policy was negative and unimaginative, that is what you might expect from a Republican with a Wall Street background. And if McCarthy and likeminded politicians capitalized on a nation's anxieties, this was simply the know-nothing mentality at work. Mr. Lens, rather, reserves his harshest criticism for the liberals who opted to take a hard line on communism. This was the trahison des clercs. Each must do his bit to help defend the Republic in time of crisis, and the egghead felt called upon to contribute his talents no less than others. The result was the erection of an intellectual apparatus justifying our foreign policy. Philosophers would discourse on the "nature of communism," showing it to be unsullied evil. Social scientists would demonstrate that Marxism was a tissue of logical errors: that America had a mixed economy, a pluralist polity, and more symphony orchestras than anyone else. Time magazine, in a cover-story featuring Jacques Barzun, welcomed the long-lost intellectual back into the fold.

If most liberals moved from a soft to a hard position there are two possible explanations. The first is that they were correct in their reassessment of communism and its threat to the West. The second is that they sensed that their own advancement and survival in a difficult era depended on accommodating to the dominant outlook of society. Mr. Lens does not explore either motives or motivations here. It would have been a fascinating exercise had he done so. For the scholar, at least in America, leads an exposed and dependent existence. Just how far this vulnerability affects his intellectual posture is a nice problem in the sociology of knowledge. But if being a liberal has been tolerable it is chiefly because most liberals have managed to make it clear that they are, in their own way, as hard-minded about communism as the Rotarians across town.

Can American policy be anything other than negative, reacting and responding to ever-arising communist initiatives? Mr. Lens has his eight-point program calling for aid to those new nations that show signs of encouraging land reform, setting up village development plans, and widening the ambit of allowable political dissent. But he also wants us to turn positive, and here lies the

real dilemma. For this raises the question as to whether we possess or can develop a social and ideological alternative to communism. It may well be that we are already middle-aged, that our time in history is running out, that the American model and American guidance can no longer excite the world. And if the national imagination is incapable of adjusting to the conditions Mr. Lens describes, then retaining our bases in an autocratic Spain may be a better hope than sending tractors to a doubtful Nigeria.—Andrew Hacker, Cornell University.

Herbert Hoover: A Biography. By EUGENE LYONS. (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. xii, 442. \$5.95.)

When Herbert Hoover accepting the Republican nomination for president observed, "I was Quaker born," he epitomized plenty. A native of Iowa he lost his father at six and his mother at nine and was then sent to Oregon to be reared by Quaker relatives. His was a rural rearing and schooling in a home somewhat short of poverty but always in the Republican tradition which was to be challenged in the very convention that nominated him and by a delegate soon to be nominated as his running mate. Still in his teens he went to the just emerging Stanford University entering the day it opened. He was soon the leader of the "Barbs" determined to prevent domination of the campus by the Greek-letter fraternities.

Under the intellectual stimulus of Dr. Branner, Herbert made the most of his opportunity to develop his aptitude for geology. During summers he built up a tough physique on geological surveys. Graduating from Stanford in 1893 he set out hunting a job with forty dollars in his pocket which were soon spent. Then, as he put it in his Memoirs, he "experienced the bottom levels of despair... the ceaseless tramping and ceaseless refusal of employment." One day he tried at the office of Louis Janin, a famous California mining expert, to hear that the only vacancy was for a typist, whereupon Hoover astonished Janin with "I can type. When do I start?"

Before long Janin, having discovered what a remarkable secretary he had, and utilizing a bold ruse, got the young man an assignment with an English mining company which took Hoover through London offices to the wilds of Australia and a miserable mining camp manned by carousing dregs of humanity. Here Hoover's extraordinary competence promptly won him the designation "The Chief." Next he was in Peking, China with his particular colony there soon surrounded by the Boxer rebels. It fell to this competent Quaker virtually to take charge as commander-inchief until American marines came to the rescue. He was frequently under fire and once rescued a

Chinese child in the line of fire. But when the episode had been written up and submitted to him for possible publication he tore the paper to shreds with the comment, "I'm no Teddy Roosevelt."

By successive assignments Hoover's far-flung mining activities became almost world-wide in range. Then came the sudden outbreak of World War I with tens of thousands of panic stricken American tourists unable to get home. Now back in London Hoover took charge and soon had the refugees home.

Next, Belgian relief fell to him and with perfect self confidence he assumed personally an obligation for twelve million dollars for food. Then followed the relief of civilians within the belligerent countries with the military in each desperately bent on crushing the enemy regardless of starving civilians. But with an astonishing command of the vast problem, and using the threat of arousing the wrath of neutrals. Hoover bent the stubborn will of ministers, monarchs, and dictators to his determination to relieve the starving. Now he became the Great Humanitarian as ancient parks, streets and squares were renamed for him. Returning home President Harding appointed Hoover Secretary of Commerce, whereupon that department was suddenly invigorated as it had never been. Without lifting his hand he was nominated by the Republican party and elected President. Here was something else to challenge this man of extraordinary talents. As President he learned to find occasional emotional relief from frustrations with such quips as, when a grand daughter was born, "Thank God she won't have to be confirmed by the Senate." Such is the essence of the story of Herbert Hoover as told in his biography by Eugene Lyons.

At this point rises a question: Why is it that whoever has read the three volumes of Hoover's Memoirs and later reads the book under review, gets to wondering whether the Hoover of this biography can be the man who wrote the Memoirs. What transformed the great liberal of the biography, the humanitarian sympathetic with labor and the less fortunate everywhere into a ludicrous symbol of conservatism and reaction? Of course he had the misfortune to have proclaimed his hopes for an approaching end of poverty before his dream was to be shattered by the Great Depression. His phobia of what came to be called creeping socialism unquestionably hampered his adaptation of available means for alleviating the overwhelming distress. Later the New Deal's encroachments on private enterprise he held due to European ideologies not the pressure of events. The Great Depression itself he held due to "the European economic hurricane that swept over us" rather than stock market speculation. Had he been reelected "we would quickly have overcome the depression." He could break out in wrath as when a favorite project of his was opposed by a "conglomeration of professors and intellectuals tainted with mixed socialist, fascist, and antique ideas." Capitalism, assumed to be the ultimate in economic evolution, would apparently be standing firm when Gabriel trumpets forth the Judgment Day.

But why does this fascinating biography skip such human foibles? Doubtless because it is, after all, a literary work of art in the sense that art is an idealized representation of nature. There are those who will long for citation of authorities and an index.—Wilfred E. Binkley, Ohio Northern University.

The Politics of Water in Arizona. By Dean E. Mann. (University of Arizona Press, 1963. Pp. xviii, 317. \$6.50.)

Problems of water scarcity have been acute in the Southwest since the region was first settled. They are becoming of increasing concern in many other parts of the nation.

This study describes the water problems of Arizona, the most arid of the fifty states. Its seventeen chapters present in detail how water policies developed from territorial days until today. As in all arid states, government was deeply involved in water problems. But the author makes it clear that long range planning and long range decisions have proved politically impossible. Thus Arizona has not faced up to the inherent limitations on growth and development resulting from water scarcity. Federal programs have generally been tied to local interests and have been dominated by local goals, so that while providing some immediate assistance, federal action has not contributed significantly to the solution of longer range problems.

For those seeking rationality in public decisionmaking, Dean Mann's study will prove disillusioning. The record is one of frequent rejection of technical advice and of ready response to short range pressures serving local or individual advantage. From the time of settlement, the pattern of government action has been a patch work of decisions stimulated by self-seeking or misinformed groups. And the result, as the author suggests, leaves one uneasy as to the future.

Clearly, water problems will continue to be sources of tension and conflict in Arizona, and this book by Dean Mann will be a basic source of information wherever and whenever Arizona water problems are considered. It would probably be useful to have similar studies for every state.

But it is perhaps unfortunate that the author has not added more to our understanding of politics and the political process as it operates in the allocation of scarce resources. Except in war, our political system has not generally had to face resource allocation problems. Only in the arid regions in the handling of water has the system had to deal on a continuing basis with resource allocation problems. Yet there is reason to expect that allocation problems (initially with respect to water) will become of increasing political significance throughout the nation. It would have been useful, therefore, if the author had gone beyond description to suggest some hypotheses and generalizations with respect to the way in which our political system is likely to respond in this relatively unfamiliar but increasingly important context.—Norman Wengert, Wayne State University.

The States Rights Debate: Antifederalism and the Constitution. By Alpheus Thomas Mason (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. 206. Cloth—\$5.00.)

The publication at this time of Professor Mason's excellent book on the roots of American federalism is fortunate, for the tempo of states rights arguments has grown recently and political scientists around the world are taking a new look at federalism. This study extends from America's late colonial period to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. As one follows the arguments of Hamilton, Wilson, Lee, Jefferson, Martin, Seabury, Madison-particularly Madison-and others, one is impressed with the current application of much of what was written a long time ago. This is of particular interest since the Constitution was only then coming into being and the drive for and against the adoption of a Bill of Rights had become a basic issue. At that time many persons had hoped that the incorporation of these rights into the Constitution would set a limit to a potentially dangerous central government; others feared that these proposed amendments, if adopted, might seriously limit the powers of a necessarily strong national government. Thus, these words of early American statesmen, with few exceptions, touch on many issues that confront the United States in the 1960's.

Eighteenth century constitutional theory with regard to federal-state relations had about as little to do with what was written and spoken concerning states rights as has that which is being written and spoken concerning that subject today. Rather, men were guided by personal opinions and personal interests. In fact, very few eighteenth century voices of national importance argued for the assimilation of state powers into an all-powerful national government merely because they considered unitary government to be theoretically preferred. There are possibly about as many—or rather as few—who have defended the proposition that the great centers of power in a

plural nation should be vested in the constituent units merely because they believe that the result would be particularly conducive to life, liberty, and a widespread pursuit of happiness. Madison, the principal participant in this early drama, was no more consistent in the furtherance of a particular dogma than were many of his contemporaries. He took a number of stands that at times conflicted with views he expressed at other times. He was guided to ideas and doctrines, or from them, by a deep concern with political events and developments that either encouraged or disturbed him. His concern was not always a naked theory but, rather, a practical goal.

This stimulating volume does not deal specifically with all the implications that readers (in addition to this reviewer) might read into it. But Professor Mason, in the valuable essays with which he opens each chapter, has made clear how early political leaders reacted to constitutional problems of federalism that were far more difficult for them to solve than those that we face today, and he has indicated how they discovered which side of any issue was "right." These arguments of the 1780's that set forth the "proper" role of the state within the Union bear serious consideration today, and they sound surprisingly familiar. If this be so, there is satisfaction in such a discovery, for federalism is not dying; it may change a bit from time to time, but it survives. - Charles AIKIN, University of California (Berkeley).

The Republican Party, 1854-1964. By George H. Mayer. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 563, \$9.75.)

The author has written a political history of one of the two major parties in the United States. His major sources are the papers of the principal actors, and biographies and Ph.D dissertations. It tells more than anyone reasonably could want to know about the Republican Party, how it came to be, the strategies of the protagonists in the varving nominating conventions down through 1960, and how successive Republican administrations have fared. It is well researched (if one accepts a tendency to overlook the literature of political science) and, excepting for a few sections which deal with complicated issues such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act in more detail than may seem relevant to the book's major purpose, it is felicitously written and enjoyably informative. In all, it is a nostalgic experience for anyone who has read in the history of American politics, and a handy compendium of facts for him who must prepare lectures in the field.

The author's emphasis upon collections of private papers as sources, coupled, perhaps, with his candidly avowed position that the "golden age" of politics "reached its peak in the decade of the '50's when the Republican party was born, and expired with the nineteenth century" has led him to slight if not disparage the Republican politics of the 1950's and 60's.

He is not interested so much in analysis or hypotheses, as in presenting facts. If any general formulation of a theory concerning parties in the United States is to be found, it is implicit for the most part. There is, for example the comment on Dewey: "As titular leader of the minority, Dewey had avoided interference in congressional politics. although the tactics of the legislative leaders distressed him." Well, what of this notion of congressional and presidential parties, not to mention the concept of titular leadership? How do the two relate (that is, if there is but one "party" in Congress for each presidential party)? These questions are but suggestive of a large number which the reader will find himself wishing to put to the author.

Professor Mayer offers a prefatory admonition against "the misleading impression that the party exists nine months in every four years to conduct a campaign for the Presidency." In what sense or how many senses does it exist? There are tidbits of information on the history of party organization, which might be taken to be one form in which those amorphous entities called parties are objectified, but this serves merely to whet the reader's appetite.—Cornelius P. Cotter, Wichita State University.

Power and Politics in Labor Legislation. By Allan K. McAdams. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 346. \$7.50.)

This book, which is a refurbished doctoral dissertation in economics, details the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. In a field as sharply polarized as labor-management relations where the very concept of neutrality is suspect, the author achieves a remarkable degree of objectivity. It would be hard to tell which side he favors. Utilizing research techniques highly suitable to his subject (interviewing and examination of documents), he succeeded in getting generous access to key sources. Moreover, by his discreet manner of handling the information gathered, he displays commendable responsibility for preserving "the great reservoir of good will toward scholars" upon which such access depends.

Regrettably, the author flaws his otherwise admirable work by adopting an inappropriate thesis and by not devoting sufficient attention to the internal power structures of Congress. In his own words, "The major thesis of the study is that the public, in ways which were sometimes direct and sometimes indirect, decided the outcome of the battle over labor reform legislation in 1959." As blunt an instrument as even an aroused public

opinion could hardly determine the particulars of as complicated a measure as the Landrum-Griffin Act. To his credit, the author disavows this interpretation as his narrative unfolds. However, to make the point that a widespread demand for strong labor legislation helped some of the contending forces would hardly warrant such an elaborate presentation. And focusing on this proposition inevitably restricts his perception and analysis of the factors involved. Fortunately, he does not steadfastly pursue his central theme. Throughout the study he includes materials which do not substantiate and sometimes contradict his thesis-but without making explicit the significance of such considerations to the extent necessary for a balanced exposition of how this measure came into being.

In particular, he fails to recognize the factor most responsible for the form in which the legislation finally emerged: the formal and informal power structures within Congress. Although he touches on the role of the over-all leaders in the two chambers, he does not adequately consider the nature of their authority and function. He does not go into the intricate network of crisscrossing obligations, commitments, and understandings among the majority and minority leaders, chairmen and ranking minority members of the legislative, rules, and appropriations committees, and the deans of the state delegations upon which their power depends. Hence, he does not appreciate the impact on Speaker Rayburn's ability to control the Rules Committee when Halleck displaced Martin as Minority Leader in the House. And he only hints at the erosion of the Speaker's power resulting from Rayburn's diminishing vigor.

While the author accords at least a cursory treatment to the conservative coalition in the House, he does not even mention the corresponding liberal Democratic bloc loosely organized under the direction of Representatives Lee Metcalf of Montana and Frank Thompson of New Jersey. He describes the difference in attitude toward remedial legislation between the Teamsters and AFL-CIO Unions. He notes that some Democratic Congressmen like James Roosevelt of California were spokesmen for the Teamsters while others favored the AFL-CIO. But he does not discuss the interaction between these considerations and the factional diversity and competition for leadership among the liberal House Democrats. This omission is ironic for two reasons. The author frequently describes the activities of Metcalf and Thompson without any apparent awareness of the larger group for which they were concurrently supplying leadership. And passage of the Landrum-Griffin Bill precipitated greater formalization of that body as the House Democratic Study Group. Likewise, the author does not develop fully enough the sharp cleavages between the presidential and congressional wings of the Democratic Party, the disability the Democrats suffered from having a substantial element of their numerical superiority consist of freshman Congressmen from marginal districts, and other significant aspects of the total picture.

As a consequence, this book is not the definitive biography of the Landrum-Griffin Act. That work remains to be done by someone with a more comprehensive conceptual framework than was brought to this study. Meanwhile, it will serve as a useful but fragmentary reference on labormanagement relations in the congressional arena.—Kenneth Kofmehl, Purdue University.

Men At the Top: A Study in Community Power. By Robert Presthus. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. 362. \$2.95, paper; \$8.50 cloth.)

This book is a well-designed and executed comparative study of community power structure. The author selected two small communities in upstate New York (designated as Edgewood and Riverview, populations 8500 and 6000) whose similarities and differences suggested their suitability for fruitful comparative study. His findings are significant not only for students of community power, but also for those concerned with normative theories of pluralism and democracy.

Presthus' point of departure is an analysis of the findings and perspectives of earlier studies, focusing particularly on the familiar divergence of pluralist and elitist interpretations of community power. Sociological studies, he notes, have often followed the inspiration of the Lynds' pioneering studies, and have found an elitist power structure in which political power is derivative from economic power. Political scientists, on the other hand, tend to be "romantically pluralistic" in their assumptions, and have discovered power structures characterized by competition, fragmentation, and fluidity. These differences are viewed as perhaps stemming from different interpretations of rather similar findings, rather than from widely contrasting data. Recent political science studies are cited as having preserved the term "pluralism" while narrowing its operational meaning. This book is an attempt to explore and clarify this issue by careful comparison of two communities to determine the various social conditions associated with varying degrees of elitism or pluralism in community leadership structure.

Methodologically, Presthus analyzes the advantages and limitations of decisional and reputational methods of identifying community leadership structures. Although operating from an

initial preference for a decisional approach, both methods were utilized in the study, and both are viewed as useful.

A few of the book's major findings may be briefly noted. A power structure of about eighty citizens was found in the two communities. In one case (Edgewood) economic leaders were found to be somewhat more powerful than political leaders; in the other (Riverview) political leaders were not only more powerful but "exercised relatively greater initiative and control" than did Edgewood's economic leaders. In both instances, however, a degree of meaningful competition between political and economic elites was found. These findings are related to various characteristics of the two communities.

Significant differences were found between the two communities with respect to the extent of pluralism in decision-making patterns. Pluralism was measured by membership in voluntary organizations, extent of individual participation in major decisions, and extent of organizational participation in decisions. The most striking result of these measurements was, in both communities, the surprisingly low rate of organizational participation in major decisions. Presthus suggests that "the role of voluntary organizations in ensuring pluralist forms of political decision-making has been somewhat overstated." The communities also differ with respect to the degree of consensus on basic community values. A higher degree of consensus appears to be correlated with a significantly higher rate of individual participation in major decisions. However, in Riverview, with more political competition and a higher rate of voter participation in local elections (conditions presumably associated with pluralism), decisionmaking is more concentrated and there is more rank-and-file apathy than in Edgewood.

Comparing his findings with those of other studies, Presthus finds a marked tendency toward elitism in small cities. Further, he feels pluralism is likely to continue to decline because of the "tendency for the major conditions of community decision-making to be set down by higher levels of government and industry."

This excellent book is rich in empirical findings which are highly suggestive. Theoretically, it serves to bridge some of the gaps between divergent interpretations. It should not be too long until a sufficiently wide range of community studies are available for a broad systematic analysis of the nature and conditions of varying degrees of elitism or pluralism in various community situations. This book is an important contribution to this development.

The book's concern with the normative problems of democratic theory is also noteworthy. It becomes increasingly clear in reading this book that some of the conventional pluralistic rules of thumb will not quite do. Anyone concerned with the problems of implementing democratic values in mass society will find an effective statement of some of these problems here.—Forbes Hays, Carleton College.

Race and Radicalism: The NAACP And The Communist Party in Conflict. By WILSON RECORD. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 237. \$5.00)

The Communist Party has been unsuccessful in making headway among American Negroes. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, at least up to more recent movements in the 60's, has commanded the respect of most Negroes and the so-called white power structure as the civil rights organization. Since the Communist party had designs in the civil rights area, it was only natural that the Party would have to weaken or obliterate altogether the strong position of the NAACP. And this is what the CPUSA set out to do. However, the NAACP has proven an insurmountable barrier to Communist designs. With broad powers vested in a watchful middle-class Board of Directors (Executive Board), the Communists have found it virtually impossible to infiltrate the Association at the national level; and whenever and wherever they have done so in the more open though nationallyoriented local branches, the leadership elite (Executive Board) of the NAACP has the power and has actually taken corrective and precautionary measures. (See esp. pp. 142-146.)

This, in part, is what Professor Wilson Record tells us in his Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and The Communist Party in Conflict. The study is an outgrowth of a much larger research project on the problem of Communism in American life. Professor Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University was project director, and he in turn commissioned several studies—one of which was the activities of Communists in pressure and opinion-forming groups. This sub-project was supervised by Professor John P. Roche of Brandeis University, and it was he who asked Professor Record to study the interaction between the CPUSA and the NAACP.

Record describes how the NAACP has refused to waver in pursuing its prime civil rights objective. Whether by infiltration, establishing competing organizations, staging sympathy demonstrations, and directing propaganda attacks, the CPUSA has met with little or no success in penetrating the Association or in gaining Negro support outside of it. This despite the fact that the Negro was an obvious and ripe target for the CPUSA. Here was a group for "which the American dream held least luster," and which occupied "the lowest rung on the American ladder." (p. 1)

But even so, the Negro has fundamentally been and remains an American first.

As an historical account of a relatively neglected area of civil rights research, Record's study is a useful contribution. Nevertheless, this kind of study, at least as Record does it, is not without shortcomings. One need which the book does not fill is for a serious study of this timely topic, such as that done by Record, that would appeal to a wider audience—an audience whose mind is filled with all sorts of notions, prejudices, and views on the subject. To have Professor Record's findings read by many of these persons, (and many need to read them) would be of immeasurable educational and informational value. Unfortunately, however, the laborious (albeit praiseworthy) chronological detailing of events (chs. 2-7), is apt to discourage all but the most dedicated reader.

Moreover, as Professor Record acknowledges, (p. xiii), much of the material, especially up to 1951, can be found both in his earlier book, The Negro and the Communist Party (University of North Carolina Press, 1951), and several journal articles. To the scholar, it thus becomes repetitious, although perhaps convenient. What the present study does is to update the earlier work, focusing somewhat more sharply on relations between the NAACP and the CPUSA. In addition, the concluding chapter considers the impact of more recent civil rights organizations (e.g., Congress of Racial Equality) on the NAACP, but here, the author attempts to do too much. While the impact of these newer civil rights organizations is relevant, the manner in which Record handles the subject is too summary a treatment of "tempting possibilities" (p. 219) not discussed in the study itself.

In another vein, it is quite apparent and even understandable that Professor Record is sympathetic to the NAACP and to the cause it espouses. This, however, should not lead him to view civil rights issues outside their proper political perspective. (Record is a sociologist at Sacramento State College.) Note, for example, the following passage: (pp. 230-31)

And what is ahead for the NAACP? In a sense the Association is working itself out of a job. Since its single purpose is to eliminate racial barriers, once the barriers are down there will be no raison d'etre for an NAACP; indeed, once that glorious day arrives, continued organization of Negroes qua Negroes would negate what the Association has been striving for from the beginning. Negroes who dislike aspects of American society other than racial discrimination will continue to work through protest movements other than the NAACP; and it is to be hoped that with racialism behind and full acceptance won, there will come a relaxation on the part of Negroes about books and plays and movies which portray a colored man in an unfavorable light, for sophistication in such matters is the ultimate gauge of mature citizenship and full equality.

If and when that "glorious day arrives," one can rest assured that the NAACP and similar organizations will still be in business. There will be a continued need for such organizations in the sense that all groups (e.g. Catholics, Jews) require defenses (and offenses) in the ordinary play of politics between and among competing interests. What will perhaps happen is that the NAACP will reorient its program in keeping with social change and political realities.

In addition, it is idealistic to exhort any group to accept unfavorable portrayals of those identified with the group. Professor Record misses the point. What Negroes (and others) object to is stereotyped and one-dimensional character portrayals. Aside from the admittedly subjective criticism that certain kinds of unfavorable portrayals might not in themselves be worthy of "sophistication," Record's view could be criticized on the more practical grounds that such portrayals might do serious harm to the very cause which organizations such as the NAACP have fought to attain. Even more established groups, such as Catholics and Jews, maintain active organizations not only to promote their views on matters of special concern, but also to guard against threats to their social station and self-esteem. This does not indicate a lack of "sophistication..." -LUCIUS J. BARKER, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

States in Crisis, Politics in Ten American States, 1950-1962. By James Reichley and Others. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 264. \$6.00.)

The journalist is the indispensable ally of any serious student of government and not least of scholars concerned with state politics. State house reporters not only supply otherwise unobtainable information from scattered parts of the nation, they also frequently provide suggestive interpretations of the events they report. Deeper analysis is, however, rarely produced by reporters whose training and daily routine discourage more intensive work. Even when freed from deadline pressures journalists usually fail to achieve perspective and rigorous analysis, as they have demonstrated in countless hackneyed volumes of journalistic commentary. There are exceptions, of course, but James Reichley's States in Crisis is not one of them. In contrast with his earlier work on Philadelphia politics (The Art of Government) the present work falls flat.

In his concluding chapters Reichley raises a number of interesting questions about the viability of American state government, but unfortunately the remainder of the book, written by ten other journalists about their states, presented Reichley with little relevant information to serve as the basis for substantial generalizations. This is a pity for the states they discussed (Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,

New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia) are an interesting cross section that might have demonstrated something about state government trends had they received more than a journalistic once-over-lightly. Instead there is the customary retelling of well-known (or rightly forgotten) election campaign tales, of regional and factional cleavages, of adroit and inept political maneuvering. They write clearly and briskly, although in some cases with annoying cuteness, but they do not have a great deal to say.

The book is also studded with dubious inferences of the kind expected in undergraduate term papers. Who knows whether Nebraska voters "seemed to suspect that [Fred Seaton] had been too long in Washington to understand their problems?" Who can say whether labor union aid to Senator Barry Goldwater's opponent in 1958 "produced a strong reaction in the Senator's favor"? One looks in vain for more evidence in support of the assertion that the "friends and neighbors" influence is strong in Nebraska, for more information about legislative politics in almost all the states discussed, and especially for a more sophisticated treatment of such subjects as ethnic rivalries and money in politics, both of which are discussed at some length but quite superficially. Surely we do not need to be introduced to the "balanced-ticket" as if it were a new development. Also a good many political scientists who have been in and out of state government and politics for years will question the assertion that the "alliance between intellectuals and the Democrats has had little carry over at the state or local levels."

One saving grace of the book is that its authors, unlike most journalists, do not set themselves up as holier than any politician to lecture from lofty objectivity. But that and the occasional nugget of useful information the book contains do not explain to me why the University of North Carolina ever decided to launch this collection on the engulfing tide of print. (The book lacks an index, but that hardly matters in this case.)—DUANE LOCKARD, Princeton University.

Congressman from Mississippi: An Autobiography. By Frank E. Smith. (New York, Pantheon Books, 1964. Pp. ix, 338. \$5.95.)

Years ago, when I read Frank Smith's book, The Yazoo, in the Rivers of America series, I warned him that he could be forgiven for his views or his votes but not for writing a book; even John Sharp Williams, with his Heidelberg degree, never risked that. In his second volume, after a competent 12-year career of courage marked by his leadership for truth in textile labeling, public works, foreign aid, international understanding, training for the displaced, security for the men-

tally retarded and many other laws, he becomes the first deep South congressman to expose the arrogance of Rules and Appropriations Committees, the idiocy of rewarding renegades, the vicious race-baiting of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, and to make clear why he felt economic improvement is a better approach to racial progress than frontal attacks for non-local consumption. When he went to Washington I sent word that he would make the best possible congressman he could and still stay in congress. He did.

My wife, whose people have also been around Greenwood over a century, was teaching in the junior college he attended, and I have worked with him in campaigns and conventions, as well as on the other side sometimes, and share with him an Ole Miss history degree, legislative service, including the authorship of the free textbook and poll tax bills he mentions, opinions on Lamar. Collins and Sillers and know the part he played in nominating Stevenson and Kennedy. But I am unable to credit that the Delta is full of honest. public spirited leaders, in spite of Stephen Bailev. that lanterns on the levee were ever lit except in imagination, that Greenville is more liberal than Tupelo, that racists run northeast Mississippi. that we have an inferior state government, or that those who talk out of the other side of their mouths when they cross the Smith and Wesson line are liberals. The progress of Mississippi has been achieved mainly by men who have had slight support in the Delta. To state that no Mississippian since John Sharp Williams has affected national destiny is to ignore the Mississippian who was responsible for the passage of the Civil Rights plank at the 1948 convention which gave President Harry S. Truman his narrow margin for reelection.

A sharp dissent must be entered to his remark that "Few voices for racial justice have come from the church," for more ministers have been forced to leave the state than members of any other profession, and churches, with all their inadequacies, have shown more courage and sheltered more men of good will than colleges, schools, press, bar, business or government. The mentally underprivileged who bomb and burn churches realize on which side the churches are. As Rabbi Klein told a Clarksdale club, "You lost this fight in 1776, not in 1865."

This is a tremendous story of how a boy whose father was murdered by a Negro for no reason at all, and whose family was not in the top Delta bracket, has been able to carry on his father's faith that hate is not the answer, and to achieve much. He laments that he has not done more, but he could not have done much more and survived that long. The nation is using the ability as a TVA director of this statesman whom Edward Morgan called "A breath of fresh air" and to

whom a constituent confided, "You are for the United States," and may well find in the future higher use for a man who is what Woodrow Wilson liked to call himself, "An emancipated Southerner."—CHARLES GRANVILLE HAMILTON, Booneville, Mississippi.

Religion and Politics in America. By Murray S. Stedman, Jr. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. Pp. vii, 168. \$4.95).

Religion and Politics in America is more a primer of activities and problems of churches in politics than an interpretation of fundamental questions concerning the relationship of religion to power in the United States. Anyone looking for an analysis of how seventeenth century Protestant principles shaped American political institutions and style will be disappointed. There is no discussion of how the revolutionary Protestant principle that each man is free to experience God and express the meaning of that experience without the intervention of higher authorities helped promote highly individualistic, market-organized politics. There is no exploration of the relationship of Protestant witness to utopianism in politics at home and messianism in foreign policies abroad. Nor has Stedman tried to show the theological or sociological bases for Protestant-Catholic division over such issues as censorship, divorce, and aid to parochial schools.

Stedman has mainly written about "people, as organized into churches, and the relationships between such organizations and the political process." A solid compendium of facts are here: the rates of growth of different churches; their organizational approach to politics; the various methods used by churches to pressure the government; and the different ways in which religious interests affect local politics.

Although facts and issues are introduced throughout the book, they are not usually analyzed in any depth. In the book's closing paragraph, Stedman suggests that "the churches in America are in a unique position to speak to the public interest" due to the widely held assumption that they are selfless and disinterested; but the validity of that assumption is left unexplored. Religion does affect the party affiliations of Americans, as Stedman states, but there is very little discussion of when, how, and who. While it is true that "sociological studies of American voters have indicated that there is a definite correlation between religious affiliation and party preference," it has also been shown repeatedly how closely that relationship is tied to class factors except in the case of Jews.

The absence of discussion in depth means that any single chapter of *Religion and Politics in America* reads like a good introduction to a longer study on the subject of the chapter. The very

brevity of the book keeps the author from asking the whys about the facts he presents: why did the Scotch Presbyterians on the frontier become prohibitionists? Why did Methodism catch fire in the United States? Why did Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Jehovah Witnesses spring from American soil? Why does practically every American politician insist that God is on our side? Why was Kennedy able to overcome the prejudices of many voters? Why did the Irish Catholic influence in McCarthyism fail to reappear in the radical right wing of today? These are questions to be probed in a longer, deeper book on Religion and Politics in America.

Stedman should be praised for the concise, clearly written catalog of issues and facts he has offered, but he should also be chided for an overly ambitious title and for failing to make explicit the limitations of his effort. He also should have been reminded to look at a variety of important books which would have helped him put more meat on his own, including Robert Brown's, The Spirit of Protestantism and John H. Fenton's, The Catholic Vote.—LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, Brandeis University.

Leadership in a Small Town. By AARON WILDAY-SKY. (Totawa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. 388. \$7.50).

Welcome to Oberlin, where "the roads to influence . . . are more than one; elites and non-elites can travel them, and the toll can be paid with energy and initiative as well as wealth." (p. 214.) Wildavsky's Oberlin is a reaffirmation of small town democracy, stressing the fragmentation of power, the influence of elected public officials, and the role of public opinion and elections in determining public policy. Alienation, mass manipulation, economic elites, power pyramids, the X family, etc., do not really exist in small town America. Who rules in Oberlin?—"different small groups of interested and active citizens in different issue areas with some overlap, if any, by public officials, and occasional intervention by a larger number of people at the polls." (p. 8)

How does Wildavsky arrive at these conclusions? Undergraduate students at Oberlin College "were asked to prepare case studies of events going on at the time." (p. vii) From these sources, together with the author's own observations, a portrait of leadership in Oberlin was constructed. Eleven case studies are presented in all, including such diverse issues and events as the determination of municipal water rates, the passage of a fair housing ordinance, the division of United Appeal funds, and a municipal election. Wildavsky's statement of a research design which can resolve once and for all the dispute between elite and pluralist theory is deceptively simple:

"If (after examing these issues) we find that the same partici-

pants exercise leadership in nearly all significant areas of decision, that they agree, and that they are not responsible to the electorate, we conclude that a power elite rules in Oberlin... if we find that the leaders vary from one issue to the other, with such overlap as there is between issue areas concentrated largely in the hands of public officials, we must conclude that there is a pluralist system of rule in Oberlin." (p. 253)

Armed with this criteria for affirming a pluralist political structure, Wildavsky examines his case studies and finds that no single group in Oberlin dominated decision-making in every issue area. It was true that "the number of citizens and outside participants who exercise leadership in most cases is an infinitesimal part of the community" (p. 265), but no person or group exerted leadership in all issue areas. To the extent that overlap among leaders in issue areas existed, this overlap involved public officials-the city manager, the mayor, and city councilmen-who owed their positions directly or indirectly "to expressions of the democratic process through a free ballot with universal sufferage." (p. 265) In addition to public officials, leadership was exercised by individual "specialists," who confined their participation to one or two issue areas, and "meteors," who were selfselected activists participating sporadically in one or two issue areas. Leaders very often competed among themselves and did not appear united by any common interest. Persons exercising leadership were of somewhat higher social status than the rest of the community, but it was not status or wealth which distinguished leaders from nonleaders. What are leaders? "Leaders are activists. More precisely they are the most active activists." (p. 282) Anyone could become a leader simply by becoming active; power was available for the asking. Inequalities of influence among individuals was a product of differing levels of interest and activity in public affairs.

The elitist-pluralist debate continues to characterize dialogues about community power. No doubt many readers of Wildavsky's book will not share his optimism about pluralism, competition, fluidity, access, and equality in community politics. Wildavsky's definition of elitism is so restrictive and his definition of pluralism so inclusive, that he is foreordained to conclude that any set of power relationships he discovered in Oberlin were pluralist. He assumes elitism to exist only if the same individuals possess exclusive control over every public decision, and only if there is no competition among persons exercising influence. Now it is doubtful if there was ever a society in which there was no competition among influentials, or in which specialists in particular issue areas did not influence the outcome of public decisions. Wildavsky's concept of elitism comes dangerously close to being made of straw. His concept of pluralism is so all-inclusive that it possesses little analytical usefulness. The author himself demonstrates this when he proclaims on the basis of his Oberlin findings that all cities in America are pluralist.

Wildavsky might have made a greater contribution to the study of community power if, instead of treating elitism and pluralism as a dichotomous variable, he had thought of these constructs as ideal types at separate ends of a continuum. He then could have identified those characteristics of Oberlin politics which resembled each of these constructs, and in this way Oberlin could have been located along an elitist-pluralist continuum. No doubt decision-making in Oberlin is quite pluralist, yet Wildavsky's material includes some important resemblances to the elitist construct. The total number of identified influentials was an extremely small proportion of the adult population, "cliques" were identified whose influence rested upon control of economic resources as well as political skill, and apathy if not alienation was widespread in the community. Wildavsky appears to reject the elitist view that power is a set of social relationships among people which persists over time and which is related to the social structure of the community. He views power in Oberlin as an unstructured, transient thing. Each public decision involves different individuals who establish for a fleeting moment a set of relationships among themselves. After each decision these relationships disappear to be replaced by a different set of relationships among different people when the next public decision must be made. This comes very close to saving that power as structure does not exist. It suggests that power is an attribute of individuals, more specifically their interest and activity level. Yet the reader suspects that even in Oberlin decisions are not sui generis, that some power relations persist over time, and that they are somehow related to the social structure of the community. Wildavsky might have written an even better book had he not rejected altogether the contributions to community analysis which elite theory can make. THOMAS R. DYE, University of Georgia.

Interest Groups in American Society. By HARMON ZEIGLER. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Pp. viii, 343. \$6.75.)

The author's command of the relevant literature and his ability to handle it with sophistication are impressive. However, the book is hard to judge largely because of the kind of book that it is: a text which moves on a much higher level than do most textbooks.

Zeigler asserts at the outset that the "intention of group theory has been misinterpreted, on occasion, as the establishment of a broad-gauge theory of the political process..." (p. iii) Group theory properly understood assumes rather that "public policy is formed as a result of competing

pressures..." (p. iv) and that organized groups furnish only a part of the pressures. The problem is to develop a "theory of the role of organized groups in politics." (p. iv) More specific questions are when do organized groups become part of the pressures on a decision and why do some groups have more success than their rivals.

Before attacking the main problem and the questions it implies Zeigler re-enforces and extends his interpretation of the received theory. He observes, "Surely it would be useless to maintain that all public policy is a result of the conflict of organized 'pressure groups,'" (p.24) and accepts the view that opposing conceptions of the public interest when held by involved officials are factors affecting decisions just as are the activities of 'pressure groups.' I take it that Zeigler feels these propositions are a part of group theory interpreted fairly. Zeigler also endorses the criticism of group theory that "it does not provide an accurate account of the role of institutions and environmental conditions," (p. 25) particularly political culture. Finally, he feels the most serious misunderstanding concerning group theory involves the notion of interest. Zeigler's position is that group interests are not co-extensive with organized associations. Some members of an organization may not endorse its stated aims while other persons not members of the organization may agree with its aims. The author summarizes by saying, "Public policy, then, is formed as a result of the interplay of group interests. We are concerned with the role that organized 'pressure groups' play in this process." (p. 30)

Succeeding sections of the book describe the political culture and the institutional context within which these groups move. A set of three chapters deal with business, labor, and agriculture. The discussion of labor is headed, "Organized Labor: Protest and Defeat," a title which reflects the author's judgment concerning the group's power. This judgement is based, at least, in part on a comparison of labor's goals with the content of public policy, a technique for measuring influence which is open to criticism as the author concedes and which is certainly crude at best. The last chapters deal with the place of organized groups in the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes. As one might expect, these chapters are a bit uneven, a condition which reflects the state of the literature and no failure of the author.

I have three comments. First, Zeigler's interpretation of received interest group theory is informed and skillful but debatable. For instance, it may be argued that group theorists did intend a "broad-gauge theory" and certainly more than a theory concerning the activity of organized groups in politics. Again it may be argued that the received theory does involve the contention that

the sum total of pressures on a policy decision is furnished by groups, organized and unorganized, official and unofficial, and that competing conceptions of the public interest are "superstructure" (to borrow a term from another theory). If Truman is taken as the text, it is a mistake to say that group theorists have neglected the impact of institutions on the group struggle. However, an argument concerning the true meanings of the group theorists or their interpreters is not inviting nor is it crucial since Zeigler's discussion of group theorists is for the purpose of setting forth his own starting point; and this leads to the second comment.

His version of group theory is a very modest one. Such modesty may be an adornment in a textbook, but this is theoretical retreat rather than advance. Instead of a limited number of explanatory statements employing more or less theoretical terms we are left with something much more diffuse and also less extensive. One may guess that the residue is called theory by virtue of the strange uses to which we put the term theory (in this book review as elsewhere). Perhaps group theory has collapsed and in reality this is all that is left. However, it seems that despite our alleged familiarity with what may be one of the few legitimate offspring of our discipline that there has been great willingness to destroy by criticism and little willingness to reformulate and use with rigor, in other words, to develop.

My last comment is that Zeigler's survey of the literature concerning the activities of organized pressure groups is on a mature level in that the complexities are retained. It is done with clarity and in good order, qualities which serve to recommend the text for use.—Thomas A. Flinn, Oberlin College.

The Constitution of the United States. By Edward Dumbauld. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 502. \$9.95.)

A clause-by-clause history and annotation of the Constitution by the United States judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States. By William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. vii, 498. \$7.95.)

A textbook describing the American legislative process topically with illustrations from both Congress and the state legislatures.

America Votes, Vol. 5, 1962. Ed. By RICHARD M. Scammon. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. Pp. 456. \$12.50.)

The fifth volume of this useful and carefully done series contains state, city, county and ward break-downs of voting for President, governor, senator, and representative in 1960 and 1962.

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Franklin L. Burdette University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Uncommon Commoner: A Study of Sir Alec Douglas-Home. By John Dickie. (London and New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 224. \$4.95.)

The nomination of Barry Goldwater in 1964 (and of Wendell Willkie in 1940, if one follows the accounts in the left-wing journals of 1940 rather than the mythology of 1964) incited a reaction not wholly enthusiastic on the part of a certain segment of the press and public. But such a reaction is by no means confined to this country. When Harold Macmillan, rather than R. A. Butler, was made Prime Minister (and, for practical purposes, Leader of the Conservative Party) by Queen Elizabeth, the action of the Queen was denounced by some critics as "unconstitutional." And the selection of Sir Alec Douglas-Home was greeted by a letter to The Guardian which included the statement "After having read the shocking news that Lord Home has become Prime Minister, I have decided to renounce my British citizenship" (page xiii). The Leader of the Labour Party announced that "a week of intrigues has produced a result based on family and hereditary connections. The leader has emerged—an elegant anachronism" (page xiv). Denunciations of the undemocratic method of selection of Leader of the Conservative Party might provoke a rebuttal along the lines of Diana Spearman's suggestion that if the pre-1832 electoral system in England had been as bad as its critics suggested, it would never, in 1831, have elected a House of Commons which was favorable, in the majority, to the Reform Bill.

Mr. Dickie has written a careful and scholarly, but quite readable, brief study of the Prime Minister. Although friendly to the Prime Minister, he is not undiscriminating or uncritical. Personal touches abound, including theories as to the pronunication of the Prime Minister's name; an account of a lawsuit worthy of Perry Mason involving a salmon-catching dog (The Earl of Tankerville versus a Dog, the property of the Earl of Home), in which judgement "was given in favour of the dog" (page 5); and parliamentary repartee which includes the story of the politician who said that "all that was wrong with South Africa was that it wanted a better class of settler and a better water supply," and received the comment (perhaps

from an Irishman) that that was all that was wrong with Hell (page 31). Elected in the Conservative landslide of 1931, Lord Dunglass (as he then was) introduced himself as one of the Clydesiders, (a group of firebrands of I. L. P. leanings), but parted with them soon on the issue of Scottish Home Rule. Easily returned in the election of 1935, he was shortly thereafter made Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour. In a memorable debate in July, 1936, he was severely heckled by his fellow-Clydesiders for his defense of the means test, shortly after which he became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Neville Chamberlain, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer in Stanley Baldwin's government. It is Mr. Dickie's opinion that identification of Lord Dunglass with the Chamberlain policy of appeasement is considerably overdone, in that it fails to note (a) the comparative lack of influence in decision-making of most Parliamentary Private Secretaries at that time and (b) the peculiar aloofness of Chamberlain. Lord Dunglass's main political function was to act as a two-way channel of communication between Chamberlain and the rank-and-file members of the House, and this function continued after Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937. However, believers in guilt by association point out that it was Lord Dunglass who received from Lord Halifax and delivered to Chamberlain, via Sir John Simon, the Munich invitation; and that he accompanied Chamberlain to Munich, where he was shocked by the bad manners of Hitler and the vulgar vanity of Goering. In the days after Munich and in the early days of world War II it was Lord Dunglass's painful duty to report to the Prime Minister the increasing extent of anti-Chamberlain feeling. Mr. Dickie feels that "the legacy of his three years with Chamberlain . . . was twofold" (page 56), that appearement as a policy could never succeed unless undertaken from a position of strength, and that the extent of pacifist sentiment in Great Britain was one of Hitler's greatest assets.

With the replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill, Lord Dunglass intended to join his regiment; but this was prevented by the development of spinal tuberculosis, which prompted his famous quip that his doctors had put backbone into a politician. He was able to speak in parlia-

ment in May 1944, and his remarks on foreign policy reflected his extensive reading during his illness. He came close to suggesting that Churchill's attitude toward Russia and the Polish Question was dangerously similar to Chamberlain's attitude toward Germany and the Czechoslovak Question. A year later, when the wartime coalition was dissolved, he became, for the "caretaker" period, one of the two Joint Paliamentary Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office, going out of office as Labour came in. and losing his seat in the House to Tom Steele after a campaign in which his expressions of doubt as to the future of Russian policy were extensively interpreted as "pro-Nazi" sentiments. It may be noted that Quintin Hogg, later Lord Hailsham, had expressed the same sentiments earlier in replying to his remarks in the House. In 1950 Lord Dunglass defeated Tom Steele in a very close contest. Before the election of 1951 the death of his father had removed him from the House of Commons. The formation of the new Churchill Government in October resulted in his appointment to the new position of Minister of State for Scotland, Churchill having apparently forgotten that the new Minister was the "rebel" back-bencher who had criticized the handling of the Polish Question. The story of his appointment first to the Commonwealth Office by Eden and to the Foreign Office by Macmillan is better known, and the leadership crisis and his unexpected elevation to the premiership is well recounted by Mr. Dickie.

One slight error will probably cause offense to patriotic North Carolinians and to the D. A. R. Guilford Court House in North Carolina is referred to as "Guildford." But this is the exception that proves the rule in a work notable for its accuracy in other respects.—Arthur B. Dugan, The University of the South.

Town Councillors: A Study of Barking. By ANTHONY M. REES AND TREVOR SMITH. (London: The Acton Society Trust. 1964. Pp. 117. 7/6.)

This brief monograph helps to fill a gap in our knowledge of British grass roots politics. It is a study in the social background, recruitment, working conditions and work perceptions of thirty councillors and aldermen of a London suburb of 72,000 persons, overwhelming working-class in character. The authors disclaim that the Borough is typical, in fact in the recent reorganization of London government Barking will join with industrial Dagenham to form a new Borough.

Some of the study's finding are as follows: Only twenty percent of councillors are native of the Borough, a minority are gainfully employed in Barking. Although it has been noted elsewhere that "the average age of councillors is a great deal too high," seventy percent of Barking's councillors belong to the 40-59 age group. Women councillors are on the average older than their male colleagues. The schooling of the majority of Barking Council was brief and limited in scope; none went to university. Twenty-three councillors, however, underwent some part time further education.

As might be expected middle-class representation on the Council exceeds by three times the middle-class composition of Barking. Unskilled manual occupations are clearly underrepresented. As regards social mobility of councillors, half have ascended socially. The authors conclude that as a group councillors "tend to be rather more mobile in an upward direction than their neighbors and this is as true of Labour members as of their opponents." In spite of this councillors have a rather low estimate of their prestige. Half of the councillors think that they do not enjoy high status in the eyes of their fellow citizens; none of them mention entering politics for the sake of future political advancement, and yet, because of the character of their political involvement they find a gratifying excitement in their Council work. While their reasons for entering politics are many, early political socialization and the impact of the Second World War loom large. The most striking fact about political recruitment in Barking is the shortage of candidates. In a working-class community, Conservatives find it even more difficult to locate candidates willing to stand for the Council and thus have been forced to recruit outside the community. At the same time Conservative candidates can get on the Council more quickly than their Labour colleagues. However, four-fifths of the councillors either experienced no delay in becoming candidates or did not want to stand initially. The relative ease of election is indicated by the fact that twenty of the thirty councillors had never been unsuccessful at the polls.

Perhaps the weakest section of the monograph is the one concerning the working conditions of the councillors. On the one hand the institutional dimensions and the functions of the Council are not clearly spelled out. On the other hand it is difficult to accept the evaluation on the part of the councillors and officers that "the line between policy-making and policy-execution was pretty firmly drawn. Certainly it does not seem that 'the officers make the policy' . . . " Nothing presented in this monograph confirms or denies the assertion. The form of the councillors' workdistribution of committee places, length of work, specialization, errand-running-all these are discussed at length. But the substance of the councillors' work, the character of their decisions and how the decision-making process works entirely escapes the reader. What is missing then in this study is the description of a policy-making process, such as the one provided by Birch in his account of rate-making proceedings in Glossop. The inclusion of the interview schedule would also have been helpful.—Lucian C. Marquis, *University of Oregon*.

The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754-1790. By Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke. (New York, For the History of Parliament Trust by the Oxford University Press, 1964. 3 vol.)

Two volumes of a proposed History of Parliament 1439–1509 in three volumes by Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood appeared in 1936 and 1938. Revival of the scheme on a different plan was made possible in 1951 by annual parliamentary grants to the Trustees. Emphasis is on the House of Commons and the treatment of the individual members.

The first volume of the present work contains (1) the ambitious "Introductory survey," by John Brooke, who completed the work of the late Sir Lewis Namier, and (2) the accounts of the individual constituencies in the period. The second and third volumes are devoted to the biographies (in alphabetical order) of the members. All of the accounts are centered upon the parliamentary activity of the members, and represent the latest and best information. All biographical sketches are signed. Some of the biographies are quite brief owing to the lack of personal information and the meagerness of the official record. The remark that "there is no record of his having spoken in the House," or its equivalent, occurs not infrequently, and may at times be a mute comment on the meager official record.

Progress of this *History* in capable hands based at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London, will do much (1) to augment the frustratingly meager official record, (2) probably to point the way to the eventual editing of the official record with any possible additions, and (3) possibly to stimulate the present keepers of the record to exercise the greatest of care.—James B. Childs, *Library of Congress*.

Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. By Wolfgang Abendroth. (Frankfurt am Main: Stimme-Verlag 1964. Pp. 144. DM 9.80.)

The book under review is the postscript to a number of publications that have appeared at the centennial of the Allgemeinen Deutschen Arbeitervereins (the forerunner of the Social Democratic Party of Germany). The author, Professor of Political Science at the University of Marburg,

knows much about the SPD, having been a member of the party's Executive Committee until 1962

Since Franz Mehring's monumental Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie little has been published in terms of a coherent over-all survey of the party. This seems to have prompted Abendroth to have written the modest volume the way he did. His aim is to present a critical survey of the historical process in which the SPD grew from a small faction to become, in terms of members and votes, the largest political organization in Germany. A chronological approach is employed, and sources are excellently annotated. The appendix contains the major party programs from Eisenach (1869) to Bad Godesberg (1959).

In the preface, Abendroth professes that the basic premises underlying his political philosophy have been formed by Marx, Engels, and Mehring. The author asserts that democracy in Germany can be made safe only if the advanced capitalistic order is replaced by a socialistic one—a change that must be brought about by the employees. The turn, however, can be accomplished only if the workers and left-wing intellectuals follow the pattern set by the Founding Fathers of German Social Democracy.

Abendroth is highly critical of the SPD development. He states that in all great crises of German history the party was the object of rather than the shaping subject of events. Abendroth exemplifies by pointing out that the SPD, and the Internationale, capitulated during the first few days of World War I in front of the "patriotic" giddiness of national suicide. Second, he maintains that during the last years of the Weimar Republic the SPD did not understand the intensity of the national crisis and was not able to analyze the viciousness of Nazism. In following an acquiescent attitude, the party, slowly but surely, sacrificed the rights and the living standard of the German workers. The author alludes that the SPD should have taken up the united front offer of the Communists and, with the KPD, should have taken a definite stand to defend German democracy. Instead, the Social Democrats helped to reduce themselves to political impotency.

Turning to the post-World War II period, Abendroth criticizes the party for its illusionary attitude toward the re-capitalization of West German society. When the federal elections of 1949 and 1953 did not bring the anticipated electoral success, the leaders of the SPD, according to the author, lost their patience and ran after the mass mood attracted by the Wirtschaftswunder. The Bad Godesberg Program cast out the last remnants of socialist aims from the

party platform and negated for good the method of the conscious development of the working class consciousness against the oligarchic capital. Finally, in 1960 the SPD withdrew its *Deutschland-Plan* and therewith, according to Abendroth, denied its former foreign and national political theses.

However, the author holds out some hope for the party. He thinks that the course of the party could still be changed, be it through the influence of the unions, be it through intra-party discussions or through outside pressures extended by renegade formations. These forces, individually or together, could move the party back toward the aims set forth by the Founding Fathers. Only then would the SPD again become the true representative of the employees.

Professor Abendroth has written a profound and thought-provoking volume. Unfortunately, it is much too concentrated. While the reviewer shares a few misgivings with the author about the radical changes introduced at Bad Godesberg (1959) and Hannover (1960), there are, nevertheless, two important pragmatic questions that Abendroth does not discuss in his survey of the contemporary SPD. First, do the majority of German Social Democrats subscribe to the kind of SPD advocated by the author? Second, could this socialist force become a viable party to win federal elections in affluent West Germany? The answers are obviously no.—Herbert R. Winter, Rhode Island College.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany. By Douglas A. Chalmers. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 258. \$6.50.)

Beginning with Robert Michels' Political Parties (1911), the SPD, grandfather of all socialist parties, has been continental Europe's most intensively studied democratic party. The pre-Weimar period has been admirably treated in Carl Schorske's German Social Democracy 1905-1917 (1955) and A. Joseph Berlau's The German Social Democratic Party 1914-1921 (1949). Now we also have thorough and highly commendable works by Hunt on the Weimar period and by Chalmers on the party in the Bonn Republic. The Hunt and Chalmers studies complement one another particularly well in that each traces one of the two stages of the party's now complete ideological shift away from Marxist socialism and concentrates upon analyzing the consequences for the party's organization.

The SPD's developmental tendencies of the Weimar years continued into the Bonn Republic, but through the 1950's the demand for revitalization became intensified. If the party were to challenge the CDU successfully, it would have to

expand beyond its class base, to respond to increasing pluralization in German society by redefining its representational role, and to respond to changes in the political culture by playing down its socialist ideology. At Bad Godesberg in 1959 the SPD adopted a program without an ideology, a program which repudiated traditional doctrine in expressing acceptance of the church, military defense, and private property.

Chalmers gives us a history of this transformation from an ideologically-oriented to a problemoriented party, reviewing carefully the choices facing the SPD and the changes in the role of its social theory in policy decisions, in ensuring party unity, and in mobilizing public support. Thereafter he focuses, in four chapters, on the implications of the new approach for: (1) policy-making; (2) leadership recruitment; (3) party organization; and (4) public relations. The consequences of attempting to broaden appeal include the fragmenting of policy-making channels as communications are established with a wide range of groups and the passing over of organization men of the Kurt Schumacher or Erich Ollenhauer type in selecting as leader the more widely popular Willy Brandt.

Because "As an idea, a philosophy, and a social movement, socialism in Germany is no longer represented by a political party" (p. 228), the SPD is vastly changed in character. Its transformation is away from the pattern of responsiveness noted by Michels and Hunt and away from the defining characteristics of Duverger's "mass party"; though its public image has not yet greatly changed, it is gaining the flexibility and the style of the "electoral party."—Sven Groennings, Indiana University.

Der Kampf um den Bau Des Mittellandkanals. By Hannelore Horn. (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, Staat und Politik, vol. 6, 1964. Pp. 145.)

Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublic Deutschland. vol. 1: Leitfaden, vol. 2: Quellenbuch. By Thomas Ellwein. (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1963. Pp. 630.

Dr. Hannelore Horn analyzes in an absorbing manner the political processes of early Wilhelminian Prussia with regard to a particular episode: the successful mutilation by the Agrarian interests of the Prussian government's bill for the building of a much needed waterway connecting the Rhein and the Elbe, Western and Eastern Germany. Dr. Horn studies first the Landbund's penetration of the Conservatives, which until then were an old style Honoratioren party, thus molding this political group for their own purposes. She then shows how the lop-sided political

arrangements of the Prussian constitutional system were utilized by the Landbund to hold up the government project until all features which might have remotely threatened their own interests were eliminated. In point of fact the canal project was completed only during the Weimar Republic. Of course, the Landbund could not have carried through its operation so successfully if the other parts of the reigning establishment had not known that any serious slight to the Landbund would endanger major navy and tariff bills in the Reichstag.

In this fight the mutual dependency of the bureaucracy, government, industry, and Eastern estate owners made it impossible for the Prussian government to continue its attempt to penalize the so-called Kanalrebellen (those governmental officials who were at the same time members of the Prussian diet and who in spite of all political pressures had cast their vote for the Landbund and against the government). At a time when Germany's parliaments are again filled with public officials of all sorts—c. 23% in the Bundestag, sometimes more than double their number in the individual diets-Dr. Horn's painstaking inquiry is illuminating, both in terms of the motivations, multiple pressures, and elements of choice influencing the Kanalrebellen and their personal careers, and in terms of the impact of the specific political decision. Today, due to the greater variety of interests with which officials are concerned, their role in German politics, both on the federal and on the state levels is more diversified and complicated. But analysis of this relatively simple model of the dual role played by officials as representatives both of state power and of agrarian interests, shows how, in the special German context, close attention to the interaction of official and group behavior may produce happy results.

Thomas Ellwein's governmental system of the Federal Republic may officially be dubbed a text for the student of German political science, but behind this modest exercise emerges an interesting and balanced analysis of the German establishment of the last fifteen years. The author shows institutional changes throughout these years, develops a typology of attitudes frequently found in important groups, and in a tentative way tries to develop yardsticks of measurement for political behavior. He asks whether a new political style has been developed and, with a side glance at the Spiegel affair, hesitates to give an unqualified answer. With this question mark, he shifts his attention to problems of administration and justice, the interrelation between Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat to which, quite in keeping with the German public's primary interests, he devotes a good share of his book. Here the leitmotif is found in his remark that when political parties are defaulting, the bureaucracy is in danger of losing its instrumental character and of assuming instead responsibility for determining community goals. In the context of the author's thinking this remark is neither trite nor almost obvious, for it is tied to the search for a non-formalistic meaning of today's Rechtsstaat. What is evident throughout this volume, and gives it its striking character, is the contrast between the quasi-permanent installation of the people in the Wirtschaftswunder and their very provisional moral and intellectual allegiance towards the institutions of the Federal Republic.

The second volume contains a 250 page source book which includes constitutional, political, administrative, and financial material, and at the same time highlights the problems of a federal structure eternally on the move. The choice of materials should not only help the German student, but will be equally beneficial to the American teacher of German affairs. It would have been still more helpful if the author had reprinted some excerpts from the Bundestag question period of the days in November 1962 when the Spiegel affair blew up in the face of Messrs. Adenauer, Strauss, and Hoecherl.—Otto Kirchheimer Columbia University.

German Social Democracy 1918-1933. BY RICHARD N. HUNT. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 292. \$7.50.)

The title of this volume in the "Yale Historical Publications" is somewhat misleading. Professor Hunt's study concerns itself primarily with the internal history of the Social Democratic movement during the Weimar Republic rather than with the SPD's part in the first German republic. However, in the reviewer's opinion this narrower focus is by no means a shortcoming, for not only has the broader issue been previously discussed in innumerable other studies, but we have heretofore lacked a first-rate history of the Weimar SPD-in English as well as in German. This we now have with Hunt's fine analysis of the development of the party organization, the sociological character of the movement, its relationship with the trade unions and its internecine factional struggles. Subsequent studies may add further details and correct some errors, but no one will hereafter be able to deal with the politics of Weimar Germany or the history of the SPD without reference to this excellent volume.

Professor Hunt's indebtedness to the late Sigmund Neumann—which he acknowledges in his preface—is evident throughout the book. He follows Neumann's 1932 analysis of the SPD as a party unable to deal with the challenge of severe crisis conditions in the political system, largely because a conservative leadership was unwilling

or unable to change its accustomed ways and could not be displaced by more qualified men. Perhaps these did not exist, as some of the old leaders have claimed in their defense, and perhaps conditions external to the SPD made it impossible for the embattled party to make drastic changes in its leadership and structure by the time the party and the Republic faced the mortal danger of Nazism. No doubt, the rivalry of the Communist party and the animosity of anti-democratic elements among the German elites immensely complicated the task of the SPD-factors which Hunt fails to appreciate adequately. Nonetheless, as this study shows in unsurpassed detail, in the last analysis the nature of its leadership explains why the party did not show greater vigor in the last vears of Weimar Germany.

Following a rather conventional review of the history of the SPD before 1918, Hunt describes the formal and sociological structure of the SPD organization and its leadership, accentuating the factors which led the movement to become increasingly inert and its top leadership ever more fearful of risking what it had gained and ever more hostile to challenges to its authority. As the selfproclaimed defenders of the democratic system these leaders could ill afford the self-satisfied lethargy which characterized so many of them, for the Republic needed dynamic defenders, not only in the Nineteen Thirties but throughout its history. Indeed, as Hunt indicates, these leaders faithfully reflected the mood of most of the lesser functionaries and probably most party members. But we are confronted by the question whether the task of a democratic party leadership is limited to expressing the sentiments of its supporters, or whether greater initiative on the part of democratic leaders necessarily violates the terms of their mandate. By relying perhaps too heavily on rather one-sided interpretations by various leftwing critics of the SPD leaders, Hunt tends to overstate his case and resorts at times to rather unfair characterizations of men and deed. But his diagnosis remains, for all that, fundamentally true.

To the reader who is fairly familiar with the general subject, Hunt's discussion of the relationship between SPD and the trade unions and of the left-wing criticism of the party leaders adds little that is new. Here his contribution is one of synthesis, of putting these factors in perspective in terms of the larger problems characterizing the internal development of the party. The author's sympathies lie clearly with the critics; a more balanced view might have done the SPD leaders more justice. And while his grasp of the left-wing intra-party opposition is, on the whole, adequate, that of the so-called "Young Turks" leaves something to be desired. The assertion that men like

Schumacher, Mierendorf, Haubach, and Leber held in common "nationalist and demagogic inclinations" similar to those of Déat in France and Mosley in Britair is a gross exaggeration.

The potential analytical pitfalls of historicism are illuminated by Hunt's concluding observations. His analysis of the Weimar SPD leads him to conclude that if the present Social Democratic party achieves more "active grass-roots participation" and "succeeds in drinking at the fountain of youth," the earlier oligarchic trend might be reversed, the stagnation that characterized the Weimar era shaken off, and the party might at last obtain a majority at the polls. However, Bonn Germany is not the Weimar Germany. The political context of the present confronts the SPD with problems which cannot be solved by avoiding the sins of the fathers, but require a far more radical transformation of the party in the light of entirely different environmental conditions.—Lewis J. Edinger, Washington University.

Germany, The Wall and Berlin: Internal Politics During an International Crisis. By John W. Keller. (New York: Vantage Press, 1964. Pp. 437. \$4.95.)

What explains the political stability of West Germany in the face of one potentially explosive international confrontation after another? Only the major episodes affecting Berlin need be mentioned-the blockade, the uprising in East Germany in 1953. Khruschchev's ultimatums, the Wall—to evoke the seemingly convulsive environment in which the political institutions of the Federal Republic have developed. The combination of a persistently superheated international situation on one side and a low-temperature domestic politics on the other is so incongruous as to suggest a paradox: the very fluidity and capriciousness of its international environment have helped to produce the viscosity of West German internal politics.

John W. Keller does not himself suggest this conclusion in his chronicle of West German public and partisan reaction to the building of the Berlin Wall, but his detailed documentation of this most recent episode tends to confirm it as a description of West German politics at each major crisis of the last fifteen years. In this case there is almost a litmus-paper quality about the situation since the sealing-off of the Berlin border occurred in the midst of a parliamentary election campaign that both major parties and the Free Democrats, as the "third" party, regarded as extraordinarily important in giving the party system a form that it might bear for some time to come. All three leading parties had more or less severe internal problems that were working themselves out as the campaign progressed: the Christian Democrats

were split over the future role of Konrad Adenauer, the Social Democrats faced a test of their new "bourgeois" program and tactics, and the Free Democrats had to consider the possibility that the trend toward a two-party system would culminate this time in their exclusion from federal politics.

Despite such high stakes the campaign muddled along listlessly until the events of August 13. Five weeks later, when the votes were counted, it was clear that whatever portentous developments might have come had the campaign not been enlivened by the building of the wall, the new reality was an old one. Coalition government was again a necessity, and the respective gains and losses suffered and enjoyed by the three parties were ambiguous enough in size and direction to make generalization little better than speculation. In only one case were the omens clear. Adenauer. by portraying the situation as a mere "preliminary crisis" and refusing to go to Berlin-whether he did so intentionally or out of necessity can be ignored here-and by his cavalier reference in a public rally on August 14 to the question of Willy Brandt's illegitimate birth, gave his opponents in the CDU the leverage they needed to begin taking the final steps that would dislodge him from the Government.

Questions of stability, of the political style of the Bonn parties, and other aspects of the new political culture that has grown up since 1945 can be examined with profit by studying the West German political system under stress. Professor Keller touches some of these questions, but only in passing, and he makes only a minimal effort at relating his own work to the pertinent literature. He records the events, political reactions, and policy statements of the period from August through December of 1961 in great detail, but his treatment cannot be described as a study. It is, literally, a laying-out of the record, and it is based not on documentary sources but largely on gleanings from the popular press. Of reporting there is a great deal, of analysis very little. No themes are accented sufficiently to warrant mentioning here. Page after page is filled with verbatim reporting or paraphrasing from German and other newspapers. It seems unlikely that this tortuous path through the tabloids and the more respectable press will be trod again. The book may have a certain value as a documentation, but even this must be qualified by the failure to provide the scholar with that small convenience he finds so helpful, an index.—Donald R. Reich, Oberlin College.

Westdeutschland, 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verwaltungseinrichtungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzungszonen Teil II. Einzelne Verwaltungs Zweige: Wirtschaft, Marshallplan, Statistik. By Walter Vogel. (Boppard am Rhein, Harold Boldt Verlag, 1964, Pp. xvi, 433. Schriften des Bundesarchivs 12. DM 28.)

After the plan of an extremely detailed government organization manual, the author at the Bundesarchiv of the German Federal Republic in Coblenz is engaged in furnishing an exact statement of the intricate and little known structure of German zonal and bizonal authorities in the three Western Zones of Germany between the conclusion of the War in 1945 and their absorption in the German Federal Republic by 1950. Mention of the military government authorities is made only insofar as relates to the German authorities. Adequate citation is given to the sources available in the Bundesarchiv. The first part, which appeared in 1956 as no. 2 of the Schriften des Bundesarchivs, had only 213 pages, and treated the agencies dealing with food, agriculture and forestry. The work is being continued, and points up the need for similar work on the German authorities of the other zone as well as overall on the organization of the military government authorities of all four zones.—James B. Childs, Library of Congress.

Political Parties in Norway. BY HENRY VALEN AND DANIEL KATZ. (Olso, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1964. Pp. xii, 383. 40 kroner or \$5.75. Exclusive English-speaking distribution by Tavistock Press.)

This is more than a comprehensive study of Norwegian political parties and voting behavior. It is a sophisticated survey research study testing many hypotheses which have been used in studies of American voting behavior (particularly, The American Voter) upon the Norwegian political system. By contrasting the American and Norwegian political systems, the authors have contributed greatly to our knowledge of comparative voting behavior.

Appropriately, this book is subtitled, "A Community Study." A report of a study on the 1957 general election in selected communities of the Stavanger area of southwestern Norway, this is one of a series of election studies sponsored jointly by the Institute of Social Research in Oslo and the Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen. The authors are particularly interested in studying political tendencies in communities undergoing rapid economic and social changes. This factor governed the selection of the particular wards (stemmekrets) selected for the study. As a ward is defined as the "area adjacent to a polling place" it seems to this reviewer that precinct would have been a more descriptive term.

Basic data for this study was obtained from two

sets of interviews. First, a voter survey of 1017 respondents was drawn from the electoral register at random. Second, a group of 149 office-holders in the party organizations at the province, commune, and ward levels were queried. These interviews yielded data with which to compare the perceptions of and attitudes toward controversial issues, the character of party leadership, and the relation of party organizations to social organizations of party voters and leaders. Elaborate appendices at the end of the volume report on the sampling procedures and contain the questionnaires used in the study. The sophisticated method used in designing the study is obvious. The series of well-organized and meaningful tables, the summaries of findings, and interpretative surveys placed at the end of each section of the study add much to the clarity of the presentation of the

In an intriguing chapter (Chapter 5), the authors attempt to demonstrate empirically the impact of party leadership on voting behavior. They use the Cutright and Rossi technique to hold constant the various demographic determinants of voting behavior and, thus, to assess the impact of the party organization. Professors Valen and Katz freely admit at the outset that their sample is not ideal for the employment of this technique. To supplement the Cutright and Rossi method they conducted voter interviews asking questions to tap awareness of local party activity. the existence of personal and impersonal communication from the party, citizen interest in or evaluation of party activities, and knowledge of party leadership.

The authors conclude that the degree of organizational activity of the party at the election district level made no appreciable difference in the votes cast on election day. The authors believe that other determinants of voting behavior are so important in Norway that the influence of the party organization in direct personal contacts is of no significance though the party organization may have an impact in reaching people through the mass media. In a subsequent section on the socioeconomic bases of support of the Norwegian parties, it is clearly demonstrated that the three major dimensions of Norwegian political behavior are: (1) socio-economic differentiation (occupational status, educational level, and income level), (2) rural-urban factors, and (3) age.

Norwegian political behavior is notable for its high degree of stability. While in recent elections the variations between the votes of Norwegian political parties have been very small, there have been significant long-term changes in Norwegian political behavior. In looking at political change in the Stavanger area, the authors are looking for changes caused by shifts in occupation or geo-

graphic concentration occasioned by increased industrialization and bureaucratization. They explore the change between generations by comparing the voting of individuals with parental voting and parental class influence and changes within the political history of the same individual. This study destroys the prevalent notion that the long-term trend of political change in Norway is favorable to the Labor party. For while less than 20% of the first-time Labor voters defect to other parties, the absolute number of defections away from Labor exceeds the defections of the other parties to Labor. Labor's declining commitment to ideology, the growing white collar class, and age are suggested reasons.

The final chapter deals with the relation of parties to social organizations. Norwegian pressure groups are shown to operate differently than their counterparts in the United States. In Norway, pressure groups do not serve the function of furnishing information and staff work in guiding legislation; on the other hand, they do assist the government in formulating legislative programs and have a direct channel for their demands through the political parties. Informally these ties between the social organizations and the parties take the form of overlapping leadership and informal groups working within the party, especially in the nominating process.

There are many other interesting aspects of this study such as political identification and the character of leadership that merit comment but space does not permit. In conclusion, this is a highly readable and worthwhile volume. It is hoped that this study will stimulate other scholars to do similiar research on the various political systems of the world. The contributions of such studies to comparative politics can not be overestimated.—H. Gaylon Greenhill, Wisconsin State University, Whitewater.

500 jaren Staten-Generaal in de Nederlanden. Van statenvergadering tot volksvertegenwoordiging. Edited by S. J. Fockema Andreae and H. Hardenberg. (Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp., N. V., 1964. Pp. 341. Plates.)

In January 1464, Burgundian Duke Philip the Good called the first continuing States General in the Low Countries to convene at Bruges. From this beginning has derived the present States General of the Netherlands. Even in the period between 1431 and 1464, there had been a few special meetings of similar character. To celebrate the five centuries of parliament, nine chronological segments have been treated by nine different authors. Each contribution is accompanied by a bibliography. The work, which was published with the assistance of the Prince Bernhard Fonds, has a joint introduction by the present chairmen

of the two chambers of the Netherlands States General. Beginnings of an organized central government with financial agencies are traced at a very early date. Even though the earlier States General were unicameral, the present bicameral form seems first to have appeared with the Batavian Republic in 1798. The last chapter of some forty pages by E. van Raalta treats of the States General in the most recent period, 1918–1963, and is accompanied by tables showing the political party representation in both chambers during the period. The memorial volume prepared with scientific care is concluded by a list of the members of the earliest and of the most recent States General.—James B. Childs, Library of Congress.

Guía de la administración civil del Estado. By the Oficina de Información, Presidencia del Gobierno. (Madrid, [Boletín Oficial del Estado, Publicaciones], 1963. Pp. 375. Organization charts.)

In contrast with the provisional edition in 1960 under the title Guía de la administración española, the present Spanish government organization manual has organization charts for the central administration, Presidencia del Gobierno and each of the civil ministries. As changes occur, the charts are revised and reissued with Documentación administrativa, the monthly review of the Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios. The three defense ministries (Army, Air, and Navv) are represented only on the chart of the Central Administration, and not otherwise treated. The hundred or so institutes of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas are itemized in full. Addresses are given for the various agencies, but no personal names are included. The Ministries are arranged in a hierarchical order seemingly similar to that followed in the national budget, and the subarrangement is in a like fashion. An index to agencies would do much to facilitate the use of the very helpful Guia.-JAMES B. CHILDS, Library of Congress.

Public relations in administration. I. Official publications. General report. By Suzanne Honoré. (Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1963. Pp. 83.)

The report by Suzanne Honoré, a conservateur of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, was presented, originally in French, to the XIIth International Congress of Administrative Sciences at Vienna, 16–20 July 1962, and was based not only upon an international survey by questionnaire, (scheduled in 1960) but upon replies from National sections of the Institute, and on several previous regional round table discussions. One of the important sources used was the UNESCO publication edited in 1958 (and now being re-

vised) by J. Meyriat under the title 'A study of current bibliographies of national official publications. A principal conclusion is "that official publications are a first-class source for the study of the administrative sciences, as for that of the political, economic and social sciences, which are developing rapidly." Part II of Public relations in administration on "the influence of the public on the operation of public administration, excluding electoral rights" is under preparation for the 1965 Congress with C. Mihcioglu of the University of Ankara as general rapporteur.—James B. Childs, Library of Congress.

A History of the Australian Country Party. By ULRICH ELLIS. (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1963. Pp. ix, 359. \$8.50.)

This book is a fine addition to the growing number of studies about Australian politics. It is a sympathetic treatment of the Country Party. The author explains: "It is written from a point of view—from the inside looking out—and must be accepted as an interpretation by one who cannot hope to be slightly objective or even unbiased." Although the author is too modest to admit it, he has had a great deal to do with both the policy and strategy of the Country Party. He worked very closely with Sir Earle Page and Sir Arthur Fadden, both of whom held a number of different federal ministries.

The book's title is somewhat misleading as there is only incidental reference to the Party's state branches. In part, this results from two facts. First, the state affiliations, according to Ellis, are inextricably bound to the national structure. Second, to do a detailed job on the state branches would have required several additional volumes.

Since Ellis writes from a point of view and is not an academic political scientist, his history does not incorporate methods of analysis which have become commonplace in our discipline. For instance, it would have been helpful if Ellis had included some tables indicating the kind and quantity of legislation introduced by Country Party members. It also would have been useful had he done some roll call analyses to determine the pattern of parliamentary solidarity and the Party's legislative relationships with other federal parties. But such omissions do not detract from the overall worth of the study. This is all the more true when one realizes that until recently there were very few reliable secondary sources on Australian politics. Ellis provides names, places, dates, and events which will be extremely helpful to future students of Australian politics. The appendices are particularly valuable in this regard.

One point which Ellis makes is that the federal Country Party, particularly since its entry into Commonwealth politics in 1917, has not been merely an extension of the three principal nonlabor parties-National, United Australian, and Liberal-which have successively vied with the Labor Party for control of the Commonwealth Government. The Country Party has never sought support in the metropolitan areas. It has entered into electoral arrangements and composite governments with non-labor parties whose strength lie in the urban centers. Through electoral arrangements there is an agreement on an allocation of seats to be contested by each partner. Critics of these arrangements contend that the Party's numerical strength, and hence its legislative power, is diminished by this strategy. The prolonged alliance with the Liberal Party, which dates from 1949 to the present, has probably sapped the Country Party's vitality both organizationally and legislatively. (From 1917 to 1964 the Country Party was involved in composite governments for 27 of the 47 years.) The Country Party has never withdrawn from a ministry. Ellis marshals evidence which indicates that this has contributed to the stability of the Commonwealth government.

Some less sympathetic students of the Country Party might conclude that it is the rural branch of the non-labor party. Such a conclusion would require investigation of Country Party participation in local governing authorities and state parliaments. Certainly, this suggestion is worthy of investigation for several reasons. First, it would provide insights into the nature of the "third party" in a three-party system. Second, and more important, it would enable us to refine our notions about party systems in general and the multiparty system in particular.—Conrad Joyner, University of Arizona.

The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. BY YAROSLAV BILINSKY. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 539, \$12.50.)

This book is virtually encyclopedic in length: apart from the copiously annotated text, it contains twenty-two special notes in the appendix (the particularly interesting note on "The Jewish Question in the Ukraine" contains fourteen double-column pages) and a fifty-three page annotated bibliography. The value of the work as a compendium of hard-to-get information about a major portion of the U.S.S.R. is beyond question. But—in spite of the title—the author did not intend to write a handbook on the Ukraine. While his purpose might have been clearer to the reader if he had stated his problems at the beginning, the attentive reader soon learns that Professor Bilin-

sky is really concerned solely with the Ukrainian nationality question. The vast array of data he presents is designed to answer such problems as: What are the factors influencing Ukrainian national identification? How strong is national feeling today? How has Soviet policy sought to manipulate it? What are the prospects for separate national identity among Ukrainians?

The crucial problem, the present strength of Ukrainian nationalism, is the hardest to approach. The direct line of investigation pursued by Bilinsky is examination of resistance to Soviet efforts to integrate the West Ukraine (i.e., the portions acquired in 1939-46). Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for the outside investigator to assess the degree of resistance to a totalitarian regime unless the totalitarian controls are at least temporarily lifted. Bilinsky has worked very diligently to collect the very incomplete information available; this reviewer, for one, is much indebted to Bilinsky for the evidence on the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent [guerrilla] Army) which he originally presented in his Ph.D. dissertation. It is a reviewer's inescapable duty, however, to point out that Bilinsky (who spent his childhood in the wartime West Ukraine) does not take a thoroughly critical approach to the question of Ukrainian resistance. Bilinsky does not positively exaggerate the importance of the UPA; but he fails to undertake the badly needed task of critically analyzing the large body of émigré writing on the subject, particularly in regard to the territorial and chronological extent of guerrilla activities. Furthermore, Bilinsky glosses over the fratricidal conflicts which preceded and accompanied the formation of the UPA and the lasting imprint which these brutal episodes had upon the development of the nationalist movement.

On the other hand, the mere fact of Bilinsky's personal commitment makes him an especially useful source on some aspects of Ukrainian nationalism. This is especially true of the passages on contemporary relations between Ukrainian nationalists and the Vatican. An outsider could not have easily uncovered the extent and nature of nationalist resentment against what many Ukrainians regard as Vatican efforts to minimize the importance of the Ukrainian (Uniate) Catholic Church as a tactic in the effort to win over Russian Orthodoxy.

The main part of Bilinsky's book is wisely devoted, not to a direct assault on the problem of the strength of Ukrainian nationalism, but to an intensive examination of Soviet policies. He then tries to infer from the policies the nature of the national attitude which the regime hopes to influence. In pursuing this indirect approach, Bilinsky discusses in detail the hitherto largely neglected statistical data on nationality factors in education

and mass media (however, his main analysis was made before the more detailed 1959 census data became available). Bilinsky wisely recognizes the impracticability of a comprehensive examination of Soviet manipulation of literary and historical symbols of Ukrainian national identity, Consequently, he approaches this facet of Soviet policy through intensive analysis of two crucial cases: the treatment of the poet Taras Shevchenko and of the "reunification" of the Ukraine and Russia in the Treaty of Pereyaslav. In analyzing the nationality aspects of Communist Party personnel changes, the author concentrates upon the period since Stalin's death. Here a good bit of speculation is unavoidable, but Bilinsky is rather too inclined to stress nationality factors in the recent power struggle. Similarly, his factually valuable discussion of the role of the Ukrainian S. S. R. in the United Nations probably overemphasizes the nationality question. In his concluding chapter Bilinsky relies heavily upon interviews with postwar defectors. He recognizes the hazards of using this uncontrollable data, but occasionally is extremely uncritical, as in his acceptance of one informant's assertion that "within a week or two, the entire city of Dneprepetrovsk, after German occupation began to speak Ukrainian." Such items are not allowed to distort Bilinsky's general findings, however, which are in accord with other scholars' conclusions. Basically, he finds, "Soviet Ukrainians tend to be so preoccupied with abolishing the ills of the regime that little thought is given to what precisely should be put in its place" and "the struggle for economic betterment occupies most of the attention of Soviet citizens, Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians alike." These findings necessarily lead to the conclusion that the future of Ukrainian national identity very probably depends upon developments which largely transcend the Ukraine itself.—John A. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin.

Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary? By ALEC NOVE. (Frederick A. Praeger: New York, 1964. P. 316. \$8.50.)

This is a collection of seventeen articles, essays and papers by the distinguished economist Alec Nove of the University of Glasgow. Their writing spans the last decade and all except two have previously appeared elsewhere.

Mr. Nove is not one of those too-frequent specialists in Soviet economics who insist always upon the primacy of their study and tend to disregard the significance of politics, literature, Russian tradition and so forth for Soviet developments. His interests as reflected in the entries in Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics cover a

broad spectrum ranging from "Occupational patterns in the USSR and Great Britain" to "The Peasants in Soviet literature since Stalin."

However, Professor Nove is at his best in the chapters on Soviet planning and agriculture, areas where he has his special expertise. In those chapters the author provides a topical and valuable account of Khrushchev's economic misadventures, written, in some instances, a half-dozen years before October, 1964. Nove indicates the extent to which Nikita Sergeevich's attempts to deal with the economic necessity for local autonomy and the political demand for central control converted Soviet economic planning into an almost impenetrable tohu-bohu. In agriculture, he points out that Khrushchev, as his predecessors, had fallen victim to that same shturmoveshchina ("campaigning") psychosis, with which, incidentally, the Russians have often impugned Chinese comrades. Nove suggests that Khrushchev's ideas for using the virgin soil lands and the fallow areas and planting corn were all excellent-but not everywhere and under all conditions. "It is this chronic tendency to overdo a good idea, to impose it by decree," Nove writes, "which ruins its application and does so much harm to Soviet agriculture."

It is Nove's position that the Soviet planning system is not "economically" rational, since it operates on the basis of political not economic decisions, and that the present difficulties of the Soviet economy can in large part be remedied by a "big dose" of economic rationality. He further maintains that what prevents the Soviet Union from undertaking such a cure is not primarily Marxist ideology, but rather the "convictions of the political leaders and planners that they, and not any 'law of value,' are the regulators of economic life." Nove seems to believe that any major change in the style of Soviet planning must be predicated on significant alterations in the psychology of the leadership, which is a major reason for the labored and sometimes painful quality of the debates over Soviet planning policy which have broken out intermittently during the past few years.

One wishes that Mr. Nove's comments on the differences between "useful" economic growth and the growth of output as measured by statistics would be read by all of those who have been involved in the often meaningless debate over Soviet economic growth vis-à-vis that of the United States. His discussions of the mounting futility of the trudoden system and of the role and burden of agricultural officials at the raion and oblast levels are particularly enlightening.

As is almost bound to be the case in a collection such as this, there is a good deal of repetition of arguments and some of the materials are so outdated as to be of little more than historical interest. This is particularly so in Mr. Nove's chapter on "The purchasing power of the Soviet ruble," which first appeared in 1958. Too many of the conclusions reached here are no longer valid and there is the additionally irritating feature for the American reader of having figures given not only in old rubles but also in pounds, shillings and pence. Try converting old rubles to new, then say £1 5s 6d. to dollar and cents, then accounting for changes that have taken place in relative values since 1957, and it will quickly be seen why this chapter might have been better left out, in spite of the fact that it was at the time of its writing undoubtedly an intellectual tour de force.

Despite these minor shortcomings, the collection is justifiable and the time of any Soviet specialist would be well spent in reading its chapters on planning and agriculture. There is one further aspect of the book, which, though perhaps trivial and presumably not specifically attributable to Professor Nove, must nevertheless be mentioned, namely the alternate title: Was Stalin Really Necessary? Other than the introductory chapter, which is one of the least valuable in the collection, the book has almost nothing to do with this problem. One can only conclude that some sales-conscious editor decided that Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics would not sell, but Was Stalin Really Necessary? might; or perhaps that two titles are safer than one. The alternate title does the book no credit. Caveat auctor!-DAN N. JACOBS, Miami University (Ohio).

Nationalism and Communism, Essays 1946-1963. By Hugh Seton-Watson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964. Pp. x+253. \$7.50.)

Hugh Seton-Watson, head of the Department of Russian History in the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of London University and author of well known books on Russian and Eastern European history and politics has assembled in this volume a collection of previously published articles and lectures. Using the rubric of nationalism and communism, the author has brought together a valuable collection of his essays under four main headings. These are twentieth-century history, eastern Europe after WWII, communism in eastern Europe and international problems. The last category deals with such international problems as Soviet foreign policy, strategy, and the Atlantic Alliance.

The author is at his best in analyzing the long range implications of twentieth century history in which the mass movements of nationalism and communism occupy principal places. Tracing how nationalism was first formulated in revolutionary France, Seton-Watson shows how it became a

democratic and secular phenomena. Turning to nationalist movements in underdeveloped countries in the last hundred years, the author points out how these movements have been directed "by a modern secular elite or intelligentsia." The nineteenth century Russian liberal leaders were the first to be called the intelligentsia but as the author points out the intelligentsia are not solely a Russian phenomena. Intelligentsia were found in all the other components of the Romanov as well as the Ottoman and parts of the Hapsburg empires.

On the future of nationalism, Seton-Watson believes that it is not as predictable as some writers who advance the causes of larger free associations and world government might have us believe. The fall of the Romanov, Ottoman and Hapsburg empires did not result in the independence of national states but "the establishment of the empire of the Bolsheviks."

On the revolutionary movements of the first half of the twentieth century the author points out that the distinguishing feature of twentieth century revolutionary movements from those of the nineteenth century is that the twentieth century movements have arisen in culturally and economically backward countries. Nineteenth century revolutionary movements arose more in the advanced countries. But the interesting phenomenon is that the nineteenth century revolutionary movements did not develop into fully blown Marxist type revolutions as did those in the twentieth century. Moreover Marx has been repeatedly proved wrong in that his forecasts for an economic revolution in industrial countries coming before the revolution in less developed agricultural societies were not born out. In the agrarian societies which had revolutions, Russia, Yugoslavia and China, the revolutions came about only because outside forces had demolished the old state apparatus. It was not the inevitable economic laws of Marx which brought about an internal upheaval because of the contradictions in capitalism but the outside forces coupled with social and political disintegration in these countries which precipitated the successful revolutions.

Coming back to the intelligentsia, Seton-Watson rightly points out that the leaders of twentieth century revolutionary movements came chiefly from the intelligentisia. Western nations desiring to influence the historical course of the new emerging nations should pay more attention to the development and training of these leaders.

The section of the book which reflects the unique personal observations of the author is on Eastern Europe after WWII. Showing the results of extensive travels and intensive study Seton-Watson's essays on the Danube states right after the war, on the Czechoslovak turnover, the Hun-

garian uprising and the Greek civil war are most informative. His essays end with a relatively recent discussion of Soviet foreign policy followed by a very current final essay. "Commonwealth, Common Market and Common Sense" in which he correctly pleads for Great Britain entering the Common Market and for Europe entering the Atlantic Community.

Some of these essays were written ten or more years ago but they are still valid. The fact that the first of them was published in 1946 and the others in almost each successive year is not a drawback because their incisive analyses are still valid. Moreover there is an additional advantage in the timing of these articles because the essays reveal a well written chronology of significant developments on the world scene from 1946 to 1963. There is no perspective more enlightening than that of a brilliant historian and Seton-Watson has in every sense this.—William B. Ballis, The University of Michigan.

The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions. By Harold Ingrams. (New York and London: Fredrick Praeger, 1963. Pp. 164, no price indicated.)

There can be little doubt that all those who some twenty-two years ago were delighted by Harold Ingrams' Arabia and the Isles were equally dismayed by his announced intention at the time not to write another book. His account of quaint, far-away and little-known peoples and places revealed a fascinating world as well as a man full of warmth, wisdom and charm. Many readers, like this reviewer, must have hoped that Mr. Ingrams would one day change his mind. This hope has now been realized.

It must, however, be stated at once that Mr. Ingrams' new book, The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions, is very different from his Arabia and the Isles. The racy, loquacious, and often eloquent manner in which he spoke of the minutiae of everyday human existence, as well as of the larger issues of tribal peace, border warfare and imperial policy, has been replaced by a tone of somber seriousness.

Mr. Ingrams' new book presents a broad survey of al-Yemen's past and present rather than a systematic study of the country and its problems. It contains a wealth of information on the tribal and denominational composition of the population; on the rise of Zaydi Shi'ism in al-Yemen; on Yemeni political personalities, both Royalist and Republican; on British-Yemeni relations, including the Treaty of 1934 and the continuing conflict over frontier questions; and on such events as the assassination of Imam Yahya, the various plots against Imam Ahmad, and the 1962 revolution which overthrew the Imamic regime.

Mr. Ingrams writes soberly and with restraint. Nonetheless, as a dedicated British colonial official who spent many of the best years of his life in South Arabia, he is a deeply committed man. Love for his country and affection for the people among whom he labored for so many years must have indissolubly linked the imperial interests of the one with the welfare of the other in his mind. He can hardly be expected to view with equanimity the forces which have brought revolution and civil war to al-Yemen, and which now threaten to shatter the British position in South Arabia so laboriously established by persons like him.

One of the interesting facts that emerges from the pages of this book is the author's change of sentiment toward Imamic rule and Imamic policies as a result of recent developments in the area. Imamic claims to British South Arabia, which had received neither the sympathy nor the support of the author prior to the appearance of the UAR upon the South Arabian scene, now appear to find justification in his eyes. In searching for a way out of al-Yemen's difficulties, it is to the present Imam al-Badr that he turns. "Maybe it is not too extravagant to suppose that such a ruler as he might well be a better proposition for al-Yemen than a Nasserite Republic or the curious hybrid Federation of South Arabia."

There is a touch of regret, and perhaps a suggestion of remorse, in the manner in which Ingrams relates how the Imam, having unsuccessfully pressed his claims to British-controlled South Arabia, invoked outside help which now threatens to encompass his ruin and radically change the power relationships in the area.

The Shi'i-Sunni conflict, one of the lesser-known aspects of the current Republican-Royalist struggle in al-Yemen, is discussed in more than one place. Notwithstanding the fact that Arab Nationalist sources have accused the British of fomenting this conflict, Ingrams does not think it necessary to deny charges of British involvement. He gives the impression that the Zaydis, particularly the two great tribal confederations of the Hashid and the Bakil, regard the Imam's cause as their own. However, it is known that important elements of the Hashid, disgruntled by the execution of their paramount chieftain by Imam Ahmad in 1959, made common cause with the Republicans—a fact not mentioned by the author.

A few errors, perhaps inevitable in so comprehensive a survey, occur in this book. For example, the two children murdered by Mu'awiya's general, Busr Ibn Artat (pp. 20-21) were not the children of Abdullah Ibn Abbas, the ancestor of the Abbasids, but those of his younger brother, Ubaydullah Ibn Abbas. Ali was not the nephew of Muhammad (p. 20), but his cousin, as correctly stated on page 27. The Imamic title "Hamid

ed-Din" does not mean "Defender of the Faith" (p. 58) but rather "He whose religion is praiseworthy."

Mr. Ingrams' concluding remarks, reiterating a theme that runs throughout the book, are a disappointing forecast of the future. The Yemenis, we are told, even after their present troubles are over, will remain as factious and disunited as ever; for like all other Arabs, they are torn between self-love and self-denial, this-worldliness and other-worldliness, individualism and desire for unity.

This slim volume contains a surprising amount of information, much of which is essential for an understanding of the present situation in al-Yemen. It is a valuable and timely contribution to the scant literature on Southwest Arabia.—Wadle Jwaideh, Indiana University.

Syrian Politics and the Military 1945-1958. By GORDON H. TORBY. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 438. \$7.00.)

The tendency of recent studies to blame the military as agents of instability in the Middle East and other under-developed areas shows no sign of weakening. Studies on the role of the military in politics can be illuminating; they remain, however, a difficult task, requiring an intimate knowledge of a people, their history, traditions, institutions, and a personal contact with both civilian and military establishments. The analyst must be primarily concerned with local assessments of the system he is scrutinizing which, added to his own, will provide him with the tools he needs. He then may begin his analysis in the light of generally recognized axioms—a tedious and frustrating process which does not guarantee the success of his enterprise.

Any attempt to analyze a situation in the Middle East or Africa from a non-local viewpoint is bound to produce inaccurate hypotheses, let alone conclusions. A knowledge gained from the local press and politicians whose prejudices are complex and manifold leads equally to deceptive conclusions.

One seeks in Torey's Syrian Politics and the Military a systematic study of the conditions that brought military groups into political eminence in Syria, perhaps even an analysis of the mystique of the military's political behavior there—a book of the type and stature of P. J. Vatikiotis' The Egyptian Army in Politics and which might serve as a sequel to that work, by studying the Syrian army as a political group with interests of its own, whose understanding of what constituted the national interest inspired its attempts and subsequent failures to emerge as the leader of a national resurgence.

The title of the book is misleading for the

author has not produced such a study. As he candidly announces in his preface, the "book is a journey into the wilcerness of contemporary Near Eastern history," a narrative based mainly on Syrian news releases and newspaper comments on the period. The lack of analysis or its superficiality whenever attempted makes the book a tiresome compilation of historical records for the area specialist and a confusing one for the layman.

Chapter I is a sketchy mélange describing such diverse topics as geography, people, historical background, society, culture, economy, education, political strikes, governmental organization, army, constitution, ministry of interior, legal system and the Syrian press. This is followed by a brief description of political parties up to independence and then by nine chapters of relatively detailed accounts of the political vicissitudes of the Syrian state. The disproportionately brief conclusion is a hasty and naive summation of "the factors which brought about the failure of democratic government in Syria," and is followed by an epilogue, appendices and bibliography.

A plethora of events are related en vrac without due consideration to minorities or economic and ethnic factors—so significant in Syrian politics; they are merely cited as existing and constituting crucial problems. Too much is left to the imagination of the reader: such a situation occurred "due to considerations of foreign policy," but such considerations are not spelled out. The author's conception of Nasir as a "patriarchal image" for the Arabs, moreover, is quite unwarranted. If Nasir represents anything to the Arabs it is youth, vigor and change.

Torey sees three distinct periods in Syria's political history from the end of World War Two to the abortive union with Egypt. From 1946 to 1949 parliamentary democracy was tried and found to be wanting; from 1949 to 1954 military dictatorship also failed to give the country the leadership it required; and in 1954 until February 1958 came "the return to a parliamentary regime."

Independent Syria's "entire life" is seen as "characterized by internal turmoil, near chaos at times, and continual governmental instability." But these circumstances, Torey remarks, are not peculiar to Syria, as they have characterized many other countries such as "Pakistan, Burma, Korea, Iraq, France and Argentina." What made Syria's political institutions too fragile to withstand such stresses and strains, according to the author, are its geographical position, lack of forsighted leadership, and its being part of a larger Arab nation. Moreover, Syria was not able "to weld its people into a compact and compatible nation" because it has "neither tradition nor past glories." And the leaders who struggled for Syria's

independence having "fought against something all their political lives" have "become accustomed to thinking in a negative frame of mind." But, Torey thinks: "Perhaps in less demanding circumstances, they would have been equal to the challenge."

Syria's geographical situation, he finds, "continually worked against the country's survival." Because, "Set between two rival blocs, Syria became the pawn of Arab power politics, the target of the rival Hashemite and Saudi-Egyptian camps."

So the civilian failed because of an inability to provide the country with a patriarch that was also a modern innovator with a capacity to push the country forward. Later, the military also failed "largely because of their inability to mold the Syrian people into a viable nation; their being caught-up in inter-Arab rivalries; and their lack of recognition that radical socio-political ideology was becoming the order of the day in the Arab world." The military were followed by a parliamentary regime—"the golden years of the Ba'th"—which also failed while showing the "progressive officers the way to achieve their dreams."

By 1958, both democracy and army rule had failed; a new system was needed but could not be found; "perhaps it was not the Syrian people's fault." The political system they inherited was ill-suited to this oriental society "undergoing a rapidly accelerating 'Westernization'."

The four pages of epilogue are a digest of the facts of Syria's political union with Egypt which, according to Torey, failed because "Nasir's Egyptian background failed to give him the requisite understanding of the Syrian temperament and mentality."

This book is neither scholarly nor very helpful to the layman; it is informative only as are releases in a daily newspaper. Unpolished, hastily compiled and edited, it is no more than a "journey into the wilderness" of the Syrian press.—Alfred G. Gerteiny, St. John's University.

The City of God and the City of Man in Africa. By Edgar H. Brookes and Amry Vanden-Bosch. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1964. Pp. vi, 138. \$3.75.)

This small volume is composed of two lectures given by Dr. Brookes at the University of Kentucky in 1963 and a substantial introduction to each lecture by Professor Vandenbosch. Dr. Brookes is introduced as professor emeritus of history and political science at the University of Natal, but he is perhaps better known as former Native representative in the South African Senate, leader in the Liberal Party of that country,

and fighter for non-European rights there generally.

Vandenbosch's introductory essays on the newly independent nations of Africa and the politics of the Republic of South Africa provide very good background material, although the former might have dealt more with internal rather than international factors. The two essays by Brookes constitute the core of the book, and the remainder of this review will examine them more closely.

In his first essay Brookes defends the European missionary enterprise as "the only way in which the faith of Christ could have been brought to Africa," a continent where lust, cruelty, and "an all-pervading fear of evil spiritual forces" were mixed with a wide variety of virtues. He stresses the missionaries' faults-especially their lack of humility-along with their virtues, and concludes that they brought the City of Man to Africa along with the City of God, a combination which he seems to imply is inevitable whenever human beings are involved. The weakness of African sexual mores, the total denunciation of colonial and missionary activities, and the messianic tendencies of African political leaders, however, are anti-Christian and consequently must be resisted totally. Thus the implementation of the City of God in Africa is the highest goal for Brookes, and evils are ranked by him according to the extent to which they impede the realization of this goal. However, his City of God is a conception developed entirely in the West, and which is to be "handed over" to Africa to defend with all her ability. It is extremely unfortunate that Brookes' failure to understand the unacceptability of this doctrine to most Africans blurs his otherwise keen insights into the contemporary African situation.

In discussing the problems of his native South Africa in his second essay Brookes once again stresses the intermixing of the City of Man and the City of God. No person or ethnic group is portrayed as the villain or the hero in this tragic situation, but rather all are shown to be caught in a struggle in which compromise is impossible, at least for the time being, although there are some signs indicating that change is taking place. Boer, Briton, and Bantu alike cannot escape the seemingly logical dictates of their cultural norms and power situations. This does not mean that Brookes is unaware of the extreme injustice that the present situation entails; he portrays this injustice vividly, but has no simple cure for it. Violence is the only way to put an end to white rule in the near future, and this is not an acceptable means because it would destroy almost everything that is good in South African society. Brookes concludes that individuals must do their

duty by knowing and feeling the facts, thinking with integrity, and speaking with courage, and that they must "appeal to God with Whom all things are possible." This course of action is likely to fail to preserve South Africa, but it is the most effective way to serve the City of God, and that is what really matters. Those who do not share Brookes' faith will probably consider him a defeatist and an escapist, but of course they cannot really appreciate his position as he sees it.—James R. Scarrit, University of Colorado.

Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization. By Charles A. Micaud with Leon Carl Brown and Clement Henry Moore. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xiii, 205. \$6.00.)

This is a lucid, informed study of modernization when change takes place under relatively the best of terms. Such a touchstone is valuable for students of modernization regardless of area interest, especially since the authors succeed so well in clarifying the historical, social, and economic context of what is primarily a political task

Tunisia was fortunate in the sequence of its political development, as Brown demonstrates in a fine analytical synthesis of the effects of the first fifty years of French rule. To a small, culturally rather homogeneous country long open to Mediterranean influences, French conquest in 1881 came almost bloodlessly. A local elite, which had decades earlier already generated its own reform movements, at first accepted French rule for being modern and orderly. The established Muslim elite asked only for equal opportunities in modern education, bureaucracy, and business, or at least, perpetuation of its social status. In the 1930's, the Neo-Destour under Habib Bourguiba's leadership emerged to organize a movement among a growing mass uprooted by French-inspired modernization but without rights or, often, place, in the new society. Enough time had by now passed, however, for modern standards and skills of action and justice to infuse the cadre organizing the new mass movement. Not so much time had elapsed that the nationalist movement would suffer the fate of the Wafd in Egypt-where an elite of landowners and businessmen feared to let the masses participate in political action except promiscuously, as mobs, so that the principal nationalist organization disintegrated without direct heirs when the achievement of independence revealed the absence of a national society. By the thirties, the Neo-Destour could, in fact, already count on the integral support of a trade union movement in its dual fight against Tunisian backwardness and French domination.

Moore, in the second section of this book (drawing upon a larger study being prepared for separate publication) assesses the Neo-Destour's contemporary role. The party's solidarity and organizational effectiveness were tested by clandestine and sometimes violent struggle for 16 years prior to independence in 1956. Self-sacrifice and intellectual and practical flexibility continue to be joined to a commitment to the transformation of society by way of a centralized democracy. Two quotations may help to suggest the tenor of that tutelary transformation. Bourguiba: ". . . The governor, the executive agent of the government, does not undertake projects that the citizens have not been prepared to understand, and on the other hand, the [party] commissioner, informed of these projects, works to prepare the ground. . . . The governor and the commissioner are an emanation of my person." Moore: "In contrast to the national scene, a healthy democratic political process flourishes at the local level. . . . Through its decades of experience, the party has developed a network of branches that transcend local rivalries. . . . The branches do more than mobilize the people in support of government projects; they represent the people and give them the opportunity to manage many of their local affairs.'

In Tunisia, economic development was postponed while political and social change were given precedence for at least five years after independence. First came the movement of new men with new orientation into the government at all levels; the grant of legal equality to women; the secularization and expansion of education; and the redistribution of one-fourth of the arable land. Planned economic development, delayed until 1961, is now being supported by more foreign economic aid per capita than any other modernizing nation now receives. Micaud, in a concluding section, highlights Tunisia's social and economic accomplishments so far, especially in self-help and social justice, and its major remaining problems in economic investment and growth.

The three collaborators have provided us with a most useful and succinct case study in political modernization. They conclude that "so far, Tunisia has been successful in carrying out the three major tasks of modernization that are the preconditions for rapid economic growth. It has succeeded in maintaining national cohesion, in mobilizing and educating the masses, and in transforming values and structures—without losing sight of the ultimate goal of modernization, the liberation of man." But if this case study is actually to be incorporated in a broader, systematic body of knowledge, new questions will first need answers from studies yet to be made.

Since only two or three other countries in Africa and the Middle East have so far modernized themselves as successfully as Tunisia, is success dependent on all the good fortunes and deliberate policies that have marked Tunisia's transformation? That would indeed be cause for pessimism. What are the likely political costs of compensating for the possession of fewer social and economic prerequisites? Are we, perhaps, being prematurely optimistic even about Tunisia? Modernization requires a persistent will and capacity to generate and absorb continuing transformation. How can we assess the solidity of a party's commitment to such a permanent revolution, and its ability to withstand the temptation of becoming, like Mexico's ruling party, primarily an efficient instrument for political integration among new political oligarchs? For pursuing such further questions, this book also offers a very good start.-Manfred HALPERN, Princeton University.

The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History. By F. A. Van Jaarsveld. (Cape Town: Simondium Publishers Ltd., 1964. Pp. 199. R 2-80.)

The range of subjects touched upon in this collection of essays is somewhat broader than is indicated by the title, but the latter quite accurately portrays the central theme of the book. In the first essay the author describes the traditional Afrikaner ideology, emphasizing its religious themes of a mission and a calling. In subsequent essays he demonstrates the influences which this ideology has had on Afrikaans historical writing, with respect to specific works and to general trends in the form and content of this writing. There is also some discussion of the influence of history on ideology in South Africa, as a necessary background for the development of the principal theme.

Van Jaarsveld sees the Afrikaner ideology and the interpretation of history based upon it as being anti-British and defensive in orientation. Historically, the Afrikaner has had to defend both his independence and his treatment of the African (Bantu) against various kinds of British interference. In order to do so, however, he first had to mould his own people into a nation, so that they could react to the British as a self-conscious and united group. It was only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that Afrikaansspeaking people became a nation, but in their historical image-making their nationhood stemmed from the "Great Trek" of 1836-1838. In fact, virtually all of their historical writing is concerned with the Trek, the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, and the intervening years. As the above events were the first two great crises in

Afrikaner history, Van Jaarsveld speculates that a large volume of historical material may soon be forthcoming on the third crisis—the attainment of political awareness by the non-white peoples of South Africa. Accompanying this, the author hopes, will be a great diminution of anti-English sentiment among Afrikaners, and the unity of the two white groups in South Africa.

Because the purposes of Afrikaans historical writing have been to create a national myth, and to justify the actions of the Afrikaner and condemn those of the British, this writing has tended to manifest certain stylistic characteristics. The form of many Afrikaans historical works is either a series of carefully selected documents, loosely linked by inadequate narrative, or a flight into phantasy based on virtually no reliable documentation. Also characteristic of many of these writings is the tendency to pay little attention to motives, or to the broader context within which the events being described are taking place. For example, the international situation and the role of the non-whites are usually ignored completely. The author is careful to distinguish "pre-scientific" and "scientific" historical writings, and he stresses that the latter are much less likely to commit these stylistic errors. Some subjectivity in historical writing is unavoidable, according to Van Jaarsveld, but the historian must do everything possible to eliminate avoidable subjectivity. British and Bantu historical writing in South Africa, as well as that of the Afrikaner, has generally failed to measure up to this standard.

There is nothing in this book in the way of startling or really new conclusions, but it is a well-written and cogent presentation of a theme which, as far as this reviewer knows, had not previously received the full treatment it deserves. Because the book is a collection of essays there is some repetition, as the author admits in the preface, but this detracts only in a small way from the quality of the book.—James R. Scarritt, University of Colorado.

The Center of the World, Communism and the Mind of China. By Robert S. Elegant. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964. pp. xii, 396. \$5.95)

Communist China since 1949 has perplexed all nations, large and small. Peking's relations with the Soviet Union and non-communist nations are dynamic, subtle, almost unpredictable and often explosive. Does the Chinese Communist leadership today pursue the ancient mission of "Middle Kingdom" to impose on neighbor nations its fiat and system of government? Does China simply struggle for its recognition by all free nations before it becomes less bellicose? Or is it dedicated

to the ultimate universal victory of Communism with China at the center of such a protracted struggle against every nation? Mr. Elegant in his book attempts to conclude that "The Mind of China" based on Confucian ideology recognizes no equals and insists on dominating the entire world, whether China is under Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung. The implication is that the ancient "Mind of China" repudiates and transcends Communism and the established nation-state system. This theme certainly raises a number of complicated arguments.

To suit his own purpose, the author discussed China's modern relations with the European nations since 1600 A.D. and succeeded in establishing the basis for the Chinese outrage against Western imperialism, which climaxed in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. He also painted a picture of incredible and kaleidoscopic changes that have taken place in China since 1949. Mr. Elegant believes that "Mao and his intimates are impelled by transcendent idealism, not by blood lust" (p. 15) and it is "The Confucian state ideology which shaped the Chinese Mind" (p. 153) which is quite hospitable to Marxist utopia. Both insist that the individual is no more than a social unit molded by official indoctrination. Mao Tse-tung "Is the creature of his own past and China's past" (p. 149) and "Communism in China is as much a reaffirmation of Confucianism as it is a reaction against tradition" (p. 171). However, he believes that Mao is a "dedicated internationalist" who sees himself as the leader of the oppressed peoples everywhere and Mao insists on "Nothing less than creation of a new, world-wide political force centered on China, . . ." (p. 350).

To destroy this "Mind of China" he suggested that any Western policy towards China "should properly proceed from a realistic appraisal of the compulsion that drives China's political leaders whether they are Communists or non-communists" (p. 368). Having repudiated the current U. S. policy towards Peking, he proposed the familiar line that the U.S. should abandon Chiang Kai-shek, extend trade and diplomatic recognition to Peking and help Peking to get into the United Nations. Thus, the unconquerable "Mind of China," to this reviewer's surprise, would become suddenly curable if the Chinese Communists are "Given the opportunities to understand the nature of the real world, so that they may stop fighting the devils of their own imagining" (p. 374).

To this reviewer, there are in his book a number of inaccurate comparisons, assertions and conflicting contentions. First of all, the "Mind of China" based on Confucianism did not always require conquest of neighbor states. Nor did it imply China's concern for oppressed peoples around it. It was nothing more than a Chinese sense of

superiority. For centuries, the Middle Kingdom sought peace among neighbors through its tributary system which was based on China's superior power to pacify the battling neighbors if necessary. It is, therefore, erroneous for the author to identify the "Mind of China" with the present Communist compulsion for conquest. Secondly, the "Mind of China," if it can be correctly defined at all, underwent many revisions and transformations. The dynastic-Confucian ideology came under many internal attacks and repudiations since at least the May 4th Movement in 1919. Mr. Elegant should not resurrect the long-desserted Confucian ideology to justify Mao Tsetung's compulsion for conquest. Confucian idealism and Marxist utopia are different in kind and degree, even though both are authoritarian and dogmatic.

It is self-contradictory for Mr. Elegant to consider Mao Tse-tung as both prudent and "Incapable of setting any limit to his ambitions" (p. 191). Recent facts have proved that the Chinese Communists are quite cautious but esoteric in their foreign policy strategy. For example, Peking has not provoked America in the Formosan Strait since 1958. Nor has it honored its announced revenge against the recent American action in the Bay of Tonkin in North Vietnam. In 1962, Peking narrowed its military action against India. It is, therefore, inaccurate to conclude that Mao "is incapable of setting any limit to his ambitions." In my mind, China today behaves just like any big resurgent nation until held back by a superior counterforce. Furthermore, it is grossly wrong for Mr. Elegant to lump together and in the same degree Professor Hu Shih, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung as products of the same "Mind of China." They have been very different in their thoughts and actions, even though all have registered protest against Western imperialism in China.

In the author's own words, if the Peking regime has produced an "Equality of deprivation" (p. 4) and the regime is "thwarted by its own inefficiency, by popular resistance and by the law of nature" (p. 191) and if the 1958 introduction of agrarian commune system did produce "The breakdown of authority demoralized- not only the masses, but the cadres, too" (p. 299), the Peking regime would seem quite weak internally, and similar crises may recur again. Internal failures will always discourage Mao's ambitions abroad. In short, the author is apparently deluded by his contention that through concession and appeasement the West can remove Mao's compulsion for revenge. Contemporary history has not verified such contention as presented.

Finally, the "Mind of China" does not exist any more. The hostile behavior of China can be fully explained by reasons that the author fails to see clearly. As a have-not but ambitious nation, China is not prepared to accept the international status quo within the context of cold war politics. The "Mind of China" is merely a sophisticated fiction created by the author.—David W. Chang, Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh.

A Curtain of Ignorance: How the American Public Has Been Misinformed about China. By Felix Greene. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. xix, 340. \$5.50.)

Felix Greene cogently denounces "the press, the experts, and ... public officials" for having transmitted to the American people a distorted picture of Communist China-a picture which "the best intelligence in our own country knows is not true," but which "governs our actions" (p. xiii). The major thrust of his attack on the press and the experts is that their reportage "was bound to increase our hostility and fear of China and could in no way deepen our understanding of her. . . . The standard in both these professions has been appalling" (p. 321). He reaffirms, for the total American reportage on China, the conclusions reached by Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz in 1920 concerning the treatment of the Russian revolution by the New York Times: that it has been "nothing short of disaster," that the net effect has been "almost always misleading, and misleading news is worse than none at all. . . . " No one can seriously disagree with his conclusions. Greene's role is that of the crusading prosecutor, and his polemic is frankly written to stimulate some improvement in the situation. He uses the horrible example rather than the controlled sample to support his argument, and in so doing invites some doctoral candidate in political science to bring scientific methods and techniques to bear for a more measured analysis of Greene's thesis.

Greene begins early in the century to show how missionaries and business men first shaped an American image of China, followed by the creation of a negative image of the China of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, which was subsequently reshaped by media under influence of the "China lobby" into a favorable image. For the Communist period, he deals with broad themes (recurrent "starvation" and "slavery," mythical representations of Chinese intentions with respect to territorial expansion, intentions with respect to nuclear weapons, etc.) and with specific issues (the wishful invention of secret codicils to the Sino-Soviet agreements of 1950, assumptions of Chinese "aggression" in Tibet and on the Indian borders, misrepresentations of life in the people's communes, etc.). As informal "controls," he uses the reportage from sources he considers more reliable, his personal judgments based on three visits to Communist China and a continuing correspondence with people in Peking, and the logic of reason and contradictions. In particular, he has searched out the patently loaded editorial judgments passed along as parts of news content. He summarizes the principal factors contributing to the prevalent American myths about China as follows: (1) preventing people from seeing for themselves; (2) ignoring accurate information that is available; (3) dissemination of editorialized or imagined "news" from such "listening posts" as Hong Kong and Tokyo; (4) the press practice of reporting official government pronouncements as statements of reality (i.e., "statements emanating from governments or political movements should not be taken as factually correct by an independent press" (p. 302)); (5) the use of headlines misrepresentative of actual story content; and (6) misrepresentative use of photographs, cartoons and captions (illustrated). The indictment is a formidable one, and Greene appeals to the conscience of the journalistic profession to set matters aright.

American, and to some extent British, scholars are also brought under fire. Passages are taken from the works of such men as John K. Fairbank, Robert C. North and A. Doak Barnett to illustrate the intermixing of editorial judgments with portrayals of factual and policy situations. China Quarterly (London) is taken to task for publishing Joseph Alsop's imaginings ("On China's Descending Spiral," July-September 1962), but Greene is even more pitiless in condemning the scholars who responded to the Alsop article in a later issue of China Quarterly: "All but one treated [it] . . . as a contribution worthy of scholarly discussion" (p. 186). Greene sets a high standard of objectivity for them; in effect, he is saying: "Write about what you know about, deal with the facts, avoid moralizing." Unfortunately, western academic specialists on China stand exposed to the cross fires of political environment and conflicting value systems, and some handle the data with greater discrimination than others: Greene insists they should eschew such adjectives as: "frightful," "diabolical," "brutal." "Machiavellian," "slavish," "totalitarian," etc., when they feel called upon to judge Chinese Communist actions. The leading scholars in the field (including many of those named by Mr. Greene) are fully cognizant of the problems of research on contemporary China, are deliberately working to develop schemata that will tighten research and make it more meaningful, and are painfully aware that they are often separated from the necessary sources of information and have no opportunities for field investigation. Even Mr. Greene's three visits to China have not saved him from occasionally misinterpreting what he saw. The scholars

who read Greene will certainly question themselves, and the validity of his charges against individuals; but the blanket indictment may be too sweeping: many of the scholars named who have used the objectionable adjectives have also contributed to the "accurate information" that is too often ignored. Greene has searched for horrible examples, not for balances.—H. Arthur Steiner, University of California (Los Angeles).

An Instance of Treason: Ozaki and the Sorge Spy Ring. By CHALMERS JOHNSON. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. 278. \$6.50.,

How timely! On September 4, 1964, the Soviet Union finally acknowledged the remarkable work of the Sorge spy ring which had been broken up by the Japanese police 23 years earlier. The task of Richard Sorge, Communist of German-Russian parents who posed as a Nazi and had become a correspondent and German Embassy confidant, had been successfully completed in the fall of 1941 before his arrest. He had assured the Soviet Union that Japan was about to strike south and not against Siberia. Earlier he had predicted Hitler's attack on Russia to within two days, had reported Japanese intentions during the critical Changkufeng and Nomonhan border clashes, and had supplied voluminous other valuable intelligence. There is much speculation as to why the Soviet Union should have acknowledged the ring at this time. One theory is that the Kremlin wants to court the Japanese intellectuals who have long admired Sorge and especially his Japanese collaborator Ozaki Hotsumi without whom he could not have succeeded. As the Asahi newspaper's brilliant China expert. Ozaki had become close to the figures surrounding Prince Konoye who headed the government during the crucial period before General Tojo took over. This book explains the Japanese intellectuals' admiration for Ozaki and Sorge and much more.

Although the Japanese authorities had made some public statements on the Sorge case as early as 1942, the Russians quashed any mention of it during the Tokyo war crimes trials. Since then, however, a flood of reminiscences, articles, and even novels and motion pictures have appeared. Foreign attention was attracted in 1949 by an American Occupation report, followed in 1952 by publication of Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring by Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's intelligence chief, whose book displays biases typical of the McCarthyite period and contains numerous misromanizations and other inaccuracies pointed out by Dr. Johnson, who is an assistant professor at the University of California (Berkeley). Publication of the (almost) complete police and court records did not occur until 1962 when the first three volumes of the Gendai-shi Shiryo (Materials on Modern History), totaling 1,835 pages, were devoted to the Sorge incident by the reputable Misuzu Shobo publishing firm. Supplementing this with Ozaki's writings and other materials in Japanese, Chinese, German, Russian, and English, Dr. Johnson has written a reliable, objective, and, in fact, fascinating study.

Johnson explains the admiration for Ozaki from the fact that he was not only an outstanding political analyst but an influential participant in Japanese politics who sought to avoid the oncoming disaster for Japan. Ozaki's published articles and books on Japan's China policies and the rise of Chinese nationalism have amazingly withstood the test of time. Through them and through his high personal connections, Ozaki "tried to warn his government-as did many other Japanese intellectuals-of the folly of a policy of aggression; but he also took independent action, through Sorge, to affect international politics in a way he thought would cushion the probable failure of the liberals' efforts." (p. 128) Many Japanese since the war have felt guilty for not having done more to fight against the prewar trend toward war; they admire Ozaki for staking his life on what he believed. If he was a "traitor," it was for the most patriotic of reasons. (p. 3) And yet the painful irony of it was that, because he had to hide his true intentions, his writings may have helped the militarists.

Despite its comprehensiveness, Dr. Johnson's book is constructively controversial, for many implications and unanswered questions remain. It nevertheless goes a long way toward putting this important case in its proper place in studies on modern Japan, on Japanese-German-Soviet relations leading to the outbreak of war, and on the revaluation of espionage in terms of its context, objectives, and results.—George O. Totten, Eastern Michigan Universly.

The Political Institutions of Modern China. By WILLIAM L. TUNG. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xiii, 408.)

Modern China for Professor Tung is 20th century China and political institutions are whatever their enabling acts—whether constitutions, organic laws, statutes, regulations or articles—say they are. After describing the erosion of Ch'ing authority in a brief introduction, he divides his attention in the body of his study in roughly a two-to-one ratio between the Republican (Nationalist) and Communist phases of Chinese politics. Attached to the study are sixty pages of appendixes that provide the reader eight constitutions (between 1908 and 1954) for easy reference.

Professor Tung clearly writes from first-hand as much as from second-hand knowledge. Like many of his compatriots during the hopeful years of Kuomintang ascendancy, he combined academic pursuits with government service at different levels and in various roles. He was, for instance, Chairman of the first Municipal Council in Peiping (1933). During World War II he was a Counselor of the Supreme National Defence Council, More recently he has been on several faculties in this country and presently teaches at Queens College, City University of New York. Given this background one senses the strictures within which the scholar and erstwhile government functionary of his generation writes about Chinese politics. He is to a degree literally—much more figuratively-surrounded by colleagues and echoes of the past that impinge on the present in ways Westerners cannot fully understand. History holds him, and others like him, hostage for a ransom that can probably never be paid. At the same time, he is detached enough to recognize the Communist incarnation of his nation and culture for what it is and to incline toward describing certain of its political features with a realism that is sure to raise the hackles of extreme anti-Communists. Both systems, Republican and Communist, are described with notable dispassion when one considers that the observer was a responsible official in one,

The study moves chronologically and systematically from "From Autocracy to Democracy" at the end of the Ch'ing to "The Government of 'Democratic Centralism' " under Mao's regime. The most recent reference is August 1962. The author sets forth the structural design of central. provincial, and local governments in considerable detail at every stage including opposition (Southern) regimes during the warlord era and Communist governments in the 20s and 30s. This record goes farther than most descriptions of modern Chinese political institutions in detailing rules and regulations. And it sets this full catalogue of constitutions and statutes in a framework of historical discourse that provides at least an impressionistic sense of development and a clue to reasons for changing political designs.

For this reviewer, however, the study serves mainly to reinforce the long-standing awareness among most students of modern Chinese history and politics that the relation between the formal structures and the actual dynamics of Chinese political development has been far more incidental than integral and causal. There is ample evidence of Chinese interest in both the theoretical and practical aspects of constitutionalism. It was a major theme in the declining years of the dynasty among "self-strengtheners" who thought they had found a key in Western constitutions

to Western wealth and power. It was more a descant than a theme during the long years of the Peking government between 1912 and 1928, though it continued to be the only generally accepted mark of legitimacy for whoever claimed authority for the moment. Successive Chinese governments have stacked constitutions one upon another down to the present as public records of shifting schematic arrangements of authority and power. As they have been stacked, they have been studied. Witness the number of constitutional analyses by Chinese historians and students of government. In a sense, this descriptive analysis of Professor Tung's is one more attestation to the fascination constitutions seem to hold for Chinese social scientists.

But these studies also attest to one of the most fundamental differences between Western and Asian politics. The West has long held it axiomatic that constitutions, basically, confirm rather than create actual political arrangements. Western constitutions have evolved where there were already working relations among major community interests, where power was already tamed in some measure by responsibility, and, most important, where there was a reliable consensus on central values and social goals. The most durable constitutions have only given design to political substance already in being. By contrast, Chinese scholars like Chinese politicians seem to have assumed that constitutions could be imposed on political chaos with the expectation that order could thus be wrested from disorder, that constitutions could be relied on to create a consensus on goals and values where none existed. Professor Tung appears, at least, to support this misconception of the function of constitutions, particularly in his assessment of the Republic. He describes in meticulous detail how institutions were organized at all levels by organic laws, regulations, and constitutions. And he would have us infer that they worked-except in those instances where he acknowledges specifically that they did not. We are also left to infer that this institutional approach to Chinese politics gives us meaningful insights into their dynamics, though he gives us no help in spelling them out.

This is acutely disappointing in the face of teasing remarks here and there that suggest that he could, if he would, assist us rank outsiders very considerably in our efforts to understand Chinese politics, particularly of the turbulent era between 1912 and 1949. The farther this period recedes into history and the more we are forced to rely on archival records, the more distorted becomes our view of the Republican interlude. Herewith, then, an appeal to our Chinese colleagues of Professor Tung's generation and comparable experience: "Come out of the archives; forsake the sterile

formalism of paper institutions; and tell us something about the politics of this fascinating and critically important transitional period!"—Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., Bryn Mawr College.

Indonesia. By BRUCE GRANT. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, Distributed in London and New York by Cambridge University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 190. \$5.50.)

The journalist can ofttimes provide insights into political life which both add color and background to the more academic work of a political scientist. This is particularly true if he has spent considerable time in an area visited by the academician only sporadically. Southeast Asia has been well covered in recent years by journalists such as Ronald Stead of the Christian Science Monitor and David Halberstam of the New York Times. Most recently a number of books have appeared written by correspondents interpreting personal experiences (such as Robert Trumbull's The Scrutable East) or analyzing specific aspects of politics (such as Arnold Brackman's study of Indonesian Communism). In the book under review Bruce Grant, an Australian correspondent, has leaned on his fourteen trips to Indonesia to provide a very readable general survey of that nation's political attitudes and problems.

This is not a scholarly book and makes no pretence of being one. In his preface the author asserts that, "As I am not a scholar this is not a scholarly work. The information is often raw and the judgements made without reference to previous authority." (p. vi). Mr. Grant does not use footnotes although he does allude to authorities such as Geertz, Kahin and Feith. However, the basic inability of the reader to check sources, when combined with infrequent cases of an apparent mixture of fact and myth, limits the volume's usefulness to the scholar.

The book itself is a survey of Indonesia's history, politics and culture, mixing straight historical and biographical accounts with personal observations on policies and personalities. It is sympathetic to the Indonesian revolution, empathetic with its political leadership and rather hostile towards Dutch colonial rule. At the same time it is generally critical of contemporary Indonesian political and economic policies. Beyond providing a readable introduction to the country to the general public, it does have marginal value to the scholar in the field insofar as the material results from the author's personal background and files. In this vein, two particularly interesting chapters deal with Australia's relations with Indonesia and a compilation of interviews with six anonymous Indonesians. While the latter does not pretend to be a scientific sampling, the conversations in themselves are intriguing insights into the attitudes of various individuals in the Indonesian "elite."

This book will not provide much that is new to the student of Southeast Asia who will find its use primarily of an anecdotal nature. At the same time, the paucity of responsible information on Indonesia is such that we should welcome contributions of journalists such as Mr. Grant.—Fred R. Von der Mehden, University of Wisconsin.

Politics of Change in Latin America. EDITED BY JOSEPH MAIER AND RICHARD W. WEATHER-HEAD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. x, 258. \$6.00.)

The Challenge of Development in Latin America. By Victor L. Urquidi. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xiv, 209. \$6.00; Paper \$1.95.)

Among the flood of recent books on Latin America a major theme running through a preponderance of them deals with political, economic, and social change. The long-time stagnation of so much of hemisphere life is being disrupted by efforts toward economic modernization. And the ascendancy to political power of groups bent on attacking traditionalism gains especial significance in the Chilean presidential elections of 1964 when the winning Christian Democrats promised "Revolution with Freedom." Thus, it seems certain that fundamental alterations of the old order are inexorable and the major uncertainty involves normative questions-what should be the methodology, the guide lines, and directions. In Politics of Change in Latin America the authors turn to various aspects of contemporary processes of change, while Víctor Urquidi, in his Challenge of Development in Latin America, seeks to outline the essentials of economic issues.

Urquidi, an outstanding Mexican economist of international reputation, combines the vital attributes of the theorist and activist. Unlike so many Latin American writers who view their economies with a certain hopelessness, Urquidi believes that, compared with central Africa and much of Southeast Asia, in Latin America there exist far more "positive than negative factors." But these positive factors primarily relate to Latin America as a whole rather than to single nations and the apparent economic divergencies among them. In other words, he makes a strongly insistent appeal to these countries to consider themselves as members of "a Latin America and a Latin American economy."

The components of similarity include a population that is essentially young and expanding faster than any other area of the world; a majority of the people living in rural environments and largely engaged in agriculture and livestock raising; an average living standard that is low—with a gross product per person about one-eighth of the United States in 1960 and on a par with Japan, though approximately four times greater than that of central Africa and five times more than that of underdeveloped Asia; an impressive acceleration in industrial output that lamentably has been offset by a slump in the growth of agricultural production; and severely uneven income distribution which acts as a drag on economic development.

Once he explores these characteristics, Urquidi uncovers the many facets of the Latin American economy in general. He points out and explains the uniqueness of this region with its long periods of financial confusion; the role of foreign capital which has been invested with visible results at the same time that Latin America "has employed part of its own resources in unproductive activities, consumer expenditures, and even exports of its capital to more developed countries"; development's retardation due to the instability of international market conditions for primary products: and the social and institutional conditions of development, economic integration, and planning. In his final chapter the author discusses the Alliance for Progress. Since his evaluations really apply to the pre-Alliance economies of Latin America—Urquidi's book being a translation of lectures given in 1961 at the Colegio Nacional of Mexico-his main observation is one of optimism. He reminds us that at Punta del Este the United States recognized Latin American concepts of what was needed without tying the rest of the hemisphere completely to itself. At the same time, the U.S. recognized the necessity of economic planning (rather than urging dependence upon private foreign capital) and for the first time accepted the premise that Latin America's overall problem of social and economic development begs integral solutions. He concludes by commenting on the possibility that "Latin America never before has enjoyed a combination of external circumstances so favorable to converting its utopias into reality."

For the most part, the thirteen contributions to Politics of Change in Latin America are outstanding and seek to shed some new light on the vital subject suggested in the title. In the first segment, "The Forces of Change and Continuity," Weatherhead opens with an excellent introduction to paradoxes in the Latin American tradition of conflict. He tackles such theses and antitheses by setting out four propositions: "(1) the ideal of hemispheric unity and the reality of particularistic disunity, (2) the quest for a distinct national character and the curse of insignificance in the modern world, (3) the nineteenth century legacy and the revolutionary mystique, and (4) the

dream of democracy and the practice of tyranny." Richard Morse and Arturo Uslar-Pietri consider ontological questions regarding Latin America's search for self-identity—the latter stressing the wrongness in generalizing about Latin America (hence, running somewhat counter to Urquidi's insistence that Latin America must consider itself as a single economic entity).

In Part Two, "The Political Puzzle," Arthur Whitaker outlines the strength and universality of nationalism among the twenty republics: Robert Alexander defines modern political party systems using as his typology traditionalistic, foreigninspired, and indigenous parties of change; and two authors (Daniel Cosío Villegas and Stanley Ross) seek to unravel the perplexities of modern Mexico. Cosío Villegas contends that the Mexican Revolution developed built-in "forces of renewal and change," though the final revolutionary stage lies ahead. The fact that this last phase is still to come favors the Mexican Left just as the Left. albeit full of shortcomings, is indispensable to Mexican progress. Professor Ross also ponders the Revolution, but adds a special warning to the U. S. to understand our great neighbor's history and, above all, to "recognize what the Russians already appreciate—namely, that the Mexican Revolution, by its achievement of social progress while maintaining freedom, offers a meaningful alternative to revolution Communist-style."

Brazil dominates the third section. Gilberto Freyre reiterates his belief in the necessity of studying "the intimate past of a social group"in this instance, the role of the patriarchal family in Brazil's history. Charles Wagley picks up the threads from the point of the traditional family's deterioration and goes on to make a case for the still powerful function of kinship in contemporary economic, social, and political life. But it is Anthony Leeds who performs particularly valuable yeoman service by shattering myths current in the United States about Francisco Julião. Leeds argues with great persuasiveness that Julião does not hold the influence generally attributed to him, that he is in fact a latifundista himself and a member of the controlling class. Furthermore, his principal motivation in tying himself to the masses is not altruistic but instead an attempt to secure an electoral base that will strengthen his own political career as well as to use this base against the powerful coastal sugar interests and traditional local leaders.

Finally, in "Challenges to the Western Hemisphere," three chapters are devoted to the need for the United States to put its racial house in order so that our image will improve in Latin America (Joseph Maier), the importance of emphasizing the first word of "Alliance for Progress" in place of "aid" (Germán Arciniegas), and cer-

tain misunderstandings besetting the Alliance for Progress (Víctor Urquidi).

All in all, both of these books merit wide attention. Urquidi's has the advantage of continuity and an integrated thesis. Whereas sometimes it is difficult to ascertain the pertinence of a given chapter to Maier and Weatherhead's general theme and a couple of chapters merely rehash old stories. Nevertheless, it does comprise some exceptionally worthy discussions. Both books acknowledge the considerable contributions of Professor Frank Tannenbaum to Latin American scholarship. And in the aggregate, the writing style, content, and choice of theme fall in the dynamic Tannenbaum tradition.—Ben G. Burnett, Whittier College.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

The Law of International Waterways—With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals. By R. R. BAXTER, WITH THE RESEARCH ASSISTANCE OF JAN F. TRISKA. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. vii, 371. \$9.50.)

This is an important and impressive book. While it is not a book to skim, it is likewise not one to abandon before completion. Professor Baxter of the Harvard Law School, with the research assistance of Dr. Jan F. Triska of Stanford University, has succeeded in presenting with authority and clarity the results of an intensive study of an intricate subject. The reader's interest is stimulated by attention to major crises rooted

in conflicting national interests concerning international waterways. Interest is maintained by skillful reference to other pertinent events as well as by citation of a wealth of documentary material. Not only is this the first comprehensive overview of the subject; for some time to come it is likely to remain the definitive work. Had the book existed at the time of the 1956 Suez affair, it can be hazarded that confusion, official and unofficial, would have been less. It is to be hoped that the work will contribute to formulation of sophisticated proposals and policies in disputes and difficulties looming on the horizon.

In the context of existing international law

concerning navigation through international rivers and straits Professor Baxter focusses on the law and institutions devised to operate or supervise interoceanic canals, in particular the three major canals: Suez, Panama and Kiel. That law he sees as the outgrowth of state practice, treaties and adjudication. With the objective of maintaining free passage through these important commercial channels the developing law has placed restrictions on territorial sovereigns, operating or supervisory agencies, and users. Believing the time ripe for codification of these rules in the interests of greater precision and more widespread acceptance, Professor Baxter in an Appendix puts forth the essentials of such a code. Though he examines the organization, range of competence and functions of a possible international administering agency for interoceanic canals, he concludes that the continuing, gradual development of a body of customary international law is a more hopeful means of pursuing the objective of maximum free passage than is internationalization in the present political environment.

The elements of Professor Baxter's proposed code are probed in successive chapters concerned with the operation of interoceanic canals, passage in time of peace and in time of war, fiscal controls, and technical problems (dredging, maintaining locks, pilotage, towage, traffic control, and labor).

The suggested draft regulations are pragmatic and conservative. Admitting the difficulty of enforcing them in crises, Professor Baxter relies on self-interest to induce compliance. Crises are however, rooted in the conflicting interests of territorial sovereign, operator and users, when these are or involve different states as in the cases of Suez and Panama. It is this fact plus the political and military interests of states in none of these categories that establish the concern of the international community not only in the just resolution of differences but also in the uninterrupted flow of traffic through these vital arteries. The Suez crisis clearly showed the inadequacy of existing international institutions in both these respects and a Panama crisis may repeat the lesson.

Professor Baxter's cautious look to the future is undeniably solidly grounded in past experience. He is probably realistic in depreciating expectation of accomplishment by international organs under present conditions. But tomorrow's law is necessarily a response to today's problems. Increasingly effective institutions and the growth of community consensus are no less interrelated internationally than domestically. From so comprehensive and meticulous a study a few imaginative guideposts to more effective community organs and procedures might not unreasonably have emerged.—Ruth C. Lawson, Mount Holyoke College.

Maroc 1943-1956: Le Conflit Franco-Marocain. By Stéphane Bernard. (Brussells: Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1963. 3 vols. 390, 286, 402 pages. 900 FB for the 3 vols.)

This ambitious work is the second of a series of four monographs sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in an effort to contribute on a general theory of international conflicts. The author has divided his study into three parts: the first book is a history of the Franco-Moroccan conflict, the second a description of institutions and social groups involved in the conflict, and the third, the "pièce de résistance" that concerns us here, is an attempt to extract from the Moroccan experience a political theory of colonial conflicts.

The theory is based on both a functional analysis (the inability of a colonial system to solve crucial problems) and an analysis of the relations between key variables-situations, attitudes, political decisions. Underlying it is the acceptance of a political determinism that stresses the "simple cleavage" separating the anticolonialism of the subjected people and the conservatism of the "colons"—the only anomalous elements being the conservatism of Moroccan "notables" and the liberalism of a small fraction of the French settlers. The deterministic sequence can be briefly summed up: new conditions create new attitudes and ideologies, all of which tend to restrict the potential authority of the government. Past a certain point, this authority lapses, as it becomes impossible to use force as a substitute for the lost consensus. The incapacity of the French government and of the "Résidence," prisoner of the colons and the colonial administrators, to find constructive solutions to the crisis soon led to an impasse that forced the nationalists to armed opposition. The author wisely points out that the revolutionary war alone could not force a decision; "elle n'est que l'argument central de la constellation de forces matérielles, politiques et morales qui finiront par décider la métropole à abandonner la lutte, mais qui seraient inopérantes si le nationalisme local reconçait à l'usage de la force" (p. 124).

To this reviewer, the major drawback of Mr. Bernard's methodology is that it does not give him a particularly useful framework for selecting and integrating relevant data. It even seems to relieve him from carefully examining some basic assumptions and from marshalling facts to support his argumentation. Thus the assumption of a deterministic sequence is complemented by the convenient concept of the appearance of "virtual" nationalist attitudes as the result of new conditions. These virtual attitudes need to be translated into actual ones by leaders and organiza-

tions, but their very existence makes the role of leadership and organization secondary and allows the author to avoid analyzing the mechanics of the acquisition of new attitudes by various social groups.

Very little is being said about the composition of the revolutionary elites and their roles in converting urban, and much later, rural masses. Only scant allusions are made to the "complex sociological structure" of the first activist nucleus, to the entry upon the scene of Western educated leaders or to the role of the trade unions. Urban nationalism is briefly characterized as the specific protest of those groups most directly affected by the consequences of colonialism. But nothing specific is said about the "new conditions" that were to create new attitudes.

The basic error of the colonialists, according to the author, is their belief that the determinant factor in the situation was the action of revolutionists on politically neutral masses incapable of spontaneous action. The colonialist thesis thus called for the elimination of the legal fictions of the Treaty of Fez and the imprisonment of the nationalist leaders. "L'erreur de l'autorité francaise est d'avoir cru que les révolutions sont faites par des chefs . . . En révolution, l'adversaire n'est pas le chef révolutionnaire, c'est la masse organisée" (p. 99). But what are the "organized masses"? Are they to be identified with what is otherwise described as elites, "noyau irréductible," "minorité active"? Why assume the spontaneous reflex of a "masse en mal de révolution"? It was not, after all, until 1955, when victory seemed assured by the return to power of Mohammed V that the rural masses, some 80 per cent of the population, began to follow the nationalist leaders.

Mr. Bernard rightly points out that the logic of the situation favored the growth of a revolutionary nationalist movement in Morocco and at the same time the successful holding operation of the conservatives in both France and, for obvious reasons, in Morocco. But why dismiss the concept of consensus, that is central to his explanation of the political evolution of Morocco, when it comes to explaining the political impotence of the French Left and why replace it with the questionable concept of "social integration" to account for the absence of a powerful left wing movement of decolonization? According to the author decisions favorable to the status quo and to the recourse to force were inevitable in the French context, the crisis of the regime playing only a minor role. Yet a decision was easily found in 1956 to both the Moroccan and the Tunisian crises with a minimum of resistance from the Right. This decision was not due, as the author suggests, solely to the admission of defeat and to the need to concentrate French military efforts in Algeria.

The bibliography ignores most of the relevant non-French sources.—Charles A. Micaud, *University of Denver*.

The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator of the International Mails. By George A. Codding, Jr. (New York: New York University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 296. \$6.50.)

Although even today one occasionally hears it suggested that the United States Post Office should be turned over to private enterprise, it appears that the delivery of the mails is among the oldest of government enterprises dating back at least to about 2000 B.C. in ancient Egypt. Throughout the centuries it became generally recognized as an appropriate government function, and finally, more than 100 years ago, became established everywhere as a government monopoly. The necessity for special arrangements to expedite the delivery of mail across national borders was also recognized early, the first postal treaty (between France and Spain) being negotiated in 1601; this was followed by numerous bilateral postal conventions between the various states, but their lack of uniformity made it evident that something more was needed to bring order out of chaos. Various individuals and groups made proposals for an international postal system, but it was Lincoln's Postmaster General, Montgomery Blair, who initiated the procedures that brought agreement in 1863 on the basic principles and finally the creation in 1874 of the General Postal Union (later called the Universal Postal Union).

The detailed story of these developments and of the operation of the Universal Postal Union is told in this book, in seven chapters. The author spent considerable time at the UPU headquarters in Geneva, he is also something of an expert in the field of international communications, and his account may be considered authoritative as well as interesting. The Universal Postal Union is particularly significant as the second oldest international governmental organization, being preceded only by the International Telegraph Union (now the International Telecommunications Union). It had therefore to be set up without experience as a guide, and its experience has become over the years a useful guide for other international organizations. It has grown in membership from 21 in 1874 to 123 in 1964, exceeded only by the World Meteorological Organization (125), another even more technical organization. Its size and its persistence are, no doubt, due to these somewhat unique features of its organization and operation: (1) It is technical and administrative in its purposes and functions, and about as nonpolitical as it is possible to be. (2) Colonies and

overseas territories have been admitted to membership on an equality with sovereign states. This was changed in 1947 to permit generally only sovereign states in the future, but with dependent areas still admissible by special action, all of which is in conformity to the rapid dwindling away of colonial or non-self-governing territories. (3) The procedure of admission has been very easy, a simple declaration of adherence only being required until this also was changed in 1947 to the requirement of two-thirds approval by the members. (4) The organization has been quite simple, with no continuing organs whose activities could be seriously curtailed by war or other international conflict. On the other hand, the UPU was, of course, affected by both World Wars, the free flow of mail being restricted in various ways by the belligerents. But the existence of UPU and its location in neutral Switzerland made it possible for its International Bureau (or secretariat) to function continuously throughout the wars and for the Organization to renew its activities immediately after the cessation of hostilities.

The author examines also the relationship of the UPU to the League of Nations and the United Nations, respectively. In the case of the former, Article 24 of the Covenant clearly contemplated that the UPU, as well as other existing international organizations, should be brought under the direction of the League. This was not accomplished for various reasons, the most important being that consent of the contracting parties was required. The author manages to avoid direct mention of the United States in this connection. but the implication is pretty clear that we were the chief obstacle. With the establishment of the United Nations, the UPU could no longer hold out against absorption into the larger organization as a Specialized Agency, but it did secure provisions that maintain its relative independence over that of most other Specialized Agencies. The problems, advantages, and disadvantages that arise under the system are fully examined by the

This is a good book, scholarly and readable. There are four annexes of useful information, an extensive bibliography, and an index.—Clarence A. Berdahl, University of Illinois.

The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order. By Richard A. Falk. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1964. Pp. xvi, 184. \$6.50.)

Professor Falk's carefully reasoned book is a contribution to the work in the Procedural Aspects of International Law under the auspices of Syracuse University School of Law's International Legal Studies Program. It is "a search for a conception of domestic judicial function that is

broad enough to acknowledge the national setting and to explain the duty of upholding international law" (p. 170). This conception must come within a framework which is based on the following two factors: (1) "International law exists in a social system that possesses weak central institutions" (p. ix), and (2) "Domestic courts must struggle to become their own masters in international law cases" (p. x).

He develops the dual responsibility of national courts: the status of domestic courts as national institutions, and the status of domestic courts as agents upholding the international order. In the domestic field the court is a national institution maintaining the legal order. In the international field the domestic court is an international agent applying international law in order that the international legal order may be maintained. The domestic court, however, may be bound by the Act of State doctrine when it has a case under its jurisdiction involving international law. The author desires to have the domestic court divorced from an executive decree when it acts as an international agent. He thinks the act of state doctrine must apply to the courts only in those situations where there is no global concensus in making a substantive rule of law. When there is a global concensus, the court must be free of the act of state doctrine. He says, "The courts must not play dead when the executive chooses to act" (p. 160). It is his viewpoint that "A domestic court operates at that peculiarly sensitive point where national and international authority intersect. The character of this intersection is closely connected with the role that can be given to law in world politics" (p. 170).

National courts, acting as agents, have an added responsibility in upholding the international legal order because "States continue to be unwilling to entrust international tribunals with reliable and regular adjudicatory competence; the result is that domestic courts are often the only judicial institution likely to adjudge the legality of important controversies about the application of international law" (p. 172). He directs his argument primarily at the judicial behavior of the courts in the United States, and he thinks that if the national courts were free to apply the rules of international law without restraint, it would involve some sacrifice on our part but it would be trivial in comparison with the sacrifice we appear so ardently to make in order to uphold our obligations of self-defense. Numerous cases are discussed in depth, and special attention is given to such landmarks as: Banco Nacional de Cuba vs. Sabbatino (a significant portion of his book is devoted to a critical evaluation of the majority and minority opinions of this case), Rich vs. Naviera Vacuba S.A., Bernstein vs. Van Heyghen Societe Anonyme, and United States vs. Pink. (See the excellent list of cases, pp. 179-181.)

In addition, the United States, because of her peculiar position in world affairs, has a definite responsibility as well as a golden opportunity to lead the way toward the settlement of controversies involving international law in domestic courts with the courts acting more like international than national agents in upholding the international legal order. It is the duty of our courts to help fill the institutional vacuum, and it is essential for our courts to work toward a common methodology that would lead to a uniform pattern of outcomes and explanations. This is possible because "Domestic Courts have extensive experience with problems of balancing the claims of the forum against the claims of foreign states that have an interest in the outcome of a legal dispute" (p. 173). It is the author's argument in his book that particular attention must be given to the horizontal structure of international society, to a dominant convergence of values, especially in the human rights field, and to a dominant divergence in the area of economic policy. He concludes his work with the plea that domestic courts accept as their role: "First, as complete an independence of executive policy as possible; second, an extensive deference in areas of diversity, together with a considerable aggressiveness in areas of concensus" (p. 177).

This book is coolly reasoned, carefully documented, and scholarly written. In his concern with judicial deference to executive authority in American courts he has the satisfaction of seeing his reasoning primarily accepted by the Supreme Court in the famous case Banco Nacional de Cuba vs. Sabbatino. In fact, a deserving tribute is contained in the statement by Rickard B. Lillich, in his Foreword to the book, when he suggested, "After reading the book, re-read the Supreme Court's opinion in Sabbatino to see Professor Falk's jurisprudence in action" (p. ix).—James A. Gathings, Bucknell University.

Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. By M. A. FITZSIMONS. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 235. \$6.00.)

Professor Fitzsimons' title is hardly descriptive of his work, on several scores. In the first place, the time specification is misleading, for the work is primarily concerned with the post World War II years, from 1945 to the present. Thus most of the Twentieth Century is considered only in a cursory fashion.

More important, the term "Empire by Treaty" is, according to the author, presumed to refer to British relationships with Middle Eastern states in the between-the-war years; again, this subject

is, by his own choice, summarily treated.

Most important of all (p. ix), "The title is intended to suggest the characteristic form of British relationship with many Middle Eastern countries. By treaties Britain sought to gain the assent, notably of Arab rulers, to concessions and bases that Britain believed to be essential for the protection of British interests and the maintenance of a British order. The antecedents of the Treaty Empire, a half-way house of British imperialism, go back to Britain's early impact on the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms." As a corollary, this empire retreated after World War II; but Professor Fitzsimons is (p. 225) "less surprised at the ending of British influence and more impressed by the fact that for so long a time it remained formidable beyond the magnitude of its supporting power."

In one sense, the author, having stated his hypothesis, then ignores it. There is no way to determine, from the evidence he presents, whether or not this Empire was indeed unique, different from that which preceded it, as he assumes this without examining the question. Further, neither his time span nor his approach permit him to deal with the question of whether treaties were indeed significant in British relationships, or whether he is really confusing the dignified with the efficient. His more detailed analysis of the retreat from Empire indicates that this is indeed the case.

In yet another sense the author ignores his hypothesis: rather than examining British relationships with specific power structures in the relevant areas, he is giving an overall view of diplomatic history. One may, as Professor Fitzsimons has done, make inferences from the recital of events of diplomacy; this reviewer finds the evidence strangely unsatisfying.

The final corollary—that Britain, by utilizing "treaties" rather than other techniques, "slowed" (to quote the blurb on the dust jacket) "the tide of history"—is equally undeterminable. Evidentally, if there was an "Empire Treaty," it lasted from twenty to twenty-five years—hardly a durable arrangement, either in terms of human history or British imperial history. Again, the evidence is unimpressive, or indeed, contrary to the stated thesis.

Perhaps these strictures are unfair, as basically the author is not attempting in any systematic fashion to test a hypothesis. He is relating a narrative of a series of events: selected aspects of the international politics of the Middle East in the post war years with a focus on British actions. With this more modest goal, the author is more successful. While a political scientist might yearn for a modicum of conceptualization of such terms as "power," "influence" and "interest," this

again would be asking the author to do a study he did not intend doing—John H. Millett, Wichita State University.

Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History. By Jacques Freymond. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. vii, 236. \$5.50.)

"France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union... Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain; every British subject will become a citizen of France." It is not always easy today to recall this proposal made by Winston Churchill on July 16th, 1940, less than twenty-five years ago. Nor does one readily remember that on March 18th, 1944 General de Gaulle in Algiers evoked a vision of post-war Europe: "as inclusive as possible... established on an economic basis... The English Channel, the Rhine, and the Mediterranean would be the arteries of this grouping, which would extend outward to Africa and the Orient."

The great virtue of this little book by the Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva is that Professor Freymond takes a historian's perspective and thus reminds us of the whole complex background of current European developments. Occasionally, a single comment on the past is as illuminating as a beacon. On p. 63, Professor Freymond asserts, "The Western Europe of 1945 was socialist, despite the fact that no one could say what kind of socialism it was." This is true, and it is equally true that in 1964 Western Europe is anything but socialist. In most reviews of post-war European developments, insufficient attention has been given to the fact that Western Europe has not only resisted aggression from the East, recovered economically and culturally, and has made several supra-national experiments, but that Western Europe has also been less and less influenced by those socialist movements which contributed the major political initiatives of the 1930s and 1940s within the Western European democracies. It may well be that the most durable impression left by the now receding years of de facto American dominance of Western Europe is not economic recovery per se, but rather the diffusion of a pragmatic approach to politics that owes more to Roosevelt's New Deal and its exponents than to the ideas of Marx, Kautsky and Jaurès. There is in fact reason to hope that Western Europeans understand the United States far better today than they did during and just after the War. Misunderstandings of course continue, and an event such as President Kennedy's tragic assassination still shakes the faith in this country of even the most sympathetic European observer, but blindly dogmatic anti-Americanism is no longer in vogue among European youth. It may be a paradox, but even the France of de Gaulle appears in terms of public understanding to be far closer to America than was the France of Bidault, Blum and Ramadier.

Again, on p. 72, Professor Freymond concludes his review of the founding of NATO by stating, "In fact, nothing cemented this newly created alliance but the Soviet Union." This is also true. and it is a most useful reminder that the present crisis of NATO is inevitably a product, less of newly diverging purposes among the United States and her allies than of a drastic general reduction of the threat which Soviet aggression today is believed to represent. Aside from the mutual desire for a common defense against Russian attack, no greater consensus on positive common goals and policies existed among the NATO allies at its founding than exists today. If there are aspects in which NATO has been a disappointment, surely the most poignant of these is the failure to implement during the past decade its potential for generating a positive content.

Because Professor Freymond's comprehensive review is full of such helpful and stimulating reminders, it is a great pity that it is in part spoiled by inexcusably careless editing. To be useful, a short history must at least be accurate. Despite the author's penetrating analysis, it is hard to put one's faith in a book that, for example, refers to R. A. Butler in both text and index as Sir Harold Butler (pp. 37, 115, 229); that dates the East German uprising on June 17th, 1954 instead of 1953 (p. 104); that dates a crucial minute from Ernest Bevin which contributed to the founding of NATO from 1949 rather than 1948 (p. 55); and which refers to Lester Pearson as Prime Minister of Canada in 1949 (p. 61).—Steven Muller, Cornell University.

The McNamara Strategy. By WILLIAM W. KAUF-MANN. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. ix, 339. \$5.95.

Robert S. McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense since January 1961 has been an extraordinary era in the administration of that extraordinary establishment, the U.S. Department of Defense. The McNamara tour de force is a fit subject for detailed and thoughtful examination, and Professor William W. Kaufmann has produced what we may properly presume to be an authoritative exposition of what has happened in this period. Professor Kaufmann has been close to Secretary McNamara and to many of his most influential subordinates since the beginning of the administration and this book therefore is by an insider. It is not, however, a book for insiders.

By letting "McNamara describe what he has been doing in his own words whenever possible," Professor Kaufmann has developed a sophisticated justification rather than a profound examination of the changes which have occurred in the department and its activities under McNamara. This is not a study of organization, however. The thematic structure of the book is to be found in the means by which Secretary McNamara has gone about implementing the strategy of flexible response and multiple options.

The strategy of flexible response is a strategy of nuclear deterrence based on the premise that the best deterrence is the ability to fight and "win" the war you want to deter. At the level of thermonuclear war, this strategy enters the realm of the "unthinkable" since it contemplates the various ways in which strategic nuclear weapons might be exchanged. From this contemplative act, certain conclusions may be drawn as to the ways damage might be "limited" within the fires of war.

An extension of the thermonuclear strategy of flexible response is the quest for a structure of forces-nuclear and non-nuclear-which permits "multiple options" in the face of a multiplicity of threats and commitments. Much of the effort and perhaps the most profound controversies of the McNamara Department have been directed toward a national and multilateral capability for "conventional" and "unconventional" warfare. Within the U.S. defense establishment these two elements have been symbolized in the organization of STRICOM and the build-up and redirection of Special Forces. Internationally, the focuses of these two efforts have been the controversy within NATO about a buildup of conventional forces on the one hand, and the intervention in South Vietnam on the other.

The forces to attain each new strategic option cost something more and characteristically cost is the central theme in the McNamara era. The secretary is an accountant at some level of existence and a principal contrast between him and his predecessors may follow from that fact. Particularly in the administration of Charles Wilson the budget ceiling was the effective control device and the outcome was summarized as a "bigger bang for a buck." Typically McNamara has started with a strategic goal and by comparison shopping and cost accounting looked for suitable weapons at lowest cost. The difference, according to Professor Kaufmann, comes about through the procedures of planning-programmingbudgeting, and the technique of cost-effectiveness analysis. By these means strategic requirements and budgeting constraints are brought into meaningful inter-action and consideration is given to alternative means (presumably at different costs) to attain an objective.

Professor Kaufmann's book is good without being very exciting for students of the Department of Defense. It is a record of McNamara's views on what McNamara has been trying to do. For that reason other views on some of the questions hardly see the light of day. For example, the author effectively dismisses rather than discusses the admittedly very subtle question of whether or not military judgment has been eliminated in decisions on weapons systems, and gives few of the arguments opposed to the conventional build-up in NATO, or the hasty MLF agreements.

Moreover, the highly personal focus of the book, which has stimulated at least one characterization of it as a campaign document, tends to distort the fact that reorganizations of the DOD and other events in the Eisenhower administration made it possible for McNamara to implement his methods, that the strategic ideas originated with others such as Maxwell Taylor, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and even W. W. Kaufmann, and that the procedural ideas were developed by Charles Hitch, Roland McKean, Alain Enthoven, Henry Rowen, et al.

In a somewhat Panglossian chapter on tests of effectiveness of the McNamara defense establishment, Professor Kaufmann discusses the Berlin crisis, the Cuban affairs, and South Vietnam. His general summation is that the outcome of these various events could have been worse, that with a choice of means the President could also require his antagonists to make choices, and that given the need for fighting there has been a selection of forces at hand. One may question whether it is this sort of conclusion which is relevant to the effectiveness of the McNamara department or whether the long run effect of the kind of decisions symbolized by Skybolt, TFX, nuclear powered aircraft, or communication satellites would be more to the point.—David A. Wilson, University of California at Los Angeles.

New Nations in a Divided World, The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States. EDITED BY KURT LONDON. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963. Pp. 336. \$6.50 cloth, \$2.25 paper.)

Les Nouveaux Etats dans les Relations Internationales. Edited by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Jean Meyriat. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962. Pp. 495. No price given.)

Anyone concerned with the so-called "third world" must, if he tries to keep up with the literature, become increasingly frustrated and confused. The trickle of books and articles on the subject has become a roaring flood, and the company of scholars and "experts" in the field has grown to an army. Thus not only has the number of individual studies increased tremendously, but increasingly, anthologies, symposia, conferences, group discussions, seminars, have come to publication. Unfortunately, the need to swell the flood all too often takes precedence over co-

herence and clarity. Sometimes, however, a symposium may result in the publication of a well organized, intelligently edited collection. The two books under question, although dealing ostensibly with the same general theme, are excellent examples of this very difference.

Les Nouveaux Etats was the result of a symposium sponsored by the Centre d'étude des relations internationales (C.E.R.I.) of the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, and appeared in its Cahiers series. The scholars represented in the volume initially worked from two separate but related questions: What are the distinctive characteristics of the foreign policies of the new states? How have the "older" countries, in particular the "great powers" in the traditional sense, been affected by the appearance of an increasing number of new states on the world scene? With guestions of such magnitude, the temptation to be prolix and global in scope must have been enormous. The editors and authors showed exemplary restraint, and the result was a series of wellintegrated essays grouped under three main rubrics. The first includes three studies dealing with the effect of external models of political. social, and economic development-particularly the Soviet and Chinese examples—upon the new states. Of the three essays, "Les pays sousdeveloppés devant les modèles marxistes; U.R.S.S. et Chine," by the USSR-China section of the C.E.R.I., is noteworthy as one of the best explorations of the subject in print. The second group of essays examine several aspects of the influence of the old colonial powers—les anciennes metropoles-upon their former wards. Of particular interest is Raymond Barré's excellent survey of the persistence of economic ties, "L'indépendance a l'epreuve des réalites économiques." The essay complements rather neatly Elliot Berg's now almost classic "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," published in the American Political Science Review, June 1960. The third rubric groups three articles dealing with the role of the new states in international affairs, with their attitudes vis-àvis such questions as non-engagement, and neutralism, and with their participation in international organizations. The rush of events has already made much of the material in these last three essays out of date, but they remain useful as thoughtful explorations of the adjustments faced by the new states as they confront a world in which they find their problems considered peripheral, rather than central preoccupations of statesmen and international organizations. In all, the eleven essays in this book are of high quality, and together they present a coherent whole. A useful index completes the book.

In contrast, the collection edited by Kurt London exemplifies the perils of the anthologist's craft.

It includes some twenty of the fifty-seven papers submitted to the International Congress on "The Non-Aligned Afro-Asian Countries in a Divided World," held in Athens in September, 1962. Judging from London's introduction-probably the most interesting piece in the book-the conference must have been extremely lively, involving as it did Europeans, Americans, Africans, and Asians in a stimulating, apparently often emotional series of discussions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the papers are of such uneven quality and that they reflect so little of the apparent vigor of the conference. Most appear as little more than position papers, and only a handful explore their subject with any thoroughness. One would have wished that the editor had used his prerogatives fully and selected a smaller number of pieces, had them expanded, and then reprinted them along with some of the discussions that followed. This reviewer would, for example, have liked to have seen expanded versions of such papers as Walter Laqueur's "'Neo-Colonialism'-the Soviet Concept," B. G. D. Folson's "The Communist View of Colonialism-An African Interpretation," Kalu Ezera's "The Role of a Constitution in Developing Political Systems: The Nigerian Example," and W. Edward Blyden (III)'s "The Idea of African Neutralism and 'Non-Alignment.' " Finally, there is the question of emphasis. If the papers are any evidence, then the conference must have been "haunted by the specter of Communism." Fifteen of the papers reprinted by London deal explicitly with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist world's relations with the new nations. The Conference's Cold War preoccupation is perhaps understandable, but somewhat difficult to explain, since most of the new nations' relations are with the West and, increasingly, with each other. The picture presented by the book is, therefore, an unhappily distorted one. The three major rubrics under which the papers are organized testify to this: (1) Colonialism and Communism-seven papers; (2) New Nations in Transition-four papers; (3) Communist Policies in Non-Aligned Countries—nine papers.

In sum, the contrasts between the two books bespeak both the dangers and the possibilities of such enterprises. The Duroselle-Meyriat volume deserves to be read and pondered over, and—hopefully—translated into English. The London volume is simply not worth the price of purchase.
—Victor T. Le Vine, Washington University, St. Louis.

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. By Edward S. Mason. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. ix, 118. \$3.50.)

The recent frustrations and agonizing debates in Congress have prompted the writing of several sophisticated works on foreign aid, of which this book is an outstanding example. Dr. Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor at Harvard, has a long and intimate connection with his subject, including membership on the recent Clay Committee. The substance of this thoughtful little book was originally presented as the Elihu Root Lectures at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, 1963.

Naturally there is no attempt in a work of necessarily limited scope to cover all aspects of foreign aid. Professor Mason directs his efforts primarily to a thoughtful examination of the most pressing questions which have recently been troubling the Congress and the public. While there is much support for foreign aid on the basis of a disinterested desire to help other peoples, as evidenced by the popularity of the Peace Corps, congressional support is closely related to the political objective of security, and some special economic interests are also served, as in the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities. Professor Mason believes experience has demonstrated that many of the instruments of foreign aid "are not likely to be subtle, flexible, and convenient tools adapted to tactical use and rapid maneuver." He feels that aid employed to win votes at the United Nations or to bolster unstable governments is likely to be less productive than aid based on a long term strategy of security. That objective, too, should be realistically limited. Consequently, he rejects the creation of a community of free nations based on the consent of the governed, supporting economic and social justice, and cooperating on matters of mutual concern, as unrealistic goals productive of bitter disillusionment.

Instead, foreign aid should support a will and capacity for economic development and a desire for independence in the recipient country, thereby offering its people real alternatives to communism and to the necessity for mobilizing internal resources by totalitarian methods. It has been found that in many countries a program of foreign aid can move towards such reasonable objectives. In some of these, however, progress is limited. External assistance cannot be fully utilized unless internal reforms are undertaken. In an interesting discussion, Professor Mason explores the limitations and possibilities of utilizing foreign aid as leverage for reforms by intervening in domestic affairs. He concludes that it can be done successfully under certain circumstances, and preferably by multi-lateral agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A separate chapter is devoted to the problem of sharing equitably the aid burden, a matter especially troublesome for Congress in view of recent balance-of-payments difficulties. Progress in this complex field is reviewed, and some thoughtful observations are made on the alternative courses available and the limitations of the methods for determining equitable shares. In a critical examination of America's major current aid obligation, the Alliance for Progress, Professor Mason recommends better coordination of policy in Washington and the creation of a regional organization in which the Latin American countries will have an effective voice and through which they will be able to promote domestic reforms essential to economic development in a number of countries.

The perspective of this book is pragmatic rather than doctrinaire, and essentially American. One hopes that Professor Mason will find the opportunity to analyze many points in greater detail. For example, certain responsibilities attach to the country or international agency which applies outside pressure for internal reforms. How do they avoid the real dangers of domination, paternalism, and lack of continuity of interest and effort? What if the reforms prove inadequate or produce harmful political and economic results? Then what are the responsibilities of the outsider? Does not the fostering of independent states by outside intervention assume some form of international interdependence? It would be helpful if scholars in the recipient countries would be stimulated to add to the current discussion of foreign aid by frank presentations from their own perspectives.—Alfred Fernbach, University of Virginia.

A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. By VINCENT P. ROCK. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. Pp. 399. \$7.50.)

At some point in the life of every human organization, the environment becomes so threatening as to make continued success in coping with it increasingly improbable. In that contingency, several options are available. The organization may deny its incompatibility with that environment by exaggerating its own capabilities, downgrading the extent of the threat, or converting an objective relationship into a purely ideological confrontation. A more adaptive response, of course, would be to appraise the nature of the incompatibility and then search for ways of modifying either the organization or its environment, in order to increase the probability of survival. A Strategy of Interdependence points very clearly toward the latter, more adaptive, response. The author recognizes—and articulates in a most compelling fashion—the inadequacy of strategic deterrence as a sole or primary means of pursuing our national interests and assuring our survival.

He does not, however, espouse any leap from the frying pan of military capability to the fire of trust in the goodwill of our adversaries. Rather, the study is an effort to dove-tail short-run defense policies with longer-run policies of collaboration based on mutual confidence.

As Rock sees it, the bridge between these two orientations is the recognition of existing elements of Soviet-American interdependence and the creation of additional ones. His proposed alternative to current American policy is "first, to devise and to invest in areas which will provide understanding and common actions in order that. . . the common interest will prevail over parochial ... purposes: and, second, to seek by a variety of approaches to restrain and limit the means and occasions of violent conflict" (p. 21). Though he never quite comes to grips with the distinction between the recognition and the creation of interdependence, the emphasis seems to be heavily on the latter, with comprehensive and suggestive chapters on: (a) space, atmosphere, and oceans; (b) spread and application of technology; (c) communication, education and culture contact; and (d) the developing regions, as areas in which greater interdependence might be generated.

Since the policy proposals are by no means as "startling" as the jacket blurb implies (including the by-now-conventional emphasis on tacit and informal bargaining) let me turn to the research base from which they derive; this is the most interesting and unorthodox aspect of the volume. Both in the text itself and in a meaty 22 page Appendix, the author summarizes and builds upon a fairly impressive segment of the sociological and social-psychological literature, especially that which deals with conflict as a dependent variable. In addition, in his role as coordinator of an Institute for Defense Analyses project conducted for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, he consulted with and received reports from perhaps three dozen of the nation's leading Soviet specialists, military analysts and behavioral scientists.

As might be feared, however, his rich experience in government and little academic immersion was insufficient to assure that all these empirical and conceptual inputs would be systematically distilled and meaningfully synthesized. Thus, the sampling often lacks discrimination, effective integration is infrequently achieved, and redundancy abounds. Moreover, the absence of tight and disciplined organization of his material further accentuates the ethereal impression. Even if the author lacks any coherent theory with which to structure his many excellent ideas—as do, unhappily, those of us with whom he consulted—he might nevertheless have gone further in developing his taxonomy, however static.

Though this is clearly the sort of interdisciplinary effort that ought to be encouraged, and its policy proposals are of the sort with which few serious international relations scholars would quarrel, the reviewer must concede that its major value probably lies in the extent to which it advanced the education of its author.—J. David Singer, University of Michigan.

The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 380. \$7.50.)

The notion that was held strongly after the failure of the League by some scholars and the planners of the United Nations was that a broad economic and social cooperation was essential to have political collaboration among nations. Emphasizing this notion, David Mitrany in 1944 even hypothesized that functionalism will gradually lead nations toward political integration. In fact, the economic and social activities in the U.N. have been one of the most growing and active areas of the Organization. Needless to say, these activities have been interwoven into a political fabric of the U.N. This trend has been largely due to the fact that underdeveloped countries have increased their bargaining power and used that power in the reality of Cold War politics. The primary aim of the book under review is neither to test the hypothesis of political integration nor to examine the role of economic and social forces affecting the Organization as such; but rather it attempts to answer a general question: Why the Soviets became actively involved in the specialized agencies and regional economic commissions of the U.N.? The book focuses on Soviet attitude and policy toward developing nations within the limit of technical and economic activities.

Unlike many books on Soviet foreign policy, this case study rightly rejects an a priori position. More than two-thirds of the book is devoted to describing and to analyzing Soviet relationships with underdeveloped countries in the field of technical and economic activities, with a view to examining the determinants of Soviet policy changes. While Rubinstein holds that the core of Soviet ideology remains unchanged, its policies and attitudes have been flexible and will still be changed in order to achieve a better political climate in international organizations. Having become convinced of the political significance of underdeveloped and neutralist countries, the Soviet Union, the author points out, reversed its attitude toward international organizations from one of merely attempting to forestall the formation of anti-Soviet coalitions to active participation in functional activities. Largely through this new position, the Soviets have increased their prestige and confidence among these dramatically growing countries both in number and influence and thus have been able to command more influence.

Thus the changing policies of the Soviets have been a means of achieving goals and objectives. However, this manipulative consideration of Soviet participation in international organizations, as in the case of the other Great Powers, may lead, in the long run, to "the most promising hopes for the consequent erosion of Soviet ideology." (p. 356) The proposition here is that any genuine international stability must stem from the world-wide basis and that the nations, including the Soviet Union, will cooperate as long as they are convinced of the possibility of advancing their interests. The result might be a system whereby political climate can be controlled. This assumption, it should be pointed out, was made without clear assessment of the role of economic and social forces in international organizations.

Like many policy-oriented books, this one has some "proposals" to offer. It argues that the West (1) should not manipulate international organizations for temporary political victory of dubious merits; (2) should initiate and challenge the Soviets to join programs of helping needy countries within the institutional framework; (3) should elect a Soviet citizen as the head of a Specialized Agency; and (4) should not only establish the headquarters of a Specialized Agency in Moscow but also meet sessions of the General Assembly alternately in New York and Moscow.

Owing to these proposals, the book should be read by policy makers and the thinking public. For political scientists, it does demonstrate a methodologically interesting suggestion; namely, the determinants of Soviet policy-for which there is a lack of authentic records of policy formation-may be explored by resorting to a comparative analysis of relevant speeches, actions, internal Soviet professional and scholarly commentaries, and interviews. Unfortunately, however, the book often fails to document interpretations of data and it provides neither explanatory notes nor descriptions of survey research which constitute a major portion of its source materials. Thus, lacking clear methodological assistance, political scientists are left without being convinced of the validity of the data nor of the soundness of the interpretations.—Sungjook JUNN, Mercer University.

Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics. By Anwar Syed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964. Pp. 348. \$6.00.)

It is probably safe to argue that the Laws of Plato and the Politics of Aristotle are the works from which we learn the most about the principles of politics. A reading of Professor Syed's book supports the argument that from these same two authors we can learn the most about the political ideas and ideals of Walter Lippmann, for in fifty years of public writing during which he was, as often as not, far from the opinions of others and far from what he himself had written a book or two back, he was never far from his classical mentors. It is not so much that Lippmann has on occasion stated the obvious, but rather that he has consistently re-stated the Greeks. The "dead but sceptered sovereigns" rule his public and himself.

For Walter Lippmann the good society is a civilized society, a society under control. This means that decision making will be in the hands of men who are practical, realistic, and rational, men who will be making decisions for the benefit of their fellow citizens who lack these required characteristics and are hence uncivilized. Civilized men do what is right, he argues, because to do so is natural for them. Only such men can be trusted to do important jobs well. Lippmann combines, however, this approach of Plato with the Aristotelian view that the function of governors is to issue commands and give decisions, but with educated public support as a base to all action. The idealistic foundation for this realistic philosophy is the concept that man is answerable to a higher law than man's own average nature can comprehend. The supremacy of reason is not given to all but only to some. Theirs is the civilizing mission.

But the world is not yet the good society nor has it ever been. Men live in squabbling nations and not in the world at large. The real question is how do civilized men as leaders of nations deal with one another. Can a substantive theory of international politics be made of this relationship? Does not the tension between international theory and international reality make illusory any concept of the good society? Has not the hydrogen bomb made us all brothers in the one sense of naked survival but in little else?

According to Professor Syed, Lippmann accepts the struggle for power as a fact of international politics. In this sense Lippmann follows the thinking of Hobbes. The goal of the statesman is national self-interest, properly understood, which for Lippmann means prudently understood, for he would not have us take life and death stands in places that are "muddy and marshy and full of jungles." But man, says Lippmann, is obligated to pursue an ideal beyond mere power politics. This ideal is the comity of nations, which for Lippmann is something akin to the peace and wisdom of the

philosopher kings. Indeed, for Lippmann, it is something akin to the peace and wisdom of Anglo-American philosopher kings. Such an Alliance would be the first step toward a "civilized world," the structural principle of public international order. Professor Syed has done a good job of researching this point, even to showing how Walter Lippmann walked in the path cut by Andrew Carnegie!

Necessarily, the author refers to major events and developments in international politics over the past half century, and it is interesting to see him drag Mr. Lippmann through some rather prickly thickets of Mr. Lippmann's own making. The only trouble with this approach is that there will be some who will count the changes of opinion that Mr. Lippmann has made without understanding that the world has changed, too. One will have to let such critics feast away, I suppose.

This reviewer has but one major quarrel to pick with the author. To know a man's philosophy one should first know the man, or at least something about him. Professor Syed makes no facts on this score known to his readers, and thus we are left to guess that family, religion, education and experience—beyond the recounting of a few Harvard professors that Mr. Lippmann knew as a student—are of little consequence to the study of Walter Lippmann's views of man and the world. But noting this, the reviewer wants to go on record that this is a good book that will enlighten readers and that does justice to a notable American who has talked a lot of commonsense in his time.—Milton Colvin, Washington and Lee University.

The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership. By George E. Taylor. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 311. \$6.95.)

The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership is an important and stimulating book which contributes much to the American's otherwise inadequate understanding of Philippine affairs. This is a provocative, analytical discussion of the big issues in Philippine-American relations. Its author, Professor George Taylor, who prepared this study for the Council on Foreign Relations, reminds us that "it is not generally understood that U.S. policies in Southeast Asia today depend in great measure on political and military partnership with the Republic of the Philippines. . . . " He adds, "The success of the partnership however, can no longer be taken for granted." This salient fact, of course, helps explain the timing of the book's publication.

Taylor's own special contribution is that he has focused his attention on the major cause for recent changes in Philippine-American relations, the Filipino nationalist renaissance. He presents an historical survey of the development of Philippine nationalism and explains why the Filipino nationalist today views certain important events of the past as he does. Taylor here shows real empathy for the Philippine nationalist position. His book should be required reading for Americans participating in the formulation of U. S. policy toward the Philippines.

Despite its broad coverage, however, this book is not as useful a reference in the field of Philippine-American relations as might be hoped. It is without bibliography, and in many passages footnotes are an inadequate guide to students wishing to do further reading on the topics covered. Occasionally the sources upon which the author relied are not appropriately noted. A few footnotes are marred by gross inaccuracies, such as the incorrect title for Golay's, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development on page 215. Inaccuracies have also crept into the body of the text, for example, "the Philippine action [making claim to North Borneo] opens up the possibility of claims to British Borneo coming from Indonesia, which actually has a more plausible case here than it had in West Irian." (p. 267. Italics added.) Nor were the first two presidents of the Philippines Protestants (p. 160), though they were Masons.

While Taylor's ready willingness to accept and understand nationalism as a valid, even desirable, expression of contemporary Filipino political thinking is refreshing, in Chapter 13 he tends to blur unnecessarily the distinctions between anti-American nationalism, intellectual Marxism, and "the parliamentary tactics of the Communist Party of the Philippines." The sweeping, unsubstantiated accusations of Communist infiltration in the press, universities, labor unions, and political organizations would seem to inhibit the author's own appeal for appreciating the native mainsprings of the nationalist revival, and for distinguishing spontaneous nationalist sentiment from Communist "tactical devices." (p. 265) Furthermore, though there is undoubtedly some Communist infiltration, the urgency of the alarm which he sounds is not convincing.

The author says, for example, "Even though the parallel is far from being an exact one, the rapid transformation of China between 1946 and 1949 provides the warning of what can happen in the briefest span of years... Although the military power of the Huks, unlike that of the Chinese Communists, has been broken, the Communists in the Philippines are relentlessly carrying out the war by methods that are potentially just as dangerous, such as the manipulation of political symbols and the creation of a new intellectual climate. As in China in 1946, there is little to indicate today that events could move so rapidly and so disastrously for the government in power."

(pp. 272-273) This reviewer would consider the parallel with China of 1946 neither exact nor meaningful. And the author has been unable to marshall evidence that would make it so.

Taylor also contends (p. 173) that in the election of 1961 the "left-wing" delivered union support to President Garcia in "impressive amounts"; yet the most careful studies of voting patterns in that election do not indicate that union leaders of any persuasion were able to deliver substantial blocks of votes to any national candidate. While citing the Roman Catholic Church as a staunchly anti-Communist organization, the author adds that "secularizing tendencies" in Philippine society have "tended to neutralize the influence of the Church in politics." Other commentators have, on the contrary, noted the very significant political revival of the Church in the last decade.

In presenting supposed examples of Communist infiltration into a variety of social and political organizations, mention is made of the "Council of Elders, an informal group of highly respected citizens whose Action Committee was dominated by left-wing individuals." As a result, so Taylor thinks, the Council denounced the Government's ban on travel to the Communist-sponsored World Youth Festival in Vienna. Previously (p. 190) the Council of Elders had been identified as "a political body that the president uses on occasion to approve high policy decisions, such as a request for missile bases, when he wishes to avoid further discussion." Were the Council in fact under the "left-wing" influence which the author suggests, it would not be very useful for the purpose mentioned.

Despite shortcomings, however, this book is a much needed survey and analysis of the increasing tensions in Philippine-American relations. Addressed primarily to the policy-maker, it is interspersed with a number of imminently sound policy recommendations. Taylor urges the U. S. (pp. 288-299) to "take this nationalism very seriously." He argues convincingly that it is the only sentiment capable of providing the political dynamism to bring about important social changes, that it is the most effective weapon against the Communist movement, and that it is a necessary part of the Philippine drive to seek a new cultural identity, the necessary foundation for a mature and self-reliant nation.

While Taylor says he believes that it is wise for the U.S. to anticipate and encourage change in the Philippines, he recognizes (p. 298) that "such a policy calls for considerable U.S. participation in the internal affairs of the Philippines, always a dangerous business." But, he says, "the risks must be taken unless we are willing to let our military and political alliance disintegrate." He contends that U.S. policy should be "directed in fact and theory to the task of imaginative participation in the political and economic development of the Philippines." (p. 4) Yet his careful attention to the resurgence of Filipino nationalism leads him to throw caution on his own recommendations. He had already noted that (p. 220), "Possibly the direct involvement of the United States in the domestic politics of the Philippines has reached the point of diminishing returns." Taylor here has been caught on the horns of a dilemma which has impaled other Americans sincerely concerned about the most appropriate role for the United States in assisting economic development in a new nation.—David Wurfel, University of Singapore.

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NEWS AND NOTES

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

Seminar for Freshman Congressmen. In early January, the Association co-sponsored, with a bipartisan group of eight members of the House, the second Seminar for Freshman Congressmen. This week-long series of meetings is designed to acquaint new members with the workings of the House, with such problems as organizing a Congressional office, dealing with pressure groups and effective committee service.

The meetings are conducted by experienced Representatives and a wide range of Congressional staff personnel, political scientists and other outside experts. As an adjunct to the 1965 seminar, a draft copy of An Introduction to Legislative Service, a 225-page manual prepared by the Association, was distributed to serve as a text. The book will undergo final revision and eventually be published in an appropriate manner, serving as a permanent reference for Congressmen and others interested in the workings of the House.

Reaction to the comprehensive program offered in this year's seminar was again uniformly favorable; between 50 and 60 of the new Members attended each of the sessions, held January 5-8 in the House Judiciary Committee Hearing Room.

Congressional Fellowship Program. There are 30 participants in the 1964–65 Congressional Fellowship Program, which is now in its 12th year of operation under Association sponsorship. The group is composed of seven journalists, one law school faculty member, eight political scientists—including one selected in cooperation with the Canadian Political Science Association—an Asian Fellow sponsored by the Asia Foundation, 11 Federal Service Fellows, a Harkness Commonwealth Fund Fellow from London, England, and a Middle Eastern Fellow sponsored by American Friends of the Middle East.

Winners of the 1965-66 Fellowship awards sponsored by the Association were announced in mid-February and included:

Journalists winners:

John M. Berry, 27, reporter, Providence (R.I.) Journal-Bulletin.

Conrad Christiano, 38, reporter, Rochester (N.Y.) Democrat & Chronicle.

Ted G. Kolderie, 35, editorial page staff writer, Minneapolis (Minn.) Star & Tribune.

Dale D. Pullen, 36, city editor, Hollywood (Fla.) Sun Tattler.

Donald W. Robinson, 27, reporter, Eugene (Ore.) Register-Guard.

Edward K. Shanahan, 29, reporter, Berkshire Eagle, Pittsfield, Mass.

Political science winners:

Carl Baar, 25, Ph.D. candidate, University of Chicago.

Michael Lipsky, 25, Ph.D. candidate, Princeton University.

David L. Paletz, 31, Ph.D. candidate, University of California, Los Angeles.

Armin Rosencranz, 28, Ph.D. candidate, Stanford University (currently in London on Fellowship-sponsored research)

Stephen L. Wasby, 28, assistant professor, Moorhead (Minn.) State College.

Ruth Widmayer, 39, professor of political science, Colorado Woman's College.

Law school faculty member winners:

Ian R. Macneil, 36, professor of law, Cornell University.

George B. Trubow, 32, associate professor, John Marshall Law School, Chicago.

Psychologist winner:

Frank I. Moore, 27, project director, legislative council study of mental illness and retardation, Oklahoma City.

Alternates:

William C. Baum, 34, assistant professor, Creighton University, Omaha.

William L. Morrow, 30, assistant professor, DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.

Wesley G. Pippert, 31, reporter, United Press International, Chicago.

Paul R. Wieland, 27, reporter, Buffalo (N.Y.) Evening News.

United States Senate Youth Program. The Third Annual Senate Youth Program was held this year from January 31 to February 6. The Program, authorized by Senate resolution and financed by a grant from the William Randolph Hearst Foundation, brings to Washington two outstanding high school student leaders from each of the 50 states and District of Columbia.

The Association, by developing and conducting the week's agenda, introduced the students to the workings of their Federal government with particular emphasis on the Senate. Highlights were provided by a meeting with President and Mrs. Johnson, luncheon with Vice President Humphrey, comprehensive seminars produced by the Departments of State and Defense, and an interview with Justice Arthur Goldberg.

The Association's work on this program falls within the framework of its Social Studies Project.

Seminar in Legislative Operations. Another in a

series of seminars conducted jointly by APSA and the U.S. Civil Service Commission for 20 Federal executives in grades 15 to 18 was held March 15-19. Patterned after the Seminar for Freshman Congressmen, the sessions were conducted by political scientists, members of both houses of Congress, and staff personnel from both the Legislative and Executive branches.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Southern Political Science Association held its annual meeting in Durham, N. C., November 12-14, 1964. The Nobel Peace Prize winner, Martin Luther King, was an honored guest during the proceedings. John H. Hallowell, President of the SPSA and chairman of Duke University's department of political science, gave his presidential address on November 13. David B. Truman, President of the American Political Science Association, delivered the opening day address. Those who gave papers and their topics were: Charles G. Hamilton, Pikesville College: "Mississippi: Resistance and Consequent Politics"; Normal L. Parks, Middle Tennessee State College: "Post Kefauver Politics in Tennessee"; Arpad von Lazar, Vanderbilt University: "Human Resources and the Dilemma of Political Development"; and Robert O. Tilman, Tulane University: "Political Development as an Integrative Process: Concepts, Theories and Directors for Research."

The joint meeting of the Western and Pacific Northwest Political Science Associations took place in Victoria, B. C., March 17-20, 1965. The program chairman for the conference was Maure L. Goldschmidt of Reed College.

A three-day conference on political development was held at the University of Pennsylvania on November 11-13, 1964. Participants included about 20 scholars and officials from other universities, private institutions and government agencies. At the three general sessions papers were presented by Marion Levy, Princeton University; Arthur Smithies, Harvard University; and Lucian Pve. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Discussants were Kalman Silvert, Dartmouth College; Howard Wiggins, Department of State; Wilfred Malenbaum, University of Pennsylvania; H. Field Haviland, Brookings Institution; and Karl von Vorys, University of Pennsylvania. At the closing luncheon, David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, delivered an address on "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development."

Southern Methodist University will be host to a second conference on "Mathematical Applications in Political Science." The conference is scheduled for July 18 to August 7, 1965. It is designed to serve political science faculties active in teaching and research. Stipends of \$300 plus travel allowances of 4 cents a mile will be available for thirty participants. Applications will be accepted through April 15. Inquiries should be directed to: Joseph L. Bernd, Director, Conference on Mathematical Applications in Political Science, Box 1099, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75222.

The annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association was held on Saturday, April 24, 1965, at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts. Officers for 1964-65 are: president, Laurence I. Radway (Dartmouth); vice president, Karl Deutsch (Yale); secretary, Gerald Grady (University of Massachusetts); members of the executive committee, Lawrence Fuchs (Brandeis), Fred Green (Williams), and Alona Elizabeth Evans (Wellesley).

The department of government at Indiana University was host to the Midwest Conference of Political Science in Bloomington, April 22-24, 1965

The XIIIth International Congress of Administrative Sciences will meet in Paris, July 19–23, 1965. Papers will deal with public relations in administration; the influence of the public in the operation of public administration; new techniques of budget preparation and management; and administrative management of public enterprises. Special meetings of representatives of schools and institutes of public administration will meet to discuss the role of their institutions in development administration. For further information write: The International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 25 rue de la Charite, Brussels 4, Belgium.

The 1965 conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research will be held in Dublin, Eire, from September 6-10, 1965. Direct all inquiries to: Dr. Irving Crespi, The Gallup Organization, Inc., 53 Bank Street, Princeton, New Jersey.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

For the eighteenth consecutive year, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan will hold a summer institute in survey research techniques. The institute is designed to meet some of the education and training needs of persons engaged in business and governmental research and other statistical work, graduate students and university instructors interested in quantitative research in the social sciences.

The 1965 institute will be presented in two fourweek sessions, the first from June 28 to July 24, and the second from July 26 to August 21. They may be taken independently or successively. For further information write to: Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

The Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration has established a national committee on comparative urban studies. The committee is planning a program of meetings and conferences, a summer research seminar, and the distribution of a newsletter. The executive committee of the new group consists of Victor Jones, University of California (chairman); Fred Cleaveland, University of North Carolina; William Gore, University of Indiana; Wallace Sayre, Columbia University; Frank Sherwood, U. S. C.; and Frank Smallwood, Dartmouth.

A Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, Inc. was organized in 1964 by the Universities of Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana and Michigan State University. The purpose of the new organization is to enable the institutions to render more effective technical aid abroad and to gain from their overseas operations the maximum of academic benefit on their respective campuses. Of the eight members of the board of directors of the corporation four are political scientists: Edward H. Buehrig, Indiana University; Leon Epstein, University of Wisconsin; Ralph Smuckler, Michigan State University; and Royden Dangerfield, University of Illinois.

In celebration of its fiftieth anniversary, the department of government at Indiana University held a series of six lectures, November 5-7. The lectures, which will be published, were as follows: "The Uses of Theory in the Study of Politics," Anatol Rapoport; "The Representative Function in Western Systems," David B. Truman, Columbia .University; "Political Parties in Western Democratic Systems," Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin; "The Making of Foreign Policy in the United States," Charles Burton Marshall, Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research;

"Problems in the Study of Local Politics," James Q. Wilson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, and "Approaches to the Understanding of International Politics," Quincy Wright, University of Virginia.

The Ford Foundation has announced a renewal grant of \$250,000 for five years to continue support of the program of the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration. Fred W. Riggs, Indiana University, will continue to serve as chairman of the CAG, with the support of an executive committee containing the following members: Fred Cleaveland. North Carolina; Ferrel Heady, Michigan; John Montgomery, Harvard; Clarence Thurber, Penn. State; Dwight Waldo, California; Edward Weidner, East-West Center, Hawaii: and Don Bowen, ASPA executive director. The CAG will conduct summer seminars in 1965 at Pittsburgh, under the direction of James Heaphey, and at California, with Dwight Waldo as director. A workshop for career development training of overseas program officers will be conducted at Pittsburgh in conjunction with the CAG seminar. under the direction of Edgar Shor, chairman of the political science department at Colgate University. The themes of the Pittsburgh and California seminars will be the spatial and temporal aspects of development administration, respectively.

The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania have announced that three awards, each of \$5,000, may be made for distinguished work in the humanities and the social sciences, to appear as succeeding volumes in the Haney Foundation Series. The first volume has just been published.

Statements of interest, or inquiries, should be addressed to Mr. Bernard J. Ford, Secretary, Haney Foundation Series Committee, Charles Patterson Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania, 3420 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The deadline of the submission of manuscripts is August 1, 1965.

The Conference on Communist Studies, an autonomous unit of the American Political Science Association, recently completed arrangements to include China and other Communist nations in Asia in its activities. Established in 1958, the Conference until now dealt with Soviet affairs and Eastern Europe. The change in scope is reflected by a modification in the name (formerly the Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies) and the election of a specialist on China, A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University, as Conference chairman for 1965-66. Conference membership

henceforth will not require annual dues and will consist of all individuals who are identified as specialists in the politics of Communist nations by the appropriate organizations, e.g., the American Political Science Association, the Association for Asian Studies, and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

The activities of the Conference on Communist Studies center on the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. The Conference organizes the Comparative Politics panels on Communist nations, and sponsors a luncheon with a guest speaker and election of officers.

George Fischer, Cornell University, is Conference chairman for 1964-65; A. Doak Barnett, Columbia University, is vice-chairman; and Allen B. Ballard, Jr., City College of New York, is secretary-treasurer.

The Institute of Advanced Projects of the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii sponsored a conference during 1964 on "Communications and Innovation in Development Policy." Papers emphasized the experience of mainland China, India and the Philippines. The major papers are now being edited for publication as a single volume by Wilbur Schramm, Stanford University, and Daniel Lerner, MIT, co-chairman of the conference. Other APSA members who participated were Lucian Pye, MIT; Lawrence Fuchs, Brandeis University; and V. K. N. Menon of India.

A month-long institute on Comparative Communist Systems and Ideology, jointly sponsored by the School of Education and the Oregon State Board of Education was held on the campus of the University of Oregon during 1964. Joseph Fiszman, department of political science at the University of Oregon, served as director.

The eighth annual institute on United States foreign policy was held at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, March 21, 1964, sponsored by the Department of State in collaboration with various agencies in Milwaukee. It was the first such regional conference in Wisconsin under State Department auspices. Speakers included Mrs. Kate Louchheim, Robert Manning, Richard Davis, Walt W. Rostow, Marshall Green, and Ben S. Stephansky, all of the State Department.

The fifth annual Governor's conference on the United Nations was held at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 2, 1964, sponsored by the Wisconsin Governor's Committee on the U. N. and the university's Institute for World Affairs Education. The U.S.S.R. ambassador to the U.N., Nicolai Federenko; Sidney Yates of the United States delegation; Zenon Rossides, Cyprus am-

bassador to the U. N.; and José Rolz-Bennett of the U. N. Secretariat participated in the conference.

The University of Denver has established a graduate school of international studies. It will engage in programs which encourage research and cooperative efforts in international relations in the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains region.

The American Historical Association, at its annual convention in Washington, D.C., December 29, 1964, awarded its Watumull Prize, \$500, for a work on the history of India, jointly to two political scientists: to Charles Drekmeier, associate professor at Stanford University, for his Kingship and Community in Early India (Stanford University Press), and to Charles Heimsath, associate professor of South Asian studies, The American University, for his Indian Nationalism and Social Reform (Princeton University Press).

Ten scholars met at the Rockefeller Foundation's Villa Serbelloni at Bellagio, Italy, in September, 1964, to plan a series of volumes on the smaller European democracies. The editors of this series, financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation, are Hans Daalder, University of Leiden, Netherlands; Robert Dahl, Yale University; Val R. Lorwin, University of Oregon; and Stein Rokkan, Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. The discussions at Bellagio concerned the "common core" elements of all these volumes, which would deal with such essentially durable features of each system as the qualities of the citizenry, their loyalties, apathies, and alienations, the qualities of the elites, the role of consensus and conflict in historical changes, and the direction of long-run changes.

Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania, participated in the sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Geneva in September, 1964.

CHARLES BACKSTROM, University of Minnesota, directed a state-wide faculty workshop in December on the 1964 election. The workshop was a project of the Minnesota Council for Education.

James D. Barber, Yale University, has a junior faculty fellowship and is spending the year at the Brookings Institution.

ERNEST R. BARTLEY, University of Florida, has been elected to full membership in the American Institute of Planners.

Thad Beyle is on a year's leave of absence from Denison University on an NCEP fellowship. He is serving as an assistant to the Governor of North Carolina.

HUGH A. BONE has been appointed by Governor Albert D. Rosellini to be chairman of the Washington State Commission on Registration and Voting Participation.

DAVID P. CALLEO, Yale University, is on research leave in France for 1964-65.

HAROLD W. CHASE has returned to the University of Minnesota after a two-year absence during which he served as visiting professor at Columbia University (1963-64) and engaged in research at the Brookings Institution during 1962-63.

FREDERICK N. CLEAVELAND, University of North Carolina, has been elected President of the Southern Political Science Association for 1964-65.

ORVILLE COPE, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, spent the 1964 summer doing research in Chile.

James T. Crown, New York University, visited the University of Poland in December, 1964, to make arrangements for a seminar in Warsaw for American graduate students to be held in the summer of 1965.

JAMES C. DAVIES, University of Oregon, spent the spring term of 1964 in Brazil.

Paul Dolan, University of Delaware, will be on sabbatical leave during the spring semester, 1965.

JEDON EMENHISER, Utah State University, is a Fulbright professor at the University of Saigon in South Vietnam during 1964-65.

DAVID FARRELLY, UCLA, continues as director of the University of California's Education Abroad program in Padua, Italy, for 1964-65.

James W. Fesler, Yale University, is engaged in European research during the current academic year.

Russell H. Fifield, University of Michigan, has been appointed Secretary General of the XXVII International Congress of Orientalists to be held in August, 1967.

EDWARD B. GLICK has resigned from the System Development Corporation to become senior staff political scientist with the Washington branch of the Bendix Corporation's Arms Control Projects Office.

LEE S. GREENE, University of Tennessee, has been named Distinguished Service professor at that institution.

ARTHUR M. HANHARDT, JR., University of Oregon, was in Germany in July, 1964, as a guest

of the cultural exchange division of the Federal Republic of Germany.

MURRAY C. HAVENS, University of Texas, has been named Secretary of the Southern Political Science Association for 1964-65.

FERREL HEADY has received a faculty distinguished achievement award at the University of Michigan. He is a senior specialist in residence at the Institute of Advanced Projects, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, January to July, 1965.

James Jarvis has returned to Wayne State University from San Jose State College where he was visiting professor of public administration for the past two years.

CONRAD JOYNER, University of Arizona, has been appointed co-ordinator of the university's Peace Corp training center.

ROY E, JUMPER has resigned from Wake Forest College to continue as consultant to the Ford Foundation in Lebanon.

GLADYS KAMMERER has received a citation for distinguished teaching and research at the University of Florida.

RAVI KAPIL has returned to the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee following a year of research in Somalia.

Kemal Karpat, New York University, addressed the Conference on Democracy in Asia held in Turkey in November, 1964.

MALCOLM KERR is on leave from UCLA for the period 1964-66. During 1964-65 he is a fellow at the American Research Center in Egypt. He will be a visiting associate professor at the American University of Beirut during 1965-66.

JOHN H. KESSEL returned in January to the University of Washington from a year's leave of absence during which he served as an NCEP fellow with the Republican National Committee.

Kenneth Kofmehl, Purdue University, has been appointed consultant to the Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C.

NORMAN KOGAN, University of Connecticut, is on leave during 1964-65 and is residing in Rome.

STUART A. MACCORKLE, director of the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, received an honorary doctor of laws degree from Washington and Lee University in June, 1964.

Henry Mason, Tulane University, will be a Fulbright professor at the Otto Suhr Institut of Free Berlin during the summer session of 1965.

ROGER D. MASTER, Yale University, is spending 1964-65 in France under a junior faculty fellowship.

DOUGLAS MENDEL, JR., University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, has been appointed Far Eastern representative of the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College.

STEPHEN R. MITCHELL, Washington State University, was an NCEP fellow at the Democratic national convention in Atlantic City.

PHILLIP MONYPENNEY, University of Illinois, is serving a two-year appointment as member of the Illinois Commission on the problem of cities, villages and towns.

JAMES N. MURRAY, JR., State University of Iowa, is teaching at the University of Istanbul on a Fulbright award.

JOHN NORMAN, Fairfield University, Connecticut, was one of the two bi-partisan plaintiffs in Buttersworth v. Dempsey. The case, involving reapportionment and redistricting of the legislative districts of Connecticut, was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court.

CHARLES B. NEFF is on leave from the University of Hawaii to direct the Peace Corps operation in Bogotá, Colombia.

THOMAS PAGE, University of Illinois, is serving as secretary to the personnel advisory board of the Department of Personnel in Illinois state government.

Belden Paulson has returned to the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee from research in southern Italy.

RALPH MIWA, on leave from the University of Hawaii, has been promoted to the position of administrative assistant to Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii.

CARL H. LANDÉ, Yale University, is conducting research in the Philippine Islands during the current academic year.

Walter Laves, University of Indiana, was appointed by President Johnson to serve as an alternate delegate to the 13th General Conference of UNESCO held in Paris October 18-November 19, 1964.

WERNER LEVI, University of Hawaii, is in India on a grant from the American Institute of Indian affairs.

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, University of Texas, has been named book review editor of the *Journal* of *Politics*.

ROBERT E. LORISH, Ohio Wesleyan University, is on leave during 1964-65 to serve as an administrative intern in the office of the provost of Michigan State University.

NORMAN PALMER, University of Pennsylvania, presented a paper at the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Geneva in September, 1964.

R. N. ROSECRANCE, UCLA, was a visiting fellow in international relations at the Australian National University in Canberra during the spring term, 1964. He is currently a Rockefeller research fellow in the department of war studies, Kings College, University of London.

JOSEPH S. ROUCER, University of Bridgeport, has been elected president of the Honorary Social Science Society. He has also been appointed to the editorial boards of the Revista de Ciencias Sociales (Spain) and Sociologia Internationalis (Berlin).

STUART A. SCHIENGOLD is on leave from the University of California at Davis and is spending the year at Harvard's Center of International Affairs as a research associate.

FRED SONDERMAN, professor of political science and associate dean at Colorado College, was invited by the British Foreign Office to participate in a conference in February, 1965. The conference dealt with the economic, political and defense problems of the Atlantic Community.

ROBERT S. STAUFFER has returned to the University of Hawaii from a year spent at the University of the Philippines under a Fulbright award.

James A. Steintrager has been awarded a research grant by the University of Texas.

WILLIAM L. STRAUSS has been granted a threeyear leave by the Arizona State College to become the executive director of the United States Education Commission in Korea.

OSCAR SYARLEIN, University of Florida, has been elected to a two-year term on the executive council of the American Society for International Law.

JOHN E. TURNER AND ROBERT HOLT, University of Minnesota, did field research in England prior to the 1964 British elections.

PEDRO C. M. TEICHERT has returned to the University of Mississippi from a four-month stay at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina,

where he was a visiting professor under a Fulbright-Hayes grant.

PETER A. Toma, University of Arizona, is participating in an inter-university consortium of social scientists who are engaged in research mapping for AID's Food for Peace Program.

Rocco J. Tresolini, chairman, department of government, Lehigh University, was one of two recipients of the R. R. and E. C. Hillman award. The award is given annually by the university to faculty members who have contributed most toward the advancement of the interest of the university.

RICHARD W. VAN WAGENEN has returned to his post as dean of the Graduate School at American

University after two years with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

ELLIS WALDRON, Montana State University, studied at Harvard Law School during 1963-64 under a Carnegie Foundation fellowship.

ROBERT WARREN has returned to the University of Washington from a year spent with Resources for the Future, Inc., in Washington, D. C.

HENRY WELLS, University of Pennsylvania, read a paper at the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Geneva.

T. P. WRIGHT, JR., has returned to Bates College after a year's absence spent in India under a Fulbright award.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

CHARLES F. ANDRAIN, assistant professor, San Diego State College

ANDREW BAGGS, instructor, University of Florida

Howard Ball, instructor, Rutgers—the State University

THEODORE BECKER, University of Hawaii

DENNIS E. BELLER, instructor, Miami University (Ohio)

WILLIAM J. BLOUGH, University of Houston

Leroy L. Bradwish, assistant professor, Drake University

DOYLE BUCKWALTER, instructor, Brigham Young University

RONALD F. BUNN, associate professor, Louisiana State University

RONALD H. CHILCOTE, assistant professor, University of California at Riverside

WILLIAM COPLIN, assistant professor, Wayne State University

EDMOND COSTANTINI, lecturer, University of California at Davis

PHILLIP COULTER, instructor, University of Massachusetts

LAWRENCE J. DENARDIS, assistant professor, Albertus Magnus College

JOEL R. DICKERSON, instructor, Millikin University

JOHN P. EAST, assistant professor, E. Carolina College

JAMES F. ENGEL, assistant professor, New Mexico State University

LEE W. FARNSWORTH, assistant professor, Brigham Young University

JACK D. FLEER, assistant professor, Wake Forest College

J. LEIPER FREEMAN, professor, Vanderbilt University

ROBERT FRIED, assistant professor, University of California at Los Angeles

STERLING HALE FULLER, professor and chairman, University of Missouri at Kansas City, effective September, 1964

Douglas S. Gatlin, assistant professor, Florida Atlantic University

WILLIAM GERLACH, associate professor, Eastern Kentucky State College

DONALD GERTH, professor, Chico State College

Louis Gold, instructor, Oberlin College

JOHN GUNNELL, assistant professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany

MICHAEL HAAS, University of Hawaii

Harlan Hahn, assistant professor of political science and research associate in the School of Health, University of Michigan

FRED HANGA, JR., associate professor, Gradu-

ate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany

CHARLES M. HARDIN, professor, University of California at Davis; formerly associate director for Humanities and Social Sciences of the Rockefeller Foundation

MARTIN J. HAUSER, instructor, University of Minnesota

DUANE W. HILL, associate professor, Colorado State University; also research associate of the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver

Douglas Hobbs, assistant professor, UCLA

JOHN A. HOBBS, assistant professor, San Diego State College

GEORGE C. HOFFMAN, assistant professor, Butler University

JOHN HUTCHINSON, associate professor and research associate of Industrial Relations at UCLA

DAVID E. INGERSOLL, assistant professor, University of Delaware

LESTER JACKSON, instructor, Newark College of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers University

GEORGE JENKINS, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee

James E. Jernberg, assistant professor, University of Minnesota

Kenneth F. Johnson, assistant professor, Colorado State University, and research associate in the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver

W. LANDIS JONES, Waynesburg College

JOYCE K. KALLGREN, lecturer, University of California at Davis

HENRY S. KARIEL, associate professor, University of Hawaii

BOYD R. KEENAN, professor and head of the department of political science, Purdue University; formerly associate director of the Committee on Institutional Cooperation and visiting professor at Purdue

Samuel Krislov, associate professor, University of Minnesota

ROGER A. KVAM, assistant professor, University of Akron

EVERETT C. LADD, Jr., assistant professor, University of Connecticut

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, professor, Yale University

Paul M. Leary, instructor, Rutgers—the State University

MICHAEL LOFCHIE, assistant professor, UCLA

STUART A. MACKOWN, instructor, Washington College, Chestertown, Maryland

RICHARD L. McAnaw, Western Michigan University

ROBERT McNeill, associate professor, Wayne State University

R. M. Mahood, assistant professor, Memphis State University

FRANK E. MEYERS, instructor, State University of New York at Stony Brook

DIANE Monson, assistant professor, Brigham Young University; formerly of Connecticut College for Women

CARL C. Moses, associate professor, Wake Forest College; formerly of Virginia Polytechnic Institute

DAN D. NIMMO, University of Houston; formerly of Texas Technological University

JOSEF PATYK, assistant professor, University of Dayton; formerly Consul-General of Poland

J. JOHN PENIKIS, instructor, University of Minnesota

MICHAEL D. REAGAN, professor, University of California at Riverside; formerly of the University of Syracuse

JON M. REINHARDT, instructor, Wake Forest College

David E. RePass, assistant professor, University of Minnesota

HAROLD V. RHODES, assistant professor, Wake Forest College

ALLAN RICHARDS, professor and director of the Bureau of Public Administration, Louisiana State University, effective February, 1965

WILLIAM L. RICHTER, instructor, University of Hawaii

CAREY G. RICKABAUGH, instructor, University of Maryland, effective January, 1965

ROBERT E. RIGGS, associate professor, University of Minnesota; formerly of Brigham Young University

EDWARD T. ROWE, instructor, University of Connecticut

LEONARD I. RUCHELMAN, assistant professor, Alfred University

Rudolph J. Rummel, assistant professor, Yale University

Mary Clarke Santopolo, associate professor, Eastern Kentucky State College

ASHLEY L. SCHIFF, associate professor, University of New York at Stony Brook; formerly at the School of Public Administration of the University of Southern California

CARL L. SCHWEINFURTH, assistant professor, Bethany College

RICHARD D. SEARS, instructor, Wake Forest College

Josef Silverstein, associate professor, Rutgers—the State University

ROBERT SMITH, Western Michigan University

WILLIAM STANDING, assistant professor, Wayne State University

MURRAY S. STEDMAN, professor and chairman of the department of government at Trinity College, Connecticut

BARBARA B. STEVENS, assistant professor, University of Connecticut

PHILLIPPA STRUM, instructor, Newark College of Arts and Sciences at Rutgers University

Kirk Thompson, assistant professor, Reed College

WOODWORTH G. THROMBLEY, associate professor, Institute of Public Administration, University of Indiana; for the last three years, principal advisor to the Indiana University-Thammasat Public Administration program in Bangkok

REXFORD G. TUGWELL, research professor, Southern Illinois University, effective March, 1965

Manfred Vernon, chairman of political science, Western Washington State College at Bellingham; formerly of the University of Alabama

LARRY L. WADE, assistant professor, Charlotte College, North Carolina

J. RICHARD WAGNER, instructor, University of Arizona

JOSEPH WILLARD, associate professor, University of Toledo

FRED W. WILLHOITE, assistant professor, Louisiana State University

CARWIN C. WILLIAMS, Brigham Young University

WILLIAM R. WILLOUGHBY, senior professor, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N. B.; formerly of St. Lawrence University

CALVIN WOODWARD, lecturer, University of New Brunswick

Amos Yoder, lecturer, University of California at Davis

VIRGIL B. ZIMMERMAN, associate professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly head of the Bologna program of the University of California

Temporary and Visiting Appointments, 1964-65

DAVID BANE, U. S. Foreign Service Officer: visiting lecturer, University of Iowa

EUGENIO BENEDETTI, University of Padua: visiting assistant professor, Ohio Wesleyan

CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, professor emeritus, University of Illinois: distinguished visiting professor, University of Delaware, spring semester, 1965

LOWELL W. CULVER, assistant professor, Pacific Lutheran University

HOWARD DEAN, Portland State College: visiting professor, University of Washington, autumn, 1964

RUPERT EMERSON, Harvard University: visiting professor, UCLA, spring semester, 1965

ROBERT H. FERRELL, University of Indiana: visiting professor, University of Connecticut

Gerald Friedberg, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis

EMMETT GRAYBILL, instructor, Allegheny College

CLAUDE H. HEYER, visiting instructor, University of Idaho

JAMES HURLEY, instructor, Dennison University

RAGHAVAN IYER, lecturer, UCLA

Yung-Hwan Jo, assistant professor, Colorado State University

CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON, Washington State University: visiting professor, Montana State Uni-

versity, 1963-64 and winter and spring quarters, 1965

RALPH JOHNSON, lecturer, Allegheny College

A. D. H. KAPLAN, Brookings Institution: distinguished visiting professor, Graduate School of Political Affairs, State University of New York at Albany

Todd R. LaPorte, University of Southern California: visiting assistant professor, Stanford University

EDWARD G. LEWIS, University of Illinois: Chester W. Nimitz professor of social and political philosophy, Naval War College

DENNIS A. LIVINGSTON, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis

James S. Nyman, University of California at Davis: visiting assistant professor, University of Arizona

KAN ORI, visiting professor, University of Minnesota

DAVID F. PAULSEN, JR., University of Washington: visiting assistant professor and research specialist, Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona

DE VERE PENTONY, San Francisco State College: visiting professor, University of Iowa

Walford H. Peterson, Bethel College (St. Paul): visiting professor, University of Minnesota

BHAGWATI P. K. PODDAR, assistant professor, Illinois State University

KARL M. SCHMIDT, Syracuse University: visiting professor, University of Hawaii

DAVID SCOTT, Southwest Missouri State College: visiting professor, Southern Illinois University

ALAN SELTZER, acting assistant professor, UCLA

ELI SILVERMAN, lecturer, Allegheny College

LEA H. WILLIAMS, Brown University: visiting lecturer, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

DAVID WILSON, acting assistant professor, UCLA

JAVAN TABIBIAN, lecturer, UCLA

Louis F. Wechsler, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis

BYONG-MAN YOON, assistant professor, Colorado State University

SEPHER ZABIH, assistant professor, Oberlin College

Paul E. Zinner, University of California at Davis: visiting professor, National War College

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

BRUCE ADKINSON, Hofstra University: assistant dean of faculty

TOTTEN J. ANDERSON, UCLA: chairman of the department of political science

CAROL E. BAUMANN, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee: director of the Institute of World Affairs Education

RONALD CHILCOTE, University of California at Riverside: coordinator of the program on Latin American research

Manning J. Dauer, University of Florida: director of the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Florida

DONALD R. GERTH, Chico State College: dean of students

M. JUDD HARMON, Utah State University: chairman, department of political science

HERBERT KAUFMAN, Yale University: chairman, department of political science

Young W. Kihl. Juniata College, chairman, department of political science

Gerard J. Mangone, Syracuse University: associate dean for academic programs, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

NORMAN MELLER, University of Hawaii: chairman of the department of political science

GENE EDWARD RAINEY, American University: assistant dean of the Graduate School

James R. Roach, associate professor, University of Texas: coordinator of international and foreign area programs

Donald R. Shea, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee: dean of international studies and programs

ROBERT STEPHENS, formerly Chief of Eastern and Southern African Office of African Programs, State Department: assistant director of East Asian Studies, Syracuse University

JAMES A. STORING, Colgate University: provost

ROBERT WILLIAMS. East Carolina College: associate dean of the College and dean of the School of Arts and Sciences

PROMOTIONS

To the rank of assistant professor:

Albert L. Gastman, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut

MARSHALL N. GOLDSTEIN, University of Oregon

RAY C. HILLAM, Brigham Young University

JAMES E. NADONLY, Western Michigan University

KNUD RASMUSSEN, Colgate University

THOMAS M. SCOTT, University of Minnesota

To the rank of associate professor:

JAMES E. ANDERSON, Wake Forest College

CHARLES H. BACKSTROM, University of Minnesota

BEN G. BURNETT, Whittier College

ALFRED B. CLUBAK, University of Florida

ROLAND H. EBEL, Western Michigan University

AHMAD R. HAFFAR, State University of New York at New Paltz

CLARKE HAGENSICK, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee

ROBERT KAUFMAN, Western Michigan University

SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, University of Iowa

Gerald M. Pomper, Rutgers—the State University

ROBERTA S. SIGEL, Wayne State University

H. Frank Way, University of California at Riverside

T. P. WRIGHT, Bates College

G. Ross Stephens, University of Connecticut

To the rank of professor:

GEORGE S. BLAIR, Claremont Graduate School

J. LEO CEFKIN, Colorado State University

LANE DAVIS, University of Iowa

STEPHEN T. EARLY, DePauw University

STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM, Rutgers—the State University

PHILIP O. Foss, Colorado State University

CHARLES D. FARRIS, University of Florida

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RETIREMENTS AND RESIGNATIONS

PHILIP W. Buck will reach emeritus standing at Stanford University in August of 1965, after thirty years in the department of political science.

MARSHALL KNAPPEN, H. Fletcher Brown professor of history and political science at the University of Delaware, retired on February 1, 1965.

CHARLES M. KNEIER, professor of political science at the University of Illinois since 1930, has retired.

MYRON R. RUBINOFF of the University of Toledo has resigned.

Walter Sharp, professor of political science at Yale University since 1951, retired in June, 1964.

LLOYD SHORT, professor of political science, University of Minnesota, will retire in June, 1965.

JOSEPH E. BLACK has resigned as chairman of the department of government at Miami University (Ohio) to become director of Humanities and Social Studies with the Rockefeller Foundation.

The Inter-University Consortium for Political Research will sponsor seminars in Quantitative Political Analysis, Community Political Analysis, and Methods of Historical Analysis at Ann Arbor, Michigan, this summer, with expenses of participants partially borne by grants of the National Science Foundation. Information may be obtained from the ICPR, P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

IN MEMORIAM

EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at The University of Michigan, died at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on December 19, 1964, at the age of 78. He is survived by his wife, May Morgan Brown.

He was born in Corralitos, California, a son of Peter C. and Katis S. Brown. He received his B.L. degree in 1907, his M.L. degree in 1908, and his Ph.D. in 1917, all from the University of California. He came to The University of Michigan in 1921 as assistant professor of political science, was promoted to be an associate professor in 1924, and professor in 1931. He served as Acting Chairman and Chairman of the Department from 1942 to 1947, and was given the title of Professor Emeritus at the time of his retirement in 1956.

During his long period of faithful service to the University, Brown published four substantial books, and some sixty articles in scholarly journals. His earlier writing was largely historical and included William Plumer's Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate, 1803–1807 and The Missouri Compromises and Presidential Politics, 1820–1825. For fifteen years he regularly contributed articles to the American Yearbook on "The President and His Policies." His Manual of

Government Publications: United States and Foreign, is still a basic reference in the field.

In his period of service he instructed more students, both graduate and undergraduate, than any other member of the department. His insistence on high standards of performance, his careful attention to thoroughness and detail, and his wise and sympathetic guidance of students have left several generations of Michigan men and women deeply in his debt. There is not a single administrative task in the department, however heavy or laborious, which he did not perform—from being lecturer in large introductory courses, to being graduate adviser and chairman of the department during the difficult war and immediate post-war years. Because of his robust health his record for class attendance may be equalled but never broken.

Before coming to Michigan, Brown served as assistant to Herbert Hoover when the former President was head of the American Relief Administration in 1918-20. His colleagues and students will long remember him as a true friend, and as a genial and kindly colleague.—James K. Pollock

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GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

- 1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a one-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review*. To be eligible, applicants must reside in one of the Asian countries listed below.
- 2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.
- 3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 8-11, in the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C.

(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any of the following Asian countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Ruyukyus, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Thailand, and Vietnam. Applicants who have not previously received grants will be given first consideration. Application forms may be obtained from The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.)

Notice

Resolutions at Annual Business Meeting

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution, this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 7, 1965, in the Wilmington Room, Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C.

1964 ANNUAL MEETING PANEL PAPERS AVAILABALE

A limited number of the following mimeographed panel papers presented at the 1964 annual meeting in Chicago are still available for 75¢ each. Checks should be made payable to The American Political Science Association and orders should be sent to the Association office at 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

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
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
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JUNE, 1965

NO. 2

ELECTORAL MYTH AND REALITY: THE 1964 ELECTION

PHILIP E. CONVERSE, AAGE R. CLAUSEN, AND WARREN E. MILLER University of Michigan

On Election Day, 1964, the aspirations of Senator Barry Goldwater and the conservative wing of the Republican Party were buried under an avalanche of votes cast for incumbent President Lyndon Johnson. The margin of victory, approaching 16 million votes, was unprecedented. Historical comparisons with other presidential landslides are left somewhat indeterminate by the intrusion of third parties. However, it is safe to observe that Johnson's 61.3 percent of the two-party popular vote put him in the same general range as the striking victories of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936, Harding in 1920, and Theodore Roosevelt in 1904.

Before the fact, the election was also expected to be the most intensely ideological campaign since 1936, in no small measure because of Goldwater's reputation as a "pure" conservative. After the fact, doubts existed as to whether this expectation had been fulfilled. Goldwater supporters, in particular, expressed disappointment that President Johnson had refused to join battle on any of the fundamental ideological alternatives that were motivating the Goldwater camp. However, as we shall see, the mass public had some sense that "important differences" between the two major parties were heightened in 1964 compared with parallel data from either 1960 or, as is more impressive, the relatively tense election of 1952.1 And certainly no one questioned the importance of ideological differences in the factional dispute that split the Republican Party along liberalconservative lines with an enduring bitterness unmatched in decades.

¹ The collection of data from a national sample of the electorate around the 1964 election was made possible by a grant to the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which had also supported the 1952 election study.

Indeed, these three prime elements of the 1964 election—faction, ideology and the contest for votes—became intertwined after the manner of a classic script. That is, the "outer" ideological wing of a party captures its nomination, leaving a vacuum toward the center of gravity of national opinion. This vacuum is gleefully filled by the opposing party without any loss of votes from its own side of the spectrum. The outcome, logically and inexorably, is a landslide at the polls.²

With a script so clearly written in advance, the outsider would naturally ask why any party controlled by rational strategists should choose a course likely to lead to such massive repudiation in its name. The answers to this question in the 1964 case are not particularly obscure, although they can be made at numerous levels. One answer, of course, is that Republican Party strategists were themselves in deep disagreement as to just what script was relevant: many recognized the classic script and predicted the eventual outcome, with all of its attendant losses for other Republican candidates, in deadly accuracy.

For the factional dispute within Republican ranks involved not only an ideological clash, but also major differences in the perception of that political reality which becomes important in winning votes and elections. The Goldwater faction was told by its Republican adversaries, as the conservative wing had been told for years, that a Goldwater could not conceivably defeat a Democratic President, and would instead greatly damage the party ticket at all levels. The Goldwater group countered that a victory for their man was entirely plausible despite the danger signals of the spring polls

² The most fertile elaboration of this classic script is of course contained in Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957).

and the normal difficulties of challenging an incumbent. It is not clear how sincere or widespread this confidence was: some statements sounded as though the Goldwater candidacy had little chance of winning but would at least provide a forum for the conservative philosophy, along with control of the Republican Party. But even in their more pessimistic moments, the Goldwater people would argue that while victory might be difficult, they certainly saw no reason to believe that Goldwater would do worse than any other Republican challenger, or encounter the electoral disaster the liberals were predicting.

Similarly, at the San Francisco nominating convention, his opponents vehemently charged that Goldwater was a "minority candidate," even among Republicans in this country. In another direct clash of perceptions, Senator Goldwater is said to have remarked to a group of Midwestern delegates, "What the minority [the convention liberals] can't get through their heads is that this is a true representation of the Republican Party."3

In this article we wish to examine the relationship between such conflicting perceptions and what is known of the relevant reality in the context of the 1964 election. Our information comes primarily from sample survey studies of the mass public that formed the electorate in 1964, and whose reactions represent one level of political reality about which so many conflicting opinions and predictions were made. While the most important aspect of that reality was unveiled by the election outcome, there remained some of the customary latitude of interpretation as to its full significance. And with respect to the interplay between the stratagems of party elites on one hand and the grass-roots American voters on the other, the chronology of the 1964 election does indeed provide a fascinating composite of sheer myth, genuine but discrepant reality worlds, and self-fulfilling prophecies.

I. THE MYTH OF THE STAY-AT-HOME REPUBLICANS

The first theory of electoral reality on our agenda may be rapidly disposed of, for it lies more simply and unequivocally in the realm of myth than any of the others we shall treat. It should not be overlooked, however, both because of its historical persistence and because of its enshrinement in the battle cry of 1964 Goldwater supporters: "A choice, not an echo!"

In the quadrennial competition between

liberal and conservative wings of the Republi-

can Party for the presidential nomination throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the conservatives were consistently bested. One of the prime contentions of the liberals was that all of the entries of the conservative wing were so distant from the "middle-of-the-road" that they had no hope of attracting the independent votes necessary for victory over the Democrats. At an ideological level, the conservative wing coined the epithet "me-tooism" to ridicule the liberals for their refusal to reject Democratic innovations of the New and Fair Deal eras root and branch. The liberals, it was charged, were slowly selling out the fundamental principles on which earlier days of G.O.P. ascendancy had been based.

This accusation of ideological "flabbiness" was not, however, compelling of itself without some further comment on the problem of winning votes. As a consequence, a theory became widely current among conservative Republicans that G.O.P. difficulties in maintaining much contact with the White House were in fact directly tied to the "me-tooist" flavor of its presidential candidates. Republicans running for that office tended to lose not because there was any lack of potential Republican votes (as the superficial observer might have thought), but because many of the "real" Republicans were sufficiently offended by "metooism" that they simply didn't bother to vote at all. Nominate a true Republican rather than a Tweedledee, the theory went, and enough of these stay-at-homes would return to the polls to put him into the White House.

As such theories go, this contention was remarkably verifiable. That is, the critic need not argue that few Republicans were disappointed by the nominees of their party, for disappointment in itself is irrelevant for argument. The question is simply whether or not Republicans, however disappointed, did continue to turn out and vote even for "me-tooist" candidates through this period—a matter much easier to ascertain. Nor is there any point in arguing that there were never any stray Republicans who in the last analysis vented their frustrations by refusing to go to the polls. Undoubtedly there were. But the theory hinges less on the question as to whether such people existed, than on the contention that they existed in significant numbers: not merely several hundred or several thousand or even a few hundred thousand, but in the millions needed to overcome the persistent Democratic majorities.

Such a pool of potential voters would be large enough to be discriminated reliably in most sample surveys. And we know of no

³ The New York Times, July 19, 1964.

reputable sample surveys at any time in this period that gave any shred of reason to believe that this significant pool of stay-at-home Republicans existed. Indeed, such findings as were relevant pointed massively in the opposite direction. From 1944 on, for example, one can contrast turnout rates between Democrats and Republicans of comparable strengths of identification. And over election after election featuring "me-tooist" Republican nominees, one finds that turnout rates are consistently higher -and often much higher-on the Republican side. Indeed, each time we isolate that polar minority who not only have an intense commitment to the Republican Party, but whose commitment is of a highly sensitive ideological sort, turnout typically reaches proportions staggering for the American system: 96 percent, 98 percent—levels almost implausible in view of registration difficulties, travel, sickness and other accidents which can keep the most devoted American from the polls upon occasion. More impressive still, we find that in 1952 those Republicans who reported during the campaign that they would have preferred the "conservative" Taft over the "liberal" Eisenhower-exactly those Republicans to whom the theory refers-actually turned out at much higher rates to vote for Eisenhower in the November election (94 percent) than did the set of Republicans who indicated satisfaction with Eisenhower's nomination (84 percent).4

These brief observations do not begin to exhaust the evidence, none of which lends any support whatever to the theory of a silent pool of frustrated conservative Republicans. Hence it is scarcely surprising that the Goldwater cause in 1964 was not buoyed up by some sudden surge of new support at the polls which other strategists had overlooked; for the hitherto silent people expected to provide such a

4 This datum is not as absurd as it might appear if the reader has failed to grasp the import of the preceding text. That is, in 1952 it was the most intense and ideologically "pure" Republicans who tended to prefer Taft to Eisenhower, much as 12 years later their counterparts chose Goldwater over the other Republican alternatives. It was the less ideologically committed (either by persuasion or by lack of ideological sensitivity) who were more satisfied with the Eisenhower candidature. The erstwhile Taft supporters did not perversely turn out at higher rates because they were disappointed in the convention choice, but because their striking commitment to Republicanism compelled them to more ardent support of its candidate whatever his ideological position.

surge existed principally in the imaginations of conservative strategists who in time of adversity needed desperately to believe that they were there. It is less of a wonder that this theory was generated, particularly before sample survey data took on much scope or stature in the 1940s, than that it persisted with greater or lesser vigor into the 1960s in the face of repetitive contradictory evidence readily available to any proponents with an edge of interest as to what the facts actually were.

II. THE MINORITY CANDIDATE OF A MINORITY PARTY

On the eve of the Republican nominating convention, an irate Goldwater supporter wrote to the Paris edition of the Herald Tribune, upbraiding it for the doubts it had expressed as to the extent of Goldwater sentiment beyond the convention delegates themselves, and pointing out that a massive groundswell of support had built up for Goldwater throughout the country "west of Madison Avenue."

The charge of the liberal wing of the G.O.P. that Goldwater not only was unattractive to Democrats and Independents but was not even the majority preference of Republicans was a particularly severe allegation in view of the constraints under which the Republican Party has been obliged to operate in recent years. It has been the consensus of observers for quite some time that the Republican Party is a minority party in the affections of the American public. Our relevant data collections at frequent intervals since 1952 have left little question in our minds both as to the minority status of the Republicans, and as to the stability of that status during this epoch. For most of this time, our estimates would suggest that in terms of underlying loyalties, the Democrats could expect to receive, all other things equal, something in the neighborhood of 54 percent of the national popular vote; and if any change has been occurring in this figure in the past 15 years, it is that this Democratic majority is slowly increasing.5 In practical terms, this means that a Democratic candidate need not have much attraction for grass-roots Republicans: he can win easily if he can but carry the votes of a reasonable share of independents, and has general appeal for Democrats. A Republican candidate, on the other hand, can only win at the national level by drawing nearly monolithic support from Republicans, attract-

⁵ See "The Concept of a 'Normal Vote,' "ch. 1 in A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York, 1965.)

ing the votes of a lion's share of independents, and inducing unusual defection among the less committed Democratic identifiers as well. The latter was the Eisenhower formula, and one which Nixon had nearly succeeded in following in 1960. More generally, the liberal wing of the Republican Party had sought candidates with this kind of broad appeal throughout this period. In this light, the question of Goldwater's popularity was serious: for if a minority party nominates a figure enjoying only minority support within his own party, it is an obvious invitation to disaster.

In the spring and early summer of 1964, the opinion polls lent much weight to the contention that Goldwater enjoyed no broad support even among Republicans. The Goldwater supporters tended to counter this kind of evidence either (1) by ignoring the polls; or (2) by questioning the validity of the polls (some Goldwater placards were to read "Gallup didn't count us!"); or (3) by questioning the immutability of the early poll readings. Of these reactions, certainly the last-mentioned was entirely appropriate. That is, in the very early stages of a push toward the presidency, even a person who has been something of a "national" figure as Senator or major Governor for a considerable period may not be recognized by very large portions of the public. Until he has received much more intense national exposure in the limelight of presidential primaries and the nominating convention, "straw polls" as to his popularity can be highly misleading and unstable, particularly if the polling pits such a candidate against other figures with more longstanding national prominence and "household"

However, survey data gathered over the course of 1964 can be put together with "hard" data from the presidential primaries to provide an illuminating picture of Goldwater's general popularity and, in particular, the reactions of grass-roots Republicans to him. In January, 1964, before the beginning of the spring primaries, we asked a national sample of the electorate:

Many people are wondering who will run for President on the Republican side this fall. . . . If you had to make a choice, which Republican leader do you think would be best for our country in 1964?

Who would be your second choice?

Are there any of the leading Republicans that you think would make very bad candidates?

In our estimation, some challengers of this description have been prematurely discouraged from competition by poll results which might well have changed radically with greater exposure.

Table I summarizes the responses to this sequence of questions. The open-ended nature of the questions meant that individuals only rated those Republicans whom they were aware of at the time, and thought of as plausible candidates. The table excludes a thin scattering of other mentions. Since the scoring used reflects both the breadth and the intensity of support, a Republican receiving relatively few mentions could not achieve any very high score. Thus, for example, another possible scoring could have shown Henry Cabot Lodge vastly outdistancing all other aspirants, as his references were almost unanimously positive. whereas the other Republicans suffered numerous descriptions as "very bad candidates." However, at this time he was not commonly regarded as an aspirant for the nomination, and the scoring deliberately puts this warm but limited positive feeling toward him in perspective.7

The table speaks for itself as to Goldwater's attractiveness as a candidate. Clearly Goldwater's problem was not that he was still too little known: he received mentions from a wider proportion of the electorate than any of his competitors. But for much of the electorate he was an object of antagonism even in January, 1964. And among grass-roots Republicans, where his strength was concentrated, he remained fourth in a field of six.

The sequence of Republican primary elections in the succeeding months tended, with some local variation, to fit the lines suggested by these January reactions. The table presages the startling Lodge write-in victory over both Goldwater and Rockefeller among New Hampshire Republicans in March, as well as his numerous subsequent strong showings. It contains ample warning as well of the amazingly poor Goldwater record in the primaries throughout the spring, including the scattered victories in such seemingly congenial states as

⁷ Lodge's strong grass-roots popularity was one of the untold stories of the 1960 election, when he ran for vice-president. Well-known for his televised confrontations with the Russian delegation in the United Nations, he was far and away the most widely recognized and warmly regarded first-time vice-presidential candidate in the elections we have studied. Given the tarnish which seems to accompany second efforts at the presidency in American elections and which would undoubtedly have hurt Nixon, it may well be that Lodge, had he been acceptable to the Republican Party leadership, could have pushed Lyndon Johnson to a closer race than any other of the Republican hopefuls.

conservative Nebraska, where by standing alone on the ticket he managed to win about half of the votes cast over a flood of Nixon and Lodge write-ins. It even renders intelligible the crucial Goldwater victory in California, where write-ins were not permitted, where the sole opponent was Rockefeller, and where Democrats had a hotly fought primary of their own. Indeed, there is room to wonder whether any presidential aspirant has ever contested so many primaries with as disastrous a showing, and still captured the nomination of his party's convention.

No evidence from polls of the period, moreover, suggests that Goldwater's popularity showed any sudden increase, even among Republicans, in the short interval between the final primary and the San Francisco convention. In interviewing our sample of the national electorate in September and October, we asked respondents to recall their reactions to the decisions of the Republican convention, including the identity of the candidates they had preferred at the time the convention began, as well as their gratification, indifference or disappointment at the outcome. While these responses suffer the inevitable frailties of any retrospective accounts that go back over an evolving situation, the social and political lines of support and antagonism for the various major contestants in July as reported during the campaign bear so close a resemblance to the lines of support visible in the January, 1964 data, as to make it unlikely that they are badly distorted by selective recollection, post hoc rationalization, and the like.

It is most instructive, perhaps, to set these popular reactions to the 1964 Republican convention against a fairly comparable set of data collected in 1952 after the conservative wing had lost its bid to nominate Senator Taft for the presidency against the liberal wing's offering of General Eisenhower, for the bitterness engendered in the 1952 struggle came closer to matching that of 1964 than either of the intervening conventions. Our question in 1952 asked respondents irrespective of partisan allegiance whether they would have preferred to have seen any other candidate nominated in either of the major-party conventions held in Chicago. Thus Republican identifiers could focus their remarks on the Democratic convention in a way that the 1964 question did not permit. However, partisans tended to comment primarily on the outcomes of their own party's nominating conventions.

Among Republican identifiers in the fall of 1952, about one in five recalled having felt a preference for Taft at the time of the conven-

TABLE I. PREFERENCES FOR THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION AMONG SELECTED SEGMENTS OF THE ELECTORATE,

JANUARY, 1964

	, ,	Segments of the Electorate		
	Per cent mentions ^a	Score across total elec- torate ^b	Score within "Minimal Majority": all Inde- pendents and Re- publicans ^b	Score among all Re- publicans ^b
	(%)			
Nixon	42	+25	+32	+37
Lodge	10	+11	+13	+13
Romney	11	+ 9	+11	+10
Rockefeller	49	+19	+10	+ 1
Scranton	11	+ 7	+ 6	+ 5
Goldwater	54	- 8	- 5	+ 9

^a The percentage entered represents the proportion of individuals in the total sample mentioning the Republican leader indicated, either as one of two best or one of two very bad candidates.

tion. Another eight percent had preferred some third candidate. The vast majority of the remaining 72 percent indicated that they had been indifferent to the choices at either convention, or expressed gratification in the selection of Eisenhower as the Republican candidate. Some other Republicans responded that they would have preferred a candidate other than Stevenson from the Democratic convention. Presumably, however, these citizens were satisfied with the Republican convention, and it seems reasonable to conclude that a maximum of some 30 percent of all Republicans in 1952 had ground to recall any disappointment over their party's nomination.

The picture from 1964 is remarkably similar in one respect, and drastically different in another. Among Republican identifiers in this latter year, slightly less than 20 percent of all Republicans recalled having preferred Goldwater at the time of the convention. This figure is only one percent less than the proportion of Taft supporters among Republicans in 1952. What was different, of course, was that in 1952 Taft lost the nomination on the first ballot, whereas in 1964 Goldwater won it handily on the first ballot. Although in our 1964 data a

b Each mention of a leader as the "best" candidate received a score of +2. Each mention as second best received a score of +1. The first-mentioned "bad" candidate received a score of -2. Any negative second mentions were scored -1. The entries in the table represent the net balance of positive or negative scores for the leader, expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible positive score an individual would have received had he been awarded all of the "best" choices given by the indicated segment of the electorate.

large segment (30 percent) of Republican identifiers indicated that they had held no preference for a specific candidate at convention time, very nearly half of all of our Republicans did recall some preference other than Goldwater. Thus these grass-roots Republicans with non-Goldwater choices outnumbered the Goldwater supporters within Republican ranks by a margin of better than two and one-half to one. A clear majority (60 percent) of those with other preferences, when asked "Were you particularly unhappy that Goldwater got the nomination, or did you think that he was nearly as good as your man?," expressed their lingering unhappiness about the outcome.

In sum, then, it is hard to turn up any bit of evidence to challenge the conclusion that Goldwater was, in rather startling degree, a minority candidate within a minority party. If his camp actually believed that the San Francisco delegates represented a true cross-section of grass-roots Republican sentiment, then they had grossly misunderstood the situation. There was, however, at least one extenuating circumstance: the support among Republican citizens for other candidates than Goldwater was split badly among the four or five other leading candidates. Thus while any of several pairs of other candidates had grass-roots party support at convention time which would have outnumbered the Goldwater faction quite readily, the fact remains that the 20 percent Goldwater support represented a plurality for any single candidate.

However this may be, disappointment at the convention outcome in 1964 had radically different consequences in November than the comparable disappointments among Republicans in 1952. As we have seen above, the former Taft supporters in that year turned out at the polls in near-perfect proportions and cast a very faithful Republican vote for Eisenhower. In 1964, however, the widespread defections among Republicans necessary to account for the Johnson landslide tended to follow rather closely the lines of lingering discontent with the nomination.

These recollections of San Francisco varied according to the different camps in which rank-and-file Republicans had located themselves at the time. So, for example, about three Lodge supporters in four reported they were unhappy with the Goldwater nomination; for Rockefeller supporters, the figure was closer to two in three. Slightly over half of the Nixon supporters, however, indicated that they thought Goldwater was "nearly as good" as their man, Nixon. With minor departures, similar patterns

marked the ultimate defections to Johnson among these varying Republicans. Since Nixon supporters were, like Goldwater's, more frequently "strong" Republicans than the adherents of some of the other camps, lower defection rates here were only to be expected. However, defections to Johnson among Republicans who had preferred Nixon at convention time remained about double what could be expected from past norms for Republicans of this particular mixture of strengths of identification. Over three times as many Republicans for Lodge and Scranton defected to Johnson as parallel "normal" expectations would suggest, and-perhaps surprisingly-defections among Republicans who expressed no pre-convention favorite at all were in this range as well. Most extreme were the Rockefeller and Romney supporters, with defection rates at the polls exceeding expectation by a factor of greater than four.8

These differences across the several non-Goldwater camps are intriguing, in part because they appear related to reactions of the various G.O.P. leaders to the Goldwater candidacy. That is, of the set of major Republicans under discussion, Nixon took greatest pains to maintain relations with the Goldwater group before the convention, and undertook to help unify the party behind him after the nomination. Therefore it seems fitting that dismay at the nomination was least in his camp, and defections relatively limited. Neither Rockefeller nor Romney made any major show of reconciliation after the nomination, and subsequently went to some lengths to dissociate themselves from the Goldwater aspects of the Republican campaign.

Yet if it were true that nothing more than a "follow-the-leader" response is needed to account for these variations in defection rates among Republicans, the data would cast a somewhat different light on the question of conflicting perceptions between liberal and conservative wings of Goldwater's voting strength. For in such a case the Senator's problem would have been less one of gross overestimates of his strength, than of self-fulfilling prophecy on the part of the disgruntled liberal leaders. In other words, they first refused to support Goldwater

⁸ While these rates may sound mountainous, it should be remembered that the expected defection rates for most of these groups are rather low—in the vicinity of 10 percent. Nonetheless, 40 percent of the Rockefeller Republicans in our sample voted for Johnson.

on grounds that he could not win enough votes, and then proceeded to withhold in large quantities the votes of their "followers" to assure exactly this outcome.

No airtight way is available to determine whether or not Republican defections at the presidential level might have been reduced significantly had Rockefeller or some of the other liberals effected a more genuine reconciliation with Goldwater to unite the party for the campaign. Nevertheless, if we were to compare the issue positions and ideological persuasions of 1964 Nixon Republicans with those of Rockefeller or Romney Republicans and find no substantial differences, we might be tempted to judge that differences in leader behavior did play some independent role in minimizing or maximizing Republican defections in November. Preliminary analyses suggest rather clearly, however, that substantial ideological differences did exist across the range of Republican factions. Republicans enthusiastic about Goldwater showed a rather unique (or "extreme") pattern of ideological positions. Nixon supporters, while unmistakably different, looked more nearly like the Goldwater people than the adherents of any of the other camps. Next in order moving away from the Goldwater position were the Scranton and Lodge followers, and the Rockefeller and Romney adherents show slightly more liberal positions still. Ideological differences, therefore, plainly existed between grass-roots supporters of the various factions, and these differences were indeed correlated with defections from a Goldwater vote. This does not exclude the possibility that the defections might have been lessened by a genuine "unity" move on the part of more liberal Republican leaders. It indicates nevertheless that the desertions were rooted not only in leader-follower behavior, but in a more personal sense of ideological distance between many rank-and-file Republicans and the Goldwater faction-a distance that would have produced increased defections quite apart from examples set by the leadership.

However this may be, it was a significant feature of the election that the customary postconvention reconciliation between party factions was in the 1964 Republican case lack-lustre at best, and at many levels simply non-existent. Many of the liberals wished to avoid the Goldwater platform. At the same time, Goldwater seemed to do less than most candidates in making it easy for the dissident brethren to return to the fold. Among several possible reasons, one may have been that in the blueprint laid out by Goldwater strategists for a November victory, the support of most of these leaders did not appear to be critical.

III. CAMPAIGN STRATEGY: THE SOUTH AS REPUBLICAN TARGET

The strategy of the Goldwater camp for a November victory was both simple and relatively selective. Goldwater felt, to begin with, that he could hold on to essentially the same states that Nixon had won in 1960. This meant a clean sweep of the populous states of the Pacific Coast, most of the Mountain and Plains states, and a scattering east of the Mississippi. To reap the additional electoral votes for victory, Goldwater believed that the way lay open. under proper circumstances, for the Republican Party to make further major inroads in the once solidly Democratic South. The plan implied that Goldwater could largely afford to write off the populous industrial states of the Northeast and some, if not all, of the Midwest -a matter which greatly reduced the importance of the dissident liberal Republican bloc. And it represented a dramatic departure from any past Republican strategy in making of the South a fulcrum for victory.

Such a strategy was not only unusual but,

against the long sweep of American electoral history, it might even be thought of as implausible. Yet it was no hastily devised scheme. For years Goldwater had participated in the Congressional coalition between conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats. The same drive for ideological neatness that led him to call for the reorganization of American politics into "Conservative" and "Liberal" parties impressed upon him the grotesque incongruity of a Democratic South. The South had no reason to be a Democratic bastion; by all of its affinities and traditions, it should long since have become Republican. Part of the problem lay with the national Republican Party, which, in the control of the Northeastern bloc, had failed to present national-level candidates making clear that Republicanism was the natural home of the Southern voter. This had been a frustrating fact since Goldwater's entry into national politics—a period during which political observers had frequently predicted an imminent partisan realignment of the South; but gains in the region, while very obvious, had remained rather modest. In discussions of Republican difficulty in recapturing majority status in the land, Goldwater had opined that the Party had to learn to "go hunting in the pond where the ducks are"-the South. As bitterness began to mount in that region toward the civil rights pressures of the Kennedy Administration, the time seemed more ripe than ever for the presentation of a purely conservative Republican candidate who could appeal to the Southern ethos in a most direct way, thereby breaking the Democratic hold on the region in one dramatic and decisive stroke.

This long-planned strategy had suffered two temporary but alarming setbacks. The assassination of President Kennedy suddenly placed a Southerner in the White House, and removed from power the most feared personal symbols of federal intrusion. The continuation of the Kennedy beginnings by the Johnson Administration, however-particularly in the 1964 Civil Rights bill-helped to reset the stage. So did the increased signs of Negro unrest, and the new element of "white backlash" in the North as well as the South that seemed apparent in the spring primaries. The capping touch was Goldwater's vote against the Civil Rights bill. This vote, to be sure, represented no condoning of segregationism per se, but rather a blow for states' rights against the encroachment of the federal government. Nevertheless, white supremacists in the South had so long paraded under the states' rights banner as to leave little room for fear lest the Goldwater gesture go unappreciated. The liberal wing of the Republican Party, having worked for years to prevent the Democrats from "gaining position" on the civil rights issue, was further horrified as it envisioned the G.O.P. suddenly transformed into "the party of the white man" at just the moment when the Negro vote was becoming effectively mobilized.

The second setback threatened when Governor Wallace of Alabama decided to enter the presidential race as a states' rights candidate. This was especially alarming, for Wallace would have competed for exactly the same votes that Goldwater had been wooing toward the Republican column. However, Wallace's subsequent withdrawal left the field open again for the original victory blueprint, and the implementation began in force. Mid-campaign accounts of the Goldwater organizational efforts spoke of a high-powered, modernistic campaign apparatus in the South stocked with volunteer labor in numbers that would have been unbelievable for the earlier Eisenhower and Nixon campaigns. While this machine had been humming efficiently from the start, the Goldwater organization in the West was described as effective but less advanced; in the Midwest it was chaotic, and in the Northeast next to non-existent. At few if any points in recent political history have so many campaign resources-in both issue positions taken and

organizational efforts made-been devoted to the cultivation of a single region. The first discordant note came when, during the campaign and apparently as the result of new poll data, Goldwater remarked to reporters that he was not as strong in the South as everybody seemed to think.

After the votes were counted, what was the success of this strategy? The verdict must come in two halves. From one point of view, the strategy was a brilliant success, and it left its imprint on the geographical voting returns with greater strength than any other of what we have called "short-term forces" in the 1964 election. One crude way of separating these immediate or new effects from those better attributable to long-term standing loyalties is to create a different kind of electoral map, entering state by state or region by region the departure of a particular presidential vote in a more Republican or more Democratic direction than the normal voting of the area involved. A map so constructed for 1964, with pro-Goldwater deviations regarded as "high ground" and pro-Johnson deviations as "low," would show one primary "tilt" or gradient across the nation. The very lowest ground would appear in the northern reaches of New England, and the gradient would move upward with fair regularity all the way west to the Pacific Coast. The same gradient would appear, but much more sharply tilted still, as one moved southward to the Gulf of Mexico. In other words, Goldwater's regional emphases were indeed profoundly reflected in the vote.

As soon as one leaves the relative question of the regional and the geographic, however, the strategy was a dismal failure. For while the whole continent tilted in the expected direction, the strong Democratic tide nationally left virtually all of the country submerged under what from a Goldwater point of view was "sea level"-the 50-50 mark in popular votes. In terms of electoral votes, Goldwater was stranded on a few islands which remained above the tide on the outer Southern and Southwestern fringe of the continent. These islands represented stunning "firsts" or dramatic historic reversals in states like Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina. But their historic interest did not bring Goldwater

any closer to the presidency.

Indeed, while Goldwater scored sharp Republican gains through the "Black Belt" of the deepest South, his assault on the South as a whole produced rather pathetic results. All observers agree, for example, that the South has been drifting away from its old status as a

one-party Democratic bastion for at least two decades, if not for five or more. Hence Goldwater could have hoped to profit from four years more of this drift than Nixon, and a decade more than Eisenhower. Secondly, all observers are equally agreed that not only in the Black Belt but well north into the Border States of the South, civil rights was the prime political issue, and there is no doubt where the mass white population stood on the matter. Our data from the late 1950s and the early 1960s have consistently made clear that the potential of this issue for dramatic partisan realignment in the South had been muffled because of lack of clarity in the eyes of the mass population, prior to 1964, that either of the two major national parties offered much hope to the Southern white. It was exactly this ambiguity that Goldwater set out to remove by providing a clear party differentiation on civil rights at the national level. Putting these two ingredients together, the actual 1964 election results from the South as a whole might seem astonishing. For Goldwater actually did less well in the region than either Nixon in 1960 or Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. One has to return at least to 1948 to find a comparably poor showing for a Republican presidential candidate; and there are reasonable treatments of the 1948 Thurmond vote which would send one back to 1944 for a parallel. Given the fact that Goldwater wooed the South so straightforwardly, and injected the new and potent ingredient of clear party differentiation on civil rights into the 1964 picture, this retrogression of Republican popular voting strength for a presidential candidate back to levels of the 1940s may seem quite incomprehensible.

A possible explanation, although one that we can summarily reject, would be that the clear party differentiation on civil (or "states") rights which Goldwater tried to communicate failed to come across to the mass voters. Perhaps to the dismay of the liberal wing of the

⁹ We have examined this possibility in some seriousness simply because often in the past we have found public perceptions of party differences on major issues totally confused and muddy. Even on issues where the politically sophisticated see marked party differences, general public inattention and the ambiguities which politicians exploit to blur the edges of their positions combine to produce either lack of recognition of differences, or very conflicting impressions of what those differences are at any given point. See Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960), pp. 179ff.

Republicans, however, the communication was near-perfect. In our 1960 election study, a measure of association between the two parties and the policy extremes of the civil rights controversy showed values of .02 and .05 (the Democrats only very slightly associated with a pro-civil rights position) on two different civil rights policy items. 10 In 1964, the perceived association in the same terms on the same two items had risen to values of .54 and .50. The change in volunteered identifications of the two parties with the issue, among the much smaller subset of people so concerned that they brought the matter up themselves, showed even more dramatic change. In 1960 these civil rightsconcerned people had tended to associate Kennedy somewhat with a pro-civil rights position, and Nixon with more of a "go-slow" approach (an association of .30). For Johnson and Goldwater in 1964, the association had mounted to .84, approaching consensus. The same volunteered materials include images of the parties, as well as of the candidates, and it is a matter of some interest to know in what measure Goldwater's 1964 position "rubbed off" on the Republican Party as a whole. In 1960, the civil rights association appeared to lie more clearly with the Kennedy-Nixon pairing (.30) than with any differences between the two parties, for these volunteered references to the parties showed only an association of .08. The comparable figure for the two parties in 1964 was .86. In short, we cannot explain why Goldwater produced a retrogression of Republican presidential voting strength in the South by suggesting that his key civil rights position failed to get across.

The Southern vote for Goldwater becomes intelligible if we add three elements to the consideration. First, while civil rights lent an important new pro-Goldwater force to the situation, various strong short-term forces which had pushed the Southern electorate in a pro-Republican direction in 1952, 1956 and 1960 were no longer present. We have argued elsewhere that the popular vote for Eisenhower and Nixon in the South was a very misleading index of the degree of solid Republican advance there. While our data do show the Republican

¹⁰ The statistic is such that if all citizens in the sample agreed that the Democrats represented one side of the issue and the Republicans the other, the figure would be 1.00 (perfect association). A figure of .00 represents the case of no aggregate association whatever.

¹¹ Philip E. Converse, "A Major Political Realignment in the South?" in Allan P. Sindler. Party inching forward in the affections of mass Southern voters, the pace has been slow; the South remains a preponderantly Democratic region. In 1952 and 1956, the Southern presidential vote swung far to the Republican side of normal for the region, just as it did in all other parts of the United States. In 1960, with the Eisenhower appeal gone, most other regions moved back toward the Democrats as we expected. This return toward normal was almost invisible in the South, since a new and offsetting short-term force-Kennedy's Catholicism-had arisen which was peculiarly repugnant to the Southern population with its concentration (Louisiana excepted) of devout and fundamentalist Protestants.12 Thus if any other of the Republican aspirants had run in 1964, we might have expected a delayed return toward a much more normally Democratic vote in the South. From this point of view, the injection of a new civil rights differentiation by Goldwater did not occur in a void, but was something of a replacement for other forces which had kept the Southern vote extended in a remarkably pro-Republican direction for three consecutive presidential elections.

Once we take this into account, the Republican retrogression is less perplexing, although intuitively we would expect civil rights to have an impact on the Southern voter more potent than either Eisenhower's appeal or fear of a Catholic president. It is here that the second and third considerations enter. While Goldwater's civil rights position drew Southern whites toward the Republicans, Negroes both South and North moved monolithically toward the Democrats. Although Southern Negro voting was still limited by registration difficulties, it increased over 1960 and was almost unanimously Democratic for the first time.13 If this sudden new increment of Negro votes could be removed from the Southern totals, the Goldwater vote proportion would undoubtedly appear to be a slight progression, rather than a retrogression, over the Eisenhower and Nixon votes.

Finally, it must be recognized that civil rights, while the primary issue in the South. was not the only one. Beyond civil rights, Southerners reacted negatively to the Goldwater positions much as their fellow citizens elsewhere. Many Southern white respondents said in effect: "Goldwater is right on the black man, and that is very important. But he is so wrong on everything else I can't bring myself to vote for him." From this point of view, the civil rights issue did indeed have a powerful impact in the South: without it, the 1964 Goldwater vote probably would not only have slipped to normal Republican levels, but would have veered as elsewhere to the pro-Democratic side. The more general ideological appeal to what Goldwater saw as Southern "conservatism" aside from the Negro question, did not have major impact.

Much the same comments hold for the failure of "white backlash" to develop in the way many expected outside the South. Our data show that civil rights feeling did not lack impact elsewhere. But for many non-Southern whites who resented the advance of the Negro cause and the summer of discontent, the election involved other important issues as well; and Goldwater's positions on them struck such voters very negatively. Thus "white backlash" feelings were translated into Goldwater votes by Democrats only where fear of the Negro was so intense as to blot out virtually all other considerations. Voters fitting this description existed in fair number and geographic concentration in the deepest latitudes of the South. Elsewhere, they were thinly scattered.

IV. THE ELECTION "POST-MORTEM"

Up to this point we have referred only vaguely to the many negative reactions Goldwater occasioned in all sectors of the country. which tended to dim out isolated attractions he did present. The Goldwater "image" was indeed phenomenally unfavorable. We have measured such images in the past, among other ways, by tallying the simple number of favorable and unfavorable references made by respondents to broad questions inviting them to say what they like and dislike about each of the candidates. Typically, American voters have tended on balance to speak favorably, even about candidates they were about to send down to defeat. The least favorable image we have seen-in Adlai Stevenson's second try in 1956 -involved only about 52 percent of all responses that were favorable. Less than 35 per-

ed., Change in the Contemporary South (Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1963).

¹² These religious effects were described in Converse *et al.*, "Stability and Change in 1960: a Reinstating Election," this Review, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 269-80.

¹³ In our data, expressions of party loyalty from the South which had been slowly losing Democratic strength throughout the 1950s show a sudden rebound in 1964. However, all of the rebound can be traced to Southern Negroes; the downward trend among Southern whites continued and at about the same pace.

cent of the Goldwater references were favorable

Just after the election, Goldwater observed that "more than 25 million people" voted "not necessarily for me, but for a philosophy that I represent..." At another time, in assessing the magnitude of his defeat, he chastised himself for having been a personally ineffective spokesman for that philosophy. This seemed particularly odd against the descriptions of Goldwater before his nomination, in which even opponents concurred that at long last the right wing had found an articulate spokesman with a magnetic personality.

The candidate references we collect are a mixture of observations concerning the personality and leadership qualities of the individuals themselves as well as reactions to policy positions they represent in the public eye. Ideally, we could take this image material and split it cleanly into references to personal attributes as opposed to policy positions, in order to judge the accuracy of the proposition that what the public repudiated was the spokesman, and not the philosophy. Practically speaking, such divisions present many difficult coding decisions.¹⁴

Nevertheless, we have sifted Johnson and Goldwater references into categories more or less purely reflecting "policy" as opposed to "personality" significance. Among the most pure policy references, Johnson's were favorable by an 80-20 margin, visibly ahead of the 69-31 balance of his total image. Mentions of Goldwater policies ran less than 30-70 favorable, thereby trailing the rest of his image slightly. In general, the farther one moves from pure policy to pure personality, Johnson's advantage declines. His "wheeler-dealer" style and the aura of conflicts-of-interest which dogged him during the campaign came through to dilute his attractiveness. Against this backdrop, Goldwater's personal "integrity" and

14 Take, for example, the charge hung on Goldwater by Democrats and some Republicans that he was "impulsive." This allegation reverberated in the public and came to make up one of our largest single categories of negative references to Goldwater. "Impulsiveness" is a personality trait that on one hand might have been less plausible for some other right-wing leader. Yet the charge took roots and began to flourish with respect to a cluster of policies that Goldwater shared with other Republican leaders of similar persuasions. It seems quite arbitrary to decide that it is exclusively either the person or the policy which is "impulsive."

"sincerity" drew praise. Throughout, the data suggest that Johnson was carried along to an image nearly as positive as Eisenhower's best, less by his personal characteristics than by the policies with which he was associated (many of them identified by respondents as continuations from the Kennedy Administration). For Goldwater, if anything, the reverse was true.

Aside from civil rights and a faint flutter of approval brought by Goldwater's latter-day stand against immorality, none of his major positions was attractive to voters outside the most hard-core Republican ranks. In general, the mass of public opinion has been quite unsympathetic to traditional Republican thinking in areas of social welfare and other domestic problems for several decades. A major Goldwater theme involved attacks against the increasingly heavy hand of "big government," yet this struck little in the way of a responsive chord. Most Americans in the more numerous occupational strata do not appear to feel the governmental presence (save for local civil rights situations) in any oppressive or day-today manner, and as a consequence simply have no reactions to the area which have any motivational significance. Among those more aware of the practices and potentials of federal government, a slight majority feels that if anything, governmental services and protections are inadequate rather than overdone. Thus for better or for worse, such contentions on Goldwater's part had little popular resonance.

Goldwater's failure to make much capital of domestic policy was not uncharacteristic of a Republican presidential candidate. What was new for a Republican, however, was his performance in the area of foreign policy. In a degree often overlooked, the 1950s were a period during which, from the point of view of many Americans inattentive to the finer lines of politics and reacting to the parties in terms of gross associations and moods, something of an uneasy equilibrium prevailed between the two major parties. Much more often than not, for these Americans the Democratic Party was the party of prosperity and good times, but also the party more likely to blunder into war. The Republican Party, conversely, was more skilled in maintaining peace, but brought with it depression and hard times.

The foreign policies proposed by Goldwater and refracted through the press and other commentators, shifted this image more dramatically than one might have thought possible (Table II). Setting aside the large mass of voters who throughout the period did not see any particular differences between the parties

TABLE II. PERCEPTIONS AS TO THE PARTY MOST LIKELY TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUT OF WAR IN THE ENSUING FOUR YEARS

	1956	1960	1964
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Democrats would handle better	7	15	38
No party difference	45	46	46
Republicans would handle better	40	29	12
Don't know, not ascertained	8	10	4
	100	100	100

in foreign policy capability, the balance of expectations in the area favored the Republicans by better than a 5-1 margin in 1956. This margin deteriorated somewhat in the late stages of the Eisenhower Administration, but remained at an imposing 2-1 edge. During the Goldwater campaign it reversed itself to a 3-1 margin favoring the Democrats.

Thus to the many ways of describing the public's repudiation of the Goldwater candidacy, another may be added: between a party of prosperity and peace, as against a party of depression and war, there is little room for hesitation.

V. LEVELS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE BASES FOR MISPERCEPTION

From at least one point of view, it is less interesting that Goldwater lost the 1964 election than that he thought he had a chance to win. What most of our descriptions of the election year have had in common is a sort of chronic miscalculation of electoral reality: miscalculations of standing strength, of new strength that might be won, and of what appeals were necessary to win that new strength. Since "electoral reality" is at many points a nest of uncertainties, and since we are told that in the face of uncertainty personal needs are likely to color perceptions the more strongly, there is little surprising in the fact that Goldwater overestimated his strength and drawing power. But as these misperceptions of Goldwater and his aides went grossly beyond what many observers felt were the margins of uncertainty, they deserve closer comment.

Rather than write off these perceptions as figments of imagination, let us suppose that to persist in the way many electoral misperceptions of the right wing have persisted, there must be some sustaining reality bases; and let us ask instead what such bases might be. For "public opinion" is a protean thing, and we shall discover that there are perfectly sound ways of measuring public opinion during the

1964 campaign which, instead of illustrating Johnson's towering lead in the opinion polls, would actually have shown Goldwater enjoying a slight margin.

As is well known, public opinion was spoken of and roughly gauged long before the operations of public opinion polling were developed. What was gauged was opinion from a variety of kinds of sources: informal reactions to events among ancillary elites around the centers of government; the writings of intellectuals and newspaper editors; representations from leaders of interest groups, and the like. While it was apparent that this conglomerate of opinion came disproportionately from relatively elite and informed sources and hence need not have coincided with what the "real public" thought, beyond mass elections themselves there were (and are, for those who totally distrust the polls) few further ways of understanding what the public below an elite level was thinking. One of those few ways of "digging down" into the real population was letters of opinion: letters sent from unassuming constituents to public officials, "letters to the editor" composed by non-professional writers reacting to daily events and even, in no few cases, to the opinions of the editor himself. This was one level of public opinion that seemed to be generated below the elite level and that, for the observer interested in opinion beyond the localisms of municipal government, could be monitored regularly on a wide geographic base.15

In our 1964 interview schedule we spent some time investigating the behavior of our respondents with respect to the writing of politically relevant letters. We ascertained first whether or not they had ever written such a letter either to any kind of public official, or to the editor of a newspaper or magazine. Then, among the minority who could recall ever writing such a letter, we went on to ask about the frequency of such activity—whether any of the letters had been written in the past four years, and if so, roughly how many such letters the respondent would estimate he had written to each of the two types of targets over that recent period.

¹⁵ Undoubtedly, for such an observer, letters were not weighted equally in his impressions as to how opinion stood: some were more cogent than others, some were more distressed, and so on. But as a rough first approximation, one can imagine that what registered as "public opinion" on a particular issue in the mind of such an observer was closely related to the simple frequency of letters pro and con.

Many aspects of these data remain intriguing despite their general predictability. Thus, for example, the materials demonstrate handsomely that the large bulk of letters to public officials or the printed media come from a tiny fraction of the population, which tends to write very repetitively. Thus, in the data summarized in Figure 1, we find that only about 15 percent of the adult population reports ever having written a letter to a public official, and of the total stream of such letters from the grassroots, two-thirds are composed by about 3 percent of the population. Where letters to newspapers or magazines are concerned, the constituency is even more restrictive still: only about 3 percent of the population recalls ever having written such a letter, and two-thirds of such letters are turned out by not more than half of one percent of the population.16 Needless to say, there is fair overlap between those who write to the printed media and those writing to public officials, so that the observer monitoring both lines of communication would tend to count the same people twice.

Furthermore, as these few people write more and more letters over time, they are counted again and again, and this of course is the phenomenon that interests us. What we have done is to reconstruct our data on various preferences relevant to the 1964 election not by a raw head-count, which is what a mass election measures, but rather with each individual's preference on an item weighted by the number of letters that he has reported writing to either target in the four preceding years. This provides a basis, within reasonable limits, for a fair replication of the different kind of "public opinion" as it might be assessed by a hypothetical observer.¹⁷

¹⁶ Data on letters to the news media are not presented graphically, in part because the inequality is so complete that there is little one can discriminate in the figure. The Gini index of concentration for the newspaper and magazine letters is .99. See H. Alker and B. Russett, "On Measuring Inequality," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July, 1964), pp. 207–18.

¹⁷ We wish to stress that it remains a crude approximation, in part because we do not know, letter by letter, what political opinions the respondent was expressing. Conceivably in many cases they lay outside the range of any of our items. But the exercise is worth completing in part because it is likely that our hypothetical observer generalizes beyond the specific content of letters ("if ultra-conservative opinion on issue x is running about 30 percent, then it is likely that




Fig. 1. Letters to public officials and letterwriters within the electorate.

Figure 2 contrasts "public opinion" in the head-count sense, with that form of public opinion as measured by letter-writing. We suggest that this figure may usher us into the reality world on which many of Goldwater's assessments and stratagems were based. This is not to say that Goldwater had no other bases from which to calculate public opinion. He had, among other things, public opinion as measured by the polls, and he did not entirely discredit this information. Yet as we have noted there was evidence that poll data perplexed him, not simply because they customarily brought bad news, but also because they failed to square with all of his other intuitive impressions as to what the public was thinking. In the measure that these impressions came from a variety of sources not very different from the letter-writers among the public (i.e., from party activists, from campaign personnel and from informal associations), it is not hard to believe that they may have been displaced from the head-count of public opinion in much the same ways.

If we accept letter-writing for the moment then as a relevant indicator of public opinion, we see a rather marvelous change in the state of

ultra-conservative opinion on issue y would run about the same level if something made that issue salient"); and in part because the systematic lines of displacement of "letter opinion" from "public opinion" in the mass electoral sense are undoubtedly valid in their general direction, whatever the details.




Fig. 2. Public opinion as measured by people or political letters.

(c) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GETTING TOO STRONG ?

political affairs. In Figure 2(a), instead of trailing Johnson sadly in the anonymous crowd in mid-campaign, Goldwater holds a visible lead. Moving back to the time of the San Francisco convention (b), Goldwater is no longer the candidate of a small minority among Republicans and Independents, but rather is the toast of an absolute majority, even counting "no preferences" against him. In (c), we discover that not only is a vast majority of the public interested in the problem of the growing strength of the federal government, 18 but those

¹⁸ The wordings of the issue items involved in Figure 2(c) and (d) were as follows:

(For 2c) "Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. Others feel that the government in Washington has not gotten too strong for the good of the country.... What is your feeling?"

(For 2d) "Some people think our government should sit down

Fig. 2 (cont.) Public opinion as measured by people or political letters.

upset by this growing strength outnumber their opponents by a ratio approaching 3 to 1! In Figure 2(d), the displacement of "letter opinion" from public opinion is much less, in part because the item wording brought a relatively consensual response. However, it is clear that Goldwater's "hard" inclinations in foreign policy are somewhat overrepresented as well in the letter-writing public.

In some ways, Figure 2(e) contains more grist than any of the others, however. First, the very form of the distributions of ideological preference differs rather dramatically. Where

and talk to the leaders of the Communist countries and try to settle our differences, while others think we should refuse to have anything to do with them. . . . What do you think?"

Figure 2(e) is based on a set of questions that asked people to indicate their affective reactions toward a variety of groups, including "conservatives" and "liberals." The scores for the figure are based on the difference in reaction to the two stimuli.

"public opinion" is concerned, nearly half the population falls in the "zero" category, making no affective distinction whatever between conservatives and liberals.¹⁹ In addition, the clustering around this zero-point is very tight: over three-quarters of the population is located within one category of the zero-point. The distribution of "letter opinion," however, is quite different. The central mode of indifference or ignorance shrinks dramatically, and voices from more extreme positions on the continuum gain in strength. Other analyses show that virtually all letter-writers rank very high on measures we have used of ideological sensitivity. Hence those who remain toward the middle of the continuum in the right half of Figure 2(e) are not there through indifference or ignorance: they understand the ideological alternatives and place themselves toward the middle of the road with forethought. And, as the bimodal shape of the distribution suggests, political discourse becomes most notably a dialogue between very mild liberals and ultra-conservatives.

It is to the world of letter opinion or one like it that the Goldwater campaign, in its original design, was addressed. At least until its late stages, it assumed an electorate with near-total ideological comprehension and sensitivity. The appeal to the Southern conservative tradition in any abstract vein was indeed joyfully received in the South, and created great ferment among a part of the Southern population. Except as this theme became concretized in day-to-day problems with Negroes, however, the part of the population affected was tiny, even though in the letter-writing and related senses it was so visible as to appear to be "most of the South," politically speaking.

Similarly, the distribution of the population in this world of letter opinion helped maintain persistent overestimations of strength. Em-

19 It is likely that this contingent is roughly coterminous with that 40-50 percent of the American electorate which we have described elsewhere as having no impression as to what such terms as "conservative" and "liberal" mean. See Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York, 1964), pp. 206-61. The data presented there were gathered in 1960. In the 1964 study we collected the same data on recognition of ideological terms, thinking that perhaps the nature of the Goldwater campaign might render these terms and meanings more salient to a wider public The data show that it did not.

pirically speaking, the center of Goldwater support lay roughly in the third bar of the figure on the conservative side. It weakened rapidly with any further steps toward the center, and was relatively solid in the outer two bars of the graph. If one looks at "letter opinion" with this zone in mind, it would appear that the base of standing Goldwater support was very substantial. Goldwater hoped to firm up the support on his side of the center sufficiently to create a majority, and in this figure it would have taken only a modest extension of influence to achieve this. In the world of public opinion relevant for mass elections, however, the distribution of actual and potential support was radically different. Rather than starting from a solid base of support on the conservative wing, the initial springboard was scarcely populated at all. To win a majority, a much deeper penetration into the center would have been required.

In the measure that we have delineated in Figure 2(e), the kind of political environment familiar to many practicing politicians, we can also better understand the first of our puzzles, the myth of the stay-at-home Republicans. For ultra-conservatives who found a wide measure of social support and resonance for their views in the world of public opinion which they understood, it must indeed have been perplexing that uniquely at election time, and uniquely in vote totals, this vigorous support had a habit of evaporating. How could one interpret this gross discrepancy between what one heard and read about public sentiments and what happened at the polls? The easiest explanation was that strong conservatives in large numbers simply refused to go to the polls, however vigorously they would express themselves otherwise. And as soon as a useful reason was worked out as to why this willful nonvoting should occur, a theory was born. It persisted in part because it was a handy tactical weapon; but it persisted in some part as well because the discrepant realities which helped to catalyze the theory also persisted. For its proponents, the election of 1964 was a sobering reality test.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

It should be apparent that the phenomena we have examined in this paper have a significance that stretches considerably beyond the 1964 election, or questions of the credibility of public opinion polls, or the playing of games with the epistemologies of practicing politicians, fascinating though each of these subjects may be.

SAFE SEATS, SENIORITY, AND POWER IN CONGRESS*

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The president's difficulties in inducing Congress to pass his legislative program are usually ascribed to the different constituencies of the two institutions. This difference would make for disharmony under any circumstances, but it is said to be particularly important because the seniority system bestows the most power on congressmen whose constituencies are most unlike the president's. His policy commitments are responses to the needs of a heterogeneous, industrialized, urban society. The occupants of the most influential congressional positions come from districts that re-elect them regardless of national political trends. The representative from such a district "views with alarm the great issues that sweep the nation and threaten to disrupt the familiar and comfortable politics of his district," which is usually characterized as a rural backwater.

Both political parties are described this way. Because the Democrats have controlled Congress for all but four of the past 36 years, most illustrations of this thesis are drawn from conflicts between Democratic presidents and Democratic congresses. More specifically, the focus of attention is usually on the refusal of southern Democratic congressional leaders to support presidential legislative requests. In this article we will be concerned with this phenomenon in the House of Representatives. The thesis we examine may be restated as follows: lack of responsibility in the Democratic party is due to control of Congress by Southerners. Their influence is due to their seniority, which is a result of the lack of party competi-

* We were aided in gathering data by Milton Cummings and Richard Scammon. Many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article were made by Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Fred I. Greenstein, Duncan MacRae, Jr., Donald Matthews, Nelson W. Polsby, Randall Ripley, Alan Rosenthal, Stephen Smith, Leo M. Snowiss, Aaron B. Wildavsky, and Barbara Kaye Wolfinger. We are grateful for financial support from the Edgar Stern Family Fund, the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council, and to the Brookings Institution for use of its facilities.

¹ James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy, rev. Spectrum ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), p. 244.

tion in the South. Most academic descriptions of American politics include this thesis.² It is particularly common in textbooks. We will call it the "textbook theory."

Another interpretation of congressional behavior, that might be called the "insiders' theory," has a good deal of currency in Washington circles close to Congress.3 The insiders concede both the one-party South and southern congressional power, but they say that the former is not a sufficient cause of the latter, and introduce other considerations to explain it. Southern influence in Congress, according to the insiders, is not due just to the lack of party competition in the South, since there are many safe Democratic seats in the North. The men in these northern seats allegedly do not, however, make use of their "potential seniority." They are less interested in congressional careers and tend to "committee hop," thus losing the benefit of whatever seniority they have accrued. Many of these congressmen come from machine-dominated big cities where command of local patronage and contracts is the real sign of status and power. When an opportunity for such a position opens up back home, they desert the House for state or local government.

In the insiders' view, Southerners value a career in the House of Representatives more highly than do Northerners. One presumed reason is that the South, less developed industrially than the rest of the country, offers fewer alternate careers to ambitious young men. A second explanation is that the plantation owners' traditional noblesse oblige has made politics a more highly valued activity in the South, attracting some of the most able men from all walks of life. In the North politics has been not so much a gentleman's calling as a channel of social mobility for underprivileged ethnic groups.

The central proposition of the insiders' theory is that the level of southern influence in Congress is due to more than the "natural"

² Burns is probably the best-known contemporary advocate of this point of view.

³ While the insiders' theory is probably the prevailing one among Washington cognoscenti, it has not been given the literary circulation of the textbook theory. Hints and scraps of it may be found in the writings of William S. White; see particularly Citadel (New York, 1956).

consequences of the lack of party competition in the South. More generally, the insiders' theory raises a number of questions about the relationship between types of party systems and effective legislative representation, and between career alternatives and types of legislative behavior. It suggests that the constituent environment may influence not only the direction of congressional behavior (for example, votes pro or con), but also the roles played by legislators from different types of party systems.⁴

Most of the empirical propositions and assumptions in the two theories are readily verifiable. Yet published evidence on them is surprisingly scarce. Their evaluation involves answering the following questions:

- Do congressmen in southern safe seats have more congressional seniority than those in northern safe seats?
- Do the career patterns of the Northerners indicate any greater willingness to leave the House?
- 3. Do congressmen from southern safe districts have more committee seniority than safe Northerners?
- 4. Do the Southerners have more chairmanships than they are "entitled to" by their seniority?
- 5. Do members of the House have more prestige in the South than in the North?

If these questions can be answered affirmatively, the insiders' explanation is a crucial modification of the textbook theory. If not, the insiders' theory is superfluous. If the insiders are right, then the growing northern Democratic representation in Congress will be partly vitiated by members who do not take full advantage of their opportunities to accrue seniority. Our purpose in this article is twofold: to examine the available data in an attempt to answer these five questions; and to explore the implications of recent shifts in the distribution of safe House seats.

I. THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS IN THE HOUSE

As a prelude to examination of the relevant evidence, it is useful to review the familiar topic of alleged southern and rural dominance in the House of Representatives. There were 255 Democratic Representatives on January 7,

⁴ For an extensive treatment of this subject at the state level see John Wahlke et al., The Legislative System (New York, 1962). See also James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (November, 1960), pp. 346-69.

1964. Of these, 38 per cent were from southern districts. Table I shows the representation of congressmen from different types of district (urban-rural, North-South) in influential positions. Contrary to some impressions, the Southerners did not have a disproportionate share of appointments to the Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees, generally considered the top three committees

⁵ Since minor changes in the composition of the House occur frequently, it is necessary to choose a date for any analysis of House membership. We chose January 7, 1964 because a House roster for that date was published in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 10, 1964.

⁶ Throughout this article the South is defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

We have included the five border states (Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) in the North. Some observers of Congress classify some or all of these states as southern, or put them in a separate category. We saw no reason to do this, since the voting record of the 28 Democratic representatives from these states is similar to that of northern congressmen, and very different from the Southerners'. In 1963, for instance, the border congressmen had a Presidential Support score of 80, compared to 59 for the Southerners and 82 for congressmen from the northeastern states. The Presidential Opposition scores of the three groups were 9, 27, and 5, respectively. (These scores are based on individual voting records for 71 House roll calls during 1963 on proposals on which President Kennedy took a position. The support score is the percentage of the 71 roll calls on which the member supported the president. Since failure to vote lowers a member's support score, we also present the opposition scores. The individual scores are in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 13, 1964.)

Congressional Quarterly defines as "urban" any central city with at least 50,000 population and any suburban city with 100,000 or more people. "Suburban" areas are those "closely settled areas contiguous to central cities," with the exception of cities over 100,000 in population. All other areas are classified as rural. See CQ Census Analysis: Congressional Districts of the United States (Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1964), pp. 1786, 1792. We have combined CQ's "urban" and "suburban" classifications for the purpose of testing the propositions stated in the text. We have classified districts as "rural" if they are 50% or more rural according to CQ, and "urban" if they are less than 50% rural.

100

51

	North		Son	South		$\bf Total$	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	No.	Per cent	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		A	
All Democratic congressmen	42	21	9	29	255	101ª	
Membership on top three committees	40	24	5	31	55	100	
Major committee chairmanships	29	18	0	53	17	100	
Subcommittee chairmanships	29	17	6	47	109	99a	

14

4

45

37

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN INFLUENTIAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS, BY REGION—JANUARY, 1964

Holding first three positions

in the House. But they are significantly overrepresented in other powerful posts. They account for 53 per cent of the chairmanships of the 17 major standing committees; 53 per cent of the chairmen of all these 17 committees'

⁷ The absence of southern overrepresentation on the top three committees is due partly to the recent appointment of four Northerners to the Appropriations Committee. During most of the period from 1947 to 1963 every southern state had a representative on that committee. (We are indebted to Richard F. Fenno, Jr. for this information.) If one splits the Appropriations Committee's 30 Democratic members on the basis of seniority, the former southern advantage becomes apparent. Eight of the top-ranking 15 members are Southerners, compared to only one of the 15 most recent appointees.

Appointments to the Ways and Means Committee are made on the basis of regional zones, but it should not be thought that this guarantees equitable representation on the committee to all parts of the country. The zones are not redrawn after every election to take account of changes in state delegations, and, perhaps for this reason, there is considerable variation in the number of representatives assigned to each zone. The range was from 14 to 24 in the 86th Congress. See Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," this Review, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), p. 347.

⁸ There are 20 standing committees. Members generally consider three of them unimportant: the District of Columbia, House Administration, and Un-American Activities Committees. The first of these—important to permanent residents of the District—is in effect Washington's city council, the second is occupied with housekeeping, and the third reports virtually no legislation. Membership on one of these three committees does not preclude assignment to another standing committee.

subcommittees; and 49 per cent of all the representatives who hold the first three positions (chairman and first and second ranking majority members) on each of the 17 committees. For a variety of reasons this last measure may be the best index of committee seniority. The number of chairmanships is so small that the death or retirement of a single chairman produces a sizeable percentage change, and subcommittee chairmen are not appointed solely on the basis of seniority. The top-ranking majority members are next in line for the chairmanship. Together with the chairman and the two ranking minority members, they are usually appointed to conference committees on bills the committee has handled.9 Among their various other advantages is first preference in questioning witnesses at hearings.

II. THE DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRATIC SAFE SEATS

For the purposes of our study we defined safe Democratic seats as those which met all three of the following criteria:

- Won by a Democrat in every special¹⁰ and general election since 1940.
- (2) Won by an average of 60 per cent or more of the two-party vote since 1944.
- (3) Won by not less than 55 per cent of the two-party vote in every election since 1946.

Changes in district boundaries proved not much of a problem in our efforts to identify safe districts. We were usually able to "follow" the incumbent. Where a change in incumbent

- ⁹ This practice is not required by the rules, but is usually followed.
- ¹⁰ Two seats, one each in the North and South, were omitted because they were won by Republicans at the special election following the death of the incumbents.

^a Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC SAFE
SEATS BY REGION AND TYPE
OF CONSTITUENCY

	North		Son	South		Totals	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	No.	Per cent	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)			
Safe Seats All Democratic	30	7	11	52	122	100	
Seats	42	21	9	29	255	1018	

a Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

coincided with redistricting, we used maps to trace the district's lineage. Our definition of safety turned out to be rather stringent. It excluded the seats held by three major committee chairmen: Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, Interior and Insular Affairs; George P. Miller of California, Science and Astronautics: and Clarence Cannon of Missouri, Appropriations. Cannon's winning percentage dipped below 55 per cent on two occasions, while the first two seats were held by Republicans in the 1940s. Also excluded were a number of seats which. because of redistricting or population movement, now seem to be completely safe. But the inclusion of such newly safe seats would not contribute much to our analysis of members' responses to the opportunity to accrue seniority. Implicit in our definition is the assumption that the key aspect of safety is the incumbent's belief that he can stay in his seat as long as he wants.

By our definition we counted a total of 122 safe Democratic seats in the 88th Congress, 45 in the North and 77 in the South. Table II shows how these were distributed between

^a The average median family income for the safe seats was \$5506, compared to \$5921 for the non-safe districts. If rural districts from the border states are eliminated from both groups, the figures are \$5811 and \$6099, respectively.

^b Quartiles are based on nationwide ranking.

All but one of the northern safe seats in the 4th quartile are from rural border districts.

d Includes all persons born abroad (except of American parents) or with at least one foreign-born parent.

• Does not sum to 100 because of rounding. Sources: 1960 Census data reported in U. S. Bureau of the Census, Congressional District Data Book (Districts of the 88th Congress) (Washington, 1963); and CQ Census Analysis. urban and rural constituencies: 72 are rural and a bare majority of them are both southern and rural. More than a third of the safe seats are northern. There are four urban safe seats for every rural one in the North; in the South this ratio is reversed. Seven of the nine northern

TABLE III. A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF NORTHERN SAFE AND NON-SAFE DEMO-CRATIC DISTRICTS—1964

	Northern Safe Democratic	Northern Non-Safe Democratic
	(%)	(%)
1959 median family		
income:		
Per cent of districts	in:	
first quartileb	18	31
second quartile	36	35
third quartile	31	24
fourth quartile	16	10
	101°	100
N	(45)	(115)
Per cent Negro:		
0-4.9%	31	64
5-9.9%	27	13
10-19.9%	13	12
20-29.9%	9	4
30% and over	20	6
	100	99•
N	(45)	(115)
Per cent first- and		
second-generation:d		
0 - 9.9%	20 [.]	17
10-19.9%	9	25
20 39.9%	36	44
40% and over	36	13
	101°	99•
N	(45)	(115)
Type of constituency:		
urban	· 80	61
rural	20	39
	100	100
N	(45)	(115)

rural safe seats are from the border states of Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. The urban seats include five from Chicago, three from Detroit, eleven from New York, and three from the Los Angeles area. The boundaries of most of these Democratic city districts were drawn by Republican legislatures.

Compared to northern non-safe seats held by Democrats in 1964, the safe districts included a somewhat higher proportion of low-income families, of Negroes, and of first- and second-generation Americans, as Table III shows. These differences are not large, however, and the safe seats are no less diverse in their socio-economic characteristics than the others. The higher level of ethnicity in the safe seats is the

TABLE IV. PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT SCORES OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE AND NON-SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1963

	North		Son	ıth
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Safe Seats	76	77	75	55
Non-Safe Seats	83	82	61	55

greatest difference. Half of the safe districts in the first income quartile and 43 per cent of those in the second quartile had 40 per cent or more first- and second-generation residents. Twenty-seven of the 45 safe constituencies had 40 per cent or more foreign-stock residents or 20 per cent Negroes, or both.

We explored the textbook theory proposition that congressmen in safe seats are less likely to support their president, presumably because they are subject to different constituency pressures. Tables IV and V show the Presidential Support and Opposition scores for congressmen in safe and non-safe seats with region and type of constituency controlled. Table IV suggests that Northerners in safe seats gave slightly less support than those from non-safe districts. Since failure to vote lowers a member's support score and many New York City congressmen are notorious absentees, Table V may be a

TABLE V. PRESIDENTIAL OPPOSITION SCORES OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE AND NON-SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1963

	North		Sc	outh
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Safe Seats	5	8	14	28
Non-Safe Seats	4	8	31	36

better indicator of presidential support.¹² It shows no differences between safe and non-safe northern congressmen. The extremely spotty attendance records of two members from rural safe districts account for most of the difference in the support scores of rural Northerners. The lower support by non-safe Southerners may result from Republican competition forcing these incumbents to adopt a more conservative position. In short, the level of party competition does not appear to be a useful general explanation of voting patterns among Democratic congressmen.¹³

III. CAREER PATTERNS OF SAFE SEAT HOLDERS

We come now to our major concern: the different levels of interest in a congressional career by members from different sides of the Mason-Dixon line. Years of consecutive service is one index of this interest. If northern congressmen in safe seats were less interested in House service, then, taken as a group, they should have less congressional seniority. But as Table VI indicates, this does not appear to be the case. There were no important differences in length of consecutive service between northern and southern Representatives.

According to the insiders' theory, many congressmen from urban machines are only serving

¹² Of course, failure to vote also lowers the Presidential Opposition score, but the rate of opposition in all northern cells is so low that 100% voting participation would not change the opposition scores significantly.

¹³ After examining voting records for the 87th Congress, Froman came to the same conclusion (*ibid.*, p. 114). Other recent findings indicate that when region is controlled, length of service is not strongly related to the support that congressmen of either party give to their president. See Judson Mitchell and George Spink, "Presidential Support and Length of Service in the House of Representatives" (unpublished paper, Stanford University).

¹¹ See, e.g., Burns, pp. 242-4. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., discusses several other propositions about relationships between competition and party loyalty at both state and national levels. See his Congressmen and their Constituencies (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), ch. 9; and the works cited there.

TABLE VI. YEARS OF CONSECUTIVE SERVICE BY DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE SEATS,

BY REGION—1964

Years of Consecutive Service	Northerners	Southerners
	(%)	(%)
0-9	38	32
10-19	33	38
20-29	25	23
30 and over	4	6
	100	994
N	(45)	(77)

⁴ Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

time in the House until they can get a more highly prized post. The principal example offered is a tendency for New York City congressmen to quit the House abruptly when a judgeship becomes available. (These are usually elective offices, but access to them has been effectively controlled by the regular Democratic organization in New York.) By extension other northern big-city congressmen alleged to have the same preference for careers in state and local government. In contrast, a seat in Congress is said to be the high ambition of almost any southern politician. Those fortunate few who attain this goal are content to stay in the House (unless an opportunity for the Senate presents itself), patiently going along and working their way up the ladder of seniority to a position of real influence in national affairs.

We tested this proposition by examining the circumstances under which safe-seat incumbents left their seats from January, 1947 to the beginning of 1964. In all but a few cases the reasons for leaving were either stated by the incumbent or were obvious enough, e.g., death in office, defeat in a primary, retirement. In a few instances we inferred the reason from the man's subsequent occupation. These data, classified by region, are presented in Table VII.

The insiders' theory is confirmed on one point: 21 per cent of the Northerners who left the House did so to run for a state or local office, in contrast to only one Southerner. Almost all of these Northerners were from New York City and most of the offices sought were state or county judgeships. Quitting one's seat to go into business also is an indication of lack of interest in a House career, and here the regional ratio is reversed. Twenty-two per cent

of the Southerners who left Congress went into private business or law practice, compared to just one Northerner. Since preferences for local public office or for private business to continuing congressional service are both examples of voluntary departure, the two categories can be combined to provide an overall measure of low interest in a House career. When so combined, these categories account for an identical proportion of northern and southern quitters: twenty-four per cent.

Fear of losing a primary may cause a member to quit in favor of another job. Rumors have it that several congressmen, from both North and South, have done this in the past decade. There is no reason to believe, however, that this fear is any more prevalent among Northerners than Southerners, or vice versa. One could argue that, everything considered, primary defeat may be less of a hazard for Northerners because of the strong political organizations in many cities. The data in Table VII support this proposition; more than twice as many Southerners were defeated in primaries.

The data presented thus far do not support the insiders' claim that Northerners evince less interest in Congress. Table VII indicates that, in fact, Northerners who leave Congress are

TABLE VII. SAFE SEAT HOLDERS' REASONS FOR LEAVING CONGRESS, BY REGION—1947-1964

Reasons for Leaving	Northerners	Southerners
	(%)	(%)
Death in offices	37	22
Retirement due to		
health or age	5	12
Defeat in primary	11	26
Run for Senate	16	12
Run for state or		
local office	21	2
Go into business		
or law	3	22
Appointed to govern-		
ment position	8	5
-	****************	
	101ь	101 ^b
N	(38)	(59)

^a See below, p. 346, for a discussion of this regional difference.

b Does not sum to 100 because of rounding. Sources: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, G.P.O., 1961); and various issues of Congressional Directory (Washington, G.P.O.).

more likely to remain in public service than Southerners. This may reflect fewer opportunities for rewarding government posts in the largely rural South. It may also be a result of the unstructured southern political parties. There appears to be much less articulation between congressional politics and state and local politics in the South.¹⁴

We have seen that incumbents in northern safe seats have as much seniority as their opposite numbers from the South. Seniority in Congress is useful chiefly to secure desirable committee assignments. Since committee rank is a result of consecutive service on the committee, the northern safe seat holders conceivably could dissipate their congressional

seniority by "committee hopping."

The data do not support this speculation. Twenty-nine per cent of the southern safe seat holders and 31 per cent of the Northerners were in one of the top three positions on the 17 major standing committees. Of the 14 major chairmanships held by members from safe districts, Southerners held nine and Northerners five; 12 per cent of the Southerners were major committee chairmen, and 11 per cent of the Northerners. The southern advantage in total chairmanships appears to be a result of their great number of safe seats, and nothing else.

Finally, we examined the proportions of the two groups of safe seat holders who were chairmen of subcommittees. Here there is a southern advantage; 36 per cent of the Northerners were subcommittee chairmen, compared to 45 per cent of the Southerners. Subcommittee chairmen are chosen by the committee chairman, who need not make their selections solely on the basis of seniority. Favoritism by the predominantly southern committee chairmen might account for the disparity in subcommittee chairmanships. We tested this proposition by counting, on each of the 17 major committees, those committee members who were not subcommittee chairmen themselves but who had more seniority than the lowest ranking subcommittee chairman. A total of 28 congressmen were in this position, 18 Northerners and 10 Southerners. 16 On committees chaired

¹⁴ See V. O. Key, Southern Politics (New York, 1949), ch. 18 and passim.

by Southerners, nine Northerners and three Southerners were by-passed. With northern chairmen, the proportion was more even: nine Northerners and seven Southerners.

Favoritism may not be the only reason for setting aside seniority in appointing subcommittee chairmen. Someone with special expertise may receive such an appointment out of turn. An uninterested or hopelessly incompetent member may be passed over. Some members may be reluctant to accept the chairmanship of an undesirable subcommittee in hopes of being chosen eventually to head a more powerful one. There is no reason to believe, however, that any of these considerations would apply disproportionately more to southern than northern members. Thus while the data in the preceding paragraph cannot be considered conclusive evidence of southern favoritism, they provide at least some basis for an explanation of the disproportionate number of subcommittee chairmanships held by Southerners.

The data presented up to this point indicate that the insiders' theory is wrong on every count:

- Congressmen in southern safe seats do not have more congressional seniority than those in northern safe seats.
- (2) The post-congressional career patterns of the two groups do not indicate any greater northern inclination to leave the House for another career.
- (3) The safe Southerners do not have more committee seniority than safe Northerners.
- (4) Safe Southerners have more chairmanships than they are "entitled to" only at the subcommittee level, where considerations other than seniority affect the selection process.

The final element in the insiders' theory, concerning differences in the prestige of congressmen, will be discussed in the following section.

IV. OTHER REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

The finding that northern safe seat holders do not quit congress any more readily than their southern counterparts does not by itself dispose of the proposition that Southerners are more effective legislators. Is it possible to examine the proposition that while the North-

Southerners comprise 44% of the membership of the highest-ranking half of the 17 major committees, and it is from this group that subcommittee chairmen are chosen.

¹⁵ The figure for the Southerners would be 13% if we took account of George Mahon's accession to the chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee on the death of Clarence Cannon in May, 1964.

¹⁶ It might be thought that the larger number of by-passed Northerners results from the fact that there are more of them in the House. But

erners are no less likely to leave Congress, they do not use their House positions as effectively as the Southerners? Are the Northerners, as a group, less able men? Some fragments of data can be considered.

In the first place, the role of United States Representative does not appear to be any more prestigious among the mass of southern citizens than among those in the North. In a survey conducted in 1947 the National Opinion Research Center studied a national sample's assessment of the "general standing" of 90 occupations, one of which was "United States Representative in Congress."17 Each of the 2920 respondents was asked to rate each occupation's "general standing" on the following scale: "excellent," "good," "average," "somewhat below average," and "poor." When tabulated by region, with southern Negro respondents removed, the results do not indicate any significant regional differences in congressional prestige. Eighty-eight per cent of the white southern respondents gave "excellent" or "good" ratings to the job of congressman, compared to 92 per cent in the Midwest and 94 per cent in Northeast and West. When all occupations were ranked, congressmen were sixth in the West and Midwest and seventh in the South and Northeast.18

The office of representative may be accorded as much respect by the mass electorate in the North, as in every section, and yet not be as highly regarded in the specialized political milieu in which politicians are socialized. Urban political organizations control Democratic congressional nominations in many northern one-party areas. Since these machines typically are based on the tangible rewards that can be drawn from control of local government, status in them generally goes to those who distribute jobs and contracts. Positions that have a share in this distribution process are the most desirable that the machine can bestow. In such cities many people see politics as a way to make money through the exercise of discretion.

Congressmen have hardly any patronage of

¹⁷ For a full description of this study see Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social Status (New York, 1961.)

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 6, 19, 200, 220 Data on white Southerners were obtained from the National Opinion Research Center through the Inter-University, Consortium for Political Research. We are grateful to Ralph L. Bisco of the Consortium and Patrick Bova of NORC for their kind help.

their own19 and, when there is a party organization of any consequence back home, federal appointments are cleared with its leader. In any event, federal patronage is negligible compared to the jobs and contracts that any machine-influenced local government can dispense. For most politicians who have worked their way up in an urban machine, being a congressman has little appeal. Some local bosses have also been congressmen, e.g., the late William Green of Philadelphia or Charles Buckley of the Bronx, but their political power was not a result of their congressional seats. In his study of the Chicago congressional delegation, Leo M. Snowiss found that in that city's powerful Democratic organization the job of congressman was not as highly prized as any of a number of party and local governmental positions.20 Consequently, at least some congressional nominations go to less highly regarded organization figures, tired mediocrities in late middle age. Most regular machine politicians in New York City seem to have a similarly low evaluation of congressmen. Richard H. Rovere's description of Peter J. Mc-Guinness, an old-time boss in Brooklyn, includes an interesting example of this point of view:

Like most politicians of his school, McGuinness considers congressmen members of an inferior class. To him, the local party bosses, who pick the legislators and tell them what to do, are the elite of politics and congressmen are men who, unable to make the grade themselves, must serve as legislative secretaries to men who have made the grade. He cannot understand the tendency, comparatively recent in this city, of political bosses to take congressional nominations for themselves. "I've sent plenty of them to Albany and Washington," he says, "but I'd never be such a damn fool as to send meself. Believe me, I'm glad I was never in a fix where anyone else could send me. If a man's a leader in New York, what the hell business has he got in Washington?"21

¹⁹ In addition to nominations to the service academies (which usually are heavily dependent on objective examination scores), the average congressman is lucky if he can name a Capitol policeman, elevator operator, or page. It takes a number of terms to acquire enough seniority to have much more appointment power.

²⁰ Leo M. Snowiss, "Chicago and Congress: A Study of Metropolitan Representation" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1965), ch. 2.

²¹ Richard H. Rovere, "The Big Hello," in *The American Establishment*, Harvest edition (New York, 1962), pp. 45-6.

One of the authors of this article, engaged in research that provided many opportunities to observe status relations in a very cohesive traditional northeastern urban organization, noted that the local congressional candidate seemed to get very little deference from most members of the organization.

This is not to say that all big-city congressmen are incompetent. The candidate just mentioned, for instance, has become a congressman with a considerable reputation for ability and effectiveness. Many other able representatives have come to Washington from the machines. In fact, given the low value generally placed on House seats in such political milieux, some ambitious men probably realize that the competition for such positions is less than for more lucrative posts at home. Nevertheless, politicians, like everyone else, are partly products of their environment, and there are indications that machine-controlled districts in the North produce more than their share of ineffective congressmen.

The New York City delegation is a case in point. Its members make up the core of the "Tuesday-to-Thursday club": congressmen who are in Washington only from Tuesday morning through Thursday afternoon and spend the rest of their time back home in more congenial and profitable pursuits. This habit is so prevalent that the decision of a second-term Democratic congressman from Queens to live in Washington evoked quasi-anthropological awe from The New York Times: "Mr. Rosenthal is the first New York City Democrat to take this step, as far as anyone in the state

delegation can recall."22

The best available measure of attendance is CQ's voting participation score, which gives the percentage of roll calls (119 in 1963) at which each member was present.23 A serious disadvantage of this score as a measure of interest in legislation is that the leadership. aware of the members' habits, tries to schedule roll calls when most congressmen are in Washington. Since the House has been in Democratic hands for the past ten years, votes are seldom held when many Democrats are absent. As a practical matter, this means that there is little voting except on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. If a member's score is low, his attendance must be very spotty indeed. Table VIII contains voting participation scores for safe and non-safe congressmen, with region controlled. Although a safe congressman should not have to spend as much time mending fences

TABLE VIII. VOTING PARTICIPATION BY DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SAFE AND NON-SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1963

Type of District	Voting Participation Score	
Northern Safe	79	
Northern Non-Safe	86	
Southern Safe	83	
Southern Non-Safe	87	

at home, the northern safe group scored somewhat lower than the non-safe Northerners. The New York City delegation accounts for most of this difference. When they are excluded, the northern safe group's score rises from 79 to 82, virtually the same as the southern safe score.

Since a number of Southerners also have unimpressive attendance records (although no southern delegation can match the New Yorkers), it is difficult to derive marked regional differences from these data. The complaints about the New York and Chicago delegations come chiefly from people who would usually like to be able to count on their votes. Possibly conservative spokesmen are equally bitter about southern absenteeism, but do not exhibit their disappointments in print.

Another bit of evidence may be useful in determining whether there are regional differences in legislative effectiveness. Despite the intentions of the spirit, the flesh may be weak. Some congressmen might not be physically capable of working as hard as they want. Representatives in northern safe seats are more likely than their southern counterparts to begin their congressional careers at fairly advanced ages. As Table IX shows, a quarter of

TABLE IX. AGE DISTRIBUTION AT BEGINNING OF CURRENT TERM OF SERVICE OF INCUMBENTS IN SAFE SEATS, BY REGION—1964

Age at Entry	Northerners	Southerners
	(%)	(%)
25-34	13	17
35-39	33	32
40-44	18	29
45-49	11	10
50-54	16	10
55 and over	8	1
	99ª	99*
N	(45)	(77)

Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

²² The New York Times, March 16, 1964, p. 37. ²³ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 31, 1964.

the present northern safe seat holders entered the House when they were fifty or older, compared to 11 per cent of the Southerners. This explains the finding in Table VII that more Northerners than Southerners die in office. The machine-dominated recruitment patterns discussed earlier may account for the regional age difference. Like other rewards for faithful service, congressional nominations are not given to neophytes. The leaders of urban machines typically are older men who have put in decades of work for the party. Upstarts are not highly regarded. On the other hand, nominations for available seats in most southern districts are more often fought over by a number of ambitious young men.24 Since this prize is seldom one that can be bestowed by a cohesive organization, precedence has less to do with who gets it.

On the basis of these scattered data, it appears that Northerners in safe seats may be somewhat less vigorous than Southerners. This difference cannot be established as either large or conclusive.

V. TRENDS IN THE COMPETITIVENESS OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

Our definition of safe seats is static and does not take account of districts that have become non-competitive since 1946. What trends have there been since then? As Charles O. Jones has shown, the number of competitive seats has decreased since 1952.²⁵ What effect is this trend likely to have on the distribution of political power in the House Democratic party? Do these trends modify the picture of safe districts painted by Burns and other spokesmen of the textbook theory?

To explore these questions we traced the number of non-competitive Democratic districts in every congressional election from 1946 through 1964. 1946 is a good starting point for two reasons: it was the first postwar election and it marks the low point of Democratic congressional votes in the past 36 years. For purposes of this discussion we will define a non-competitive election as one in which the Democratic candidate received 65 per cent or more of the major party vote. This is an arbi-

²⁴ The classic description of the unstructured politics of most southern states is Key's book. See also Julius Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (May, 1953), pp. 197–210.

²⁵ Charles O. Jones, "Inter-party Competition for Congressional Seats," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17 (September, 1964), pp. 461-76. trary criterion, designed only to put often uncontested southern seats in some sort of comparative framework with northern non-competitive districts.

Table X shows the distribution of non-competitive districts in every election since the war. The number of southern districts in this category remained almost constant through 1958, with the exception of 1956, and has declined since then. The number of northern non-competitive districts has increased consistently and now exceeds the South's. The 1964 election has exaggerated these trends,26 but the probably aberrant character of this election should not minimize the significance of the steady increase in the North's share of noncompetitive districts. Since 1956 Northern districts have never comprised less than 44 per cent of all seats won by 65 per cent or more. A similar proportion of non-competitive districts has been urban since 1956. It is no longer so true that non-competitive districts "have a heavily rural bias," as Burns said in 1963.27

The increase in Democratic strength in the North is due in part to population growth and movement. Better-off urban residents have been moving to the suburbs. The remaining city dwellers include higher proportions of Negroes, ethnic groups, and the poor. Reapportionment after the 1950 and 1960 Censuses may also have contributed to the growth of non-competitive districts.²⁸ Republican state legislatures often follow a strategy of concentrating Democratic voting strength in a few districts.²⁹

The increase in northern numbers has been accompanied by a decline in the southern position. In 1947 there were 103 Democratic representatives from the South and only two

²⁶ There probably would be fewer southern noncompetitive seats (not to mention fewer Democratic congressmen) if there had been Republican candidates in every southern district in the 1964 election. In several southern states Republican candidates either won or held their opponents to less than 65% of the vote in every district that they contested.

²⁷ Burns, p. 242.

²⁸ The wholesale reapportionment resulting from recent Supreme Court decisions is also likely to increase urban and suburban representation in both North and South.

²⁹ This is an example of how a rational strategy for Republican parties at the state level—conceding a minimum number of seats to the Democrats—is harmful to the party's interests on the national level because it enables these Democrats to build up seniority in Congress.

TABLE X. CONGRESSIONAL SEATS WON BY DEMOCRATS BY AT LEAST 65 PER CENT OF THE
TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY YEAR AND REGION—1946 THROUGH 1964

Year	North				South				Total		Total
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural		Seats Won By 65%		Demo- cratic
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent	No.	Per	No.	Per cent	Seats Won
		%		%		%		%		%	
1946	16	15	7	6	11	10	76	69	110	100	188
1948	31	23	14	10	12	9	78	58	135	100	263
1950	25	19	13	10	12	9	79	61	129	994	235
1952	24	20	4	3	12	10	78	66	118	99a	213
1954	40	28	. 14	10	9	6	79	56	142	100	232
1956	32	26	8	. 7	13	11	68	56	121	100	234
1958	61	35	20	11	20	11	75	43	176	100	283
1960	57	36	12	8	19	12	70	44	158	100	260
1962	53	39	10	7	10	7	64	47	137	100	259
1964	81	49	25	15	12	7	48	29	166	100	294

a Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Sources: for election returns, various editions of Richard Scammon, ed., America Votes (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press); several editions of the Congressional Directory; various editions of Clerk, U. S. House of Representatives, Statistics of the Congressional and Presidential Elections (Washington, G.P.O.); and Complete Returns of the 1964 Elections by Congressional District (Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965). The task of classifying Congressional districts as urban or rural proved to be rather complicated. For the 1962 and 1964 elections we used CQ Census Analysis, and for 1956 through 1960 similar data in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, February 2, 1962. In an earlier classification published in 1956, CQ used a completely different four-point classification scheme, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1956 (Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1956), pp. 788-792. We adapted this scheme to the urban-rural one on the basis of apparent similarities in the two taxonomies. For the elections from 1946 through 1950 we used the 1956 data, modified by examination of Congressional district maps.

Republicans. By 1963 there were eleven southern Republican seats; and in 1965 there are 17 such, 30 and 89 Democratic. Some of the Republican seats gained in 1964, notably five in Alabama and one in Mississippi, may presently revert to the Democrats. On the other hand, Goldwater did not do as well as Eisenhower and Nixon in the peripheral southern states. Possibly, therefore, the Democrats will recover their seats in the Deep South only to lose seats in Florida, Texas, or Virginia. The 1964 election cost the South two of its subcommittee chairmanships. 31 These are not the

³⁰ This includes Representative Albert W. Watson of South Carolina, a Democrat who backed Senator Goldwater in 1964, was stripped of his seniority for this defection by the Democratic Caucus, and then switched parties.

³¹ Representatives Grant and Roberts of Alabama and Winstead of Mississippi, all defeated by Republican candidates, headed a total of four

only seniority losses the region has suffered. Primary losses and redistricting have also eroded its power in the House. Since 1947 eight southern congressmen have lost their seats through redistricting and 15 more have been deposed in primaries. The redistricted seats have been gained by other southern states, but the new incumbents in these 23 seats could not inherit the seniority of the supplanted congressmen.

These trends mark an important shift in the distribution of power in the Democratic party. The northern wing of the congressional party is just now recovering the ground lost in the Republican sweep of 1946. The enormous Democratic losses in that election were con-

subcommittees. A fifth subcommittee was chaired by John Bell Williams of Mississippi, who shared Watson's fate (but did not switch parties). Northerners took over Williams' subcommittee and one of the two chaired by Grant. fined almost entirely to the North. One of the long-term consequences of the Republican landslide then was the creation of a "seniority generation" dominated by Southerners. Unless the trend depicted in Table X is reversed, northern Democrats with useful amounts of seniority will soon be as numerous as the weakened southern contingent. Within a few years the North should begin to realize in its turn the fruits of the seniority system.

The familiar debate over "party responsibility" often leads to rejoinders that fragmentation is inevitable in American political parties. Some fragmentation is unavoidable, but it is one thing to say that we cannot (or should not) have cohesive parties on the English model, and quite another to claim that any particular existing level of fragmentation is immutable. As the changes in House rules at the beginning of the 1965 session demonstrate,32 arrangements to make the process more or less responsive to majorities can occur within the basic framework of fragmentation. A "bargaining system" can be any of a variety of political orders, from just short of anarchy to something like what happens in Great Britain when one party does not have a decisive majority. All systems characterized by bargaining do not assign similar resources to the principal actors. If the effective power of the president and the majority leadership were enhanced by any of half a dozen procedural changes, e.g., an item veto, it would still be necessary for the actors to bargain with each other. The change would be in the cards, not the game. This is a simple point, but it seems to be overlooked by some of the most enthusiastic academic apologists for anti-majoritarian aspects of our political sys-

Dissension in the Democratic party is due largely to Southerners.³³ As the relative strength of the South decreases, the cohesive potential of the party as a whole will increase, for there is little reason to expect that the northern wing of the party will become pro-

³² Procedures were changed to reduce the Rules Committee's power to prevent floor consideration of legislation and avoid appointing conference committees. Most Southerners resisted these actions.

³³ There are, of course, many Southerners, including powerful committee chairmen like Carl Vinson, who are (or were) loyal to Democratic presidents all or most of the time. One cannot validly label all southern congressmen as invariably dissident. Nevertheless, there is also no doubt that the southern wing of the party is the major source of deviance.

portionately more divided as it grows in strength.³⁴ To put it another way, the decline of the Southerners will be accompanied by a Democratic president's greater ability to get his way with Congress. It appears, then, that present trends are in the direction of greater cohesion and "responsibility" in the Democratic party.

VI. SUMMARY

We have presented data to test two theories about southern influence in the Democratic party in the House of Representatives. The central question is whether southern power can be explained solely by the lack of party competition in the South, or whether it is due also to regional differences which result in more dedication to legislative careers on the part of Southerners. We approached this problem by comparing northern and southern occupants of safe Democratic seats. There were no regional differences in congressional or committee

34 Some political scientists have argued that large legislative majorities are less responsive to the president, because they lead to factionalism. It is unclear whether this proposition refers simply to a majority for the president's party, or an effective majority for his policies. Even if it refers to the latter, there are some difficulties. Most important, it would seem that the smaller the majority, the easier it is for a potential defector to impede the president's program, since he needs to win fewer other dissidents to destroy the majority. As the majority grows, so does the size of the splinter group necessary to make an impact, and hence so does the magnitude of the defector's task. For discussions of this "law of economy" see E. E. Schattschneider. Party Government (New York, 1942), pp. 85-96. William H. Riker, who is cited on this point, actually discusses the weakness of big majorities only when they are so big that they become "a coalition of the whole." See his A Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962), p. 56.

Statements of this proposition are usually accompanied by reminders that President Roosevelt, having won enormous congressional majorities in 1936, found his legislative program bogged down soon thereafter. This appears to be the major item of evidence to support the proposition. It does not appear that presidents have restrained their efforts to elect friendly congresses for fear of suffering Roosevelt's fate. A systematic examination of the historical record found that, if anything, big majorities are better than little ones. See Jay Goodman, "Legislative Majorities and Presidential Success" (unpublished paper, Brown University.)

seniority, or in forsaking Congress for other careers. Lack of party competition, aided perhaps by southern favoritism in appointment of subcommittee chairmen—and in the wake of the northern Republican sweep in 1946—seems to be an adequate explanation for the disproportionate number of Southerners in influential positions in the House. The textbook theory, accordingly, appears to be correct on this point.

The southerners may be more vigorous in the use they make of the positions they have. If age is any indication, Northerners, while they remain in the House, may be less able and energetic than Southerners. We could find no evidence of regional differences in the prestige of congressmen among electorates. The Northerners did tend to include more absentees and more members who first entered Congress at age 50 or older. These differences are not great, however, and must be interpreted with caution.

The number and share of non-competitive seats held by the North have increased markedly in the past fifteen years. The text-book theory is becoming increasingly less valid in its description of the characteristics of non-competitive districts. Unless this trend is reversed, northern Democrats will become much more influential in the House within a few years, since the other findings of this article do not indicate that they are any less likely to accrue seniority. The effect of these trends will be a decrease in the power of the deviant wing of the Democratic party and therefore an increase in party cohesion.

CHARACTER AND MISSION OF A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE, UNDER CONDITIONS OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

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A principal element of the United States Government's conception of general and complete disarmament pertains to establishment and development of a force not identified with any national governing entity, subject to control by an all-embracing international collectivity, and charged with missions of global scope in connection with peace-keeping.

The purpose of this essay is to examine what might be entailed, as conditions and as consequences, in establishing such a force. The discussion focuses quite explicitly on terms in the United States' proposal before the eighteennation Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1962—a document hereinafter referred to by the short title *Outline*.¹ Other sources, including proposals and discussions of forces of kindred type, are referred to for details concerning conceivable forms and conditions for the undertaking.

I. THE PROJECT IN BROAD COMPASS

As set forth in the Outline, such a force would be brought into existence over a span of years. The process of realizing it would be linked, stage by stage, with a progressive diminution of all forces under national control. At a transforming juncture, national forces would have been scaled down to a level rendering impossible their projection of any threat beyond the borders of their respective domains. Concomitantly, the global force would be increased to a level such as to place it beyond effective challenge by any other force existing. The course would not be one of simply doing

¹ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Blueprint for the Peace Race: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962). This article is from a study prepared for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University. The judgments in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

away with forces capable of deployment over a wide range. It would involve an amalgam of such forces into an all-encompassing monopoly —a coercive institution of scope and relative, if not absolute, power heretofore never achieved.

The lines of development would be essentially interdependent. The final step in reducing nationally controlled forces to a level commensurate with internal security requirements would be contingent upon a solid and immediate prospect of achievement of an efficacious global force. Fulfillment of the design for the global force, moreover, would be dependent upon diminution of nationally controlled forces.

An initial question, necessarily hypothetical, is in order concerning the appropriateness for their respective missions of the world peace force and of forces to be permitted under national control. The criteria in the Outline are limited to quantitative and technical considerations expressed in highly general terms. With respect to the world peace force, the key words in the Outline are: "sufficient armed forces and armaments that no state could challenge it." This prescription is amplified by the following phrases: "fully capable of insuring international security in a disarmed world" and "equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter any threat or use of arms."2 The counterpart terms in the Outline regarding forces permissible for states to retain under their own direction are: "agreed requirements for nonnuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens." States would be required to disband "organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment."3

Relevant qualities in each instance are simply postulated. Their feasibility and ascertainability are assumed. The terms necessary for fulfillment are left to be worked out by international accord. For the moment, questions of the adequacy of a purely quantifying and technical expression of attributes may be passed over, along with questions regarding

² Outline, Stage III, H, 3; A. Objectives, 4. ³ Outline, Stage III, B, 1.

the practicability, probability, or even desirability of the relevant contemplated developments. The focus here is on the broad missions of the force and its presumable character in the light of its missions and on the requirements and consequences inferable from its missions and character.

A mission assigned to the projected peace force with respect to maintenance of order and security among states, as explicitly expressed in the Outline, would be enormously inclusive and complex. In addition, however, the force would have duties to perform with respect to security within component states. Because this aspect of the matter is only implicitly indicated in the project, and because it is fundamental to comprehension of the idea of the peace force, elucidation is called for. For that purpose, it is necessary to make clear the transformation of the character of states envisaged in the project.

II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATES

A decision to move into and past the transforming stage would involve both resolution of will and ascertainment of fact on the part of concerned governments acting in their single discretion but also as a group. A number of antecedent choices would have to have been made, and relevant actions effected, to take the course to that decisive stage.

The purpose here, rather than speculating upon procedure, is to examine the sorts of questions likely to require answer at the seat of judgment. As a precondition to the final step, or, more accurately, as a constituent part of it, the governments would have to register themselves as satisfied on two interrelated propositions: first, a solid and immediate prospect of the scaling of forces retained under individual state control, case by case, down to a level providing no surplus over requirements for domestic security; second, a concomitant conveyance of overwhelming superiority to the world peace force. Clearly—a point requiring no argument—the determination would be both subjective and objective: the governments' wills would be resolved in response to their appraisal of relevant realities, but the relevant realities would in major part flow from their combined wills.

For the moment, the focus is on the first of the two propositions. The forces permitted to retain national identity and to be at the disposition of individual governments would be limited to agreed requirements and would be of agreed types, with the referent à propos of requirements and types to be the function of maintaining internal order and protecting the security of citizens. Capability for sustaining

the internal security of states would have been removed from their autonomous jurisdiction.

One might speculate on a possibility of proforma ascertainment, with each government's estimate of its own requirements and its related inventory of equipment and related manpower to be accepted as conclusive by the others. The supposition does not withstand analysis. Fulfillment of the paramountcy accorded the central forces would be measurable only in relation to capabilities to be retained by states individually or cumulatively.

As an auxiliary postulate, however, one might premise the irresistibility of the universal force by assuming it to have been vested with a monopoly of prodigious instruments such as nuclear weapons, thereby rendering uncritical the amounts of weapons of less destructive efficacy and the related trained manpower to be retained by individual states. This line of argument requires overlooking the references to agreed requirements and to provisions in the project calling for states to disband "organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment." It requires one to hypothesize huge improvidence on the part of the participating governments in creating a world security force capable of effective action only at the highest levels of destruction—a characteristic far more likely to inhibit authorized use of the force than to intimidate potential challengers.

One might speculate also on a possibility of limiting the term of general concern in retained security capabilities to the moment of decision, whereafter the matter would revert to the autonomous jurisdiction of the respective states. This notion of lifting internal security requirements of states only for a moment to the center of world concern and then permitting them to subside immediately into being a concern for each state to settle in its own way also fails of credibility. Factors simply do not shift so arbitrarily from importance to indifference.

The inference is clear. Limitation upon internal security capabilities to an agreed level of requirements would be a continuing and integral part of the pattern of general obligation in the disarmament undertaking. Establishment of that level, case by case, would be a matter for international authority not just initially and once but thenceforth and continuously. The limitation would be part of a contract underlying a global governing apparatus. Confinement within those limits would be an essential aspect of adherence to the whole scheme and subject, therefore, to the processes of verification and enforcement underlying the

disarmament program as a whole. Any question of upward revision of restrictions settled on at the outset would be international business on a par with the question of setting limits in the first instance.

The constituent states would have yielded their autonomy with respect to allocation of resources as between the uses of civil enjoyment and provision for coercion. The autonomy thus surrendered would relate not only to power to decide, within limits of resources available, on provision of forces for launching or repelling attack as counters in relations with other states but would extend as well to the discretion of any government as to requirements for maintaining the regime within.

The point is basic and highly important—one deserving to be acknowledged for what it is rather than minimized euphemistically. The implications are made clearer by taking into account the nature of internal security requirements, which are implicitly predicated as fixed and predictable in the United States disarmament project but which are in reality elastic and unpredictable.

III. PREDICTABILITY AND INTERNAL ORDER

How far ahead could the internal security requirements of any particular political society be divined? The question is not disposed of by postulating the efficacy of international arrangements for interdicting all factors playing upon such a society from beyond its borders. That sweeping assumption is scarcely demonstrable at best, but in order to forward the argument here, relevant doubts may be discounted. An array of imponderables would still remain.

To place the matter in perspective, it is in point to take account of the meanings of the key term internal order used in connection with standards and limits predicated for forces to be permitted to be retained under the control of particular states. The phrase implies reliable conditions in human relations over the land concerned—a sense conveyed in an auxiliary phrase about "the personal security of citizens." Beyond that sense, the term embraces the idea of continuity of regime. Order may be said to obtain within a civil society when succession to places of authority is reliably controlled by rules rather than subject to determination by forcible means. In an ordered society, those holding title to power would be enabled, as well as constrained, to convey it to successors determined under the same basic licit arrangements by which the holders in their turn had received it.

Those holding high magisterial positions under any orderly system of governance, moreover, must take heed of questions of continuity and descent. Faculties for deciding on the allocation of means to ensure continuity of the system itself are an integral element in any governing system, a necessary constituent of power to lay down the law. Divested of power to assure the means of survival, a system of government would lose a main prop of authority—an element of internal sovereignty, to use an overworked abstraction.

These observations do not imply a possibility of an absolute guarantee of survival for a system of government. Perhaps no regime could ever foreclose all possibilities, at least logical possibilities, of being overthrown by revolt or revolution. Nevertheless, the concept of order—and this is the main point—entails a licit and reliable descent of authority as distinguished from violent disjunctions and overturns in the system of rulership.

Whether with respect to order in the sense of assurance of the personal security of persons or in the sense of assured continuity of the system of government, internal security requirements, stated in amounts or types, vary in relation to the mores prevailing within a society. They vary in relation to factors of urban concentration and rural dispersion. They vary in relation, moreover, to factors of identity and confidence operative between a regime and its populace. They are affected by degrees of confidence assumed by regimes, or accorded by their populaces, with respect to their legitimacy. They vary as between circumstances of political tension and oppression and those of free consensus. They vary in relation to stress or contentment with respect to conditions of production and distribution, social unrest or placidity, and to factors of ethnic and cultural homogeneity or diversity and circumstances of disturbance or adjustment among ethnic groups. They are affected by factors of morale and competence within the security forces themselves. All these considerations—and many others of indisputable relevance—may be summed up as inherent and persistent variables in any political society. The point requires no labored argument. One needs only to ask himself as to the validity of a ten-year projection of internal security requirements for the United States drawn up, say, in the year 1855.

Variability of internal security requirements leads logically to a consideration of the role of military establishments in regard to internal security, to implications of abolishing such establishments under national control, and to

the bearing of the topic on the mission of the projected United Nations peace force.

IV. DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS REGARDING INTERNAL ORDER

This facet of the subject entails a recital of some elementary, even obvious, points concerning organization of coercion in relation to maintenance of order and statehood. The delineation necessarily is highly generalized, focusing on essences rather than details and eliding empirical distinctions as between unitary and federal systems and as among states of varying degrees of civic development in the contemporary world.

A basic division of functions with respect to the apparatus of coercion is generally characteristic of advanced states. The origins trace back to a stage of development when groups first settled down in permanent identification with delimited portions of the earth's surface and used them as sites for accumulating goods and established fixed habitations and passed them along from one generation to another. The concept of state—as suggested by its static implication—is rooted in the idea of fixed position. It represents established order pervasive within an area, with diversity beyond the perimeter.

Basically, the relevant division of function lies between establishment of a span of jurisdiction and control on the one hand and the exercise of control or jurisdiction within the established span on the other: external security and internal security. These are distinguishable but not absolutely separable functions.

Military functions pertain to the establishment of spans of control. They are concerned with securing, in the first instance, dominion over land or water, as the case may be—and in modern circumstances, over air space as well; with holding perimeters against other forces competing for access to or mastery over all or part of the range concerned, and with expanding perimeters as opportune or necessary under the spur of ambition, advantage, or survival.

In our nomenclature, the generic term in respect of enforcing order within an established span of jurisdiction is police—derived, obviously, from the Greek term for city, reflecting the institution known as the Greek city state, and cognate with such terms as polish, politics, polity, and the like, associated with the handling of general affairs among a people living in proximity, interdependent, highly involved in each other's existence, and needing a pervasive and constantly operative scheme of order to minister conditions of their common life.

Military and police institutions share many

characteristics, some of them superficial only. Each type is customarily called a force—a term denoting coercion, directed energy, and a body of men prepared for action. Their specialty centers on weapons and their use. Uniform dress and distinguishing emblems to differentiate members from the general run of people are a normal requirement on duty. Each such institution—certainly, at least, in a constitutional order—is under rigorous restrictions regarding the occasions and purposes for bringing its specialty to bear in action. Their structures are tightly hierarchic. Each is more highly organized than other institutions of society in general.

Yet contrasting characteristics are also relevant. The rigor of organization and authority is generally more pervasive within a military establishment. Systems of tutelage and surveillance within are more highly developed. Autonomous standards of privilege and courtesy are particular traits. Military organizations have separate codes of rules enforceable through an autonomous system of adjudication and punishment effected by magisterial systems of their own. Prerogative to deploy elements in what has been called systematic nomadism is part of the scheme of authority in the usual case. The obligation of service between a member and the military establishment is dissolvable only at the state's consent: that is, a member cannot quit at his option but must be absolved from duty. Such are the characteristics distinguishing a military establishment as a sort of state within a state.4

A police establishment is committed to its mission continuously. At all times it is deployed and operating within its assigned area. It acts on a basis of delegated discretion. Its activities on behalf of internal order therefore may be said to be of an administrative character. A military establishment represents, in contrast, a latent power under normal circumstances. Its mission is reserved. A military establishment exists in some degree of readiness, but it is not in action with respect to its mission except under extraordinary circumstances. Then it takes the field not on a basis of delegated discretion but properly in response to specific command or authorization representing an exercise of prerogative basic and central to the existence and maintenance of a state.

The prerogative to call military forces into action has to do not only with levying war against external enemies but also with maintenance of a state's span of jurisdiction against

⁴S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York, Praeger, 1962), pp. 6-13.

internal challenge as well. Military forces are a part, even if normally an abeyant part, of the internal security arrangements of a state. Police forces are calculated to cope with predictable challenges to internal security. Military forces are a reserve capability for use when a challenge exceeds the capabilities of police establishments, whether because of some extraordinarily formidable character in the challenge or because of some factor of disaffection within the police apparatus. The concept here invoked is not one of mere theorizing. In an instance still fresh in American national experience, a thousand score of troops were called out to enforce the right of one individual to attend a university.

Thus one of the potentials for maintaining order within a state is military power. Disorder within a state's span of jurisdiction may take on proportions challenging the integrity and continuity of the state's existence. In such an extremity, the relevance of military power to the maintenance of internal order becomes patent. Even in normal times, when military power is only an abeyant factor, its very existence and the prospect of its availability in exigency are a presumable, if incalculable, factor in support of internal security.

Discussion on the point here has been directed to the role of military power within political systems characterized by a high level of institutional development. In contrasting cases military establishments are often dominant factors rather than subordinated elements in patterns of rulership. In some extreme instances-illustrations from recent events in various African states come readily to mindunbridled military establishments may even be an aggravating factor in discontinuity and disorder. In others, a degree of corporateness and effectiveness within the military apparatus may supply a principal and virtually sole basis for holding a so-called nation together. Such phenomena do not offset the main argument here concerning the basic role of military power within autonomous states.

The project for abolishing military capabilities of states thus has deep implications for their existence and for the character of authority within them. The prerogative to interpose forces in exigency beyond those forces provided in the police establishment for coping with challenges to internal security would pass from the hands of state authority and be vested in an organ external to each state.

Limitation to internal security requirements of forces under control of any state might be so construed as to permit each government to

maintain armed bodies in some modest excess of constant requirements as a means for coping with extremities. Some such thought is reflected in the Outline. This approach would raise a question of how to foreclose use of such forces to threaten the security of neighboring areas. Neighboring areas, too, might have, as counters to such threats, forces of their own in excess of calculable internal security needs. This line of thought would tend to perpetuate in some degree the relationship which the Outline would seek to transform. Such a problem and a related necessity of dealing with it appear to have been anticipated in the Outline, which apparently envisages a system of continuous surveillance and reporting on the stationing and operations of internal security forces. The point supports a conclusion con-

⁵ This conclusion is warranted by a careful reading. Indeed, no alternative interpretation seems adducible. After completion of disarmament, "The Parties . . . would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II." Outline, Stage III, F, 2. Moreover, the International Disarmament Organization "would be strengthened . . . to ensure its capacity . . . to verify. . . . " This would be accomplished through extension of arrangements referred to. Outline, Stage III, G. Relevant provisions for Stage II simply refer to "extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I...." Outline, Stage II, E. Hence it is necessary here to refer only to Stage I. The measures are expressed as follows:

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed. [Moreover], Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation

cerning the subordination of internal security to international jurisdiction.

The basic intention would be to eliminate national forces in excess of requirements for internal order assumed to be predictable and passed upon by international authority. In the event of exigencies requiring forces in excess of allowed levels to cope with internal violence and threats to public order, each state would be left in the position of a petitioner for assistance from a source beyond its own control. Those having a determinative voice in withholding or making available such assistance from outside would be cast as ultimate arbiters of order within each state. The forces from outside, if made available, would operate under a chain of command external to the state concerned. The doctrine under which the force would operate would presumably be beyond determination by the state affected. The same would be true of personnel constituting the outside force.

It is fitting now to take account of some of the considerations relevant to establishing and maintaining such a force as envisaged.

V. MATERIAL BASES OF THE PROJECTED PEACE FORCE

Constituent governments acting to create a new framework of force would presumably have to be convinced of its prospective reliability in high degree before divesting themselves of control of military forces of their own and subordinating themselves to the new arrangement. A condition of the reliability of the new arrangement would be the good faith of all significant parties in subordinating themselves. The problems posed by interdependency between these two considerations are not logically more difficult than those involved in any proposition of forming a new frame of government by contract. The essential thing here is to

recognize the process as that of forming a world state of sorts.

The matter of reliability of the new arrangement would include, beyond assurance against likelihood of misuse of the peace force, assurance of the force's capability and disposition to meet its responsibilities. By a proviso "that no state could challenge it," the Outline predicates an overwhelmingly effective force, but the only index to its efficacy—a phrase regarding "sufficient forces and armaments"—is a quantitative and technical description reflecting what has been aptly characterized as a typical civilian fallacy in measuring military strength.6 In all probability, the technical and quantitative aspects of putting such a force together would be the simplest part of the processthough its simplicity would only be relative to the difficulties of others.

The force would require mobility and technical proficiency of the highest order and would have to be immediately available when summoned to action to meet manifold and ranging responsibilities. It would necessarily be a fighting force capable of exerting coercive power with overwhelming effect—that is, to a degree calculated to prevail—at any level of armed activity against whatever adversaries it might be called upon to meet in any environment whatever.7 It would have to be, in sum, a sophisticated, versatile, multifarious force. Besides requiring at operating levels great subtleties of doctrine and an extraordinary degree of corporate identity and morale, it would need at staff levels a mastery of higher logistics and huge proficiency in military and industrial mobilization. The matter of industrial and technical underpinnings for such a force is especially important. In this respect, the Out-

⁶ Frederick Martin Stern, *The Citizen Army* (New York, St. Martin Press, 1957), p. 4.

7 This point seems adequately clear, notwithstanding a tendency among some to meet questions of how to fit United Nations contingents for unmeasured responsibilities by imagining the problem of force to have been obviated and the way thus opened for immaculate order. For example, one such writer predicates such a moral authority for the United Nations as to enable a force under its aegis to prevail by symbols-its efficacy in its arm bands rather than its arms. See William P. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York, Oceana, 1957), p. 91. The context shows this idea to have been a generalization overdrawn from the single case of the United Nations Emergency Force interposed between Israel and Egypt.

of posts would be agreed. (Outline, Stage I, F, 1 and 2.)

The Outline says further, in relation to Stage I: Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations (Outline, Stage I, G, 2, C.)...

line affords small illumination, presenting not so much a formula as an invitation to governments to attempt a formula. Implicitly, however, it points to an intricate question of how to begin.

The requirements indicated, in connection with reduction of force levels to internal security requirements, include action by participating governments "to cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing," dismantlement or conversion to peaceful uses of bases and facilities beyond those permitted to be retained for internal security purposes, and closure of all military research, development, production, and testing except as permitted by international agreement for purposes of maintaining internal security.

Obviously, however, lore and technology relevant to military matters are in the hands of national governments. The international collectivity could scarcely start from scratch in fashioning a military mechanism of the limitless scope and supreme proficiency intended. It would fall to participants to contribute to aggrandizement of the force. Presumably, though this is not explicit in the Outline, the process would have to be that of conveyance, by participants to the world collectivity, of ownership, control, and operation of considerable portions of their domains, their concentrations of relevant professional talents, and their scientific and industrial complexes. At least, this would be incumbent upon participants having such endowments. The new military collectivity would have to have something to draw upon. It is scarcely plausible for nations at once to extirpate military resources and to proliferate military strength in combination.9

8 Outline, Stage III, B, 1 and 2.

⁹ A quite different set of hypotheses is employed, however, in one relevant work. The portion of nationals permissible from any one state would be limited to 3 per cent of the force. Nationals of the twelve most populous states—namely China, the Soviet Union, India, the United States, Indonesia, Pakistan, Germany, Brazil, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy—would be wholly barred from service in the top command. Basing of any portion of the force in the aforementioned countries would be forbidden. Implicitly, these provisions would amount to a wholesale realignment of military capability. Militarily significant and resourceful areas would be ordained to become militarily

Something equivalent to a global defense ministry would have to be founded, since retention of such agencies by individual states would be forbidden. Implicitly, the establishment would include a multifarious staff system of its own, research and development systems, access to and control of patents and manufacturing systems, as well as contractive powers, procurement processes, systems for settling accounts, and the like, along with cantonments, training ranges, aviation complexes, depot systems, transport arteries and port facilities and vessels of its own or enforceable accesses to them, and many other such properties of a cogent military capability. All of these would necessarily be operative within and located within territory of presently independent states.10 They would have to be exempt from interference by such states. Otherwise, obviously, the apparatus would be subject to impediment and interruption. Its efficacy would not then be a calculable surety. The force would lack the measure of absolute reliability postulated as a central characteristic.11

insignificant, and vice versa. No empirical evidence to support the practicability of the proposal is adduced, however. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2d ed., 1960), pp. xxix-xxxii.

10 Again, note should be taken of a proposal, ibid., p. xxx, for locating "main bases . . . on easily defensible islands or peninsulas." The proposal has been elaborated with a suggestion of Trinidad, Madeira, Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, Zanzibar, and Ceylon as locations. Sohn, in Arthur B. Larson, ed., A Warless World (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 5. Reasons for such anxiety about security in locating a force supposed to be inherently paramount do not need to be speculated upon here. The main point of doubt concerns something else. A world peace force, if realized, would be a central reality, not a marginal and abeyant one. Of far greater apparent practicality—if such a quality may be invoked in respect of so hypothetical an exercise—is the idea of deliberately positioning such a peace force within the larger industrial countries. See Thomas C. Schelling in Lincoln P. Bloomfield, ed., International Military Forces (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1964), p. 227.

¹¹ Some readers of this part of the manuscript have suggested an alternative possibility. States participating in the disarmament arrangement might be permitted to retain control of facilities, contracting authority, patents, and so on, relevant to capacity for making war, and at the same

Tracing out ramifications, one sees clearly in general conformation if not explicitly in detail the outlines of a world government. The point may be elaborated by considering, in addition to quantitative and technical aspects of the projected peace force, the more subtle requirements for men to compose the force.

VI. MANPOWER AND COMMAND IN A GLOBAL PEACE FORCE

Planning for a global peace force adequate for its manifold duties while amenable to control by some collective authority must entail appreciation of the nature of command and its interrelation with the character of the force commanded.

Not a great deal on the subject is available in general literature on the idea of a world peace force. Mostly the writing is characterized by expansiveness of imagination amounting to romance, as anyone with appreciable military experience and some grasp of factors of diversity in the world would note. A sort of omnicompetence for governments and their negotiators is predicated. Cultural factors would become completely malleable on a premise of an absolutely new day in world affairs, and statesmanship would be enabled to perform prodigies of combination heretofore unachievable. Heterogeneity would fall into ranks, and a homogeneous force would thereupon be ready to march. Ethnic antipathies and factors of diversity respecting language, nutritional habits, religious practices, and innumerable taboos would fade into inconsequentiality. Deficiencies in talent would somehow be redressed. Thus men from primitive societies would be fitted to constitute and to operate a complex, versatile, modernized force fit to serve in any clime and amid populations of whatever cultural level. Maximum admixture of ethnic and lingual groups in ranks and even alienism between

time be subjected to restrictions which would permit making use of them only as agents of the world collectivity and providing material underpinnings for the global peace force. The idea underlying this alternative possibility is that states would be spared thereby from impingements upon their autonomy. The idea involves a distinction without a real difference. Agency is not the same as autonomy. To fulfill the characteristics stipulated for the peace force, that force would have to be placed beyond possibility of challenge by any state. That would require placing it beyond possibility of being hamstrung by any state's withholding use of facilities or other material requirements.

officers and men would be cultivated as positive bases for morale rather than as conditions for chaos. Men would sign their years to rotation among remote garrisons.

Such suppositions and propositions, drawn from the literature of disarmament, reflect what has been already described as a typical civilian fallacy of regarding military organizations in technical terms only.12 This outlook, preoccupied with categories rather than functional realities and noting structural parallels between one national force and another, construes military life as a genus of culture and imagines unlimited possibilities of combination. Components are treated as fungible like mechanical parts. By this line of thought, a peace force would be susceptible of assemblage from components of national forces according to whatever design statesmen might determine. A force could be made multinational in such degree as matched the authors' desires.

Such exercises in imagination have small bearing on practical problems. Planners for a world peace force could surely count on no exemption from requirements relevant to the human equation inherent in setting up a cogent military body. To assume such exemption would be equivalent to planning a ship in disregard of factors of seaworthiness.

Some guidance for such planners is provided by the *Outline*. The document calls for examination anew of the feasibility of giving effect to article 43 of the UN Charter. A stipulation

12 It seems pointless to churn at length through ideas contained in the largely fantastical literature on the subject. Essays of Schelling and Henry V. Dicks, respectively, loc. cit., pp. 212-256, are of some considerable value, however, as endeavors to come to terms with problems inherent in such an undertaking. They avoid the fallacy of assuming that the world and all factors relevant to creating such a force can be made over to suit statesmen's designs. In contrast, little of relevant value appears in Clark and Sohn, op. cit.. which is interesting chiefly as an illustration of what has been called the civilian fallacy. This sort of fallacy has been aptly described by an authority in gestalt psychology. From structural similarities between one heart and another, it construes a community among hearts and overlooks the ties functionally binding a heart to a pair of lungs in a relationship infinitely closer than any conceivable between one heart and another. Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology (New York, Liveright, 1929), p. 351, cited by Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 12.

for the new force to "be supplied agreed manpower by states" might be construed as a scheme both to prorate participation and to authorize conscription for the purpose envisaged. The language might accommodate preservation of symbolic national identities of troops, but it would be consistent also with conglomerate forces. The point is relatively inconsequential. The peace force is clearly anticipated as one inclusive apparatus. National command structures would be things of the past. Organization, support, and tempering of the force would be international business.

As a point for emphasis, the endeavor to create a force on such a mould of admixture, should it ever materialize, would be a departure from experience. No certain precedent indicating feasibility is adducible. Forces operating under the United Nations or, in earlier times, the League of Nations, have not been in such a pattern but have consisted rather of temporarily and contingently assigned units of national military establishments. The French Foreign Legion is sometimes cited as a model, but the instance proves inapposite when examined in detail.¹⁴

¹³ This last interpretation is consistent with a ban on conscription expressed elsewhere in the *Outline*: "The parties . . . would halt all military conscription . . . inconsistent with the foregoing measures" which include the provision regarding supply of agreed manpower for the peace force. *Outline*, Stage III, B, 3.

¹⁴ The French Foreign Legion as an example might have seemed more persuasive before the French government's decision in 1961 to disband its paratrooper battalions because of their recalcitrance and potential for mutiny. In any event, the Foreign Legion is a French Foreign Legion. The members are subject to French indoctrination and authority, serve on missions ordained by the French government, and use French as their operational language. Company officers are largely French and senior officers entirely so. Some Frenchmen serve in ranks. The rest are drawn mainly from European cultures somewhat assimilated to the French. Alien members usually serve in expectation of receiving French nationality upon completion of service. All are judged and rewarded or punished according to standards authorized by the French government. Discipline, however, emphasizes rigorous punishment for strictly military infractions but is indulgent with respect to social offenses, as would be usual in a service based on a mercenary principle—that is, without high identity between the outfit and the frame of authority. Withal, deserThe problem is put in better proportion by including among criteria of reliability such considerations as identity, common doctrine and motivation, and amenability to command and control, in addition to the relatively easy factors of magnitude and technical adequacy. One must see a way through these aspects before being justified in any appreciable degree of confidence in the practicability of the whole idea of a global peace force. Without a plausible formula for bringing governments into concord on such sensitive and basic considerations, one could scarcely be said to have even the beginning of a plan.

Faculties of command respecting a military apparatus concern both the chain of authority within and the system of guidance and control exterior to and above it. The interlaced functions of command are broadly four: first, determination of doctrine underlying and motivating the force, its character as a social entity, and traits to be cultivated through control of members' careers; second—and closely related -the magisterial function of judging and punishing derelictions; third, choice of weapon systems and inculcation of proficiency in them, conceived in relation to putative missions; fourth, competence to decide upon and to effect deployments in actual operations. The first two aspects—characteristically taken for granted or summarily dealt with in projects for universal forces—are foundations of accomplishment with respect to the other two.

A fundamental aspect concerns the moral basis of the faculty of command. In a superficial view, obedience flows from establishment of a command framework: create authority, and compliance will follow in consequence. This approach involves a simplification amounting to distortion. Command authority is in essence a grant from those subject to it. Command conceived as a product of obedience comes closer to basic truth than a statement putting the relationship vice versa. 15

tions have been a perennial problem, as gang tendencies also have been. The Legion's suitability is limited to duties in marginal areas with high incidence of combat rather than to routine duties in metropolitan areas. See Adrian Liddell Hart, Strange Company (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953), passim.

15 Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 163-164. Also James G. Harbord, The American Army in France (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1936), p. 259. Military annals are replete with instances of units rendered actively mutinous

A second key aspect concerns the cultural base of a military organization's responses.16 This base is linked integrally to the concept of reliability. Reliability standing alone conveys little. The term requires a referent: reliability with respect to what? To be reliable, a force must have unity of character—a unity reflecting a common doctrine, reflecting agreement about values. The range of possibilities concerning moral and cultural bases for creating an effective force are wide, but no universal base -no generally accepted ethic of authority, responsibility, and the like-exists to be invoked as a basis for a world peace force. Such an ethic would have to be agreed upon and given reality as a motivating body of ideas, as a condition to creating a structure of command and control. Because of its importance, this simple point deserves elaboration.

VII. AN UNDERLYING ETHIC FOR A GLOBAL FORCE

It is accurate but inadequate to conceive of a force as a body of men organized and equipped to bring energy to bear destructively against designated adversaries on proper command. A force is not a collection of depersonalized entities. A force, moreover, should be thought of as spending the larger part of its existence under peaceable conditions rather than in hostile operations. The problem of relation to environment mostly concerns pacific environment. The members represent some pattern of identities and associations. In the usual case, a member has affective ties with some place in-

or passively unresponsive, whereupon power of command was vitiated even though the structure of command was left intact.

16 "Military institutions are intimately bound up with the state of culture which the nation has obtained," in the words of Rudiger von der Goltz, quoted by Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde (New York, Putnam, 1939), p. 3. Literature constituting what might be called a sociology of military organization is not abundant. Stern, op. cit., Nickerson, op. cit., and Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York, Macmillan, 1959) are useful, however. Two relevant points emerge from a perusal of such works: the basic and complex social character of military organization in contrast to the relatively simple technical aspect; the fallacy of thinking of military culture as a culture per se rather than as an aspect of culture normally related to a national base. Niccolò Machiavelli's insights into the national basis of military morale, though brief, are incisive. See his Discourses (New York, Random House, 1940), Bk. I, ch. xlii.

habited by his own kind—a place in whose security against enemies he is personally involved.

Peaceable associations, sense of identity, and affective connections are basic to the assumptions, responses, and motivations underlying the character and effectiveness of a force. These characteristics vary in detail and strength from one member to another. In the degree of their existence and likeness, however, as between one member and another, they afford some basis for essential community. They do not account for all constituent traits of a force. Many other intertwined factors enter into determining a force's character, meaning the sum of what it can be relied upon to do or not to do: such matters as indoctrination, development of common habits and general proficiency by training, cumulative common experience as a group, systems of preferment and promotion, qualities of administered justice, standards of leadership, and the moral basis of authority. The sum total of determinants of a force's character is great and complex, and the sum differs from one culture to another, so that respective armed forces, however much alike considered from a technical standpoint, are widely variant as social entities. Such moral aspects are basic, and their paramountcy over material factors is recognized in a well known Napoleonic maxim.

Persons from alien cultures may indeed be assimilated to a force associated with some particular culture. This circumstance does not gainsay the main point: a force cannot be adequately considered apart from a cultural base and an underlying ethic. Outsiders must be assimilated. A force must reflect a character—not a patchwork. Forces may have roots in variant schemes of identity and value. A force must have, and be limited to, one basis. Otherwise it would constitute not a force, but a congeries of forces—not susceptible of being equated against putative missions.

The considerable variations possible may be illustrated by a force, on the one hand, with preponderant attitudes and associations scarcely distinguishable from those characterizing the civil community to which the force relates and, in contrast, a force dissociated from its surroundings, centered on its own existence, and characterized by inward affective connections so that the outfit itself becomes a moral equivalent of a homeland, and barracks life becomes the engrossing focus of loyalties. The Swiss army or a force based on the ethic delineated by Frederick Martin Stern in The Citizen Army would typify the

first. Any force in the Janissary or Praetorian-Guard model could typify the latter.¹⁷

What the Outline contemplates is a force. It would be synthesized from pre-existing forces associated with particular cultures—an assemblage of fragments taken over from disbanded national components. Three, and only three, elements of its binding ethic are made apparent: first, an affirmation of the unconditional heinousness of unauthorized violence; second, as a corollary, the countering rightness of authorized violence; and third, the repose of relevant authority—meaning the faculty determinative of the difference between violence authorized and violence unauthorized—in some prescribed consensus, as yet undefined, of local representatives in an international collectivity.

For a moment, at whatever cost in effort to suspend disbelief, it is appropriate to hypothesize achievement of a force on the basis of the ethic stipulated and to ponder its possible effectiveness, whether active or deterrent. The two aspects would be linked. The deterrent effects would be a product of estimates of the force's probable efficacy on being called into action.

A decision is made by a requisite majority in the establishment vested with control of the global peace force. It deems some act, whether in connection with an international quarrel or a contest for power within a national domain, to be a malefaction deserving or requiring interposition of the peace force; designates the malefactors; and summons the force to bring to bear its irresistible capabilities. The decision is conveyed to the apex of authority within the confines of the force establishment properpresumably some global equivalent of a ministry of defense. Appropriate orders thence are relayed to the military command apparatus. The immediate results conceivable fall into two general categories: an effective strike against the designated malefactors, or a default. The implications of these two broad possibilities deserve further consideration.

¹⁷ A reader has asked whether an army of occupation would not be in the same category. That would depend on its inherent character as a force, not on its relation to a particular scene of duty. An army of occupation, though at least formally alienated from its surroundings, is not *ipso facto* in the mood of feeling detached from any homeland whatever or being disposed to think of home as being the barracks. This is no less the case with troops on occupation duty accompanied by their kindred.

An effective response might reflect either an identification on the part of a determining number within the force with the requisite majority's view on the merits of the matter at issue or an unreflecting acceptance of the directive as conclusive ipso facto. The first would not necessarily constitute a precedent for subsequent compliance under different circumstances. The second, unreflecting compliance, would apparently—with emphasis on that qualifier—tend to sustain the frame of authority unequivocally.

The possible forms of failure of compliance. signaling collapse of the ethic and derogation of the authority, would be various, for the ways of mutiny are multiple: dissent and cleavage within the command structure, resulting in a withholding of orders or even a commitment of force to the opposite side; divided identities within the force as a whole. rendering it inert in the particular instance or even sundering it, dividing its irresistibility into two or more parts, and bringing on an internal struggle for ascendancy. A potential for such developments would remain in any force with national identities and a sense for the merits of issues lingering in the command structure or the cadres,18 and calculations of that potential and of ways for affecting it would become a central consideration in world politics.

It would be presumptuous to dismiss possibilities, as distinguished from probabilities, of achieving a force to suit the prescription and to sustain authority by bringing its overwhelming capabilities unquestioningly to bear. Some may uphold the possibility on a premise of recruiting members with a zeal for universal peace.19 This is an improbable hope. A force's capability must depend on a fighting élan—not a zeal against fighting. Theoretically, however, such a force might be realized in either or both of two ways: by recruitment of individuals free of antecedent loyalties, moved by an urge to identify with paramount power, or desirous of opportunity to fight on the overwhelming side without fear of formidable retribution, or by a

¹⁸ Paul Kecskmeti, "Nuclear Absolutism," Commentary (July, 1963), pp. 43, 47.

¹⁹ See for example Dicks, *loc. cit.*, p. 252. The author envisions a force imbued with, and motivated by, zeal for peace. He suggests the Ghurkas and the French Foreign Legion as possible prototypes. The inappositeness of these two traditional groups, with high reputations as fighting men, needs no laboring.

rigorous method of indoctrination such as to expunge members' antecedent loyalties and identities, to inculcate purely reflex responses to mandate, and so to transform personalities as to render members willing to operate even against their erstwhile homelands because a vote taken has determined for them to do so in the name of enforcing peace.

In reason and prudence, a word must be added. One should rule out an assumption of achieving a complete departure from lessons and limits of experience through international concord on the ethic of a global force. A force of such overwhelming corporate spirit, imbued with absolute obedience, dissociated from considerations which move or stay others, divorced from cultural ties, and committed to so peculiar an ethic, would in great probability be characterized by a high Janissary or Praetorian potential—a potential for developing its own momentum, a potential for passing almost momentarily from subordination to usurpation of authority or from absolute obedience to absolute mutiny.20

VIII. DOUBTS AND QUERIES

With his mind's eye, one can visualize the component parts of the new ordering of force predicated in the United States project: first,

20 This danger is dealt with, and a solution offered, by one highly reputed writer in this field: "The danger of Caesar worship may be avoided if the command of the force is entrusted, not to a single person, but to a committee of five or seven persons, all of whom preferably ought to be nationals of small nations. At the same time, to ensure the impartiality of decisions, the majority of the command group should come from the noncommitted nations rather than the two major blocs." Sohn, in Larson, op. cit., p. 5. No showing is made on the relevance of such concepts as "major blocs" and "noncommitted nations" under conditions of complete national disarmament. No links between "impartiality" and "noncommitted nations" are demonstrated. No showing is made for the assumed likelihood of finding small nations to be resourceful in affording talents and experience for the intricate and subtle problems of command under the contemplated conditions. No experiential data on the efficacy of command by committee are offered. Nothing is adduced to support an assumption in favor of the appropriateness of plural command as a means of averting the perils. The passage quoted is an interesting example of how to project the future in disregard of experience.

the basic force itself; above, yet part of it, a command and staff structure; higher still in the chain of formal authority, an equivalent of a world defense ministry; and in supreme or political charge a collectivity of representatives of erstwhile independent governments.

The peace force itself would be a body of fighting men chosen in accordance with some criteria, supposed to be moulded to a set of habits and responses in common, equipped and trained not for some abstractly conceived mission of peace but prepared or preparing to interpose and to wage havor in particular theaters under specific assumed operational conditions. Necessarily, it would be garrisoned somewhere, maybe in a diversity of locations. It must come to some social relationship within itself and with environing populations. The members might conceivably be cut off from women and familial ties. They might be permitted fuller lives in enclaves set apart from the surrounding societies, or they might even enjoy that combination of aloofness and prerogative associated with a conqueror's status. Their way of life might be that of blending into surrounding cultures as full sharers. The basis chosen would, of course, have a bearing on the degree of feasible admixture into a conglomerate homogeneity or of assortment into diverse components attempted in the force, and that factor in turn would have much to do with how the force could be used.

The higher command and staff structure itself presumably drawn from diverse cultural sources and struggling with language barriers as well as internal divergencies of outlookwould be concerned with trying to realize a cogent, unified, operationally reliable instrument out of culturally varied men. The men must be either admixed into a uniformity of diversities or separated into a diversity of uniformities. With small inherent unity within itself, the structure would be trying to cope with unexampled complexities of human relations. What notional missions should be prepared for-inasmuch as military doctrine and training cannot be formulated against abstractions?21 Staff work and command would be

²¹ Schelling, loc. cit., p. 233, puts the matter succinctly: unless conceived as a purely ceremonial or symbolic entity, such a force would have to have a strategy. A set of purposes and assumed missions would have to be built into the organization and reflected in its doctrine. Determining that strategy would be a central concern in world politics, because in turn that strategy

unremittingly involved in that most prickly of questions.

The ministerial agency, itself internally diverse, would be trying to perform prodigies of superintendency in integrating force over a world scope. It would be seeking and trying to apply formulas for qualification, selection, promotion, brigading, compensation, retirement, and conditions for a common life covering throngs of persons of divergent background, different senses of reality, highly varied frames of value, and discrepant expectations and taboos. It would face baffling problems in the formulation and administration of justice resulting from interspersion of cultures in an intensively organized body. It would be charged with measuring operational requirements, and procuring accordingly, against unforeseeable missions.

The supreme authority, the political collectivity itself, would be engrossed in parallel issues in trying to translate the rhetoric of unity and world order into measurable realities. Basically, the collectivity must determine the distribution of authority. The participants would be in an ambiguous position. The entities for which they would speak would be putative targets of, as well as participants in, the amalgam of force. This duality would affect a wide range of questions requiring decision. One such question would be that of selecting a site for the force's headquarters. Others would arise in connection with locating the force's main bases and main normal concentrations of personnel and determining its main supply sources. Obviously, except under incalculably distraught conditions, the force would never be ordered to proceed against its own establishment or sources. Hence a host area, or a significant contributary, might presumably be exempt from ever becoming an operational target. On the other hand, the continuing presence of large numbers of global troops would probably be an important political conditioning factor in any land. The issues would be deep and enduring.

Further, such questions would arise in determining who should command from one stage to another, what should be the extent of his or their prerogative to determine subordinates in the chain of authority, and who should have the determining voice in displacing commanders. The questions, obviously, would bear upon what the force might be relied upon to do or

would have a determinative influence on world politics.

not to do. The participating entities would have to be vitally alert because vitally concerned.

A basic matter would be that of settling who should lay down the binding doctrine for the force and how the inculcation of that doctrine should be supervised. These would not be theoretic questions. Academies, staff and command schools, and the like would have to be instituted in view of the abolition of national establishments of such character. Who should be in charge? What precepts and methods should be imposed in them? The pattern of fidelity and reliability for a globally irresistible force might well turn on such questions, and every significant unit of government would feel vitally concerned.

How and by whom would specific questions of equipment and specific objects of training exercises be determined? In a related way, how, and at whose say-so, should operational intelligence be gathered? The implications do not need to be labored. Forces must be prepared to operate on one kind of mission or another, in one sort of terrain or another, and amid one populace or another-against specific rather than abstract operational targets. For example, the force may run maneuvers under simulated Alpine conditions. Or, it concentrates on desert training. The staff studies Baltic or Red Sea oceanography. Some officers are assigned to study Arabic. Data on land approaches to Kashmir are gathered. One can readily imagine the sort of reverberating issues bound to arise as plans, exercises and the gathering of operational information were directed to correspond to particular countries. One may predicate the vesting of control of nuclear weapons in the projected apparatus and ponder the question -and its implications—as to what particular capitals or industrial complexes should be tar-

Such questions, by no means exhaustive, are illustrative of what would be involved in creating links to ensure control and response with respect to such a force. The aspects are myriad, and all delicate. Authority of a central collectivity over such a peace force may sound engagingly simple when confined to considerations of authorizing a pre-established and ready force to blast away at some hypothetical miscreant. In practice the elements of control would be integral to the character of the force itself and would have to be built into the force from its origin and to be continuously superintended.

If the whole idea were to work at all, the

collectivity, however organized, with the force under its charge as an instrument of presumed reliability, would have to exercise effective power in suppression of attempts to undermine the arrangement. The irresistible force would need to be brought to bear at once and rigorously against any effort to offset its irresistibility. Any move by a formerly independent state to resume military autonomy would need to be regarded and dealt with as an act of rebellion and secession. In consenting to become a participant in, and putative beneficiary of, a world monopoly of military force, a state would ipso facto consent to becoming a target in event of a later attempt to renounce the contract. Under other conditions—and without an effective will to maintain paramountcy in the central arrangement—the force would fail of irresistibility, and states could not afford to commit their security to its care unconditionally. Yet the paramountcy premised for the force must rest on such commitments made in an engrossing pattern. With respect to the whole undertaking, the peace force's irresistibility is thus premised both as a condition precedent and as a consequence. In any event, and in practical terms, it is at least subject to doubt that the constituent elements of the stipulated quality are accessible.

The collective authority, with its irresistible coercive instrument, would become arbiter of questions of legitimacy touching the system of regime in every land. To its jurisdiction would come questions of enlarging quotas of force permitted to particular governments for internal security. It would have to develop a basis for approving and rejecting such petitions. It would presumably inquire into the necessities in view of the methods and purposes of an applicant government and in relation to the purposes and interests confronting it. It would be in position to grant effectiveness, to license oppression, or to deny a beset regime requirements for maintaining itself against internal challenge.

In extremity, involving a regime's inability to counter domestic challenge with its permitted quota of internal security forces, it would fall to the world collectivity to lend or not to lend a hand with a fraction of its irresistible components—a political question of sweeping import. A factor in the life and stability of regimes would be their standing, in the measure of political favor, with whatever consensus might prevail in the apparatus of control over the central force and the apparent probability, again calculated in political terms, of their

being able to obtain its assistance in exigency. In an instance of rival claims to a local seat of authority, the advantage falling to a claimant enjoying favor with the determining voices in the central apparatus might well prove conclusive.

In like fashion, the suffrage of the central apparatus would be dominant in issues of secession arising within any constituent area.

These considerations have a basic importance to every scheme for integrating and centralizing the organization of force over a great expanse. Characteristically—and, one should add, essentially—such projects in the past have faced the attendant problems squarely. They have started from postulates of the legitimacy of every regime engrossed and of the propriety of its span of jurisdiction. In predicating a central authority in possession and control over paramount forces, they have complementarily undertaken to guarantee each participating regime in perpetuity.

Thus it was, for example, with the Duke of Sully's Grand Design in the sixteenth century and with the Abbé de St. Pierre's Projet in the eighteenth. Thus it was, and remains, with the Constitution of the United States. A provision, in section 10 of Article I, that "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . keep troops, or ships of war" goes hand in hand with provisions, in sections 3 and 4 of Article IV. that "no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State: nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress" and that the "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them . . . against domestic violence." The integrity of every span of domain and the continuity of legitimacy for every participating regime are clearly stipulated. Every state is secured against disruption of its domain. Every state is promised a duly elected and representative regime and guaranteed constitutional continuity.

The Outline omits equivalent provisions for guaranteed peaceful continuity. To the contrary, it bespeaks peaceful change. Yet assurance of what can be counted on to last—not what can be counted on to give way—forms the foundation of order. It is difficult to see how any significant regime could afford to sign away command over factors of force without some such set of guarantees as those cited from

the Constitution of the United States. Yet the idea of agreeing ab initio on a universal frame for legitimacy, undertaking to guarantee licit continuity of authority in every land, and predicating the fixity of all territorial dispositions only underlines the remoteness from actuality of preconditions for a world monopoly of force.

To assume such preconditions as fulfilled is to construe the underlying problems of world order and security as solved. To attribute to governments individually and collectively such plenitude of power—such omnificent capacities—as to enable them to achieve these conditions as an exercise in policy involves disregarding the actual limitations bearing upon their actions. As an element in the United States disarmament plan, the project for a world peace force may promote an aura of abstract good intention for United States policy. Its usefulness with respect to the credibility of United States policy is another matter.

THE 1914 CASE*

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This paper will employ techniques of content analysis to examine some features of top-level communications between national policy makers during a momentous period of stress. It is concerned with the effects of stress upon: (1) the manner in which decision-makers perceive time as a factor in their formulation of policy; (2) the contrasting ways in which they view policy alternatives for their own nations, for their allies, and for their adversaries; and (3) the flow of communications among them.

I. HYPOTHESES AND DATA

Specifically, the following hypotheses will be tested with data from the 1914 crisis leading up to the Great War in Europe:

Hypothesis 1. As stress increases in a crisis situation:

- (a) time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making.
- (b) decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

Hypothesis 2. In a crisis situation, decision-makers will perceive:

- (a) their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.
- (b) their allies' range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

Hypothesis 3. As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive:

- (a) the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower.
- (b) the range of alternatives open to adversaries to expand.
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Hypothesis 4. The higher the stress in a crisis situation:

- (a) the heavier the overload upon the channels of communication.
- (b) the more stereotyped will be the information content of messages.
- (c) the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication.
- (d) the higher the proportion of intracoalition—as compared with inter-coalition—communication.

These hypotheses have been developed in large part from recent decision-making literature and from the voluminous experimental literature of psychology. The advantages of precise measurement, easy replication, and tight control over the experimental variables have permitted psychologists to probe into many aspects of human performance under varying situational conditions. Results obtained primarily from observations of undergraduate students may at first blush be suspect when generalized to foreign policy leaders. The strong support for these hypotheses in the experimental literature, however, at least suggests that they warrant testing in historical crisis situations.1

The 1914 crisis provides a particularly suitable case for a test of the hypotheses. The available documentation relating to the outbreak of the Great War surpasses that of any crisis of similar magnitude. Among the nations directly involved, only the Serbian archives have remained relatively inaccessible to the investigator. A generation of careful scholarship produced document collections of unquestioned authenticity, including those of Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Germany and Russia.² Finally, the crisis is a classic ex-

¹ This literature is reviewed in my "Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making," as the earlier version of this paper, noted above, was entitled. See also F. E. Horvath, "Psychological Stress: A Review of Definitions and Experimental Research," in L. von Bertalanffy and Anatol Rapoport, eds., General Systems Yearbook, IV (Ann Arbor, Society for General Systems Research, 1959).

² Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Ministerium des k. and k. Hauses und des Äusseren, Österreich-

ample of war through escalation. The minor war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which crisis-hardened European diplomats expected to remain localized,³ engulfed nearly the entire continent within ten days. The existing international system—still commonly referred to as the archetype of a functioning "balance of power" system—was unable to cope with the situation as it had previously in the recurring Balkan crises. While extensive war plans had been drawn up by the various general staffs, there is little evidence that any European decision-maker wanted or expected a general war—at least in 1914.

The data for this paper were derived in whole from documents signed and sent by designated British, French, Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian decision-makers; that is, those persons filling the roles of: head of state; head of government; foreign minister; under-secre-

Perceiver	Agent	Action or Attitude	Target
Sazonov	Austrian	hope is the ultimate annihilation of hope is the ultimate annihilation of	Serbia
Sazonov	German		Serbia

Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914; Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreich-ungarischen Ministeriums des Aussern, Ludwig Bittner and Alfred Pribram, Heinrich Srbik and Hans Uebersberger, eds., vol. VIII (Vienna and Leipzig, 1930.)

France, Commission for the Publication of Documents Relative to the War of 1914, *Documents Diplomatiques Francais* (1871–1914), 3d series, vols. X and XI (Paris, 1936).

Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. XI, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds. (London, 1926).

Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., Outbreak of the World War, German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky (New York, Oxford University Press, 1924).

Russia, Komissiia po izdaiiu dokumentov spokhi imperializma: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v ipokhu imperializma; dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarkogi i vremennogo pravitel 'stv 1878–1915 gg., seriia III, toma IV and V (Moskva-Leningrad, 1931 and 1934).

In this paper references to these collections are made by document number, rather than page number

³ The reaction of Sir Arthur Nicholson, British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was typical: "I have my doubts as to whether Austria will take any action of a serious character and I expect the storm will blow over" (Great Britain,

tary of foreign affairs; minister of war; chief of the general staff. The data in the present paper are derived from the complete verbatim text of published documents meeting the criteria of authorship and date (June 27-August 4). While these documents do not record all messages initiated by the designated leaders—notably lacking are face-to-face or telephone conversations—they do embody a substantial portion of all their communications.

The initial step in the content analysis of these documents was to develop a coding unit—
the perception—defined in terms of the following elements: the perceiver; the perceived, or agent; the action or attitude; and the target.
For example, the assertion by a Russian decision-maker that "The Austrian, as well as German, hope is the ultimate annihilation of Serbia," was coded as two separate perceptions, in each case the perceiver being the author of the document.4

The 1914 documents yielded 4883 such perceptions.

The independent variable in each hypothesis—the level of stress—can be defined as resulting from a perceived threat to high priority values. Eight of the ten hypotheses postulate changes deriving from increased stress. The outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will be used as the dividing point between the period of lower (June 27-July 28) and higher (July 29-August 4) stress. Intuitively one would expect that European decision-makers—except perhaps the Serbs and Austrians, by then already committed—were under greater stress during the latter period.

op. cit., #40). At about the same time Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote, "I went to bed with a feeling things might blow over... we were still a long way, as it seemed, from any danger of war". Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1914 (New York, 1928), p. 208. As late as July 28 the Kaiser wrote of the crisis in the Balkans, "A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away" (Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #271).

⁴ For a full description of the coding operations, see Robert C. North et al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963). Some problems of sampling in the use of historical documents are discussed in Holsti, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

TABLE I. FREQUENCY AND TYPE OF PERCEPTIONS OF TIME AS A FACTOR IN DECISION-MAKING: COMBINED TOTALS FOR AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, GERMANY, FRANCE, RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN

7-1-1	Total		Tim	e Percept	ions	m1	
Period	Perceptions	A	В	С	D	E	Total
June 27-July 2	306	3	0	0	0	0	3
July 3-16	349	11	1	0	1	3	16
July 12-20	211	1	0	0	1	1	3
July 21-25	634	11	17	9	0	1	38
July 26	300	0	3	0	0	. 0	3
July 27	287	0	7	1	2	2	12
July 28	407	0	1	0	0	0	1
July 29	456	0	5	1	1	0	7
July 30	342	1	1	5	2	0	9
July 31	529	0	0	10	5	2	17
August 1-2	583	0	2	11	8	7	28
August 3-4	479	0	σ	2	18	3	23
		•					
Total	4883	27	37	39	38	19	160

Code of relevance of time:

This premise is supported by measures of both attitude and action. The documents yielded 882 perceptions of hostility directed against the perceivers' nations, which were scaled by the Q-Sort method. The results indicate significantly higher intensity during the July 29-August 4 period for each alliance (Z=10.81and 3.88; both are significant at the .0001 level). A scaling of the actions taken by members of each alliance also reveals a significantly higher level of violence or potential violence during the last week prior to the outbreak of general war (Z=2.24 and 5.58, significant at the .025 and .0001 levels respectively).4a Thus the two periods meet the requirements necessary to test the hypotheses.

II. PERCEPTIONS OF TIME

To test the first two hypotheses, the entire set of nearly five thousand perceptions derived from the decision-makers' documents was recoded; every statement making reference to time as a factor in decision-making was extracted. The 160 time perceptions were initially classified according to date⁵ and stated reason for the relevance of time (Table I).

Time perceptions in these data fall into four major categories which correspond to the development of events within the crisis. During the earliest period—through July 20—some 68.1 per cent of the references to time focus on

tent analysis data, the data were divided into twelve periods of approximately equal volume of documentation as in Table I; thus time periods early in the crisis are longer than those in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war. See Ole R. Holsti and Robert C. North, "History as a 'Laboratory' of Conflict," in Elton B. Mc-Neil, ed., The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, 1965); Holsti and North, "Perceptions of Hostility and Economic Variables," in Richard Merritt, ed., Comparing Nations (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965); North et al., "Perception and Action in the Study of International Relations: The 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer, ed., The International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research: Empirical Studies in International Relations (1965, in press); Holsti et al., "Violence and Hostility: The Path to World War," paper read at American Psychiatric Association meeting, Los Angeles, Calif. (May, 1964.)

The statistical tests of hypotheses 1a, 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b are based on these twelve periods.

A-Factor in Austro-Hungarian action toward Serbia.

B-Factor in localizing conflict.

C-Factor in mobilization.

D-Factor in political commitments.

E-Others.

^{4a} For a more detailed discussion of the data and scaling methods see, *ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

⁵ In earlier studies of the 1914 crisis using con-

the prospects of early Austro-Hungarian actions against Serbia. Count Alexander Hoyos, for example, wrote on July 7 that "From a military standpoint . . . it would be much more favorable to start the war now than later since the balance of power would weigh against us in the future."6 Hoyos's fear that "through a policy of delay and weakness, we at a later moment, endanger this unflinching support of the German Empire,"7 was not wholly without foundation. Germany was exerting considerable pressure on its ally not to postpone a showdown until a less clearly defined future. Gottlieb von Jagow, German Foreign Minister, wrote on July 15: "We are concerned at present with the preeminent political question, perhaps the last opportunity of giving the Greater-Serbia menace its death blow under comparatively favorable circumstances."8

Once the content of the Austrian ultimatum became known, the 48-hour deadline given the Serbian government to reply became an immediate subject of concern. The time perceptions from July 21 through 29 focus predominantly (54.0 per cent) on the necessity of delaying the course of events in the Balkans in the hope of averting war, or at least containing it within a local area.

By July 30 it was apparent that war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia could not be prevented. At the same time, it was increasingly evident that such a war was likely to spread. As late as August 1 many European decision-makers asserted that if time permitted a reconvening of the concert powers, general war might be avoided. The British Foreign Minister wrote: "I still believe that if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war it might be possible to secure peace."9 By this time, however, the pressure of time had taken a different meaning for many of them. A major concern (48.1 per cent of all time perceptions from July 30 to August 2) was that one's nation not be caught militarily unprepared in case of war.

The dilemma was obvious. Time was re-

⁶ Hoyos's assessment that time was working against the Dual Monarchy was supported by General Conrad, Austro-Hungarian Chief-of-Staff: "In the years 1908-1909 it would have been a game with open cards," he said. "In 1912-1913 the chances were in our favour. Now it is a sheer gamble [ein va-banque spiel]." Quoted in Edmund Taylor, The Fall of the Dynasties (Garden City, 1963), p. 206.

- 7 Austria-Hungary, op. cit., #10118.
- ⁸ Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #48.
- 9 Great Britain, op. cit., #411.

quired to avert a general European war; above all, a moratorium on military operations was necessary. So on August 1 King George V wrote of his efforts "to find some solution which permits in any case the adjournment of active military operations and the granting of time to the powers to discuss among themselves calmly."10 But increasingly this consideration was overshadowed by the fear that a potential adversary might gain a head start in mobilizing its military power. Although no official mobilization orders except those of Austria-Hungary and Serbia were issued until July 29. there were increasing rumors and suspicions of secret preparations—some of them well founded, as it turned out.11

In the early hours of the morning of July 30, the Kaiser wrote on the margin of a message from the Czar,

... the Czar—as is openly admitted by him here—instituted "mil. measures which have now come into force" against Austria and us and as a matter of fact five days ago. Thus it is almost a week ahead of us. And these measures are for a defense against Austria, which is in no way attacking him!!! I can not agree to any more mediation, since the Czar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back. It is only a maneuver, in order to hold us back and to increase the start they have already got. My work is at an end!¹²

Later the Kaiser added, "In view of the colossal war preparations of Russia now discovered, this is all too late, I fear. Begin! Now!" 13

The previous day Russia had ordered—and then cancelled—a general mobilization. Later it was decided in St. Petersburg that the mobilization of the four southern military districts would deter an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia without alarming Berlin. But technical

10 France, op. cit., #550.

"Winston Churchill mobilized the British Navy contrary to a decision of the Cabinet. "At the Cabinet [meeting of August 1] I demanded the immediate calling out of the Fleet Reserves and the completion of our naval preparations.... However, I did not succeed in procuring their assent.... I went back to the Admiralty and gave forthwith the order to mobilise. We had no legal authority for calling up the Naval Reserves, as no proclamation had been submitted to his Majesty in view of the Cabinet decision, but we were quite sure that the Fleet men would unquestioningly obey the summons." Churchill, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

- ¹² Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #390.
- 13 Ibid., #433.

difficulties caused the Russians to reverse their decision once again on July 30 in favor of general mobilization—German warnings notwithstanding.

In response to what was perceived as a mounting threat against its eastern frontiers, the German Empire proclaimed a "state of threatening danger of war" on July 31 and dispatched a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding a cessation of military preparations. Berlin then ordered mobilization on August 1. A general mobilization was simultaneously ordered in Paris. Although official British mobilization was delayed until August 2, many had advocated such action considerably earlier. On July 31 Arthur Nicolson had urged immediate military preparations: "It seems to me most essential, whatever our future course may be in regard to intervention, that we should at once give orders for mobilization of the army."14

So, ten days after the small scale mobilizations by Serbia and Austria-Hungary on July 25, each of the major European nations had ordered a general mobilization; the armies totalling less than 400,000 men called to fight a limited war had grown to nearly twelve million men. As each mobilization was ordered it was described as a necessary defensive reaction—made more urgent by the pressure of time—to a previous decision within the other alliance, although such an act was commonly regarded in 1914 as tantamount to a declaration of war. Thus, each mobilization acted as a stimulus that elicited an almost reflex-like response. 15

14 Great Britain, op. cit., #368.

15 In some cases, the escalation of measures and counter-measures was sustained almost by accident, or by the failure to perceive the effects of one's actions. The mobilization of the Russian Baltic fleet is a good example: "On 25 July, when the Tsar looked over the minutes and resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the 24th, he not only approved them by adding 'agreed,' but, where it was the question of mobilizing the districts of Kiev, Moscow, Odessa and Kazan and the Black Sea fleet, he inserted in his own hand 'and Baltic' without any of his ministers drawing his attention to the fact that the mobilization of the Baltic fleet constituted an act of hostility toward Germany." Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953), II, p. 558.

Although the Russian Baltic Fleet was no match for the German Navy, the Kaiser apparently felt genuinely threatened. In response to Bethmann-Hollweg's plea that the German Fleet

In the final hours of the crisis leaders in both coalitions became increasingly concerned (78.2 per cent of all time perceptions August 3-4) that other nations make their intentions known immediately. Allied states, members of the opposing coalition, and even neutral states were subjected to demands for immediate commitment to one side or the other.

The first hypothesis (1a, above) relating the stress of crisis to perceptions of time states that:

As stress increases in a crisis situation, time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making.

In order to perform a valid test of the hypothesis, the frequency of time references for each of the twelve periods (Table I) was adjusted as follows:

$\frac{\text{Time Perceptions} \times 100}{\text{Total Perceptions}}$

The resulting scores were then divided into two periods, June 27-July 28, and July 29-August 4.

A Mann-Whitney U-Test of the direction and magnitude of differences between the two periods was applied to the data for each coalition. The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data for the Triple Entente (France, Russia and England), whose leaders perceived time as a factor in decision-making significantly more frequently during the culminating stages (July 29-August 4) of the crisis than during the earlier period (June 27-July 28) (U=3, p=.009). The data for the Dual Alliance (Germany,

be left in Norway, he wrote, "there is a Russian Fleet! In the Baltic there are now five Russian torpedo boat flotillas engaged in practice cruises, which as a whole or in part can be at the Belts within sixteen hours and close them. Port Arthur should be a lesson! My Fleet has orders to sail for Kiel, and to Kiel it is going to sail!" Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #221.

16 This test is used to determine if there is a systematic difference between scores in two samples or populations. Each item is given a rank order score; in the case of hypothesis 1a, each time period receives a rank score based on the adjusted frequency with which time is perceived as a salient factor in decision-making. The value of U (the statistic in this test) is given by the number of times that a score in one group (July 29-August 4) precedes a score in the other group (June 27-July 28). Thus, the lower the value of U, the more significant is the difference. Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York, 1956), pp. 116-127.

Austria-Hungary) reveal that differences between the early and later periods of the crisis are in the predicted direction, but that the difference is not statistically significant (U=11.5, p=.19).

According to the second hypothesis (1b) concerning perceptions of time:

As stress increases in a crisis situation, decisionmakers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

Of the total of 160 statements in which time is perceived to be a factor in decision-making, only eight reveal a concern for the more distant future. When the data are divided into the early and later periods of the crisis, all perceptions of the distant future occur during the June 27-July 28 period, and none are found in the last week of the crisis, a distribution which is statistically significant (Fisher exact p = .002).

These data confirm again the relevance of the "Thomas Theorem": "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." An analysis of European military technology and doctrines reveals that "objectively" time was of incalculably less importance than in the 1960s. Estimates of the time required for Austria-Hungary to field a full army ranged from three to four weeks. The necessities of harvesting the summer's crops were an important factor in military timetables. Russia's inability to mount a rapid offensive against Germany could be discounted; this assumption in fact was the basis of the Schlieffen plan.

Yet in the situation of high stress the decision-makers perceived that time was crucial—and they acted on that assumption. In the culminating phases of the crisis, leaders in the various capitals of Europe increasingly perceived potential enemies as able to deliver a sudden punishing blow. As a result, the penalties for delaying immediate military action were perceived to be increasingly high. Or, to use the language of modern deterrence theory, the nations of each coalition perceived those of the other alliance as able and willing to launch a massive, crippling first-strike, and thus hastened their own preparations. 17 Hence the entire

¹⁷ A question of possible interest to deterrence theorists is: Would the "capacity to delay response" have materially altered the outcome in 1914? Although we can only speculate, one point does seem clear. The ability of the weapons system to delay response successfully may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient, factor. None of the states in 1914 had the ability to unleash a rapid destructive blow, crippling the retaliatory capabilities of the adversary. But during the final

European concert system—which was assumed to act as an equilibrating mechanism—became instead a "runaway system."

III. PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES

The entire original set of 4883 perceptions was recoded to test the hypotheses relating to perceived alternatives. This process yielded 508 statements classified as perceptions of "choice," "necessity," or "closed alternatives." 18

The "choice" category includes all statements in which more than one course of action is perceived.

The "necessity" category includes all statements indicating that the author sees only one possible course of action.

The "closed" classification includes all statements indicating that some course of action is not possible.

The initial hypothesis (2a) to be tested with these data is that:

In a crisis situation, decision-makers will tend to perceive their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries; that is, they will perceive their own decision-making to be characterized by necessity and closed options, whereas those of the adversary are characterized by open choices.

Table II reveals that British, French, Russian and German decision-makers perceived significantly fewer options open to themselves than to their adversaries. In one respect the data for Austria-Hungary are similar to those of the

week prior to the outbreak of general war, decision-makers in the capitals of Europe increasingly attributed this ability and intent to potential enemies. Thus the capacity to delay response is not likely to be effective unless decision-makers: (a) perceive the net rewards of delay to be higher than those of immediate action; and (b) are willing to attribute the same preferences to the adversary's decision-makers.

18 The inter-coder reliability was 0.87.

19 There may, of course, be political and strategic reasons for such assertions, quite aside from the way in which the situation is actually perceived. This is particularly likely in documents which are intended for wide public circulation. On the other hand, the most "private" documents—intended only for circulation within the various decision groups—do not differ materially from the entire set of documents in respect to the findings reported here. See, for example, the Kaiser's marginal annotations, or the various minutes of Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

TABLE II. PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES: FREQUENCY OF "CHOICE," "NECESSITY,"
AND "CLOSED" ALTERNATIVES FOR OWN NATION AND ENEMIES

		GERM	4 <i>N Y</i>		
	Choice	Necessity		Choice	Closed
Self	10	109	Self	10	19
Enemies	21	3	Enemies	21	0
$\chi^2 = 75$	3.6 p < .001		$\chi^2 = 2$	22.2 p < .001	
		AUSTRIA-I	HUNGARY		
	Choice	Necessity		Choice	Closed
Self	. 13	80	Self	13	7
Enemies	0	3	Enemies	0	0
Fisher	exact $p = .65$		Fisher	exact $p = 1.00$	
		RUSS	TIA.		
	Choice	Necessity		Choice	Closed
Self	7	20	Self	7	7
Enemies	6	2	Enemies	6	0
Fisher	exact $p = .02$		Fishe	r exact $p = .04$	
		FRAN	CE		
	Choice	Necessity		Choice	Closed
Self	1	13	Self	1	6
Enemies	12	2	Enemies	12	3
$\chi^2 = 1$	7.8 $p < .001$		Fisher	exact $p = .006$	
		GREAT BI	RITAIN		
	Choice	Necessity		Choice	Closed
Self	7	20	Self	7	23
Enemies	21	2	Enemies	21	0
$\chi^2 = 2$	1.6 $p < .001$		$\chi^2 = 2$	29.3 $p < .001$	

other nations—the decision-makers in Vienna perceived themselves to be acting out of necessity and closed options rather than open choice. There are only three Austro-Hungarian statements regarding the options of the enemies and none are perceptions of choice. This finding is not surprising. After the earliest phase of the crisis, the policy of punishing Serbia was pursued in Vienna with a single-mindedness not evident in the British policy of seeking a mediated solution; nor in the German policy of trying to preserve the "dignity and honor" of her ally, while averting a general war which many Germans perceived would end disastrously; on or in the Russian policy which, like

²⁰ An earlier study of the 1914 crisis revealed, for example, that German decision-makers were fully aware of Germany's inability to wage a successful two-front war in 1914. Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of War," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and

that of Germany, sought to support the prestige of a weak ally without a world war.

Leaders of the Triple Entente nations perceived few acceptable alternatives open to themselves in regard to the Balkan crisis. Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 24 that "We can do nothing for moderation unless Germany is prepared pari passu to do the same." Almost to the end leaders in Berlin opposed mediation. According to Bethmann-Hollweg, "We cannot mediate in the conflict between Austria and Serbia but possibly later between Austria and Russia." Nor were the Russians inclined to

Foreign Policy (New York, 1961). Admiral Tirpitz wrote, "It [the German Government] was convinced from the very beginning that we should not win...that government itself was most deeply convinced of its hopelessness." Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (London, Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., 1919).

²¹ Great Britain, op. cit., #103.

²² Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #247.

mediation because, in the words of Sazonov, "We have assumed from the beginning a posture which we cannot change."²³ Yet the same leaders tended to perceive more freedom of action for members of the other alliance.²⁴

The tendency to perceive one's own alternatives to be more restricted than those of the adversary is also evident in the reaction to the events leading up to general war. On July 28 Nicholas II had warned that, "I foresee that I will succumb very soon to the pressure put upon me and will be compelled to take extreme measures which will lead to war." Three days later—in the course of his desperate last minute correspondence with the Kaiser, the Tsar asserted, "It is technically impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilization. 26

The reaction of German decision-makers to the series of events leading up to mobilization and war was almost identical to that of the Tsar. On the one hand they repeatedly asserted that they had no choice but to take vigorous military measures against the threat to the east.²⁷ These were, on the other hand, interspersed with statements that only Russia was free to act in order to prevent war.²⁸ And Wilhelm, like the Tsar, finally asserted that he had lost control of his own military and that only the actions of the adversary could stop further escalation:²⁹

- ²³ Russia, op. cit., #118.
- ²⁴ After the outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, Grey wrote: "The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace' (Great Britain, op. cit., #263).
 - 25 Russia, op. cit., #170.
 - 28 Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #487.
- ²⁷ "Then I must mobilize too!... He [Nicholas] expressly stated in his first telegram that he would be presumably forced to take measures that would lead to a European war. Thus he takes the responsibility upon himself." *Ibid.*, #399.
- ²⁸ "The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your [Nicholas] power to avert it." *Ibid.*, #480.
- ²⁹ To students of strategy the assertions of the Kaiser and the Tsar may appear to be a "real life" application of the tactics of "commitment: a device to leave the last clear chance to decide

On technical grounds my mobilization which had already been proclaimed this afternoon must proceed against two fronts, east and west as prepared. This cannot be countermanded because I am sorry your [George V] telegram came so late.³⁰

The same theme of a single option open to one's self, coupled with perceptions that the initiative for peace rested with the enemy, are

the outcome with the other party, in a manner that he fully appreciates; it is to relinquish further initiative, having rigged the incentives so that the other party must choose in one's favor." Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 37.

The behavior of military leaders in St. Petersburg and Berlin proved, however, that neither monarch was merely bluffing. After Sazonov and General Tatischev had browbeaten the vacillating Nicholas into ordering general mobilization, the former called General Ianuschkevitch and said: "Now you can smash the telephone. Give your orders, General, and then—disappear for the rest of the day."

In Berlin Moltke effectively undermined belated German efforts to restrain Austria-Hungary by wiring: "Stand firm to Russian mobilization. Austria-Hungary must be preserved. Mobilize at once against Russia. Germany will mobilize."

In Vienna Conrad von Hotzendorf insured himself against any second thoughts Francis Joseph might have had by ordering mobilization one day ahead of schedule.

One factor which contributed to the perceptions of a single alternative was the rigidity of the various mobilization plans. The Russian attempt to mobilize against only Austria was anathema to the Russian generals because no such plan had been drawn up. According to General Dobrorolski, "The whole plan of mobilization is worked out ahead to its final conclusion and in all its detail... Once the moment is chosen, everything is settled; there is no going back; it determines mechanically the beginning of war." Virginia Cowles, The Kaiser (New York, 1964), pp. 343-46.

Similarly the Kaiser's last minute attempt to reverse the Schlieffen plan—to attack only in the east—shattered Moltke, who replied: "That is impossible, Your Majesty. An army of a million cannot be improvised. It would be nothing but a rabble of undisciplined armed men, without a commissariat. . . . It is utterly impossible to advance except according to plan; strong in the west, weak in the east." Moltke, Erinnerungen, quoted ibid., pp. 348-9.

²⁰ Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #575.

evident in the French and Austrian statements regarding their own mobilizations. ³¹ During the last week only the British consistently stated that they were able to act with some degree of freedom. Owing in part to a badly divided Cabinet, to estimates of public apathy, and to pressure from the business community for neutrality, Grey asserted that British "hands were free."³²

According to the second hypothesis (2b) relating stress to perceptions of alternatives:

In a crisis situation, decision-makers will tend to perceive their allies' range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

European leaders perceived fewer alternatives open to themselves than to their adversaries; they regarded their allies to be in a similar position. On the one hand German documents are replete with explanations that Austria was pursuing the *only* policy open to her, thus preventing Germany from playing a moderating role in Vienna.³³ On the other hand the Kaiser was apparently convinced that England could perform the very function which he felt was impossible for Germany—the restraining of the most belligerent member of the coalition.³⁴

³¹ Austria-Hungary, op. cit., #11203; France, op. cit., #532, #725.

se Great Britain, op. cit., #447. These statements explain, in part, the Kaiser's violent reaction to Grey's telegram of July 29 that, "There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we know very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid." Ibid., #286. Upon reading this, Wilhelm wrote, "The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and England sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of her persistently prosecuted purely anti-German world policy . . ." Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #401.

33 "Thus, there remains nothing for the Austro-Hungarian Government to do unless it is willing to make the final sacrifice of its status as a Great Power, but to enforce its demands by the use of heavy pressure, or, if need be, by taking military measures." *Ibid.*, #423.

³⁴ "Instead of mediation, a serious word to Petersburg and Paris, to the effect that England would not help them would quiet the situation at once." *Ibid.*, #368.

"If Grey wanted really to preserve peace he need only as Prince Henry suggested on 20th July intimate to the two allies France and Russia—not to mobilize but to wait, until the pour-

The assumption of British freedom, coupled with restrictions on German policy, is nowhere as clear as in one of the Kaiser's marginal notes:

He [Grey] knows perfectly well, that if he were to say one single serious sharp and warning word at Paris and Petersburg, and were to warn them to remain neutral, both would become quiet at once. But he takes care not to speak the word, and threatens us instead! Common cur! England alone bears the responsibility for peace and war, and not we any longer!³⁵

This approach to the problems of allies was not confined to Berlin. Nicolson wrote on July 29: "I do not think that Berlin quite understands that Russia cannot and will not stand quietly by while Austria administers a severe chastisement to Serbia." Grey assessed the requirements of his French ally in similar terms. At the same time, however, he believed that Germany could constrain her southern ally. 38

Only when mobilizations and other actions had gone too far to be stopped, were some futile attempts made to restrain the militant members of each alliance. For example, at the last minute Bethmann-Hollweg tried to hold Austria in check, but he was effectively countermanded by Moltke's wire to Vienna urging immediate general mobilization.³⁹

Because there are relatively few perceptions of allies' alternatives, the data for the second hypothesis have been aggregated by alliance rather than by nation (Table III). For both the Triple Entente and the Dual Alliance there is a significant ($p \le .02$) difference between the choice

parlers which I was directing had succeeded or otherwise between Vienna and Russia." *Ibid.*, #720.

³⁷ "France did not wish to join in the war that seemed about to break out, but she was obliged to join in it, because of her alliance." *Ibid.*, #447.

38 "But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action in Vienna." Ibid., #99.

³⁹ On July 30, Bethmann-Hollweg concluded a telegram to Vienna: "Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above mentioned honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us." Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #395.

³⁵ Ibid., #368.

³⁶ Great Britain, op. cit., #264.

TABLE III. PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES:
FREQUENCY OF "CHOICE," "NECESSITY,"
AND "CLOSED" ALTERNATIVES FOR
ALLIES AND ENEMIES

DUAL ALLIANCE			TRIPLE ENTENTE			
	Choice	Neces- sity		Choice	Neces- sity	
Allies	13	20	Allies	30	17	
Enemies	21	6	Enemies	39	6	
$\chi^2 = 8.9 p = .005$			$\chi^2 = 6.4$ $p = .02$			
	Choice	Closed		Choice	Closed	
Allies	13	3	Allies	30	7	
Enemies	21	0	Enemies	39	3	
Fishe	r exact p :	=.07	$\chi^2 = 2.5$.20 > p	>.10	

and necessity perceptions for allies and enemies. The difference between perceptions of choice and those of closed alternatives is in the predicted direction, but in the region of doubt. Hypothesis 3a states that:

As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower.

A valid test of the hypothesis, free from the effects of message volume, required a prior adjustment of frequency of "necessity" and "closed" perceptions similar to that performed on the time data. The resulting figures were again divided into two periods: June 27-July 28 and July 29-August 4. A Mann-Whitney U-Test reveals that the difference for each coalition is in the predicted direction, and is statistically significant (U=7,p=.05).

According to the final hypothesis (3b) relating crisis-induced tension to perceived alternatives,

As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to adversaries or potential adversaries to expand.

To test the hypothesis, frequency of perception was again adjusted for message volume and the data are divided into the periods of lower (June 27-July 28) and higher (July 29-August 4) stress. A Mann-Whitney U-Test lends only partial support to the hypothesis. For both alliances, differences between the early and later periods are in the predicted directionthe "choice" alternatives open to members of the opposing coalition were perceived to be increasing as the crisis deepened. In the case of the Dual Alliance, the increase in perceptions of the open alternatives for adversaries is significant (U=5, p=.02); for the Triple Entente, however the difference is not sufficient to support the hypothesis (U=10; p=.13).

IV. PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION

The data used to test hypotheses relating to communication in crisis differ from those in earlier sections of this paper in one important respect: all 5269 documents in the Austro-Hungarian, British, French, German and Russian collections, rather than those authored by selected decision-makers, were counted and classified into four categories:

- (1) Documents from officials abroad (ambassadors, ministers, attachés, consuls, etc.) to their central decision-makers.
- (2) Documents from central decision-makers to their officials abroad.
- (3) Documents from the central decisionmakers of one nation to those of another nation.
- (4) Documents circulated within a central decision-making unit.

Two units of measurement are used to describe message volume—the document and the word. An index of the average number of words per line in each volume was determined by an exact count of every fiftieth page. The number of lines in each document was then counted and multiplied by the index figure. No attempt was made to adjust message volume for linguistic style, which may affect word counts.⁴⁰

The initial communication hypothesis (4a) to be tested is that:

The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the heavier the overload of channels of communication.⁴¹

Figure 1—in which message volumes for all five nations have been aggregated by type—reveals sharp increases in daily average message volume during the latter stages of the crisis. During late June and early July, for example, the average frequency of messages from a nation's diplomats abroad was approximately four per day. By July 30, this figure had risen over tenfold.

For purposes of testing the hypothesis, the data have again been divided into two periods: June 27-July 28, and July 29-August 4. A

⁴⁰ For an attempt to adjust for linguistic differences—that is, the necessity to use a different number of words in various languages to express the same idea—see Dina A. Zinnes, "Expression and Perception of Hostility in International Relations," Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1963, pp. 137–43.

⁴¹ Hypothesis 4a clearly presupposes the existence of a quantitative definition of "overload." This problem is discussed, but not resolved, below.




Fig. 1. Daily average message volume by type and date. Figures for Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Russia and Great Britain combined.

Mann-Whitney *U*-Test for the direction and magnitude of differences between the two periods was applied to the message volume—measured both in documents and words—of each nation and for each type of communication (Table IV).

The increase in message volume appears to depend on three factors: the degree of involvement in the early stages of the crisis, the channel of communication, and the unit of measurement.

Austria-Hungary was most deeply involved in the crisis during the early period, and increases in Austro-Hungarian message volume from the early to the later period of the crisis are generally lower than for Germany. Similarly, among members of the Triple Entente, Russia was the first to be involved in the Balkan crisis, and the increase in Russian message volume is less significant than that for either France or England. Thus, the less dramatic increase in message volume for Austria and Russia during the most intense period of crisis may be interpreted as adding support to the hypothesis.

The change in message volume also appears to depend on the source and destination of the documents. The rate of increase was highest for messages from ambassadors and other officials abroad to the various capitals of Europe. This finding is generally consistent with Taylor's thesis that the decision-makers in 1914 were "snowed under by the blizzard of information" [information input] and that "decisions"

[information output] tended to lag behind events."42 The differences in message volume within the central decision-making unit between the early and late period of the crisis are in the predicted direction, but rather marginal. This is probably the result, in large part, of increased reliance upon oral communication during the final days prior to war.

Finally, when the rate of communications is measured by the number of documents, the change from the early to the later period of the crisis is more significant than when a word count is used.

The second communication hypothesis (4b) states that:⁴³

The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the more stereotyped will be the information content of messages.

The average length of messages has been taken as a measure of stereotypy, on the premise that richness of information concerning the course of events, possible alternatives, and completeness of detail are more characteristic of longer documents. The data lend strong support to the hypothesis. The average length of messages decreased systematically as war

⁴² Taylor, op. cit., pp. 220-21.

⁴³ This hypothesis is not dissimilar to Lasswell's prediction that "style grows terse... when the crisis is recognized as serious." Harold D. Lasswell et al., The Language of Politics (New York, George Stewart, 1949), p. 28.

TABLE IV. DIFFERENCES IN M	MESSAGE VOLUME BETWEEN E.	ARLY (JUNE 27-JULY 28) AND
LATE (JULY 29-AUGUST 4	PERIODS OF THE 1914 CRISIS	s: mann-whitney U -test

	Official to C	ges from s Abroad entral n-Makers	Central Mal	ges from Decision- cers to s Abroad	Central	es within Decision- ng Unit
Daily Average Volume—No. of Documents	U	<i>p</i> *	U	<i>p</i> *	U	<i>p</i> *
Austria-Hungary	0	.008	5	.133	15	n.s.
Germany	2	.005	3	.009 `	3	.009
England	1	.003	5	.024	8	.074
France	3	.009	5	.024	7	.035
Russia	2	.005	9	.101	14	n.s.
Daily Average Volume—No. of Words						
Austria-Hungary	2	.033	11	n.s.	12	n.s.
Germany	6	.037	4	.015	6	.037
England	5	.024	10	.134	14	n.s.
France	7	.053	12	n.s.	6	.037
Russia	11	n.s.	11	n.s.	15	n.s.

^{*} $n_1=7$ $n_2=5$, except for Austria-Hungary, $n_1=7$, $n_2=3$.

approached. Each document written immediately following the assassination averaged 326 words in length. During the two days immediately prior to England's entry into the war the average message was only 97 words long. A Mann-Whitney U-Test reveals that documents were significantly (U=2, p=.005) shorter during the period of highest stress (July 29-August 4).

Prior to World War I, the normal and most important channel of communications between two nations was the diplomatic corps. When leaders in London wished to communicate with their counterparts in Berlin, the message was sent to the British Ambassador to Germany, who would then convey its contents to the proper German decision-makers. Direct communication between top level leaders was clearly the exception to normal procedures. According to the third hypothesis (4c) relating stress to communications:

The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication.

⁴⁴ A more comprehensive description of the normal patterns of communication in 1914 may be found in Zinnes, op. cit., pp. 20-24.

Of the 2780 inter-state messages, 1530 occurred from June 27 to July 28; of this total, only 74 (4.8 per cent) were direct communications between central decision-makers. During the last seven days of the crisis, on the other hand, 116 out of 1250 (9.3 per cent) messages were sent directly to another state's decision-makers, bypassing the ambassadors. The difference between the two periods is statistically significant ($X^2=21.3$; p<.001).

As crisis deepens, the need for clear and unimpeded communication between potential adversaries is likely to become both more urgent and more difficult. It is unlikely that similar difficulties in communication will arise between members of the same coalition. Hence the hypothesis (4d) that:

The higher the stress in a crisis situation, the higher the proportion of intra-coalition—as against inter-coalition—communication.

When inter-nation messages are classified according to date and divided into inter-coalition and intra-coalition communications, the results support the hypothesis. During the first month after the assassination, 830 out of 1530 (54.3 per cent) inter-nation messages were exchanged between members of opposing coalitions. Dur-

ing the week prior to the outbreak of general war, on the other hand, inter-coalition messages account for only 580 out of 1250 (46.4 per cent) messages. The difference between the two periods in regard to communications within and between alliances is significant ($X^2 = 17.3$; p < .001).

The four communication hypotheses have generally been supported by the 1914 data, but some interesting questions remain unanswered. For example, the assumption that information input overload is as dysfunctional as lack of information, is supported by evidence on at least five levels—the cell, the organ, the individual, the group, and the organization. At though there is strong evidence that channel capacity is inversely related to the size of the system, we know comparatively little about what magnitude of input constitutes overload at complex levels such as foreign policy decision-making units.

A second problem is that the communication hypotheses have been concerned solely with the volume of messages without regard to their content. While these two factors are not independent of each other, further research on information input overload must consider such factors as the ratio of signal to redundancy and noise.

The most difficult aspect of studying communications in historical situations is the assessment of its impact on policy. For example, how is the behavior of decision-makers changed by communication overload? In his survey of the experimental literature, Miller has identified a number of coping mechanisms: omissions, error, queuing, filtering, cutting categories of discrimination, employing multiple channels, and escape.46 Some insights can be derived from the 1914 data; the employment of multiple channels during the latter stages of the crisisthrough more frequent direct communication between decision-makers—has already been noted. But data regarding such consequences as selective filtering of incoming information is at best fragmentary. Thus, even with the relatively complete documentation available for the 1914 crisis, the findings on some important questions are only suggestive.

v. conclusion

In conclusion it may be useful to consider some questions of more general concern. First,

⁴⁵ James G. Miller, "Information Input Overload and Psychopathology," The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 116 (1960), pp. 695-704.

46 Miller, "Information Input Overload," Self Organizing Systems—1962, n. p.

do the concepts and findings in this paper have any relevance beyond the historical one of illuminating a series of unique events?

The factors of perceived time, perceived alternatives, and patterns of communication are usually treated as generic concepts in the decision-making literature. The experimental evidence from psychology supports the assumption that they are among the key factors which affect the performance of individuals and groups, particularly those engaged in complex tasks. Further support for the findings in this paper appears to be forthcoming from laboratory simulation studies.47 Their ultimate importance for the student of international politics must, however, be established in case studies of actual foreign policy decision. In this connection, a study of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 assessed the importance of the factors discussed in this paper; it was shown that the crucial factors in the settlement of the crisis without recourse to war included the ability of President Kennedy and his advisers: (1) to maintain multiple options for both the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) to lengthen decision time, again for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; and (3) to use effectively multiple channels of communication.48

A second question concerns research strategy. Are these hypotheses merely a matter of "common sense," and if so, do they warrant the extensive research effort which is entailed in the use of content analysis? A major drawback to the type of data used in this study is found in the very nature of content analysis, which requires considerable expenditure of scarce research resources. Recent developments in programming computers—such as the IBM 7090—for content analysis have gone a long

⁴⁷ A full report of the findings from this simulation will be found in a doctoral dissertation by Charles F. Hermann, Northwestern University.

48 Holsti, et al., "The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations, October 1962," to appear in a reader edited by Richard C. Snyder and Dean Pruitt, in press. The theoretical and practical implications of such future studies may be somewhat different. For example, should one find that 1914-like results appear only in every tenth case, the social scientist might reject the hypotheses. The criteria of practical relevence might be less rigid. Given twentieth century military technology, such findings should give little rise to complacency. As Brodie, op. cit., p. 175, has pointed out, today a single case of deterrent failure is too many.

way toward solving the problem.⁴⁹ An adaptation of the "General Inquirer" system of automated content analysis permits studies such as that of the 1914 crisis with substantial reduction of manual effort while materially increasing speed, reliability, and flexibility.⁵⁰

The more fundamental question of research strategy relates to the choice of "common sense" hypotheses for extensive research. Yet as Robinson⁵¹ has shown, in his study of some propositions similar to those in this paper, decision-makers generally characterize their own activities in terms of classical economic models of decision-making (reviewing all alternatives for the optimum one). They often apply the same model to the decision processes of other states. Moreover, it is not difficult in almost every case to develop precisely the reverse proposition. For example, it is wholly consistent with the concept of crisis as a situation of potentially high penalties, as well as with common sense, to hypothesize that:52

⁴⁹ Philip J. Stone et al., "The General Inquirer: A Computer System for Content Analysis and Retrieval Based on the Sentence as a Unit of Information," Behavioral Science, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 484-494.

⁵⁰ Holsti, "An Adaptation of the 'General Inquirer' for the Systematic Analysis of Political Documents," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 9 (1964), pp. 382–88.

51 Robinson, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

52 A series of assertions which tend to contra-

As stress, increases, decision-makers will be motivated to search for, and to consider an increasing number of alternative policies.

While the last two decades have seen a great deal of theorizing about international relations, as well as the development of numerous promising techniques of generating and analyzing data, a basic theory—solidly grounded in empirical evidence—remains a distant goal. Given the rudimentary state of international relations as a discipline, it may be that research directed toward illuminating and rendering more precise our notions, even of "common sense," is not wholly misdirected, either from the standpoint of developing a viable theory of international relations or of contributing to a more stable world

dict the hypotheses in this paper may be found in Theodore Abel, "The Elements of Decision in the Pattern of War," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 6 (1941), pp. 853-59, in which the author writes:

"I. The decision to fight, unless the opponent abandons resistance without a struggle, is not reached on the spur of the moment. In every case the decision is based upon a careful weighing of chances and of anticipating consequences. . . . In no case is the decision precipitated by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd-behavior, or other irrational motivations.

"2. The rational, calculating decision is reached far in advance of the actual outbreak of hostilities."

LAW, SOCIETY AND THE DOMESTIC REGIME IN RUSSIA, IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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American experts on the Soviet Union have given much of their time to discussing whether the Russian communist government is going to remain "totalitarian" or instead turn "liberal." Journalists and scholars alike judge Soviet policies and decrees largely according to whether or not they extend more "freedom" to the Russian people.1 Similarly, American writers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries almost never inquired as to what purposes the Russian imperial government's policies and decrees were actually intended to serve but only how liberal they were or were not. When one writer said that the Tsar was liberalizing, another would reply that he had not actually surrendered any of his arbitrary power and that Russia was still as oppressive as ever.2 In American eyes, then, the Russian state apparently cannot move except along a single line that extends from freedom to oppression, democracy to absolutism, similarity to Western institutions to dissimilarity. If Russia is not moving toward one of these poles, then she is not moving at all. Few have suggested that Russian statesmen have been operating along other lines and coping with other problems. Seldom has it occurred to American observers that the question of liberalization has actually been rather a minor one in Russian development.3

Ι

Political freedom, as Americans use the term, is fundamentally an attribute of society rather than of the individual. Individual rights do not repose in separate persons but in the common recognition of them by the citizenry as expressed in law. A citizen's right to speak freely resides not so much in him as in the men around him.

- ¹ E.g., R. Conquest, "After Khrushchev: A Conservative Restoration?," Problems of Communism, Vol. 12 (September-October, 1963), pp. 41-6.
- ² Typically, the author of "Civil Liberties in Russia," Outlook, Vol. 54 (November 1905), pp. 543-4, believed the Tsar was liberalizing in October 1905, while the author of "The Russian Chaos," Living Age, Vol. 247 (November, 1905), pp. 502-4, believed he was shamming.
- ³ A welcome exception is T. Von Laue, Why Lenin? Why Stalin? (New York, 1964.)

If they believe in the abstract principle that government cannot interfere with the individual's right to speak, and if all statutes and government decrees conform to this principle, then the citizen possesses the right. To be more specific, if in some particular instance the men around him do not agree that he is free to express himself, the legal system and their respect for it limits the actions they can take to stop him.⁴

Conceived in this way, law proceeds from abstract principles, applied to everyday life in such a way that specific enactments and decisions are supposed to be rationally consistent with the principles and with each other. Theoretically, the very legitimacy of the state stems from its consistency with an integral constitutional system based on explicit guarantees of rights common to all citizens. Men may be unequal in a free society but not by express provision of the law.

Freedom, in this view, is not simply the right to do whatever one wishes. It is the condition of men whose experience has inculcated in them common notions of the rights properly belonging to the individual and whose law embodies these notions. When Americans say that a government is liberalizing, they mean in effect that it is limiting itself to operate within a

- ⁴ T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), pp. 100-5, notes that the social origin of individual rights has been ignored by Western liberal thought ever since John Locke. The social-historical development that produced the eighteenth-century ideal of "natural" rights has been what Parsons calls a residual category, an assumption which is necessary to the validity of an idea but which is left unstated and unnoticed.
- ⁵ A. L. Goodhart, "Some American Interpretations of Law," in *Modern Theories of Law* (London, 1933), pp. 1–20, acknowledges that the legal system in America is not in fact reducible to a consistent framework. Nevertheless, he says, American judges make their decisions with the aim of developing and maintaining as consistent a body of law as they can. See also R. Pound, Social Control through Law (New Haven, 1942); A. Hagerstrom, Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (Stockholm, 1953); and L. Petrazhitsky, Law and Morality (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).

purportedly consistent legal system based on constitutional principles which the citizens generally recognize as legitimate—a constitution of the sort that Sartori has called *garantiste*.

In Russia, neither freedom nor law have commonly carried these meanings or even implied them. Russian society has never produced a commonly recognized legal system based on abstract governing principles. Russian social institutions have generally been narrowly local and isolated from one another. In cities and villages alike, the members of "family groups," as the communists have quite accurately termed them, have been set into separate social positions in hierarchical relation to one another either by inheritance or the personal favor of someone in authority.6 Each Russian has been sharply aware of his own special privileges and prerogatives, but the concept of rights shared by all men, rights whose force and legitimacy derive entirely from the fact that they are shared, he has comprehended only dimly at best.7

Up to the last few decades, over four-fifths of the Russian people were peasants, living in small, self-sufficient, culturally isolated villages. To them, the word freedom meant primarily the absence of any outside interference that threatened their personal status in their separate villages. Law had two meanings. The word pravo, formally equivalent to the German Recht, meant both the traditional social structure of his own immediate group, based largely on common habits, and the arbitrary authority of the ruler.8 Ideally, these two meanings represented aspects of a single system, in which a benevolent tsar (or, later, a party secretary) exercised his personal power to protect the local hierarchical group from harm. In practice, the tsar's power has been exercised ever since the fifteenth century by a number of agents and landholders, each and all of whom were themselves arbitrary authorities who could interfere with or protect the peasant villages pretty much at will. The people at large shared no common legal relations, consequently the tsar had no basis on which to compile a law that would guide and limit his officials. Whatever intentions he had and however many pious

⁶ M. Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 85-9, 407-8.

phrases he inserted into his decrees, all he could grant to his agents in fact was an undefined authority, and the only way he could limit their activities was by setting them in opposition to one another. From the peasant's view. then, the concrete forms of the tsar's authority did not constitute pravo. The tsar's power as pravo was an abstraction, a dream of an allpowerful demi-god who would correct the evils of his own government if only someone told him about them. Thus, the peasant's experience taught him that political authority in practice had nothing to do with pravo. Even when the agents of the state followed their regulations. their power seemed arbitrary to the people with whom they had to deal.

In the nineteenth century, when the ruler began to attempt to govern the peasants by law, his agents and judges still seemed as arbitrary to the peasant as they had always been. The peasants continued as before to utilize or appeal to or bribe the government agents, but the essential quality of the state's minions continued to be their arbitrary power, not the consistency of their operation. Toward such a power the peasant might feel reverence and awe, but no duties and no responsibilities. The peasant could conceive of the state and even feel a vague loyalty toward it, but the idea of legal relationships with it involving rights and duties was quite foreign to him.

The typical Russian peasant has not generally resented arbitrary rule as such. With few exceptions he has recognized the central government as necessary and tried to utilize the power of its agents for his own purposes, usually by bribing them. If one agent acted oppressively, a peasant was more inclined to appeal to another agent than to any abstract law. The significant characteristic of the Russian's legal consciousness, that which has distinguished his concept of law most clearly from the American, has not been that he has opposed central governmental authority but that his notion of law as either habit or force has produced very little sense of duty or responsibility in him. The legal rules the peasant has known have been primarily confined to habitual attitudes. Political power as he has experienced it has neither needed nor claimed his active support.10

⁷ B. A. Kistiakovskii, Sotsialnyia nauki i pravo (Moscow, 1916), pp. 619-59, discusses the weakness of legal consciousness in Russian society prior to the Revolution.

⁸ A. Leontev, "Volostyni sud i obychnoe pravo," Zhurnal iuridicheskogo obshchestva pri S-Petersburgskogo universiteta (November, 1894), pp. 23-33, 41-7.

⁹ N. M. Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krestiane i reforma P. D. Kiseleva (2 vols., Moscow, 1946, 1958), describes the government's first consistent attempt to establish a legal system over and within the peasant communities; see esp. II, 74-8.

¹⁰ Sorokin has made it abundantly clear that

The Russian peasant's characteristic attitude toward the state is both a cause and a result of the state's historical development. From its beginnings, the Russian state grew up around a band of warriors whose battlefield extended from the White Sea to the Black and from the Baltic to the Caspian.11 The problems and policies of the warriors took form on such a vast scale, and the social horizons of the people were so limited that for all practical purposes the Russian state evolved apart from Russian society. Its needs and purposes were quite beyond the consciousness of its subjects, and thus the unity it imposed on them possessed no other institutional form than what the central government itself established.

The Russian state has always lived in fear of its neighbors. United, the powers within striking distance of its borders have always possessed ample strength to invade and perhaps overcome it and they have often threatened to do so. That they have never fully succeeded has been due not only to Russia's own military prowess but also to their continuing struggles with each other. The same could be said for the other powers of Eastern and Central Europe during the last five centuries. They have all dreaded one another ever since they have been recognizable as states, and their mutual fear has been its own justification. Acts of defense in Eastern Europe have usually been indistinguishable from acts of aggression; weakness has been an invitation to invaders; military power has been a state's only security and the foundation for its independence and identity. In every state the desire to survive has merged easily into the urge to conquer. In short, warfare, both hot and cold, has been constant in Eastern Europe for several centuries. All governments have had to concern themselves primarily with survival against enemies whose strength might at any moment become overpowering. In good seasons and bad the most compelling problems of government in Russia have been to field an army and to keep neighboring powers disunited.

In the early eighteenth century, Russia became a European power, and the area with which her statesmen had to concern themselves became extended abruptly to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Her new competitors were perhaps more orderly but hardly less warlike and threatening than the ones that had plagued her in the preceding centuries. Most significant, the West European states possessed the economic resources to support very expensive armies, and Russia's armies likewise had to be very expensive.

Like all the larger continental European states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian government not only collected taxes, but involved itself directly in national economic development. In Russia, as in Western Europe, the state attempted to regulate society as a means to the fulfillment of its economic needs and to resolve those conflicts of economic and social interests among its subjects to which economic development gave rise. In the West, however, the state found social institutions and economic classes that had already undergone a long experience of interaction with one another. Various groups had developed interests and purposes and philosophies that identified what the members had in common with one another and that defined the relationships between groups. Society itself had gone a long way toward replacing hierarchical relationships with those of common interest and collective self-awareness. When the state acted, therefore, it expressed to some extent the growing social awareness of its subjects. Their interest groups and institutions were already in being and in interaction. They had made coherent political forces of themselves and found avenues for political action. They conflicted with each other, but they were doing business. Although they were often opposed to the state, they constituted concrete political forces with which the state could negotiate and form relationships that would give a measure of consistency and legitimacy to its policies. Conflicts of interest among the various social and economic groups and between them and the state gave rise to a legal system, the necessary institutional concomitant of modern economic development. In the West, all levels of society participated in social evolution and formed their interests, purposes, and ways of life around it. Social and economic groups grew

peasant life is typically ritualistic and liturgical. See P. A. Sorokin et al., eds. A Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology, 3 vols. (Minneapolis, 1930), I, 13-4; II, 124-34. Good discussions of the Russian peasant's attitudes toward law and the state may be found in K. D. Kavelin, Krestianskii vopros (St. Petersburg, 1882); A. Novikov, Zapiski zemskogo nachalnika (St. Petersburg, 1889); Leontev, cited above, n. 8; and V. A. Beer, Kommentarii novykh provintsialnykh uchrezhdenii 12 iulia 1889 goda (Moscow, 1894), pp. viii-xi.

n One of the best descriptions of Russia's perennial problems of foreign policy is J. Fennell, Ivan the Great of Moscow (London, 1961). Although Fennell's study is limited to the late fifteenth century, the nature of Ivan III's problems is suggestive concerning the situation he left to his successors.

increasingly dependent on one another whether they liked it or not. 12

In Russia, on the other hand, the groups that responded to the state's growing efforts to maintain itself did not engage in much interaction with each other before the late nineteenth century. Up to the 1860s, society in cities and villages alike was still strongly hierarchical at all levels, and the interests of the various "families"—the hierarchies of personal influence—were still confined largely to maintaining their established local positions. All the commercial and industrial development of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries notwithstanding, self-conscious groups based on common economic interest and commonly accepted practices had not yet replaced the hierarchical relationships of the old society.

The habit of negotiation had struck only a few weak roots in Russia by the eighteenth century, when the state began its attempts to stimulate economic development. Peter the Great found no major political forces to work with. There were only separate "families", each concerned primarily to maintain its own social position or to better it, pursuing its ends not by cooperating with other groups, but by attaching itself to some higher power in hopes of rising above and so displacing other groups. People on all social levels were inclined to see the state in the image of their own local societies, as a gigantic hierarchy of persons rather than an institutionalized negotiation between groups each united by common interests or purposes. In 1613, on the one occasion when the responsible leaders of Russian society exerted themselves on their own initiative to restore the unity of their country after a period of foreign invasions and acute domestic disorders, they had simply restored the hierarchy largely as it had been: they installed the Romanov dynasty. That they made no serious attempt to draw up law codes or set up institutions that would represent their separate interests and negotiate between them is a clear indication that there was no basis for such laws or institutions in Russian social experience.

Lacking any system of de facto legal relationships, the Russian state has had to negotiate directly with family-type groups to achieve its ends. It has offered the rewards of political

¹² Two excellent descriptions of government interaction with society in Western Europe prior to the industrial revolution are F. O. Hertz, The Development of the German Public Mind, 2 vols. (London, 1957, 1962); and G. T. Matthews, The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth Century France (New York, 1958).

influence and economic power to the social groups which could best serve its purposes. just as the Western European states have done. In a hierarchical society, however, to offer a reward to one group—or rather to its head is per se to punish another, in a zero-sum game. Any extension of political influence to a particular servitor is likely to disrupt the existing hierarchical structure; and since the argument revolves around social position rather than interests, there is little room for compromise. New arrangements that would satisfy all parties and the state as well are not likely to emerge from squabbles over hierarchical position. The social conflicts that plagued the Russian state were therefore qualitatively different from those that produced the Western legal systems. Conscious interests did not produce new legal relationships that would lend stability to society, but only a perpetual struggle between "families" whose heads were in favor and those whose heads were being shunted aside. Civil wars and rebellions did not involve the clash of interests so much as widespread struggles for position between members of hierarchies and outcasts.13

¹³ The later peasant uprisings of the period 1900-1917 and the widespread workers' strikes of about the same period are the only cases of mass violence in Russian history in which a significant part of the trouble stemmed from conflicts between social groups each identified by common interests other than status position. Even in these years, whenever revolutionary violence reached its height the social classes whose interests were jeopardized hastened to identify themselves with the government rather than to compel the government to accept their demands. Western European states, on the other hand, prior to the 1920s, characteristically responded to crises by making significant concessions to the social elements that could support them the most effectively. The October Manifesto of 1905 was, of course, a concession by the Imperial government to the dominant social classes in Russia, and as such it is unique in Russian history. Nevertheless, the government cancelled it out within two years by openly violating its guarantees—and this with the general approbation of the very classes to whom it had been a concession. The cancellation, not the Manifesto, proved to be lasting. The "ruling classes" were still more concerned to be in-groups than to struggle for their interests. Both the landowning gentry and the business and industrial leaders threw themselves behind the central government from 1905 on and became, in effect, parts of its organization. See R. Roosa, "Russian Industrialists Look to the Future: Thoughts on

Social interaction in Russia before the Revolution was far less a dynamic force for social change than in the West. In all modern states the government has had both to keep order and to foster progress; and in all states this has involved the government in contradictions. In Russia, the contradiction has been extreme. Keeping order has meant preserving static hierarchies; fostering progress has meant breaking them down and, inadvertently, forming new ones still as helplessly attached to the state as their predecessors. Until the last century, Russian society did not itself progress toward closer unity. Its people did not grow significantly more conscious of their dependence on each other but only clung to their habitual relationships. When the state fostered progress, therefore, it was in effect imposing goals of economic achievement and social reform upon its people which were formulated apart from their conscious needs and their traditions. The tsar from time to time tried to insert foreign methods, organizations, legal systems, and even ethical values into a reluctant society in order to establish workable legal and economic relationships with the people and among them, but his efforts, however successful, also served thereby to alienate the state from society and to disrupt society itself.

II

The domestic aims of Russian government have derived basically from the peculiar role it has played in Russian society. The government has taken form primarily as an instrument for the tsar (and later, the party secretary) to use in order to direct the energies of the people toward the alien goals he and his supporters have selected for them. A Soviet and tsarist

Economic Development, 1906–1917," in J. S. Curtiss, ed., Essays in Russian and Soviet History (New York, 1963), pp. 198–218, for a survey of the attitudes of the industrial leaders. No systematic study of gentry attitudes in this period exists, but evidence is plentiful showing their wholehearted support of the state's interest as if it were their own. See D. N. Shipov, Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom (Moscow, 1918), pp. 501–31; S. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923), I, 130–218; and the programs set forth by various gentry groups in 1906 in B. B. Veselovskii, ed., Agrarnyi vopros v Sovete Ministrov, 1906 g. (Moscow, 1924), pp. 23–7, 152–3.

¹⁴ The distinction between the government's role in social development in Russia and in Western Europe is pointed out in Kavelin, cited above, n. 10, and in D. P. Troshchinskii, "Zapiska Dmitriia Prokofevicha Troshchinskogo ob uch-

statesmen alike have generally regarded themselves as preservers of their people's "freedom." They have always assumed in practice that society by itself was not free, that individual subjects were unable to protect their own interests except by appealing to persons in power. Russian society until lately has been, in their eyes, only an interminable and aimless squabbling among narrow, selfish family-type, hierarchical groups with no broader aim than to put other groups down so that they might rise higher themselves. In such a milieu only the ruler and his favorites have stood for "freedom." They have consistently believed that their personal power has been the only vital force for social order, economic progress, popular morality, and all the other good things that Americans and Russians alike are fond of associating with freedom. 16 It is not surprising, therefore, that the main political concern of Russia's leaders has been to make the central government organization a more effective instrument for the exercise of power. Liberalization, in the sense of a surrender of the tsar's authority to institutions purporting to represent public opinion, has only very rarely been a practical aim among Russian statesmen.17

rezhdennii ministerstv," Sbornik Imperatorskogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva (148 vols., St. Petersburg, 1867-1917), III (1868), 45-58, 86-7 (see below, n. 22).

15 M. Cherniavsky, Tsar and People (New Haven, 1961), pp. 84-8, argues that the Russians conceived of the tsar as a source of law in himself; his personal will was above society, whereas in Europe the most absolute of monarchs derived most of his power from an extant traditional legal framework (pp. 26-9). The tsars, like the European monarchs, claimed to be the preservers of the law (see, e.g., Ivan IV's charge to the ecclesiastical assembly of 1551 in Le Stoglav, Paris, 1920, pp. 14-25), but in fact there was not much law to preserve.

16 E.g., K. Pobedonostsev, Reflections of a Russian Statesman (London, 1898), pp. 254-62. It has been a communist dogma that the power of the party leaders is equivalent to the people's freedom. See History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheriks), Short Course (Moscow, 1951), pp. 79-82.

17 Many statesmen have recognized that Russia needed legal and constitutional reforms before her people could be "free," but even these functioned from day to day in absolute dependence on the ruler, and they have recognized the necessity for his supremacy until such time as law was in fact developed. P. A. Valuev, Minister of Internal Affairs from 1861 to 1868, is a good example. He

Most American authorities say otherwise. The current version of Russian history exhibits several rulers, notably Catherine II, Alexander I and Alexander II, who are supposed to have been liberal at one time or another during their reigns. 18 But there is no basis for this interpretation. All Russia's rulers have desired to develop a system of law that would establish justice among their people, but none has ever thought that such a system already existed or that all his people possessed rights of their own as individuals apart from what the state power allowed. Every ruler has been aware that rights apart from state power were in Russia only individual privileges, and that where they did have force, they did not make anyone "free." Catherine granted the gentry their land as private property in 1785, but this was a grant more than a right. She and her successors hoped that the gentry would someday become citizens whose consciousness of right carried with it a consciousness of duty, but no tsar ever believed that that day had arrived in his own time. Catherine never suggested that she was only recognizing a right that the gentry already possessed naturally.19 Alexander I's schemes in the early nineteenth century were all directed primarily to the improvement of the government's executive organization,20 and so were

may have been limited in his intellectual horizons and his policies were not always enlightened, but he was generally realistic and relatively straightforward. His diary (Dnevnik, 2 vols., Moscow, 1961, 1964) shows him often in profound disagreement with Alexander II and with what he himself had to do, yet never wavering in his conviction that the tsar's absolute power was indispensable for the government of his day. His conviction seems to have been constantly reinforced by his day-to-day experience in the government service (see P. A. Zaionchkovskii's introduction to vol. I of Dnevnik, pp. 20-1, 26-32; and Valuev's own entries for 13-14 April 1861, pp. 97-101). On 14 April Valuev conversed with Prince Dolgorukii on the need for a constitution in Russia. Dolgorukii said that Russia needed a constitution but that the tsar was opposed to it; then he asked Valuev what he thought should be done. Valuev replied, "Wait in loval submissiveness until the tsar changes his mind" (p. 101).

¹⁸ See, e.g., A. Mazour, Rise and Fall of the Romanovs (Princeton, N. J., 1960), pp. 72, 89, 108-11.

¹⁹ V. Leontovitsch, Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1957), pp. 25– 36; and N. M. Korkunov, Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1909), II, 435–7.

20 Leontovitsch, op. cit., pp. 43-100.

Alexander II's local autonomous institutions.²¹ Seen from the government's point of view, even the emancipation of the serfs was an administrative reform. Alexander II's purpose was not to recognize the peasants' liberties or even to grant them. He and his statesmen simply wanted to govern them more effectively. If these rulers are to be termed liberal, we should also have to speak of the liberal years of Ivan IV, Peter I, Nicholas I, Alexander III, and Josef Stalin, all of whom devoted their lives to improving the government organization so that it could bring the Russian people "freedom" more effectively.

No Russian ruler has ever willingly considered the outright surrender of state power to institutions apart from the central government's executive organization. Russian legal convictions have tended to keep society fragmented rather than to unite it. Social groups have devoted their separate efforts to fortifying their own narrow traditions, not to the development of a legal system based on abstract principles common to all Russia. The tsars (and the party secretaries after them) have dreamed of developing a unity of convictions and practices among their people from which a coherent legal system could be derived, but they have realized that such a system could not be based directly on the existing family-type institutions of Russian society.²² Power surrendered to family-

²¹ Korkunov, op. cit., II, 533-4, discusses the purpose of the zemstvoes and city dumas. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Provedenie v zhizn krestianskoi reformy 1861 g.* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 93-9, describes the organs of peasant government, especially their relation to the central administration.

²² See Troshchinskii, op. cit., above, n. 14. Troshchinskii was a high-level official from about 1793 until his retirement in 1817. He disagreed with the prevailing tendencies in the administration of his time, chiefly the innovations of Michael Speranskii; but his view of Russian society was common among both innovators and conservatives in the government. He said that Russian society possessed no effective political institutions and had no basis for developing them except the power of the tsar. Only the tsar could furnish the necessary leadership to develop the institutions of a modern legal system in Russia. For some comparable Soviet views regarding the role of the ruler in Russia see J. Hazard, The Soviet Legal System, 3 vols. (New York, 1962), I, 5-12.

It is true that the tsars made many attempts to divide the government into regional units, but none of these were founded on existing social institutions, and in any case they all failed, primarily because regional administrators were as

type, hierarchical groups has been in effect power lost to the state and unity lost to the nation.

In the past two centuries the only politically significant Russia-wide organizations have been the Orthodox church, the central government, and, since 1917, the communist party. They have all been for the most part clusters of family groups, hierarchies of personal status joined to each other in a similarly hierarchical order, so that the whole of each organization has been in essence a network of personal influence, seemingly rigid but easily corrupted and manipulated in practice. Government, church and party alike have been united chiefly by liturgy and ritual, not by a rationally consistent system of law recognized by the members as legitimate in itself.23 Only exceptionally has any functioning organization in Russia been able, at least until very recently, to operate within a system based on abstract legal principles. Law in practice has been largely a matter of status structures. Villages, guilds, towns, government ministries, revolutionary groups, and regiments alike have always tended to isolate themselves into "families."24

The isolated hierarchies that have made up traditional Russian society cannot be dismissed as merely the products of ignorance and stupid-

wont to form separate family groups as anyone else in Russia. B. Rauch, Russland (Munich, 1953), describes the various attempts by Russia's rulers to create federalist systems.

²³ The characteristics of Orthodox Church organization are described in E. Benz, The Eastern Orthodox Church (New York, 1963), pp. 43-7, 202-8. Fainsod, Smolensk, op. cit., discusses "family groups" in communist organization in the 1920s and 1930s and J. D. Littlepage, In Search of Soviet Gold (New York, 1937), pp. 8, 13, 42, 160-2, gives examples of status hierarchies in Soviet industrial organization. M. Raeff, "The Russian Autocracy and its Officials," in H. McLean et al., eds., Russian Thought and Politics (Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. 4, Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 77-91, describes the hierarchies in the tsarist government prior to 1861.

²⁴ N. I. Lazareskii, Lektsii po russkomu gosudarstvennomu pravu (2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1910), I, 103–261, esp. p. 210. Max Weber has described the evolution of the modern legal system in Western Europe out of older, family-type forms. See Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1954). To use his terms, Russian administrators have tended to organize themselves into a "formal-irrational" system even though the terms and ideals of the written laws have been largely "formal-rational."

ity. On the contrary, they have represented valid organizational forms in a country where neither legal system nor effective, consistent law enforcement has ever existed for the mass of the people nor for the government itself. Personal bonds have furnished the only available guarantee of unity and solidarity against a hostile world full of bandits, indifferent and oppressive landlord-owners, and ruthless government agents. The government officials themselves have generally formed hierarchies of personal status within their organization in order to protect their positions against arbitrary superiors. Family-type groups have persisted up to recent times on all levels of society because they have constituted the best way for individual Russians to cope with the realities they have faced. Chekhov's metaphor of the ocean steamer portrays these realities as the Russians experienced them more vividly than any scholarly analysis could do:

... there is darkness and disorder. Tall waves are making an uproar for no reason. Each one of them as you look at it is trying to rise higher than all the rest and to chase and crush its neighbor; it is thunderously attacked by a third wave that has a gleeming white mane and is just as ferocious and ugly.

The sea has neither sense nor pity. If the steamer had been smaller, not made of thick iron plates, the waves would have crushed it without the slightest remorse, and would have devoured all the people in it without distinguishing between saints and sinners. The steamer's expression was equally senseless and cruel. This beaked monster presses forward, cutting millions of waves in its path; it fears neither darkness nor the wind, nor space, nor solitude—it's all child's play for it, and if the ocean had its population, this monster would crush it, too, without distinguishing between saints and sinners.²⁵

The deep-seated and continuing tendency toward forming personal hierarchies has forced all Russian statesmen to pursue mutually contradictory aims. On the one hand the ruler and his agents have had to do the daily work of maintaining the state without any reliable legal system to direct them, beyond orders from superiors to subordinates. On the other, they have tried to establish or discover workable, mutually consistent laws that would guide the actual practice of the government administrators and the people. Tsars and party secretaries alike have regarded a coherent system of law as an essential means to secure their power and to

²⁵ From "Gusev," in The Portable Chekhov (New York, 1947), p. 265.

carry out their policies. But because daily operation has had to proceed through a hierarchy of personal influence whose customary ways have kept it disunited rather than united, central authority has had to be itself arbitrary in order to be effective at any particular time. Government officials on all levels have had to disrupt the rules they have been ordered to uphold simply to get the necessary work done. The tsars and party secretaries have themselves set the example for arbitrary rule by frequently violating their own decrees.²⁶

The edicts of the Russian state, although duly recorded for the last two or three centuries as laws of the land, have rarely been more in fact than temporary regulations applicable at best only to a single locale or government office. As permanent statutes, they have often obstructed the unification of the Russian legal system. Hierarchical groups within the administration have been able to protect themselves against the vigor of reforming statesmen by citing clauses from past decrees, long since inoperative. Would-be reformers have had either to ignore the law entirely or to issue new orders to cancel the old ones, in which case they have upset whatever regularity had developed in practice. New commands have served only to accomplish specific, immediate purposes. New statutes have constituted only statements of purpose-ideals to be achieved in the future and experimental attempts to achieve them rather than operational rules.27

²⁶ Troshchinskii, pp. 56-65, 86-8. S. Dobrin, "Soviet Jurisprudence and Socialism," Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 52 (July, 1936), pp. 402-24, shows that this contradiction has carried over into the Soviet period. Soviet statesmen generally avoid any explicit reference to it, but their habit of demanding legal procedure while simultaneously violating it themselves is well known. The outstanding example was A. Ia. Vyshinskii, who in 1937 was conducting the infamous purge trials with one hand while strenuously working for the observance of law in the government administration with the other. See G. Morgan, Soviet Administrative Legality (Stanford, 1962), pp. 91-116, esp. p. 112.

²⁷ Druzhinin, op. cit., II, 77-8, has shown that this was true of Kiselev's reform legislation of 1837-1838. Lenin said that he used decrees as experiments during the civil war years; see his speech before the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, quoted in S. N. Frokopovich, The Economic Condition of Soviet Russia (London, 1924), pp. 13-4. Hazard calls the constitution of 1918 a "statement of lofty aims" rather than a "set of rules," op cit., I, 27, and it is clear from Morgan's account, cited

For about five hundred years, since the time when the church persuaded the Grand Duke of Moscow to act consistently as a statesman, the government of Russia has been at cross purposes with itself. The ruler has had only two procedures available to him for the effective exercise of his power. At times he has worked through the hierarchies, respecting and guaranteeing their customary ways and privileges, while at other times he has attacked them, breaking them down by his arbitrary power and replacing their members with new men, more responsive to his wishes. Not infrequently, he has utilized both methods in combination. The periodic purges of government servitors since the late fifteenth century have been drastic and far-reaching applications of the latter approach. But purges by themselves have worked no constructive reforms in government organization. They could never eliminate personal hierarchies as such; on the contrary, the arbitrary exercise of force compels men to seek the protection of personal influence with redoubled urgency.

In the absence of consistent laws and regulations, government servitors in Russia have almost never formed anything resembling a rational network of operating relationships among themselves extending throughout the government organization. Servitors on the lowest echelon of both tsarist and Soviet governments—those men who have actually collected the taxes, assembled recruits for the army, built schools and roads, run factories and the like—have had to deal with people isolated

above, n. 26, that statutory laws in the Soviet Union have often been ideals rather than norms, op. cit., pp. 49-53, 73-5, 96-116. Michael Speranskii, who did more, perhaps, than any other man to bring law to Russia, explained the difficulties involved in a series of memoranda printed in Proekty i zapiski (Moscow, 1961), especially pp. 17-28. Speranskii was primarily responsible for the publication of the first Svod Zakonov (Digest of Laws) in Russia in 1833, after almost thirty years of work. He in turn based his studies on more than a century of previous attempts by various commissions, elected and appointed, to organize Russian law into a coherent system. Even with all this preparation, Speranskii denied that the product of his efforts was really a code. See N. M. Korkunov, "Znachenie svoda zakonov," Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia (Sept., 1894), reprinted in his Sbornik statei (St. Petersburg, 1898), pp. 77-96; and V. Gribowski's review of this article in the Zhurnal Iuridicheskogo obshchestva pri imperatorskom S-Petersburgskom universitete (January, 1895), pp. 4-6.

from one another by their traditions. A government agent who has confined himself strictly to following the formal regulations of his superiors has had to violate the existing order among those subject to him, thereby increasing the difficulties involved in accomplishing his tasks. Normally, therefore, the agent has worked through the hierarchies as he has found them among his "subjects" or subordinates and he has even made efforts to preserve them, which is to say that he has become a part of them. In cases where an especially strong official has usurped the places of established leaders among his "subjects" or subordinates and forcibly replaced them with men more willing to carry out his orders, he has not created a system that could operate by a set of formal regulations but only a new hierarchy of persons with himself at its head. Strong and vigorous leaders have been governed by the crude necessities of their power rather than the dictates of tradition, but they have still had to act as members of local hierarchies, not as the agencies of a rationally consistent system.

These contradictions have communicated themselves to successively higher levels of the administration and ultimately to the ruler himself. Officials on all echelons have had to cope with a hodge-podge of personal hierarchies, operating according to a wide variety of customs and necessities. Whatever purposes or goals Russia's leading statesmen have pursued, hierarchical groups have generally been the only available means for pursuing them. In a real sense, then, the rulers of Russia have been trapped by their own government organization. They have had the power to enact regulations but never to enforce them as such. Laws they have published in great profusion, but a system of legal relations has been slow to develop.28

During the last several decades of the tsarist regime, convictions regarding the individual rights of all citizens did develop among the gentry and some of the "upper middle class." Legal institutions emerged or began to be established which reflected a Russia-wide social consciousness. Nevertheless, no more than ten to fifteen per cent of the population experienced this development. For the peasant masses, law remained essentially a random mixture of local custom and arbitrary force, and in the years prior to World War I local custom was rapidly breaking down.²⁹ With the peasants in turmoil,

the tsarist administration continued to regard itself as necessarily above any legal system, constituting an all-powerful and impartial arbiter apart from the factions and classes of society—the guardian and director of its people and the keystone of the Russian nation. The legal system, said the statesmen, was not yet strong enough in itself to eliminate the need for arbitrary power. Paradoxically, the need for the exercise of arbitrary power increased in Russia at the very time when a modern legal order seemed on the point of being successfully established.

The traditional keystone of the Russian state itself proved vulnerable to the personal weakness of the tsar, and in March 1917 it disappeared. A government based entirely on legal relationships tried to replace it, but the factions and classes had not yet developed institutions that could cooperate effectively on their own under the stress of war. The old contradiction between the necessity for action and the striving for legal system became suddenly very sharp, and at last it became clear that only force could restore order. The attempt to govern Russia under law collapsed in November 1917.³¹

entered into the peasant way of life by the end of the tsarist regime. B. S. Martynov, *Poniatie* zemleustroistva (St. Petersburg, 1917), describes the difficulties involved in establishing legal definitions of ownership among the peasantry. S. N. Dubrowski, *Die Bauernbewegung in der* russischen Revolution, 1917 (Berlin, 1929), pp. 37-62, describes peasant violence in the years before 1914.

³⁰ E.g., P. A. Stolypin's speech of 1 April 1911 to the State Council, in E. V. [erpakhovskaia], Gosudarstvennaia deiatelnost P. A. Stolypina (3 vols., St. Petersburg 1911), II, 150.

31 P. P. Gronsky and N. J. Astrov, The War and the Russian Government (New Haven, 1929), furnishes a useful chronicle of government organization up to November 1917. The sudden collapse of Russian society in 1917 reflects the flimsiness of social order in Russia and the tensions which still plagued the newly industrializing economy. Between 1917 and 1920 a number of generals and liberal politicians called upon the "Russian people" to overthrow the communists and restore some facsimile of legitimate order. Their appeal would seem to have been reasonable. The communists were in fact usurpers: they forced the Constituent Assembly, the legally elected representatives of the people, to disband. Nevertheless, throughout all Russia there was almost no response to the generals' appeal except from the non-Russian nationalities, and these

²⁸ Lazarevskii, II, 158; Troshchinskii, pp. 37-41.

²⁹ V. I. Boshko, *Grazhdanskaia pravosposobnost krestian v oblasti zemlevladeniia* (Kiev, 1917), gives some idea of the degree to which legal system had

III

The years 1917-1920 saw a phenomenon very close to total social collapse in Russia. Nicholas II abdicated, removing not only himself but, in the absence of a suitable heir, the institution of tsardom as well. Within a few months, the classes which had attached themselves to the ideal of a Russian nation under a common legal system lost their hold on the armed crowds that dominated the cities. Factories shut down, railroad traffic dwindled, and the cities lost half their population. Russian society came close to dissolution, and the state would probably have been scattered into a number of League mandates, had not a few ruthless leaders acted to preserve it. Inevitably, the new order that they constructed was in effect a crude hierarchy, utterly without legal system, whose desperate leaders could pull Russian society together only by taking measures which alienated them from it. The new communist rulers relied almost wholly on arbitrary force to sustain their power. They dragooned indifferent peasants into their hastily formed armies, forced hostile servitors from the tsarist regime to staff their administration, and marshalled even their own party into a ruthless band held together only by a chain of personal influence. No one, not even party members, could act effectively except under compulsion

were only trying to get free of Russia, not to restore her. In Russia proper almost no one voluntarily attacked the communists and almost no one supported them. In fact, the "Russian people" did not care who ruled Russia nor did they care what happened to their elected representatives. See D. Footman, Civil War in Russia (New York, 1962), pp. 49-55, 104-11, 139-42, 303.

In Finland the native communists also forced out the elected Diet and seized power, but here the result was quite different. General Mannerheim, who was no more nor less reactionary than the Russian White Army leaders, found himself at the head of a united and aggressive volunteer army made up largely of Finnish peasants actively concerned over who was ruling them. Within four months he was able to drive out the communists and restore legitimate government. He had German help, but it was no more significant than what the Allies gave the Russian White armies. In Finland, then, the tsar's abdication did not seriously weaken society as such, whereas in Russia it represented in fact the removal of a keystone. See C. Mannerheim, Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim (New York, 1954), pp. 130-83; and C. Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution (Athens, Ga., 1958), p. 211.

In social chaos, no one could decide rationally and no one could agree. There were only those who were courageous enough to command and those desperate enough to obey. Within a few months after they seized power, even the most capable and devoted communist leaders had fallen to bickering among themselves and attacking one another with such intensity that only a strong and arbitrary commander could hold them together. They found themselves tied fast to each other by their struggle for survival and yet unable to work together effectively. Utterly dependent on one another and yet utterly without the habits of active cooperation and mutual trust, they clung to Lenin, as their own subordinates clung to them, with a fervent desperation.32

Since 1917 the communist party has had to contend with much the same contradictions that plagued the tsars. Its leaders have had to build up Russia's defenses against enemies so powerful that their failure to crush the Soviet government at the outset surprised Lenin himself. Like the tsars, the party leaders have worked feverishly to develop Russia's military and economic strength and in so doing have brought viclent upheaval to the narrow hierarchies in which they and their people have lived. It is not surprising, therefore, that despite the communists' devotion to Marxist principles, they adopted the most arbitrary of the old tsarist methods of governing immediately upon seizing power.³³ The democracy of the Soviets disappeared within the first year. Democratic centralism in the party organization gave way to a centralized hierarchy, whose power the party itself sanctioned in March 1921.34 Stalin definitively renounced the equalitarian ideal in 1931.

Until the last decade, the communists have controlled their government largely through picked agents possessing broad and ill-defined powers, responsible directly to the center.

³² A. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine (New Haven, 1963), portrays the emergence of essentially hierarchical relationships among the Bolshevik leaders out of the actions they understook in the Civil War. In general these relationships seem to have developed against the will of the leaders themselves. See esp. pp. v-viii, 28, 116-27.

33 Morgan, op. cit., pp. 22-3.

³⁴ A good chronicle of the early disappearance of democracy and the growth of a hierarchy of personal rule in both government and party emerges from Sverdlov's speeches and dispatches. See the last two volumes of I. M. Sverdlov, *Izbrannye proizvedenniia* (3 vols., Moscow, 1959).

These agents have worked outside the operating government organization in order to be in a position to enforce the orders of the leaders directly. Such have been the party commissars, the party control commissions, the workers' and peasants' inspectorate, the procuracy, and above all, the secret police. Until recently, this host of arbitrary supervisors has been practically the only means of direction and control available to the Soviet leaders. Only arbitrary power on all levels could cope with the hierarchical groups that formed in all the operating departments of the executive administration, and only they could furnish the center with anything approaching reliable information.

In their time, the tsars had utilized special agents vested personally with arbitrary and undefined powers. By the early 1800s, if not before, such agents as the oprichniki, the procurators, the revizorii, and the governorsgeneral had gained a permanent place in Russian political thought. The writings of Michael Speranskii-a liberalizer according to the view of Russian history now in vogue-offer a convincing account of how to use all-powerful agents, a description of the circumstances under which they should be used, and a warning as to the disadvantages of using them.35 But the most tyrannical of the tsars never set up anything so extensive as the incredible accumulation of secret and semi-secret inspectorates which guided Soviet administration in its first four decades.

IV

Rarely has history furnished such a clear demonstration of the force of state necessity as the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath. It cannot be imagined that the communist rulers gave the lie to their ideals and aspirations willingly. Their words, their early, abortive attempts to introduce communist institutions, their continued bickering to the present day over the details of what they are pleased to call Marxism-Leninism, are clear proof that they still cherish their old dreams. Indeed, they are still communist insofar as their necessities have allowed them to be. Yet in practice they have junked most of their professed ideals and surrendered themselves utterly to the superhuman task of putting together and governing a shattered Russia. They are, of course, still working toward a society where every man regards it as a virtue to give what he can and take only what he needs. They call this Marxist and so it is; but Marx shared this particular ideal with such eminent economic liberals as Jeremy Bentham,

John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Samuel Smiles, to name only a few. 36 It is in fact little more than an ethic common and necessary to all societies possessing modern economic organization, whatever their political systems. The communist vision of the ideal man is not so different from the "bourgeois" ethical notions which have been vital to Western capitalism. except that Russian "communism," contrary to both Marxian and Western liberal prescriptions, calls for the state to take the lead in remaking the Russian people in the image of this ideal man.37 But this, of course, is precisely what the Russian state has been consciously trying to do for over two centuries.

The circumstances in which Russia's leading statesmen have had to work make it clear why liberalization in the Western sense of the word has never been relevant to Russian development. The state has had to organize itself in accordance with necessity rather than Russia's social institutions. The government's very action to unify its organization has been characteristically arbitrary, and its own action has served inadvertently to perpetuate the traditional hierarchical fragmentation of Russian society. Russia's failure to liberalize, then, has not resulted from the ignorance and mental rigidity of her rulers, any more than the failure of Russian society to unite itself represents some inherent deficiency in the people. Both "failures" spring from the peculiar circumstances of Russia's historical development. which have set government and society in a unique relationship to one another.

If the main problem of Russian government has always been that the executive organization could not operate within a consistent legal system, then it is obvious that removing the arbitrary ruler and replacing him with an elected president or legislative assembly would at no time have made any relevant contribution to Russian development. In fact, an elected legislature in a society traditionally broken down into hierarchical fragments is most likely to become the tool of a single privileged group, freezing the government itself into an immovable hierarchy without liberating anyone at all.38 Until such a time as Russian

- 36 J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York, Hafner Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 3-4; J. S. Mill, On Liberty (Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1949), pp. 95-6; and S. Smiles, Self-Help (New York, n.d.), pp. 293-7.
- ²⁷ J. Triska, ed., Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco, 1962), pp. 112-3.
- 38 S. N. Eisenstact, The Political Systems of Empires (Glencoe, Ill., 1963), pp. 13-27.

³⁵ Speranskii, *loc. cit.*, n. 27, pp. 80-1, 105-25.

society became unified by its own of life, laws passed by an elected assembly could have had no more effect than the ruler's decrees.³⁹ Indeed, the relation between government and society in Russia has been such that only an absolute personal authority has been able to hold it together.

Quite without foundation, however, is the argument that since Russian government has not been liberalizing, it has therefore not been changing or developing at all. Obviously tsarist and Soviet rulers have both wanted to base their regimes in a rationally consistent law that actually would govern the everyday life of the people and regulate the government, a condition which would approximate that of Western society, but which, doubtless, would embody very different political forms. The communist party has been striving to find roots in Russian society by developing legal relationships among its people, just as the tsarist government did in its time and for the same reasons.

Rule by arbitrary force is inherently disruptive and therefore dangerous for any government that employs it.40 The rulers of Russia, especially the communists, have used force and violence against their own subordinates and by so doing have strengthened the very hierarchies which have made a coherent administration impossible; but this has never been by choice. Those scholars and emigrés who imagine that Soviet leaders use purges and spies purposely in order to inspire distrust among their subjects and their subordinates have either failed or simply refused to recognize the traditional fragmentation of Russian society.41 No sane statesman has ever desired to alienate his people by terror or any other means except as an expedient measure against groups which actually block government action or threaten the statesman's own position. The alienation of the citizenry has never increased the power of a state, but only rendered both rulers and ruled more desperate. Arbitrary force—specifically

38 Korkunov, op. cit., I, 417-50.

the use of all-powerful inspectors, purges, and spies—is in any case a very clumsy method of control. Secret police and trusted men are not by themselves an adequate means for securing information and directing subordinate agencies, especially in a modern industrial society. As Speranskii pointed out long ago, if such men make only brief visits to the agencies they are assigned to inspect, then they will not have time to find out what is really going on. If they stay long, they themselves become part of the "family" and cease to be effective as agents and informants for the rulers.42 Government by purely arbitrary power is only useful to a ruler who, like Machiavelli's usurper, possesses no other means of control.

What actually does develop in Russia will not be a matter of what Soviet leaders want to do but rather what they can do under the circumstances, internal and external, which they face. The technical requirements of maintaining a massive industrial plant, the effects of widespread education, the coming to maturity of new generations born into a modern society unified by economic interdependence and a sense of collective accomplishment-all have had and will continue to have their effects on the old struggle between rulers and people. The results are impossible to predict, because the process of change is inherently contradictory and subject to both global and domestic circumstances, but Americans might come closer to understanding what the Soviet leaders are about if they direct their attention more to the circumstances confronting the Russian state and less to distorting their observations to fit their preconceptions. American political theory, which is concerned primarily with rendering a government administration powerless in itself, is irrelevant to the attempts of Russian statesmen to erect and maintain an effective state organization that can unite a people who have never been themselves a nation.43 Whatever Russia may become, she will not be likely either to follow or to deny the principles of Thomas Jefferson. Her statesmen will simply ignore them as they always have and go on trying to find Russia's own course.

42 Speranskii, loc. cit., pp. 105-6.

⁴⁰ Speranskii, loc. cit., pp. 56-67.

⁴¹ J. D. Littlepage's description of Russian behavior patterns, based on his experience as a mining engineer in the Soviet Union, shows the effects of this fragmentation on Soviet organization at all levels during the early 1930s. See his *In Search of Soviet Gold*, cited above, n. 23.

⁴³ V. Weidle, Russia: Absent and Present (New York, 1961), pp. 34-7; Cherniavsky, op. cit., pp. 71-96.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VOID BALLOTS IN WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS*

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In the 1961 federal election six per cent of West German voters failed to cast two valid votes under the single-ballot, two-vote German electoral system: 1.3 million voters cast their party list vote invalidly, while almost one million failed to vote validly for a district candidate. Since 1949—and 1953, when the present single-ballot, two-vote system was introduced—the development of the invalid vote has been as shown in Table I.

TABLE I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVALID VOTE IN GERMANY, 1949–1961²

Year	First V	otes	Second Vo	Second Votes	
•	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Per cent
1949			763,216	3.1	
1953	959,790	3.4	928,278	3.3	5.1
1957	916,680	3.0	1,167,466	3.8	5.7
1961	845,158	2.6	1,298,723	4.0	6.1

Not only has the total invalid vote increased steadily, despite the counter-movement of first

* I am indebted to Professor Otto Kirchheimer for his encouragement and advice in the preparation of this article, and to Professor Juan Linz for his critical reading of an earlier draft.

¹ The German ballot consists of a single sheet of paper on which are printed two parallel columns of contestants. Each voter casts a first vote from the column on the left side of the ballot for the party-sponsored or independent candidate whom he favors in his local election district; and casts a second vote from the right-hand column for the Land (state) list of the political party which he favors nationally. His two votes need not coincide and need not both be exercised. Since each vote is tallied separately, an invalid vote in one column does not invalidate the vote in the other column. For a detailed description of Germany's mixed system of "personalized proportional representation," see Uwe Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 17-37.

² Based on official publications of: Germany (Federal Republic), Statistisches Bundesamt,

and second vote trends; it has also been exceptionally high in comparison to the Weimar Republic, Imperial Germany and other Western European countries. Thus in pre-Hitler Germany the invalid vote seldom exceeded 1 per cent of the poll. In postwar parliamentary elections in Scandinavia it has not yet exceeded 1 per cent while in Britain, Switzerland and Austria it has approached 2 per cent only in rare instances. In Fourth and Fifth Republic France spoiled and blank ballots have been constant at about 3 per cent of the poll. Only in isolated cases—for example, where compulsory voting is combined with a deep-seated social and political malaise, as in Belgium—has the invalid vote been comparable in proportion to that of Western Germany.3 Yet comparison

Wiesbaden (hereafter referred to as "Bundesamt"). Data for the 1949, 1953 and 1957 elections appeared as Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. 10 (1949); Vol. 100, Nos. 1-2 (1953); and Vol. 200, Nos. 1-4 (1957). Data for the 1961 election appeared in the new electoral series, under Fachserie A: Bevoelkerung und Kultur, Reihe 8, Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag, as Wahl zum 4. Deutschen Bundestag vom 17. September 1961, Nos. 1-4. (Hereafter these documents will be cited as "Bundesamt: 1949." "Bundesamt: 1953 (2)," etc.). For a detailed bibliography of official electoral statistics published by the Bundesamt and state statistical offices, see Bundesamt: 1961(1), pp. 59-67. A useful compilation of federal and state election statistics, 1946-1960, is contained in Erwin Faul, ed., Wahlen und Waehler in Westdeutschland (Villingen-Schwarzwald, Ring-Verlag, 1960), pp. 321-363.

German invalid vote data for 1871-1919 are found in Germany, Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, Vol. 42 (Berlin, 1921/22), pp. 354-355; and for 1919-1932, ibid., Vol. 52 (Berlin, 1933), p. 539. Some comparative data are given by Richard M. Scammon, "Postwar Elections and Electoral Processes," in E. H. Litchfield, ed., Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 505. For France see David B. Goldey, "The French Referendum and Election of 1962: The National Campaigns," Political Studies, Vol. 11 (October, 1963), p. 302; and Philip Williams, Politics in Post-War France (2d

here seems problematic, for in the Federal Republic voting is voluntary, social cohesion high, and the political temperature low; indeed, never before in this century have social calm and political consensus appeared so broad or deep.

ed., New York, Longmans, 1958), p. 324 and pp. 446-447.

Comparative data on invalid votes in parliamentary elections in fifteen Western European countries since 1945 are found in the appendix on post-war election statistics in Uwe Kitzinger, Britain, Europe and Beyond: Essays in European Politics (Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1964), pp. 183-217. See also Kitzinger's discussion of invalid votes in Belgium, and in the cantons of Switzerland and states of Austria where voting is compulsory, in his chapter on "The Belgian Electoral System," ibid., pp. 174-175. For an analysis of the cleavages in Belgian politics, see Val Lorwin's chapter on Belgium in R. A. Dahl, ed., Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965), forthcoming.

Herbert Tingsten, in an extensive examination of the effects of compulsory voting in several European countries before the Second World War, demonstrated that compulsory voting—which, if effectively enforced, inevitably involves the electoral mobilization of some citizens who are more or less unwilling or apolitical—was in most cases accompanied by increases in both the level of participation and the proportion of invalid votes. See his *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics* (Totowa, New Jersey, The Bedminister Press, 1963; first published as *Stockholm Economic Studies*, Vol. 7, 1937), ch. 4.

Besides Belgium, only Luxembourg has consistently recorded an invalid vote well in excess of 3% of the poll; clues for the reasons underlying it may perhaps be found in highly effective compulsory voting regulations and the relatively complex electoral system, described by Kitzinger, "The Luxembourg Electoral System," in Kitzinger, loc. cit., pp. 181–182.

Italy, in 1953, completes the list of deviant Western European examples: 4.6% of the voters spoiled their ballots in that year's parliamentary election. The chief motivation seems to have been popular resentment of a specially rigged electoral law pushed through parliament just prior to the election and designed to insure continued dominance by Italy's four-party governing coalition. The law provided that any associated group of parties which received 50% plus one of the votes cast was to obtain two-thirds of the parliamentary seats; thus it represented an attempt to overthrow Italy's traditional proportional representation electoral system. For many Italians the law

Why, then, is the invalid vote so high? And why is it increasing? Is the problem essentially a technical one, solution of which depends on increased civic instruction in the use of the allegedly complex two-vote ballot? Does it represent a small nucleus of political protest? Or is it the product of deeper sociological and psychological factors on the contemporary German political scene?

Most observers of German electoral politics—political scientists, the Bundesamt, and most state statistical offices—consider the invalid vote negligible in number and politically unimportant. While paying lip service to other interpretations, most analysts hold that its principal cause is the failure of some voters to understand the possibility or at least the technique of voting twice. One optimistic appraisal places the technical-complexity argument in the center of its analysis, then concludes that "the low magnitude of invalid votes is as favorable a sign of the success of political education in postwar Germany as the high level of popular participation."

Yet we have seen that the invalid vote is both high and increasing; and the contention of this article will be that the frequent occurrence of invalid votes is a small but distressing sign of the underdevelopment of political interest, involvement and integration in the West German variant of industrial mass society; that it stems in part from the deceptively high level of electoral participation (which is high in quantity but not in quality); and that it expresses a variety of political discontent. We shall turn first to the general patterns of invalid voting, then to the motivations which underlie it.

was unhappily reminiscent of Mussolini's Acerbo Law of 1923. Dubbed the "swindle law" by the Communists, it elicited a great deal of bitter debate both in parliament and in the election campaign itself. Cf. Gerard J. Mangone, "Italy," in Taylor Cole, ed., European Political Systems (2d ed. rev.; New York, 1959), pp. 508-509.

⁴ Some representative examples are: Samuel H. Barnes, Frank Grace, James K. Pollock and Peter Sperlich, "The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election," this Review, Vol. 56 (December, 1962), pp. 905-906; Bundesamt, "Ungueltige Stimmen bei der Bundestagswahl 1961," Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1962, No. 3, pp. 145-147 (hereafter cited as "Bundesamt: WS 1962(3)"); and Baden-Wuerttemberg, Statistisches Landesamt, Statistik von Baden-Wuerttemberg, Vol. 80 (1961), pp. 10-11.

⁵ Barnes, et al., op. cit., p. 906.

Stimmzettel

für die Bundeslagswahl im Wahlkreis Nr. 22 Hamburg VIII am 17. September 1981

Jeder Wähler hat

	Frsssimme für die Wahi des Wahikreisabgeoräneis	_	and	Zwelislimme 2017 die Wahl nach Landcall	
1	Schmidt, Helmut DiplVolkswirt HmbGr. Flottbek1 Zidtzaddweg 6b Socialdemokratische Partel Deutsch- Spp		1	Sozialdemokratische Pariei Deutschlands Dr. Brauer, Wehner, Frau Keilhack, Schmidt, Kalbitzer	
2	Gewandt, Heinrich Drogist Hamburg 39 Sierichstraße 20		2	Christlich-Demokratischa Union Blumenfeld, Dr. Bucerius, Dr. Seffrin, Gewandt, Frau Blohm	
3	Rademacher, Willy Max Sped-Kaufmann Hamburg 30 Seitchstraße 90		3	Freie Demokratische Partei Rademacher, Dr. Dahlgrün Frau Dr. Klep-Alteniot, Dr. Frankenfeld, Dr. Naumann zu Könic Grück	
4	Dr. Bialas, Gossmideutsche Rolf Poted (DP. BHE) Arzt. HmbPublisbüttel GDP Februsce 12		4	Gesamideutsche Partel (DP-BHE) Dr. Behr, Radtke, Frau Kayser, Beass, Glabbate	
5	Bethge, Horst Lehrer Hamburg 22 Petkumstraße 7		5	Deutsche Friedens-Union Prof. Dr. Gröbe, Frau Er, Beck, Berg, Lippold, Or. Colps	
6	Dr. Nielsen, Ernst Baurat Hemburg 19 Eichenstraße 50	0	6	Doutsche Reichs-Partei Prof. Dr. Kunstmann, Kupke, Hoblader, Bister, Trute DR	

BALLOT

For the Federal Election of September 17, 1961 Electoral District No. 22 Hamburg District VIII

Each Voter Has

f	First Vote or the election of his district d	eputy	and	Second Vote for the election from Lan	d lists
1	NAME of Candidate Party Occupation Address	0	1	NAME of Party Names of Candidates	0

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' I. GENERAL PATTERNS

The sample survey data collected by the Federal Statistical Office in 1961 in 1,125 representative precincts throughout the Federal Republic produced the following composite picture of invalid votes by type and combination:

nent in the southern and western areas of the Federal Republic. They have been a characteristic feature of voting patterns in the Saarland, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Baden-Wuerttemberg since the first postwar Landtag elections. Exceptionally low invalid votes, on the other hand, have been common since 1949 in

TABLE II. INVALID VOTES BY TYPE AND BALLOT COMBINATION, 19616

	Number	Per cen
A. Invalid First and Second Votes	338,500	18.0
1. First and second vote columns blank	236,600	12.6
2. First vote blank, second vote multicrossed	25,300	1.3
3. Second vote blank, first vote multicrossed	37,600	2.0
4. Both votes multicrossed	30,100	1.6
5. One vote blank, other vote miscellaneous causes	2,500	0.1
6. Both votes miscellaneous causes	6,400	0.3
3. Invalid First and Valid Second Vote	583,600	31.0
7. First vote blank	572,300	30.4
8. First vote multicrossed	9,800	0.5
9. First vote miscellaneous causes	1,400	0.1
. Invalid Second and Valid First Vote	959,400	51.0
10. Second vote blank	847,800	50.4
11. Second vote multicrossed	10,500	0.6
12. Second vote miscellaneous causes	1,100	0.1
'otal	1,881,500	100.0

The striking fact which emerges from this table is that 82 per cent of all invalid votes (51 per cent of party list votes, 31 per cent of district votes) were paired with a valid vote. Moreover, most invalid votes were void because they were left blank—scarcely 6 per cent were multicrossed, while fewer than 1 per cent were voided by miscellaneous causes.

Except for Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen, high invalid list votes have been most promi-

⁵ Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 11. According to Paragraph 39 of the West German Federal Electoral Law, a vote is considered invalid if the voter's preference for a district candidate or party list is not unmistakably clear. In Table II, "blank" votes include a small number of crossedout vote columns as well as those which were "multicrossed" votes are those unmarked; marked for more than one candidate or party list: and "miscellaneous causes" include vote-columns defaced by marks, tears or comments, as well as those on which the voter's mark is unclear. The special count of invalid votes is described in Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 145. On the sample survey, see Bundesamt: 1961(3), pp. 4-8.

the northern German states of Niedersachsen. Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen.7 But if the rank-order of the states according to per cent of invalid list votes has remained fairly constant, the patterns of increase have not; only one of the ten German states has never ranked among the first four states in rate of void list vote increase on at least one occasion. The federal average is particularly sensitive to voting fluctuations in the bigger states; thus the largest increase—0.5 per cent in 1957 resulted chiefly from the exceptional increases recorded that year in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Nordrhein-Westfalen, not from admission of the Saarland as some observers have maintained.8

⁷ Faul, ed., *loc. cit.* Void district votes have also been consistently higher in the southwestern part of the Federal Republic, except for 1953 when they were also high in these three north German states. With few exceptions the void district vote has decreased steadily in all states and in every election since 1953.

⁸ See, for example, the contentions of Barnes, et al., op. cit. But in 1957 void list votes increased

table III. Invalid votes and ballot combinations by age and sex, 1957–1961

		Number of Votes Cast Invalidly Per 1000 Voters				
Age-Group, Men		Both Votes	First Vote Only	Second Vote Only	Either Vote	
21-30	1957	10.6	13.5	20.5	44.6	
	1961	7.4	11.8	24.2	43.4	
30-60	1957	11.7	14.9	17.4	44.0	
	1961	10.3	13.2	21.0	44.5	
60 and over	1957	12.2	18.4	22.0	52.6	
	1961	12.2	19.5	31.8	63.5	
Total	1957	11.6	15.4	19.0	46.0	
	1961	10.2	14.4	24.1	48.7	
ge-Group, Women						
21-30	1957	, 11.6	20.0	30.1	61.7	
	1961	8.0	16.6	34.3	58.9	
30-60	1957	12.5	21.7	29.9	64.1	
	1961	10.9	20.7	35.8	67.4	
60 and over	1957	13.5	27.4	36.5	77.4	
	1961	11.5	30.9	46.0	88.4	
Total	1957	12.6	22.7	31.4	66.7	
	1961	10.6	22.5	38.0	77.1	
Total, Both Men	1957	12.1	19.3	25.7	57.1	
and Women	1961	10.4	18.8	31.6	60.8	

Some voters are more prone than others to cast invalid votes. The chief variables identified by the sample survey are the voter's age and sex, the size and location of the community in which he lives and his political party preference. Especially relevant are age and sex factors, as shown by Table III. In the 1961 election 7.7 per cent of women voters (and 8.8 per cent of women over 60) and 4.9 per cent of men voters failed to cast two valid votes. The larger proportion of imperfect ballots cast by women was

in Baden-Wuerttemberg by 68,000 (1.3%), in Nordrhein-Westfalen by 62,000 (0.4%); the Saarland added 38,000. Nordrhein-Westfalen increased by only 0.2% in 1953, and decreased by 0.4% in 1961. Baden-Wuerttemberg decreased by 0.9% in 1953, and increased by 0.6% in 1961. Therefore, even without the Saarland, the federal average invalid vote for 1957 represented an increase more than twice the federal increase of 1953 or 1961. Bundesamt: 1957(3), pp. 64-65; Bundesamt: 1961(1), p. 8.

due primarily to the fact that women much more frequently than men combined a valid vote with an invalid vote. Older voters of both sexes shared chief responsibility for paired invalid votes. With increasing voter age, void district votes among women increased from 1.7 to 3.1 per cent; among men from 1.2 to 2.0 per cent. Likewise, with increasing voter age, void list votes among women increased from 3.4 to 4.6 per cent while the corresponding figures among men were only 2.4 and 3.2 per cent.⁹

Thus both men and women of all ages cast more invalid list votes than district votes; more women voted invalidly than men in every age group and on every possible ballot combi-

⁹ Since women form a majority among voters, their share of the invalid vote is numerically even more striking. Burdesamt, "Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmabgabe der Maenner und Frauen nach dem Alter bei der Bundestagswahl 1961," WS 1962(2), pp. 75–79.

nation save paired invalid votes cast by elderly men; and more older voters than younger voters failed to cast two valid votes. Since 1957 the paired invalid vote has decreased among all age-groups of both sexes; the combination of an invalid district with a valid list vote has decreased among all but the oldest voters of both sexes; and the combination of an invalid list with a valid district vote has increased among all age-groups of both sexes, and most conspicuously among voters over 60.10

These figures suggest a partial explanation for the counter-movement of district and list vote trends. Although the correlation coefficient for invalid votes and participation shows no relationship between the two factors.11 it is nonetheless clear that both the size and development of the invalid vote are partly determined by changes in the sociological composition of the participating electorate. In 1961 three principal changes occurred; all three affected the invalid vote. First, there was a great increase in the number of voters over 60. among whom the occurrence of blank second votes was especially frequent and the increase from 1957 especially marked. Second, there was a great increase in the number of voters under 30, among whom participation in past elections had been very low, among whom the occurrence of invalid second votes was relatively frequent and increasing, and among whom the occurrence of invalid first votes was least frequent and decreasing. Finally, the number of women participating increased substantially, which had a decisive over-all impact on the number of invalid votes cast. In some states—for example, Baden-Wuerttembergcertain of these trends were even more pronounced and the net increase of invalid votes correspondingly larger than in the Federal Republic as a whole.12

No less important than differences in the frequency and patterns of invalid voting among age-groups and between sexes have been differences among various sizes of community. Voters in village and rural areas (about one-third of the electorate) are more likely to cast invalid votes than are voters in small and medium-sized towns and cities. Thus the highest invalid vote is normally recorded by men and women over 60 in communities of fewer than 3000 inhabitants. Above we noted that void list votes tend to increase among all age-groups of both sexes, while void district votes

¹⁰ Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 11.

increase only among the old. Although this pattern retains its basic shape, it shifts from one size of community to another. In village and rural areas the increase in void district votes was just slightly less pronounced in 1957 than the increase in void list votes, and then not only among older voters but also among middle-aged men from 30 to 60. On the other hand, in cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, the per cent of invalid district votes cast by older citizens did not change; but of course the absolute number increased owing both to the high turnout and increased number of older voters.¹³

Data on the political party orientations of invalid voters are also relevant to an understanding of the general patterns of invalid voting in the Federal Republic. Nearly 61 per cent of all void list votes in 1961 were cast by electors who gave their district vote to the candidate of the CDU (33 per cent) or SPD (28 per cent); another 25 per cent were cast by "straight-ticket" invalid voters—that is, by voters who cast no valid vote at all. Corresponding data for void district votes show similar patterns: over 50 per cent were cast by major party list voters, only 13 per cent by minor party voters, and some 36 per cent as straight tickets. However, while under 2 per cent of SPD or CDU voters failed to vote for a district candidate, and slightly more than 3 per cent for a party list, over 5 per cent of the minor party electorate cast void district votes and over 4 per cent void list votes. Since 1953 the per cent of both major and minor party. voters failing to cast two valid votes—and particularly those failing to cast the important party list vote, on the basis of which proportional representation is figured—has gradually increased.14

II. CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

At least four main causes of invalid voting can be identified. They are: (1) protest; (2)

¹³ Bundesamt: 1957(3), pp. 21-22. Most of the districts (24 of 27) which ranked highest in 1953, 1957 or 1961 in per cent of invalid votes—and three-fourths of those with consistently high percentages—were comprised predominantly of farms, villages and small towns. Cf. Bundesamt, Statistische Berichte, Arb.-Nr. VIII/5/12 and Arb.-Nr. VIII/5/15; and Bundesamt: 1953(1), pp. 52-63. See also Bundesamt: 1961(4), p. 26, for the results of the 1961 sample survey.

¹⁴ Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 10; 1957(3), p. 53; 1953(2), p. 47. For 1953 see also W. Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schuetz, Waehler und Gewaehlte: Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953 (Berlin and Frankfurt, Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1957), pp. 322-

¹¹ Barnes, et al., loc. cit.

¹² Baden-Wuerttemberg, op. cit., pp. 9-11. For the federal trends see Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 9; and Bundesamt: WS, loc. cit.

ignorance of voting techniques; (3) cross-pressures; and (4) apathy. Their exposition will be somewhat clearer if we organize our discussion according to the types of invalid votes and their combination on the ballot papers (see above, Table II).

Votes invalidated by the addition of extraneous marks, tears or comments were a comparative rarity in the 1961 election, accounting for just 0.5 per cent of all invalid votes. They represent—as do probably the crossed-out vote columns—the irreconcilables present in all organized political societies, voters who use their ballots to indicate in drastic fashion their total alienation from the political system in which they live.

More significant, if still relatively infrequent, were the 113,000 votes invalidated by multicrossing. Few of these can be considered products of political protest; on the other hand, it is thoroughly conceivable that many of these voters had an insufficient understanding of the electoral system. Voters who placed both their marks on one side of the ballot may have wished to cast their two votes for two different political parties but erred in the attempt to do so. Other voters may have assumed that they were permitted two votes for each or either column, despite minor technical improvements in ballot design and instructions between 1953 and 1957. More important than lack of information or inability to read directions may have been the problem of conflicting information, owing to the wide variety of electoral systems (and hence of vote-casting experiences) in use at state and local government levels in the Federal Republic. For example, the municipal and county electoral systems in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bayern permit each elector several votes, which he may split among several candidates, cumulate for a single candidate, or cast as a block for a single party list without change. The per cent of invalid votes voided by multicrossing is significantly higher in these two states than in the rest of the Federal Republic.15

Another possible interpretation of multicrossing—at least where valid votes are paired with invalid votes—is that of cross-pressures. Unable to decide between two parties or two candidates which strongly appeal to him, the voter marks his ballot for both. Although we lack precise information on the combination of multicrossed invalid votes for the Federal Republic, an examination of such ballots in Bayern found that when people voted for two parties they nearly always voted for two which were ideologically relatively close to each other, indicating perhaps that multicrossing was not so much the product of errors as of political impotence in the face of equally attractive choices.¹⁶

Most invalid votes were simply abstentions. Almost a quarter of a million voters turned in unmarked ballot papers; they cast neither a district nor a party list vote. Whether they "voted" for the sake of appearance or because they wanted to, they apparently came to the polls with the sole intention of casting an unmistakable and cogent protest vote, not only against the choice of candidates and political parties, but against the political system itself. More interesting, therefore—and statistically much more important—are the one and onehalf million voters who paired an abstention with a valid vote. One-third of all voters who cast such a combination failed to mark the left side of their ballot paper (for a district candidate), two-thirds the right side (for a party list).

The most frequently cited explanation for valid and blank vote combinations is ignorance by some voters of the purpose and technique of casting two votes, And in fact a convincing case can be made for this thesis. There is, first of all, some evidence from local, state and federal elections which indicates that the size of the invalid vote varies directly with the complexity of the electoral system and the design of the ballot. Moreover, in some cases

16 Richard Schachtner, "Wahlberechtigte, Wahlbeteiligung, Nichtwaehler und Falschwaehler," Bayern in Zahlen: Monatsheft des Bayerischen Statistischen Antes, Vol. 6 (January, 1952), p. 21. Cf. S. M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N. Y., 1963), pp. 212-213. Of course, crosspressures could equally well lead to withdrawal and abstention. Cf. ibid., pp. 211ff.

17 For example, see Schachtner, op. cit., pp. 20-21; Baden-Wuerttemberg, op. cit., p. 11; Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen, Vol. 4 (January, 1949), p. 15; also "Vierzehn Jahre Wahlen in Friedrich Erbe, Westdeutschland (1946-1960)," in Faul, ed., op. cit., p. 40. However, the Bundesamt noted that introduction of the two-vote, two-column ballot in 1953 had had only a fractional impact on invalid voting; void list votes increased by only 0.2% from a sum which in 1949 (see Table I) the Bundesamt had regarded as chiefly an overt expression of political protest. Bundesamt: 1953(2), p. 47; 1949, p. 7. Already by 1957 and especially in 1961 the Bundesamt's position inexplicably changed; its new emphasis has been on technical complexity as the sounder explanation for both the size and successive increases of invalid votes. See Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 21 and p. 52; and Bundesamt: WS, loc. cit.

¹⁵ Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 146.

where direct efforts have been made to acquaint prospective voters with details of the electoral system—an example is the postal ballot in 1961—the invalid vote has amounted to 1 per cent or less.¹⁸

Detailed studies of West German crossvoting behavior in each of the past three federal elections also suggest an interpretation of partially void ballots which emphasizes error rather than intent as the chief cause of invalid votes. Despite the fact that each elector who casts two votes must vote separately for the district candidate and the party list of his choice, 89 per cent of the voters in 1957 and 94 per cent in 1961 cast their two votes for the same party: thus the personality of the district candidate can have played only a minor role in the voter's choice compared with his party label.19 This conclusion is substantiated despite the larger number of void list votesby extensive survey research data from the Divo, Allensbach and Emnid institutes of public opinion. Thus it was found that most voters paid little attention to, and had scant knowledge of, the electoral law or the personal qualities of district candidates; very few of those questioned considered the candidate's personality to be the basis of their electoral choice. Instead, the issues to which the electorate responded were bound up with images of a few nationally known politicians and the great political parties—with their achievements, programs and relative capacities for national leadership.20 Many of the voters who allowed

¹⁸ Bundesamt, "Ergebnis der Briefwahl bei der Bundestagswahl 1961," WS 1962(1), pp. 23-25. There are, however, special features of the postal ballot which impair its comparability with other aspects of invalid voting; for a brief discussion, see Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, pp. 284-285.

¹⁹ Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 54; Bundesamt: WS 1962(2), p. 79. Cf. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, p. 288.

²⁰ For 1961 see Emnid-Institut, Der Prozess der Meinungsbildung (Bielefeld, 1962), excerpts from which appear in Klaus D. Eberlein, "Die Wahlentscheidung vom 17. September 1961, ihre Ursachen und Wirkung," Zeitschrift fuer Politik, Vol. 9 (September, 1962), pp. 236-257; and Gerhard Schmidtchen and E. Noelle-Neumann (Allensbach), "Die Bedeutung repraesentativer Bevoelkerungsumfragen fuer die offene Gesellschaft," Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 4 (June, 1963), pp. 174-179. For 1957 see Divo-Institut, Untersuchung der Waehlerschaft und Wahlentscheidung 1957 (Frankfurt, 1959), pp. 72-121 and pp. 170-235. For 1953 see Hirsch-Weber and Schuetz, op. cit., pp. 94-355.

the important party list vote to remain a blank must therefore have committed unintentional errors. They probably thought that by voting for a district candidate whose name was also marked with a party label they had fulfilled their electoral duty.²¹

The first use of voting machines in a German federal election in 1961 in four precincts also lends credence to the technical-complexity explanation for invalid voting. The machines were designed to render impossible the casting of accidental invalid votes; and a measure of their success appears to be that whereas in 1957 the number of invalid votes polled in the four precincts had ranged from 13 to 34 district votes and from 15 to 63 party list votes, in 1961 no precinct had more than three invalid first votes or seven invalid second votes. Moreover, in three of the four precincts there were equal numbers of invalid first and second votes (not an excess of the latter as one would expect); in one precinct there were no invalid votes at all; and in the fourth precinct there were only two invalid first votes, seven invalid second votes. (See Table IV.)

But if voter ignorance thus appears to be a relevant explanation for blank votes, it is neither the only nor the most important one. An equally important cause is political protest, rooted in electoral alliances; in the decline of radical political parties; and in the reaction of local populations to temporary political, social or economic dislocations.

A principal cause of invalid first votes has been the device known as Wahlabkommen, or electoral alliance, whereby a political party refrains from nominating a candidate in a particular election district and instead instructs its

21 Kitzinger, loc. cit.; and Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 21 and p. 52. The Bundesamt's suggestion that void party list votes may have resulted from rejection by major party voters of unalterable state party lists over whose composition and order they have no influence, seems improbable in the light of these data, since it is the party and not the man for whom the voter apparently marks his ballot. Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 21. In Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bayern, where voters have long been able to alter lists and cumulate votes, and where, therefore, one might expect such considerations to be especially relevant, the void list vote has been high, but lower than in several other states where voters are not permitted to alter lists or cumulate votes. Moreover, the data from both states suggest that the more choices a voter has, the more likely he is to cast invalid votes, rather than vice versa. See Schachtner, loc. cit.; and Baden-Wuerttemberg, loc. cit.

District In Which Precinct Located	Year	Electors	Voters	Per cent		Votes valid	Secon Inv	d Votes alid
Krefeld, 81	1953	882 689	78.1	14	2.0%	14	2.0%	
•	1957	1250	1123	89.8	18	1.2	15	1.3
	1961	1624	1227	75.6	2	0.2	7	0.6
Duisburg I, 92	1953	November		·				
J ,	1957	700	634	90.6	21	1.7	41	6.5
	1961	679	585	86.2	α	0.0	0	0.0
Dortmund I, 116	1953	1080	925	85.6	29	3.1	38	4.1
	1957			-				
	1961	861	605	70.3	3	0.5	3	0.5

1226

1388

1036

81.2

85.0

80.4

TABLE IV. VOTING MACHINES AND INVALID VOTES IN FOUR PRECINCTS, 1953-196122

supporters to give their first votes to the candidate of an ally-party.²³ Rejection of electoral alliances by some voters of both large and small political parties produced an artificially high invalid first vote in 1953 (when there were 39 such alliances²⁴) and 1957 (when there were 20²⁵). Consequently a true comparison of in-

1953

1957

1961

1509

1632

1289

Darmstadt, 145

²² I am indebted to Dr. Karl Schwarz of the Bundesamt for a photostatic copy of the data on which this table is based. The Bundesamt's own brief analysis appears in Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 146. For a description of the voting machines, see Das Parlament, September 13, 1961, p. 16.

²³ A complete list of Wahlabkommen appears in Erbe, op. cit., pp. 84-85. By means of this device the Bavarian and Center parties in 1953 and the German Party in both 1953 and 1957 managed to circumvent the electoral law's splinter party clauses and obtain representation in the Federal Bundestag.

²⁴ In 1953, 14 of the 20 districts with an invalid first vote exceeding 5% were districts in which alliances had been concluded between two or more of the bourgeois parties. The largest invalid vote was recorded in districts in which the CDU withdrew in favor of one of the smaller parties; in 20 of 22 such districts the invalid first vote exceeded 4%, while that was the case in only 8 of 23 districts in which a smaller party renounced in favor of the CDU. Notice that 27 of the 39 Wahlabkommen were in Niedersachsen, Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen, which thus explains their unusually high polls of void district votes that year; see above, note 8.

²⁵ In 1957 Wahlabkommen were concluded between the CDU and German Party (DP) in 12 districts, between the SPD and Bavarian Party valid first votes for 1953, 1957 and 1961 (when there were no alliances) is extremely difficult; for example, if the ten districts without major party candidates are subtracted from the 1957 totals, the percentage decrease of invalid first votes from 1957 to 1961 is 50 per cent less than that indicated by the official election returns. Should the electoral alliance reappear—which seems unlikely in view of party consolidation and the acknowledged dominance of the two big catch-all parties—the downward trend of void district votes could be slowed, halted or even reversed. The second construction of the two even reversed.

28

34

2.3

2.4

0.3

41

63

3.3

4.5

0.3

(FU) in 8 others. In 8 of the 10 districts where the SPD or CDU renounced, invalid votes numbered more than 7%, ranking first through eighth among German election districts. In each of the other two, void district votes exceeded 5%. For an analysis of the cross-pressures impinging on the SPD and FU electorates, and the resultant high incidence of first vote abstentions especially among SPD voters, see the local study of Munich-Land by Keith Panter-Brick, in Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, pp. 338-339.

²⁶ Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 147.

led by Franz Josef Strauss, should follow through on its apparent 1965 Wahlabkommen with the small right-wing Bavarian GDP (whereby the GDP is to "deliver" the right-wing vote to the CSU, and the CSU is to guarantee the GDP two direct mandates and three list mandates, thus permitting it to reenter the Bundestag; see Die Zeit, January 22, 1965, p. 3), void district votes by disenchanted CSU voters could contribute to a relatively higher invalid first vote in particular districts.

The decline of radical parties has also contributed to the gradual increase in the number of ballots intentionally invalidated in whole or in part by disenchanted, protesting voters. On the political Right the relationship seems manifest particularly in 1953 and 1961, on the Left chiefly in 1957. In 1953 the rate of void list vote increase was greatest-more than five times the federal average—in Bayern (+1.0 per cent), where the right-wing WAV, which had polled 14 per cent of the vote there in 1949 and sent 12 deputies to Bonn, no longer existed. Sharp increases in the number of void list votes were recorded in nearly every area of former WAV strength; and in one-half its 1949 refugee and lower middle-class citadels the percentage increase amounted to twice the Bavarian and ten times the federal average increase.28 Similar results also obtained in the two

In the absence of Wahlabkommen, however, the downward trend of void district votes may even accelerate as minor and splinter party voters make the transition to voting for the major parties. In the past, these voters have often cast invalid first votes in districts where their party ran no candidate. For example, in 1953 special counts revealed that 25% of the DRP voters in Rhineland-Pfalz and over 11% of the Center Party's voters in Nordrhein-Westfalen invalidated their first vote because they had no opportunity to vote for a DRP or Center Party candidate in their district; see Hirsch-Weber and Schuetz, op. cit., p. 330 and p. 333. For 1957 see the data and analysis in Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 53. Representative of such districts in 1961 were 153 in Rhineland-Pfalz and 198, 211, 213, 218, 221, 230, 232 and 239 in Bayern; see Bundesamt: 1961(1).

²⁸ See especially districts 196, 198, 199, 205, 208, 211, 212, 213, 217, 224, 226 and 228. Bundesamt: 1949, p. 24; 1953(1). In noting that voters did not vote invalidly in 1953 as often as had been expected owing to introduction of the new two-vote, two-column ballot, James K. Pollock implies that voter ignorance of the technical aspects of vote-casting was particularly minimized in Bayern, where the voters already had experience with a comparable electoral system. James K. Pollock, ed., German Democracy at Work: A Selective Study (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1955), p. 88 and p. 193, note 11. Were voter ignorance actually the primary cause of invalid votes in the Federal Republic, however, Bayern should have recorded no significant increase from 1949 and should have polled among the fewest invalid votes of any of the German states. In fact, it registered a larger increase in 1953 than any other state and ranked third in per cent of invalid second votes.

North German states of Bremen and Niedersachsen, where the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party, outlawed in 1952, scored political breakthroughs in Landtag elections in 1951.29 Not until 1959 did a right-wing extremist party again score comparable gains in state politics. The DRP that year polled 5.1 per cent of the vote in Rheinland-Pfalz; and two years later, in the 1961 federal election, the invalid vote rose most sharply-between three and four times the state and 15 times the federal increase -in the seven small town and rural areas where in 1959 the DRP had been most successful in mobilizing the disaffections of economically depressed vine-growers and small farmers.30

Dissident Communist voters, bereft of their party vehicle after prohibition of the KPD by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1956, contributed—often extensively, it appears—to the 1957 upsurge of invalid votes in five states where the KPD had polled well in Landtag elections during the immediately preceding two years. Thus the SPD (which is supposed to

²⁹ The relevant figures by district are found in Bremen, Statistisches Landesamt, Statistische Mitteilungen, 1951, No. 3 and 1953, No. 4; and in Niedersachsen, Statistisches Landesamt, Wahlen und Abstimmungen, Reihe F, Vol. 14, Nos. 1 and 3. Detailed information on the SRP may be found in Otto Buesch and Peter Furth, Rechtsradikalismus im Nachkriegsdeutschland: Studien ueber die 'Sozialistische Reichspartei' (SRP) (Berlin and Frankfurt, Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1957), esp. pp. 93 ff., 97 ff., 152 ff., and 156 ff.

30 The areas are included in federal districts 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 159 and 160. See Rheinland-Pfalz, Statistisches Landesamt, Statistische Mitteilungen, November 1961, pp. 259-266 and May 1959, pp. 99-104. Cf. Richard S. Cromwell, "Rightist Extremism in Postwar West Germany." Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 16 (June, 1964), pp. 284-293. A contributing factor in the void list vote increase in Rheinland-Pfalz was probably the merger of the increasingly right-wing Refugee Party with the former German Party to form the All-German Party (GDP). The GDP suffered an 83% drop in 1961 from the combined 1957 strength of the two parent parties; at the same time the per cent of GDP electors casting void list votes jumped to 8.3, four times the party's national average (which in any case was up sharply from 1957). Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 10 and p. 20; 1957(3), p. 53. On the resentment engendered among former DP supporters by the merger with the Refugee Party, see Eberlein, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

³¹ Invalid list votes increased in the Saar, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bremen, Hessen, and have absorbed the Communist vote) increased its vote in 1957 in Nordrhein-Westfalen by only one-half its federal average proportionate increase and by only two-fifths of the percentage which the Communists and other left-wing parties had polled in 1953;32 meanwhile, 15 of 17 districts which had given the KPD at least 4 per cent of the vote in 1953 recorded void list vote increases in excess of the average Nordrhein-Westfalen increase.33 It appears likely that many Communist voters in the Saarland simply sat out the 1957 election, only to vote invalidly with at least one of their two votes in 1961, when they came to the polls in response to election appeals by the newly founded, leftneutralist German Peace Union (DFU).34

The Saarland provides an excellent case study in the use of invalid votes as a weapon of

Nordrhein-Westfalen, invalid district votes in all but Nordrhein-Westfalen. The KPD had polled 3.4% of the vote in Hessen and 3.8% in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 1954, 6.6% in the Saar and 5.0% in Bremen in 1955, and 3.2% in Baden-Wuerttemberg as late as April, 1956. Among states with no appreciable Communist vote, only Schleswig-Holstein recorded a large invalid vote increase in 1957. See the data in Faul, ed., op. cit., pp. 321–363. The unusual parallel increase of invalid first and second votes may have been a reflection of the great regularity of KPD straightticket voting (exceeded only by the SPD) in 1953. See Bundesamt: 1953(2), p. 47.

⁸² Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, p. 284. Moreover, the per cent of SPD electors casting void district votes rose steeply, possibly indicating a less than wholehearted commitment even among those KPD voters who did switch. Bundesamt: 1957(3), p. 53; 1953, loc. cit.

³³ Cf. especially the results in districts 74, 75, 76, 89, 90, 92, 99, 102, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117. Bundesamt: 1957(1); 1953(1).

34 The correlation is particularly clear in the Saar districts of St. Wendel (Federal election district 246) where the KPD had won a plurality in the Saar Landtag election of 1952: i.e., 229, 235, 249, 261, 268, 275, 282. It is noteworthy that Communist strength in postwar Saarland scarcely wavered: in 1955 the party received about the same number of votes it had in 1947 and only 7% fewer than in 1952. See Saarland, Statistisches Landesamt, Statistischer Bericht, B III 1, January 1961; and Kurzbericht, II/10, 1955 and II/1, 1956. On the character of the German Peace Union (DFU) see Der Spiegel, August 23, 1961; and Eduard Wald, "Communism," in Walter Stahl, ed., The Politics of Postwar Germany (New York, 1963), pp. 293-294. On Communism and invalid voting in the Saar, cf. also Erbe, op. cit., p. 41.

political protest. Reunited with Germany politically in 1957 following popular rejection of political autonomy by referendum in 1955. and reunited economically in 1959 following dissolution of the Franco-Saar economic union concluded in 1947, the Saarland has participated in only two German federal elections. This has prompted some observers to dismiss the relatively higher invalid vote recorded there in 1957 and 1961 with the simple assertion that Saar voters "have had less experience than others with the German electoral system."35 Had that been the real cause, however, halfvalid ballots should have been considerably more numerous in the Saarland than elsewhere; but in fact 44 per cent (federal: 25 per cent) of void list votes and 55 per cent (federal: 36 per cent) of void district votes were paired with another invalid vote in 1961 in unambiguous protest against the prevailing political situation.36 In addition to the partyless Saar Communists, it appears on the basis of available voting data that former supporters of the Saar Christian People's Party (CVP), who were opposed to integration with Germany, may have selected the invalid vote as their own medium of political expression.37 In Saarlouis, Merzig-Wadern and St. Ingbert the void list vote was little short of amazing: in 1961 it actually exceeded 10 per cent of the poll in onethird of the Saar precincts where the CVP had obtained 20 per cent of the vote in its final electoral appearance (as the Saar branch of the Bavarian CSU) in 1957.38

35 Barnes, et al., loc. cit.

36 Bundesamt: 1961(3), p. 22.

³⁷ Erbe, *loc. cit.*; Bernhard Beger, "Anatomie einer Wahl, Gewinne und Verluste am 17. September," *Politische Meinung*, Vol. 6 (October, 1961), p. 19.

38 Saarland, Statistisches Landesamt, Statistischer Bericht, B III 1, January 1961. Actually, Saarlanders had waged political battles with invalid votes even prior to the 1955 referendum, but then the source of discontent was the obverse of 1957 or 1961. In 1952, for example, almost a quarter of the Saar electorate invalidated their ballots in response to appeals for abstention by the Deutscher Saarbund and the pro-German political parties, which the fearful and mildly authoritarian Saar government had refused to license. See Hans-Joachim Hagmann, Die Saarlaendischen Landtagswahlen vom 30. November 1952 (Cologne, 1953), pp. 111 ff. and pp. 174 ff.; Richard Schachtner, Die deutsche Nachkriegswahlen (Munich, Isar Verlag, 1956), pp. 171-173; Erbe, op. cit., p. 40; and esp. Jacques Freymond, The Saar Conflict 1945-1955 (New York 1960), pp. 125-128. Only in 1955, when all

Finally, invalid protest votes result from the disaffection of local populations with temporary political, social or economic dislocations, as we have already noted with respect to Rheinland-Pfalz in 1959 and 1961. An especially fertile source for the study of literally thousands of examples of invalid voting as a weapon of political protest are the state and local elections in south-central and southwestern Germany during the period of the military occupation.39 For example, in Hessen in 1946 refugee discontent at the refusal of American Occupation authorities to authorize an allrefugee political party found expression through invalid votes at the first Landtag election; three years later, in the first Bundestag election, the number of invalid votes declined in certain districts in proportion to the vote polled there by refugee candidates standing independently of the licensed political parties.40

In the French Occupation Zone—where invalid voting was especially frequent—the number of void ballots cast at the first Landtag elections varied in direct proportion to the efforts expended by France to dissociate occupied areas from German control. Thus it reached 11.1 per cent in Rheinland-Pfalz, 9.2 per cent in Baden and 7.5 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern.41 One of the best ex-

claimants competed openly for the first and last time in a postwar Saar election, did the invalid vote amount to no more than a "normal" 1-2%.

³⁹ The most useful compilation of election statistics for the immediate postwar period is that prepared by the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, Elections and Political Parties in Germany, 1945–1952 (Bad Godesberg/Mehlen, Germany, 1952), pp. 37–71. See also the extensive publications of state statistical offices for the state and local elections of this period, to which the bibliography in Bundesamt: 1961(1), pp. 59–67, provides a convenient guide.

⁴⁰ Erbe, loc. cit. On other aspects of anti-Occupation protest voting with invalid ballots in Hessen, see Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1947), pp. 20-26; and Vol. 4, No. 1 (1949), p. 13 and p. 15.

⁴¹ Cf. Erbe, loc. cit. Invalid votes in all three areas may also have reflected the relatively greater social unrest in the French Zone caused by severe local economic dislocations resulting from France's harsh reparations, monetary and commercial policies, described in F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945–1949 (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1963). For a brief description of local disruptions in Rhineland-

amples of invalid protest voting during the Occupation period occurred in a special election held in September, 1947 to select a member of the Rheinland-Pfalz Landtag to represent communities transferred from the Saarland back to German jurisdiction: nearly 30 per cent of the voters cast invalid votes in protest against the transfer.⁴²

Political protest (defaced and blank votes); cross-pressures (multi-crossed and blank votes); and voter ignorance of vote-casting techniques (multicrossed and blank votes) are three major causes of invalid voting. A fourth—which to some extent gives rise to the other three—is the coupling of widespread political apathy with an unusually high voting turnout.

Voting in Western Germany is not compulsory; yet electoral participation has been consistently and remarkably high even by European standards, increasing from 78.5 per cent in 1949 to almost 88 per cent in 1957 and 1961.43 Although some political scientists have welcomed high turnout as a sign of the success of political education in postwar Germany,44 available survey data suggest quite different conclusions. Survey research data from the 1953, 1957, and 1961 elections—some of which have already been cited-indicate that the politically well-informed (with respect to the candidates, issues and voting techniques) constitute much the smaller part of the German electorate; moreover, there is ample evidence that high electoral participation occurs independently of either political interest or of personal political involvement on the part of most German voters.45

Pfalz, cf. Freymond, op. cit., pp. 52-53 and pp. 245-248.

42 Scammon, op. cit., p. 505.

43 Comparative data are found in Kitzinger, Britain, Europe and Beyond, op. cit., pp. 183-217. For Germany, see Erwin Faul, "Soziologie der westdeutschen Waehlerschaft," in Faul, ed., op. cit., pp. 135-315.

44 For example: Barnes, et al., loc. cit.

46 In 1957 less than half the Divo respondents expressed interest in the campaign; only 4 in 10 could remember having discussed the outcome of the fall election when questioned shortly before it took place; discussion was least frequent among women, older persons, CDU voters, and in outlying areas. Divo-Institut, op. cit., pp. 198-209; 72-75; 268-269. Few voters could perceive any relationship at all between the possible electoral result and their personal lives. Ibid., pp. 294-295. Cf. Allensbach Institut, "SPD und oeffentliche Meinung," Politische Meinung, Vol. 8 (July-August, 1963), pp. 103-105; and Lewis J. Edinger, "Electoral Politics and Voting in Western

Nor do most Germans believe that voting serves the citizen as an effective means of participation in public affairs; only a fraction of the population would actually seek redress for personal political problems by voting for or against either of the major political parties.46 On the contrary, the real political process is viewed as a rather distant play in which the citizen-actor has no role; political affairs impinge on the individual but are intractable to his influence.47 One's focus is in any case on one's particular "veto-group," or his private life, to which the state relates chiefly in its capacity as administrator of social welfare schemes or collector of taxes.48 In short: it appears probable that among broad segments of the West German population, political interest and insight are minimal, electoral involvement impersonal and peripheral, and both the expectation of real political change and the assessment of one's own political efficacy negligible.

Why, then, does the German citizen vote? Several explanations are possible. Above all, however, going to the polls seems to be a variety of social conformism—possibly rooted in the Third Reich and the Occupation⁴⁹—and an expression of the widespread German feeling that voting is a moral obligation, a duty which the state imposes on its citizens before releasing

Germany," World Politics, Vol. 13 (April, 1961), pp. 480-481.

⁴⁶ Wolfgang Hartenstein and G. Schubert, Mitlaufen oder Mitbestimmen: Eine Untersuchung zum Demokratischen Bewusstsein und Politische Tradition (Frankfurt, 1961), pp. 43-48; W. Hartenstein and K. Liepelt, "Party Members and Party Voters in W. Germany," in Stein Rokkan, ed., Approaches to the Study of Political Participation (Special Issue of Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6, Fasc. 1-2, 1962), pp. 43-52; Sidney Verba, "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study," ibid., pp. 22-42.

⁴⁷ U. Lohmar, Innerparteiliche Demokratie (Stuttgart, F. Enke Verlag, 1963), pp. 26-34. Cf. Otto Kirchheimer, Appendix to his chapter on "Conditions of a Stable Opposition: Germany," in Dahl, ed., op. cit.

⁴⁸ Cf. the remarks in Otto Kirchheimer, "German Democracy in the 1950's," World Politics, Vol. 13 (October, 1960), pp. 256-257.

⁴⁹ That is, in coercive plebiscitarian voting (which particularly mobilized women and residents of village and rural areas) or in the circumspect habits acquired under the watchful tutelage of foreign military authorities. On the former see Faul, op. cit., pp. 150-151 and p. 159; on the latter see Hirsch-Weber and Schuetz, op. cit., p. 160.

them to private life.⁵⁰ Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that German elections over the years may have mobilized and brought to the polls a large number of less interested and less discerning citizens who have lacked a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the single-ballot, two-vote electoral system and who, therefore, have sometimes cast unintentional invalid votes.⁵¹ The Divo survey in 1957 identified these 14 per cent of least informed and least interested "mobilized" voters as predominantly women, older men, supporters of the CDU and residents of village and rural areas.⁵² The link between "mobilized"

50 In one recent poll 52% of the respondents felt that even persons who were politically totally uninterested should vote; 39% considered voting a formal duty. Hartenstein and Schubert, op. cit., p. 37. For 1757 data, see Divo-Institut, op. cit., p. 295 and Table 159. Less than a quarter of the Divo respondents cited ideological or pragmatic political reasons for voting. This relationship between sense of duty and voting turnout is not necessarily a uniquely German trait; Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960), p. 106, report a similarly close correlation between the two factors for the 1956 U. S. Presidential election. Nevertheless, as Almond and Verba have clearly demonstrated, this combination of high frequencies of formal participation and a passive orientation to that participation is an attitude and behavior pattern that reaches far more deeply into the German political culture than it does the American or British, with important consequences for democratic politics. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1963). Cf. Verba, op. cit.; and the same author's excellent chapter. "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965).

⁵¹ Others, more knowledgeable in at least the technique of voting, perhaps felt competent to choose between national parties and programs but unable to decide between local personalities who were often unknown to them; according to Kitzinger, many of these voters no doubt deliberately allowed the left-hand side of their ballot paper to remain blank. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, p. 288.

52 Divo-Institut, op. cit., pp. 152-161. Sex is probably the most striking variable: in late 1963 only 15% of the women (but over 50% of the men) interviewed by the Allensbach Institut expressed an interest in politics. See "Umfragen: Interesse fuer Politik," Politische Meinung, Vol. 8 (December, 1963), pp. 84-88.

voting and invalid voting seems fairly clear: both mobilized and invalid voters have been recruited from among substantially the same groups of West German citizens.

More worrisomethan mobilization of apathetic voters could be the mobilization of citizens characterized by Lipset as "normally disaffected habitual nonvoters." Under other political regimes such individuals might tend to withdraw and to isolate themselves from politics; but in Western Germany they may come to the polls despite their political nonintegration simply for the sake of appearance, in response to the general social pressure to vote. Once inside the voting booth such voters may well invalidate their ballots in whole or in part. In particular, it may be that alienated middle-aged and older voters in village and rural areas, affectively tied to the fortunes of a political party which no longer competes effectively on the political scene, frequently prefer the anonymity of invalid voting to the publicity of nonvoting.54

53 Lipset, op. cit., p. 229.

54 See the analysis of rural invalid voting in Bavarian elections by Richard Schachtner, "Wahlberechtigte, Wahlbeteiligung, Nichtwaehler und Falschwaehler," Bayern in Zahlen: Monatshefte des Bayerischen Statistischen Amtes. Vol. 4 (August, 1950), pp. 402-403; cf. Hessen. Statistisches Landesamt, Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen, Vol. 4 (February, 1949), p. 15; and Faul, op. cit., p. 160. The practice of reporting election results by precinct even in sparsely populated rural areas probably tends also to increase the general social pressure to vote; cf. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, pp. 35-36. Concerning the factors which generally promote a combination of high electoral participation and comparatively low interest in politics in rural areas, see Juan Linz, The Social Bases of West German Politics, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1959; Microfilm Publication #59-4075 (University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan), pp. 731-790.

Minor and radical political parties were supported chiefly by older and middle-aged voters (especially men) in rural and village areas. Bundesamt: 1957(3), pp. 46 ff. and p. 53. Significantly, the least decrease in paired invalid votes has occurred among older and middle-aged voters (esp. men); invalid list votes have been most numerous and have increased most rapidly among older voters; while the only increase of invalid first votes has occurred among the elderly and among middle-aged men in rural areas. The slow increase in the percentage of major party electors who cast valid district votes but void list votes also is indicative of the relationship between invalid voting and minor party political orienta-

Several recent studies of right-wing and restorative tendencies have suggested that public accommodation by political conservatives to the generally accepted standards of political speech and behavior prevalent in the Federal Republic (presumably including, for many, the act of voting), camouflages political attitudes by these persons which are often dangerously uninformed and frequently hostile.55 It is scarcely worth noting that when deviant political attitudes exist in an environment which is intolerant of deviant political behavior, some other expression must be found for those attitudes; and in Germany a partial answer may be conformist electoral participation but invalid voting. In this connection the data associated with the voting machine experiment are not unambiguous. Thus the most interesting aspect of this experiment is perhaps not that the number of invalid votes decreased. but that turnout decreased sharply in each of the four precincts; it may be that the

tion; moreover, the increase is faster for the CDU, which absorbed most of these minor party switchovers, than for the SPD. (See above, text and references on "General Patterns" of invalid voting). Another suggestive relationship is the following: the spatial distribution of radical political party strength in postwar Germany has tended to be concentrated along roughly the same belt where the Nazis formerly polled best and where the invalid vote tended later to be highest. Cf. Faul, op. cit., p. 159.

One final remark concerning the mobilization of these peripheral voters may be relevant: in many countries the habitual, uninterested or disaffected nonvoter-type simply stays home; when forced to vote (in Belgium or Luxembourg, or in the cantons of Switzerland or states of Austria where voting is compulsory) he may vote invalidly. In Germany social compulsion replaces legal compulsion but the effect is the same: nonvoters vote invalidly. Cf. above, note 3.

55 Cf. some of the data in J. Habermas, et al., Student und Politik: Eine Soziologische Untersuchung zum Politischen Bewusstsein Frankfurter Studenten (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1961), summarized in part by Kurt Tauber, "Nationalism and Social Restoration: Fraternities in Postwar Germany," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 78 (March, 1963), pp. 83-85; Peter Schoenbach, "German Reactions to Anti-Semitic Incidents—A Sociological Study," in Stahl, ed., op. cit., pp. 329-331. See also Hans-Helmuth Knuetter, "Extreme-Rightism," ibid., pp. 213-228; and Manfred Jenke, Verschwoerung von Rechts? Ein Bericht ueber den Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland nach 1945 (Berlin, Colloquium Verlag, 1961).

well advertised introduction of voting machines inhibited some voters from going to the polls, all the more so if they intended to cast void or partly void ballots: turnout then became less important than the imagined risk of losing one's anonymity when casting an invalid vote.⁵⁶

Finally, a cursory analysis of void ballots at state and local elections also helps to clarify the general factors which lead voters to spoil their ballots, rather than to cast a valid vote for a candidate or political party. Such an appraisal yields several instructive points. First, in most states participation, invalid votes and the CDU's share of votes all tend to be lower than the comparable figures at national electionspartly because the CDU is unable to mobilize less committed, indifferent women and older voters as effectively in state as in federal elections.⁵⁷ Second, because of the wider lattitude of political choice, there tends to be a greater scattering of votes among independent and splinter party candidates than is true in federal elections-and, perhaps as a consequence, a lower number of spoiled ballot papers are cast by particularist voters who are unable to find the candidate or representative of their choice.58 A third feature of void balloting at the

⁵⁶ Note particularly the sharp 14% drop in Krefeld from 1957 and 15% drop in Dortmund from 1953. See above, Table IV.

⁶⁷ For the basic data, see Faul, ed., op. cit., pp. 321-363; for the extensive literature on sample surveys conducted by state statistical offices, see Bundesamt: 1961(1), pp. 59-67. Cf. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, pp. 291-295. There are of course additional reasons for lower participation rates, as well as for the relatively poorer showing of the CDU; see Edinger, op. cit., pp. 436-437; and Erbe, op. cit., pp. 36-39. However, the reason cited seems to be decisive for the lower invalid vote in most cases.

58 For a concise survey of most of the minor and splinter party groups which have appeared since 1945, see Erbe, op. cit., pp. 52-63. Cf. above, the material cited in notes 29, 30, 31, 38; such examples could be multiplied many times over. However, in many cases at the lower levels of selfgovernment, a narrowed range of political choice again obtains and the invalid vote increases: frequent failure of the major parties to nominate candidates for local office in small towns and villages deprives many voters of the opportunity to vote for the party of their choice-in this case usually CDU or SPD—and they respond to that situation by depositing a blank or crossed-out ballot in protest. As a result, the invalid vote in peripheral areas at local elections often exceeds that cast in these same areas in federal elections. For example, in the 1960 communal elections in state and local levels of government is the startling degree to which the reasons for invalid votes often may be traced to highly specific local and personal factors, rather than to questions of national or party politics or to some combination of national and local factors.⁵⁹

III. CONCLUSIONS

Invalid votes are most conspicuous among women, older citizens, village and farm dwellers, previous nonvoters, and supporters or former supporters of minor political parties who now vote CDU or SPD. They are based at once on the most apathetic segments of the population and—drawing as they do from the electorates of the expremist parties as the latter

Hessen, the SPD put up a party list in just 900 of the 2600 communities, the CDU in 357, the BHE in 388 and the FDP in 78. Invalid votes varied directly with the number of parties competing in a given commune: the more parties, the fewer invalid votes, and vice versa. In the larger, kreisfreie cities-those detached governmentally and administratively from the county in which they are situated—all the parties put up lists of candidates; there the invalid vote was just 1.3%. The neglected areas were mainly the smaller of the kreisangehoerige towns and villages in less accessible rural areas; in these the invalid vote averaged 6.0%, depending on which party or combination of parties failed to present candidates. In communes where the parties presented lists for the first time in 1960, there was a noticeable retrenchment in the percentage of invalid votes cast in 1956. Hessen, Statistisches Landesamt, Beitraege zur Statistik Hessens, No. 124; and Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen, Vol. 15 (October, 1960), pp. 253-256.

⁵⁹ A classic example was that of the commune of Rockensuess (Kreis or County Rotenburg), in the 1952 Hessen communal elections, where nearly 55% of the ballots deposited were invalid. Close examination revealed that most of these had been cast in a single polling district, the neighborhood of Cornberg (where 82.7% of the voters spoiled their ballots); Cornberg was campaigning for detachment from Rockensuess and status as a self-governing commune. Hessen. Statistisches Landesamt, Beitraege zur Statistik Hessens, No. 52. A number of personal and local factors in particular Saar communes in 1955 also provide instructive insight; they are described in Freymond, op. cit., pp. 252-254. Cf. especially the case of Webenheim. Schachtner's two articles on invalid voting in Bayern in the early 1950s (see above, notes 16 and 54) are also valuable, particularly for their detailed differentiation of urban and rural patterns.

decline—on political radicals and disaffected persons in outlying regions who have not done well in economic life. Insofar as voter ignorance of the electoral system produces invalid votes, it is centered to a great extent among individuals who are only imperfectly integrated into the West German political system, who are more concerned with personal than with public affairs, and who vote only because they think they ought to or because everyone else does.

Hence there are basically two categories of invalid voters. The first is the apathetic "invalid," who is borderline from the nonvoter, who responds to the general electoral mobilization because it is the thing to do, but who remains actually indifferent to the political system. Whether out of ignorance, negligence or cross-pressures, he fails to cast two valid votes. The second major category is formed by the highly politicized "invalid," who knows exactly how he would vote if he could find the party corresponding to his ideas, but who, not finding that party, deliberately invalidates his ballot as a political act. ⁵⁰ Each of these two groups has its own potential significance.

The highly politicized. To the extent that radical voters are merely leftovers from the authoritarian past, they will in time disappear and the invalid vote based on them will continue to decline. On the other hand, given the gradual narrowing of the political party choice spectrum (both in the number of parties and in the differences between the big "catch-all"

60 This can even be stated as a rule: wherever there is a perceived constriction of political choice, some invalid votes will be cast by those who feel deprived. In addition to the data on German federal, state and local elections presented in this paper, evidence in support of this rule may be found in the first (comparatively less regimented) Nazi and East German elections, in which invalid votes were often unusually frequent, and in some communes even more numerous than valid votes (e.g., at the East German communal elections of 1946); in the Italian elections of 1953, cited in footnote 3; and in occasional single-member constituency elections in Switzerland in which only one candidate has been nominated. See: Germany, Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, Vol. 53 (Berlin, 1934), p. 550; Bundesministerium fuer Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, Die Wahlen in der Sowjetzone: Dokumente und Materialien (5th ed.; Bonn and Berlin, Deutscher Bundes-Verlag, 1963); Scammon, op. cit., pp. 526-531; and Uwe Kitzinger, "Swiss Electoral Democracy," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 13 (Summer, 1960), p. 339.

parties which remain) and the effective closure of the system to new political party aspirants, some groups of otherwise dedicated Bonn citizens may come to feel that the only effective exercise of political opposition which remains open to them is the deposit of void ballots at federal elections. The potential political usefulness of the invalid vote as an avenue of political protest has recently been recognized by Pastor Martin Niemoeller, one of the leading (and most controversial) figures of postwar German Protestantism, who is openly advocating the deposit of void ballots at the forthcoming September, 1965 election. 61

The apathetic. The significance of the apathetic "invalids" is more difficult to assess. To the extent that electoral mobilization has provoked invalid votes by less competent voters in the older age groups, these too may in time decrease. 62 However, to the extent that the apathetic "invalids" are representative of an underdeveloped political interest, involvement and integration incident to much wider circles of the German electorate, they merit attention and raise troublesome questions. For a democracy in which substantial numbers of persons both voting and nonvoting—are, politically speaking, totally uninterested and uninvolved may be one in which democratic political consensus and commitment are relatively low. Scepticism, cynicism and hostility may not be far removed from apathy and ignorance, especially under potential conditions of external or internal crisis.

German political culture is not yet a "given"; the critical questions of boundaries and national identity are still unresolved, producing that curious West German paradox in which politics is both nowhere and everywhere, nothing and everything. §3 As Verba has noted, "the

on Niemoeller, a neutralist who opposed German rearmament, was formerly director of the bureau of foreign affairs of the EKD (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland), and president of the provincial evangelical church of Hessen-Nassau. For Niemoeller's appeal and reasons for casting invalid votes, as well as the sharply critical response of the press and leading politicians, consult: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 30, 1964 and January 4, 1965; Christ und Welt, January 8, 1965; Die Zeit, January 15, 1965.

62 Although we have stressed the dominance of older age groups, it should be pointed out that more than 4.0% of the voters in each age group of both sexes failed to cast two valid votes in both 1957 and 1961. See above. Table III.

⁶³ Cf. Kirchheimer, "German Democracy in the 1950s," pp. 262-265.

future level and form of German political involvement is unpredictable because the issues of German politics—issues connected with both the German past and the German future—are so important." Present stability, without real political integration, may be deceiving or at least vulnerable. Moreover, privatization, while helpful in reducing political and social conflict over the last decade and a half, may only have made it more difficult to perceive and guard against latent forms of antipathy or nonintegration. High voting turnout by indifferent citizens may actually camouflage depoliticization which is more apparent than real. **

In these circumstances the invalid vote may acquire functional significance as a "barometer of discontent"; it can serve political democracy as an early warning system against potentially stabilizing political attitudes existing or

forming among the electorate.

But if the invalid vote is to serve as an auxiliary tool by which to study German political cleavage and consensus, we must first learn a great deal more about it. Inclusion of an "invalid vote" lever on the new German voting machines is one step in this direction. Another would be the incorporation of a series of questions designed to illuminate invalid vote patterns and motivations into projected Divo, Emnid and Allensbach studies of the forthcom-

⁶⁴ Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," op. cit.

ing 1965 election.66

The West German invalid vote is not simply technical and cannot be eliminated solely by a program of civic instruction designed to reduce voter error. Rooted in several shades and varieties of political protest, and in a generally low level of mass political interest, involvement and integration with the political system; relatively extensive in comparison with other Western European countries; and possessing a potential significance as a "political barometer" which may reach well beyond the small number of voters it actually encompasses, the invalid vote permits, in limited but useful fashion, insights about a number of complex and important problems of mass political participation in contemporary Western Germany.

66 For an intriguing letter-to-the-editor by a disenchanted German citizen, proposing such survev questions as a means of both exercising political opposition and analyzing it, see Christ und Welt, January &, 1965, p. 11. Unfortunately, the Bundesamt has implied its endorsement of vote-counting measures which would obfuscate rather than clarify invalid vote patterns. It suggests that a more realistic appraisal of the number of invalid votes could be gained if separate ballot papers were used for first and second votes, with the voter free to deposit one or both ballots as he sees fit. The two ballots would then be tallied separately. Abstentions would thus appear statistically as lower turnout rather than as deposited blank (invalid) votes. See: Bundesamt: WS 1962(3), p. 145. No doubt, this would be a convenient device for reducing the per cent of invalid votes, but at the expense of making it even more difficult to assess the possible political significance of invalid votes and their combinations on the ballot papers.

cussion in Ulf Himmelstrand, "A Theoretical and Empirical Approach to Depoliticization and Political Involvement," in Rokkan, ed., op. cit., pp. 83-110, and esp. p. 110; and in Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 28-31.

SCIENTISTS AND THE POLICY PROCESS*

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Alan T. Waterman (retired Director of the National Science Foundation and past president of the A.A.A.S.) recently insisted that there is a considerable difference between observations and perceptual images of scientists' behavior in governmental and policy-making situations when made by scientists and when they are made by persons "outside of science."1 Waterman went on to say that most natural scientists would prefer to write on "science" rather than "scientists" in policy-making. Reflection on the implications of these distinctions raises several fascinating questions. In what senses may there be a political science of science? Are only natural and biological scientists equipped to investigate and interpret the behavior of scientists in non-laboratory, public policy-formulating situations? Is it necessary to have separate "natural-scientific" and "socialscientific"—to say nothing of any number of "humanistic"—views of the political role of science? What does it mean to say that the proper focus of study is the representation of science, rather than scientists in government?

The foregoing questions could be analyzed and argued philosophically; but that is not my purpose here—beyond conveying the reminder that "science makes progress largely by redefining the key questions and problems." The present paper, based on selective interviews and intensive examination of the growing literature on science-government relations, attempts instead to do three things: (1) to identify the principal concepts and models that postulate the separation, but at the same time the vital connection, between the political framework of coercive public authority and the voluntary, established organization of scientific effort in society, and in so doing to make explicit certain attributes and characteristics of science and scientists viewed as a political constituency; (2) to report some findings from a study of scientists in the Executive Office of the President, including an appraisal of the conditions attached to accepting responsibility for shaping controversial decisions of public policy;

* Delivered at the Annual Meetings, American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 9, 1964.

¹ Science, Vol. 144 (19 June 1964), p. 1438. A review of R. Gilpin and C. Wright, Scientists and National Policy-Making (New York, Columbia University Press, 1964).

and (3) to distinguish several major, different types or patterns of policy-making affecting science. The paper specifically excludes consideration of the effects of government policy and scientific participation therein upon the conduct of scientific research in government, industry or the universities.

I. SCIENCE AND THE POLITICAL ORDER

The first step in cutting through the conceptual complexity and semantic confusion that bedevil understanding of science-government relations is to develop a skeptical attitude toward divisions of the field into two broad categories, such as Wiesner's differentiation of "science in policy" from "policy for science,"2 Wright's separation of "science" from "science affairs," and Waterman's notion that the "representation of science" in government is somehow different from scientists acting as official advisers and administrators in government positions. Useful as such ideas may be in a preliminary way to introduce order into chaos, it turns out that these distinctions are not really fundamental analytical categories, but are actually labels for different parts of the total problem.

Thus Wiesner very understandably differentiates between (a) the policy problems of recruiting and mobilizing competent scientific advice to work on the formulation of urgent national policies which require a considerable amount of technical, scientific knowledge for their resolution, and (b) working out either in general or in particular areas the terms and conditions of government support for scientific research, manpower, education and information. For different reasons, Wright, along with Wohlstetter and others, properly insist upon the situational and environmental differences between the methods and behavior of scientific workers in the laboratory, when the scientist is engaged in investigating a problem of knowledge, and what is involved when scientists engage upon the external affairs of science, e.g., the work of planning, organization, finance,

² Jerome B. Wiesner, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, *Systems* Development and Management, Part 1, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (1962), p. 142.

³ Gilpin and Wright, op. cit., p. 257.

communication and consultation that links the world of science with education, industry and government. Waterman, finally, groups together what to him are the important issues of public support for science and taking a scientific approach (that taken by scientists) to policy questions—preferring not to discuss the less interesting, perhaps distasteful organizational and administrative problems of getting scientists into jobs at appropriate levels and points of public decision-making. Each of these terms or phrases refers to a problematic aspect of science policy; none of them provides a reliable conceptual map of the field.

Does such a map exist? The rudiments have been outlined for the United States in Vannevar Bush's famous 1945 report, Science: The Endless Frontier, which should be read with the annotated progress report 15 years later by Alan Waterman,⁴ in penetrating articles by Don K. Price and Wallace Sayre,⁵ and in two comparative sketches by Alexander King.⁶ From these sources we can visualize national science policy (used interchangeably with the term "Government-Science Relations"), as an area comprising the following related elements:

- 1. The values and relations of science to the nation
- The national strategy of scientific development
- 3. Government science organization
- 4. Policies and practices in support of science

Elaboration of these categories should produce a comprehensive picture of the field, understanding of the linkages between the parts and the whole, and identification of the institutional components of the system and processes of science policy-making.

Detailed elaboration of the above categories will have to be reserved for another place. For the present, it must suffice to observe that what we call the values and relations of science to the nation are the authoritative public attitudes and doctrinal beliefs defining the national purposes with respect to science and establishing the boundaries between the scientific and the political communities. By national strategy for science is meant the operative, explicit and implicit norms of the policy processes that guide the determination of goals and priorities

- 4 National Science Foundation, 1960 (NSF-60-40).
- ⁵ Reprinted in Gilpin and Wright, op. cit., pp. 19-40: 97-112.
- ⁶ "Towards A National Science Policy," Impact of Science on Society, Vol. XII (1962), pp. 157-175; "Science and Technology in the New Europe," Daedalus (Winter, 1964), pp. 434-58.

among the competing claims for support of scientific research. Government science organization refers to the official, authoritative definitions of the structure, location and missions of government departments and agencies administering programs of scientific research and development, including the instruments of coordination and communication with the President and Congress. Policies and practices in support of science is a listing of the various kinds and processes of government financing of scientific research, $\epsilon.g.$, (1) basic research; (2) science education, training and manpower; (3) facilities; (4) planning (determination of trends and requirements); (b) budgetary policy (determination of total amounts and allocation of available resources among different programs and projects); (6) government-university and government-industry relationships (including policies governing awards of contracts and grants, indirect costs, conflicts of interest and standards of conduct for persons engaged in government-financed research, etc.); (7) scientific information; (8) civilian technology; and (9) international aspects of science. The list, of course, could be expanded to include the whole range of subject-matter areas of government support for scientific research, such as military weapons, space exploration, atomic energy, medical and agricultural research, down through the more controversial fields of natural resources and conservation, communication and transportation, housing and urban redevelopment, measures for alleviating unemployment and retraining of technologically displaced workers, delinquency and crime, social insurance, and so on throughout the entire agenda of modern government.7

Taking these four categories, with their accompanying subdivisions, to constitute an adequate conceptual outline of the field of government-science relations, it immediately appears that much of what has been called the "politics of science" falls within the first two, which have to do with the constitutional principles that in broad terms define the legitimate. respective spheres of science and government and the relations between them, and the political assumptions that provide the context for controversial decisions establishing goals and priorities among conflicting claims for government support of scientific research. Constitutional principles and political assumptions may be called operative norms, authoritative attitudes, embodied in a public philosophy of

⁷ Charles A. Beard, *The New Leviathan* (New York, 1930) was an early effort to treat American government in the context of science and technology.

science-government relations. As such they are intangible matters of conviction and belief: they also reflect or are associated with very materialistic interests and values; they are at once the product and the source of historical evolution and institutional change. In the United States we have seen both massive, longrun and dramatic, short-run changes in these constitutional attitudes during the twenty-five years since 1940 (for evidence, compare the National Resources Planning Board's 1938 report, Research: A National Resource with Appendix G of the President's Executive Budget for 1964). In this political perspective of changing values, interests, and institutions, what models or theories help to explain the evolving relations of science and government?

Even if we accept the "scientific war" of 1939-1945 as the great divide marking the revolution in the relations between science and politics, there are strong reasons for questioning the representative accuracy of the notion of the pre-1940 scientific world as one inhabited by isolated, autonomous, independent workers in university or industrial laboratories, engaged in a "pure" quest for knowledge for its own sake, motivated only by the curiosity of the truth-seeker. Undoubtedly such individuals existed, but the scientific societies and institutes financed by royal (European) and philanthropic or industrial grants (United States) were always proud to justify their work and activities by the derivative benefits and technological uses of scientific ideas. Moreover, the organization of scientific research comprised the same groupings before 1940 as after 1945 namely, university professors and research assistants engaged in research, industrial research laboratories, government agencies engaged in more or less basic research associated with the missions (purposes) of their parent departments (Naval Observatory, Weather Bureau, Geological Survey, Agricultural Experiment Stations, Bureau of Standards, etc.), and nonprofit research corporations and institutes financed both by private foundations and public capital (Carnegie Institution, Rockefeller Institute, Smithsonian Institution, to name but a few). Scientists were organized into professional associations by disciplines of knowledge, and by cooptive recognition into National Academies of Science for voluntary and cooperative services to the nation upon request. Even the devices of governmental delegation or devolution of scientific research by contract or grant to universities, industrial corporations, or nonprofit research organizations, were known before 1940. The quantum shift that World War II brought about was partly attitudinal, partly materialistic, in the sheer magnitude of changes in dollar volume of governmental support for scientific research. It followed from the mutual recognition of politicians, science administrators and scientific workers that: (a) science and technology were strategically important elements of national strength and power, militarily speaking, (b) science and technology were not merely culturally and educationally advantageous in personal terms, or industrially profitable, but were a national asset and resource upon which national political and economic development depended.

Not all at once, and not without controversy, nations discovered that the advancement of scientific knowledge had become an object of major national policy, not only in conjunction with specific agency programs (Defense, Atomic Energy, Space) but also to encourage and enlarge the supply of scientific manpower in the nation by direct support of scientists engaged in basic research and of institutions engaged in recruiting and educating scientists for the future. This shift in "constitutional thinking" was not brought about by ideological conversion, but by the dramatic demonstration of events, and by scientists who participated in the construction of those events becoming convinced that they should participate in the policy decisions establishing the conditions of government support for scientific growth and progress.

Much of the story of how scientists were mobilized for the nation's service has been and is being written elsewhere. In searching for a model to describe the process whereby the revolution in government-science relations was brought about, the notion of some of the atomic scientists that the effective instrument was their organizing themselves into a pressure group for purposes of popular information and congressional lobbying, I am convinced, has been overstated. The political concept, and the instrument, of the transformation that comes much closer to reality is, in my opinion, Don K. Price's idea of the establishment—that is to say,

8 R. G. Hewlett and O. E. Anderson, The New World: 1939-1946 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962); the autobiographical works of A. H. Compton, Harold Groves, and L. L. Strauss; Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960); D. K. Price, Government and Science (New York, New York University Press, 1954); J. S. Dupre and S. A. Lakoff, Science and the Nation (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962); D. Wolfle, Science and Public Policy (University of Nebraska Press, 1959); R. Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Policy (Princeton University Press, 1962).

certain individuals who made themselves useful in the achievement of governmental purposes by showing the politicians and administrators helpful and acceptable ways of mobilizing for government employment the skills and resources of scientists.

Such relationships of course go back many years. The most recent stage began around 1940, when scientists began to work on weapons technology, such as the development of radar and electronic detection devices, the proximity fuse, and the controlled release of nuclear energy, for the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Such men as Vannevar Bush, J. B. Conant and K. T. Compton were the mediaries between the President, the military and the M.I.T. and California Radiation Laboratories, the Chicago and Los Alamos Metallurgical Projects. Second. some scientists in Britain and the United States began to work on so-called "operations research," constructing mathematical models of alternative military situations, predicting and evaluating the results of alternative weapons systems and strategies. At a lower level, others accepted employment as consultants and advisers to military and civilian agencies, developing and testing technical aspects of their operating programs.

After the war, a new form of assistance to government came on the scene, namely, that of reviewing and advising on the desirability and feasibility of research proposals submitted to government agencies (again both military and civilian) for support; this led naturally to being asked by such agencies to evaluate (including recommendations to proceed with, to modify or to drop) specific scientific or technological programs for budgetary purposes or policy reasons related to the national health and safety. Having earned their keep, as it were, in connection with operating departmental and bureau programs in the military and civilian agencies, it was only a matter of time (1951) and Sputnik (1957) before scientists were drafted into service at the highest executive and legislative levels of government to evaluate competing programs and proposals between departments for budgetary and other policy reasons, to study specific areas of science to identify new opportunities for research and development, to formulate coherent national programs of research support, and to advise on organizational responsibilities involving the most effective coordination and economic allocation of scientific resources.9 In all this, by making their services available, valuable, and

⁹ Harvey Brooks, "The Scientific Adviser," in Gilpin and Wright, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

sought after by the government, scientists were not acting in a representative capacity, speaking for the scientific community and bringing pressure to bear upon government after the manner of a pressure group, but rather were acting as a skill group of varying technical specialties, individually contributing their services as members of the official team (not to say "family") determining policy for science-related and science-affecting government programs.

Now, it is not quite accurate to say that the scientific establishment acts only through individuals. Their ability, reputation and contribution are the product of a complex system of professional training, competence, standards, performance, recognition, and employment by a university, industrial concern, foundation or government giving them autonomous and prestigious status in society. The utilization of scientists as a professional skill group resembles that of the lawyers more than the military specialists, whose recruitment, training and equipment is that of a special class of government service. In contrast with the differentiated processes of formal litigation and the application of organized force that the legal and military groups have developed, there is as yet no technique conventionally recognized as a distinctive process of scientific policy-making and execution, in the general sense of "the systematic application of logico-experimental methods of testing knowledge to the solution of public problems." The calling or vocation of science may share common or general standards of competence and evidence for ascertaining truth, including personal and social values required for supporting the advancement of knowledge, 10 but the methods of science seem to be limited by the nature of the subjectmatter and the technical specialties appropriate to the analysis of the particular segment of reality selected for investigation. Scientists may become politicians or administrators, just as lawyers do, but the fact that the content of so many political decisions has become heavily scientific has not yet produced a transformation (or adaptation) of governmental decision-making processes to the scientific model for resolving conflicts of opinion, interest or power. We cannot yet specify an agreed-upon statement of the requisite conditions of a scientific model for

¹⁰ Max Weber, "The Vocation of Science," in H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in General Sociology (Oxford, 1946); W. R. Schilling, "Scientists, Foreign Policy and Politics," in Gilpin and Wright, op. cit., pp. 144 ff; D. Bell, "Twelve Modes of Prediction," Daedalus (Summer 1964), pp. 845–80.

public decision-making, 11 operations research and game theory to the contrary notwith-standing.

We thus are obliged to conclude for the time being that the scientific community is not organized nor does it act in the conventional sense of a political constituency or interest group. Its usefulness to government consists in objective skills associated with control of the material environment.12 Scientists as a technical, policy-making skill group are organized on a craft and confederation basis cutting across the private and governmental economies; they are represented in the public order by a variety of cooptive, consultative, contractual, employment and subsidy arrangements. Instead of visualizing a single process or agency (such as a Department of Science) staffed by scientists prepared to apply a distinctive body of concepts and techniques to the solution of problems, we must continue to visualize and invent improved ways of associating different kinds of scientists with different kinds of responsibilities for achieving public purposes, at operating, staff, executive and legislative levels.13

II. REPRESENTATION OF SCIENCE IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

1960-61 there were approximately 1,400,000 professional scientists and engineers in the United States; some 387,000 were working on federally financed research and development: 201,000 scientists (relatively few engineers) reported to the National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel, and about 155,000 scientists and engineers were employed by the federal government. Robert C. Wood and Christopher Wright have independently estimated the size of the science establishment -depending upon whether one takes the criterion of "consistently influential in national science policy" or "continually engaged in the conduct of national science affairs" at from 200-400 at the lower limit to 800-1,000 at the

TABLE I. INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF MEMBERS
OF PANELS, SUBPANELS, AND CONSULTANTS TO THE
PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
1962-63*

Category	Number	Per Cent
University scientists and administrators	153	50.7
Research foundations, insti- tutes, contractors	53	18.3
Industrial research execu- tives Government scientists and	52	18.2
administrators	32	10.8
Total	290	100.0

* I am indebted to Mr. Daniel Z. Beckler, Assistant to the Director, Office of Science and Technology, for access to the materials from which this table was compiled.

upper.¹⁴ During the winter of 1962-63, the writer had the opportunity of examining the names and institutional affiliations of persons currently serving as members of panels, subpanels and consultants to the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). There were 290 individuals of whom one-half were affiliated with universities in either a scientific or administrative capacity, one-fifth each came from private, nonprofit research institutes and from industry, and one-tenth were government scientists or administrators. Most of them worked on a part-time basis, of course, presumably on leave of absence from, or in addition to. regular research, teaching or administrative duties.

Taking them by their institutional affiliations, the 22 members of the PSAC and alumni consultants-at-large were numerically dominated by university professors (16), the remaining six being divided between medical research (2), university or business administration (2) and industrial research (2). By scientific occupation, physics and electrical engineering dominated the group (12); next came chemists and the chemical engineers (4), with medical research and administration (4), and finally mathematics (2). Informal, personal and experimental bases of group alignments within PSAC remain to be derived from career and' interview data. For example, a number served on the Research and Development Board and advisory committee structure of the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commis-

¹¹ Huxley's Brave New World; Orwell's 1984; Harvey Wheeler, Science and Democratic Government (Center for Study of Democratic Institutions); and the literary attack upon C. P. Snow's The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution are familiar illustrations of the controversies. But see J. Bronowski's Science and Human Values (1956) and K. Polanyi's Personal Knowledge (1958).

R. C. Wood, "Scientists As an A-Political Elite," in Gilpin and Wright, op. cit., pp. 41-72.
 D. Lerner and H. C. Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford University Press, 1949);
 D. Lerner, ed., The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences (Meridian Books, 1959).

¹⁴ Gilpin and Wright, op. cit., pp. 48, 273.

sion; several were associated with the M.I.T. and Berkeley Radiation Laboratories during World War II. Geographically, the residences of the PSAC members were concentrated among states on the east coast (17), with only 2 from the west coast and 3 from the midwest. Terms of appointment to PSAC are normally for four years; reappointment is not uncommon, so that about half of those serving in 1962-63 had been members in 1958. The average age of the members was reported in 1963 to be 49. The recruitment process appears to be one of co-optation, governed by the following factors: (1) experience, contribution and distinction during World War II; (2) distinguished service and prominence on departmental or agency advisory committees in the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission; (3) the presidency or high office in the National Academy of Sciences; (4) distinguished service with one of the outstanding private research foundations: (5) major theoretical or technical contributions to basic science. As time goes on, we may expect the importance of (1) and (5) to decline relatively to the other three. There is a remarkable continuity and overlapping of names on the rosters of OSRD and the research organizations it supported, the consultants and advisers to the Office of Naval Research and Research and Development Board of the Defense Department (1947-53), the Defense Science Board (after 1953), and the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission.

These data go far to support Huntington's thesis that the group affiliations and the interpenetration of institutional hierarchies are two of the critical indices for assessing the political influence of policy-making elites (in that case, the military).15 When to them is added the criterion of association (through consultation and recommendation) with the allocation of tremendous sums for particular weapons systems, approval or "scratching" of broad, national programs of support for both research and facilities, and assignment of respective organizational responsibilities, there is no doubt that the university scientists have acquired a strong position among the seats of the mighty. However, certain conditional features of their influence should be specified, both of a positive and negative character.

First, and perhaps the most important dependent variable, is their technical usefulness to the Chief Executive, namely, to review and evaluate objectively the competing, interested, bureaucratic claims (from the military or

¹⁵ S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Random House, Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 88-9.

civilian agencies of government, university or industrial interests) for the need and priority of their research or operating programs, all of which have their own scientific protagonists. It is this variable, probably, which explains the atmosphere and environment of secrecy surrounding PSAC proceedings, in what C. P. Snow calls "closed committee politics." Scientific advice also loses its helpfulness to the Chief Executive if he cannot trust technical recommendations tainted by special scientific interests, personalistic drives, and political motivations either in the partisan or the interest group sense. At the same time, scientists do not relish publicity among their colleagues with respect to their personal responsibility for official decisions vitally affecting the lives, interests and reputations of their professional colleagues. Closely connected with these implicit factors in the environment of decision is the hard fact that the scientific, technical alternatives-quite aside from the intangible assumptions about the national interest-are neither understood by nor susceptible to the test of public preference and popular satisfaction. For such considerations the Chief Executive must assume responsibility (in the basic sense of political representation), until such time as we can invent ways of sharing his authority with leaders of legislative and influential group opinion. Interest group negotiation on behalf of publicly informed constituencies would destroy the utility and defeat the purpose of objective deliberation and scientific recommendation in the Executive office. 17

The second structural, dependent variable which qualifies the influence of non-government scientists on the PSAC is their relation to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. While the members collectively have the right to elect their own chairman and to report directly to the President, under all four Assistants (Killian, Kistiakowsky, Wiesner and Hornig) they have in fact chosen the President's Assistant as their chairman, and found communication and reporting through him quite compatible with maintenance of their professional objectivity and public responsibility. This balance or equilibrium is extremely important, because the President cannot talk familiarly and confidentially to a committee of part-time consultants and advisers, while the usefulness of his Science Adviser depends very largely upon the latter's ability to mobilize the

¹⁶ Science and Government (Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 56-66.

¹⁷ D. K. Price, Science, Vol. 142 (6 December 1963).

working energies and retain the respect of leading scientists throughout the nation. When this relation is operational, the PSAC serves the nation in giving the President competent help not only in deciding complex specific issues of weapons technology, affecting military and foreign policy, but also in broad decisions as to areas and programs of scientific research to support. Through a series of educational reports, it helps him to lead and create public and congressional opinion concerning the conditions, uses, limitations and needs of scientific progress.

The third conditioning variable is the relationship between the non-government (mostly university) scientists on the PSAC and the government scientists and science administrators. The diversified, hierarchical governmental structure requires some formal mechanism, which usually takes the form of an interdepartmental committee, and since 1959 has been called the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST). This also is chaired by the President's Special Assistant, and is composed of eight other government officials, either the chairman or administrator of a major science agency (NASA; AEC; NSF) or the assistant secretary or principal science adviser to the Secretaries of the largest scienceaffecting departments (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, HEW, and Interior). Like PSAC, the FCST works primarily through committees and subcommittees. In 1962-63 there were nine standing committees, composed of some 70-80 subordinates of the nine Council members, and a secretarial staff drawn from the Office of Science and Technology and Bureau of the Budget. Here all the problems of government structure and hierarchy are presented: the government laboratory scientists have to filter their views through administrative superiors; bureau chiefs have their own problems of access and influence with department heads, assistant secretaries and other bureau chiefs; and the principals on the Federal Council are themselves mostly at a level below the Secretarial or Cabinet level, and so cannot report directly to the President. Government scientists therefore feel that they are under-represented in the Executive Office, in prestige and influence, compared to non-government scientists in the PSAC. This is probably unavoidable, unless in the unlikely event that the President were to delegate—and so downgrade -the staff function of his Special Assistant for Science to a Cabinet (Interdepartmental) Committee. The PSAC is very much aware of the problems of government science: it was responsible for the creation of the FCST in 1959. Through the leadership and initiative of the President's Assistant, it has invited many government scientists, members of the Council and their alternates to serve on PSAC panels; it has encouraged and participated in several investigations and reports dealing with the problems of recruiting, compensating, moralebuilding and retaining scientists in government employment: it has fostered and supervised the work of several interdepartmental committees. notably in oceanography and atmospheric sciences, which developed coordinated, longrange, inter-agency programs of government research support. In the last analysis, however, the PSAC's and the Special Assistant's value consist not in solving the administrative problems of government science—to which they can contribute only tangentially-but in their detachment from departmental, agency and bureau programs, and in bringing their objective judgment to bear on the national problems of balancing the programs and interests of university, government, and industrial research.

The first postwar presidential science adviser (Oliver Buckley of the Bell Telephone Laboratories), appointed in 1951 by President Truman, came from industry. But his four successors have been university-affiliated, and industrial scientists have never constituted more than a small minority of PSAC and its panels. Industrial research executives have been more prominent on Defense and AEC advisory and consultative groups, as perhaps might be expected, in connection with operating programs of applied research and development, rather than in promotion of basic science or at the Executive Office level. On the other hand, private research foundations have contributed significantly to the personnel of presidential science consultation, beginning with Vannevar Bush from the Carnegie Institution and continuing through Detlev Bronk of the Rockefeller Institute and National Academy of Sciences (which in the United States is a nongovernment instrumentality, although chartered by Act of Congress in 1863).

At one time it was thought that the National Science Board and its Director under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 would become an instrument of science representation and national science policy-making. Under its first Director, Alan T. Waterman (1950–1963), the National Science Board became representative more of college and university presidents than of scientists, and the Board confined itself to policy development primarily in the fields of basic research, education and government-university relations rather than in the coordination of government science policies generally, or in the resolution of science-related policy issues involving military or other

agencies at the presidential level. The Board and the Foundation have always contributed greatly through staff assistance and other help to the work of PSAC and the Presidential Science Assistants, particularly in the fields of scientific manpower and education. In 1962, President Kennedy's Reorganization Plan No. 2 (87th Cong., 2d sess., H.R. Doc. 372) creating the Office of Science and Technology (OST) in the Executive Office of the President, headed by the President's Special Assistant, finally transferred the statutory powers of the National Science Board for evaluation, review and coordination of federal science programs to the OST.

It is still too soon to evaluate properly the effects of the 1962 action giving statutory status to the Presidential Science Adviser as Director of OST, almost parallel to the Director of the Budget and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. The significance of the step was a gesture to Congressional feelings of ignorance and uncertainty concerning the facts and responsibilities for important policy decisions affecting science being made in the Executive Office. The first Director of OST, in his testimony justifying establishment of the Office, made the explicit distinction between matters of confidential advice to the President on issues where scientific questions were concerned, and matters of overall review, evaluation and coordination of the very large and growing scientific research programs of the federal government. The implication was that Congress had the right to know the considerations underlying Presidential budgetary and policy recommendations requiring Congressional authorization and appropriation of funds. We still lack detailed knowledge of whether Wiesner was able to maintain this distinction in testifying before Congressional committees, avoiding exposure of the personalities associated with differences of view and final disposition of issues, while satisfying the congressmen of the completeness of his reports and the soundness and accuracy of decisions made by the Executive branch. It is the counterpart of the distinction that Edwin G. Nourse, first Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, insisted upon, in refusing to testify before the congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report in support of the President's program. 18 Congressional agitation

¹⁸ See his memoir, Economics in the Public Service (New York, 1953), esp. pp. 203, 221, 270; and Corinne Silverman, The President's Economic Advisers, Inter-University Case Program, No. 48 (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill), reprinted in E. A. Bock and A. K. Campbell, eds., Case Studies in

has not disappeared for additional machinery to oversee and administer federal science policy—witness the 1963 Report of the Senate Government Operations Committee, Establishment of a Commission on Science and Technology, 19 on S. 816 (McClellan), and Senator Bartlett's bill (S. 2038) to establish a Joint Congressional Committee and Office of Science and Technology.

To sum up this discussion of scientific representation at the highest levels of government, one may ask whether the term "scientific establishment" is appropriate to describe the formal-informal, inter-agency, composite structure of policy advice and consultation, the contract-and-subsidy-supported, decentralized administration of scientific research and development that unites universities, private foundations, industry contractors and government bureaus in the nation's scientific effort. But regardless of the label, one must agree with President Lee DuBridge of the California Institute of Technology that the crucial questions involved in the science-government relation are not whether but now the government is to enlist the help of the most competent, available members of the scientific community in meeting its problems in the revolutionary age of science and technology; and how the government organizes and applies the diverse institutional components of this community to the science-related issues affecting the public interest and the fostering of scientific progress. We must also agree with him that the criteria of evaluation are whether the scientists' contribution has been characterized by the highest levels of competence, breadth of vision and foresight, personal objectivity and conscien-

American Government (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962), pp. 301-24. Unlike Wiesner, Nourse wanted to dissociate himself from the advice the President took, while maintaining the scientific integrity of the Council's *Economic Report*; he soon found his position untenable.

19 88th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rep. No. 16. The hearings and report reveal that the idea of a federal department of science is by no means defunct, both as a vehicle for congressional control and some scientists' conception of how science policy should be made, notwithstanding the almost unanimous opposition of the scientific establishment and informed political scientists.

The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress has lately formed a Science Policy Research Division, headed by Edward C. Welsh, Jr., formerly Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. New York Times, August 30, 1964.

tiousness, in the most inclusive sense of the nation's interests.²⁰

III. THE ROLES OF SCIENCE IN POLICY

Science and scientists are represented in the political and governmental order because of their utility (one might say indispensability) not because of their omniscience or correctness of judgment.21 The problem of scientific representation, then, is not a case of an omnipotent, ruling clique, but a significant case in the general problem of the relation of the expert in the policy-shaping process. In the first section of this paper, the concept of that process as conforming or analogous to the model of the scientific worker in the laboratory was rejected. Several different functional roles in public service were distinguished which scientists have successfully demonstrated their competence to fill. These roles may be briefly recapitulated:

- 1. Scientific laboratory research in cooperation with government agencies,
 - (a) in government laboratories (basic or applied)
 - (b) in industrial laboratories (applied, development and testing)
- (c) in universities (basic and applied).2. Direct support of basic research: review and evaluation of proposals for research
- support (e.g., panels of NSF and NIH).

 3. Authorization and review of research programs (in-house, contracted, or subsidized), communication into policy channels, and translation into policy alternatives for decision:
 - (a) technical consultation or service
 - (b) administrative: continuing supervision, evaluation.
- 4. Research on the politics of choice (prediction and evaluation of alternative strategies of decision).
- 5. Formulation of specific or broad, coherent programs of research support through government funding:
 - (a) mission-related, within agencies
 - (b) inter-agency programs
 - (c) science education; recruitment and training of scientific manpower.
- 6. Evaluation, coordination, allocation of all scientific programs:
 - (a) among fields of basic scientific research
- ²⁰ "Policy and the Scientists," Foreign Affairs (April, 1963), pp. 571-88.
- ²¹ The essays by Albert Wohlstetter and Bernard Brodie in the Gilpin and Wright volume provide ample evidence for the fallibility and limitations of scientific judgment in policy situations.

- (b) between basic, applied R&D, and agency missions
- (c) general policies for modes of research support (contracts vs. grants; project vs. institutional; indirect costs; government-industry-university relationships).

Generally speaking, the kinds of services listed proceed from the more technical to the more policy-oriented, from the operating levels of agency research programs to the staff and higher policy levels of departmental and government-wide management and coordination. The recruitment and upward mobility of scientists into administrative work and government policy committees proceeds to some extent along the line of progression from function I to 6. But the distinction between the technical aspects of knowledge tested and testable by research, and the applications of knowledge in policy is but a matter of degree.22 As the character of problems departs from those which can be stated and answered with almost complete precision and certainty, to those about which information on the several variables is uncertain and the inferences debatable, to those about which the variables, the respective weights and conclusions are all speculative, the problem is not simply a matter of substituting the judgment of the policymaker for the expert's but one of eliciting the contribution of each and finding an appropriate balance between the several expertnesses involved. It is most interesting to observe the parallels between the recent thought about the contributions of the military to policy and that of the scientists.23 The contemporary emphasis in both fields seems to be upon professional objectivity and balance in the presentation of the technical, i.e., the military or the scientific, factors and viewpoints, along with the political, economic or moral aspects of the particular policy problem. If then, to adapt Huntington's terminology to another context, high professional objectivity is associated with low political (electoral) involvement and high popular prestige, the contemporary relations between science and government would appear to be consistent with a long-standing American tradition.

- ²² H. D. Smyth, "Science and National Policy," Walter J. Shepard Lecture, Ohio State University, February 8, 1961.
- ²³ See testimony of Col. G. A. Lincoln and appendices, Hearing Before (Jackson) Subcommittee of Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 88th Cong., 2d sess., "Administration of National Security," Part 9 (June 25, 1964), esp. pp. 560-1.

DEMOCRACY, ORGANIZATION, MICHELS

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This article marks an attempt to clarify the teachings of Robert Michels. It suggests that in Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (1915), Michels presented a favorable account of the compatibility of organization and democracy.

Other treatments attribute to Michels a thesis of the following kind: (1) Large, organizationally complex associations, compared with small, simple associations, are likely to be governed by cliques whose powers (disposable resources, freedom of action, security of tenure) are abundant and whose policies (use of official status and resources) deviate from the policy-preferences of their constituents. (2) Increments of Organization (of scale, or members, and of complexity, or procedural formality, functional differentiation, stratification, specialization, hierarchy, and bureaucracy) augment the powers and the policy-deviating propensities of leaders vis-à-vis followers.

¹ See S. M. Lipset's introduction to the Collier Books edition (1962) of Political Parties, and the commentaries cited by Lipset. For additional statements or approximations of this version of Michels's thesis, and some challenges, see the following: P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, Format Organizations (Chandler, 1962), pp. 48, 228; R. C. Brooks, Political Parties and Electoral Problems (Harper, 1933), p. 30; F. W. Coker, Recent Political Thought (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1934), p. 328; R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (Harper, 1953), pp. 279-85; A. W. Gouldner, ed., Studies in Leadership, pp. 418-35 (T. W. Adorno) and 477-504 (B. Barber); H. S. Hughes, Consciousness and Society (Vintage, 1951), ch. 7; Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (Random House, 1963), pp. 72-3, 80, 263, 273-74; Arthur Kornhauser and others, eds., Industrial Conflict (McGraw-Hill, 1954), ch. 9 (L. H. Fisher and G. McConnell); H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (Yale, 1950); R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (Macmillan, 1959), pp. 122, 140, 434; R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (Praeger, 1964 ed.), pp. 15-17, ch. 11; C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes, eds., A History of Political Theories: Recent Times (Macmillan, 1924), pp. 56-67, 383; Max Nomad, Aspects of Revolt (Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1959), ch. 1; Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society (Knopf, 1962), pp. 4, 41-52; It probably is true that in Michels's terms, a system where leaders possess the means and the disposition to ignore their followers' will (or wills) is an undemocratic system.² It is not true that on Michels's showing, organization is relatively inhospitable to democratic leader-follower relations. It is not true that Michels portrays increments of Organization as breeders, persistently and proportionally, of counter-democratic changes. Instead, he argues (in a complex but not inconsistent manner) that Organization is incompatible with the attainment or maintenance of absolute democracy and yet can be a source, in many cases and in many ways, of democratization.

It is true that Michels deplored Organization. It is true that Michels voiced a profound pessimism about the fate of mankind, a pessimism rooted in conceptions of the indispensability and the consequences of Organization. It is not true that Michels's pessimism was the pessimism of a democrat.

Far from being a democrat, Michels was a

J. M. Pfiffner and F. P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization (Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 338; Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 42, 82, 100, 120-28, 134; David Spitz, Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought (Macmillan, 1949), esp. p. 27 and the treatment in Part II of James Burnham's The Machiavellians; D. B. Truman, The Governmental Process (Knopf, 1955), pp. 137-55; and Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," this Review, Vol. 46 (March 1952), pp. 100-01.

² Michels does not use the terms "democracy," "oligarchy," and "crganization" in a consistent or coherent manner. The terminological difficulties have been probed by C. W. Cassinelli, in "The Law of Oligarchy," this REVIEW, Vol. 47 (Sept. 1953), p. 3 f. However, Michels persistently associates democracy with equality, with conditions suggesting the notion of popular sovereignty, and with the "system in which delegates represent the mass and carry out its will." On the other hand, he speaks of "The notion of the representation of popular interests, a notion to which the great majority of democrats... cleave. . . . " Political Parties, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Dover Publications, 1959), esp. pp. 1-2, 27, 401. References hereafter will be to this edition unless designated otherwise.

Romantic Revolutionist. He deplored the "conservative" effects of Organization—its general tendency to facilitate the maintenance of a society which is not and cannot be perfectly democratic, and its particular tendency to dissipate "revolutionary currents" in society. But by his account, Organization is counter-revolutionary precisely because it facilitates the amelioration of discontents and injustices; it facilitates democratization.

Far from being a democrat, moreover, Michels was a Scientific Paternalist. He portrayed, and lamented, Organization as the nemesis of authority-systems wherein leaders possess the means and the disposition to voice the scientifically ascertained Interests of the "mass." But by his account, Organization facilitates the advent and the maintenance of leaders who are able and willing to express the manifest wills of their clients or constituents.

Such, at any rate, is the interpretation which seems consistent with the following analysis of (I) Michels's account of general historical trends, (II) his basic reasoning, and (III) his treatment of the Socialist experience.

T

According to Michels's account of general trends, democratization has persistently accompanied Organization.

The modern era, in which "political and economic life" acquires increasingly "complex forms," and in which massive bureaucratization occurs in the state and industry and labor, is "what we know as the era of democracy." Only the "blind and fanatical" fail to perceive that "the democratic current daily makes undeniable advance."

Modern "state institutions" exhibit "increasing democratization." Human "freedoms and privileges" have broadened. The workers are enjoying "better conditions of labor;" their burgeoning aptitude for "criticism and control" is bound to increase further "in proportion as the economic status of the masses undergoes improvement and becomes more stable, and as the masses are admitted more effectively to the advantages of civilization."

Michels stipulates that in "the sphere of party" as contrasted with "the sphere of the state," democracy is in a "descending phase." Yet he testifies that a "democratic external form" prevails among modern parties. The aristocratic parties have come to espouse "democratic" policies, and some liberal and

The foregoing citations are not arbitrarily selective. Michels does not specifically name any associations in which democracy has been attenuated by Organization.

His contradictory testimony concerning party evolution may be ascribed to at least two sources. On the one hand, it may be ascribed to inconsistent, ambiguous use of the term "party." Sometimes "party" denotes an existential aggregate; sometimes if refers to a hypothetical aggregate. Thus, the so-called, existential 'parties' have not manifested counter-democratic changes, but hypothetical, authentic 'parties' must undergo such changes.

On the other hand, his contradictory testimony may be ascribed to inconsistent, ambiguous use of the term "democracy." Sometimes "democracy" signifies close control by followers over leaders; sometimes it signifies a distinctive associational character (an ideological, sociological, operational uniqueness) and a moral commitment to the cause of social-democratic revolution.

Only in the latter unconventional sense, and only with respect to hypothetical aggregates, does he sustain the argument that 'parties' necessarily undergo a counter-'democratic' transformation.

)11.

II

According to Michels's basic reasoning, Organization precludes democracy, and can destroy democracy, and can facilitate democratization.

These three propositions are not contradictory. The first pertains to what is ultimately attainable. The others pertain to what can happen in various situations.

Organization precludes democracy. Michels argues persuasively that the presence of Organization is incompatible with the presence of democracy:

conservative parties have worked "essentially" for "socialist ideas and for the victory of the proletariat." The Socialist International has changed from an "individual dictatorship" into "a federal republic consisting of several independent oligarchies." Nearly every Socialist and labor group has manifested "tendencies toward decentralization," tendencies which create pluralistic rather than monistic oligarchies. In the German Socialist and labor parties, an "enormous increase" in membership and in organizational development has been accompanied by changes from "dictatorship" to "oligarchy" and to "theoretical and applied democracy."

³ Pp. 33, 40.

⁴ P. 402.

⁵ Pp. 329, 406.

⁶ Pp. 3, 5, 5n, 11, 63, 190, 194, 201.

Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy....Immanent oligarchical tendencies [exist] in every kind of human organization which strives for the attainment of definite ends....Oligarchy is...a preordained form of the common life of great social aggregates.... The majority of human beings, in a condition of eternal tutelage, are predestined... to submit to the dominion of a small minority, and must... constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy.... Leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life [and] every system of leadership is incompatible with the most essential postulates of democracy.... All order and civilization must exhibit aristocratic features.

This reiterated proposition seems logically unassailable, so long as two considerations are kept in mind: (a) the proposition pertains only to the attainability of 'pure' democracy, or absolute equality; and (b) "oligarchy" signifies not the antithesis of democracy, but a condition occupying the ground between pure democracy and pure autocracy.

With these considerations noted, the basis of his proposition can readily be appreciated. The presence of Organization signifies the presence of an association whose members are so numerous that it is technically difficult for all to participate equally in all decisions. This condition also is technically incompatible with the exercise by one member of direct control over the formulation and implementation of policies.

Similarly, the presence of Organization signifies the presence of a "system" of leadership, or of subordinate-superordinate relations, together with an established pattern of differentiated tasks, responsibilities, privileges and resources. These conditions are incompatible with equality—and with autocracy. There must be inequalities, and the inequalities must be multiple. Various tasks and resources are vested in various members of the association, each being endowed with a particular expertise and a particular decisional jurisdiction.

In short, Organization necessitates "oli-

⁷ Pp. 11, 32, 390, 400, 402.

garchy"—that is, arrangements which are neither absolutely democratic nor absolutely autocratic.

Between the poles of pure democracy and pure autocracy lies an enormous range of variations. Although no "system of leadership" can be democratic, some can be less undemocratic than others. Variations can arise from differences in the rules, in the social composition, and in other traits of associations.

Michels does not say, nor does he imply, that the extent of deviation from pure democracy must be directly related to the size or complexity of organization. He does not exclude the possibility that increments of democratization can accompany increments of scale and complexity. Thus his proposition that Organization precludes (absolute) democracy is logically compatible with his reports that democratization has persistently accompanied Organization.

Organization can destroy democracy. Michels devotes most of his attention not to the proposition that Organization is a condition which precludes (absolute) democracy, but to the proposition that Organization is an agent which destroys (absolute) democracy:

Democracy leads to oligarchy, and necessarily contains an oligarchical nucleus... When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely... Oligarchy... issues from democracy... Organization is ... the source from which the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy... The formation of oligarchies within the various forms of democracy is the outcome of organic necessity. 10

The proposition contained in these passages has been persistently misunderstood. It is not that Organization breeds Oligarchy; it is that Democracy leads (through Organization) to Oligarchy. The difference is momentous.

Michels's proposition—his Iron Law of Oligarchy—is a statement about what must happen in groups which initially are democracies. Only when democracy is present initially can it be slain by Organization. Democracy is not self-evidently present in all groups which lack Organization. Some small, primitive groups may be run by bullies; others may be isocracies, or associations of equals. Only in the latter instances can the onset of Organization be blamed for the demise of Democracy.

⁸ We are excluding here Michels's arguments for the indispensability of Organization and his suggestions that the process of Organization tends to be self-accelerating. Attention is confined to the question of what arrangements can be compatible with the presence of Organization.

⁹ For a sophisticated discussion of these processes and of some implications, see Langer, above, note 1, esp. ch. 3.

¹⁰ Pp. viii, 22, 168, 402, 408.

Scholars have persistently inferred that Michels's Law applies, or can apply, to a much broader range of cases—perhaps to the generality of voluntary associations, or of social movements, or of human groups. Michels has been credited with the broad proposition that increments of Organization invariably yield increments of Oligarchy. This misunderstanding may be due to a misapprehension concerning his use of key words. The key words are emphasized in the following passages:

In every organization, whether it be a political party, a professional union, or any other association of the kind, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly. The mechanism of the organization, while conferring a solidity of structure, induces serious changes in the organized mass, completely inverting the respective position of the leaders and the led. As a result of organization, every party or professional union becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of directed.¹²

Reduced to its most concise expression, the fundamental sociological law of political parties (the term "political" being used in its most comprehensive significance) may be formulated in the following terms: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy." 13

The crucial point here is that by "political parties" and "professional unions" Michels does not mean the generality of so-called, historical parties and unions. Instead, he uses these terms to designate the "kind" of association which is emphasized in Marxian thought: association by social class. This qualification is of vital importance.

According to the Marxian formulation, the members of a social class are equal to one another and are endowed with identical needs. If they actively associate, the initial relationship among them must be democratic. The leaders initially will be equal in resources to the followers and will exemplify the policy-preferences of their followers. In Michels's terms, then, who says "party" says initial democracy. Thus,

The term "party" presupposes that among the individual components of the party there should exist a harmonious direction of wills toward

identical objective and practical aims. Where this is lacking, the party becomes a mere "organization." ¹⁴

Similarly, in a "party,"

Originally the chief is merely the servant of the mass. The organization is based upon the absolute equality of its members. Equality is here understood in its most general sense, as an equality of like men. . . . The democratic principle aims at guaranteeing to all an equal influence and an equal participation in the regulation of the common interests. All are electors, and all are eligible for office. . . . All offices are filled by election. The officials, executive organs of the general will, play a merely subordinate part, are always dependent upon the collectivity, and can be deprived of their office at any moment. The mass of the party is omnipotent. 15

From this romantic premise of "pure democracy," Michels unfolds his tragic tale of degeneration wrought by Organization. In "the sphere of party," with "the advance of organization, democracy tends to decline." As far as party life is concerned,

It may be enunciated as a general rule that the increase in the power of the leaders is directly proportional with the extension of the organization. In the various parties and labor organizations of different countries the influence of the leaders is mainly determined . . . by the varying development of organization. Where organization is stronger, we find that there is a lesser degree of applied democracy.¹⁶

Given this premise of initial democracy, Michels is logically free to argue that only at a

¹⁴ P. 376; emphasis added. He also says, "A party is neither a social unity nor an economic unity." (p. 387) His characterization of *change* in parties, however, presupposes initial unity. See section III below, under *Social Pluralism*.

15 Pp. 27-8. Omitted from this quotation is a contradictory remark, illuminating Michels's chronic confusion about the difference between hypothesis and history. He remarks that the "equality of like men" is "manifested" in some cases (i.e., Socialist labor groups) "by the mutual use of the familiar 'thou,' which is employed by the most poorly paid wage-laborer in addressing the most distinguished intellectuals." (p. 27) If poor laborers and intellectuals are associated, then "equality of like men" is absent. The group is not a social democracy, although it may employ equalitarian rituals and it may be pledged to the attainment of social democracy.

16 P. 33.

¹¹ For example, David Easton, *The Political System* (Knopf, 1959), pp. 56-7.

¹² P. 32.

¹³ P. 401.

"second stage" of organizational development (the stage of full-time, salaried, specialized officialdom) do leaders become "stable and irremovable." Similarly, the assumption that the first leaders were indistinguishable from the followers enables him to say that the "first appearance of professional leadership" marks "the beginning of the end" for "democracy," since such leaders are said to be stronger than their followers and to be animated by deviant interests. 18

This line of reasoning depends for its elemental plausibility on the validity of the premise of initial democracy. Michels's argument applies only to cases where "at first" the leaders are "no more than executive organs of the general wills," where the leaders first arise "spontaneously" to perform only "accessory and gratuitous" functions, where the leaders initially are "simple workmates" or "single molecule(s) of the mass." 19

Such reasoning is conspicuous for the contingencies it does not cover. It does not cover associations initially run by bullies. It does not cover groups initially led by men who, instead of being "simple workmates," descend from upper social strata. Since it does not cover cases of this sort, it is neither sustained nor refuted by evidence that in many cases, including cases of so-called political parties, Organization has been accompanied by democratization.

Organization can facilitate democratization. The propositions that Organization precludes absolute democracy and can destroy absolute democracy do not exclude the possibility that Organization can facilitate democratization. Two broad possibilities, within appropriate circumstances, are discernible from Michels's analysis.

(1) Organization can facilitate 'external' democratization. Michels teaches that Organization is the "weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong"—an instrument which facilitates "economy of effort" and the political utilization of numerical strength.²⁰ He acknowledges that "Within certain narrow limits, the democratic party, even when subjected to oligarchical control, can doubtless act upon the state in a democratic sense."²¹ (In the context, the phrase "democratic party" evidently denotes a kind of aim or interest, rather than an

In this argument Michels covers a contingency which he has been accused of overlooking. He acknowledges that the democratization of the state and of society can be promoted by, and can occur in the midst of, associations which are non-democratic.²³ Strong organization among society's lower strata impels the ruling caste, for the sake of self-preservation, to make concessions in the form of policies and positions.²⁴

The old political caste of society, and above all the "state" itself, are forced to undertake the revaluation of a considerable number of values—a revaluation both ideal and practical. The importance attributed to the masses increases, even when the leaders are demagogues. The legislature and the executive become accustomed to yield, not only to claims proceeding from above, but also to those proceeding from below.²⁵

(2) Organization can facilitate 'internal' democratization.

Michels does not deal explicitly with the possibility that Organization can facilitate the democratization of groups within societythat is, the equalization of resources among members and the conformity of leaders' policies to followers' wishes. Such a possibility may be inferred, however, from his testimony that counter-autocratic changes accompanied Socialist Organization. The same possibility may be inferred from the basis of his reasoning. Increments of Organization necessitate delegation and dispersal of authority. In the case of an association where all the members have exercised all authority on an equal basis, the effect of Organization will be counter-democratic. In the case of an association where one or just a few members have exercised all authority, the effect of Organization will be counter-autocratic. An appraisal of these possibilities may be gained from a review of Michels's treatment of Socialist history.

Ш

According to Michels's account of Socialist experience in Western Europe before 1914,

internal structure.) The chances for democratizing the state are relatively favorable "where there exists universal, equal, and direct suffrage, and where the working class is strongly organized and is awake to its own interests."22

²² P. 365n.

²³ For example, see Sartori, above, note 1, pp. 121-26.

²⁴ See pp. 176, 185-87, 272, 392.

²⁵ P. 365.

¹⁷ P. 401.

¹⁸ P. 36.

¹⁹ Pp. 31-2, 36, 206, 400.

²⁰ Pp. 21-2.

²¹ P. 365.

Organization facilitates democratization. He depicts Organization as the efficient cause of multitudinous changes in the 'character' of Socialism, changes that are alleged to be unavoidable and horrible. He spins a fable of innocence lost.

In the days of the so-called "socialism of the emigres," the socialists devoted themselves to an elevated policy of principles, inspired by the classic criteria of internationalism. Almost every one of them was . . . a specialist in this more general and comprehensive domain. The whole course of their lives, the brisk exchange of ideas on unoccupied evenings, the continued rubbing of shoulders between men of the most different tongues, the enforced isolation from the bourgeois world of their respective countries, and the utter impossibility of any "practical" action, all contributed to this result. But in proportion as, in their own country, paths of activity were opened for the socialists . . . the more did a recognition of the demands of the everyday life of the party divert their attention from immortal principles.26

With the advent of practical activities and professional activists, Socialism's "wider and more ideal cultural aims" were smothered by the "petty, narrow, rigid, and illiberal" bureaucratic spirit. The "logical audacities" and "revolutionary currents" suppressed, the once-bold champions displaced by routinizers whose "personal inclination towards quietism" could not be "neutralized" by "the preponderant energy of a comprehensive theory." Socialism's youthful promise to represent the "popular interests" was violated; the "democratic principle" of "THAT WHICH OUGHT TO BE" was suffocated by "that which is." Bureaucratization and vote-chasing ravished Socialism's "essential character"; having contracted "promiscuous relationships with the most heterogeneous elements," Socialism lost "political virginity."27

Now let us dry our tears. Let us attempt to break the spell of the "metaphysical pathos" of organization.²⁸ Before agreeing with Michels that Socialism underwent a moral and a counter-democratic degeneration because of the imperatives of Organization, let us attempt a more systematic canvass.

Below are listed ten changes which by Michels's account took place as the Socialist parties developed. Each will be discussed briefly for its broader theoretical implications.

(1) Mitigation of formal dictatorship. Genuine Socialist parties allegedly are, and some of the young Socialist parties allegedly were, corps of para-military combatants. Small, frail, ostentatiously seditious groups cannot afford the luxury of democratic procedures.²⁹ Socialist growth and development produced a new orientation, emphasizing legalism and electioneering. This marked a deviation from principle; it also facilitated and necessitated a measure of formal democratization.

In broader terms, Michels's analysis suggests that patterns of internal authority vary systematically according to associational aims and situations (or strategies) and sizes. Internal dictatorship is most likely to accompany revolutionary aims, extra-legal tactics, and smallness. Bigness necessitates allegiance, legalism, and a modicum of internal democracy. Each factor helps to explain and engender the others.

(2) Mitigation of informal dictatorship. "Every great class movement in history has arisen upon the instigation, with the co-operation, and under the leadership of men sprung from the very class against which the movement was directed." The Socialist movement allegedly consisted initially of two social strata: wage workers, or incipient proletarians, who in terms of "culture and of economic, physical and physiological conditions" are society's "weakest element"; and ex-bourgeois intellectuals, veritable "supermen," the "best instructed, most capable, and most adroit" products of society's most powerful class. Such a compo-

²⁸ Pp. 187-8.

²⁷ Pp. 187, 189, 371, 307, 401 (his capitals), 376. Some writers have suggested that Michels's Law of Oligarchy deals with the general subject of goal-reorientation as determined by internal group processes, rather than with the particular subject of democracy. For example, see Samuel Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. H. W. Ehrmann (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 184. Philip Selznick relies heavily on Michels's contributions to understanding the "unanticipated consequences" of Organization and of

circumstantial adaptation. See esp. Selznick's "An Approach to the Theory of Bureaucracy," American Sociological Review, Vol. 8 (1943), p. 1.

²⁸ See A. W. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," this Review, Vol. 49 (1955), p. 3. Gouldner argues that Michels, Selznick (in TVA and the Grass Roots), and other modern theorists of group organization quite arbitrarily assume that the "unanticipated consequences" wrought by Organization will be deplorable.

²⁹ Part I, ch. 3, esp. pp. 41-3.

³⁰ P. 238.

³¹ Pp. 22, 237, 281.

sition is required because the workers, without help, are ignorant of their interests and their practical needs. It was "only when science placed itself at the service of the working class" that "the proletarian movement" became "a socialist movement." The men of "science" served at the head of the new movement. The early Socialist program was not a compromise between insight and ignorance; it was "a synthesis of the work of numerous learned men."32

Michels never claims the Socialist groups were democracies at inception. He claims rather, that they were democratic in conception in the goals they espoused (rather than the procedures employed), and in the Interests they 'objectively' represented (as contrasted with the cause they actually promoted). Thus, the socialist and revolutionary parties, . . . in respect of origin and of program, represent the negation of any such tendency [as oligarchy], and have actually come into existence out of opposition thereto. . . . In theory, the principle of the social and democratic parties is the struggle against oligarchy in all its forms.33

More generally, Michels suggests that history's great political movements must initially be internally oligarchic, even if their goals and results are democratic. Leaders of the great leveling movements descend from the upper echelons of society; followers are recruited from the most deprived strata. As the resources of leaders and followers become more equal, the drive for societal equalization loses momentum.

- (3) Social pluralism. Whereas the Socialist groups initially consisted of a bourgeois and a proletarian stratum, they rapidly became heterogeneous. Many processes contributed to this differentiation:
- (a) General social change. The social composition of the Socialist groups was differentiated in consequence of the general process which characterizes modern life—a process not of class polarization, à la Marx, but of "increasing differentiation."34
- (b) Secular social change. Worker-Socialists became additionally differentiated among themselves, and within the working class, in consequence of their various political activities. These contributed to "an even greater accentuation of the differentiation which the pro-

letarian groupings already present...."35 (c) Proletarian enterprise. Some worker-

- Socialists were transformed into petty-bourgeois in consequence of Socialist Organization. Of these, some were forced into small business in consequence of industrial blacklisting, while others exploited commercial opportunities (such as tavern-keeping) which developed in consequence of Socialist activities.36
- (d) Bureaucratization. The advent of Socialist Organization enabled some worker-Socialists to become salaried officials. Organization served to "deproletarianize" workers, according to how "extensive" and "complicated" the "bureaucratic mechanism" of the Socialist movement became. 7
- (e) Immigration. Additional differentiation was produced by the influx of recruits drawn from various social strata. Such differentiation was facilitated by a number of factors and processes: formal accessibility of membership; the absence of repugnant slogans and policies: the increased availability of salaried posts and other vocational opportunities.38

In view of these changes, Michels suggests that bureaucratized associations in general, and politically sensitive associations in particular, cannot be (or long remain) socially homogeneous. Bureaucrats characteristically solicit new recruits, paying little attention to "quality." The "modern party, like the modern state, endeavors to give to its own organization the widest possible base," and to fortify the support attained by multiplying salaried posts.³⁹ Consequently, each mature Socialist party became, "from the social point of view," a "mixture of classes," being composed of elements fulfilling "diverse functions in the economic process."40

Such a social transformation might be deemed counter-democratic, from the standpoint of intra-group relations, if the transformation occurred in a once-homogeneous setting. In the Socialist case, as Michels portrays it, the change was from polarized dualism to horizontal and vertical pluralism.

(4) Petty-embourgeoisement. Whereas the authentic or early Socialist groups were dualistic and polarized, social change involved chiefly an enlargement of middle-ranking strata. This occurred through the attraction of pettybourgeois recruits and the "deproletarianiza-

³² P. 238; emphasis his.

²³ P. 11; emphasis added. Elsewhere (esp. ch. 2) Michels voices doubt that such a commitment has ever truly animated a particular social group.

⁸⁴ P. 40; also pp. 289-90.

⁸⁵ P. 295.

ss Pp. 283-8.

³⁷ Pp. 271-82.

³⁸ Pp. 265-70.

⁸⁹ Pp. 185-87.

⁴⁰ P. 387.

tion" of some worker-Socialists.

Michels summarizes this transformation as "the embourgeoisement of the working-class parties." However, his label is not accurate, unless it is meant as a psycho-moral judgment rather than a sociological description. A bourgeois element was present at the beginning, and this element persisted. Socio-economic distance was not created or increased by Socialist Organization; it was 'filled in.'

The Socialist case cannot be cited to show that Organization invariably 'de-polarizes' groups. The 'de-polarization' was conspicuous in the Socialist case because of a distinctive social origin. However, Michels does suggest unmistakably that Organization facilitates the maintenance and enlargement of society's middle strata.

Bureaucratic posts are middle-class in social status. These posts allegedly multiply faster than total populations. The proliferation of bureaucratic posts serves to counteract the effects of capital-concentration, effects which otherwise would drive bankrupt small businessmen into the ranks of the proletariat.⁴²

Various bureaucracies cater to various social strata. The modern state's bureaucracy caters particularly to the sons of "small manufacturers and traders, independent artisans, farmers, etc."—the sons of people who are particularly discontented and articulate, because they feel the squeeze of "expropriative capitalism" and organized labor. 43 The Catholic Church enables talented sons of petty-bourgeois and peasant families to attain middle-class professional status, whereas this status normally is unattainable because it requires long formal education at private expense. 44 Similarly,

For the German workers, the labor movement has an importance analogous to that of the Catholic Church for certain fractions of the petty bourgeoisie and of the rural population. In both cases we have an organization which furnishes opportunities for the most intelligent members of certain classes to secure a rise in the social scale.⁴⁵

In no instance does Michels argue that Organization polarizes society. He depicts Organization, rather, as a built-in antidote to the worst consequences of capitalism. The processes of production and exchange under capitalism supposedly spur the creation of two radi-

cally distant classes, each increasingly homogeneous. But these processes also spur Organization. The processes generated by Organization facilitate (a) a general, but uneven, improvement in the socio-economic status of the lower strata ('deproletarianization'); (b) the maintenance and enlargement of the middle strata; and (c) a kind of "social exchange" whereby some people move upward socio-economically while others move (in a non-socio-economic sense) downward.⁴⁶ Michels laments this process, because it is counter-revolutionary.

(5) Careers opened to talent. Throughout his book, Michels emphasizes that the individuals most directly and substantially benefited by Organization (in terms of socio-economic elevation), are society's most talented, most intelligent individuals. Organization provides "facility for ascent in the social scale" by such individuals.47 The peasants who attain middleclass status through the Church, the bourgeois who penetrate the Prussian nobility through the military corps, the workers who become petty-bourgeois through Socialist organizations, are not hacks. At one point, indeed, Michels declares that "democracy" (his fictional starting-point of Socialist development) "ends by undergoing transformation into a form of government by the best, into an aristocracy.48

Such a characterization of the men who attain bureaucratic eminence seems particularly remarkable in view of one of the meanings he assigned to democracy. Although he frequently identifies democracy with absolute equality, Michels also says that democracy "gives to each [citizen] the possibility of ascending to the top of the social scale... annulling... all privileges of birth, and desiring that in human society the struggle for preeminence should be decided in accordance with individual capacity." 49

On the other hand, Michels maintains that "the bureaucratic spirit corrupts character and engenders moral poverty." This accusation is closely identified with his major accusation: that in elevating talented workers (along

⁴⁶ Part IV, chs. 2, 3, 4. The downward movement involved in the "social exchange" is ideological and affiliational rather than socio-economic. Idealistic or opportunistic bourgeois join Socialist groups, usually as leaders.

⁴⁷ P. 279.

⁴⁸ P. 89.

⁴⁹ P. 1.

⁵⁰ P. 189.

⁴¹ P. 268.

⁴² P. 275f.

⁴³ Pp. 185-7.

⁴⁴ P. 278.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

with other workers), Organization forestalls revolution.

(6) Advent of diverse interests. Whereas the early Socialists allegedly were endowed with a singular Interest (social-democratic revolution), social differentiation allegedly produced a conflict of Interests. Especially debilitating was the emergence of full-time, professional leaders endowed with a singular "conservative" Interest which diverges from the Interest of the "mass."

The party is created as a means to secure an end. Having, however, become an end in itself, endowed with aims and interests of its own, it undergoes detachment, from the teleological point of view, from the class which its represents. In a party, it is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the party will coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the party becomes personified. . . . By a universally applicable social law, every organ of the collectivity, brought into existence through the need for the division of labor, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself. The existence of these special interests involves a necessary conflict with the interests of the collectivity. Nay, more, social strata fulfilling peculiar functions tend to become isolated, to produce organs fitted for the defense of their own peculiar interests. In the long run they tend to undergo transformation into distinct classes.51

Michels rests his case for the oligarchical impact of Organization chiefly on the argument that the specialists' Interests clash with those of the "mass" and the specialists' powers are stronger. Thus the advent of "professional leadership" marks the beginning of democracy's end. This argument seems inapplicable to the generality of cases, including the Socialist cases, for these reasons:

In the first place, with regard to Socialism it is necessary to accept uncritically the assumption that initial class differences did not involve a conflict of Interests. Michels seemingly covers this eventuality by depicting the pioneer Socialist intellectuals as "ideologues" who transcended the Interest peculiar to their class status.⁵²

In the second place, the notion of a conflict of Interest between leaders and "mass" spuriously presupposes a homogeneous "mass." According to Michels's analysis, the advent of professional leadership coincides with the advent of a heterogeneous rank-and-file.

In the third place, the notion that a "conservative" Interest clashes with the Interest of the "mass" arbitrarily presupposes an innovatively oriented, revolutionary "mass." Only the proletariat, according to Michels's Marxian analysis, is objectively endowed with an unconscious Interest in revolution. But worker-Socialists are not fully proletarianised. And any other membership would be endowed with an 'objective' Interest which is not diametrically different from a "conservative" Interest.

In the fourth place, while a given caste of leaders might be endowed with an identical Interest, what is in the interest of one leader may contradict what is in the interest of another. Michels devotes a chapter on "The Struggle Among the Leaders Themselves," to this chronic situation. He indicates that the policies championed by various leaders will differ because each leader is striving competitively to solidify his own position.

Finally, identity between the Interests of leaders and electors is not self-evidently a requisite of democratic representation. If there is a need which can be expressed in the language of Interest, it is the need that the Interest of the leader be one which impels him to conform to the will(s) of his electors. As it happens, the "conservative" Interest ascribed by Michels to professional leaders seems to meet this requirement. The professional leader is "conservative" in the sense that he craves to maintain his status. To that end he is likely to conform to the wishes (rather than to the 'objective' Interests) of his electors, insofar as such behavior is the most efficacious or economical means of staying in office.

(7) Emasculation of unpopular doctrines. While the early Socialist program allegedly voiced the true "interests of the workers," many elements of this program proved to be inexpedient politically. They were inexpedient for the game of "mcdern" party politics, the game of "electoral agitation" to secure votes and "direct agitation" to secure recruits. In short, they were unpopular.

one from which to advocate the interests of the workers...so that the renunciation of this platform almost always involves the loss of opportunity for defending working-class interests" (p. 116).

⁶¹ P. 389. A very similar argument (omitting the "teleology" of "class" fidelity), is advanced by E. H. Carr in *The New Society* (1951) and is dissected by Langer, above, note 1, p. 263.

⁵² P. 280.

⁶⁴ P. 367.

Socialist and aristocratic party experience mutually demonstrated that "principles" are "often a stumbling block to a party whose main desire is to increase its membership; and to disregard principles may bring electoral advantage, if at the cost of honor."55 To "avoid alarming" potential "adherents" and "sympathizers" who are "still outside the ideal world of socialism or democracy, the pursuit of a policy based on strict principle is shunned. ... "56 Similarly, since the aristocrat "recognizes" that in this "democratic epoch" he "stands alone" with his unpopular "principle," he "dissembles his true thoughts, and howls with the democratic wolves in order to secure the coveted majority."57

The efficient cause of this doctrinal emasculation, as of all the other changes besetting the Socialist movement, is alleged to be Organization. With increments of scale and complexity, "every struggle on behalf of ideas within the limits of the organization is necessarily regarded as an obstacle to the realization of its ends"—the ends, that is, of the bureaucrats, who yearn for recruits and safety.⁵⁸

(8) Renunciation of unpopular policies. Let us examine two examples.

(a) Legalism. The old Socialist determination "to demolish the existing state" was supplanted "by the new aim, to permeate the state with the men and ideas of the party." This change allegedly was realistic, in the sense that it marked a response to the fact that "the forces of the party, however well-developed, are altogether inferior and subordinate to the forces of the government." The realism was prompted, however, by Organization, which created thousands of livelihoods which would be jeopardized by governmental suppression. Socialist experience demonstrates the general and ironic fact that "the party becomes in-

creasingly inert as the strength of its organization grows." Numerical and financial affluence does not breed audacity. It produces a "need for tranquillity." Thus "the last link in the long chain of phenomena which confer a profoundly conservative character upon the intimate essence of the political party" is the problem of gaining governmental indulgence. So However, Michels acknowledges that the advent of Socialist legalism was consistent with widespread popular sentiments. He also acknowledges that the laws which the Socialists came to obey were the laws of formally democratic states.

- (b) Patriotism. In response to World War I, most of the Socialist leaders in Western Europe renounced policies which seemed consistent with their avowed principle of "proletarian internationalism." This change allegedly proved conclusively that the "oligarchical tendencies" infesting "modern political parties" impose a "regressive evolution": the "external form of the party, its bureaucratic organization, definitely gains the upper hand over its soul, its doctrinal and theoretical content." Be that as it may, Michels readily acknowledges that the leaders who opted for patriotism were conforming to prevailing rank-and-file sentiment. "Throughout the proletarian mass there has not been reported a single instance of moral rebellion" against the patriotic stance.64
- (9) Emergence of 'representative' Whereas the ex-bourgeois intellectuals allegedly expressed the Interests of the proletarian "mass" without belonging to that stratum, the second-generation Socialist leaders allegedly conformed more closely to the values and attitudes of their electors. The new leaders came up from the ranks. Michels emphasizes the psychological transformation which must accompany a change in status. But his conception of a psychological transformation pertains to Interests, or underlying motivations. rather than to attitudes and values. As to the latter, he portrays a close correspondence between those of workers and those of exworker-bureaucrats.

The leaders who have themselves been manual workers...are more closely allied with the masses in their mode of thought, understand the workers better, experience the same needs as these, and are animated by the same desires....

⁵⁵ Pp. 398-9.

⁵⁶ P. 367.

⁵⁷ P. 6.

⁵⁸ P. 367.

⁵⁹ P. 374.

⁶⁰ P. 394; also pp. 367-74. Michels amended this assumption in the light of the Bolshevik and Fascist triumphs. He acknowledged the prowess of elitist-insurrectionary (non-"mass") parties during crisis periods. He also suggested that these parties alone can maintain a moral and social integrity, since they do not need to emasculate their doctrines for the sake of pluralistic electoral support. R. Michels, "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties," this Review, Vol. 21 (Nov. 1927), p. 3.

⁶¹ P. 371.

⁶² P. 374.

⁶³ P. 367.

⁶⁴ P. 393-5.

[They commonly possess] a more precise understanding of the psychology of the masses.... 65

The ex-proletarian Socialist leaders deviated from official or sacred Socialist principles, not from rank-and-file attitudes and values. The typical workman's "ideal" is "to become a petty bourgeois"; his attitudes are "optimistic," accommodative toward other classes, and "conservative." If the professional leader "continues to express reasonable opinions,' he may be sure of securing the praise of his opponents and (in most cases) the admiring gratitude of the crowd." From the same securing the praise of his opponents and (in most cases) the admiring gratitude of the crowd." From the same securing the praise of his opponents and (in most cases) the admiring gratitude of the crowd." From the same securing the praise of his opponents and (in most cases) the admiring gratitude of the crowd." From the same securing the professional leader "continues to express "cases" and "cases "cases" and "cases "cases

- (10) Advent of 'responsive' leaders. Whereas the early Socialist leaders allegedly responded to the Interests of a Collectivity, the secondgeneration leaders responded to the manifest will(s) of constituents. Michels castigates such behavior. The new leaders' "mania for promotion" found expression in "obsequiousness" toward employers, in "a semblance of obedience to the masses," and in "demagogy." Demagogues are "courtesans of the popular will. Instead of raising the masses to their own level, they debase themselves to the level of the masses."68 Such deplorable responsiveness exemplified the characteristic Interest of professional leaders (a yearning for status-maintenance) and the characteristic situation of professional leaders, a situation in which deviations from constituents' wishes entail relatively great risks. The situational imperatives include the following:
- (a) Financial dependence. "When the leaders ... are attached to the party organism as employees, their economic interest coincides as a rule with the interests of the party"; the "practice of paying for ... services rendered ... creates a bond"—a control which is not available in the case of non-salaried volunteers. "9"
- (b) Meager 'personal' resources. The professional leaders were relatively deficient in those non-technical resources which allegedly facilitate domination in the absence of tangible
- ⁶⁵ P. 297. The second-generation Socialist leaders, in addition to being psychologically and sociologically more representative than their predecessors, also were 'ethnically' more representative. The early leaders (and many followers) were bourgeois, militant, and Jewish. (pp. 258–63, 28, 324, 342)
 - 68 Pp. 289, 319, 171.
 - ⁶⁷ P. 306; emphasis added.
 - 68 Pp. 89, 165.
 - 69 Pp. 389, 114.

service. The principal "factors which secure the dominion of minorities over majorities" are "money and its equivalents (economic superiority), tradition and hereditary transmission (historical superiority)," and "formal instruction . . . (so-called intellectual superiority)."70 Also formidable are "prestige of celebrity," hypnotic eloquence, catonian self-righteousness, psycho-economic self-sufficiency, and "force of will which reduces to obedience less powerful wills."71 Compared with their pred-Socialist ecessors. the second-generation leaders were meagerly endowed with these resources. They were not suited to become "temporal divinities" in the eyes of idolatrous masses.72 Such idolatry, with all the authority it confers, is not likely to devolve upon "strict and prosaic" bureaucrats.73

(c) Alert constituents. Michels cites the "general immobility and passivity of the masses" as a major source of "oligarchy in the democratic parties." In such groups, drawn chiefly from the lower social strata, turnover among members is high and turnout for meetings is low. The "leaders, when compared with the masses, whose composition varies from moment to moment, constitute a more stable and constant element." The "gregarious idleness" of the rank-and-file facilitates "the influence of the leader over the masses" and the leaders' "independence" from the masses.74 This condition varies among groups not according to organizational scale or complexity. but according to social composition and concern with the affairs of a group. The advent of professional Socialist leadership coincided with. and facilitated, an influx of petty-bourgeois members, an elevation of the socio-economic status of worker-Socialists, and an enlargement of the personal, tangible significance of Socialist affiliations.

(d) Non-available 'official' resources. The advent of professional leadership coincided with the establishment of regular, 'official' treasuries, organs of communication, files, agendas, meeting dates, mailing lists, and patronage. Michels discusses with keen insight the way such resources may be used by leaders to disarm challengers. But he does not indicate that these resources become more formidable, more available, in proportion to the scale or complexity of organization. He does testify

⁷⁰ P. 80.

⁷¹ Pp. 71-2.

⁷² P. 67.

⁷⁸ P. 301.

⁷⁴ Pp. 400, 50-2, 79, 98.

that "decentralization" of authority occurred, and this presumably involved a dispersal of control over the official resources. He also testifies that Organization entails procedural formalization; this presumably involves specification of legitimate uses of official resources.

(e) Individual technical expendability. Michels argues that the "technical indispensability of leadership" proved to be "the principal cause of oligarchy in the democratic parties." This seemingly acknowledges that the leaders ultimately proved durable on account of their authentic utility to their followers, rather than their superiority in wealth, celebrity, oratory and other factors which promote obedience without necessarily rendering service. However, Michels's concept of "technical indispensability" is elusive; it merits an extended analysis.

In one sense, the "technical indispensability of leadership" signifies merely that a particular function, leadership, cannot be forsaken. 6 Since those who perform this function are likely to enjoy some advantage in one-to-one contests with challengers (the advantage, for example, of incumbency), there must be an element of Oligarchy in Organization. But this tells nothing about the relative advantages of leaders in various organizational and sociological contexts.

In another sense, Michels seemingly is suggesting that an individual's power (his freedom of action and security of station) depend ultimately upon the 'objective' utility of the skills at his disposal. One who is richly endowed with a skill which is rare and prized approaches technical indispensability. Such an endowment raises the problem of discretionary action. Gratitude for past service and diffidence toward current complexities may impel clients to grant their agents a broad range of discretion. Agents thought to possess rare skills may be retained even if they defy their clients' policy directives, on the expectation that in future

the officials will prove to be technically adept and responsive.

On this subject Michels testifies that

This special competence, this expert knowledge, which the leader acquires in matters inaccessible, or almost inaccessible, to the mass, gives him a security of tenure which conflicts with the essential principles of democracy.

* * *

The democratic masses are . . . compelled to submit to a restriction of their own wills when they are forced to give to their leaders an authority which is in the long run destructive to the very principle of democracy. . . . The history of the working-class parties continually furnishes instances in which the leader has been in flagrant contradiction with the fundamental principles of the movement, but in which the rank and file have not [drawn] the logical consequences of this conflict, because they feel that they cannot get along without the leader, and cannot dispense with the qualities he has acquired in virtue of the very position to which they have themselves elevated him, and because they do not see their way to find an adequate substitute. Numerous are the . . . leaders who are in opposition to the rank and file at once theoretically and practically . . . [The rank and file] seldom dare to give [the] leaders their dismissal.77

If indeed the second-generation Socialist leaders could survive "practical" conflicts more readily than their predecessors, then one could not conclude that the new leaders were relatively responsive to the will(s) of their electors. But Michels does not systematically develop, or sustain, the charge that the new leaders could readily retain office in the face of "practical" conflicts (deviations from the policy-directives of their constituents). He confines himself almost exclusively to the charge that the new leaders persistently, and securely, retained office in spite of "theoretical" conflicts (deviations from the policies 'demanded' by Socialist doctrine).

That "practical" conflicts actually dwindled in the course of Socialist development seems evidenced by the nature of the changes in Socialist policies and by the growth of Socialist membership. The new leaders did the popular, rather than the theoretically 'correct,' thing.

That "practical" conflicts necessarily dwindled in the course of Socialist development—dwindled in consequence of Organization—

⁷⁵ P. 400.

ra "The mass per se is amorphous, and therefore needs division of labor, specialization, and guidance." This "incompetence" is "incurable." (p. 404). Sartori observes that what is rendered as "leadership" in the English translation of Political Parties appears as Führerstum and as sisterma di capi in the German and Italian editions. The latter terms allegedly connote "rulership," or "headship" or some sort of arrangement more sinister than what is conveyed by "leadership." Sartori, above, note 1, p. 110.

⁷⁷ Pp. 83-83, 86.

seems likely in view of all the considerations advanced earlier in this article and in view of two more considerations.

First, Socialist Organization facilitated, and was accompanied by, material affluence. To that extent, the Socialist partisans acquired more resources with which they could search for agents who were technically qualified and psychologically disposed to be responsive.

Second, Socialist Organization involved taskspecialization, and task-specialization often involves task-simplification. "It must not be supposed that the technical competence of the leaders is necessarily profound. . . . "78 Moreover, the "epoch" of Organization also is a time when "science puts at every one's disposal" such "efficient means of instruction" that "even the youngest may speedily become thoroughly well-instructed." Thus there is "less need for accumulated personal experience of life. . . . Today everything is quickly acquired, even that experience in which formerly consisted the sole and genuine superiority of the old over the young." To that extent, the supply of qualified technicians grows more abundant as organization develops. Consequently, the risks involved in defying an employer's policy-directives become more substantial.

On this showing—on Michels's showing—political survival in large-scale, complex organizations would seem to require that officials gratify the wishes of those they are hired to serve, regardless of the Interests of the latter. The result may be denounced as "obsequiousness" and as infidelity to popular interests, or it may be described as democratization.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Contrary to prevailing belief, then, Robert Michels actually provided a favorable account of the compatibility of Organization and democracy. While maintaining that Organization is incompatible with pure democracy, and that increments of Organization produce counter-democratic changes in associations which initially are pure democracies, he also suggested (in the case of European Socialism and in broader theoretical terms), that Organization can and frequently does accompany and facilitate a multitude of changes which constitute or facilitate democratization.

Among the conditions he linked to Organization are augmented formal rights and privileges, a general increase in social wealth, more prosperity and security and leisure and education and sophistication among the lower social strata, increased horizontal but not vertical social differentiation, enhanced opportunities for talented individuals to ascend socially, and the advent within public and private associations of leaders who are conspicuously qualified technically, disposed socio-psychologically, and obliged circumstantially to conform to the policy-preferences of their electors.

Far from being a pessimistic democrat, Michels was a pessimistic Romantic Revolutionist and a pessimistic Scientific Paternalist.

He denounced Organization for promoting the amelioration instead of the radical purification of society. He detested Organization for promoting the manifest wishes rather than the 'objective' Interests of the "masses."

Michels's solicitude for the welfare of the "masses" evidently was linked with a profound disdain for the judgment of the "masses." In the light of his values and his beliefs, it seems understandable that Michels accommodated himself to Fascism.

⁷⁸ P. 83n.

⁷⁹ P. 76.

CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS: ENLIGHTENMENT AND BUREAUCRACY¹

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The Thirty Years War, though essentially religious in origin, assumed towards its end a distinctly political complexion. It became a trial of strength between the major powers of Europe, resulting in the unquestioned supremacy of France and Austria, the establishment of Switzerland as a fully fledged sovereign state, and the extension of the dominion of Sweden and Denmark. Most, if not all, of these changes occurred at the expense of the territorial unity of the German Empire. At the same time the disruption of German Imperial unity brought in its wake the effective assertion of sovereignty on the part of some 360 German principalities. The political unity of 'Germany' became a legal fiction.

Under these changed circumstances the generally prevalent Roman Law, based as it was on the idea of strong central administration, was no longer in accordance with the political realities of Germany. Faced with the strains and stresses caused by particularist tendencies it increasingly had to come to terms with a mode of legal and political thinking that was preoccupied with specific local circumstances and contemporary needs rather than with the universal applicability of general laws. Henceforth the religious autonomy of the diverse German principalities came to entail also the right of the ruler to determine the scope and nature of legislation pertinent to the requirements—as he saw them—of his own domain. Henceforth, too, the search began for a German theory of law and politics. Indeed, it would not be wrong to say that political science as a distinct academic discipline took shape at the very time that Germany disintegrated as a political unit.2

¹ I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the German Academic Exchange Service for two research fellowships which enabled me to spend extended periods of study in Germany in preparation of this article. I would also like to record my debt to Professor Isaiah Berlin (Oxford) for encouraging me to undertake this research as a follow-up to my studies on Herder's political thought, and to Professors Kurt Berger (Marburg) and Max Horkheimer (Frankfurt) for their help in making source material accessible to me.

² Benedict Carpzov (1595-1666) and Hermann Conring (1606-81) are two outstanding names among political jurists of this period anxious to formulate a theory of positive law in Germany.

Apart from the emergence of a school of positive law, however, this period is also marked by a renewed interest in Natural Law. Hugo Grotius's De jure belli ac pacis (1625) was the first systematic attempt to translate the hitherto individualistic and theological interpretation of Natural Law into a secular theory of international or inter-state relations. His work became the basis of a new appraisal of Natural Law in the law faculties of European universities. In Germany, however, Grotius's ideas encountered a distinctly hostile reception in view of the persisting domination of theology over all fields of learning, and over jurisprudence in particular. Samuel Pufendorf's De jure naturae et gentium (1672), in which he further developed Grotius's conception of Natural Law met with the same fate. Protestant, no less than Catholic orthodoxy was in arms, determined to protect the ecclesiastical authority over Natural Law against any inroads of secular thinking.

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Within this theologically oriented atmosphere young Thomasius received his first legal and philosophical training in Leipzig.3 It is not surprising, therefore, that his first reactions to the writings of Grotius and Pufendorf were not favourable. Only after his departure from Leipzig for Frankfurt-on-the-Oder-where he came under the influence of one of the most famous jurists of the period, Samuel Stryk (1640-1710)—did Thomasius's thinking undergo a drastic change. And by the time he took his doctorate (1678) he had become one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Pufendorf's legal and political philosophy. Thomasius's subsequent friendship with Pufendorf was to prove the most abiding feature in his rather turbulent and changing personal relationships. Pufendorf, in turn, thought no less highly of his new disciple. "You have the courage," he wrote to him, "to put into print views which I wholly share, but which I did not have the nerve to express publicly."4

- ³ Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) was born in Leipzig, the son of a university professor. His father first introduced him to the writings of Grotius.
- ⁴ The letter is dated Berlin, February 25, 1688. See Emil Gigas, Briefe Samuel Pufendorfs an Christian Thomasius, 1687-1693 (München and Leipzig, 1897), p. 14.

After a brief sojourn in Holland Thomasius settled down in his native Leipzig to embark on a law career. But in spite of his success as an attorney he soon tired of the protracted mode of litigation characteristic of contemporary legal procedures. By 1686 he decided to follow in his father's footsteps and devote his life to university teaching. His fiery temperament coupled with his 'heretical' approach to law and philosophy, however, soon brought him into conflict with the orthodox theologians and his conservative colleagues. Estrangement was followed by hostility and open persecution. It soon became evident that to remain true to his convictions Thomasius had to leave Leipzig. With the help of Pufendorf and the Prussian Court Thomasius was invited to come in 1690 to Halle, which was then in the process of becoming a university. Although here again he could not entirely avoid conflict with his theological colleagues (including the Pietists in his later years), he nonetheless remained in Halle until his death.

The nature and extent of Thomasius's impact upon eighteenth-century thought in Germany may be gauged by the reputation his works enjoyed some time after his death. A. L. Schlözer, the great eighteenth-century publicist and historian, attributed to him an influence more widespread and beneficial than that of the Greek philosophers. Herder spoke of him as "a man such as his Age longed for."6 Gottsched, Lessing, Schiller and Goethe expressed similar sentiments.7 However more profoundly Leibniz's philosophy was to determine the intellectual orientation of the German Enlightenment on the one hand, and Pufendorf's legal doctrines the speculations of German political theorists on the other, it was to Thomasius that the emergence of a new critical temper of thought and of a new conception of the nature and functions of political rule owed its very existence. Whereas Leibniz addressed his ideas to the politically mighty and influential with whom he enjoyed consider-

⁵ Cited in H. Luden, Christian Thomasius, nach seinen Schicksalen und Schriften (Berlin, 1805), p. 300.

⁶ Werke, ed. Suphan (33 vols., Berlin, 1877-1913), VIII, 234; see also V, 413; IX, 425; XIV, 323; XVI, 594; XVII, 205 and 274; XVIII, 128; and XXIII, 70, 466 and 493.

⁷ See Th. W. Danzel, Gottsched und seine Zeit (Leipzig, 1848), p. 330; Lessing, Werke, ed. Lachmann (Leipzig, 1900), vol. XV, pp. 292 and 382 and vol. XXII, p. 278; Gräf and Leitzmann, ed., Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe (Leipzig, 1912), vol. II, p. 215.

able favour and respect, Thomasius appealed to all who were able and willing to read his writings or attend his lectures. Leibniz chose the methods of high-level diplomacy and the channels of scientific journals and learned societies, disregarding the as yet virtually inarticulate and politically ineffectual sphere of public opinion. Thomasius employed the weapons of wit and satire in his bold and occasionally aggressive attempts to arouse a critical public awareness through his popular monthlies. Yet, contrary to what one might expect, it was Thomasius who achieved the more tangible and socio-politically more significant results. The dissemination of culture. the dispersal of the fog of ignorance and superstition that was still enveloping the major part of contemporary mankind, the awakening of a more humane, open-minded and public-spirited attitude among all sections of the population: they were the fruit of his pioneering work.8

II

Free enquiry was his first demand. The search for truth must not be impeded by reverence for authority or by established beliefs and prejudices.

Challenge prejudice as the prime source of all errors and mistakes. Never rely in the discovery of truth upon the authority of any one person whosoever he may be, if you yourself lack the inner conviction that what has hitherto been generally believed is founded upon principles of undoubted validity.⁹

⁸ For an interesting study of the points of contact and divergence between Leibniz and Thomasius, see Karl Biedermann, "Zwei berühmte Leipziger," Westermann's Monatshefte, Vol. 56 (1884), pp. 363-70.

9 Christian Thomasius, Ausübung der Vernunfft-Lehre (Halle, 1705), p. 16. (The translation of cited passages is mine.) In his own lectures Thomasius urged his students to think independently and not to accept anything blindly. "I ask you to give me a fair hearing, but I do not mean by this blind trust. I do not want you to believe everything I am telling you; . . . you will not displease me in the slightest by disagreeing with me. On the contrary, the stronger your doubts, the sharper your opposition, the more I shall like it. No one need to fear that he will thus cause me to become impatient." He also encouraged them to attend other lectures to hear diverse views. "Thus you will learn to doubt, and I shall feel indebted to you if as a result you will find errors in what I teach and thus help me to correct them." Summarischer Entwurff derer Grundlehren (Halle, 1699), paras. 34 and 48-56.

The individual mind must be free to accept or reject ideas irrespective of their source or sanction; it must be free to follow its own light, its own reason. Even theology must accept the challenge of free enquiry in the light of human reason: "The mysteries of God do indeed surpass the human understanding, but they are not incompatible with it."

Thomasius's second main aspiration as an Aufklärer was to break down the barriers that separated the world of learning from practical every-day life. Learning, he maintained, must serve the needs of society. It must cease to be regarded as the exclusive property of the few, for it is in the interest of civil society that anyone who can profit from education should have access to it, even women. But education must be oriented toward practical goals, and no one should deem himself educated if he does not succeed in putting his education to some practical use.11 The universities, therefore, Thomasius demanded, must turn out men who will make their mark "in vita civili," and for this reason show greater concern for the actual challenges of this world rather than for the more hypothetical cares of the next.12 To this end Thomasius put forward some radical proposals for the reform of university education. In particular he urged the teaching of Economics and Political Science as academic disciplines in their own right.13 He also decided, against accepted academic custom, to use German instead of Latin in most of his writings and lectures, thus removing the last vestige of medieval scholasticism. He justified his choice in these words:

Everybody uses his mother-tongue. After all, the Greek philosophers did not write in Hebrew, nor did the Roman philosophers write in Greek.¹⁴

Undoubtedly Thomasius's decision to use German, coupled with his determination to write in a manner intelligible to the layman, accounted for the popularity which his writings enjoyed. His works were republished in several editions and Thomasius was constantly urged by his publishers to write new books. Not since the days of Luther were the works of a German scholar so much in demand by people of all

walks of life. 15 What is more, his deliberate cultivation of the German language helped to restore some sense of self-confidence and self-respect among the bourgeoisie vis à vis the "Frenchified courtiers and nobles" composing high society. 16 Thomasius accurately diagnosed the tendency to copy everything French (even French sins and diseases, as he mockingly remarks) as the most pathetic result of the Thirty Years War which, all the fearful material destruction apart, had fatally damaged the moral fibre of the German middle classes.

There can be no doubt... that if our ancestors, the old Germans were to rise and return to Germany, they would have not the slightest notion that they are back in their fatherland among their own countrymen... French clothes, French food, French furniture, French language, French customs, French sins, yes even French diseases are everywhere the fashion.¹⁷

At the same time he did not deny that there was much that the Germans could learn from their French neighbors. What they had to guard against was blind imitation. The first thing they ought to learn from the French was self-respect and pride in their own language and socio-cultural traditions. A foreign, and particularly a dead language, might well be suited for the analysis of well established notions and concepts, but scientific and literary development no less than its wider assimilation required the use of a living mother-tongue. 18

As a further means to help circulate his ideas Thomasius published in 1688 the first monthly journal in the German language. It was intended to be scholarly and entertaining at the same time. Above all, his *Monatsgespräche* aimed to forge a link between the academic world and the world of every-day affairs. With complete disregard for his personal

¹⁵ See Walther Bienert, Der Anbruch der christlichen deutschen Neuzeit dargestellt an Wissenschaft und Glauben des Christian Thomasius (Halle, 1934), p. 353; and the bibliography in Rolf Lieberwirth, Christian Thomasius, sein wissenschaftliches Lebenswerk (Weimar 1955).

¹⁶ Max v. Boehn, *Modes and Manners* (The Eighteenth Century), transl. Joan Joshua (London, 1935), vol. IV, p. 38.

17 Thomasius, Kleine Teutsche Schriften (Halle, 1701), "Christian Thomasius eröffnet der studierenden Jugend zu Leipzig in einem Discours, welcher Gestalt man denen Frantzosen in gemeinem Leben und Wandel nachahmen solle," p. 3.

¹⁸ Thomasius, Kleine Teutsche Schriften, op. cit., pp. 19-35.

¹⁰ Thomasius, Einleitung zu der Vernunftt-Lehre (Halle, 1691), p. 82.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 84-8.

¹² Ibid., p. 2.

¹³ Thomasius, *Historie der Weiszheit und Thorheit* (Halle, 1693), pp. 1-59.

¹⁴ Thomasius, Einleitung zu der Vernunft-Lehre, op. cit., p. 16.

prestige and safety Thomasius attacked everything that he considered obsolete, pedantic, inhuman or intolerant. His chief campaign was directed against witch trials, religious persecution, and the use of torture to extract confessions. He even defended Jews (though he always felt he had better add that he had no friends among the Jews) and atheists against prevalent superstitions and libellous accusations.¹⁹

Thomasius's decision to use German in university lecturing has been hailed by an American scholar as an epoch-making event, of equal if not greater importance than the "revolution in England" that occurred in the same year. "The year 1688 is memorable for two revolutions—one in England, the other in Germany. In England a conspiracy—partly patriotic, partly rascally—dethroned the last Stuarts; in Germany a young Leipzig professor began giving lectures not in Latin but in German . . . A plausible argument might be made to show that of these two revolutions the act of the German professor was really the more important." 20

Be that as it may (though we must correct a factual error—Thomasius was not yet a professor at Leipzig), the year 1688 is significant also for quite another Thomasian event. Before 1688 Thomasius, following closely the Natural Law teachings of Grotius and Pufendorf, was an ethical rationalist, imbued with unlimited optimism regarding the rational powers of man. After 1688, chiefly as the result of such strangely contrasting influences as those of Pietism on the one hand, and those of Bayle and Locke on the other, Thomasius reveals a much more ambivalent attitude toward 'reason'

19 Thomasius, Freymüthige Lustige und Ernsthaffte jedoch Vernunft- und Gesetz-Mäßige Gedancken oder Monatsgespräche (Halle, 1690). See also Thomasius, Ernsthaffte, aber doch Muntere und Vernünfftige Thomasische Gedancken und Erinnerungen über allerhand auserlesene Juristische Händel (where many of the monthly articles are reprinted), (4 vols., Halle, 1720-21); see esp. I, 105-118 (on superstition and libel), 125 ff. (on torture), 223-5 (on suspecting Jews of ritual murder), and 197-206, as also II, 300-39, and III, 221-33 (on witch trials). See further Chr. Thomasius Erinnerung wegen seiner künfftigen Winter Lectionen (Halle, 1702), pp. 14-18 (on superstition, witch-trials and torture).

²⁰ Andrew Dickson White, Seven Great Statesmen in the Warfare of Humanity with Unreason (London, 1910), p. 113. This is the only work that so far has appeared in English which devotes more than a passing mention to Thomasius.

and a far less optimistic faith in its efficacy to achieve by itself man's secular redemption. He no longer held 'reason' to be equivalent to the traditional Cartesian 'ratio,' to be valued for its own sake as the supreme and infallible arbiter of truth. He now qualifies it by the adjective 'sound' (gesund) and makes its objective validity contingent upon conformity to empirical observation by sense perception.²¹ Without the latter, reason ceases to be "of use." Sense perception must not, therefore, be opposed to reason but considered as its essential complement.

Neither sense perception without reason, nor reason without sense perception, can be of use to man. He is therefore in need of both if he is to arrive at truth. Indeed, sense perception is the very basis for the functioning of reason for it forms, so to speak, the foundation upon which reason can construct its edifice.... It follows that none of the propositions derived from the operation of reason alone can be accepted as true if they conflict with knowledge gained from sense experience.²²

It would not be wrong to say that 'reason,' in Thomasius's use, approximates very closely to Locke's concept of 'reflexion,' except that Thomasius, in an attempt to reconcile Locke's Empiricism with Rationalist elements, stresses its partly a priori origins. Man, he says, would never be capable of forming ideas of numbers, of extension and time (ideae quantitatis), were it not for his a priori capacity for entering into pure processes of thought (actus purus der Gedanken). Indeed, man would not be man if he were able to reflect in response to sense perceptions alone but never independently of them.23 It is of historical interest that Thomasius was one of the first major thinkers to depart from the prevalent Cartesian mode of Rationalism and to introduce Locke's ideas into Germany.24

However, Thomasius's main concern was not

- ²¹ It should be noted, however, that Thomasius, even before he became familiar with Locke's philosophy, evidences empiricist tendencies: see his *Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae* (Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1688), lib. I, cap. 1, para. 51, and cap. 2, para. 39.)
- ²² Thomasius, Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes (Halle, 1699), pp. 7-8; see also Einleitung zu der Vernunfft-Lehre, op. cit., pp. 139, 155 and 225f.
- ²³ Einleitung zu der Vernunfft-Lehre, op. cit., pp. 168-72.
- ²⁴ Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais*, which also transmitted Locke's ideas to Germany, were not published until 1765.

with epistemology. His chief attention was focused on ethics or 'practical philosophy,' as he called it. Epistemology, logic and metaphysics had value for him only in so far as they assisted man in his practical life. Their function was the removal of "prejudices" and their sphere of application those problem areas which are within the grasp of the human understanding.25 In view of this preoccupation with the world of action, it is not surprising that ethics plays such a pivotal part in Thomasius's thought. What is surprising is that, whilst ethics is sharply distinguished from religion and theology, moral action is made contingent on man's faith in divine grace. The clue to this apparent paradox lies in Thomasius's doctrine of the human will.

Not 'understanding'-by which Thomasius means the operation of both reason and senseperception—but 'will' is held to be the driving power in human actions. It is quite wrong, Thomasius insists, to attribute to the understanding any initiating power, for only the will is capable of engendering actions or thoughts that aim at actions.26 Admittedly, it is the understanding which recognizes the distinction between good and evil, yet by itself it is quite powerless to determine the will in either direction.27 The will, on the other hand, Thomasius maintains, is by itself wholly oriented towards evil. It causes man to be the most wretched of all living creatures.28 Thomasius does not deny that man also has propensities toward kindness and benevolence, but these sentiments are in "daily combat" with the far superior power of the will and their only chance of success lies in divine intervention. Man by himself is incapable of conquering this "most evil principle of the world."29 The recognition of this inability leaves him no option but to seek aid from a higher power. Whilst he can have no certainty about enlisting God's aid, he cannot but entertain the belief in its possibility if he is not to despair.30 Faith in divine grace, therefore, is postulated by Thomasius as a psychological

²⁵ Einleitung. . . , pp. 84-93, and 294.

need. He does not specify any particular faith, nor does he base faith on revelation. But he is adamant in treating secular happiness as a matter of divine ordinance:

God has not willed his creatures to lead a life of sadness or unhappiness, but one of happiness and joy. For happiness in this world, if it is different from that of the next, is so only in degree but not in kind.³¹

Two circumstances, then, combine to necessitate the postulate of religious belief: man's evil will and his helplessness to overcome it solely by his own efforts, on the one hand, and the conviction that it is his right and duty to promote his happiness on earth, on the other.

'Happiness' is equated by Thomasius to 'reasonable love.' He defines it formally as "that unique state of serenity or 'inner peace' in which man is imbued with the conviction that he can bring his will into harmony with what the understanding [i.e., his reason and his senses] recognizes as morally compelling."32 Thomasius stipulates further that man's attainment of this state must be a matter for each individual to pursue in his own fashion, free from any external compulsion.33 No theological dogma, no moral theory can teach man how to attain happiness, let alone any external secular or ecclesiastical 'authority.' Even reason can do no more than act as a practical guide.34 What is involved, according to Thomasius, is a somewhat tenuous and uneasy combination of faith (in a divinely ordained state of human felicity) and the realization that happiness is something that has to be struggled for since it is not 'given' by nature. If it were, all people would naturally be happy people and the state of nature would be in effect the morally most perfect form of human and social existence. But, patently enough, this is not so:

If we view our fellow human beings, indeed the rest of mankind—in so far as it is known to us—with a dispassionate eye, we have to admit that most men are the unhappiest of creatures, even if many of them would not care to admit it.²⁵

The existence of man's 'inner peace,' then, though a highly desirable condition for social life, can hardly be relied upon as its sufficient

²⁶ Thomasius, Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes, op. cit., p. 183.

²⁷ See his Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium (Halle, 1705), lib. I, cap. 1, para. 37: "Voluntas semper movet intellectum." See also Versuch, op. cit., p. 184.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 187-8.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 189.

³⁰ Thomasius, Einleitung der Sitten-Lehre (Halle, 1692; edition here used, 1720), I, p. 8; see also his Ausübung der Sitten-Lehre (Halle, 1696), p. 95.

³¹ Thomasius, Summarischer Entwurff derer Grundlehren, op. cit., para. 61.

³² Thomasius, Einleitung der Sitten-Lehre, op. cit., IV, p. 187.

³³ *Ibid.*, IX, p. 369.

³⁴ Thomasius, Ausübung der Sitten-Lehre, op. cit., p. 516.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

condition, if society is to attain any degree of permanence, or transcend the narrow confines of family relations. Thomasius does not wholly deny the existence of a social propensity in man—indeed he considers it as a corollary of 'reasonable love,'36 but he regards it as too frail, too precarious and uncertain to guarantee man's 'outer peace' which he deems essential for man's life in civil society.

Before we proceed to inquire what political inferences Thomasius draws from his conception of the psychological and moral nature of man, it would seem opportune at this point to reflect for a moment how it was possible to reconcile, let alone identify so pessimistic a view of human reason with a way of thought in which reason was held to be the key to all human progress and perfection. In posing this question we are at once brought face to face with what distinguished the German Enlightenment from its French and, to a lesser extent, its English counterparts. For whereas the former shared with the latter two the affirmation of the individual's right to question established truths and their sanction by external authority, this affirmation found manifold and diverse expression, and the belief in the supremacy of reason was by no means consistently maintained.37 With most of the Aufklärer even Christian Wolff-the challenge was primarily directed against religious orthodoxy, and it sprang, not from religious hostility or sceptical disbelief, but rather from a deeply felt concern for religious values in an age of religious disenchantment. Some of the most passionately religious thinkers of the era were engaged in the quest for such a religious reorientation. And since to many of these the aim of this re-orientation was almost identical with a return to what they considered to be the essence of the Lutheran creed, it can hardly be surprising that Thomasius's pessimistic, and in this respect essentially Lutheran, outlook seemed to them both revolutionary and traditionally congenial at one and the same time. Finally, it must be remembered that Thomasius was the first since the Reformation to challenge the religious and intellectual status quo in Germany in so bold a manner. To the young men of the German Enlightenment, Thomasius was above all the intrepid man of action, the professor who scorned academic pedantry, the prophet of a new dawn. His pessimistic doctrines did little to cloud the 'progressivist' image he had created in their minds.

III

Thomasius's political views, no less than his ethics, embody the fusion of traditionally held and challengingly novel ideas. Whilst his ethics deals with man's inner contentment and with activities the nature and value of which would be annihilated were they made subject to compulsion, his political works are concerned with those areas of human existence where external compulsion is the very hallmark. Whereas the 'inner peace' of the individual is legitimately his own personal affair, in which he may or may not wish to seek the guidance of the church, his 'outer peace'concerning his material welfare and securityis the responsibility, and the sole responsibility, of a body specifically instituted for that purpose and subject to no other law than that which it has itself created.38 Following Hobbes, Thomasius demanded the supremacy of secular law over ecclesiastical law in all matters affecting the external relations of citizens within a state. Only the law of the state is law proper. The so-called divine law and the Natural Law are only pseudo-laws, for they are devoid of physical sanction and hence not enforceable. Might is the sole effective source of right.39 Natural Law, therefore, has no binding or compelling force other than that of a moral precept.40 It is entirely for the individual to decide which, if any, natural laws he regards as morally binding in the light of his 'sound reason.'41 Unlike his immediate precursors Grotius and Pufendorf, Thomasius sharply distinguished Natural Law from divine law. Neither depends upon the other. Divine laws are those which the individual voluntarily accepts as guidance for his religious life. They too are of entirely subjective relevance and of purely individual concern. 42 Thus we find Thomasius in support of individualism in the moral and religious sphere and of absolutism in the

³⁹ Institutiones, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 1, para. 30. ⁴⁰ Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 6, para. 21.

⁴¹ Institutiones, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 1, para. 3. ⁴² Ibid., lib. II, cap. I, para. 35. For a fuller treatment of Thomasius's legal theories, see Erik

Wolf, Große Rechtsdenker (4th ed., Tübingen, 1963), pp. 379-414 to which I am in debt.

²⁶ Thomasius, Einleitung der Sitten-Lehre, op. cit., II, pp. 89-91.

³⁷ See Hans M. Wolff, Die Weltanschauung der deutschen Aufklärung (2d ed., Bern and München, 1963).

⁸⁸ Thomasius, Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae, op. cit., lib. II, cap. 2, para. 7; see also his Der Politische Philosophus (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1724), particularly the preface (Vorrede).

politico-legal sphere. In the final analysis, however, individual rights can only claim a conditional autonomy for they can only be exercised if backed by positive law. To be sure, Thomasius recognizes the existence of certain innate and inalienable rights—the iura connata -as distinct from those which have emerged in the course of positive legislation—the iura acquisita.43 But, again unlike Grotius and Pufendorf, he is not prepared to treat them as divinely ordained rights in the Christian tradition, by virtue of which the individual would be justified in certain circumstances to resist the command of the ruler. Such resistance is as categorically ruled out in Thomasius's political theory as it is in that of Hobbes.44

Yet in his account of man in the state of nature, Thomasius is almost as much at variance with Hobbes's image of a 'bellum omnium contra omnes' as with Grotius's hypothesis of an instinctive 'appetitus socialis.' There is no ground, Thomasius feels, for postulating either. Man in the state of nature is neither a social animal, nor a furious lupus. He is a weak, isolated, lonely creature, in constant fear of disasters, inclined by his evil will to appropriate more than his due share of such of the scarce things in life as he can come by. In so doing he is forever courting the danger of coming into conflict with his fellows. Whilst he is aware of an inner 'law' which bids him to respect the 'rights' of others, he is at the same time conscious of its insufficient authority and compelling power. The victim of conflicting impulses, he is a danger to himself and to others. Mutual fear and distrust are the inevitable result, making social intercourse precarious if not impossible.45

In effect, it is true, Thomasius arrives at the same position as Hobbes, but he arrives there by a slightly different route. His man of nature is a man of conflicts, inherently capable of social cooperation no less than of acts of inconsiderate selfishness. He is not necessarily 'at war' with his fellows. He is simply incapable of forming any lasting social links whatsoever, for he can see no common basis on which to maintain them. For Thomasius, therefore, human 'society' in any form or shape is inconceivable prior to the institution of civil society. Grotius's notion of a natural, biological 'community' has as little meaning for him as Pufendorf's idea of a natural society bound by common traditions and customs. Civil society

According to Thomasius the reason for the social contract is man's growing realization that the state of nature is an insufferable situation in that it miserably fails to safeguard, let alone promote, his individual interests.46 He therefore, as a primary step, concludes with other like-minded individuals (presumably in a flash of rationality or 'reasonable love') an agreement to form a permanent union.47 The contracting individuals or at least a majority of them, then issue a proclamation which embodies the constitution of their union and a decree which lays down the form that government is to assume.48 A second agreement thereupon empowers one man, or a number of men, to take on the functions of government. By virtue of this second compact each man not only gives up his natural freedom but also submits his will and his energies to the will and government of the ruler or rulers.49 The purpose of the government thus formed is the exercise of supreme and sovereign authority with a view to safeguarding the civil happiness of the statewhich Thomasius, following Hobbes, calls a 'commonwealth.' By 'civil happiness' Thomasius means the citizens' 'external peace,' that is, their welfare and safety and their protection from offences against, or attacks upon their property.50 'Welfare' is conceived, however, in a collective or public rather than a purely private sense, for the commonwealth is to enjoy complete economic autarchy in addition to, or rather, in support of, its political sovereignty. To ensure this, the individual citizen is expected to subordinate his private interests to the interests of the state (as interpreted by the government), irrespective of whether he believes these to conflict with his own or not.51

Thomasius is quite explicit regarding the

does not evolve, it is the result of a conscious and deliberate political act. The social contract brings together individuals who prior to its existence were isolated atomistic units. But although Thomasius explains why the social contract comes into being and also describes the manner in which it is formed (here he follows traditional lines), he fails to give a plausible explanation of how it can come about in the first place under the conditions which he depicts. In this respect Thomasius is no more successful than other social contract theorists before and after him.

⁴³ Thomasius, Institutiones, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 1, para. 109, and his Fundamenta, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 5, para. 11.

⁴⁴ Institutiones, op. cit., lib. III, cap. 6, para. 63.

⁴⁵ Ibid., lib. III, cap. 6, para. 12.

⁴⁶ Ibid., lib. III, cap. 6, paras. 22-24.

⁴⁷ Ibid., para. 29.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 35.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 31.

⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 56.

⁵¹ Ibid., para. 23.

form of government which he prefers. He distinguishes between healthy and sick types of governments. Whilst he admits that any type of government may undergo crises owing to changing and frequently unforeseeable exigencies (including the varying quality of administrators), he insists that there are some types where political diseases are particularly endemic. Among these latter he includes all forms of mixed governments in which not only functions but even decision-making powers are shared between different, though coordinate, bodies.⁵² Healthy government, on the other hand, in Thomasius's view, requires the concentration of power in the hands of those whose responsibility it is to rule. Thomasius recognizes the need for persuasive power in addition to physical power. Indeed he considers the former-in the hands of educators in the widest sense—to be vitally important to the smooth running of the state. Nonetheless, the 'advisors' must be clearly distinguished from the 'rulers,' and the supreme authority of the latter must never be called in question. For the basis of sound government is effective government. And effective government is disturbed or made impossible if those who are not willing to heed advice are left in any doubt or ambiguity about the source of the law and the enforceable sanctions at the disposal of the law-giver.53 Whereas in the state of nature each individual is in a position to enforce his will by having recourse to physical force and thus wage 'war' upon his fellow, in civil society it is only the ruler who can use force in order to punish the legal offender. The citizen is merely entitled to bring an action before the courts (actio), not to mete out punishment (poena). There can, therefore, never be a 'right' (in the legal and hence, for Thomasius, in the only proper sense) which the subject can invoke to justify the use of force in place of an actio, or even in support of one, if the aggrieved citizen feels that the poena fails to meet the crime committed against him. And this applies equally to actions brought against other citizens as well as to those directed against the State.54

But having made the legal and theoretical position clear, Thomasius then goes on to warn the ruler or rulers that 'politics' does not mean the same thing as 'legalistics.' There is, he says, almost as little connection between the lawyer and the politician as between the politician and the medical man.⁵⁵ The ruler will be no less

foolish to claim a divine right to rule arbitrarily than to ignore the citizen's innate right to own property or to hold beliefs of his own choosing. even if such innate 'rights' are not strictly enforceable. Whilst as a ruler he is legally not subject to Natural Law, he is morally bound by it in the same manner as his subjects. And the latter's consent and support is politically as vital to him as are his protection and tolerance to them. 56 Thomasius does not reveal, however, how, in practice—the original Contract apart popular consent (let alone support) is to be elicited. Yet even Locke, who does maintain the citizen's right to revolt and on that account is commonly regarded as a radical or democrat, is not very informative on this point.57

Historically speaking, Thomasius was primarily concerned with the secularization of politics and with establishing it as an autonomous activity in clearly specified fields. He was as adamant in maintaining the absolute and supreme power of positive law, in theory, as he was in circumscribing its political application in practice. He had no wish to eliminate 'honestum' and 'decorum' in favour of the enforceable 'justum,' but he aimed to discourage false hopes in their potency as a political basis for maintaining law and order both within states and in the relations between states. Above all he sought to impress his countrymen that politics is not something that can be left to the jurist or to the well-meaning, though politically inept theologian or philosopher. 58 He believed that the modern state required a professional class of politically trained administrators. He had as little use for the myth of divinely ordained kings as he had for the no less traditionally held Platonic belief in the wisdom of philosopherkings. The task of the modern administrator was different from that of Cicero; it also had little to do with the Laws of Moses.59

⁵² Ibid., para. 39.

⁵³ Fundamenta, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 4, para. 77, and Institutiones, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 1, para. 104.

⁵⁴ Institutiones, op. cit., lib. I, cap. 1, para. 104.

⁵⁵ Der Politische Philosophus, op. cit., preface.

⁵⁶ Thomasius, Das Recht evangelischer Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten (Halle, 1696, 4th ed., 1699), p. 12.

⁵⁷ Locke certainly nowhere suggests that he subscribes to a theory of universal suffrage. For discussion of this question, see Martin Seliger, "Locke's Theory of Revolutionary Action," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (1963), pp. 548-68.

⁵⁸ Thomasius, Erimerung wegen zweyer Collegiorum über den anderen Theil seiner Grund-Lehren (Halle, 1702), p. 32. Thomasius considers it "one of the oldest errors in Christendom... that the zealots of good morals attempt to talk the Christian princes into enforcing Christianity by legislation." (ibid.)

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 34-5.

IV

Thomasius's conception of government as a device for achieving limited and clearly defined ends became the accepted political philosophy of the leading political writers in Germanythe Cameralists, as they came to be calledduring the first half of the eighteenth century. Some of them were university professors, such as Gasser (1676-1745) and Dithmar (1678-1737); others were professional administrators. such as Hornigke (1638-1712) and F. K. Moser (1723-98); a few were both, such as Justi (1720-71) for example. They favoured highly centralized absolutism, not principally, as Gierke has suggested, to provide a rationale for the political status quo,60 but because it afforded in their view the best chance of carrying out effective and efficient government without the risk of interference by the non-professional outsider. Their ethos may have been paternalistic and, by modern democratic standards, arrogant, but they were sincere in their belief that a well constructed bureaucratic organization, operating within a framework of fixed rules, could not but further the well-being of the subjects. A number of them also believed that by perfecting the administrative machine as a system of strictly specialized functions they were minimizing the risk of arbitrariness due to personal forces, and thus ensuring fair and impersonal government.61

Whilst it would plainly be an overstatement of the case to say that these writers and followers of Thomasius were thinking of the administrative apparatus as a device for restraining the absolute power of the ruler—for he was commonly envisaged as a power outside and above the governmental 'machine'—they were certainly more interested in strengthening the power of the bureaucracy than in buttressing

⁶⁰ O. Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, transl. E. Barker (Cambridge, 1934), vol. I, p. 144.

⁶¹ For a detailed account of these administrative theories, see Albion W. Small, *The Cameralists* (Chicago, 1909); see also Geraint Parry, "Enlightened Government and its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 6 (1963), pp. 178–192.

the position of the monarch. Their monolithic and mechanistic conception of government was undoubtedly inadequate as a political theory in that it failed to take account of the complexity and many-sidedness of socio-political life. But in their emphasis upon administrative organization, public finance and political expertness, the Cameralists correctly anticipated, as Thomasius did before them, the growing role which bureaucracy was to play in the modern state.

It was no accident that the Prussia of Frederick II was by far the most enlightened of the absolutist states in eighteenth-century Europe. For it was during the decisive years of the transition from semi-feudal government to absolutist regimes that the Prussian administration drew its recruits from a university (Halle) which was the first in Germany to institute chairs of Politics and Economics and which, within a decade of Thomasius's teaching, rose to become one of the leading and most forward-looking universities of the time.⁶²

No less impressive was Thomasius's achievement as a legal reformer. In 1728, the year of his death, Prussia witnessed the last witch trial, and just over a decade later (1740) Frederick II, publicly acknowledging Thomasius's services to the European Enlightenment, 68 decreed the abolition of the practice of torture.

If we take as the basic criteria of liberalism the ideas that the liberty of the individual must be safeguarded by the limitation of governmental power and that, in order to be limited, political power must be shared, then Thomasius can scarcely be regarded as a liberal. But if other, less formal, standards are applied, Thomasius surely qualifies in the history of ideas as a thinker in the liberal tradition. He was undoubtedly perspicacious in suggesting that a politically trained bureaucracy, far from endangering individual liberties, could in fact constitute one of the safeguards against their infringement by arbitrary rulers.

⁶² See Dernburg, Thomasius und die Stiftung der Universität Halle (Halle, 1865), p. 4, and Schmoller, "Preußischer Beamtenstand unter Friedrich Wilhelm I.", Preußische Jahrbücher, Vol. 26 (1870), p. 148 f.

63 Frederic II, Oeuvres (Berlin, 1789), vol. I, p. 376.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON CONSTITUTIONALISM

TO THE EDITOR:

There is a great deal in Professor Sartori's article, "Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion" (this Review, December 1962), with which I find myself in enthusiastic accord. I would suggest, however, that in two respects his case may be overstated.

1. The fifth thesis of the summary (p. 863) states that "either the term [constitution] is used in its specific garantiste meaning, or it is a meaningless (and deceiving) duplicate of terms such as organization, structure, form, pattern, political system and the like." The difficulty here is that the sharpness of distinction he calls for seems more than the substance of the matter will bear. The garantiste meaning is not sufficiently specific in itself; nor is it so easily separable from at least some of the other terms mentioned.

In the first place, let us take the "unambiguous" meaning offered at p. 855: "a fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure 'limited government'." How "unambiguous" is this? "Fundamental" is a matter of degree and "limited government" has more than one meaning. The footnote 10 at this point already admits some difficulty: "Of course the query, 'What do the guarantees include?' (e.g., a certain technique of allocation of power, a bill of rights, the rule of law, judicial review, etc.) receives different, complex and changing answers." Just so; there are several routes to the restriction of arbitrary power, and one of these lies along the way of rules as to who is to do what, i.e., "allocation of power." In other words, garantisme need not necessarily be secured by a "bill of rights" technique; it can be reached through certain kinds of "frame of government."

In the second place, "rules" too are a matter of degree and kind. (Admitting that differences are of degree does not entail saying that they do not matter.) "'Rules' applies to any kind of rule—including the rule of leadership" (p. 854); by this we are invited to believe that when the British say "we have rules" they are saying nothing. The Wheare and Jennings definitions are described as "formal" and it is said that they "can be filled with any content whatever" (p. 856). But, to begin with, these

definitions are not exhaustive; they are introductory to examination of what the rules in Britain are. Again, insofar as they do indeed speak of "rules which govern the government" (Wheare) or "rules determining the creation and operation of governmental institutions" (Jennings), their purely "formal" nature cannot safely be stressed; it would scarcely be true that "they can be filled with any content whatever," since such definitions would hardly apply to a regime where the government itself simply decides the rules. "Even games have 'rules' " (p. 856), but we would think it strange if we learnt of a game where one side made the rules as it went along. In other words, the regularity which the term "rules" implies is itself hostile to arbitrariness.

Third, and closely related to the above, there is the problem of Aristotle's meaning. In order to support the sharpness of the distinction between the garantiste use and all meaningless use of 'constitution,' Sartori suggests (p. 860) that Aristotle cannot be called as a witness to the contrary and that the view that he might be rests on a mistranslation or misunderstanding of politeia. "To speak of a Greek 'constitutionalism" is found "quite absurd," while it is said that "nothing resembling this concept [i.e., that of "a frame of political society, organised through and by the law, for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power"] was in the mind of Aristotle." Now the difficulty in translating politeía must be admitted. But much of the difficulty surely comes from the several different ways in which Aristotle uses the term. It appears too sweeping to say that Aristotle gives it one sole meaning: "politeia only conveys the idea of the way in which a polity is patterned." While this could conceivably be a way of expressing the element common to the usage in 1274 b and 1276 b, it overlooks other meanings. These include (as Sartori concedes) that contained in the "passages . . . in which the term politeia specifically refers to the way in which the polis magistracies are ordained," such as 1278 b, 1289 \bar{a} , and 1290 a; it is open to debate whether in these cases "this meaning appears in passing" as Sartori alleges. Further, there is, of course, the use of politeia to denote a particular form of government-e.g., 1279 a. Here Aristotle is saying that since constitution implies order and arrangement, it is appropriate to label that government constitutional in which matters are well ordered. But above all there is the notable passage, 1292 a, in which Aristotle firmly connects the idea of constitution to the whole discussion of the rule of law in Book III: speaking of a kind of democracy in which demagogues sway the multitude and the decrees of the assembly override the law, he writes that "it would seem reasonable to object that this kind of democracy is not a constitution at all, on the ground that where laws do not rule there is no constitution" (1292 a, R. Robinson, ed., Aristotle's Politics Books III and IV, Oxford, 1963).

Of course, there can also be uncertainty about the meaning of "laws," but I have taken it (e.g., in my "The Emergent Countries" in Political Quarterly, July, 1963) that Aristotle can be interpreted, with the least forcing of meaning, as saying that while all political societies, so long as they are stable enough to be said to exist at all, are bound to be regarded as having "constitutions" (i.e., arrangements of their parts), the differences between the extremes of the range are great. At one end are states which are so poorly composed, so irregularly conducted, as to be scarcely deserving of the name; they are liable by disintegration to fall, so to speak, off the end of the range altogether. At the other end are others which are firmly composed, secure, well constituted; and their being well constituted is expressed in their being constitutional (i.e., under the rule of law). In other words, the two senses of constitution are present in his mind and he is feeling his way toward a connection between them, that connection being that an adequately patterned political society is one which has developed or established firm rules controlling the use of power.

I conclude that we have here a conceptual continuum. The *garantiste* meaning of constitution is a development of the "rule of law" meaning and that in turn is a development of the "arrangement of parts" meaning. These important relations should not be obscured by forcing excessively sharp distinctions.

2. The second thesis of the summary states that despite "the complexity of the original model (the English constitution)" and "a somewhat polemic isolationism of the British scholars," "the idea of limit is basic to the English prototype just as much as to the American and the French subsequent models." While his annoyance with the isolationism is understandable, it will not do to suggest that the British approach to constitutionalism differs from that of the Americans and French only because its expositors are polemic isolationists displaying "coquetry" and "unhelpfulness." For this

would be to ignore an important strand in British political thought. Bentham can best stand as its representative and he can be heard expressing the relevant point in Chapter IV of the Fragment on Government and in the 1789 postscript to the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. He is scornful as regards attempts to formulate the limits of state or governmental action by reference either to "laws of nature" or to fundamental natural rights listed in a constitutional document. He agrees, and indeed insists, that there are important differences between "free" and "despotic" governments, but he holds that these are neither to be expressed in terms of metaphysics (i.e., "consent" vs. "coercion," "in accordance with the laws of nature" vs. "contrary to the laws of nature") nor to be achieved by the preparation of formal lists of (impracticable) do's and dont's. In a free state as in a despotism, there is sovereignty: "the field of the [sovereign's] authority must unavoidably, I think, unless where limited by express convention, be allowed to be indefinite." (The qualification here is of course important, and the footnote at this point interesting.) "Wherein is it then that the difference exists?," he asks. In his answer (para 24 of that Chapter) Bentham points to what may be called the realities (or real conditions) of political life. He mentions, for instance, liberty of the press and association and machinery for rendering governments accountable and replaceable. What this all contributes to is a (distinctively British?) garantisme of a peculiar kind in which constitutional form matters less than political habits. This is not, of course, to say that Bentham was an anti-constitutionalist; only that in some of his writing he expresses a hostility to certain forms of garantisme, that this hostility has remained a feature of British writing about the subject, and that it accounts for some of the "isolationism" which is found so unwarranted and distressing.

The ways in which "limits" on arbitrary power are achieved in practice in different countries differ no more than the ways in which the ideas about the nature of these limits are expressed. To say that "the idea of limit is basic" to several traditions is true; it is equally true that the ideas about limits are interestingly and significantly different among these same traditions. British scholars are, very properly, making this clear.

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A REJOINDER

TO THE EDITOR:

A "preliminary discussion" is also an invitation to a further discussion. Therefore I am most grateful to Professor Morris-Jones for his penetrating and perceptive critique of my article, in which the other side of the case is brilliantly stated. My first temptation would be to bow to his witty criticism and concede that his arguments are indeed convincing. In fact, if I followed the approach he takes, in most cases I could only reply: I agree. If I nevertheless stop short of such a conclusion, this is mainly because our disagreement presupposes a methodological issue which deserves to be discussed.

The issue boils down to this question: Why do I find other people guilty of "understatement," and why am I now, in my turn, found guilty of "overstatement"? The explanation, I think, was clearly suggested by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason when he made the point that reason follows two methods, or principles: "homogeneity" and "specification" (Cf. ch. III, Appendix to Transcendental Dialectics). Consequently "in one thinker it is the interest for multiplicity that prevails (following the principle of specification), while in another thinker it is the interest for unity that prevails (according to the principle of aggregation)." And Kant made it very clear that neither principle has, in itself, a superior claim. Both are only "regulative maxims" that express a "different interest of reason" which is, in turn, "the cause of the diversity in method." Therefore when Morris-Jones finds my distinctions "too sharp" he is actually uncovering the fact that I follow the method of "specificity." And this is in turn the reason why I find some of his distinctions too soft.

Does this conclusion imply that we are both right and wrong or, better said, that we are neither right nor wrong? Logically this seems to follow, for either method, in principle, is correct. Nonetheless we need not be content merely with taking stock of the fact that we have reached a stalemate. Logically, or in the abstract, both methods are correct, but historically, i.e., concretely, there are times when one method is more justified or more necessary than the other.

The historical growth of the tree of knowledge is oscillatory and somewhat cyclical. To put it picturesquely, the development of thought follows a pattern that I would call the cycle of the cupboard. Some generations labor under the illusion of storing and ordering ideas and information into a system of cupboards. When they have done so, subsequent genera-

tions open the cupboards and tear everything apart. The generations that follow inherit chaos and have to start again ordering the world of knowledge into new cupboards-and so on. The timely question, therefore, is: should we now still pursue the destruction of the cupboards, or is it not high time to engage in their reconstruction? I take the latter view, that the balance between flux and stabilization of knowledge should be restored by trying to rebuild a filing system. And this is why I am more unhappy than Morris-Jones with diffuse thinking, with the advice that we should avoid logical polarizations, with the current abuse of the formula that everything is a matter of degree—and the like. In sum, I believe we have gone too far along the path of "homogeneity" and that the time has come to concentrate on "specificity." Perhaps Morris-Jones does not share that feeling. Yet from the point of view of the cupboard theory of knowledge-if I may call it so-we need not conclude that we are faced with a methodological deadlock, and the way has been cleared for a better mutual understanding.

First point: the garantiste meaning of the term constitution. Morris-Jones points out that this meaning "is not sufficiently specific in itself; nor is it so easily separable from at least some of the other terms mentioned." Quite so. But is this a reason for declaring inseparable what appears difficult to separate? According to my approach, it is not. And the "substance of the matter" has little, if anything, to do with this issue because there is nothing in re, in the nature of things, which can decide a "regulative" matter. To say that the garantiste meaning is not sufficiently specific "in itself" is only to say that previous thinkers have blurred it, or that nobody has yet specified it; in either case we are dealing with mental products which abide by man-made decisions.

The general definition of the garantiste meaning that I have suggested is "ambiguous" in that it is general; but perhaps it is an advance vis à vis current ambiguities and consequently is "unambiguous" in this relative sense (even though, I grant, still inadequately so). I could hardly deny that "'fundamental' is a matter of degree and [that] 'limited government' has more than one meaning." Here again, however, my question is: Is this a reason for saying that we cannot draw a line between fundamental and secondary, or between limited and limitless government? Morris-Jones rightly asserts that "there are several routes to the restriction of arbitrary power" and that "garantisme need

not necessarily be secured by a 'bill of rights' technique." I could not agree more, provided that one is not satisfied with leaving the argument there, as it is—unfinished.

Second point: the meaning of "rules." On this I cannot agree with Morris-Jones, and particularly with his concluding statement that "the regularity which the term 'rules' implies is itself hostile to arbitrariness." This view only testifies to what extent we have lost sight of what constitutionalism is for, and fail to appreciate what it provides. Logically, if there is a rule there is a "regularity"—this is a tautology. But constitutionally it is a small consolation. Princeps legibus solutus est, and regis voluntas suprema lex are rules. But they are not "hostile to arbitrariness." They are precisely rules which allow the power-holder to make decrees, to change them, or to dispense with them, as he goes along. In fact, they are the rules of dictatorships and have been the rules of absolutism. Therefore if "regularity" is all that is required from constitutional rules, we may as well bid farewell to constitutionalism and resign ourselves to the loss of the constitutional State.

Maybe I have been unfair to Wheare and Jennings in taking out of their context definitions which are "introductory to an examination of what the rules in Britain are." Yet the fact remains that the definitions in question are purely "formal"; and I do not quite see why their books should be introduced by missing the point, that is, missing the specificity of those rules which are of a constitutional nature. Description (what the rules in Britain are) and conceptualization (what is the nature of constitutional rules) do not belong in separate watertight compartments. Therefore I submit that if Wheare and Jennings are satisfied—conceptually—with providing a merely formal definition of rules, the most likely explanation is that they are concerned with constitutions but hardly with constitutionalism. And if this is true, it is a sombre symptom.

Third point: Aristotle. Morris-Jones is quite right in saying that my way of dealing with Aristotle was "too sweeping." His analysis is acute, and I only wish to inject a further caution in the discussion. Granted that "much of the difficulty... comes from the several different ways in which Aristotle uses the term," there is an additional difficulty, namely, that generally we do not quote Aristotle but the translators of Aristotle. I have at hand several translations of the *Politics* (both because my Greek is rusty and because the experiment is amusing), and each translation conveys a rather different idea of what Aristotle had in mind. In the Robinson edition cited by Morris-

Jones the crucial passage of 1292 a reads "where laws do not rule there is no constitution"; but in the classic Italian translation of V. Costanzi (Laterza, Bari, 1925) the same passage reads "where laws do not rule there is no political regime" (my italies). Since Costanzi often does translate politeia as "constitution," why is it that in this case he uses a more comprehensive and uncommitted term? Possibly because he feels that, in 1291 a, Aristotle's focus is not on the notion of politeia but rather on the notion of democracy. Actually his subsequent and concluding sentence ("the kind of arrangement in which everything is decided by the decrees of a popular assembly is not even a democracy in the proper sense of the term") lends weight to the interpretation that politeia is the definiens (the expression used to define), that demokratia is the definiendum (the expression to be defined), and therefore that the gist of his argument was to say that where the mob rules instead of the laws, all political institutions collapse—this is no polity, no "arrangement of parts" (as Morris-Jones so well puts it) and therefore this is not even a democracy.

We need not, however, open Pandora's box by entering an exegetical discussion. Whatever was in the mind of Aristotle, let it be suggested that gross misinterpretations are inevitable unless we approach him by subtraction, that is, by taking away from the Greek vision of the world all the discoveries of the mind that were added later. And this is why I said that I find it "absurd" to speak of a Greek "constitutionalism" (just as I find it absurd to speak of a Greek "state"). The thesis of my article was, in fact, that "constitution" is both a modern word and a modern concept, and that when the term was conceived at the end of the Eighteenth century it was given a specific, substantive meaning. Therefore to speak of a Greek constitutionalism is, to begin with, a falsification of the past, for in doing so we inevitably project a modern frame of reference into a very distant and different world, flying as it were over the head of more than twenty centuries.1

Morris-Jones concludes his discussion on Aristotle by saying that "we have here a conceptual continuum," in the sense that the "garantiste meaning of constitution is a development of the 'rule of law' meaning and that in

¹ See Francis D. Wormuth, "Aristotle on Law," in Milton R. Konvitz, and Arthur E. Murphy, eds., Essays in Political Theory presented to George H. Sabine (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1948), pp. 45-61; and Wormuth's The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism (New York, Harper, 1949).

turn is a development of the 'arrangement of parts' meaning." But I cannot follow him along his continuum. It seems to me that Morris-Jones builds his continuum paralogistically, that is, upon two different meanings of "rule of law": one a generic way of saying, and the other a more technical meaning. Technically, rule of law does not simply mean that it is the laws and not men that rule. Therefore Aristotle did not use the proposition "where the laws rule" in the sense which Morris-Jones seems to suggest—perhaps too sweepingly. At least, I have taken it (in my Democratic Theory, 1965 ed., Praeger, New York, pp. 288-291) that the Greek approach to the problem of "liberty under the law" was an anticipation of the legislative conception of law, rather than of the English rule of law conception of law. As Jhering and Bryce long ago pointed out, the rule of law in its technical sense originates with Roman jurisprudence. Hence I find a discontinuity where Morris-Jones sees an ideal continuity. It is very true that the garantiste features of the British constitution are founded on, and derived from, the rule of law (this, incidentally, is why the English did not need a bill of rights); but from the English-type rule of law, not from the Greek concept of law, and even less from Aristotle's meanings of politeia.

Fourth point: what is peculiar and distinctively British about present-day English constitutionalism. If my article conveyed the impression that my passes at the English passion for "understatements" or at their "polemic isolationism" were meant to be an exhaustive explanation, Morris-Jones fills the gap very well. Where I had detected a style of "saying less," Morris-Jones points to something which is both more important and more serious: a strand of "hostility to certain forms of garantisme" which becomes, from Bentham onwards, "a feature of British writing about the subject." This clarification is indeed an illuminating addition to the topic. Yet my query remains: is it really true that British scholars are "making clear" whatever there is that needs to be clarified? I wonder.

Why is it, for instance, that the British can afford to have an unwritten constitution? Morris-Jones supports the view that "constitutional form matters less than political habits." I would argue, however, that this statement is unwarranted unless one goes on to show that it is the "habit" that creates the "form"; otherwise why should the latter "matter less"? Moreover, the statement omits to state (understates?) an essential qualification: that it applies to the British people only because they happen to have the right political habits (i.e.,

habits which are both cause and consequence of the constitutionalization of politics). The next question is: how were these habits formed? It will not do, I think, to explain habits with habits and to ground everything on the cake of custom. Most British scholars, however, do leave the argument at this obscure point.

To cite another instance to warrant my complaints, let me return to the crucial question: what do the English mean when they say "rule of law"? The latest definition in my files (by John Strachey in his latest Encounter pamphlet) reads that the rule of law is the principle that "a man or a woman is free to do anything which is not specifically forbidden by the laws of his or her community." I submit that Strachey largely missed the target, for if this were all, any despotism—and the more totalitarian the better-could easily manage to abide by the rule of law. Granted that Strachey was not an authority on the subject, what strikes me is that any Englishman would know better if he was taught better—that is, if British scholars did make things clear. Dicey went too far when he said that "in England the law of the constitution is little else than a generalization of the rights which the courts secure to individuals" (The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., Macmillan, London, 1960, p. 200); yet he came close to the mark when he noted that "the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law" (p. 195) in the sense that it "is a judge-made constitution" (p. 196). Granted that this is only one part of the picture, the interesting point is that Dicey's commentators have generally been more concerned with showing where he was wrong than with improving on him where he was almost right.

The fact is, then, that English scholars seldom, if ever, lay the stress on the crux of the matter, namely, that the rule of law is first and foremost a conception of the law (apart from its having several particular meanings), and specifically that conception according to which law is not State-willed law, is not legislated law. (This, incidentally, is why the British tradition could safely afford to stress the omnipotence of parliament). As I have put it in Democratic Theory, the "rule of law" is the opposite of the "rule of legislators," and the more the latter replaces the former, the less even the English may ultimately rely on a rule-of-law type of guarantees. Perhaps this development helps to explain why British scholars appear reluctant when they are asked to unveil the "mistery" of their rule of law, when they are asked what the essence of rule of law is. At any rate, my point is that they are not making it clear.

Morris-Jones will forgive me, I hope, if I

have taken his remark about the English tradition of "hostility" (toward the non-British forms of garantisme) so seriously as to suggest—pushing the argument a step further—that this hostility is becoming outdated, that it may be unsafe to envisage the future as if the rule of law foundations of the English constitution were not weakening, and therefore that it may be wiser to realize that Western constitution—

alism as a whole is ever more faced with similar problems and with a common challenge. My plea was, and remains, that the British oracle should become more helpful.

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A NOTE ON THE EVALUATION OF ERROR AND TRANSFORMATION IN DATA ANALYSIS

TO THE EDITOR:

Researchers continually have to confront two practical problems-how to allocate limited resources in the implicit bargain between data refinement and analysis, and how to produce serviceable data within a time in which they remain relevant. A recent review in this journal of a volume by me and other members of the Yale Political Data Program¹ raises several fundamental points about these research problems that deserve careful attention. Let me begin with a comment on accuracy, directed to the reviewer's lament over the frequency of transcription errors in Table 9. Certainly there are more errors in that table than we would have hoped for, and their presence is the cause of real chagrin. Yet, even in what at first sight may seem so gross an instance, it is essential to have a fairly precise idea of the magnitude of the error and the magnitude of its effects on analysis.

Aside from noting a couple of particular caveats,² the important point to be made is

¹ Bruce M. Russett and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1964), reviewed by Arthur S. Banks in this Review, Vol. 59 (March, 1965), pp. 144-146.

² Two cases asserted to be in error can be shown to be correct, though, as may occur elsewhere, the reasons (comparability adjustments we made in the figures published in our sources) may not be obvious. Furthermore, two kinds of error should be distinguished. One is erroneous data, the other is erroneous footnoting of correct data. For example, two instances of the latter occurred when superscript references to sources were omitted and the reference thus seemed to be to the general source listed for the table. The data, correct, are to be found in others of the works given at the foot of page 53. An erratum sheet is available on request from the Yale Political Data Program, 89 Trumbull Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

that the total error alluded to amounts to only one per cent of the variance in the table. Thus the corrected table is correlated .993 with the unrevised one. For some purposes this might indeed still have serious effects, but if the object is primarily to see the direction and strength of the relationship between this variable and another, the conclusions should in no important way be affected; because of other problems of reliability, assumptions about "sampling," etc., differences of a single percentage point in squared correlation coefficients are meaningless. Now I can hardly be sure that there are no errors in the other 74 tables of Part A of the Handbook, though for a variety of reasons I am confident Table 9 is not typical. But for the sake of a simple illustration let us assume the worst-that in every other table there is a magnitude and type of error corresponding to that in Table 9.

The first thing to note is that it is random error, not correlated with income, political system, or any other variable. The effect of random error is to lower the correlation between variables. This can be shown, and its magnitude assessed, by an experiment which I performed. I deliberately introduced error, of the same amount and type in Table 9, into the data for eight other variables (Tables 1, 8, 31, 41, 43, 44, 51, 64), computed the correlation of each with every other, and compared them with the correlations produced by the data as given in the Handbook. The average difference in the r^2 produced by the two versions of each table was less than .03; in most of the cases the variables with the random error had lower correlations than those without.3 Thus the

³ Highly skewed distributions should of course be subjected to a logarithmic or other transformation before correlation coefficients are computed. For this computation the data were transformed precisely as were those in the *Handbook* for the analysis given in Part B. The correlations reported here and below will be only those staeffect on substantive conclusions would seldom be great, though in a few instances of rather low correlation it might mistakenly result in acceptance of the null hypothesis that two variables were not related. And this is where error is introduced into both variables, not just

For the other kind of mistaken conclusion the unwarranted rejection of the hypothesis of no relationship—non-random or systematic error is more often responsible. This type of error is most likely to stem from deliberate or semi-deliberate distortion by the reporting countries themselves, and its effect can be suggested by another example. Into the same eight Handbook tables I deliberately introduced systematic error, meaning that particular types of countries regularly had their values changed in the same direction. I raised the values for all East European countries and again computed the matrix of correlations and compared it with the original one. Here the damage was even less serious; the average difference in r^2 was under .02, although most of the new correlations were higher than with the original data. Both types should be considered in the light of the other problems of data reliability and comparability discussed in the text of the Handbook. For most variables these are likely to be appreciably greater than transcribing error, and we attempted to indicate, at least in an appropriate way, their likely magnitude.

We can pursue this subject further, to the discussion of the effect on correlations produced by the decision whether to transform a variable before using it in computations, and, if so, what type of transformation to employ. Banks makes the excellent suggestion that in doubtful cases several different transformations be tried, and that the transformation finally used be specified and the Chi-Square value for the distribution be given. He then shows that four of the tables (nos. 8, 9, 51, 64) not transformed in the *Handbook* might have been so treated, and indicates what transformations would improve the approximation to normality.⁴

tistically significant at the .01 level with a one-tailed test. It would be misleading to report all correlations, however trivial, because with very low correlations small changes can produce substantial variation in the r (for example from .20 to .30) without affecting what one may be most interested in, the r^2 , by nearly as much (i.e., from .04 to .09). Such low correlations are likely to occur by chance in any case. For a discussion of the relevance of "statistical significance" in this situation, however, see the Handbook, p. 263.

4 The review also emphasizes the inappropriate-

But again the magnitude of effect is highly relevant. In a procedure analogous to that above, I made the transformations suggested and compared the resulting r^2 with those produced by the transformed variables. The difference was .09. Under some circumstances, where the degree of skewness was greater or where there was more coincidence among the outliers in different tables, the effect would have been greater. But though in the cases suggested less than 10 per cent of the variance was actually affected, the difference is the greatest found so far and should teach care when correlating skewed distributions.

Even this could be contrasted with another common type of transformation, the dichotomization of a variable into high or low, or more or less, where the researcher feels unsure of the accuracy of any finer distinctions in his data. All of us employ this method at one time or another. For comparative purposes I took eight tables and dichotomized the data according to the criteria which had been found useful in another study and matched the results against those obtained from the data as employed in the *Handbook* correlations, either logarithmically transformed or used in their raw form. The difference was greater than that produced by any of the influences discussed above—the

ness of applying a logarithmic transformation to a left-skewed distribution and perhaps leaves the impression that we erroneously did so. This is not the case—there are only two left-skewed distributions in the book, and neither was transformed.

⁵ One measure of skewness is that suggested in the Handbook, where skewness = $3(\overline{X}-Md/\sigma)$ and \overline{X} = the mean, Md = the median, and σ = the standard deviation. By this measure the degree of skewness in the four distributions ranges from .18 to .79. For those distributions in the Handbook that we did transform the mean value for skewness was 1.36.

⁶ Except for Tables 9 and 51 the variables employed in the preceding analysis were included in Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1963), as dichotomized variables. I substituted table 40, which has a counter-part in the Survey, in the following analysis. In my review of Banks and Textor ["Strategies for Comparing Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9 (June 1964), pp. 166-70] I suggested some regrettable consequences of the decision to dichotomize, but there are also weighty arguments in its support. My own "The Calculus of Deterrence," ivid., Vol. 8 (June 1963), pp. 97-109, looked for association between dichotomized variables.

mean difference in the r^2 was .20.7 Moreover, in virtually every case the result was a drop in r^2 . With dichotomized data one would be much more likely to accept the null hypothesis of no association than when the data are used in their original interval form without the loss of information produced by dichotomization.

The examination of the effects of error, and of various kinds of transformations, needs to be

⁷ Though it is not a common practice to compute r for dichotomized data it is permissible so long as the n for either side of the dichotomy is not seriously disproportionte and so long as one is not concerned with significance tests.

pushed much farther than has been possible here. These illustrations do not substitute for an adequate mathematical consideration, though a number of important contributions in fact exist in the literature of statistics and econometrics. But perhaps this discussion has suggested some criteria for dealing with a common kind of research problem.

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⁸ For a useful piece by a political scientist, however, see the forthcoming article by Rudoph Rummel, "Dimensions of Error in Cross-National Data."

ON THEORIZING IN COMPARATIVE STUDIES

TO THE EDITOR:

We cannot allow to pass unchallenged two inaccurate statements by Gabriel Almond in his review of *Political Power: USA/USSR* in your December 1964 issue.

First, Almond argues that when we attack the so-called convergence theory—which holds that the United States and the Soviet Union are becoming more alike—we are attacking a "'straw man' . . . which few students of politics would advance with any seriousness. . . ." Maybe Almond's students do not advance this theory, but many learned scholars, leading intellectuals, and influential statesmen do. Walt W. Rostow calls communism a "disease of the transition" to a highly industralized society and predicts that "Communism is likely to wither in the age of high mass-consumption" which the Soviet Union is now approaching. George Kennan states that the changes in the Soviet Union since Stalin represent "an essential alteration of the nature of the regime" toward a "new form of parliamentarianism". "In the main," he says, "the goals and trends of Russian communism lie along the same path as those of Western liberalindustrialism. . . . It is probable that the progress already made is in the direction of our own institutions."2 Walter Lippmann has stated that the leaders of the Kremlin "are finding ... what Western society found 200 years ago . . . that if you are going to have an indus-

trial society, you have to have liberty. . . . " Khrushchev, Lippmann argued, "wants more liberty," and the Russians, he concluded, are "becoming more like us" and "less like the Chinese."3 Clark Kerr and his associates predict that the social and political differences among industrial countries will decrease as they all move toward the "uniformity" of "pluralistic industralism".4 Philip Slater and Warren Bennis argue at length that democracy is the only efficient form of government for an industrial society, that "autocracy is beginning to decay in the Soviet Union," and that there is an "inevitable Soviet drift toward a more democratic structure...."5 Nor are these views limited to, or even primarily found among, Americans. In five months of travel through the Eastern Hemisphere from Tokyo to London in 1962-1963, we heard similar views expressed by at least seventy-five per cent of the intellectuals and political leaders with whom we talked. Perhaps the most articulate and impressive case for convergence was made by Jawaharlal Nehru, who argued at length that the Soviet Union was becoming "liberal" and "bourgeois". Are all these gentlemen—Lippmann, Kennan, Rostow, Kerr, Nehru, and the rest-straw men? Or is their theory one which,

³ CBS television interview with Charles Collingwood, May 1, 1963, printed in Washington Post, May 3, 1963, p. A-12.

⁴ Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Men* (Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 10, esp. pp. 288-296.

⁵ "Democracy Is Inevitable," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 42 (March-April 1964), pp. 51-59.

¹ The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 133, 162.

² In Raymond Aron, ed., World Technology and Human Destiny (University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 77, 79, 89-90.

although erroneous, is both intellectually respectable and politically influential?

Second, Almond claims that, while we correctly reject ideological models, we "offer no analytical models to take their place." "It is surprising," he concludes, "that in a decade marked by a proliferation of political typologies they use none of these and offer none of their own...." In response to this criticism. we can only point out that his review deals chiefly with the introduction, conclusion, and table of contents. His preoccupation with convergence is preoccupation with a subject which is treated explicitly only in the introduction and conclusion. He does not mention, much less discuss, any of our substantive findings. All his principal comments are directed to points made either in the introduction or conclusion. When he does refer to the other nine chapters which constitute ninety per cent of the book he is almost invariably wrong. "The authors," he says, for example, "provide us with four comparative case studies of politics and policy-making in the two countries." In fact, there are six comparative case studies presented in five different chapters. In the other four chapters in the first half of the book we develop a variety of categories and typologies which we utilize in the analysis of the two political systems. Among other things, we explicitly draw distinctions between: ideological and instrumental political systems; political socialization and politization; political ideologies and political beliefs; bureaucratic and electoral recruitment systems; social forces, interest groups, and policy groups; and the phases of initiation, persuasion, decision, and implementation in the policy-making process. With these and other categories we try to develop generalizations about the similarities and differences in political behavior and attitudes in the United States and the Soviet Union. Some of the categories and typologies we use in this analysis we borrowed from other scholars; others we developed ourselves. Our comparative approach may or may not be successful, but to claim that we ignore the work of others and that we offer no framework of our own is simply inaccurate. Perhaps the problem is that we did make use of categories and concepts from Dahl, Easton, Etzioni, Hyman, Kornhauser, Lasswell, Lindblom, Lipset. March, and Simon, but that we did not find

relevant or useful any of the many typologies "proliferated" by others!

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TO THE EDITOR:

I would like to reply briefly to the letter of Professors Huntington and Brzezinski which takes issue with some of the criticism which I made in my review of their *Political Power: USA/USSR.*

I want to reaffirm the evaluation in my review, both in its positive and negative aspects. My criticism took the form of an expression of disappointment. I had the feeling then, as I do now, that Huntington and Brzezinski became faint-hearted when confronting the implications of their own imaginative and often brilliant analysis. Instead of going forward to discuss the intersection of characteristics of the Soviet and American political systems (an intersection which is more than implicit in their own formulation), they drew back and set up a "straw man" conception of "convergence" to refute.

I read the book with some care and with great reward. I read the introduction and the conclusion with even greater care, since the formulation of the problem and the drawing of conclusions are very important parts of an analytical effort. I did not intend to depreciate their analytical inventiveness and the categories which they have drawn from other theorists or have developed themselves. I simply felt it was remarkable that they did not try to present their conclusions about the general characteristics of the Soviet and American political systems in the context of political system typologies such as the ones resented by Apter. Shils. Tucker, and Coleman. Without such a political system typology, it is very difficult to confront the question of degree of convergence, extent of intersection, or similarity—dissimilarity.

Finally, let me express again my conviction that this is an original and important work, and my apologies for having miscounted the number of case studies presented in the body of the work.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Man's Quest for Political Knowledge—The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times. By WILLIAM ANDERSON. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 381. \$8.00.)

Not entirely satisfied with the often-told stories of political events and of political ideas, Dr. Anderson concentrates on the neglected question when, where, and why the quest for political knowledge arose and to what extent and through what people it was activated in studying, teaching and writing about politics. He devotes more than half of the book to Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Israelites and, in Greece. to the Delphic Oracles, the pre-Socratic writers and Socrates' contemporaries before turning to the classical giants. Relatively little space is given to the Romans, with the last chapter covering the six hundred years from Augustus to Justinian on only twenty pages. A second volume is to carry the story through the middle ages to our day.

Knowing in what totally different fields Dr. Anderson has conducted research in his busy life one wonders how he could have undertaken the present work, which seems to presuppose a profound knowledge of history in various sections of the ancient world. He frankly disclaims particular competence but, seeing a gap in literature and no one else around to close it, he decided to do it himself. He set a dozen graduate assistants to examining available literature for material pertinent to the project, and then went to work. Far from being merely a secondrate compilation, as I would have expected from these beginnings, the outcome has been a major contribution because Dr. Anderson has applied his mature knowledge of things political, his discerning mind, his great analytical power, and his own considerable reading knowledge of at least the Greek literature to his selfappointed task.

Although ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt developed remarkably successful administrations there are few indications of a study of government in secular or comparative terms. Egypt had no generic terms for "state," "government," or "politics." There certainly was a remarkable in-service training and an elaborate education of scribes ("it is writing that makes people remember" is Egyptian wisdom) and even some good psychological advice on public relations, such as this Egyptian one: "A petitioner likes attention to his words better than the fulfilling of that for which he came . . . a good hearing is socthing to the heart." But critical research on government would not have been tolerated. The king either had the support of the gods (Mesopotamia) or was recognized as a god himself (Egypt)—that was all the people needed to know. Nevertheless some contributions to political studies were forthcoming, such as the application of writing in government and administration, enlargement of political units. in-service training, and eventually a beginning separation of politics from theology. Dr. Anderson holds that especially the Mesopotamian record should be "studied very carefully for evidences of political inventions, discoveries, and thought, before the Greeks."

Turning to Israel, this is one of the rare books in political science that try to do justice to the contributions made by the ancient Jews. Moses' father-in-law, Jethro, pointed out to him the incompetence of his methods of earthly rule, "one of the speediest governmental surveys on record," and taught him the first important lessons in efficient organization. Jethro put emphasis also upon ability and honesty for officials in the public service. Deuteronomy recommended central consultation with the local people on the qualifications of those to be appointed as local administrators and judges. Prophetic warnings were often based on a realistic appraisal of consequences and risks, such as Samuel's discussion of the risks of kingship (1 Samuel 8) and the parable of the contest of the trees (Judges 9:7): if competent men shirk public responsibilities, there will at the end always be some "bramble" to assume power. Princes were frequently given good advice. Anderson rightly complains of the prevailing tendency to emphasize the religious and ethical messages and to ignore the political and administrative passages of the bible. (He does not seem to know Eric Voegelin's three volumes Order and History, the first of which is excellent on political Israel). Anyway, he concedes that the Israelites did not "really mark out the field of politics as something distinct from religion," and that this limited their achievements in the study of secular political matters.

The Greeks had three advantages. With their country organized in many independent city

states, Greek students had within easy reach a number of states for comparative studies, historical accounts, intensive "case studies," and philosophical-ethical studies of politics. Having an inquiring turn of mind, they were not diverted from research by the belief in one all-powerful God, and their institutions left them more freedom for critical appraisals.

The predictions and counsels of the Delphic oracle must have been based on some serious study of politics. But as an institution clouded in mystery, blending knowledge and religion, the Delphic establishment made no contribution of lasting value to the study of politics. Neither did Homer, who was not much interested in political matters as a subject for description and analysis. More so was Hesiod, who developed the principle of government according to law. But even to him the chief decisions were made by the gods. Solon, however, was a student of politics in a "truly modern sense." He assumed a "basically humanistic and secular point of view," recognizing man's role in the making of political decisions. The gods are there, but they refrain from action, leaving it to human beings to govern themselves. Solon applied the laws of cause and effect to the political field. Injustices set up reactions among the sufferers who then revolt and destroy their oppressors. People were themselves responsible for the good government of their communities. "Religion and politics he definitely distinguished if not separated. This was the great shift in point of view....

Of other pre-Socratics Anderson deals with Thales, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. As regards Socrates' contemporaries the author has little taste for abstract logical paradoxes. He dismisses Zeno's famous demonstrations that Achilles could not overtake a tortoise with the remark, which does little justice to the intricacy of the logical problem, that a simple experiment of pitting any good runner against a tortoise would have been enough to destroy Zeno's argument. But he looks carefully for contributions to the study of politics in the works of Alemaeon, the Eleatics, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Archelaus and Leucippus. Democritus, who outlined a system of government based upon democracy, education, freedom of speech, and the election of public officials, harmony of the social classes and the need for justice, seems to Anderson an important enough man to deserve a thorough modern study of his contributions to politics. Archytas (about 380 B.C.) was remarkable for the stress on the importance of reason in politics. "A correct calculation of consequences prevents the commission of crime." His approach was as secular and free from religious slanting as Solon's.

The sophists contributed little to the study of politics, Anderson holds, because their teachings were largely based on opinion rather than research. He acknowledges, however, that Protagoras established the idea—over Socrates' objections—that politics can be taught and learned by teaching. Hippias, too, was a "fairly important student of politics," but in the theoretical rather than descriptive and historical sense.

In general two ideas stood in the way of a direct study of politics—the notion that political virtue could not be taught and that men could not trust their senses. It was the historians, Herodotus and Thucydides, rather than the sophists, who broke through these barriers by comparing various forms of government and by collecting facts. Thucydides deserves credit also for having brought international relations into the field. By his reporting the speeches of various statesmen, he supplied the "first book of readings on political theories." Almost equally important were the dramatists, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes, because of their discussions of unwritten human rights, higher laws, relative merits of monarchy and democracy, and (Euripides) equality of rights and of sexes. Aristophanes was, through his plays, in fact a teacher in current politics, a "hard hitting and influential political propagandist." Among the statesmen, Pericles, like Solon not expecting the gods to intervene, taught the Athenians the lesson of individual and collective responsibility. Anderson regrets that over his great funeral speech his two other excellent speeches reported by Thucydides have been neglected.

It should be clear by now that what the author means by research and teaching refers primarily to scientia transmissibilis, especially to the empirical approach, as distinct from mere "thought" if ever so deep. This limitation of focus-which he should have explicitly stated and defended at the outset-leads him eventually to a considerable downgrading of Socrates and even more so of Plato. It was not Socrates, but historians like Herodotus, Xenophon and Thucydides who were studying human affairs broadly by the direct observation of men's actions at home and abroad and by interviews with them. Outside of Athens, Socrates made no direct observations. He often remained ambiguous; few of the dialogues presented by Plato seem to Anderson to come to any clear conclusion. Plato himself "sailed off on the wings of his Utopian schemes" instead of

applying his outstanding critical intelligence to realistic political analyses. Anderson keeps speaking of Plato's "anti-politics" and challenges modern students to write studies on the empirical material in Plato (of which there is plenty) rather than on his Utopian and semi-Utopian plans. The very remoteness from actual politics of Plato's Academy seems to explain the fact that it was saved from destruction for eight hundred years while Aristotle's Lycee did not reach the first centenary. Students, not in all respects of the first rank, like Isocrates and Demosthenes, made more important contributions to political science than Plato, Anderson says. Isocrates was a typical political science professor in the modern sense. He concentrated on this field more than did Aristotle, who had much broader interests. Demosthenes "failed, but grandly." The proper hero of Anderson's story is Aristotle, of course, whose merits he extols in a beautifully written summary. Aristotle's Lycee was a "well-organized research center with a definite program," four divisions, and library. His Politics was the first real text on the subject. The second part of his Constitution of Athens is to Anderson the non plus ultra of a study on local government, political theory and analysis. But Aristotle, too, had shortcomings. Anderson mentions his failure to understand the trend toward units larger than cities, his doctrine that there was a general purpose moving toward the good, and his undervaluing the role of economic welfare.

The book's account of political science in Rome, although not lacking in pertinent remarks, is silent on the manner in which political experience and wisdom were being passed on within the leading families and hierarchies of offices. I have missed also a reference to the excellent monograph on Polybius and his theory of mixed government by Kurt von Fritz (The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity, A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas, New York, 1954).

These are minor objections. Adoring greatness of human thought wherever it has appeared in the course of history, as it did in Socrates and Plato, this reviewer nonetheless agrees with Professor Anderson that to write a separate story of the empirical approach to politics is an enterprise as legitimate as it is necessary. Anderson has blazed a trail.

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Anarchist Thought in India. By Adi H. Doctor. (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964. Pp. 120.)

This slender volume is by far the most per-

suasive philosophical critique of the political thought of Gandhi and his supporters I have read. Adi Doctor, a Lecturer in Politics at Marathwada University in India, begins by effectively arguing that Gandhi's rejection of the state is not an outgrowth of classical Indian thought but is essentially a twentieth century Indian view. Unfortunately, the author weakens this argument by appearing to accept the notion that there is a single classical tradition against which Gandhian thought can be tested, when what is essential to the critique is not the philosophical connections between Gandhi's views and the Indian "tradition" but the fact that Gandhians turn to the tradition to provide a justification for what is in any event a contemporary view. Nonetheless, by demonstrating that important strands of Sanskritic thought are contrary to Gandhi's anarchist position, Doctor successfully turns our attention to the question of whether such a philosophical position is tenable for contemporary India.

The relevance of so-called traditional patterns of political behavior, political institutions and political philosophy to modern Asia and Africa is an issue in most of the developing nations. It is often argued that modern "western" political institutions are inappropriate and that one must therefore turn to more "traditional" patterns of government as if there were a single relevant tradition. Such an argument is based upon what Bert Hoselitz aptly called an ideology of "traditionalism," which attempts to justify and sanctify contemporary actions by reference to real or imagined traditions.

Doctor's tightly reasoned volume is a sharp corrective to traditionalist thought for he does what any modern political and social analyst must do-relate normative judgments to the limits imposed by the real world and relate philosophical principles to philosophical ends. After briefly analyzing the political ideas of several ancient texts, especially the Epics, the Manusamhita, the Dharmasastras and the Arthasastra, Doctor turns to the contemporary writings of Gandhi and his most prominent disciples, Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. Doctor quite rightly suggests that Gandhi's attack against centralized governments, political parties, coercive legislation and majority rule itself represents an assault upon India's parliamentary system, not only a traditionalist protest against modernization. In practice the Gandhian critique urges Indians to direct their attention not toward the problem of how to make a parliamentary system work more effectively, but toward its replacement by weak central government and self-sufficient villages in which there are neither parties nor elections but government by consensus. It turns Indians away from the central political problems—not how to eliminate conflicts, but how to manage them; not how to eliminate private ambitions, but how to reconcile these with the ambitions and interests of others; not how to eliminate central authority, but how to make it more effective; not how to establish a village "consensus" (often a guise for the tyranny of a village oligarchy), but how to channel village rivalries into constructive channels.

Doctor's critique of the utopian assumptions underlying Gandhian thought, and his demonstration that the Gandhian proposals would not accomplish what they purport to achieve, namely a society without conflict or coercion, are familiar points to students of political philosophy. His contribution lies in intelligently applying them to the foremost utopian ideology in the developing world.

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Nomos VII: Rational Decision. EDITED BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 228. \$6.50).

The question common to most of the essays in this volume concerns the degree of relevance of reason or rationality to legal and political decision-making. The volume does not include a representative sample of all the views current concerning this subject, but it presents a considerable range of positions, and considers a number of the important issues.

A surprising feature of the volume is the slim representation of the view, which comes down to us from Hobbes and Hume, that reason is able to function only with respect to "matters of fact" and "relations between ideas" (Hume), that it is powerless in the realm of values or ends. In the latter areas, reason is the "scout" (Hobbes) or the "slave" (Hume) of the a-rational agents called the passions. This position is represented by the brief comment of Felix Oppenheim. Oppenheim contends that "Intrinsic valuations are a matter of subjective commitment, not of objective truth." Hence they are neither rational nor irrational, but "non-rational" (p. 219). On this view, reason is relevant to politics solely as an aid in calculating means-ends relationships. This is perhaps the most widely held position in contemporary political science. It has also been popular in Anglo-American philosophy since Hume, and it dominated that philosophy for a considerable period in our century. More recently, however, serious questions have been raised concerning it, and at present it has few adherents among Anglo-American philosophers. This is reflected in the papers by philosophers in the present volume.

The starting point of much recent criticism of the Humean view is the observation that our language allows us intelligibly to ask for reasons in support of value decisions, and that we regularly do so. That is, we regularly utilize the English word "reason" and its cognates to request presentation of the grounds on which value choices rest, and to describe or categorize responses to such requests. Given this empirical fact, the philosophical assertion that reason is irrelevant to value decisions generates a paradox. Unless it is assumed that use of "reason" and its cognates in discourse concerning value decisions rests upon a misunderstanding of those words, that is unless it is assumed that no communication takes place in such discourse, the philosophical assertion has the force of insisting that men cannot do what they regularly do as a matter of course. Since a glance at the dictionary falsifies the assumption, the philosopher is in the untenable position of dictating to ordinary language. If this line of argument is correct, it is false to say that reason is irrelevant to intrinsic value decisions. It is demonstrated to be false by the fact that the English word "reason" is employed in discourse concerning value. For this employment demonstrates that the non-linguistic referent of "reason" is in fact used in making such decisions.

It will properly be objected, however, that philosophical disputes concerning problems of value cannot be adjudicated by the simple device of consulting ordinary language. But if linguistic evidence cannot conclusively resolve philosophical disputes, it directs us to the source of the differences between the philosopher and the common sense views reflected in ordinary usage. These differences trace, to adapt John Ladd's argument slightly, to an "obsession [on the part of the Humean] with science and with scientific models of reasoning ... and the assumption that there is only one kind of rationality, namely, that represented by formal logic and the scientific method" (p. 127). Or, in Aristotelian language, to "the reduction of practical thinking to some form or other of theoretical thinking" (ibid.). Aristotle insisted that the exactness of theoretical science was unattainable in practical discourse. Yet he regarded man as capable of making defensible decisions in that sphere and held that this

¹ See the essays in V. C. Chappell, ed., Ordinary Language (Prentice-Hall, 1964).

capacity distinguished man from other animated beings. Conceding, in other words, that moral decisions cannot be entailed or validated in the sense required of conclusions in theoretical discourse, he nevertheless held that some decisions could be shown to be rationally preferable to others. Ordinary language reflects a similar view.² The Humean, on the other hand, while admitting that value decisions can be made to turn in part on questions of fact and relations between ideas, and hence that reason has an ancillary role to play in making them, insists that "ultimately" they depend upon commitments to which reasons are irrelevant.

The dispute would appear to be in part terminological. Hume uses "reason" in one way, Aristotle, a number of other philosophers, and most speakers of the English language, use it in another. But matters of substance hinge upon the differences in terminology. The Aristotelian view, to take but one example, prompts investigation of value questions as they arise in various contexts, seeking constantly to maximize practical rationality. "While our present theory is thus necessarily inexact, we must do what we can to help it out."3 The Humean, by contrast, takes it as settled that nothing of a rational sort can be said concerning intrinsic value decisions. His motto might be said to be "Our present theory is entirely exact and there is nothing we can do to help it out." The Humean view, therefore, underlies the widely accepted position that scientific analysis of moral and political life has no concern with value decisions, while the Aristotelian position sees such decisions as a central concern of moral and political analysis. Hence the dispute is of more than terminological significance.

The view just summarized, drawn primarily from the papers of Frankena, Freund, and Ladd, is also relevant to the very different approaches of other essays in the volume. Harvey Mansfield, Jr. prefaces his closely argued interpretation of Burke's Bristol Speech with a distinction between reason and "true reason." "All men, or at least all normal men, are rational because they speak, giving reasons. But only a few men know true reasons, and

² Note the extent to which Aristotle's *Nico-machean Ethics* is taken up with analysis of ordinary language.

only to a limited degree. Yet a reason is in the highest sense not a reason unless it is a true reason" (p. 199). Further, true reasons lead to "correct decisions"—not merely to decisions—and "in the highest sense, only a correct decision is truly a decision." Leaving aside the identification of speech and (inexact) reason, the question is raised as to the differences between reason and "reason in the highest sense" or "true reason."

Mansfield's use of "true," "correct," and "exact" as modifiers for "reason" and "decision" recalls Oppenheim's "objective truth." It suggests not a continuum moving from more to less inexact reasoning within the category of practical reasoning, but a sharp dichotomy between inexact and truly exact reasoning leading, respectively, to a "compromise of opinions" (p. 197) and "truly correct decisions." Mansfield would seem to agree with Oppenheim and his positivistic cohorts that "exact" conclusions or decisions are the only ones that truly deserve to be called rational, but to disagree with their view that such conclusions are unavailable in the realm of value decisions.

If this interpretation of Mansfield's distinction is correct, and it should be admitted that there are some suggestions of another view, there are obvious conflicts, both linguistic and philosophical, between it and the view summarized above. Mansfield appears to be sensitive to the possibility of linguistic difficulties with his argument since he troubles to claim the support of language for his view. He asserts that "The meaning of 'decision' tends in the direction of 'correct decision,' just as the meaning of 'rational' tends in the direction of 'true'." Passing by the question of the evidence on which these assertions rest, the reader is left to discover the force of the verb "tends" for himself. That uses of "rational" range from "arguable" to "true" can be discovered from the dictionary. But if Mansfield's argument is to be supported by linguistic evidence, that evidence must show not merely that "rational" is sometimes used in the sense of "true," but that this is the sense in which it is used (or to which it "tends") in discourse concerning the value-laden decisions of political life. It is on this point, which he ignores, that Mansfield's argument conflicts with a fundamental aspect of the position summarized above.

Mansfield departs less sharply from ordinary usage than does Oppenheim. We do use "true" as a modifier for "reason" and "rationality," and it cannot be said that we never do so in discussion of values. If the foregoing arguments are viable, however, when such usage is

³ Nicomachean Ethics, II, 2. (Wheelwright translation.) Several of the essays in the present volume, particularly those by Pennock, Freund, Ladd, and Mavrinac, are solid albeit brief efforts in this direction.

challenged ("what precisely do you mean by 'true'?"), it must be withdrawn or equated with "more rational than the alternatives" or a related locution. Escape from these alternatives is possible only if philosophical arguments are offered which define the nature and demonstrate the possibility of "true" or "exact" conclusions in the realm of values. Mansfield neither presents nor cites any such arguments. Hence his formulation is misleading in that it suggests (unintentionally if I understand his comments concerning Hobbes) an equivalence between practical and theoretical discourse, or simply puzzling in that we do not know how to interpret "true." In conceptual analysis, ordinary language is not the be-all or end-all, but it is the begin-all.5

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The Strange Tactics of Extremism. By HARRY AND BONARO OVERSTREET. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. 315. \$4.50.)

Harry and Bonaro Overstreet's The Strange Tactics of Extremism is a needed, perceptive, and readable book. It is a needed book because American society is once again under attack as it has been at various times in our historyby a small, dedicated handful of zealots, in whose breasts flames the most virulent of hatreds, who would advance their own distorted views of public policy and their own thirst for personal power by playing on the fears of, as well as seeking to intimidate, some of their fellow citizens. The Know-Nothings, the Ku Klux Klan, the Communists, and now the multiple front elements of the radical right: all have had, and some continue to have, their moments on the American scene. Public awareness of their real aims, and an aroused recognition of the danger have meant, and hopefully, will always mean, their sure demise.

It is a perceptive book because the Overstreets are not strangers to the strategies and tactics of those whose anachronistic views of the world about them leads them to jeer at almost anyone who seeks progress in this age

- ⁴ The discussion of Mansfield's paper is relevant to Gottfried Dietze's argument concerning "absolute" rationality and to Heinz Eulau's construction of a "model" of rationality as well.
- ⁵ I have of course ignored the many difficulties with this argument. Some of them are dealt with in the essays summarized above. The reviewer is attempting to deal with aspects of these problems as they relate to politics, in a forthcoming work entitled The Public Interest, An Essay in the Logic of the Normative Discourse of Politics.

of science and space. Three books and years of research on Communism and the tactics of Marxism-Leninism provide an excellent background to analyze and explore the tactics of the radical rightist movement.

It is a readable book because the Overstreets are the Overstreets and they seek to communicate their thought and their findings to the many rather than to the select few. They write not merely for the professional students of radical groups but for the laymen in cities and towns across America who, if they are to help preserve our nation, must be provided with the intellectual tools which will expose the fallacies in the thinking of those on both the far left and the far right.

The Overstreets are biased. So am I, for they believe, as I believe, in the concept of a democracy in a republic. They believe, as I believe, in the values of free and decent discussion. They have faith, as I have faith, that an American people, given the "facts," will, in the long run, come to grips with the problem and make the right decision. Most Americans I think, share this bias. The current problem is: what must we as Americans do to preserve a system of free discussion when it is undermined by radicals on both ends of the political spectrum.

Before one can act with wisdom, one must understand. The Overstreets assist in providing that understanding, as they take you through the labyrinth of ideology and tactics as practiced by Robert Welch and the John Birch Society, Dan Smoot in his Report, Carl McIntire and his 20th Century Reformation Hour, Myers G. Lowman and his Circuit Riders, Edgar C. Bundy and his Church League of America, and Billy James Hargis and his Christian Crusade.

Professor Revilo P. Oliver, associate editor of the John Birch Society magazine, American Opinion, believes, according to the Overstreets, that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated because he was falling behind in "delivering the assigned quota of conspiratorial gain" (p. 239). Is this view too far removed from Robert Welch's incredible statement that Dwight D. Eisenhower, the last Republican President, was "a conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy"? Of course not.

The Overstreets note early in the book (p. 17) that both Lenin and Hitler set down their aims and tactics for all the world to see, but few paid attention until acts were committed, and by that time it was almost too late. The Overstreets want us to begin our homework on the radical right now, and note that "the materials we need to read are being published

in our midst every day of the week. The problem we have to cope with is that of our own unawareness of the need to learn." (p. 18) They state that while the John Birch Society "is in the American scene, it is not of it: certainly not in the relationship it defines between leader and led." (p. 26) To its leader, Mr. Welch, democracy is "a perennial fraud." (p. 36) As my colleague, Senator Milton Young (R-North Dakota) noted when he revealed some of the activities of the John Birch Society, a high percentage of those whom Mr. Welch attacks are "middle-of-the-road, and even conservative, Republicans." (p. 42)

The Overstreets ask what is the worst that men can say of extremism? Their tentative answer is in accord with the values of Western Man which have slowly been attained over the ages and that is that "extremism...pronounces a death sentence upon honest communication." (p. 54) They analyze the nature of the extremist communication and skillfully reveal the illogic of its structure and the misleading innuendo which is drawn from the irrelevant fact. In this regard, perhaps the understatement of the book is that "one key to Welch's success is his remarkable power to use the tools of scholarship without letting them cramp his style." (p. 85)

The tactics of the far right are similar to those of the far left: the reading rooms, the periodicals, the radio and TV programs, speakers' bureau, all serve to indoctrinate the faithful; the letter-writing and petition-passing serve to keep them busy, and the "fronts" to confuse the opposition and attract the willing dupes. The radical right is against, rather than for something. Thus, they oppose the United Nations, NATO, the income tax, civil rights, the Supreme Court, Radio Free Europe, and the Peace Corps, and so on. They deal in stereotypes rather than problems. (p. 123) Perhaps the radical rightist's basic disservice is, as the authors note, that he treats the term Communism as a spacious container that can be made to hold all the religious, social, political, and economic attitudes and policies of which he disapproves." (p. 191)

The Overstreets correctly make it clear that conservatism should not be equated with radicalism of the right, any more than liberalism should be equated with Communism. They say "at the risk of being repetitious, we would stress again that not everyone who sees danger in the growth of centralized government or who opposes federal housing and aid to education is thereby proved to be an extremist. What counts is the manner in which these issues are interpreted. . . ." (p. 212)

The radical rightist is against any area of agreement between America's two great political parties, he seeks to "politicalize" every aspect of life as does the totalitarian, he seeks to infect related groups in society and create intolerance to all who oppose his aims, he believes in secrecy, and also in a double-standard of conduct. (pp. 224-225) The Overstreets urge conservatives to learn what the radical right can do as the liberals were educated to what the radical left could do in the 1930's and 1940's. What is the best way to do this? Ask the radical rightists "to substantiate every charge they make and . . . then (give) the fullest possible publicity . . . to their responses." (p. 249) The authors note that the schools, the PTA's, the mental health movement, and the public libraries have long been particular right-wing targets. (pp. 266-267) To protect these institutions from the onslaught of the extremists, and to expose the contradictory nature of extremist beliefs, the Overstreets advocate full and free discussions. They note that labeling the radical right as "fascist" or "anarchic" is not only emotional. but incorrect. If any label can be applied to these extremists it is that of "anarchic totalitarianism." (p. 268) The radical rightist line, conclude the authors, "is not underwritten by any coherent theory. It is a product of anger, not of thought; of anger, and of a will to be on top of some heap. It expresses a determination to climb up and to bull down." (p. 268)

While noting that the strength of the nation is in its "liberal-conservative" or "conservative-liberal" center, perhaps the authors place too great a stress here and there on the "liberal" or the "conservative" in American society. Such labels even though we admit their lack of preciseness connote an emphasis on and commitment to ideology which I do not believe exists. I hope also that the authors will some day undertake a further work dealing with extremism in cur society and attempt to determine the causes of the frustrations which have provided the material upon which such groups thrive.

Of particular interest to educators, and a sentiment with which this reviewer concurs, is the Overstreets' admonition to those in charge of our schools that perhaps our young people should have more familiarity with "the great words of our tradition so that they will have, all their lives, the supportive companionship of these words when they need them." (p. 296) The authors are thinking of the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address. While such a plea might sound "corny" to some who have devoted their lives to the fine points

of analyzing the governmental processes and dealing with the sophisticated methodologies of the behavioral sciences, it is time all of us realized that there is more to government in a free society than the analysis of particular issues or the statistical predictability of particular decision-makers. There is a spirit of freedom which must be conveyed in terms of our past if we are to keep faith with the future. That is the challenge of the Overstreets, not only to their fellow Americans, but to all who seek, through service and through instruction, to set an example for the young men and women of our land.

The radical reactionary right in the United States poses a danger for our country. It is constantly seeking to undermine faith in government and in public servants. Anyone who disagrees with its fanatical beliefs is in danger of false and venomous attack and abuse. The time for all decent, reasonable citizens to stand up against radicals, left and right, is certainly here. The Overstreets have shown how this stand can be intelligently, responsibly and patriotically taken.

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Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society. By Fred W. Riggs. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964. Pp. xvi, 477. \$7.95.)

As chairman of the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration and as one of the most imaginative and prolific theorists of political development, Fred Riggs has measurably reshaped the thinking of both practitioners and pedants of public administration in the new states. He was in the forefront of those who insisted that the principles of American public administration cannot be directly applied to transitional societies and that new models and concepts must be designed both to explain what goes on in such societies and to facilitate substantive programs of development. The measure of Riggs' influence is not how many people use such terms of his as "prismatic society," "sala," or "clects," but rather the large number of people who are following him in trying to find some patterned order in the otherwise strange behavior of officials and bureaucrats in the new states.

During the last few years it has not been easy to lay one's hands upon much of Riggs' writing, for as an extraordinarily cosmopolitan scholar he has generously published in numerous out-of-the-way journals. Now, however, he has done us the service of bringing together

many of his widely scattered articles and organized them as the chapters of this new book. This work is therefore not a systematic exposition of his theory of a "prismatic society," something which we still await. It is instead a fascinating introduction to the restless searchings of an amazingly wide-ranging mind. Riggs is always uninhibited in sharing his readings and his ruminations. As a theorist he is intrigued with words, their definitions and their nuances of meaning. He is constantly breaking the flow of his analysis to elaborate on the need for a new word, on the inadequacies of conventional terminologies, on the need to make more refined distinctions than the mind of man usually feels comfortable with.

But it would be grossly wrong to dismiss Riggs as one who would tell us more about verbal distinctions than we want or need to know. Although at places in this book it is hard to understand why Riggs is so enthusiastic in laboring points which appear hardly to deserve footnote status, in truth the sum effect of his efforts is a substantial advance in both our knowledge of transitional societies and the state of social science theory in general. And this is true for two very specific reasons. First, in spite of his penchant for abstractions. Riggs is in fact above all a realist whose speculative mind is sparked by visions of exactly what happens in particular settings and not by the formulations of other theorists. Second, in seeking his level of description and analysis Riggs has gone further than anyone else in shattering the traditional disciplinary boundaries and finding a new level for integrating, in particular, economic and political behavior and thus suggesting a modern, behavioral version of the old-fashioned field of political economy.

Intellectually Riggs began his theoretical studies of the underdeveloped countries with the dichotomous models of "traditional" and "modern," which were evolved in the writings of Maine, Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons; and he once saw the underdeveloped countries as "transitional" or mixed systems in a condition of unstable equilibrium between the two ideal types. Like most other contemporary scholars he was, however, soon dissatisfied with these categories and with all the compromising or euphemistic terms which have been invented for labeling the phenomena. It is true that Riggs has come up with a new terminology, and certainly only a very few scholars will feel that the basic problems of classification have been solved by his invention of calling traditional systems "fused" as is light before striking a prism, modern societies

"diffracted" as is a beam of light after passing through a prism, and transitional systems "prismatic" for the state of light within a prism. Tastes differ and analogies that are illuminating to one may seem only gross and clumsy to others. But it is not the terms that are important, as much as Riggs would belabor them; what is important is that Riggs has gone further than any other social theorist in taking the transitional societies as they really are and seeing them as much in a state of equilibrium as any "traditional" or "modern" system. In his theory of the "prismatic society" Riggs singles out patterns of behavior which have an internal logic of their own, and which do not merely represent imperfect incorporation of modern practices in societies in which traditional ways are being disrupted. In noting precisely what goes on in these societies he does not try to rationalize away or dismiss as transitory phenomena practices which might seem deviant in either traditional or modern settings.

Let is be clear that Riggs is not advocating the Pollyanna view that apparently strange behavior in transitional societies "makes sense" if one only "understands their values." Nor is he saying that given time alone changes in behavior can be expected. What he is trying to do is to create a general utility model in which economic wealth, political power and social status considerations can be treated in the same matrix, and with respect to which, given the resource parameters of prismatic societies, the behavior of actors represents the hard-headed and clear-eyed judgments of men who are striving to optimize their total selfinterest. The implication of Riggs' analysis is that people do what they commonly do in transitional societies because that is where the payoffs lie for them and not because of any lingering "hold of tradition." Thus, "development" toward "modernization" cannot be expected as long as people, who can do something about it, will be hurt more than helped by such "development."

All this represents a significant advance in the boldness of theory building. Unfortunately it cannot be said that Riggs has been fully successful in expounding this model in the book under review. We must await the time when he will attempt a full exposition of his theories. In the meantime, however, he has given us a rich and provocative harvest of ideas.

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Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries. By Wilbur Schramm. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 333. \$7.50.)

For better or for worse, it is now widely assumed that social science can be useful to policy makers, and particularly that careful attention to our storehouse of knowledge can make the processes of bringing about change or "development" less chancy, socially painful and politically unpredictable than was true in the past. Exactly how the contemporary leaders of the West or of the New Nations find their way through the theoretical and conceptual jungle of national economic, political and social development is an intriguing mystery. Whether they can derive any coherent meaning from the babel of hunches, insights, hypotheses, theories, "laws," findings and speculations that social science has produced in this area in recent years is itself a subject that might be rewardingly researched.

One great merit of Wilbur Schramm's volume is that it is in part a self-conscious effort at intellectual stock-taking. His central premise is that the process of economic and social development (the "terrible ascent" from traditionality to modernity) can be greatly facilitated through the intelligent and systematic use of modern communications technology -particularly the mass media of radio and television. In support of this premise, he assembles a striking amount of data on the distribution of information and informationproducing facilities around the world; he summarizes much of what we believe we know about the dynamics of change; and he provides a number of summary examples of the role of communications in facilitating change, drawing in some detail on the works of Lerner, Doob, Holmberg and Rao. Few will quarrel with his contention that those who would speed up the industrial response to the "revolution of rising expectations" would do well to understand the importance of communications in this process.

Schramm's data clearly indicate that the task of achieving the goal he desires is formidable. Arresting statistics are produced to show that to be underdeveloped means, among other things, to be radically deprived on every dimension relating to the production and dissemination of information. Foreign news coverage in the world's newspapers, for example, centers overwhelmingly on the affairs of France, Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. A relative trickle of news emanates from the rest of the world, both because the less developed countries do little to transmit local information

and because the foreign dispatches of the five world news services (owned by the same four countries noted above) concentrate on the affairs of each other. When these world news services do report on the affairs of Asia or other less developed parts of the world, the emphasis is often on the spectacular or the bizarre. This distortion and lack of balance is a problem worth considerable reflection.

The pattern of severe inequality in the flow of information remains unchanged when one examines such media as mail, telephone and telegraph messages, radio and television. Most of the world remains a considerable distance from achieving the modest level of communications development established by UNESCO as a minimally acceptable standard. For the many reasons Schramm cites, the serious lack of mass media facilities is not significantly counterbalanced by the two-step communications flow whereby information is diffused from urban centers to the countryside and from a few literates to a larger mass of illiterates. Moreover, he also argues quite cogently that economic development—and especially political development-will require the existence of not one but many channels of information diffusion. A rational handling of this problem necessitates not merely more schools and newspapers but, in addition, greatly increased use of radio and television.

Schramm is judicious in differentiating the kinds of things the mass media can accomplish in the complex field of development. As "watchmen," he feels the media acting alone can do much to broaden human horizons, disseminate knowledge of economic alternatives and raise the level of human aspirations. In the area of changing values, attitudes and social customs, he suggests that the mass media must work through other structures by seeking to have an impact on opinion leaders and by imparting such necessary things as status and technical information to those who might in turn influence others. As "teachers" he concludes that the role of the mass media must be essentially auxiliary, reinforcing and perhaps extending the capability of existing human resources. His hope is that the mass media in the vital area of education can grow from the use of first and second generation materials (e.g., charts, maps, chalkboards, books) to the utilization of third and fourth generation devices (e.g., films and film strips, radio, television, programmed instruction and computers). It is these new media which "represent the great hope of the developing countries for supplying education at the rate and of the quality required."

Despite the author's frequent caveats about well known obstacles to change, there is both a strikingly sanguine attitude toward the efficacy of the mass media and a distressing tendency to slide over several perplexing issues. For example, one would surely want to question Schramm's implicit assumption that a relatively high level of economic modernity can be brought in the foreseeable future to that portion of the world he calls the "band of scarcity." Some of his own data depicting the extremely modest improvements growing out of planned economic inputs clearly suggest how staggering this problem is and how little change one can expect in a period of several generations. If this is so, one is led to wonder just how much added information is consistent with keeping the "rising frustration" level at something below the point of serious eruption. The author himself at one point observes that change must be balanced (e.g., literacy and technical skills should not outrun jobs), but he does not go on to specify that this concept—in some places and under certain conditions-may very well imply slowing down rather than accelerating the communications revolution.

The author also raises the ethical question about using information technology to overcome traditional resistances to change. He concludes that "the developing countries have decided to change" (which raises the question of who this is) and that, other things being equal, knowledge is better than ignorance, health better than disease, eating better than going hungry, a comfortable living standard better than poverty, and political participation better than isolation from the polity.

As an abstract statement of a democratic ethic, such a roll call of preferences is certainly laudable. But as an implied prediction about what is likely to emerge in the developing world, the rationale seems curiously removed from the conditions and patterns that currently prevail there. The realities of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America indicate that mass communications in part are utilized quite deliberately by indigenous elites to achieve and maintain control of political systems, often at the expense of the very values that are important to the author. In Schramm's scheme of values (illustrated by the criteria for drawing up a national communications statute prepared by Fernand Terrou), information should be free, strongly protected by legal institutions and used as an instrument of human liberation. That, as a matter of empirical practice, it may and often is used as a device for enslaving man receives less treatment than one might expect.

Finally, there is something unrealistic about Schramm's repeated assertion that in the developing countries demands for budgetary outlays for communications development should not be viewed as part of the normal competition for funds that obtains among administrative departments. Because communications are essential to all governmental activities, its claims should be accorded a privileged position. Quite apart from the query whether communications, inherently a part of all functional administrative units or divisions, warrant separate operational status in a cabinet or ministerial structure, it seems of great importance that those who would increase budgetary outlays in this sector should be made to compete with the champions of more roads, better health, public housing, expanded educational facilities, industrialization and other activities associated with modernization. How limited resources are in fact allocated in any system is the essence of politics, and it seems unlikely that a formula can be found that will take the field of communications outside this sphere.

Schramm's treatment is a cogent and often brilliant brief for the thesis that communications are central to-perhaps even the touchstone of—economic, social and political development. As such, it represents an important contribution to the growing published output in the communications field, of which Schramm is a leading figure. Those who read this volume with care will be rewarded by its combination of rich detail and illuminating insights. Many will feel, however, that the case for the kind of attention to mass communications that the author suggests suffers from the great gaps that remain in our knowledge about the dynamics of change. Schramm's lucid analysis will certainly help us to identify the kinds of problems that require further scholarly attention, both on the dimension he treats so competently and on others of equal relevance to the difficult subject treated by this volume.

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American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline. By Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 173. \$5.75.)

Somit and Tanenhaus accept some rather narrow limits in this book. They are not concerned with what we as political scientists do, nor with how or how well we do it. Rather they ask what attitudes or beliefs we have about a series of matters: behavioralism, the adequacy of our profession, the existence and influence of an Establishment in the APSA, the quality of

doctoral programs, the significance of the work being done in various fields, the composition of our "hall of fame," the factors making for professional success, the prestige-value of publication in various journals, and career satisfaction. They get at our beliefs through a questionnaire sent to a representative sample of the members of the APSA and through computer-assisted multivariate analyses of the responses (N = 431).

One of the main parts of the questionnaire, Part B, consists of 26 statements, respondents being invited to check "agree strongly," "agree," "disagree strongly," or "can't say." The statements are taken from the literature and are of the kind that we all repeatedly hear. Yet they are vague and ambiguous, most of them in more than one respect. For example, "A substantial part of the intellectual conflict in American political science is rooted in issues that are methodological in character." What is the meaning of substantial? Suppose that I think that a "substantial" part is so rooted, and that another "substantial" part is not. How should I respond? Whatever my response, am I reacting to a factual statement or to a criticism? If it is a factual statement, what is the point in responding "strongly?" Should I agree "strongly" that it is three o'clock? Another of the 26 statements illustrates similar difficulties: "The really significant problems of political life cannot be successfully attacked by the behavioral approach." How should I respond if I think (as I do) that some can be and that others can't be, and further that even when it is possible to adopt a behavioral approach it may or may not be sensible to do so? (I will not ask the tired question—though I might, for it is relevant—whether we all agree on the definition of "behavioral approach.")

One of the conclusions that Somit and Tanenhaus reach is that "political scientists consider behavioralism the single most important issue facing the discipline." But obviously the finding is limited by the fact that they checked only on some selected issues of an intra-disciplinary sort, not on issues relating directly togovernment and international affairs.

A colleague skilled in factor analysis, Samuel C. Patterson, is from a technical point of view quite respectful of the methods that Somit and Tanenhaus employ. On the negative side he points to the claim that factors concerning "behavioralism" and the "adequacy of the profession" are independent of each other and says that the alleged finding was in fact postulated in the method employed—that the orthogonal rotation of the factors precluded any

finding that they were related. On the positive side he points particularly to the sophisticated and ingenious analyses relating to the "havenots" and to "career satisfaction."

The most striking of the findings emerge from Part C of the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to name the political scientists who have made the most significant contributions to the discipline. As Somit and Tanenhaus note. the item revealed a "curious lack of consensus." A mention by 2.9% or more of the respondents sufficed to get a name among the "greats," 18 being included for the pre-1945 period and 19 for the post-1945 period. To add to the curious aspects of the situation, we might note that of the 33 on the combined list (four appear twice), 19 have been elected to the Presidency of the APSA, but only 4 are among the 25 authors whose books have received the Woodrow Wilson prize since it was first awarded in 1947. The most notable fact is that almost all of the "greats" are the Ph.D. products of a very few departments. To put it differently, most departments—even most of the top eleven as determined by Hughes in 1925, Keniston in 1957, and Somit and Tanenhaus in 1963have failed to produce a single "great." We can wonder what the effect would have been if a slightly different question had been put, e.g., if the respondents had been instructed to name a designated number of persons, or if they had been instructed to render judgment only in their own major field of interest.

In the chapter dealing with the "greats," Somit and Tanenhaus attempt to identify the elements of eminence—the factors that seem to account for the presence of the various names on the list. In the following chapter their concern is with "the road to success." But "success" apparently has nothing to do with eminence. Somit and Tanenhaus choose, for their purposes, to equate it with "the ability to get offers from other schools," and they comment on the "realism" with which respondents rated the contribution of various factors, e.g., the view that the quantity of publications contributes more than their quality. But again the responses raise questions. How would the results have differed if the respondents had been asked about the actual receipt of offers rather than the ability to get them? How would they have differed if a distinction had been made between offers from Harvard University and Harding College? How would they have differed if respondents had confined themselves to explaining offers they themselves had received or extended rather than explaining those received by the other fellow?

In sum, judgments of the book can well be mixed. It is elegantly written, and much of it is interesting. But when people—even professors are asked vague and ambiguous questions to which they can respond only on an impressionistic or intuitive basis, how much importance should we attach to the findings? If similar but clearer questions were asked not of a subgroup comprising a representative sample of the profession but of a subgroup consisting of persons commanding very special respect, how much would the results differ and in what ways? And with regard to the departments that have produced the "greats," what do they have that the rest lack? Or should we ask what they once had that the rest then lacked?

VERNON VAN DYKE

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The Crisis of Political Imagination. By GLENN TINDER. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. Pp. 373. \$7.50).

One criterion applicable to a book whose topic is ostensibly political theory is the fruitfulness of the genre in which it is written. Professor Tinder's essay is a study in political metaphysics. Its chief theme is the alleged failure of political theory to do away once and for all with all the world's ills and to rectify the tragedy of the human condition. According to Tinder, modern political thought has managed to create a "bifurcation of spirit and society," and has then refused to recognize this schism as the critical question confronting modern political thought. Consistent with this genre of analysis, the condition of mankind is deduced from principles which are assumed to be axiomatic and, consequently, beyond systematically acquired empirical data.

The axiom in question is the alienation and estrangement of man, "the dread of his personal existence," the separateness of his life, and the decline of the traditional social and community institutions which in the past provided the conditions for a more productive, secure and happier existence. This axiom is, as axioms must be, self-evident. Thus anchored, Tinder proceeds to an analysis of how alienation or estrangement has manifested itself in our culture. The symptoms of mass disintegration are everywhere (indeed, no area of personal or social life escapes): the loss of rural assets (e.g., an open, unpolluted sky, the breezes of the open country); the high divorce rate; the dislocations of industrial society; the decay of fraternalism in trade unions, lodges and neighborhoods; neuroses and psychoses; a loss of warmth in human relations (including an end to the esprit of the slums (sic); deadening

conformity; the private political impotence engendered by mass democracy.

Estrangement and alienation are enforced not only by social and historical circumstances, but are expressed in cultural institutions as well. Religion, science, art, and philosophy, earlier sources of unity and social and psychological integration, have each contributed to this dislocation. In rejecting religion, despite those respects in which skepticism constitutes a victory of rationality and enlightenment (p. 43), the relationship of man to the universe established "through the great myths of Christianity" has been largely lost (p. 44). Science, chiefly physics, in its mechanistic or Newtonian stage, made it possible for man to "master a portion of reality . . . became an obstacle to apprehension of the whole range of being." (p. 44) Modern physics, on the other hand, is incomprehensible to the layman and, therefore, a source of bewilderment, hence estrangement, rather than security. In philosophy, Descartes, Kant (whose philosophy is "in some ways one of the most depressing ever formulated" [p. 46]), Hegel, and the existentialists have made the world unknowable and absurd. Recent art communicates the personal eccentricity rather than, as in the classical past, the universality of the human experience. Above all, politics has failed to offer a philosophy of community or a policy for furthering community. Liberalism, with laissez faire capitalism, and mass democracy have issued in a decline of political authority and thus of community.

Where must we look, what must we seek to do, to extricate ourselves from this oppressive and dehumanized condition? Tinder replies:

... the first task of social thought in our time is to regain the posture, if not of religious faith, at least of religious openness and inquiry. During most of Western history, theology and political theory have, despite some exceptional periods and figures, been close allies. What seems to be called for by the present failure of political imagination is above all a restoration of this ancient coalition. (p. 241)

At this point Tinder explicitly formulates the theological premises of his argument, stating that "the demand of our time—which can be ignored only at the ultimate price of the continued decay of Western civilization—is that society be reconstituted on the foundations of revelation, faith, and vision." (p. 272)

Now, the words "alienation" and "estrangement" are exceptives which serve, like the concept "neurosis" or the concept "selfish" to denote systems of behavior which are char-

acteristically different from other kinds of behavior. It would be senseless to say that everyone, everywhere and always, is neurotic or selfish. The logic of the concept "neurosis" requires, if the word is to be meaningfully used, that non-neurotic behavior is possible. "Alienation" is a concept of the same sort. Its utility as a descriptive concept depends upon the possibility of nonalienated existence. Anyone may, of course, use the concept in whatever fashion he wishes, but if it is employed in a general and undiscriminating way, we are simply left without a word to denote the phenomenon in question. Certainly the young Marx recognized this characteristic of the concept alienation and used it to describe a narrow and unique phenomenor-viz., the alienation of the proletariat from the products of their labor. The extension of the theory of alienation to all aspects of life diminishes its fruitfulness and renders it innocuous and banal. The etiology of this error appears to go something like this: despite his increased control over nature, chiefly since the industrial revolution, man is nonetheless lonely and unfulfilled in a universe which he does not comprehend and which appears to offer neither solace nor encouragement. This condition is thought to stem from a breakdown in traditional norms of community. (Cause and symptom are systematically confused by Tinder. Men, it is thought, could not always have lived this way. And, like Jeremiah and the prophets, Tinder urges us to look to the past and consider the conditions of life lived by those who were less anxiety ridden, less neurotic, less existentially lonely and estranged. Who then? The Athenian in the agora? The village smith under the spreading chestnut tree? The medieval vassal? The Jew of the ghetto? It is not clear—but somewhere in the past, before political and religious institutions were torn asunder, life allegedly was better: stable, orderly, happy-a veritable Golden Age of Fulfillment.

The Crisis of Political Imagination is not a crisis in political imagination at all. It is a catalogue of clichés (with a cliché for a solution) which does not add up to an argument. There may well be a painful, tormented and lonely dimension of life which has nothing whatever to do with politics. Private feelings of estrangement may, as well, be a luxury for those who at this point in industrial civilization need no longer expend their time, energy and effort in acquiring the basic necessities of life.

Finally, there is, as Tinder himself observes, a kind of pretentiousness in supposing that our times and our problems are greater or that

they are uniquely different from those of the past. But it is sheer folly to suppose that a possible solution to these problems lies in the resurrection of ancient and well interred religious institutions. Political theorists ought to be among those most keenly aware of the torment and effort expended by mankind in getting politics clear of the religious rubric. Whatever price is paid in the "disintegration of community" (if indeed this infelicitous expression has any meaning at all) it is a small one if the conditions of political community require the reemergence of religion in political life.

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The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence. By Victor T. Levine. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. 329, \$7.50.)

It has become commonplace to stress at the beginning of a political study devoted to a particular African country that the area under consideration is culturally heterogeneous. In the case of the Cameroun Federal Republic, such an assertion is fully justified not only because the republic's people belong to three major African culture areas (according to the late Melville Herskovits's classification) but also because the country has been a meeting ground for three major European cultures: German, French, and English. What was originally the German protectorate of Kamerun was divided into two mandated areas administered by France and Britain respectively. The French "Cameroun" became independent on January 1, 1960; two regions that constituted the British "Cameroons," administered as part of Nigeria, chose different fates by means of a referendum: the Northern part was integrated with Nigeria, and the Southern part joined its French-speaking neighbor to constitute the present Federal Republic on October 1, 1961. This new state thus shares with the Somali Republic the rare distinction of being a country in which units administered by different colonial powers came together at the time of independence. As the only political history of the area, Mr. LeVine's book is a useful addition to the relatively short list of serious country monographs on Africa.

The focus of this study is on the lesser-known of the two components, French-speaking East Cameroun. More than half of the text is devoted to background factors and pre-World War II institutional and political history but contains several items that are particularly well handled and contribute significantly to an understanding of later political development

The first of these is LeVine's interesting discussion of the German colonial experience in Kamerun which, in spite of its harshness, became an extremely important factor shaping nationalism in the area: "The German experience remains, for many Cameroonians, at once a political touchstone and a potent symbol of a half-mythical golden age when the Cameroons were one." (p. 38) This is more than a footnote to colonial history: it indicates how rapidly the boundaries drawn during the African scramble became symbolic referents for nationalist ideologues. Given the importance of the German factor, however, one wonders why there are no traces of African reactions to the German conquest of Western Europe which are known to have occurred in such disparate areas as Northern Mali, the Congo, Kenya, and Madagascar, where the event was associated with hopes for African liberation and led to political effervescence.

Another item of particular interest is Le-Vine's treatment of ethnic tensions among the Bassa and Bamileke of the south in the chapter on westernization and social change. This is of the utmost importance for an understanding of recent politics in the area because these groups have provided the nucleus of support for the Union des Populations du Cameroun, an organization founded in 1948 and originally affiliated with the French West African Rassemblement Démocratique Africain; when the latter adopted a meliorist strategy, the UPC remained militant and eventually became an underground terrorist movement whose persistence throughout the past decade has affected the entire political system. Although it is not completely clear from LeVine's discussion why such social tensions, common to numerous other ethnic groups in similar situations, should have resulted in this particular political outcome, he has provided at least the beginnings of a case study which hopefully will lead others to attempt a comparative examination of a dramatic but hitherto poorly understood aspect of the political process in Africa.

Since the author has already published in compendia edited by others much of his material on recent political parties and groups, as well as on institutional arrangements within the Federal Republic, the chapters he devotes to the post-World War II period constitute primarily a chronicle of groups, personalities, and events, with relatively little stress on political structure and process. This is somewhat unfortunate because it deprives the present book of what might have been a more unified format. It is indeed difficult to find our bearings when the author reaches the end of the line—except

that it is 1961 and the ride is over. There is very little conceptual clarity in the terminal discussion of what is, after all, a very interesting problem of integration. Similarly, among his conclusions, LeVine states that "Admittedly, a nation . . . does not need a vigorous party system in order to be a nation. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Yugoslavia are no less nations for having single-party systems." (pp. 220-221) What is the relevance of this remark? He goes on to argue that since both East and West Camerouns have chosen democratically-oriented systems, however, "The stability of the Camerouns' party system becomes, therefore, a crucial element in building a Cameroun nation as Camerounians themselves would like it to be." The author then summarizes "the gradual collapse of multipartyism" (covered in detail in his other publications), the emergence of a one-party state, and concludes that "The East Cameroun has, for all practical purposes, ceased to have a 'party system'. . . . " He then ends with further remarks on stability and democracy.

The shift in the level of discussion from regime to system, the confusion between modernization and democracy, the lack of clarity in the relation of both of these with some undefined state labeled "stability" is unfortunately characteristic of much current work in comparative politics. While he does not achieve conceptual elegance, however, LeVine has demonstrated soundness of judgment and empirical flair by forging out of disparate materials a useful political study.

ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG
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The New States of West Africa. By Ken Post. Penguin African Library AP14, 1964. 206 pages. \$1.25.

In this interesting and able book Mr. Post, a British political scientist who has worked particularly in Nigeria, surveys the new world created since so many West African countries gained their independence in the period 1957-1961. He is interested, he notes, in formulating a "preliminary set of generalizations" about the political systems operating there, but he is not model-building at a high level of abstraction. He suggests that too much attention has been paid to outward forms in looking at modern West Africa; he is more concerned to describe political reality than political forms. To this extent his book does not deal in the terms of political sociology which David Apter and others have previously applied to West Africa, but belongs rather to the British school of narrative and dissection.

Mr. Post deals first with the manner in which the various West African states achieved independence. His account is not ∈lementary, and readers without some familiarity with West African names and parties may find it complicated to follow. He then considers the role of the African elites to whom the colonial powers transferred authority, the political institutions which they attempted to transfer, and the problems of creating national unity and national consensus. This is the real focus of his work, and its most informative and useful section. The differences among the various national elites and their relations with traditional structures of authority are thus described, as well as the heritage of political ideas left by the British and the French. Mr. Post concludes that the difference in political attitude of these two powers is still to be seen in West Africa: indeed, he really uses "French" as a synonym for ideological, and "British" as a synonym for pragmatic. He notes that the political system in Ghana does not fit into either category and that the special conditions of federalism explain many developments in Nigeria. Nevertheless, this single antithesis seems incomplete as an analysis of the differences among West African political systems, and Mr. Post tries to make it explain too much. In his opinion, incidentally, both British and French policies were failures in West Africa, for the French failed to transcend territorial boundaries to build a French West Africa, and the British concept of parliamentary government has not taken root.

In discussing current institutions and problems Mr. Post devotes a chapter to what Mamadou Dia called "the indispensable symbiosis of party and government". Here he considers not so much the structure of a oneparty state, as its real impact on policy and development at local levels, in other words how it affects the ordinary citizen. He notes with interest recent trends in Senegal and Guinea which seem to point toward a rebuilding of local administrative cadres and their insulation from direct party influence, although party structures still handle the making of policy. On problems of national unity he discusses the lack of distinction so far made by African leaders among such terms as "state", "nation", and "country", to which Leopold Senghor has added "fatherland". He makes clear the turning inward of the new political units, even to the point of xenophobia, as well as the role (or lack of it, at present) of agencies of dissent: competing parties, trade unions, youth groups, the church. Mr. Post is not sanguine about the dangers which the call for unity and uniformity may create, when an opposition has no method

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Adams Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. Edited by L. H. Butterfield. (New York: Atheneum, 1964. Boxed in four paper volumes. Vol. I, Pp. xcviii, 365. Vol. II, Pp. x, 458. Vol. III, Pp. xiii, 449. Vol. IV, Pp. x, 403. \$2.65 each volume.)

When these first four volumes of The Adams Papers were originally published in 1961 it marked an event of such historical significance that President John F. Kennedy was called upon to review them for the American Historical Review. For these first four volumes are but the beginning of a mammoth publishing undertaking, sponsored by the cooperative endeavors of Life, Harvard University Press, the Massachusetts Historical Society and the Adams family, to bring forth an anticipated one hundred volume record of the writings of three generations of the Adams family. This monumental project, which commences in 1755 when John Adams started his Diary, will cover some thirteen decades of Adams' writing, up to 1889, which the editors have chosen as the cut-off year because it was the year in which the last survivor of the "third generation," died. Scholars will thus have for the first time an accessible record of the major literary accomplishments, reflections, observtions and comments of what assuredly was the most historically conscious family in the formative years of our history.

In the attractive paper-back edition of the Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, the Diary, spanning the years 1755 to 1804, runs to two and a half volumes; the Autobiography, composed of three large fragments of manuscript which ends in midsentence in 1780, covers approximately a volume and a half. The last one hundred pages of volume four are devoted to an exceptionally copious and informative index to the four volumes.

While these volumes cast little new light upon political history, they are quite revealing of the temperament and personality of their author. What emerges from this remarkable record, in much fuller flavor than found in its previous partial publication in the Works of John Adams edited by Charles Francis Adams (1850–1856), is an intensely sensitive, vain, warm, introspective, humorous and occasionally earthy human being. Here is the contrite and Puritanical Adams who could write in his twenty-first year, "Oh! That I

could wear out of my mind every mean and base affectation, conquer my natural Pride and Self Conceit, expect no more deference from my fellows than I deserve, acquire that meekness, and humility, which are the sure marks and Characters of a great and generous Soul, and subdue every unworthy Passion and treat all men as I wish to be treated by all." Here is the ambitious and self-pitying youthful Adams: "I long to be a master of Greek and Latin. I long to prosecute the mathematical and philosophical Sciences. I long to know a little of Ethicks and moral Philosophy. But I have no Books, no Time, no Friends. I must therefore be contented to live and die an ignorant, obscure fellow." Yet here also is the omnivorous reader, Adams, devouring every work he can lay his hands upon in law, history and philosophy, in Latin and Greek as well as French and English and dutifully recording each achievement along with his conjectures in his diary. "Would the State of Nature be a State of War or Peace?", he considers upon reading Montesquieu. "Hobbes thinks, that Men like Cattle, if in a state of Nature, would mutually desire and strive for the Mastery, and I think Secondat's Argument from the Complexity of the Idea of Dominion, is not a Refutation of Hobbes's Hypothesis, for Cattle fight for Dominion, and Men in the State of Nature may be supposed to have as clear an Idea of Dominion as the Cattle have." And here also is the maturing "mixed government" theorist, recollecting in his Autobiography his opinions of Thomas Paine's Common Sense. "The Arguments in favour of Independence I liked very well: but one third of the Book was filled with Arguments from the old Testament . . . and another Third, in planning a form of Government, for the separate States in One Assembly, and for the United States, in a Congress. His Arguments from the old Testament, were ridiculous. . . . The other third part relative to a form of Government I considered as flowing from simple Ignorance, and a mere desire to please the democratic Party in Philadelphia. . . ."

It is interesting if not surprising to find that in composing his Autobiography Adams did not bother to consult his Diary to refresh his memory. As a result events remembered in the Autobiography do not always occur in precisely the same fashion as those recorded in the Diary.

L. H. Butterfield, editor of The Adams Papers,

and Leonard C. Faber and Wendell D. Garrett, assistant editors, deserve especial praise for the manner in which they have joined the miscellany of manuscript into a coherent whole. Their judicious use of informative notes, which reveal a tremendous amount of painstaking research on their part, enlighten the reader to names, places and events which otherwise might remain either confusing or obscure. John Adams once wrote in his Diary, "... I never shall shine, till some animating Occasion calls forth all my Powers. I find that the Mind must be agitated with some Passion, either Love, Fear, Hope, etc. before she will do her best," These four volumes are the record of a mind passionately active in the making of our history.—Alan P. Grimes, Michigan State University.

Mill and Liberalism. By MAURICE COWLING. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 161. \$5.00.)

Cowling's essay on John Stuart Mill is of a piece with his Nature and Limits of Political Science (reviewed in this REVIEW by Dwight Waldo, LVIII, 403, June, 1964), and it is probably the most severe attack on Mill since James Fitzjames Stephen published his Liberty, Equality, Fraternity in 1873. In the Nature and Limits Cowling argues that political science has become pretentious and sterile, or at least fallen into a state of confusion, through its failure to sever explanation on the one hand from persuasion and practice on the other. Dwight Waldo is probably correct: most of us will find Cowling's general thesis "perverse and precious" and be repelled by his advocacy of "Science for Science's Sake" and "Philosophy for Philosophy's Sake"; yet from the vantage point of this frame of reference Cowling is able in this essay on Mill to highlight some of the confusions in Mill's work and to show he is something less than the liberal he is usually held

Cowling believes it bad enough to move from explanation to prescription, but he finds completely "intolerable" the sin of using the former as a "cover" for justifying or dignifying the latter. And Mill has sinned beyond redemption. He could be forgiven, Cowling says, if he had done what one expects of a politician, if he had offered practical advice and then supported it with "rhetorical gesturing"; but when one finds a philosopher has allowed his practical interests "to dominate, and deflect, the structure of his explanation" and has justified persuasion to moral revolution on the basis of philosophical authority, "then one must say that philosophy has been corrupted." (p. 113)

Nor can it be otherwise: Mill places all hope for the moral and political reconstruction of modern society in the very group that Cowling feels must divorce itself completely from practical matters-Cowling's academia (the scientist and the philosopher) apparently corresponds very closely with Mill's "clerisy" (the literati and the intellectuals). In Cowling's estimate Mill believed Christianity had served its purpose of providing an ordering principle during the Middle Ages, but Christianity was inadequate for the developing age of science, an age that demanded an all-encompassing Truth in place of the partial truth to which the inflexible Christian intolerantly clung. Moreover, Christianity was negative, emphasizing "Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic pursuit of Good." (p. 13) A new fount of moral doctrine was needed, the clergy were to be replaced by the clerisy; and then, freed from the shackles of convention, eventually all men would, through their intellect and under the guidance (and indoctrination) of the clerisy, be able to arrive at a consensus about the way the empirical world functions (Mill's Sociology). Moreover, through the sense-knowledge obtained in the Science of Sociology man would be able to arrive at moral agreement (Mill's Ethology). Apparently this latter consensus will come when man rises to a level of intellectual cultivation where through self-examination he can achieve a "disinterestedness," a state enabling him to see that his own interests are best served by the serving of the best interests of all. (A "natural-harmony-ofinterests" postulate makes an easy bridge between is and ought.)

On the methodological dimension Cowling is . asking the impossible or belaboring the obvious: while he would insist on the impossible requirement that the scientist should have no bias from the very beginning of his investigation, his insistence harmlessly serves to remind us that the scientist must take every precaution to eliminate his prejudices when possible or to minimize them when it is not-or at the very least to lay them bare before his audience. Far more interesting to Mill scholars will be the substantive judgments, the firm denials that Mill was the Great Liberal. For Cowling argues most persuasively (if at inordinate length) that Mill finds individuality no more an end than liberty; they are but instruments to permit the clerisy to unburden themselves of convention and lead us into the light, according to Mill.—Theodore B. Fleming, Jr., Wayne State University.

Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. By R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley. (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1964. Pp. xv, 295. \$5.00.)

This work, admirable in many of its aspects, is the result of the collaboration of two professors in the Scottish Universities of Aberdeen and St. Andrews. They have written this commentary for the benefit of British students whose introductory course in philosophy is based upon a reading of the Republic. They aim to provide the reader with an appreciation of Plato's views, with an explanation of the structure of his arguments, of the philosophical problems involved and also to provide an introduction to philosophy as the authors understand the term. Their approach to philosophy, however, and Plato's conception of philosophy differ in many respects so that their attempt to conjoin an introduction to modern philosophy to an exegesis of the Republic does not have a wholly felicitous result. One part of their enterprise, the introduction to modern philosophy is well realized, and though their exegesis is not equally successful, it is still eminently worthwhile.

The structure of the Republic lends itself to an introduction to philosophy, since the dialogue itself is, among other things, a propaedeutics to philosophy. The authors analyze the initial arguments with special care; they show the alternative lines of enquiry that remain unexplored; the occasional errors in argumentation are pointed out and we see that some of Plato's arguments are indeed quite bad. At the same time as we follow the argument we become acquainted with the various kinds of definition (the authors reject Aristotle's real definition as too narrow) and with the dangers of ambiguous terms.

As the argument moves forward we become aware of the complex of ideas enveloped in the term justice; social, moral, epistemological and ontological dimensions appear, and the wide range of topics and materials requires the commentators to become selective. They choose to disregard the educational theories and to restrict themselves to brief observations on politics of which two are of special interest. The authorsargue rather convincingly that no social contract theory is to be found in the Republic since Glaucon's argument contains no idea of political obligation. The authors also call attention to Plato's shift from economic classes in the first and second city to political classes as the basis of organization in third city. This change of organizational principle occurs without any emphasis, so that there remains a moot question whether Plato was unaware of the shift or decided to accomplish it without awakening the reader's attention.

The main stress of the commentary is laid upon purely philosophical topics. Better than a third of the work is devoted to discussion of *Republic* 474 to 535 (end of V, VI and VII) where problems of epistemology and ontology are treated extensively. Here, as throughout the whole com-

mentary, the discussion is penetrating and lucid, the comments incisive, and the presentation of the various strands of argument is a marvel of clarity. But here also it becomes evident that the authors' aim to furnish simultaneously a philosophical propaedeutics and an exegesis of the Republic cannot be wholly realized.

The distinction of episteme and doxa is analyzed in terms of the difference between knowledge and belief. As Messrs. Cross and Woozley point out neither English term, though customarily used as translation, does quite convey the meaning of the Greek. It is necessary to add, moreover, that in our usage the word belief contains an element of subjectivity, not present in Plato's notion of doxa. The authors' procedure to elucidate Plato's doctrine through an analysis of the meaning of belief and knowledge and examination of their linguistic function, though very interesting and informative, rather tends to obscure Plato's teachings. Plato's epistemology, its constitution of differing objects of knowledge coordinated to the different modes of knowing, is open to objection. But the authors' criticism based on their discussion of knowledge and belief miss their mark. The distinction between doxa and episteme is fundamental to Plato's ontology, but as the authors have been misled by their own interpretation of knowledge and belief they are not compelled to give an exhaustive account of the ontological characteristics of the Forms (ideas). Their attention is focused mainly upon the functions of the Forms as basis of necessary (a priori) propositions and as universals. There is a masterly account of the functions of the Forms in Plato's system from which the student will derive a better understanding of the structure of Platonism. The account of Plato's philosophy of mathematics is also very interesting. The suggestion that the mathematicals are the Forms seen in isolation, while the highest level of knowledge is the perception of the Forms in their connection with the Form of the Good is thoughtprovoking.

The commentary concludes with a chapter on Plato's philosophy of art and a very brief discussion of the final myth. The brevity of the last section indicates that Mssrs. Cross and Woozley consider the myth largely irrelevant. No doubt, most modern philosophers would esteem it little. But, since the device of the myth is often used by Plato at decisive points, relegating the myth of Er to unimportance will give the uninformed reader an erroneous impression of the role of myths in Plato.

As an explication of Plato's teaching his work is highly provocative, always thoughtful and full of valuable insights but not in all respects authoritative. Considered as an introduction to philosophy for British students this work is excellent. The parochial nature of the audience for whom this commentary is intended may explain the paucity of American authors cited and the absence of any literature in a foreign language.

Despite the various shortcomings noted, the authors have greatly enriched the Platonic literature and their work should be read by every student of the *Republic*. It would be well, however, if all those readers who wish to grasp Plato's intent would at the same time consult Jaeger's *Paideia*, Wild's *Plato's Theory of Man* and Voegelin's *Plato and Aristotle*, none of which are mentioned in the bibliography.—ULRICH S. ALLERS, *Georgetown University*.

John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951. Selected and Edited by Sidney Ratner and Jules Altman with James E. Wheeler as Associate Editor. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. 737. \$12.50.)

This volume is a fascinating record of the intellectual exchanges between the late Professor John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley. The record begins with a letter from Bentley, dated November 15, 1932, in which he states that he is sending a copy of his recently published Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics to Professor Dewey. He remarks that some of the views expounded in the book owed much to some of Professor Dewey's early lectures. The second letter is Professor Dewey's reply, dated May 22, 1935. He doubts that he acknowledged the receipt of the volume when it was received, and he adds that he has recently read it. "It has given me more enlightenment and intellectual help than any book that I have read for a very long time. . . . "

The next to the last letter in the volume, 595 pages later, begins "Dear A. F.," dated April 9, 1951. The last letter is dated December 6, 1951, and it begins "Dear John." In the intervening pages may be found comments on almost all problems of philosophy and scientific method and also the steps by which the formal salutations of 1932 and 1935 became the informal salutations of 1951. The story is told through the correspondence of the two men. The editors have noted and corrected the mistakes the writers make in their letters and occasionally have added a note to clarify the transaction that is going on between the two men. These editorial insertions are major aids to the reader in following the intellectual controversies. The issues and problems come alive as these two men strive to make clear the notions that they are developing. It is a great pleasure to follow the fully documented account of their agreements and disagreements.

An introductory essay by Sidney Ratner provides a biographical sketch of each man and an

excellent summary of the philosophical mileu in which the correspondence occurred. The volume contains two previously unprinted essays by Dewey and two appendices. One of the latter gives a brief but useful bibliography, and the other a brief biography of the persons that are referred to in the letters. Both are very useful features of the book.

The correspondence that is reproduced covers a period long after the publication of The Process of Government. There are a few brief references to the Process book and some casual remarks about a few political scientists. The major topics in the letters are the notions that are developed in the essays published by Dewey and Bentley under the title Knowing and the Known (1949). Both authors published other works in the period covered by the letters.

The book will be most helpful to those who are interested in the problems of scientific method, for there are elaborate commentaries on most of the major contributors to philosophy in this century. The reader will find himself titillated by the vigor and informality of the correspondence and he will be impressed by the seriousness of purpose that pervades the search for firm statements about the human condition. The volume is a substantial contribution to the intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.— Charles B. Hagan, *University of Illinois*.

Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations. By Leonard W. Doob. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. 297. \$6.75.)

Professor Doob is a psychologist with a remarkable facility for relating psychological research to problems of political importance. In the past he has performed this task in relation to the problem of the change in beliefs, values, and behavior associated with the process of "becoming more civilized" and the problem of the boundaries of communications systems. This earlier work was based on extensive field work in Africa. The current book, which extends the earlier research, is based on field work in another area where problems of community and nation building are important—the German speaking South Tyrolean section of Italy. And here the main concern is with patriotism and nationalism.

Patriotism, in Doob's useful definition, is "the more or less conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his society." Nationalism is the set of demands for action arising from patriotism that incline people to sacrifice on behalf of their government's aims. Patriotism is thus intimately

related to the general political problem of nation building. And nationalism—which used to be a political problem in the international sphere as a source of potential conflict among nations-is, as Doob defines it, closely related to problems of economic and political development. The nationstate is the institution that mobilizes resources for development and coordinates developmental activities. Economic development and social change have always been related to appropriate motivation—be it the Protestant ethic or high achievement motivation-but in a context where the state is the focus of development, nationalism becomes a prime motivating set of beliefs. Nationalism becomes a way of motivating people to work for social change and of harnessing their energies into cooperative and coordinated activities.

Patriotism and nationalism are related to commitment on lower or higher levels—to local attachments and to international attachments. Thus economic and social development that depends upon commitment to the nation-state has important implications for both parochial commitments to the family, community, ethnic group, and region and for commitment beyond the nation-state to internationalism. Here Doob returns to the great questions about nationalism that have usually been the focus of concern—its role in generating international tensions and in blocking international cooperation.

Doob has many interesting things to say here upon these subjects from his psychological perspective, largely because his particular psychological perspective is an extremely sensible one. He does not look at nationalism as a way in which personal psychoses play themselves out on the political stage. Though he considers the psychological functions of nationalism, it is not considered a pathological manifestation. He deals with the ways in which political events are interpreted by those involved in them and how these interpretations in turn lead to further action. This provides a useful psychological approach to history-as a set of interpretations of events and reactions to them. In this way, history becomes intimately connected with the contemporary culture of a nation.

One of the most interesting sections of the book deals with the objects of patriotic and nationalistic commitment. One rarely loves one's country in the abstract sense of the term, but rather, some observable manifestation of the country—its land, its people, its culture, its symbols—and the discussion of the variety of possible objects of attachment is particularly enlightening.

The book opens with the important question of what the psychological study of nationalism can add to our understanding of the political problem of nationalism. The question is dealt with from a variety of perspectives in the book—the psychologists' tools are brought to bear on the problem of the sources of patriotism and nationalism, and on the problems of causal inference and of measurement. And many fascinating ideas are suggested. But perhaps because the subject is so intriguing, because Doob has so many interesting ideas to develop, because his skills are so apt for the task, and, perhaps, most of all, because this reviewer had such high expectations based on his experience with Doob's earlier books on Africa, the present volume is somewhat disappointing.

Doob's previous work on Africa has employed data gathered in the most uncongerial circumstances to deal with complex and important problems. The present book in contrast is rather thin in new material. One might have hoped for more material from Doob's new studies in the South Tyrol and more comparisons with the results of his African studies. Much of the book is a speculative essay on nationalism based on a mixed bag of psychological, historical and philosophical works (though good speculation, it is true). And lastly, the book makes clear how important it is that the psychological study of nationalism be merged with studies of nationalism from the organizational point of view. Further information on the organization of South Tyrolean nationalism would have added greatly to our understanding of the role of nationalistic beliefs.

But this is perhaps to ask too much. The present volume remains a stimulating discussion of a vital topic—a discussion that is psychologically wise and politically pertinent.—Sidney Verba, Stanford University.

Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model. By William J. Gore. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. viii, 191. \$5.00.)

This book is a major contribution to organization theory. Professor Gore subjects the process of decision-making to closer scrutiny than has been done heretofore, and he comes up with some highly original observations, not only concerning decisions, but as to the nature of organization.

He begins by constructing a detailed model of decision-making based on successive empirical studies and then draws theoretical conclusions. The model provides insights into the decision-making process and into the way the problems are perceived, evaluated, weighed in terms of consequences, and support obtained for an agreed course of action. He traces the organizational actions and varied reactions in each of these phases.

Decision-making has become a most popular subject in public administration in recent years. As Gore wryly points out, it has become the latest in "a succession of widely held enthusiasms for some particular dimension as the key to effective administration." (p. 2)

But from Gore's material the decision-making process as usually described does not conform to administrative reality. "Classical theory sets decision-making off as a sequence of independent choices made by executives with formally designated powers. Acting in the name of the organization with the assistance of top staff and through consultation with their subordinates, these men were said to carry out decision-making functions. They do this through the rational process of defining a problem, identifying the alternatives, selecting the most appropriate and acceptable alternatives, translating it into a course of action, and initiating the implementing activities. . . . We do not have one case history that shows an executive making the decision through a formal mechanism. The procedure described by the classical theory is the means used to formalize and proclaim the decision, not to cast it." (pp. 132-133)

Actually, Gore concludes, administrative decision-making cannot be separated from the full stream of organizational behavior "Though some distinctly choice-making behaviors can be separated from the full scope of forming a collective response, it does not seem profitable to attempt to break down organizational behavior in terms of a choice-making, non-choice making dichotomy. Decision-making seems to serve as an orienting device by means of which a response is first given direction and then appropriate content." (p. 133)

More clearly than any theorist before him Gore analyzes the organization as an enormously complicated pattern of inter-acting behaviors in a somewhat precarious equilibrium. The executives (or as he calls them, "power-holders") are not the persons who choose satisficing alternatives most appropriate to achieve agreed ends, nor who perform a specified technical operations; "they are the power-holders in a large, indigenous social system, who have the political skills and the character traits that lead them to strive for and pay the price of maintaining a position in an inherently unstable, often untenable power structure." (p. 134)

In his studies of the organization as an interacting system Gore is acutely aware that, even in the simplest organization, the goals pursued by the various participants (including clientele groups) are never unified and often clashing. It is fortunate that his illustrations are drawn from a small town fire department which most people assume to be a single purpose unitary organization. He effectively shows that such is not the case.

I think Professor Gore is unduly modest in his claims for this work. He calls his analysis "a decision theory fragment." It is certainly more than that. It casts new lights on many aspects of organization. Perhaps most significant about Gore's analysis is its implications for total political systems. If his generalizations are true for simple organizations they describe as well the operations of the larger political system. He also makes possible an understanding of the dynamics of change and the way it effects (is incorporated into or rejected by) organizations.

If there is a criticism of this book it is the fact that it is so tightly written that it is likely to frighten away or lose those who most need its message. Much of the material so contradicts the "conventional wisdom" in the field of organization theory that to incorporate these insights would require a basic re-structuring of most of the teaching materials now used in the field.—Donald Smithburg, Illinois Institute of Technology.

The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups. By TERENCE K. HOPKINS. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 205. \$6.50.)

In this book a sociologist at Columbia University reduces to system a wide range of research and theory building on small groups. He uses the work of psychologists like Kurt Lewin, Muzafer Sherif, Solomon Asch, Herbert Hyman, Robert Bales, and Leon Festinger; of sociologists like Durkheim, Lazarsfeld, Parsons, and Merton; of philosophers like Ernest Nagel; and of comparably distinguished writers who are harder to classify. The work of these researchers and writers is indeed of durable vitality. It is in this book, logically and neatly arranged within a hermetically sealed retort, in which all these rich and yeasty cultures die.

Within its own terms the book is brilliantly successful. It sets out to examine patterns of influence within small groups, which the author defines as those not containing subgroups. It limits itself to influence patterns as they are determined wholly by forces that generate (or—to use a term more appropriate to contained analysis—function) within small groups. Hopkins states that influence, which is not equally shared by all group members, reflects status, which in turn has five properties: rank, centrality, observability, conformity, and influence.

The non-static relationship between these five attributes is not quite clear. The author correlates each with every other one, though the subject of the book, influence, is the property to which the four others presumably bear some special relationship. In describing the book, one hesitates to use such terms as independent and dependent variables, or causes and effects, because they are not consistent with the static style of thought that characterizes the book. Rank, centrality,

conformity, and influence all positively correlate. Rank, influence, and centrality tend to cumulate. Aside from what is implicit in cumulation, there is no real consideration of why these attributes tend to interact statistically with each other.

The author states that there is less change in group members as a consequence of inter-personal influence (i.e., by a single individual working on another individual) than of group influence. He offers two explanations for this: that it is easier to change opinion in a group context and that group pressure is visible. The first is not really an explanation but rather a tautology; the second is an intriguing, little discussed enigma.

Why are people more influenced by their fellow group members than they are by a person who has one or another attribute of high group status?

At various points, Hopkins gives clues. He says that the motivation for compliance is outside the interaction system, and he does not look into motivation. He says that those parts of a person that are outside the group are causally relevant to individual behavior in small groups. But again these parts are not part of his analysis of these groups. What the author has done by mentioning these factors is to indicate that the etiology of group interaction is in part external to the system and therefore not a matter of concern. This is as grand a non-sequitur as the chemist who says that the analysis of acids and bases relates to ions of hydrogen and hydroxyl, but since positive and negative charges of electricity are outside the chemical system, they are not to be considered. Chemists do not so exclude physics.

What is curious is that a sociologist so manifestly competent in psychological and sociological literature and in logic itself can so casually eliminate from consideration those forces that would reanimate the cultures sealed in his bottle and produce in vitro an analysis in vivo. The book's systemism concerns rank but has no odor. Indeed, even within the group as system, the author refuses to consider dynamic forces: "The principal mechanism checking the tendency to anomie . . . is the exercise of influence." This is almost another tautology and may be valid only if other (non-group) causes of anomie are excluded. Why some individuals have influence and others accept it is not considered, because these would involve an analysis in depth of group interaction and in breadth of the non-group aspects of the personalities of the group members.

As an attempt to abstract and codify some manifest characteristics of group interaction, the book is a success. But abstraction of principles, a necessary ingredient of all scientific endeavor, is by no means sufficient. It is like reducing all chemistry to the periodic table. Group interaction involves long and complicated equations, with

elements compounding and interacting in a manner that such a periodic table as this book helps little to understand.—James C. Davies, *University of Oregon*.

The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. By George L. Mosse. (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964. Pp. 373. Cloth \$5.95, Paper \$2.65.)

After the military defeat of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis in 1945, scholarly interest in Fascism rapidly and sharply declined, while communism (particularly after the start of the cold war in 1947) became the focus of attention among students of totalitarianism. Yet the unexpected phenomenal success of William Shirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich a decade and a half after World War II showed that the interest of the reading public in German Nazism was stronger than the professional historians and political scientists had assumed. The continued relative lack of interest in the Italian and other varieties of Fascism may be based on an inarticulate—and yet very perceptive-realization that German Nazism was not just another variety of Fascism but a phenomenon sui generis-totalitarianism in its most nihilistic form so far experienced. As time goes on, therefore, it may be expected that more and more searching analyses of Nazism will be forthcoming, abandoning the shallow interpretations of Nazism as capitalism in depression and decay or as a reaction to the Versailles Treaty or as the product of a few evil men of the Hitler-Himmler-Eichmann type.

Professor Mosse's book is a valuable symptom of, and contribution to, this stirring process of serious and probing study of German Nazism and its background. While many dismissed Nazi ideas for long as mere tools of propaganda that few Germans-including the Nazi leadership-took seriously unless they belonged to the cultural and social riff-raff of German society, the author emphasizes at the outset that it "is important to keep in mind that the Nazis found their greatest support among respectable, educated people" (p. 1). The interpretation of the small Nazi movements in countries like Holland or Norway in terms of the concept of Lumpen-Bourgeoisie possesses considerable validity, but is entirely inappropriate in analyzing the ideological forces that culminated in German Nazism. In fact, one of the most striking results of the author's research is to demonstrate the questionable usefulness of the general conception of Fascism to the extent that the differences between German Nazism and other varieties of Fascism may be greater than the similarities. Thoroughly familiar with Fascist movements outside of Germany, the author concludes that "the German variety came to be

unique" (p. 315), and that the fundamental difference between Nazism and other types of Fascism "reflects the difference between German thought and that of the other western European nations" (ibid.). Professor Mosse singles out the rationalism of the Enlightenment and the social radicalism of the French Revolution as the two most important ideological forces that were repudiated by the German "Volkish" tradition that finally culminated in the triumph of Nazism. The author correctly points out that these ideological forces were, and remained, alive throughout the high tide of Fascism elsewhere in Europe, and consequently Fascism remained a relatively small movement in the western countries outside of Germany. What was a (perhaps the) central cultural tradition in Germany over a long period of time, was only a marginal and episodic current of opinion in the rest of Western Europe. In elaborating these basic differences between Germany and other western nations Professor Mosse fails to deal with the all-important phenomenon, both in thought and behavior, of nihilism. In this nihilistic attitude, developed in Germany long before the rise of Nazism, nothing was sacred or permanent. In religion, Germany was the only country in which it was seriously planned to destroy the Jewish-Christian tradition and ethics and to revive the ancient pre-Christian pagan cults of Wotan et al. Among primary social institutions, even the family was to be done away with-something which, again, no other Fascist movement intended to do. Finally, in murdering six million Jewish men, women, and children at Auschwitz and other extermination camps, German nihilists revealed how the unthinkable could be turned not only into the thinkable but into real events. It is Professor Mosse's merit to show in his book that this mentality has a long background in German thought and institutional life, and while he does not propose that the tradition that culminated in Nazism encompassed all facets of German thought and action, he shows that it was a trend strong enough to eventually become the dominant force of the German state and society. In particular, he points out the crucial role played by the German conservative classes in actively aiding the rising tide of racialism, irrationalism, and totalitarianism.

The wealth of material in Professor Mosse's book, inaccessible to anyone not intimately familiar with the German language and writings unduly neglected outside of Germany, makes his work a must for any student of modern totalitarianism. The book would have been more valuable still if the author had not confined himself to the period after 1870 in tracing the ideological background of Nazism. The late eighteenth century would perhaps have been a better start-

ing point, since the author could have then shown the impact of Romanticism, for example, in literature as well as in history, politics, economics, and law. Finally, while the author shows in a masterly fashion how the ideas and sentiments developed in Germany that found their final and disastrous expression in Nazism, he hardly comes to grips with the basic question of why such attitudes were embraced by so many Germans but rejected very largely elsewhere in Western Europe. But perhaps this is a theme for another book.—William Ebenstein, University of California (Santa Barbara).

The Liberal Idea of Freedom. By DAVID SPITZ. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1964. Pp. 210. \$5.50.)

This far-ranging book, by our most persistent and industrious spokesman for the political theory tradition that reaches from Mill to MacIver and Bertrand Russell, includes inter alia: a refutation of the "iron law of oligarchy"; a demonstration that the Communists are not, properly speaking, of "the Left"; a new attempt to salvage John Milton as a legitimate forerunner of contemporary "open society" doctrines; an indictment of the American South (it is seceding "not merely from the country but from civilization itself;" it "may well drown the country in [a] . . . torrent of barbarism which is a continuing affront to democracy and to mankind") that some readers, including this one, will have to interpret as a summons for a new Civil War; a defense of "the right of civil disobedience"; a vindication of Hobbes against the classical political philosophers, who "pretentiously" claimed to know the highest good, while Hobbes did not. On all these matters, Professor Spitz' conclusions flow from his premises just as inevitably as ever Euclid's did from his axioms; for those who share those premises, he provides the best of all possible refresher courses in how to use them as weapons with which to rout the forces of reaction, authoritarianism, aristocracy. At the end of the book Professor Spitz stands, like Fortinbras in the last act of Hamlet, himself unscathed, among the fallen corpses of those who have, in one fashion or another, stood in his way. Two groups of readers, perhaps, will hesitate to celebrate his victories: First, those who do not share his premises. And second, those whose specifically intellectual history has been, in recent years, a little different from his.

We have all had the experience: the orchestra on the radio begins a tune that we have not heard for a long while, and suddenly we are transported across time and distance to a moment and place we had supposed to have faded completely from our memories; we feel again the feelings, experience again the associations, even re-know bits of knowledge, that make us, for the nonce, 18 or 25 or 32 again. So it is with The Liberal Idea of Freedom: it evokes a world in which World War Two has not yet happened (so that it seems only natural, not surprising at all, when, at one point, Professor Spitz refers to Josef Stalin as if he were still alive and running the USSR, and, at numerous points, cites MacIver and Laski as if they were names to conjure with). One searches, as one reads, for the secret of the evocation, which cannot be a matter merely of the unfamiliarity of the names or even of Professor Spitz' very considerable literary skills. Then, suddenly, one understands: the world he conjures up is a world not yet touched by the Strauss-Voegelin revolution in political theory scholarship, the world of Sabine and Catlin, a world, therefore, in which modern political theory has not yet been brought into focus by Natural Right and History, and in which the American political tradition continues to look as it can never look again to the man who has moved into the Strauss-Voegelin universe. Those whose recent intellectual history has been different from Professor Spitz' will not, I repeat, celebrate his victories; but there could be, for them, no better bench-mark than his new book from which to measure the eons that separate us from MacIver and Laski. A not-yet-dead Stalin will, for them, be less of an anachronism than a Hobbes (Hobbes the very inventor of those individual "rights" that constitute the essence of Professor Spitz' explicitly "anti-conservative" position) whom the author, without blinking an eye-lash, can describe as a "conservative."

It remains to mention the part of The Liberal Idea of Freedom that should most gladden the hearts of Professor Spitz' political co-religionaries, namely, pp. 127-174, in which he takes up "the curious contemporary revival of what may loosely be called conservative thought" and passes in rapid review some of its typical spokesmen: Senator Goldwater, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Walter Berns, Peter Viereck, Russell Kirk, Willmoore Kendall. Here his theses seem to be first, that the writers in question all suppose themselves to be in possession of a higher truth, or set of principles, or orthodoxy, that they are only too eager to impose upon others, that they seem little able to agree among themselves as to what that higher truth, or those principles, are, and that, taken individually, they turn out, upon examination, to be pretty much unintelligible. On the unintelligibility charge, this reviewer finds himself in substantial agreement with Spitz, except perhaps, but only perhaps, in the case of that one of the writers whose work he (the reviewer) knows best. On the lack-of-agreement charge, again no quarrel from this quarter-at most the suggestion that our

author pay less attention in future to the Conservative intellectuals he takes time to vivisect—they are indeed, for the most part, a poor lot—and more to the real well-springs of American Conservatism, which is the continuingly-successful though inarticulate resistance, out in American society, to what I have called elsewhere the Liberal Revolution. On the eager-to-impose-anorthodoxy charge, I content myself with (a) denying it, and (b) observing that it might come with better grace from a theorist less intoxicated than Professor Spitz upon the absolute rightness of his own position.—Willmoore Kendall, University of Dallas.

The New Meaning of Treason. By REBECCA WEST. (New York: The Viking Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 374. \$6.95.)

Rebecca West is one of those fortunate people untroubled by serious doubts. Not for her are the agonies of a Gheorghiu or a Hesse or a Kafka striving to understand the pathos, even the absurdity, of the human condition. Not for her are the confusions of a mind torn by a conflict of loyalties, or by the uncertain meaning of loyalty itself-whether this implies devotion to the laws or to the state or to the people or to a moral or political principle by which we may judge those laws or that state or that people. Not for her, again, are the qualified and tentative portravals and judgments of the skilled biographer or historian; despite the absence of adequate dataand as Herbert L. Packer's Ex-Communist Witnesses makes clear, even the most exhaustive legislative investigations, administrative hearings, and court trials are deficient fact-finding instruments—she simply and repeatedly asserts "he must have imagined" and "it can be taken as certain that . . . " Not for her, finally, is there an appreciation of the fact that her book is about The New Traitors, not The New Meaning of Treason; for what really concerns her is not treason or changing concepts of treason-least of all the haunting thought that the ultimate dishonor is treachery to one's self-but the character and motives of some of England's recent and contemporary traitors. In short, Miss West's projected clarity is the clarity of the innocent; and in the absence of sustained and systematic political and philosophical analysis, the innocent are as unlikely to understand the guilty as the rich are to understand the poor.

If we can set all this aside, the encomiums heaped on Miss West's book—a revision and expansion of a work originally published in 1947—are understandable. For Miss West tells an absorbing story in an absorbing way. With uncommon literary grace, she spins the tale of treason in England from William Joyce (Lord Haw-Haw)

and John Amery to Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs to the defectors Burgess and Maclean. Even the sordid Ward-Profumo-Keeler case falls under the purview of Miss West's acid yet stylistically elegant pen. For one who wishes to while away an otherwise dull afternoon, and who has no Eric Ambler at hand, this is an intriguing volume.

But one must not read or inquire too closely. If he does, if for example he asks: who or what is the new as distinct from the old traitor? he will find it difficult to apply with consistency the three chief labels Miss West provides: the New Traitor is the extrovert rather than the introvert, the professional rather than the amateur, the Communist rather than the Fascist. If he takes seriously her oft-repeated contention, reminiscent of Socrates in the Crito, that "if a state gives a citizen protection it has a claim to his allegiance" (p. 361), he will have to ask, what Crito with his intellectual limitations did not ask, why then was Socrates in prison in the first place? Clearly a claim is not

always equivalent to an obligation or a right; and it is not the least of Miss West's shortcomings that in all her many pages she has room for but a single paragraph that barely touches this side of the coin. And if the reader enjoys such quips as, "The French Revolution has given pleasure to all subsequent generations, because it was an outstanding event which afterwards proved never to have happened" (p. 80), and "communism... is fascism with a glandular and geographical difference" (p. 141), he will also have to ask himself, what is their relevance to her argument? and more importantly, are the statements true?

That Miss West's book is a superior example of sophisticated journalism, that it abounds with sprightly aperçus, and that it raises questions of major significance, make it all the more regretable that the book warranting this title is not the volume Miss West has written.—David Spitz The Ohio State University.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

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S. SIDNEY ULMER University of Kentucky

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- 5. University of Minnesota
- 6. Pennsylvania State University
- 7. University of Washington
- 8. Rutgers University
- 9. Indiana University

- 10. University of California Medical Center, San Francisco
- 11. University of Oxford
- 12. Tokyo Metropolitan University
- 13. University of Chicago
- 14. University of Southern California
- 15. University of Delaware
- 16. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 17. University of Kentucky
- 18. University College of Rhodesia, Nyasaland
- 19. University of Kansas
- 20. University of Michigan
- 21. Yale University
- 23. Ohio State University
- 24. The University of Essex
- 25. University of Hawaii
- 26. Hunter College
- 27. University of Missouri at Kansas City
- 28. University of Wisconsin
- 29. Northwestern University
- 30. Technical Operations Inc., Burlington, Massachusetts
- 31. Ethyl Corporation
- 32. Kansas State University
- 33. York University, Toronto
- 34. Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta
- 35. North Dakota State University
- 36. Michigan State University
- 37. University of Houston
- 38. University of Goteborg, Sweden
- 39. Wayne State University
- 40. National Institute of Mental Health

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962. By MARTIN ANDERSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 272. \$5.95.)

This is an unfortunate book. It is unfortunate in that the author presents it as a work of objective scholarship, and it fails lamentably to meet minimum scholarly standards. It is unfortunate in that a university press has seemed through this publication to give the imprimatur of academic respectability to a book which would not otherwise have acquired such credentials. It is unfortunate in that the book has debased the currency of the academy among knowledgeable men of affairs. It is unfortunate in that this inadequate polemic has already come to play a major role in the political debates over urban policy. The issues involved in urban affairs are complicated and difficult enough without the distortions and obfuscations Anderson introduces with his array of nonevidence.

Anderson's general conclusion is that the

federal urban renewal program should be repealed. He argues that renewal projects involve major social costs, primarily by destroying large amounts of low-cost housing (slums), relocating the low-income residents, and building a smaller volume of higher priced housing. The effect is to shift slums rather than eliminate them, and efforts to inhibit further blight through rehabilitation programs are, says Anderson, inherently doomed to failure. As against these costs, the benefits of renewal are alleged to be far smaller than commonly supposed. Actual rebuilding is slow and not very profitable, only privileged economic and intellectual elites benefit, tax resources are lost to the city, and so on.

These are important arguments, in much need of careful inquiry and constructive dialogue. Renewal did generate a halo effect for itself and has subsequently generated opposition from such strange bedfellows as urban liberals and ideological conservatives. Thus the political issues have both curiosity and social importance. Their elucidation cannot be served by incompetence.

Anderson makes a strong case against reliance on summary statistical reports and occasional secondary sources for analysis of complex problems. He makes the case through his exclusive reliance on this sort of material. There is no evidence that he has conducted any field inquiries at all, and he makes no effort to determine whether there are significant variations among cities and, if so, why. His data are not only inadequate but quite out-of-date. Generally he stops in early 1961 which was about the time that many large projects began to move into construction phases. At one point (p. 106) Anderson concedes that more recent data may undercut his position, but he decided that it was "not feasible to attempt to redo the entire study in order to update the data." A perfectly reasonable position, provided the argument is altered to take account of the new prospects.

In his preface Anderson acknowledges that readers thought his book was unbalanced. In reply, he asked, "But what haven't I considered? What have I left out that is important?" (p. x) The answer is that he left out a great deal. For example, he stresses the fact that urban renewal projects had destroyed, as of March, 1961, some 126,000 dwelling units, mostly low cost slums, and built only about 4000 low cost units to take care of the erstwhile slum dwellers. He neglects to mention the 268,000 units of public housing completed during this same period in other parts of these cities.

There is a chapter questioning the constitutionality of renewal programs. The author sustains his argument by quoting at length from a district court opinion which the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently overruled and by omitting mention of later reaffirmations of this position. Anderson's conception of constitutionality hinges on his notion of virtue, not on the law, which on this question is not at all uncertain. Another curious use of material involves a quotation from the president of Alcoa respecting that firm's experience in renewal work. "We have seen enough to know that we have had it" (p. 122). The same man is quoted in The Journal of Housing as follows:

"We have the conviction that urban renewal is essential if our cities are to survive and that Alcoa can play a constructive role in that battle and bring home to its shareholders a reasonable return on their investment." (October, 1964, p. 472)

If Anderson wants to establish the disenchantment of investors with renewal, he needs systematic evidence, not an isolated instance.

In his concluding chapter Anderson cites twenty "quite persistent" beliefs about the urban renewal program. No clues are given as to whose beliefs these are, but they constitute a summary version of the straw men against whom Anderson

is arguing. He then arrays twenty "facts and estimates" which purport to demonstrate the invalidity of the beliefs. In one such pairing Anderson asserts that it is believed that, "Urban renewal is definitely in the public interest, that is, its net result is 'good' when looked at from the national viewpoint." The "fact and estimate" reads, "It has never been clearly established that urban renewal is in the public interest. In fact, a strong argument can be made that it is not in the public interest." (p. 223)

An unfortunate book.—Robert H. Salisbury, Washington University (St. Louis).

Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies. BY WILLIAM W. BOYER. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. ix, 184, \$1.95.)

"This book," William Boyer writes in his preface, "not only attempts a general description and analysis of policy making in administrative agencies but is also concerned with administrative policy making in terms of its relation to democratic government and 'due process'." By policies, he refers to "agency statements, essentially legislative in substance, that affect private rights and interests" (page 1). If a teacher is looking for a brief and relatively simple introduction to administrative procedure for use by students, this book should do quite well. The diversity of formal procedures and the arguments for and against various standard practices are outlined throughout the book. But the reader who takes the title seriously and expects discussion of how administrative agencies make decisions on substantive policy matters is bound to be disappointed. The only policy decisions treated here are those concerning the kinds of procedures to be followed in making administrative rules.

In his concluding chapter, the author begins by observing that typical policy making does not exist in the context of governmental pluralism, at least not in details, but that

Nevertheless, in an idealized form the policy-making cycle is tantamount to the structure of a model. From this model, certain conceptual propositions emerge that have important implications for administrative theory:

- 1. Policy making in public administration is not devoid of an identifiable process capable of descriptive analysis.
- 2. This process consists of a cycle of five sequential stages—initiation, preliminary drafting, public participation, final drafting, and reviewing.
- 3. The most important stages substantively, and the most complex procedurally (those that involve the most participants) are the initiation and public participation stages.
- 4. The initiation and public participation stages involve the vital interaction of public administration with its external environment
- 5. This vital interaction is organized and purposeful, rather than individual and accidental. (pages 166-167)

Apparently, the author wishes to convey his

belief that there is some definable pattern in administrative rule making and that the world outside the agency has some impact upon it. It would be interesting to speculate on why he saw fit to draw up these elementary notions in the form of "conceptual propositions" or even "the structure of a model." What might otherwise be reasonable statements turn into vacuous grand conceptions only because the author abandons his material in favor of genuflections to the worst aspects of contemporary fashion in the social sciences. His real contributions risk getting buried amidst the rubble of pseudo-propositions.

Taking material not only from the usual sources on national administrative law but also from a variety of state sources, Boyer adds to our knowledge of administrative procedure. He shows us the great variety of procedures and the many problems connected with them. We see how contact with the application of rules sometimes makes administrators reluctant to codify or even publish them. The problems which this creates for the affected citizens and for those concerned with due process are brought out so that students can appreciate the difficulties. The author's special knowledge of Wisconsin adds a valuable dimension to his discussion.—Aaron Wildaysky, University of California (Berkeley).

Who Speaks for the South? By James McBride Dabes. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, Inc. Pp. 398. \$5.95.)

James McBride Dabbs speaks for the South in the voice of his prototype, the Southerner. Mr. Dabbs believes that there is a predominant southern type and a characteristic southern attitude. The reviewer is inclined to doubt that the South is singular or that there is a typical Southerner. But Mr. Dabbs, who was born and reared and continues to live on a South Carolina plantation, speaks with more authority than the reviewer who was born and reared in the North and has lived in the South only a little over thirty years. Moreover, Mr. Dabbs is past President and a member of the Executive Committee of the Southern Regional Council, "champion of the best in the South," "the most solidly based interracial organization in the South."

This is not a book in political science, or social science, though it offers many discerning views on southern politics and southern society. The analysis is highly subjective and introspective. The author himself concedes that his interpretation of southern culture is probably influenced by the fact that he was born in a seaboard state of the Old South and not in one of the later southern states such as Alabama or Mississippi. Quite obviously, the Southerner is a White Southerner though the author treats White Southerners and

Negro Southerners with equal courtesy and concern. This, indeed, is the crux of his thesis, that the Southerner has been created largely by the relationship between the two races, a relationship which he traces back to the early settlers whose "basic error" was to accept the institution of slavery for plantation life.

The South about which Mr. Dabbs writes "was, and is, in part legendary, in part real." One gains the impression that the author admires and loves the legendary part, regrets and deplores much of that which is real. A truly religious person, his perception of the South and the Southerner reflects his own values and convictions. The Southerner is "the product of history, still existing, though daily being modified toward the American norm." Because the region perpetuated the "basic error" of its first settlers, it still suffers from a sense of guilt that sets it apart from the rest of the nation. As Mr. Dabbs points out, the South has always been a great land for politicians. Politics perforce has substituted for religion, for the roots of religion are necessarily shallow in a society that accepts slavery. Protestantism with its emphasis on individual morality was never able to encompass the whole culture of the region. And, even after the Civil War, the treatment of the freed Negroes remained on the conscience of the Southerner who tried to keep ethics out of politics and to talk more about State's Rights than civil rights.

If the author lingers too long upon the tragic as well as the heroic past, it is not because he has no vision of the future. He notes briefly, and almost incidentally, that industrialization and urbanization in the past twenty years have been producing revolutionary changes in the region. He notes also that the South has been increasingly drawn into national circles by the Democratic Party (obviously written before the 1964 election!) and that it has felt the unifying impact of federal appropriations for military installations. More impressively he suggests that "The South has been God's project"—a kind of pilot project --- "learning how to do within a limited area what now has to be done in the world if civilization is to survive." As he views it, "southern history was God's way of leading two opposed peoples into a richer life than either could have found alone." Thus, tomorrow the South, "By God's Grace."

What can a political scientist learn from this?—what one thoughtful and sensitive Southerner thinks and believes about his own land and people. But the South is a complex subject and no one person speaks for its entirety. Other southerners are no less southern who speak quite differently about the same land and people—Strom Thurmond, Martin Luther King, Ralph McGill, George Wallace, James Prothro, Em-

mette Redford, et al., southerners all!—MARIAN D. IRISH, Florida State University.

Essays on the American Constitution. GOTTFRIED DIETZE, ED. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. x, 245. \$6.50.)

All who labor in the field of constitutional law know the impact of Alpheus Mason's efforts. This Festschrift makes it clear that a famous scholar may also be a great teacher. Plainly Alpheus is not one of those professors who—after a short burst of youthful enthusiasm—come to look upon their work as the casting of false pearls before true swine. For he has kept his enthusiasm in the only way an intelligent man can keep it-by passing it on to others. This of course is high art, and obviously Alpheus has it. Year after year Princeton undergraduates have cited him as their "most inspiring teacher." Now in this volume a group of his former graduate students pay similar tribute in the special coinage of scholars-the commemorative essay.

Even so, I think, Alpheus has been a bit short-changed. For these essays are confined almost exclusively to problems of the American Constitution. That leaves largely untouched the history of American political thought in which—as I see it—A.T.M. is second to none.

The first selection, entitled "The Chasm that Separated Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall," was written by Julian P. Boyd, who studied under Mason in the 1920's at Trinity College, now Duke University. He is now Professor of History at Princeton and editor of the papers of Thomas Jefferson.

The other contributors—Gordon Baker, Harold Chase, Andrew Hacker, John Hopkirk, Woodford Howard, Samuel Krislov, Richard Leach, Donald Mathews, Jack Peltason, and James Prothro—are post-World War II graduates whose work already suggests that at least two or three of them may ultimately match their teacher's accomplishments.—Wallace Mendelson, The University of Texas.

At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898-1958. By THEODORE J. LOWI. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xvi, 272. n.p.)

This study of the appointments of New York mayors since 1898 is tinctured with arsenic and decorated with old lace. The first takes the form of an occasional patronizing attitude toward predecessors in the community politics field, extending even to Robert A. Dahl, and of an annoying and unjustified tone of arrogance. ("The novelty of my own approach is that it combines the historical methods of earlier scholars with the quantitative, empirical methods of today." But

the approach is not novel. It is today routine.) The old lace is found in a Victorian style of writing. ("If the recruitment role of interest groups has grown it is because..." It is the task of the author to tell us if it has grown. And if it has, why not say so declaratively?) The book as a whole suffers from an inferior writing style that could and should have been corrected by the author or the editors of the publishing house. The book is also cluttered with value judgments that could better have been left out. They destroy the disinterested analysis we have been led to expect from the opening statements.

Lowi spends part of the book in whipping a horse that died about a decade ago: "It is a great mistake to treat a political system from the beginning as though there were only a single power structure or a single influence process; it is extremely misleading to refer glibly [or even thoughtfully?] to 'the power structure'..." He urges us to search for conditions rather than "universal" generalizations, by which he means, apparently, that we should seek to identify dependent variables. Most researchers will surely not disagree.

The book is an extension of the Sayre and Kaufman study, Governing New York City, and uses its analytical framework. It makes an important contribution to the study of local politics, but that contribution is not in the "more sophisticated approach" to community politics that the author promises, rather it is in the excellent historical analysis of the office of mayor as it has been buffeted in the political gales of the great city. A prodigious amount of work went into the data collection and into the analysis of interest group behavior in relation to the mayor's office. The description of the class-oriented group conflicts involved in the politics of distribution as distinguished from the non-class-oriented politics of regulation is first rate. The two best chapters in the book, I thought, were those dealing with "arenas of power": Personal Continuity, and Attribute Continuity. Lowi finds the tenure pattern in distribution agencies to be significantly different from that in regulatory agencies. The critical decision-making positions where the policy concerns of the mayor are great also have a different pattern from the highly structured offices where policy is shaped largely by public expectations and a professional bureaucracy. In these, administrative values dominate.

The chapters on patterns of pressures for appointments are important and impressive. The conclusions reached in them are more convincing than what the author calls his "major conclusions" which "revolve around the thesis that it is the minority, or majority-in-the-making party that is the source of innovation." He cites as evidence the reform administrations of Seth Low

and John P. Mitchel, and especially of Fiorello H. LaGuardia and the supporting political parties of each. The idea is not new. Reform parties are expected to be innovative and during the Great Depression innovation was rampant throughout the land, everywhere encouraged by desperate protest. "Without history," Lowi asks, "how is one to know what phase of community trend he has captured?" Even with a fifty-year time span, can one generalize about the relationship between parties and innovation? Can one, in such a span and in only one city, generalize about innovation and patterned variables? The generalization he makes is not false, of course. He shows that political innovation has come through the minority party and has been much less characteristic of the majority party. He does not and cannot show that it could not also have come through the majority party.

This is an important book which makes contributions to both our collections of data and to theory building. With a bit more modesty on the author's part, it could have been a much better book. "The proper question for political scientists," the author tells Robert Dahl and the rest of us in his conclusion, "is not 'Who rules?' but 'What are the conditions for rule?" It is perhaps, more accurately, "Who rules under what conditions?"

The book has many helpful charts and graphs and a good index. It received the J. Kimbrough Owen Award of the American Political Science Association in 1962.—Charles R. Adrian, Michigan State University.

Mr. Crump of Memphis. By WILLIAM D. MILLER. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 372. \$6.75.)

Edward H. Crump preferred to be known as "Mr. Crump, leader of the Shelby County delegation," but author Miller adopts the popular view that Crump was the "last of the old-fashioned bosses." Crump was in the tradition of the "boss and the machine" but he cannot be considered typical. In fact, there is some difficulty determining what is typical because, as the late Harold Zink discovered, it is risky to make generalizations for all bosses. Crump would have been happy to be considered by himself alone and not in other bosses' company. He particularly refused to be bracketed with such men as Curley, Hague and Pendergast.

Crump entered politics early in the century espousing the Progressive philosophy of that period, at least as much of it as is associated with civic reform and the castigation of the alliance between city government and corporate interests. If this background is distinctive among bosses, much of the operation of the Crump organization

is Memphis was predictable. All of the standard practices of ward politics were followed. To a degree that few other bosses achieved, it was one-man rule and his rules were clear. In cases of infraction, the person was "excommunicated" and Crump was implacably opposed to him thereafter. One of Crump's signal achievements was to bring generally high calibre men into public office and compel them to operate within the broad lines he set. He both gave and expected loyalty.

As an individual, Crump had a passion for order in all things and was strongly puritanical. Simple and direct, he ordered his own life on the maxims he frequently repeated to others. "He was an absolutist in everything he did from the way he kept order in his dresser drawer to the way he organized the Memphis political machine." (p. 189) Crump was wedded to politics, at least Memphis politics. He had the virus in his political bloodstream, not to be a candidate and hold public office, but to dominate because he knew what was best for his people.

Although he was rich, it is difficult to prove that he enriched himself improperly from political activity. The connection was probably much more subtle-the realization of Memphians that it was wise to insure with the E. H. Crump Company, for example, although this biography does not hint of such connections. The Crump organization was noted for its honesty even among its detractors. He did not rise to the heights or stay there by dependence upon rackets or a privileged group. He worked much of his life in politics without financial compensation and did not resort to the usual demagogic devices and issues to keep his control. Author Miller concludes that the motivation was a romanticism in Crump's makeup but that Crump "determined to actualize his romantic fancy." (p. 222) All he asked in return for his organization's substantial contributions was that he run the City. Memphians got "good government" at the price of self government or, as some insisted, by selling their souls.

The sources of the Crump strength are found in the group basis of politics. Crump took care of the vital interests of Memphis groups and, by the use of various techniques, kept down the normal factionalism which arises from clashes of interests. He held himself aloof, was not identified with any group or intimate with anyone. Even within his organization, he was "Mr. Crump," never "Ed." Most groups considered him a friend who had a special understanding of their problems. He maintained a channel to each group through one of their representatives and held together Baptists, Jews, Catholics, Irish, Italian, Negroes, business and the AFL but not the CIO. His rela-

tions with business perhaps were most publicized. To the business community, Crump was their man. He provided an efficient and honest administration of city services; kept insurance, transportation, electric, and tax rates low; provided a climate for growth in political stability. Thus, large industries as well as small business were enthusiastic supporters and pressured their employees to vote.

The Negroes were a special case, for the organization "voted" them regularly, and there were no nice distinctions about residence inasmuch as Arkansas and Mississippi Negroes were as acceptable as those living in Memphis. Crump was a racist in the traditional Southern school, believing that Negroes had their own place. However, he gave them consideration in appointments, in health, and in housing and was committed to improving their conditions.

Restiveness after World War II supplemented the backlog of opposition from the dissidents. Whites were more responsive to the intellectual's attacks upon the lack of self government and Negroes were more interested in equal rights and less in noblesse oblige. The culmination was Crump's famous state-wide defeat in 1948. Crump's style of campaigning had become out of date and, in many respects, so had he. It was a new world, one he would never have made. Despite his reverses, he was never overthrown in his own bailiwick; but, the organization being his, died with him. No one else could possibly have carried it on.

Miller apparently was the first to have access to the Crump papers and while they proved illuminating in some respects, the student of Tennessee politics may have the feeling that not all of the Crump story was found there. Extensive interviews with many participants in the events of the Crump years yielded no noteworthy revelations. The author is a former Memphis resident and has previously written on Memphis politics. On at least one occasion he was a poll-watcher for Crump's opposition, but he indulged no grudges in this book. There is an obvious attempt to be fair and objective, admitting quietly what was unquestioned and resisting charges for which he concludes there is no proof. Crump's operations and relations with some Tennessee political figures are sometimes blurred. For instance, the late Senator McKellar suddenly comes into the picture but from where the reader is not told.

The author has summed up the issue by admitting that Crump authoritarianism restricted freedom. "But the extent of freedom is bound by the ordering factor of its intrinsic worth. Had there been no Crump there doubtless would have been more freedom for independent political action, but would the people of Memphis have

been as free in those areas that represent the basis for any humanized society—order and material well being? Considering the character of Memphis as Crump found it, it is doubtful that they would have been." (pp. 222-23)

This may not be the last word on Mr. Crump but it can well be the last word in his behalf.—William Goodman, Southern Illinois University (Edwardsville).

The Costs of American Governments: Facts, Trends, Myths. By FREDERICK C. MOSHER AND ORVILLE F. POLAND. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1964. Pp. xvi, 180. n.p.)

Anyone concerned with public policy, whether scholar or citizen, will find this book useful. It presents many facts and discredits many myths regarding public fiscal affairs. It deserves wide reading.

In this reviewer's experience most undergraduate and many graduate political scientists are illiterate with respect to the facts of fiscal policy. Sharing a general bias with their instructors in favor of fiscal policies espoused by Democratic Administrations, most political science students express only a superficial understanding of fiscal policy issues or of the facts relevant to them. Yet if politics is defined as "who gets what, when where and how," fiscal decisions are of crucial significance.

Among the reasons for the neglect of fiscal policy issues by political science students has been the absence of brief and definitive treatments. A big step in remedying this lack has now been taken by the Mosher-Poland volume.

In nine chapters crammed with data, much of which is in chart or table form the authors consider: Perspective and Public Finances; Trends in Public Spending; Expenditures and the Federal System; Public Revenues; Balancing the Budget; The Public Debt; The Purposes of Public Spending; Public Employment; and The Ecology of Public Finances.

Their presentation is clear and there are many wise insights scattered among the 152 pages of fact-filled text. The discussion of the limited savings likely from improvement in administrative efficiency (p. 147) represents both wisdom and realism. The well-documented statement that "... by every yardstick, the national debt has gone down [since the end of World War II]" is an example of authors' success in dispelling many fiscal myths. Many more examples might be cited to suggest the value of this book. Each chapter, incidentally, concludes with an excellent summary, testifying to the orderliness of presentation.

Criticisms of a book as fine as this one by Mosher and Poland may seem gratuitous, yet the book might have been even better it there had been more than passing references to the politics of fiscal decision-making. In the discussion of "Defense Spending and the Economy" (p. 109) the reader is left to infer the political consequences of the fact that "An unusually large number of the companies that have experienced rapid growth since World War II have been concerned with products for the defense effort." It might similarly have been useful to discuss the political implications of the so-called "trust funds," and the myths associated with them. The politics of Social Security taxation may become a burning issue in the not too distant future when expenditures from the "trust funds" exceed revenues.

With respect to the presentation of state and local data, it might have been useful if distribution ranges and regional differences had been pointed out, in addition to aggregates and averages. Students might have found the charts and tables more interesting, if some "Madison Avenue" touches had been used—perhaps in the style of recent Twentieth Century Fund reports on the American and European economies.

But despite these possible deficiencies, this book is a first rate piece of work. It should find many uses in and out of the classrooms.—Norman Wengert, Wayne State University.

The Miami Metropolitan Experiment. BY EDWARD SOFEN. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963. Pp. vii, 330. \$6.95.)

Among contemporary domestic problems, few are more challenging than planning for metropolitan areas. The difficulties that beset our great cities and their mushrooming suburbs cannot be solved by local communities alone, for governmental functions now cut across boundary lines. They can be resolved only by planning on a metropolitan scale. Most efforts to plan regional services have been pragmatic, taking the form of cooperative arrangements, understandings, or agreements. Sometimes special districts, created to perform a single function, have been superimposed on existing governmental structures.

Such devices have created crazy-quilt patterns of responsibility and authority. In some regions local jurisdictions have proliferated into jungles of local governmental authorities. What is needed, many political scientists believe, is a more sweeping approach, which will assemble the hodge-podge of units in a metropolitan area and fit them together into a new political framework, with adequate power for regional planning.

One of the very few regions that has created a metropolitan-wide unit for coordinating governmental service is Florida's Dade County (the Miami area). That is why Sofen's scholarly and perceptive account of this unique area offers a valuable contribution to our understanding of metropolitan politics and government. Sofen wanted to know how Dade County succeeded in adopting far-reaching structural changes in government, while similar proposals, as well as less drastic plans, had failed in most other areas where they had been introduced. He also wanted to find out how the county officials managed to defeat repeated efforts to dismantle "Metro," as the metropolitan government of Dade County was called, and what problems it had to resolve before it could survive. In providing answers to these important questions, the author includes the political and social background of Dade County, a history of the development and early years of "Metro" in this area, an account of its internecine squabbles and the attempts to emasculate it, and a description of its titanic problems and initial achievements.

Sofen was unusually well qualified to write this volume, the second "Metropolitan Action Study." (This series, sponsored by the University of Indiana, analyzes efforts to change metropolitan governmental institutions.) A member of the University of Miami's Committee on Municipal Research, he has closely followed Metro's development and published analyses of its political, legal, and financial problems in professional journals and research reports. This background enabled him to probe the subject in depth, applying the techniques of political science. For example, Sofen not only describes Metro's evolving mechanism of government, but also presents a detailed analysis of its charter, a summary of court decisions on the subject, and an extended interpretation of the federal system of relationships it established between the county and its twenty-six constituent municipalities. Again, when he describes the stakes of the region's interest groups in metropolitan consolidation, he draws on detailed political behavior surveys conducted by his colleagues in the Government Department of the University of Miami. Many of the sources in this thoroughly documented work required considerable effort to ferret out.

One of the outstanding characteristics of this volume is that it does not confine its analysis to a single area. The typical study of a single region offers the advantages and limitation of a case study. It makes implicit comparisons with other areas, but the reader has to puzzle them out for himself. Relatively few studies of the government and politics of metropolitan areas, however, are available. This underscores the importance of explicit comparisons. Before attempting to explain why Dade County succeeded in creating a viable metropolitan government, Sofen made an intensive study of the literature relating to com-

parable areas. This gave him a sound apperceptive base for drawing conclusions about the Miami area.

The Miami Metropolitan Experiment presents a massive set of relationships, based on an enormously detailed body of source material its author has collected over the years. To read it readily and fluently, however, requires not only a background of political science, but also a thorough familiarity with the politics of Dade County, a combination probably only a handful of students of the Florida scene possess. Fortunately Sofen offers a few guides to this labyrinth of detail, such as chronologies, chapter summaries, and a summing up in his final chapter.

Several decades usually elapse before the initial adoption of a constructive political or social idea; often it requires a full century before it is universally accepted. Political scientists' proposals for drastic governmental reorganization of metropolitan areas, however meritorious, are not likely to obtain immediate widespread acceptance. But when other metropolitan areas seek systems of comprehensive regional planning that are superior to their present patchwork arrangements, they will find valuable lessons in The Miami Metropolitan Experiment.—FREDERICK SHAW, City University of New York.

The Rationing of Justice. By Arnold S. Trebach. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 350. \$10.00.)

This is an important book, both substantively and methodologically. It draws attention to a significant subject to which political scientists have in recent years drawn more and more attention, the problems facing a man who is accused of a crime. At the same time, Dr. Trebach adds to a considerable body of knowledge about the law on this subject, as laid down by legislative bodies and appellate courts, a substantial amount of empirical information.

In the effort to study not merely the law in the books, but also the law in action, Dr. Trebach interviewed many judges, prosecutors, lawyers, prison-keepers and other officials concerned with the administration of criminal justice. But most important of all, he also interviewed a considerable number of prisoners-359 to be precisefrom whom he sought information as to their treatment during the various stages of their difficulties, from arrest to sentence and appeal. Of these prisoners, 245 were in New Jersey institutions, 39 were in a jail in Philadelphia, and 75 were in the federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. While Dr. Trebach draws heavily upon federal rules of criminal procedure, and is quite aware of general tendencies in the criminal law at the state level, he relies largely upon New Jersey law for his local illustrations.

While Dr. Trebach has broken new ground, from the point of view of political science methodology, and while he is to be commended for the imaginative diligence he displayed in pursuing his research, it is difficult to avoid the observation that the author's sample is very small indeed, as he himself repeatedly warns the reader. I suspect that a one-man crime survey is simply a physical impossibility. What this book teaches us-among many other things—is that the time has long since arrived when a truly national crime survey, adequately supported and staffed, is urgently needed if the country is to secure any significant body of reliable information as to what is going on in the field of criminal law administration, as a basis for enlarged public understanding and for reforms in both institutions and procedures. There has been no such national inquest since the old Wickersham Commission, which was created by President Hoover, who was so strongly devoted to the utilization of social science research as a useful tool of government. While Dr. Trebach does not come to this conclusion, though he does come to other useful and interesting conclusions, it seems to me that in many ways this is the basic teaching of this book.

Several propositions stand out crystal clear in this fine study. One is that most of the people who get involved in the toils of the criminal law are poor. As the author puts it, "those most affected by injustice or inefficiency in the criminal process are almost always socially powerless if not insignificant. They stand at the bottom of the social heap." Another is that we still have many unresolved problems in this area which clamor for attention, such as illegal arrest, police violence, eavesdropping, delay, coerced confessions, denial of bail, bad jail conditions and "bargain justice." But the preeminent problem is lack of counsel, and Dr. Trebach makes the significant point that the right to counsel involves many things, including compensation for counsel, the availability of investigative services, assistance during the critically important pre-trial stages, the use of expert witnesses, more adequate discovery procedures, and counsel at the sentencing, appeal and postconviction stages. While the author spells out the inadequacies of the public defender system, which is now used in 184 American counties, he concludes that on the whole it is to be preferred to the assigned counsel system. He also advocates improved professionalization of the police, independent advisory boards to deal with complaints against the police, and some device for over-all supervision, such as the Scandinavian Ombuds-

In many ways this is, in the political science

field, though not in the academic law field, something of a pioneering work. One may hope that other political scientists will continue the work in respect to which Dr. Trebach has made such a good start.—David Fellman, University of Wisconsin.

First Tuesday. BY DAVID WALLACE. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. viii, 328. \$6.00.)

This book reports a survey based on 829 mailed questionnaires representing a 54 per cent response from a sample of registered voters in Westport, Connecticut. Addresses were drawn equally from the official lists of Republican, Democratic, and unaffiliated registrants; the mailing was made in the Spring of 1960. After the election of November, 1960, a short follow-up form was returned by three out of every five of the original 54 per cent.

Westport is an upper income "liberal Republican" town on the perimeter of the New York City commuting circle. According to Wallace, in the 1940's it experienced over a 40 per cent population increase and in the 1950's a 60 per cent increase. In the 1930's and 1940's its normal majority for the Republican presidential candidate was approximately two-thirds. It gave Eisenhower a larger majority than this in both his elections, but in 1958, Abraham Ribicoff, as Democratic candidate for governor, also received more than 50 per cent of the two-party vote in Westport.

Unfortunately, this work is ambiguous as to purpose. Sometimes findings are discussed seemingly to confirm propositions from earlier research by the Michigan or Columbia groups. Sometimes findings are used as a basis for marvelling at the perceptiveness of men like Simmel (p. 254) or Tocqueville (p. 257). The literary style is journalistic, and suggests a lay audience as the target -perhaps the avid library patrons of Westport itself. Mr. Wallace feels it necessary to explain the "socialization" should not be confused with "socialism," "socialized medicine," or other leftish political usages (p. 229). On the other hand, the work is replete with complicated tables presenting the Westport data, with the clear inference that something new has been found there. It is necessary to evaluate the book as a separate social inquiry—not simply as a popular exposition of Westport politics.

One of Wallace's theses seems to be that in this Connecticut town at least, suburban life does not transform Democrats into Republicans. Westport Democrats comprise two principal elements: first, the (old) working-class descendants of Italian Catholics, the lowest income and education groupings in the town (and underrepresented in First Tuesday samples) and, second, the new

"Madison Avenue" group of in-migrants, drawing membership heavily from high SES strata and including most of the suburb's relatively large proportion of Jews (overrepresented by their heavy response to the mailed questionnaires). Insofar as Wallace's data bear on the question of partisan conversion in Westport, he reports that a between-generations shift toward the Republican party did occur among the "old style Catholic, second generation Democrats," and that this is barely offset by the post-1930 Democratic trend among the Jewish migrants to Westport.

Wallace's argument against the Republicanizing tendencies of suburban life is apparently based on his finding that the net shift toward Republican partisanship among Westport respondents has been just about zero-using intergenerational change as the acid test. (No comparison is made with the secular Democratic trend elsewhere and hence there is no rigorous basis for his claim to have refuted the "doctrine of predestined suburban Republicanism.") It is not clear whether his contention is against the view that the suburbs are more Republican in percentage than they were in the 1920's-a view held by few familiar with available voting statistics-or whether he is maintaining that the suburban social climate exerts no decisively Republicanizing effect on newcomers. Chapter III discusses some related questions posed in the relevant literature (especially the political significance of migration to and from urban centers) but without formulating hypotheses to be tested with the Westport data.

The book's subtitle, "Rationality in Voting," suggests a major theme for analysis. But here again the specific contentions of the author are hard to identify. Chapter V seems to propose a nonrational basis for partisan identification. Becoming partisan, like accepting the religion of one's parent, is seen as an "inevitable" part of early socialization. The acquisition of political and religious loyalties is treated by Wallace as strictly analogous, though little beyond statistical parallels can be adduced for such a view. In his summary, after observing that in Westport the "modal Republican" is Protestant and the "modal Democrat" Jewish, Mr. Wallace remarks that "The act of voting is guided by essentially nonrational political partisanship that is culturally transmitted . . . the same as is 'character,' 'breeding,' or any other of the abstruse terms used to describe a cultural heritage." In other words, the effort to explain rationality in voting has been abortive. This is a pleasant book that highlights suburban politics in mid-century without crystallizing any insights into the underlying configurations. - DWAINE MARVICK, University of California (Los Angeles).

Tales Out of Congress. By Senator Stephen M. Young. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964. Pp. 254. \$4.50.)

Senator Young's book is both entertaining and enlightening. He tells of his long and useful public life with disarming and engaging pride. He has fought what he regards as "the good fight" and relishes telling of his victories and "occasional" defeats. But most importantly he offers insights into why he dedicated his life to "the good fight" against poverty and injustice and why his efforts were rewarded with a goodly measure of electoral success in conservative Ohio.

The book was written and published before his victory over Robert A. Taft, Jr. on November 3, 1964. The book, though, helps unravel the mystery of the biggest election upset of that election day. Election analysts who adopt a mode of thinking which they mistakenly associate with the processes of the automatic computers explained his victory in terms of the Lyndon Johnson landslide and Taft's endorsement of an unpopular Republican presidential candidate.

Such analyses overlook the hearts and minds of both the voters and the candidates, and in this case the character of Stephen M. Young. Interestingly, the electronic computers which forecast the results of the election never make such an error. They simply take the vote of a representative part of the state's voters and project the returns on this basis. No black magic is included in the electronic calculations of the vote results and there is no dehumanization of the electorate. The votes placed in the machine are the product of flesh and blood reactions to the candidates, and all the machines could say election night was that the division in Ohio was too close to be predicted. The dehumanizers of the electorate are the commentators who attempt to squeeze out of the final electoral decision every element of rational and irrational calculation of the relative merits of the candidates and reduce it to a kind of "mass mind" reaction to the Johnson-Goldwater race.

Without doubt, the principal element in Young's personality that appeals to Ohioans is his independence. Senator Frank Lausche is also "independent" of political bosses and special interests. However, Young's independence as it emerges from the pages of Tales Out of Congress takes a radically different form from Lausche's. Young's political independence seems due to the fact that he is a "gut" liberal. Throughout Tales Out of Congress he refers to his concern with poverty and injustice. According to Young, his awareness of and concern with injustice was a product of his father's liberal attitudes, and acts of injustice he witnessed as a child, e.g., senseless police brutality directed at helpless people, such as a hobo who was beaten by a town police officer. The most important manifestation of Young's liberalism is his voting record in Congress. However, for Ohioans and the world his fame as a maverick is founded in the letters he writes badtempered constituents. Young takes pride in the letters and devotes a good deal of space in the book to them. Perhaps his most widely known letter is the one in which he helpfully informed a constituent: "I am sending you a letter received this morning, evidently from some crackpot who used your name." Again, when Young was told by a voter that he was the sort of fellow who would enjoy descrating the graves in Arlington Cemetery, the Senator succinctly replied:

"You are a liar."

Young was equally blunt in his correspondence with the officers of pressure groups. For example, when he received a letter from the Americanism Chairman, Hamilton County Council of the American Legion of Ohio "Disapproving and censoring" one of his actions, the senator's reply was as follows:

"Sir

"So—you self-appointed censors and self-proclaimed superduper 100 percent America Firsters censure me. You professional veterans who proclaim your vainglorious chauvinism have the effrontery to issue a press release gratuitously offering an expression of censure and making urgent demand that I cancel a speaking engagement previously made.

"I repudiate your resolution, Buster, and your pompous, selfrighteous, holier-than-thou title of Americanism Chairman! Why don't you read and try to understand that cornerstone of our liberties, the Constitution of the United States?

"If, in your press release, you asserted, or implied that I am likely to become a tool of the Communist apparatus, you are a liar.

"Another thing—why don't you puffed up patriots write my American Legion Post demanding my expulsion? Or, do you self-appointed vigilantes demand that I submit a list of speaking engagements for clearance by your outfit before I, as, a Senator of the United States, open my mouth in public?"

Ohioans laughed when they read Young's letters in the papers—and the laughter was generally with Young and against his enemies. A frequently heard comment was, "Whatever else you say about Young-he sure has guts." By virtue of his letters Young became a personality in Ohio, and his liberalism was given concrete meaningful expression. Senator Young, then, defeated Robert Taft, Jr., in 1964 because many voters respected him as a personality and felt an affinity for his political philosophy as expressed in his letters. Johnson's landslide victory helped Young, but the history of Ohio politics demonstrates that the Ohio voters never hesitate to split their tickets, if they prefer the candidate of the other party, e.g., witness Lausche's landslide victories in the face of Eisenhower's overwhelming electoral triumphs in 1952 and 1956.

In 1958, Lou Harris noted in an analysis of Ohio's voting behavior that it was a source of amazement to him that no Democrat had ever forcefully attacked John Bricker's "reactionary" voting record in Congress. Steve Young proceeded to fill that vacuum and subsequently defeated the "unbeatable" John Bricker. Similarly, in 1964 Stephen Young accomplished the "impossible" by defeating Bob Taft, Jr.

In reality, neither victory was as unpredictable as observers alleged. Bricker was not popular in Ohio. Similarly, the Taft name was never as great a political asset in Ohio as myth would have led us to believe. Bob Taft, Sr., won only one "big"

electoral victory in Ohio, and that was against Joe Ferguson, a candidate of somewhat limited attainments. And in 1962, Bob Taft, Jr. won an impressive victory against a Democratic opponent who was repudiated by both the Ohio Democratic party and his Democratic running mates because of his racist position.

Senator Stephen Young exploded the myths concerning the "political invulnerability" of Taft and Bricker. And these victories symbolize a lifetime devoted to exploding myths and attacking windmills. But when Steve Young attacks a windmill it had best look to its moorings.—John H. Fenton, University of Massachusetts.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Anderson, Lee F. Individuality in Voting in Congress: A Research Note. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1964.

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Africa's Quest for Order. By Fred G. Burke. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. 177. \$4.50.)

If the title of this book emphasizes order (and the search for it) the material is largely devoted to the analysis of change. Mr. Burke, describing the various ways in which change is occurring, emphasizes the transition from a rural to an urban environment, subsistence to commercial enterprise, local to central government, and, more generally, particularism of traditional social life to a more complex all-embracing pattern of overlapping association.

Indeed, disassociation of individuals from one set of institutions and their reassociation in new corporate groups is a central theme of the book. The "order" to which he refers arises out of this process. To emphasize this he chooses Simmel's term, sociation, as the critical variable. The result will be useful for beginning courses on Africa.

For the specialist the book is not very helpful. The sweep is broad but lacking in insight. It does not compare well with Wallerstein's Africa, The Politics of Independence, or Hunter in The New Societies of Tropical Africa. Bohannan and Lucy Mair have covered similar ground with greater knowledge and shrewder judgments. One cannot help wondering why Burke fails to employ the aspects of Simmel's theory dealing with conflict, without which the concept of sociation has little significance. In effect, Burke realizes this. After introducing the idea of sociation, little use is made of it in the substance of the book.

There are a number of irritating small errors such as, reference to Lumumba's tribe (the Otetela or Batetela not Valetla, p. 30). The proof-reading is careless. (For example, the word American is used where African is clearly meant, p. 81). The late Soviet Africanist, Ivan Potekhin is spelled Potemkin. (p. 73)

There are surprising omissions. A discussion of the role of women leaves out any reference to Denise Paulme's Women of Tropical Africa. In the discussion of the city, one of the most interesting and significant, Dakar, is scarcely mentioned. The example of urban redevelopment in Lagos, so carefully analyzed by Peter Marris in Family and Social Change in an African City is not even mentioned. Such books would have been helpful, the sketchiness of an over-view notwithstanding. They contain mature judgments on topics with which the book deals.

The last half of the book suffers considerably when, departing from the earlier effort at analysis, we are treated to a survey of events. The survey should have been more carefully done. For example, it is misleading to say that Mali was not displeased at the breakup of the Mali Federation. Not only were Malien's displeased but they were furious at what appeared to be Senegalese acquiescence to French imperialism.

Sometimes the sequence is confusing. A discussion of the Casablanca group and the association of Guinea, Ghana and Mali (p. 122), fails to make clear the fact that the association had been dissolved at the time of the Addis Ababa Conference. The latter point is made only on p. 138 and in a different context.

In general, however, and despite these criticisms, the book is a useful addition to the growing literature on Africa. Its style is felicitous despite an unfortunate tendency towards misplaced cliches; with Africans "flexing their newly acquired racial and political muscles" (p. 111), and changes in relationships described "heady wine" (p. 112), to choose some examples at random. By far the best material is on East Africa, which Mr. Burke knows best, and that, of course, is to be expected.—David E. Apter, University of California (Berkeley).

Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. By Coleman, James S., and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964, xiii, 730 pp. \$10.00.)

Rarely has a book in the field of African politics been awaited with such anticipation and for so long as Political Parties and National Integration, edited by James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. In the light of the time it took to edit and bring out this massive collective work, it is perhaps not ungracious to have expected that the concepts defined in the introduction and conclusion would have been used more obviously in the individual sections, and that there would have been comparisons within and thus more cumulative impact by the sections themselves. Nonetheless, the volume is an impressive one, and includes a wide range of useful factual material

written clearly and very succinctly.

The framework within which the sections of the book are presented is suggestive in itself. Two-thirds of the work are devoted to what is called "The One-Party Tendency"—surely a considerable understatement—which is divided in turn into "The Pragmatic-Pluralistic Pattern" (Senegal, Ivory Coast—an outstanding piece—Sierra Leone and Cameroun); "The Revolutionary-Centralizing Trend" (Guinea, Mali and Ghana); and "The Control of Nonparty Groups" (Voluntary Associations, Trade Unions, Traditional Rulers, and Students).

The other third carries virtually the same title as the book as a whole, "Parties and National Integration." It has a number of subsections whose titles are more suggestive; under "The Transformation of Historic Oligarchies" are Liberia and Zanzibar, of which the latter's transformation, considered briefly in a postscript, has gone a great deal farther then Mr. Lofchie could have guessed at the time of writing and "The Expansion in Political Scale" deals with Somali-where more could have been done with the fact that there is a genuine cultural nationalism, closer to that of the European or Arab-Middle Eastern pattern than is found elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa with Congo (Leopoldville)where events have far outstripped and unhappily overlaid the description provided—and with Nigeria. Several, though not all of these countries have been treated along somewhat the same lines in other recent collections, or as with the Ivory Coast, Cameroun, and Nigeria, in far greater detail by the authors who handle them in this volume. The justification for their appearance here is in part the fact that this volume was planned so much earlier, but possibly more so because the experience of particular countries illustrates specific types of regimes and development.

Since Professor Coleman and Professor Rosberg are both well known for their pioneering efforts at system making with the somewhat intractable material of African politics, the introduction and conclusion attract particular attention. Both are stimulating though it may be questioned whether the sophisticated terms that are used do not sometimes confuse more than they illuminate. This is the more so since the descriptions, as for example of the four patterns of oligarchic situations, are so spare and refined that they do not transmit the full meaning which lies behind them. Indeed, there is enough in these last thirty-five pages of conclusion to expand into a useful and stimulating "Government and Politics in Africa" that might fill one of the more noticeable gaps in the literature of this area.

The American scholarly study of Africa coincided to considerable degree with the rise of the

behavioral sciences in this country. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the newer tools of scientific and theoretical analysis have been tried out in conjunction with African studies. What is still needed-and what, perhaps too optimistically, had been hoped for from this work-is a pervading quality of theoretical analysis that goes beyond the efforts made to date. Instead Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa joins the other solid, competent studies with which we have been favored in the past few years, to some degree distinguished by the analysis of its editors, and occasional original summations by its authors, but destined like the others to become outdated by passing events. Is it too much to hope that the insights of classical theory and the solid accomplishments of political history may be joined one of these days to the imaginative conceptualization of behavioralism to produce a new framework of analysis and understanding that encompasses those elements of African life that are relatively untouched by contemporary politics as well as those fragile aspects that can alter so sharply and noticeably with changing events?—Gwendolen M. Carter, Northwestern University.

The New Liberia: A Historical and Political Survey. By LAWRENCE A. MARINELLI. (New York: Praeger, 1964. Pp. 228. \$5.95.)

This laudatory and largely uncritical account of the regime of President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia is published under the auspices of the Africa Service Institute of New York. Mr Marinelli dismisses the central problem of Liberian society, the relationship between the 90 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture and the fractional ruling elite of Monrovia, in terms of personal impressions gained during his visit to the country. "Has the Unification Policy really been effective? Has it really improved the lot of the tribal people? Has it really brought a change in the attitudes of the Americo-Liberians toward their tribal country men? Based upon several months of research and first hand observation, this writer must reply in the affirmative." Regrettably, Marinelli does not present sufficient evidence on which judgment could be made as to whether the ambitious health, education and economic projects of the Tubman regime have substantially improved the living conditions of the tribal majority. Some years ago infant mortality figures in "bush" villages were reported as touching on 80 per cent. Current vital statistics are missing from this work though account is given of the number of hospitals constructed and the measure of success reached in the control of yaws, leprosy and small pox through campaigns undertaken by the World Health Organization. Also missing are Labor and Income statistics that might assist in elucidating specific ways in which the majority of the people benefit from the exploitation of Liberian resources. However non statistical appendices, containing Tubman's speeches and correspondence together with the text of the Liberian Constitution, amount to 82 pages as against 146 pages of text. Marinelli may prove correct in his major contention that the Tubman Open Door Policy-basically a foreign concession policy-"is an important model for the continent wide progress of emerging Africa." Certainly the private sector of United States power and influence has committed itself fully to this viewpoint in Liberia. The French observers, Pierre and Renée Gosset in their book, L'Afrique, les Africains, describe Liberia as "esclave et enclave du dollar." Witticisms and visitors' impressions aside, a requirement exists for an objective review of the consequences of the flow of external capital into the Liberian economy. If a resulting breakthrough in social development for the bulk of the population is indicated, then the system will stand justified despite accusations of neo-colonialism. On the other hand if an oligarchy is being entrenched and enriched contrary to the interests of the common people, United States policies, both private and governmental, may founder in another Zanzibar-type revolt. Raymond Leslie Buell's pioneer work in Liberia, a century of survival, deserves updating in line with its scholarly standards from the abundance of statistical and sociological material now available. Marinelli writes as an advocate for President Tubman, unquestionably a key figure of singular attainments in the existing Liberian situation. A useful chapter is devoted to Tubman's skilful diplomacy in the interplay of African states. In a brief Introduction, Leopold Senghor expresses his esteem. Liberia, under Tubman, enjoys a respected place amid the turmoil of African affairs, providing American interests and influence with a favorable base on the Continent. It would be regrettable if our investment in capital and prestige were squandered through lack of objective analysis of underlying social and political conditions.—Thomas R. ADAM, New York University.

The Crisis of British Government in the 1960s. BY BERNARD CRICK. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964. Pp. 274. 36/-.)

This is an excellent book which, within its self-chosen limitations, can scarcely be praised too highly. Dr. Crick has a natural and rare aptitude for combining theory with its application to practical affairs of state. Supplemented by seven factual appendices, on, e.g., 'The Work of the House of Lords,' the book concludes with a chapter, 'What is to be Done?', itself carrying ten recommendations. That "British government and

politics is British government and politics" (recommendation 10) may seem somewhat Gertrude Steinish but, after the recent Conservative Party Blackpool Conference, many a British politician (including Mr. Reginald Maudling) has cause to reflect on the wisdom of the remark here that "much of politics is the art"—and the luck also—"of being present at the right time." That "Parliament serves to inform the electorate, not to overthrow Governments" (No. 1) is provocative and controversial. That "technical and expert advice is more and more necessary to modern government but is more and more open to opinion and interpretation" is close to the core of Dr. Crick's theme.

The privileges of Parliament are archaic, arbitrary and excessive. The British Constitution is 700 years old and not good. This is not only because, under the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament, "there are no overriding legal restraints whatever upon a British Government's actions" set by the people-admittedly interference with the judiciary is regarded with disfavour, even when it keeps for sizable lengths of time probable thugs in prison without trial. It is indeed, as Blackstone says, "an extraordinary tribunal." The issue is not even whether the power of the Prime Minister has increased, is increasing and should be reconsidered. At present, as in the last days of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, he can remain in office, not because he has a popular mandate, but because he knows that he hasn't, and bides his time. (In one respect indeed the power of Members against Ministers has recently increased: they debate decisions in Foreign Affairs. As late as Asquith this was considered a 'mystery of State,' not for their eyes, but to be agreed secretly by a few of 'the King's Ministers.' The Union of Democratic Control did something to end that.) The system is bad because it is a mix-up between the principle of local representatives coming to Westminster to agree to taxes, in return for redress of local grievances, and the need in a highly technical age for an Executive competent to rule its Civil Service, but which yet appreciates what the expert issues are. The requirements can be sharply different. The answer is the usual British one: "The muddle works." Does it? That is one of Dr. Crick's questions. Another real issue is the relations of Premier and Party (a far more formidable, nationally organized body than in the States).

Dr. Crick argues that, as a fact, "governing has now become a prolonged election campaign." Much of this indeed will be carried on outside Parliament, through media where the little unelected Popes of Broadcasting can quiz senior Ministers in a fashion no back-bencher would dare to attempt. "The public must know all." An

appendix to this book discusses TV in Parliament and "powdered Parliamentary faces."

Is, then, the government of a great nation to be conducted like a perpetual political rag-market? "Corruption," writes Dr. Crick, "exists wherever the function of a government is held to be reduced to one overwhelming consideration: political survival." Many people today would so far agree with Dr. Crick about this inflated importance of party victory in the brawl of political football as to hold: (a) that we are democrats, and alone pure democrats, in judging that polls, plebiscite and direct TV appeal are indeed "the chief procedural invention of the democratic era," and that the graph of these political consumer polls must be watched, but not servilely followed; (b) that of respect for these polls an elected Parliament is the watchdog, moving in decent fear of constituents; (c) that, as in Switzerland, Cabinets should be enduring coalitions of elected professionals, conducting the nation's business on the basis of a sought consensus, proportional to the Parliamentary representation; (d) that rival Party shops, stocked with salesmen and even 'fans' (or fanatics) may be well enough, but that this should not obscure the prior importance of the sober and efficient transaction of the nation's business. This book is a sprightly plea, scholarly but light-hearted, for the Reform of the Mother of Parliaments. The question is whether this very elderly lady has the least desire to be reformed.— GEORGE E. G. CATLIN, London.

Australian Party Politics. By James Jupp. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 235. \$7.50.)

The ten chapters of this study fall logically into three parts: brief general surveys of party history and party background; discussions of each party; the two final chapters analyzing "The Party Machine" and "Australian Politics."

Australian politics has been characterized by dissension and confusion. Only the Australian Labor Party has a continuous history of more than fifty years. The author gives coherence to what might otherwise appear chaotic by stressing three points: the trend from loose, personal alliances battling over narrow issues in the colonial period to "national politics organized by mass parties on domestic and international issues"; the importance of the tradition of "colonial radicalism" which, although waning, is inherited to some extent by all present-day parties; and lastly, the influence of events outside Australia upon the crises which have precipitated periodic realignments. The discussion of the environmental factors affecting Australian politics is illuminating. What appears to be a homogeneous society is torn by sectional, sectarian and separatist tendencies. These, coupled with the federal structure and tensions between "town and country capital" generate conflicts within the parties which are often more significant than those between them.

It is impossible here to do justice to the discussion of the machinery, inner conflicts and policies of each of the parties which makes up the central half of the volume. The material is rich, the treatment is well-balanced and perceptive, the theses developed in the earlier chapters are fully illustrated, and the author builds up a strong case for the conclusions which follow.

The final chapters are an acute analysis of the party machines and their effect on democratic processes. The similarities in party machinery and the influence of the A.L.P. upon its rivals are stressed. Labor is still the most extreme advocate of parliamentary subservience to the party machine, but the gap between it and the other parties has narrowed in the last fifty years. The Country Party has adopted many of its methods as well as much of its machinery. And even the Liberal Party has adopted some of the relationship between parliamentarians and party which its predecessors attacked so violently. The author concludes that all parties have become machines for providing access to power rather than "movements striving after ideals." For the last forty years the power base of each party has been stabilized in certain geographical areas and occupational groups. Mr. Jupp is at his best in analyzing the groups supporting each party, and in pointing out features of the electoral system and social structure which have encouraged this stability. Preoccupied with power, the parties are barren of new ideas and it is difficult to discuss them in terms of "progress" and "reaction," "left" and "right." Within them bitter conflicts take place among "power" and "interest" groups with little ideological significance. Because of this the parties are not attracting new members and gradually their mass-base is being eroded.

In his critique of Australian parties the author concedes that they have gone a long way toward channeling regional and social differences into two coherent parliamentary followings. But insofar as they are "transmission belts" it is between organized interests and the government rather than between the party's mass support and the government. Lacking interest in policymaking, the parties have failed to provide the machinery and the climate which encourage discussion of ideas and generally favor "practical" men rather than "intellectuals." Only in the federal secretariat of the Liberal Party is there any serious attempt at coherent formulation of policy. As the parties fail to attract mass support and translate it into influence on the government,

initiative in policy-making comes from organized interests and the contest between parties becomes a struggle of interests to allocate the nation's resources. What troubles the writer about this is not its "pragmatism" but that it is "irrational. aimless and conservative," and that it leaves the parties so ill-prepared to cope with pressing issues of foreign policy being forced upon them from outside Australia. Parties do not remain static and Mr. Jupp suggests several interesting marginal realignments as possible. But whatever direction these take, two changes seem certain: the development of "centralist" tendencies, and the greater dependence on professional staffs by central party executives. The author even suggests that reliance on technicians may reach the point where the parties will become "public relations agencies for the parliamentarians," thus completely reversing the tradition that the politician is the servant of the party.

Mr. Jupp has given us an excellent interpretative study based upon recent research which helps fill in many gaps in our knowledge of Australian parties. One may not agree with him throughout, but one cannot quarrel with the consistency of his interpretation or the scholarship with which he supports his points. It is a study which demonstrates the rapid progress made in the field of political science in Australia since World War II, and which suggests trends well worth exploring in studies of parties in other democracies. A critical bibliography would have been a welcome addition, especially to overseas scholars.—Louise Overacker, Professor Emeritus, Wellesley College.

The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945-1962.

BY WILLIAM P. SNYDER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 284. \$6.25.)

In the dust-jacket's claim of "a definitive study of a complex and neglected subject," there is only the usual publisher's exaggeration. It would be surprising to have a definitive work on the politics of any nation's recent defense policy. The subject is new and by no means entirely open to scholarly scrutiny. Even more often than in other policy-making areas, defense decisions of a democratic government—not to mention those of a nondemocratic government—are made for reasons concealed from public view. It is even difficult to know whether the reasons derive from domestic pressures, economic or political, or from strategic responses to external circumstances.

It says much, therefore, for Snyder that he has written a good and useful book on a subject about which we would like to know much more. Trained both as a West Point officer and as a political scientist, Snyder writes knowledgeably on defense

policy itself as well as on British politics. While well-balanced in every respect, the work conveys a tone of general approval of the British policymaking process. Certainly Snyder criticizes that process less than many recently fashionable commentators on British institutions, but this is not because of any ignorance of the pressures now widely believed to influence British governmental decisions no less than American. Snyder simply recognizes conflicting pressures as part, indeed as a useful part, of the decision-making process. Neither the pressure nor any other part of the process is held responsible for deficiencies in British defense. If there are such deficiencies (and Snyder appears to think that there is a gap between British commitments and the conventional forces to fulfill those commitments), he attributes the deficiencies to a conflict between military policy and other national goals. In other words, Britain has not been spending enough on defense, or enough on conventional as opposed to nuclear deterrent defense. Yet Snyder does not argue that Britain should spend more. Instead he presents data indicating the relatively large British program. Even in 1960 defense expenditures were seven per cent of the gross national product, and they were as high as twelve per cent during the Korean war.

The British defense policy of 1945-1962 is fairly labelled an "alliance-deterrence strategy," replacing the nation's older "maritime-intervention strategy." The new policy is clearly described and evaluated, but this aspect of the book is less original than the effort to show how the policy has been made. Snyder discusses the influence of parliament, the articulate public, pressure groups (notably industrial groups), policy elites, and service departments. He also takes into account the limits fixed by Britain's balance-of-payments problem and related economic difficulties. His main observations under each of these headings are within the now standard view of the British governmental process, and what Snyder has to say is an important contribution to our knowledge of that process. Thus he shows that parliament, while possessed of limited information and at any rate excluded from direct policy-making participation, remains an influence if only because of ministerial responsiveness to backbench pressure. Similarly, while emphasizing the extent to which decisions are actually made by the executive authority, Snyder makes it clear that there is a great deal of bargaining within this executive authority before the decision is made. He is at his most interesting when he tells us even a little about this bargaining and especially about the role of the service departments, often backed by their respective industrial suppliers, in making the bargains. There is the important suggestion that the navy and air force, with stronger links to

private manufacturers, fare better than the army, which receives much of its equipment from royal ordnance factories.—Leon D. Epstein, *University of Wisconsin*.

The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. By Peter G. J. Pulzer. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. 364. n.p.)

How hard it must be to lay aside one's feelings on a subject as emotion-laden as anti-Semitism and write a book with restraint and clinical objectivity. But Peter Pulzer, lecturer in politics at Oxford University, has achieved this objective. Not that he withholds his views entirely and provides the reader only with sets of facts; on the contrary, his sophisticated analyses and interpretations lend substance to the distressing and depressing subject.

The author traces the roots and the development of anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, with primary emphasis on the period from 1867 to 1914. His chief contribution lies in unearthing and tapping private archive papers and documents hitherto not used, and then weaving these into a fabric of the history of the movement. He demonstrates the remarkable parallels between German and Austrian anti-Semitism, and devotes much space to the latter since it has been less fully discussed in other writings.

The pre-World War I epoch was selected because despite few significant successes on the part of the anti-Semites, their ideology "penetrated the general stock of political thinking and undermined the acceptance of the liberal values of the nineteenth century." Pulzer's thesis is that anti-Semitism represented a reaction to Western rationalism and liberalism, to capitalism and urban civilization: "It is a revolt, not of the sentimental idealist or the hardheaded reformer, but of the dionysiac element in man, a hunger for precivilized standards of conduct."

In this "cult of the grass roots" the movement's political foundations were laid in the 1870's, followed by an era of uncertainty in the 1880's, and some successes in the 1890's. The author deals at length with such men as Adolf Stöcker and Otto Böckel in Germany and Karl Lueger in Austria who attempted to gain mass followings by writing tracts, and organizing meetings and political parties. What is remarkable is the failure of many respectable elements of society to resist their exhortations and their irrational arguments. It was the support of members of the clergy and the middle and lower middle classes which propelled Lueger into the mayoralty of Vienna in 1897 and which kept him in power until his death in 1910. While Lueger's victory can be attributed partially to the resentment of many people against the economic position of the Jews, his maintenance in power can also be attributed to his skill

in politics and his dabbling in municipal socialism. Other leaders had less political success than Lueger, and around the turn of the century the movement became dormant as the old generation of leaders disappeared.

If the anti-Semitic movements had been only the product of a few obscure fanatics during the nineteenth century, they might be relegated to the pages of history, but unfortunately the ideology on which they were based permeated other sectors of society: the nationalist and pan-German movements, the university community (including dueling fraternities, student organizations and academicians, e.g. Heinrich von Treitschke), and in the early period even European socialist parties. Later when the German Social Democrats became staunch foes of anti-Semitism, their Marxist ideology blinded them in their forecasts: "The solution of the Jewish question, like that of all other problems, would be provided by the coming of Socialism, which would not only remove the economic basis of anti-Semitism but do away with the separate identity of the Jews." August Bebel even commented that anti-Semitism would never decisively influence German politics.

Pulzer argues in the epilogue, dealing with the period 1914-1938, that such forecasts proved wrong and that anti-Semitism made relatively more headway in Germany and Austria than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, because in the latter liberal ideas and institutions had become an integral part of the open and relatively mobile society. In the former, members of the professional and small and middle business community did not accept liberalism, and vented their frustrations and difficulties on members of the financial-capitalist elite, many of whom were Jews. Religious and "racial" biases compounded the hate.

The schisms in Germany and Austria and the "ravings of obscure sects," however, would not have led to the final catastrophe if it had not been for the political and economic crisis, accentuated by "sins of commission and omission," and finally by the Nazis who, unlike earlier anti-Semites, actually engated in mass violence and sadism.

If any criticism is to be made of the book it lies in the scope of its narrative. The reader could have judged the movement in a wider context if some space had been devoted to the relative power of anti-Semitic movements in other countries during the same era, and more space to the power of forces opposed to anti-Semitism in the two countries under review.

To interested political scientists and historians this book is recommended as an important social documentary. To the racists wherever they may be this book should be required reading to make them aware of the consequences of their preachments of hate.—Gerard Braunthal, University of Massachusetts.

Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republic. Vol. 1 Die Periode der Konsolidierung und der Revision des Bismarckschen Reichsaufbaus 1919-1930. By Gerhard Schulz. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1963. Pp. 678, n.p.)

The profusion of subtitles of this book indicates that Schulz had difficulties in determining exactly its subject matter. Did the author want to write the political or the administrative history of the Weimar Republic? Or was he mainly concerned with one particular aspect of both: the practice of German federalism under the Weimar Republic? At any rate, using very profitably the mass of hitherto unknown official documents and autobiographical material, Schulz begins by presenting various plans and projects for the future constitutional and administrative organization of the Weimar Republic, as seen from the vantage point of the closing days of 1918 and the first half of 1919. In this period the bureaucracy, which had remained intact from before the war, and its new social democratic rulers found an easy meeting ground in their common desire to uphold and defend continuity and order against all suspicious attempts to experiment with new forms of organization. It was not only Kurt Eisner who-to quote a famous dictum of Meinecke-slipped into the temporarily empty mansion of the Bayarian state. In his later chapters the author demonstrates convincingly how Eisner's more skillful Prussian colleague, Otto Braun, without the burden of any intellectual baggage, and more favored by circumstances of time and place, performed successfully a similar feat.

Once the framework of the Reich-Laender organization had been re-established, even without Bismarck's effective linkage of the Reich and Prussian political and administrative machinery at the command level, the question of its adequacy for the political life of the new state arose. To answer this question the author is compelled to describe in some detail much of the history of the political conflicts of the early twenties. His survey includes the occupation of Saxony and Thuringia by the Reichswehr, the effective ejection of their deviant governments, and the tortuous methods by which the military, political, and bureaucratic leaderships of the Reich and of Bayaria were able to reach an accommodation. His description frequently corrects previous more partisan and partial accounts.

To this part belongs the story of the divisive and unitary tendencies present in both the Rhein and the Ruhr, and described for the first time, as having occurred in East Prussia as well. The author's presentation continues to emphasize both thrust and counterthrust tendencies affecting the rights of various bureaucratic apparatuses, and making their influence felt through constitutional formulae, ministers' and civil servants' memos, conferences and committees.

In evaluating Schulz's first volume, it is important to differentiate between the early period and the period of consolidation from 1924 to 1928. During the earlier years the history of federalism is so closely interwoven with substantive problems of the period that constitutional theorems and bureaucratic strategems appear simply as byproducts of major political and social struggles. But with the beginnings of consolidation in 1924, those in power in the territorial governmental units became actors in their own right. Therefore, if one considers the staying power of the administrative structure, the later period is the more revealing. For despite the impetus received from the financial plight of the Laender, reform of the Federal structure was frustrated by the resistance of the Prussian S.P.D. leadership. The author shows convincingly how at that late stage Prussian political leaders lost interest in a Prussian-Reich merger which could not guarantee them a permanent share of political power.

Whatever one might think of the author's organization of his material, his book will long remain indispensable for the analysis of two problems: 1) the relative weakness of federal structures in dealing with major problems of a socially heterogeneous society; 2) the conditions and chances of successful collaboration between higher bureaucracy and the conservative leadership of various mass parties and protest movements.—

Отто Кірсннеімев, Columbia University.

Il clero di riserva. By Gianfranco Poggi. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1963.)

Il clero di riserva (The Auxiliary Clergy), subtitled Studio sociologico sull' Azione Cattolica Italiana durante la presidenza Gedda (A Sociological Study of Italian Catholic Action During the Gedda Presidency), is an analysis of how the structure and functioning of Italian Catholic Action in the years preceding 1958 prevented it from achieving the goals set by the Church. It is a very good analysis of the particular Italian situation and a contribution to our understanding of the relationship between structure and goals in a church-related association.

The author, formerly at the University of Florence and now teaching at a university in the U.K., is well qualified by background and training to undertake this study; it originated as a doctoral dissertation in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Poggi worked with Professor Joseph La Palombara in his study of Italian interest groups and had access to his

materials and interviews dealing with Catholic Action. Il clero di riserva, however, does not focus on Catholic Action in politics. Nor is the author primarily interested in Catholic Action as an organization.

His concern is rather with the interaction among the organization, the Church, and the larger society. It is his principal thesis that the use of Catholic Action by the Church as a defense mechanism, an auxiliary clergy shielded from the main stream of Italian life by an emphasis on rigid individual morality and complete subordination to the hierarchy, prevents it from performing its historical mission of serving as the church's vital link with a rapidly changing and increasingly secular society. Instead of being an extension of the church in the secular world it is a means of selecting out the more pious elements and detaching them from the main stream of developments. As a result, the teachings of Catholic Action and the church are largely irrelevant to contemporary Italian problems.

In presenting his argument the author shows how the internal structure of Catholic Action serves to detach the member from many important contacts and experiences of his age group. The principal organizations of Catholic Action divide members by age and sex on the basis of the parish or diocese. Diocesan organization groups all social classes together; the author believes that separate organizations for young workers, as in France and Belgium, would be more effective. Apart from the four large organizations for men. women, young men, and young women, there are specialized organizations for university students, university graduates, and school teachers (associations for workers, farmers and other specific categories are outside Catholic Action proper).

At all levels in these organizations the real power rests with priests and, ultimately, the Vatican. Although laymen occupy important positions, they are closely controlled by the clergy. The absence of lay initiative leads to sterility in ideas and a lack of dynamism. The more creative and able, even among practicing Catholics, tend to leave Catholic Action or never to join. As a result it is a recruiting ground for religious orders and the Christian Democratic party; but it does not achieve its goal of penetrating society as the example of Catholic adaptation to the modern world, for it "does not take seriously the things of this world." Its too close ties with the church, its limited adaptability, and the authoritarian proclivities of Gedda were primarily responsible for this lack of success.

This study does not attempt to evaluate the changes which have taken place since 1958. Under Pope John XXIII Italian Catholic Action took on a new image and Gedda was replaced as

president. As Dr. Poggi points out, the Gedda line had met important opposition even within Catholic Action and the church hierarchy. The situation is now considerably altered from that analyzed in *Il clero di riserva*.

The basic questions asked by Dr. Poggi remain. How can one organization sponsor another without dominating it? How can a highly hierarchical church adapt to an age of political democracy and lay participation? How can a traditional organization such as the church engage in adaptive and dynamic action in an increasingly secular world? Certainly the church has done a better job of adapting in numerous countries than in Italy. The closeness of the Vatican, its interest in Italian affairs, the fear of communism in Italy, and the close ties between the church and dominant Italian elites have caused Italian Catholicism to lag far behind in coming to grips with the modern world. Perhaps the era described by Dr. Poggi was the last of its kind and the fresh views of Pope John XXIII will come to dominate in Italy. Certainly the Gedda leadership of Catholic Action, however, fitted neatly into the spirit of Italian Catholicism. A new approach will have to overcome not only the opposition of much of the Italian hierarchy but also the restraining influence of the ingrained habits and attitudes of Italian society itself.—Samuel H. Barnes, University of Michigan.

Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg. By Jens Jeppesen and Poul Meyer. (Aarhus: Aarhus University Institute of Political Science, 1964. Pp. 105.)

This distinguished study of electoral turnout in Denmark uses both official voting statistics since 1909 and survey data from the parliamentary elections of 1957 and 1960. Since Danish voting statistics, like those throughout Northern Europe, are comprehensive as well as of long standing, the raw material is almost overwhelming. Jeppesen and Meyer have, however, with considerable conceptual sophistication, made intellectually interesting a study which of necessity consists mostly of statistical tables.

These tables demonstrate that a remarkably high proportion of the Danish electorate votes regularly. Since the 1939 election the turnout for parliamentary elections (Jeppesen and Meyer make valuable comparisons with turnout in Danish local elections, as well as in parliamentary elections in West Germany and Sweden, and in local and parliamentary elections in Norway) has remained above—generally well above—80%. In 1957, for instance, the turnout was 83.7% and in 1960, 85.8%. Significantly, the highest turnout (89.5%) was in 1943, when Denmark was oc-

cupied by German troops, and voting became even more meaningful as an act of national commitment. The number of Danes who never vote in parliamentary elections is very small; the number who vote in some but not all parliamentary elections is substantial. Participation in elections increases with age until a relatively late age-for men. until sixty or seventy years of age, and for women somewhat earlier. Those who would be more likely to vote only irregularly, or not at all, include women, the youngest and oldest voting ages, and rural residents. The greatest differences between voters and non-voters, however, are in marital status. Married men vote more often than married women, who vote more often than single men, who vote more often than single women. Least likely to vote of all Danes are single women, either very young or very old, living in rural areas isolated from Copenhagen, the center of political life. Supporting recent Norwegian and Swedish findings, Jeppesen and Meyer conclude that separated and divorced persons have the lowest electoral turnout. Unmarried men vote much less often than widowed men, but unmarried women vote a little more often than widows. In Denmark, as elsewhere, the self-employed vote more often than wage-earners, higher employees more often than lower employees, and skilled workers more often than unskilled workers. High-status members of Danish communities, especially in rural areas, apparently obey a social norm according to which they are expected to vote regularly.

Regional differences in electoral turnout in Denmark are relatively small. Among the few exceptions to this geographical uniformity were the 1935 and 1939 elections in Southern Jutland, where the threat presented by National Socialist Germany was especially evident. To explain that degree of geographical variation in turnout which does exist, Jeppesen and Meyer argue that electoral turnout is inversely correlated with the distance of the electoral district from Copenhagen. This hypothesis proves valid for rural areas, but not for larger cities. The authors suggest that in these cities a special urban electoral milieu is created, which is completely independent of the adjoining rural milieu. With continuing urbanization of Denmark, there will be presumably even further reduction in geographical differences in electoral turnout. Social location is clearly more important than spatial location, and social distance is more important than spatial distance. Neither of these distances, of course, is very great in Denmark. The dominant impression one receives from this study is the national uniformity of electoral turnout. In this important respect, as in so many others, the Danes have come as close to achieving a true political community as is perhaps possible in this imperfect world.—Marvin Rintala, Boston College.

History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. By IVAN AVAKUMOVIC. (Aberdeen: The Aberdeen University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 207, Vol. One, 60s.)

The first volume of this projected series on the history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia launches a truly monumental project, even if the first installment is only slender in size and restricted in scope. The author, a native of Yugoslavia, who left his country and was subsequently educated in Scotland and at Canadian universities, is currently a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. He is uniquely qualified to write the definitive history of Tito's Communist movement since he is completely conversant with, and seems to have excellent access to, the original documentary materials dealing with the Party and its rapidly changing leadership.

Volume One focuses on the 1914-1941 period. beginning with the years of World War I and stretching to the spring of 1941 when the German invasion of Yugoslavia heralded not only the advent of an inevitable World War II, but also the emergence of a Communist nucleus in the forefront of the country's resistance struggle. Despite the voluminous documentation of the earlier period, this reviewer found the story more interesting (and more relevant to the current Eastern European scene) as the late nineteen thirties are being discussed in terms of the rise of Tito and the factional inner-strife of the Comintern hierarchy. This impression also suggests that subsequent volumes will be increasingly important contributions to scholarly work on Balkan politics, and possibly of more appeal to the general public and college students alike. The first volume is clearly a specialist's book written for fellow-specialists.

The study is lucidly organized into four central parts; although each section is a chronological slice of Yugoslav Communist history, it also has a definite main theme running through that particular period. Thus we witness the "years of legality" (1919-1920, in which the Socialist movement crystallized between the Social Democrats and a small Communist group); the "years of semi-legality" (1921-1928, marked by bitter infighting on the Communist "home-front" and bewilderingly contradictory instructions from Stalin through various Balkan Comintern specialists); the "years of illegality" (1929-1936, when King Alexander's royal dictatorship and efficient secret police succeeded in breaking apart the burgeoning Communist Party while imprisoning its leaders), and finally the years of "Popular Front Tactics" (1937-1939, when Tito gradually assumed the center of the small CP stage to the exclusion of everyone else). Finally, an all-too brief chapter deals with the onrush of the "Second Imperialist War" which engulfs both protagonists and bystanders, both Royalists and Stalinists alike.

In specific terms, the book's highlights include a discussion of an interesting Yugoslav Communist call for a general strike as early as December 1920, to be carried out by the Communist trade unions (p. 49 et seq.); an ideologically significant argument with the Comintern as to whether the Yugoslav Communists were ready and able (in the 1920's) to profit from the Bolshevik experience and organize a "successful revolution in Yugoslavia" (p. 57), and the first membership purge carried out by Tito in the 1937-1938 period when he proceeded to shake up the Croatian and Serbian CP members with the full blessing and support of Moscow's Comintern leadership (p. 137). Indeed, the Comintern authorization was so broad, giving Tito "the task of pursuing the purge of all alien, vacillating elements from the Party." that one could date the origins of this man's monolithic rule over the CPY from this 1938 order.

The volume ends with a social and economic analysis of the crucial 1939-1941 transition years which saw the CPY assume a defeatist, anti-Western attitude in foreign policy, while accelerating at home the drive to recruit members in Belgrade University, in the secondary schools of the major cities and in the various literary societies. This period is characterized even more interestingly, and certainly with more eloquence, in Milovan Djilas' Land Without Justice which reported on his own "capture" by Communism as a young high school and college student. Everyone concerned with Communism and with Central-Eastern European politics will look forward to subsequent volumes by Dr. Avakumovic.-ANDREW GYORGY, Boston University.

World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith. By RICHARD LOWENTHAL. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xxii, 296. \$6.00.)

Richard Lowenthal has put together in this volume a number of essays which have previously appeared in *Problems of Communism, Encounter, The China Quarterly*, and various German magazines and journals. When most of these articles were first published, there was less agreement among specialists on World Communism that this movement was in such a highly fissionable state. Commencing his discussion with the unsuccessful Soviet attempt to return Tito to the Communist fold and ending with an epilogue on the events in

the summer of 1963 on the Sino-Soviet split, Lowenthal takes the reader through a fascinating chain of events plaguing the Communist bloc. The author analyzes the significant XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of February 1956, which might be regarded as the beginning of the split in the bloc under Khrushchev. By admitting separate roads to "Socialism," the Soviet leader took the lid off to Pandora's box. Since then, the Soviet bloc has not been the monolith which it once was, Khrushchev had hoped that this new freer discussion would usher in an ideological rebirth of Soviet and international communism. It did the opposite. Chaos, insubordination, and ideological warfare have followed. The book is especially good on the 1959, 1960, and 1961 periods of the breakup of world communism.

Khrushchev's advocacy of peaceful coexistence was one of the divisive forces separating Moscow and Peking. Enunciated at the XX Party Congress in February 1956, this disputed doctrine has been ever present in the ideological tug of war between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Khrushchev's trip to the United States in September 1959 and his efforts in behalf of a summit conference without China contributed to the furthering of the rift which became increasingly more acute with each new month. Khrushchev's policies of the reduction of Soviet armed forces in early 1960 and his expressed willingness for discussion of controls for a nuclear test ban contributed to the feeling on the part of the Chinese that Khrushchev was letting them down. The U-2 incident made the attempt at a summit conference abortive but the Russians did not lessen their ideological pronouncements of peaceful coexistence. At the December 1960 meeting of the eighty-one Communist parties, Khrushchev said, "Peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems does not mean reconciliation between the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies an intensification of the struggle of the working class, and of all Communist parties for the triumph of socialist ideas . . . Peace is the true ally of socialism, for time is working for socialism and against capitalism." The Khrushchev formula of avoiding international wars but justifying wars of national liberation was a Soviet-proffered ideological compromise with the Chinese—a compromise which Mao could not accept.

On the leadership question of the international Communist movement, the 1960 declaration indicated the failure to have a single Communist center. The 1957 Moscow declaration implied that there was such a center, the USSR. By December of 1960, there was admitted the existence of two actual centers of Communist

authority, Moscow and Peking, because Khrushchev had asked "for the omission of the flattering formula placing the Soviet Union 'at the head of the Socialist camp' and the CPSU 'at the head of the Communist world movement'." But by the XXII Congress of the CPSU in 1961, Khrushchev was openly defied by the Chinese Communists. This forced him in Lowenthal's opinion to wipe out the last symbolic remnants of Stalinism, including the removal of his body from the sacred position of repose in the mausoleum in Red Square. The Chinese had persisted in backing the defeated Stalinist remnants in the USSR and in the Soviet bloc. The Chinese refused to accept the expulsion of Albania from the Communist camp and flouted Khrushchev by laving a wreath on Stalin's tomb.

Lowenthal discusses some of the various repercussions of this schism. He predicts that some individual Communist parties will become less dependent on Moscow while remaining as national Communist totalitarian states. Rumania's recent independence from the USSR by going its own way economically and ideologically, has borne out this prediction. Lowenthal believes that the most marked new results of the schism will come within the USSR itself, in the Soviet Communist Party. Khrushchev's dethronement has transpired since Lowenthal wrote these essays. But what Lowenthal prophetically wrote has been revealed in fact. The ideological implications of the schism have been realized in the CPSU. In Lowenthal's words written in 1963, the schism "has also sown the seeds, then, of a future 'de-Khrushchevization'; in the next crisis of succession, reassertion of the primacy of an ideological party may no longer be the safest road to victory."

In an Epilogue: On the Stages of International Communism, written in 1963, Lowenthal traces how the centralist World Party stage of Lenin and Stalin, which followed the loosely organized Russian Revolutionary stage had been transformed into the Khrushchev international leadership stage. The Khrushchev stage reached its apotheosis in 1957 and proved unworkable by 1960. Lowenthal believes that the present stage of attempting to maintain Party unity by compromise, which the reviewer might add has been continued with some modifications by Khrushchev's successors, can never work at all. It remains to be seen whether this is true. This test will come in to course of events in Vietnam. The future development of Communist Parties dependent on the USSR will, according to Lowenthal, show a withering away of power as the Soviet Union declines in authority in the world Communist movement. Lowenthal argues that those parties with the greatest potential for independence are those "concentrated in underdeveloped regions, where today, Chinese ideological influence is greatest." This is a far cry from the predictions of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, or even Khrushchev.—William B. Ballis, The University of Michigan.

The Arabs: Their History & Future. By Jacques Berque, trans. by Jean Stewart. (New York: Praeger, 1964. Pp. 290. \$7.50.)

Professor Berque brings a rare combination of qualities to his studies of the Arab world. His anthropological work, Structures Sociales du Haut-Atlas (1955) is a classic, and he has lived and worked in both North Africa and the Middle East. His book, originally published as Les Arabes d'Hier à Démain (1960), reflects his acute awareness of disciplinary demands tempered by an intimate knowledge of the Arabs, their mentality and their aspirations. His book borders on the poetic, but it is poetry with full recognition of the real dilemmas and frustrations of the people of whom he writes. Moreover, Professor Berque's anthropological and sociological interests give the study a forceful action orientation, something which many scholarly works on the contemporary Muslim world lack.

The focus of the study is the contemporary Arab in relation to his environment and his intellectual history. Perhaps there is nothing equivalent to spending months in an isolated village to develop the extraordinary sensitivity Berque displays: the saint's tomb in the midst of the junkyard, the Arab League office overshadowed by a Coca Cola sign, the Arab intellectual destroying his copies of Racine in tearful rage during the Suez crisis. Examples of this kind are scattered throughout the book, and might lead the superficial reader to regard it as an unintelligible mélange of impressions. In a sense, it is, because the Arab's view of the world is such a mélange, but in a more important way it is not because Berque sees these dramatic situations as revealing the Arab conflict with a realism that permits orderly differentiation and analysis.

Despite the symbolism essential to ordering such a work, Professor Berque deals with very real problems. Indeed, seven of the fourteen chapters deal with specific economic questions: finance, technical innovation, entrepreneurial qualities, working conditions, etc. These chapters might be considered the most useful because they shed a completely new meaning on the barren figures economic analysts are prone to project on the human problems of the Arab world. His curiosity takes him to psychological fundamentals in the emergence of a more complex society, e.g., what are the connotations of "things" and "number" in Arabic. The Islamic injunctions

about saving and investment are not sterile theological speculations, but brilliant insights into how the Arab relates the objects of his environment to his feelings, frustrations and intellectual history. Every student of emergent nations will sympathize with the "need to build new pyramids" (p. 141), and every diplomat should appreciate Berque's notation that the Aswan Dam represents Nasser's reply to the Suez disaster.

The later chapters of the book may seem less clear, in part because the juxtaposition of object and perception is much less well defined in discussing art, music, language, the role of women and politics. No more succinct statement of the meaning of marriage in the Arab world exists than his observation that marital relations are "an affirmation rather than an exchange." (p. 175) Seldom have the problems of the Arabic language been more acutely summarized than in his note that Arabic "scarcely belongs to the world of men; rather it has been lent to them." (p. 190) As a student of North African politics, this reviewer could not agree more with his observation that "emancipation took place when total independence had become a euphemism." (p. 260) These insights, however, would be in the category of wisely written memoirs were it not that Berque constantly returns to the symbolic meaning of each conflict in the total experience of the contemporary Arab.

Berque's method is unclear because he indeed does not insist that his conceptual tools provide concrete limits to variations in human experience. Much that he writes would receive corroboration in learning theory and in Gestalt psychology, e.g. "radical reconsideration of the past involves paradoxically the deliberate choice of swift progress." (p. 147) His optimism about the future of the Arabs, then, is not derived from how their social relationships might conform to ours, but from the creativity that might take place in the process of their struggle to adapt the past to the future. His reliance on symbolism is dictated by his insistence that the layers of meaning be recognized, often using old logical patterns and meanings in completely new situations. This is not an easy book to read, but the careful reader may learn to free his imagination and perception from many of the unproductive ground rules of more commonly used concepts and conventional studies. He will surely come to appreciate the Arab world in its total complexity in a way that few other books have approached.—Douglas E. ASHFORD, Cornell University.

The Formation of Malaysia; New Factor in World Politics. By WILLARD A. HANNA. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1964. Pp. 247. \$6.50.)

The formation of Malaysia seemed to provide a quiet and graceful disentaglement of British authority from its last colonial remnants in Southeast Asia. In actual fact, it created a new storm center lashed by the winds of President Sukarno's "newly emergent forces." The twentyfour chapters of Willard Hanna's book (excluding the newly-written Introduction and Postscript) represent his original American Universities Field Staff reports submitted between February 1962 and mid-September 1963. They present a lucid account of how a tentative proposal for federating the State of Malaya with the former British colonies of Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak led to the creation of Malaysia through the rational adjustment and manipulation of conflicting interests. Recorded before and while international pressures began to exert themselves upon Malayan policymakers, these chapters contain a freshness which might well have been lost if they had been written at a later date. At the same time they reflect the insight of a competent on-the-spot observer into the internal politics of the merger proposal both in Singapore and the relatively little-known Borneo territories.

Hanna's discussion of the gradual (1957-62) economic merger of the former Crown Colony (and free port) of Penang into the newly formed Federation of Malaya led him to predict that the economic merger of Singapore with Malaya could well be mutually profitable and prevent fewer serious immediate problems than anticipated at the time of his writing. Nor can Hanna be accused of hindsight when he mentions the possibility (in his Febr. 28, 1962 report on "Politics in Borneo") that, in spite of official pronouncements, Indonesia was likely to turn its attention to the "liberation" of the Borneo territories after the successful completion of its West Irian liberation campaign.

The tiny (2,000 square miles, 90,000 people) colony of Brunei is an oil-rich paradise with an annual state income of \$40,000,000, ruled by a Sultan who was willing to reform. Guided by British technical know-how, the ordinary family was able to afford most of the world's modern amenities. Yet it was this highly favoured Brunei welfare laboratory which fomented a widely-supported local rebellion. This incident causes Hanna to ask whether peace, progress, and prosperity by themselves are sufficient to ensure stability or whether the mystical appeal of the "newly emerging forces" is irresistable. If the latter is true, chances for stability in the remainder of Southeast Asia are dim indeed (p. 151). Hanna admits that the Malaysia experiment itself stands in sharp contrast to the whole idea of "violent revolution" and he believes that the very gravity of Singapore's dilemma "becomes the best insurance of its sanity" (p. 205). He leaves some doubt in the minds of his readers,

however, whether this victory of rationalism will be able to withstand the onslaught of ultranationalism and the stigma of being part of a "neocolonial conspiracy." Hanna notes that contrary to original expectations the orderly and successful development of the Malaysia experiment seems to depend mainly upon the wiles of Indonesian policymakers.

Interesting though each of the 24 AUFS reports are, their presentation in one volume has some disadvantages. Several of the chapters provide the reader with interesting insights and sidelights of life in Malaya and Singapore, but in combination with those which focus on political matters do not make for easy reading in bookform. The elimination of these chapters might have deprived readers of precious vignettes but the central theme of the book—the formation of Malaysia-would have stood out in better perspective. With the consequent reduction in length, more space could have been devoted to the causes of the Philippine and Indonesian reactions. With regard to the latter, for example, this reviewer was surprised to find no mention of the Indonesian fear that Malaysia would become a state dominated by Chinese. It is also to be regretted that there is no discussion of the British position which would have required a Hannan analysis of the Cobbold Commission report. The latter comments, however, are mainly criticisms of organization and expression of regret that there were not more AUFS reports by Hanna. His compilation is evidence not only of his ability as a shrewd observer but also of the value of the AUFS to the American student body in providing timely analyses of foreign affairs.-PAUL W. VAN DER VEUR, Australian National University (Canberra).

Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation. By Wendell Bell. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 229. \$6.00.)

The postwar period has seen the birth of new nations in greater profusion than at any other time in history. Almost all of them have inevitably had to be phoenixes (though not always birds of great beauty) rising from the ashes, or at least the embers, of worn out colonial empires. Inevitably, too, most of them have been in Africa, where colonialism most recently flourished.

Opportunities for the establishment of new sovereignties in the Western Hemisphere are relatively few. It is the more useful, consequently, to have available a good study of Jamaica, one of the most recent of the new nations. Wendell Bell, a Yale sociologist, has carried on extensive research in the West Indies, especially in Jamaica, and this study is the fruit of that long investigation. As becomes a devotion to its author's

discipline, the approach and content are primarily sociological but there is much of interest and value to the political scientist.

In an introductory chapter the author sets the stage historically, politically, and economically. The overwhelming conditioning fact of Jamaican life is of course its enormous percentage of Negroes. For more than a hundred years that percentage has varied only slightly between 75 and 80. The presence of this segment of the population, both under Spanish and, after 1655, English control, determined Jamaica's economy, its social structure, and in recent years its politics.

In this chapter, too, we are introduced to the two dominant figures in contemporary Jamaican political life, Sir Alexander Bustamante, founder of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and later of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), and Norman Washington Manley, chief figure in the formation of the People's National Party (PNP), Jamaican affiliate of the British Labour Party.

Later chapters move more directly into an analysis of Jamaican leadership. They are based chiefly on a thorough and skillfully devised questionnaire submitted to some 800 Jamaican "elites" selected from Who's Who, Jamaica and other sources. Of those queried, 238 responded, and the scientific analysis of these comprehensive answers gives the basis for much of the fascinating information included in the study. The questionnaires were supplemented by widescale interviewing. Numerous statistical tables give the gist of the analysis; the text admirably supplements and explains such findings.

In one chapter title Bell asks whether Jamaica should have a democratic political system. He concludes that political cynicism is fairly wide-spread in Jamaica, that the politically cynical leaders (nondemocrats) tended to oppose independence for the island and the politically idealistic leaders to favor it, and that the real danger to the continuation of fledgling democratic forms comes chiefly from those leaders who wanted both political independence and at the same time social and economic progress.

In examining the attitudes of his elitist respondents toward the question of whether Jamaica should be independent Bell finds that about two-thirds were nationalist, that nationalist attitudes did not generally reflect great bitterness toward the mother country nor hold that independence would be a panacea for all Jamaica's problems, and that most of his respondents believe that independence will bring economic benefits but that close economic relations with the United Kingdom should be maintained.

An independent Jamaica faced a theoretical choice between East and West and the problem

was made somewhat more difficult by the pseudoglamour of nearby Communist Cuba. It was decided by 1963, however, that Jamaica would align itself with the Western democracies, a decision which, the author holds, must necessarily affect the island's future in significant ways. That future is precarious, though, inasmuch as the economic base is small and so much remains to be done in the fields of education, housing, economic diversification, removal of the sense of political alienation and cynicism.

Jamaica's leaders, Bell maintains, seem to have avoided corruption and opportunism but it is not yet determined whether they can avoid a drift toward increasing cynicism about political democracy and whether they can lead the way to a more equalitarian society.

In appendices the author gives an analysis of Jamaican occupational ratings, a discussion of his methodological procedures and problems, and a reproduction of his 54-point questionnaire. A number of excellent photographs add to the interest of the book.

Bell has skillfully wedded sociological and political analysis. His techniques might well be borrowed by others interested in making similar basic studies of new nations and underdeveloped countries.—Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *University of California (Santa Barbara)*.

Colombia Today—And Tomorrow. By PAT M. HOLT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. viii, 209. \$5.50.)

This is an interesting book which is mistitled, for it is not an analysis of Colombia Today-And Tomorrow, but rather a collection of miscellaneous information which probably should have been entitled "Observations on Colombia." The author, a former newspaperman and a staff member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, writes in a preface that "this book is based largely on a series of newsletters that I wrote to the Institute of Current World Affairs when I was a fellow in the Institute in residence in Bogotá in 1961-62. It is based also on independent research and on information gathered and impressions received during five other visits to Colombia between 1953 and 1963." The book contains a brief geographical description of the country, something on the social classes, an outline of its history, and a great deal of descriptive material about the government, the agricultural system, the role coffee plays in the country's economy, the steps being taken to introduce agrarian reform, and to industrialize the country. One chapter deals with the experiences of the United States Peace Corps volunteers in Colombia, another analyzes the elections of 1962 and 1964, and one deals with the Catholic church. The material

is not knit together by any systematic analysis, nor is the author sure what the future holds for he writes, "Colombia faces a future heavily charged with "ifs." (p. 195) "The question remains whether the bursting, shifting population of Colombia, now awakening after centuries of slumber, can continue on this slow and difficult road—or whether new violence lies in ambush around the next bend." (p. 197)

Colombia is one of the most difficult of all the Latin American countries to understand, For many decades, as Lewis Hanke has written, there was a "widely held idea that Colombia represented Latin American democracy at its best." This misconception died quickly when the most violent and destructive riot ever to take place in Latin America left part of Bogotá in ruins in 1948 and almost broke up the 9th Conference of the American Republics. At least 200,000 men, women, and children were murdered during the next ten years as chaotic violence swept the country. Conditions became so bad that, to try to stop the senseless slaughter, the leaders of the two most important political parties quit opposing each other and won support for the novel idea that all governmental power should be shared equally by the two large political parties and some stability returned. Thus, from 1958 to 1964 all positions on all levels and in all branches of the government are equally divided and the presidency rotates between the parties every four years. It is hoped that by 1974 the country will have been pacified enough so that democratic government based on competition between political parties can be reintroduced.

This book will be useful to those unfamiliar with what has been happening in Colombia since there is no other good book available in English. Mr. Holt describes a country undergoing rapid change in which urbanization, industralization, and a rapid rise in population have disrupted the old traditional society. Yet at the same time, he points out, "Colombia's social structure and cultural habits are still basically those brought there by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century." (p. 7) This is best seen in his description of the country's agricultural system. Mr. Holt writes: "In the country as a whole, roughly four per cent of the land is owned by sixty per cent of the farmers in lots of less than three Hectares (about seven acres). The farms of more than one hundred Hectares are owned by less than three per cent of the farmers and account for more than half of the land." (pp. 85-86)

"The way in which land is used in Colombia seems to be somewhat more uniform than the way in which it is distributed. With some exceptions, the general pattern is that the best lands are used extensively for cattle (frequently with unimproved pastures) and the pocrest lands are used intensively for crops." (p. 86) As a result of the land tenure system and other aspects of the organization of society, the economy does not as yet supply a decent standard of living to most of the population. Thus, the country has been living through a serious crisis for decades and a race goes on between the "National Front" government trying to induce ordered change and the chaotic social forces no one seems able to control.—HARRY KANTOR, University of Florida.

Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America. By Edwin Lieuwen. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 160. \$4.50.)

This little book is an updating of Professor Lieuwen's earlier and well-known Aims and Politics in Latin America. There are brief descriptions of the seven military coups occurring in Latin America between March, 1962 and April, 1964; there is a general discussion of military politics in Latin America and suggestions for U.S. policy-makers.

An attempt to compress factual analysis and policy critique in a slender volume covering such a vast and complex area is fraught with conceptual difficulties. The tendency is to hover somewhere between reporting and polemics and to confuse assumptions with conclusions. This book epitomizes these problems. Crucial words and phrases go undefined. An example here—as in many books on Latin America—is the term "oligarchies." They are variously referred to as "landed," "commercial," and/or "business oligarchies." They are treated throughout as if in all countries they share monolithic interests and have similar simbiotic relations with the military.

The very term "military" offers similar difficulties. To arrive ultimately at some general policy declarations the author treats the "military" as a transcontinental institution of common aims and interests. Thus, "there is little question that the armed forces are a conservative, antirevolutionary institution standing in the way of the achievement of evolutionary social revolutions by democratic means" (p. 130); and on the same page, "ten of Latin America's twenty republics are gripped in military vises designed to hold back the pressures of social revolution." (My italics.) But from the evidence which Lieuwen adduces in his seven case studies, plus those of Venezuela and El Salvador-cases of the military "acquiescing" in social reforms-it is clear that generalizations about the "Latin American military" become misleading. He himself underscores the importance of discussing the military in terms of its varying reactions to the "acute social crisis through which Latin America is passing" (p. 8). He is careful to discuss the

important divisions within the Argentine military in 1962, not all of which can be dismissed as merely personal or opportunistic power plays undivorced from ideological or policy positions. Throughout the descriptive parts of the book a distinction is made between military interventions which obstruct social reform; those where the military announces an interest in the idea of reform but may intervene to keep the "labor-left" out of power; and those where the military acquiesces in social reform. A biref section is devoted to "Nasserism"-a vaguely defined term referring to the leadership of social revolution by the military. Lieuwen does not give much hope to this kind of development in Latin America, but on the other hand he speaks of an awakening social consciousness in the military, increasing recruitment into the armed services from the lower middle class, the development of more responsible middle-rank officers. Though he does not want to make the picture look too gloomy, he concludes that even where armies justify their intervention in politics as arbiters of conflicting civilian forces, to save the Constitution from "Communists" or to lead reforms, they really intervene to save their own institutional interests and are, therefore, the "chief impediments to democratic social revolution." (pp. 86, 107)

Unrigorous conceptualization leads to contradictory policy recommendations. Lieuwen is quite correctly conscious of the conflicting goals of the U.S. regarding Latin America. He is frank to admit that "despite its noble efforts and intentions, the Kennedy Administration accomplished little in furthering the cause of democracy in Latin America." (p. 129) Nevertheless, after criticizing the Johnson Administration's apparent move away from the policy of non-recognition of military governments, he urges its reassertion. He suggests the argument that the failures of the Kennedy Administration in Latin America were due to the inability of Washington to exercise control over the actions of Latin American military organizations. (p. 128) But if it is true, as he has explained earlier, that the Latin American military are political actors, not apolitical professionals and intervene politically to defend their own institutional interests—then it is quite apparent that Washington simply can not exercise control over them, whether or not it should.

Although Lieuwen states that "the attempt to use reason, to lecture the military on its responsibilities toward the law and the constitution does no good whatsoever," as President Bosch of the Dominican Republic discovered (p. 111), he insists, in the closing sentences of the book, that the most fruitful policy for the U. S. is to continue to try to convince the Latin American military to "eschew politics completely... to become the

tools rather than the masters of the state . . ." (p. 149). The desire to compress the analysis of such diverse and complex events as those that form the descriptive base of this book into immediate policy exhortations seems to lead us into ever-narrowing circles.—ROBERT W. ANDERSON, University of Puerto Rico.

British Guiana. Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society. By Peter Newman. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. 104. Map. Tables. \$1.95. Paper.)

This timely volume, issued under the auspices of the British Institute of Race Relations, provides the general reader with a very good introduction to the emerging nation of British Guiana, whose violent political life has several times appeared in newspaper headlines in recent years. Chapter titles—Geography and Natural Resources, Historical Background, Demographic and Social Pressures, The Performance of the Economy since 1953, Political Developments, and Conclusions—well indicate the scope of the author's treatment. It should be added that the treatment of these various themes tends to focus upon the political problem.

The author traces historically the development of the British colony (Chapter II) as a basis for his demographic and social analysis in Chapter III, possibly the most informative part of the book. His analysis of the economy (Chapter IV), an economy based on sugar, rice, bauxite, and timber, concludes with a plea to remedy the lack of planning which has resulted in an unemployment rate (1961) of 18 per cent. In the discussion of political developments (Chapter V) the author points out how various factors in the situation contributed to moving both of the popular political parties toward a generally socialist position, while blaming the British suspension of the constitution in 1953 for much of the subsequent violence and political anarchy:

The net effect of the 1953 intervention was to postpone for a long time the development of responsible thought about the real economic and social problems of the country, and therefore to move the locus of discussion back to constitutional problems of independence and eventually to problems of racial division... (p. 81)

Both Burnham and Jagan are criticised for their demagogic political leadership, particularly the latter. The author believes that Dr. Jagan merely pretends to be a marxist and is greatly at fault for not presenting a clear cut description of his economic program. Yet much of the blame for present conditions, the author insists, lies with Britain for her "thoughtless colonial assembly of planatation labour from so many disparate sources," and for neglect of the kind of "active and generous participation" without which the

economic and social future of British Guiana will be bleak. (p. 102)

A Postscript (pp. 103-104) written after the political and racial violence of 1964, which grew out of a strike of the sugar workers union, supported by the Peoples Progressive Party costing 160 lives, adopts an even less optimistic view of the future than that set forth in the main text. The author writes that "it is clear that the present situation is not stable at all in the long run." He is skeptical of the suggestion of Eric Williams, Premier of Trinidad, made in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference of July 1964, for a limited UN trusteeship, believing that somehow a solution should be found within the Commonwealth.

The book is well written, objective in tone, and cogent in arguing its central thesis of British historical responsibility for an anarchic political situation. Some readers may feel the author is too imbued with the concept of class struggle. (See page 78.) None will suspect him to race prejudice.—HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS, The American University.

Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic.
BY SELDEN RODMAN. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. Pp. x, 202. \$5.95.)

This is an outstanding book on the Dominican Republic and its pre-Columbian predecessor, part of which was known to the Tainos as Quisqueya. But "outstanding" is a lefthanded compliment, a phrase with no political coloration.

It is lefthanded, for Quisqueya is the only work on the nation nearest Puerto Rico worthy of being rated in a fairly-good-to-very-good range since Sumner Welles' Naboth's Vineyard (1928). Briefly, this reader knows of no outstanding book in any language by a social scientist on Columbus' first permanent settlement, a tragic colony, an international pawn of big power politics, a Marine-ruled Wall Street debtor, intermittent nation, corporate-type private fief of a voraciously efficient thief, and short-lived Alliance for Progress showcase that today is the Dominican Republic.

With emphasis on political stress and strain, especially on domestic ineptitude and greed, nonetheless there is a vast amount of condensed, valuable, and dramatic information in 172 of the pages. Of the thirty left, twenty consist of a physical description appendix. A blue pencil should have cut out the appendix. It is partly a useless appendage, partly a painful one, and partly a gangrenous one. By that is meant it is repetitious of what has been said earlier; or it should have been included in the first chapter; or it is incongruous. Numerous tourist guide interjections about the palatability of the fare in

hotels throughout the country, highway mileages, beach bathing facilities, and historic monuments make up the appendix's incongruity. Few tourists go any place except to Santo Domingo; virtually none brings a car with him or visits the interior. These intrusions are unduly subjective. For example, Rodman refers to the "hopelessly restored" palace of Diego Columbus. In view of the poverty and cultural level of the Republic, there is nothing hopeless about the edifice, and found at it is infinitely less commercialism than at Williamsburg.

A selected bibliography indicates about as much of a dearth of politico-historical literature on the Dominican Republic up to 1910 as on Puerto Rico. On a comparative population appraisal not much more has been produced on the Republic since 1910 than on the French Antilles, in which to date have occurred no notable outbursts for independence.

Rodman's subjectivism in the appendix and elsewhere may be accounted for by his background. An occasional contributor to the long defunct New Masses, he is the author of six books of verse, has compiled five anthologies of poetry, and has written seven books on the visual arts, including three on Haitian art. Quisqueya is the only book of his he identifies as being a history. Those who would quarrel with his scarcity of footnotes, infrequent dramatic flourishes, failure to treat adequately of the impact of exterior economic events, might dilute their acerbity by recalling they have not written a book on the Dominican Republic. Rodman did. He has thus measurably filled up with a largely dispassionate recital a historical time gap existing since 1928.

The work would be more useful had Rodman devoted another hundred pages to the Trujillo era and its aftermath, probably most of them to the aftermath, particularly to Juan Bosch and the aborted Alliance for Progress program. But books on the Dominican Republic, even those on Trujillo, have not been best sellers. Within the limitations of his market potential and subject, Rodman has done well.

Quisqueya is not comparable in quality, coverage, scholarship, and documentation to Eric Williams' History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago (1962), a 294-page paperback which sells in Port-of-Spain for less than U.S. \$2.00. This contrast cannot be explained simply by some glib over-simplification about British thoroughness and Spanish haphazardness. After all, Cubans have produced excellent histories of their island.

At present (May 1965) 30,000 American troops occupy Santo Domingo, in the aftermath of the Dominican Revolution. That our marines are back in Santo Domingo is evidence of a new Johnson Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Hav-

ing been a professor at Santiago de Cuba in 1956, just prior to the Castro Revolt, and also at Santiago de los Caballeros early in 1965, I feel qualified to make a prediction, even though I am now jobless. In the next ten years five other Cuban-Dominican-type revolts will occur in hungry, desperate, hopeless Latin American countries. In 1964 there was a dearth of unbiased,

well-rounded, in depth books, monographs, and other studies on the Dominican Republic. I expect the same can be said in 1967 by which time a dozen new ones will have been published. Byron White, Universidad Cátolica Madre y Maestra, Santiago de los Caballeros, Dominican Republic.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The Democratic Civilization. By LESLIE LIPSON. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 614. \$7.50 and \$10.00.)

Leslie Lipson has written a grand book in the grand manner. Bringing to bear a wide knowledge and understanding of political theory and comparative government he ranges across not only the United States and Great Britain but also such countries as Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, and New Zealand in his attempt to generalize about the character of modern democracy.

Some will of course be tempted to add that the book is written in the "old" style as well. There are no mentions of Talcott Parsons or David Easton; there are no four-cell tables or diagrams filled with boxes and arrows; there is no effort to adapt recent behavioral phrasings to his subject of study. While *The Democratic Civilization* is heavily comparative in its emphasis, in no sense

at all does it try to do for the developed areas of the world what Almond and Coleman did for the developing.

What does emerge is a skilled synthesis of philosophy and institutions. The great ideas, from Plato and Pericles to Marx and Mill, are considered in tandem with parties, legislatures, and related agencies of government. References to Dickens, Shaw, Shakespeare, and Swift also catch the eye and are used to good purpose. There is, in short, a breadth and sweep of learning here that is bound to command respect. The author's imperviousness to recent methods and approaches is, in the final analysis, an asset. Each of us should do what he can do best. Those scholars reared in the earlier tradition who have tried to switch intellectual horses-or to straddle both at once-have more often than not ended up floundering in the stream. The point is that this book,

by not seeking to be all things to all readers, comes forth as a study from which students of varied persuasions can profit.

This is a study of what might be called the traditions and institutions of civility. While much of the focus is on the modes and mechanisms of majority rule, the abiding concern is with social and political patterns which elevate the quality of human life. The assumption is that the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as some smaller countries, are not only democracies but are on their way to solving most of the problems that persist in their midst. The tone is optimistic, at times even to a fault, and there are occasions when one begins to wonder if there is much of anything left to worry about. At all events, there exists the premise that the philosophy of such writers as Aristotle, Locke, and Jefferson has been transmuted into prevailing democratic ideology. This philosophy, however, was as much aristocratic as it was democratic. While the principle of majority-rule was approved it was assumed that the populous would refrain from getting big ideas about itself. Thus the values of civility would prevail despite the growth in suffrage and the rise of leaders sprung from the people. These values call for the defense and encouragement of civil liberties and civil rights, of constitutionalism and liberal learning. They require an atmosphere of moderation, maturity, and self-imposed restraint. These social and intellectual underpinnings of democratic civility are examined in various national settings, and particularly impressive are the chapters showing how potentially explosive issues like language and religion have been resolved in diverse settings.

The conclusion is that on the whole the people have not overstepped their proper bounds. To the query whether democratic majorities have been prone to acts of tyranny, the answer is that fears of such excesses have seldom been realized. Yet it would have been interesting to have some reflections on a few of the current debates like the one over the quality of democratic culture: in art and literature, education, even entertainment. The consumers with the highest bidding power have been accused of driving serious matter from the air-waves and the classrooms. This is, in a sense that is both real and political, an act of a majority's tyranny over a minority. Alternatively advanced democratic societies are increasingly characterized by large corporate institutions which seem to be able to make plans and exercise power without having to ask for public permission. Neither Aristotle nor Rousseau knew of such institutions, and it may well be that the principles embodied in the traditional corpus of theory has less relevance today than might at first be thought. At all events the tendencies of a mass society and a corporate society are both inimical to the tradition of civility. Whether the public has too much or too little power, or even just about the right amount, there is reason for suspecting that forces making for civilized life have been weakening and are failing to be renewed.

One final query: Is The Democratic Civilization a textbook or isn't it? The publisher quotes two prices, for text and non-text use. Clearly the textbook appurtenances are there: frequent subheads, minimal footnotes, an all-tco-brief bibliography. There has been a tendency for serious thematic studies (in the field of political theory the recent works by Sheldon Wolin, Carl Friedrich, Roland Pennock and David Smith come to mind) to try to appeal to two markets at once: not only to one's professional colleagues but to bid for wide classroom adoptions as well. Whether such attempts can be successful is problematical. The books must be longer, more step-by-step, if they are to be used in undergraduate courses. This tends to put off the advanced reader, who is disinclined to sit down with a textbook-looking book of a leisurely evening. At the same time such volumes can only really be effective for a semester of teaching if the instructor is willing to recast his course outline to accord with the theme and content of the book. And this is unlikely to happen in many places. But just because this book is not likely to be successful as a text does not mean that its appearance should frighten away the serious student. Leslie Lipson has brought a fresh mind and wide learning to bear on a vital subject. Any political scientist can consider this book as part of his education.—Andrew Hacker, Cornell University.

Germany and Europe: Reflections on German Foreign Policy. By Heinrich von Brentano, translated by Edward Fitzgerald. (New York: Frederich A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 224. \$5.95.)

This volume is an abbreviated version of a book published 1962 in West Germany under the title Deutschland, Europa, und die Welt: Raden zur deutschen Aussenpolitik. It contains a collection of speeches given by the late Heinrich von Brentano during the formidable years of the Bonn Republic. The author commenced his political career after World War II as Landtag representative in Hesse, was elected to the Bundestag in 1949, became Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the Christian Democratic Union in the federal legislature, and served as Foreign Minister from 1955 to 1961.

The speeches in this book cover a much broader field than the sub-title suggests, and extend, in terms of substance and time, from the economic and political consolidation of the three Western zones of occupied Germany to the problems of the Atlantic Community in the 1960's. The volume can be divided into four sections: the first collection of essays deals with issues and problems related to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. Here the author discusses the political tasks of the Länder, the problem of de-nazification, and the Bonn Statute. The second part concerns European unification. It includes speeches on Franco-German understanding, the Schuman Plan, European political unification, and the future of the Atlantic Community. The third section features speeches on the German problem and West German foreign policy. The author speaks out on the issue of all-German elections and self-determination, discusses the German problem in connection with Western foreign policy, explains West German policy toward Eastern Europe, and elucidates cultural and economic considerations in foreign policy. The final part of the book contains some miscellaneous speeches and statements, among them an obituary for John Foster Dulles, a memorial address in honor of Gustav Stresemann, and Mr. von Brentano's resignation statement.

Some criticism might be made about the selection of the articles. The German original includes some speeches that might have been of interest to the student of German politics, but, unfortunately, have not been put into the publication under review. For example, Mr. von Brenatano's speeches endorsing West German accession to the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Economic Community should have been included. Also missing in the Praeger publication are the author's 1958 speech on the ardently debated topic of disengagement in Central Europe and some informative talks on West German foreign policy considerations in 1959 and 1960.

In general, the translation is quite satisfactory. Moreover, the English in this volume is less stilted than one encounters in a number of other translations. On the negative side, however, it should be said that the reviewer found the constant use of "Federal Landtag" (instead of Bundestag) slightly irritating. There are also some minor substantive errors in this volume which are not found in the German original. But despite these and a few other criticisms that might be made, the volume constitutes a desirable addition to the English-language sources on contemporary German politics. For, with the exception of Weymar's dated Konrad Adenauer: His Authorized Biography little is yet available in the English language that renders a primary account of the West German government's position on the issues that were widely argued between the spokesmen of the government and the Social Democratic leaders in the 1950's.—HERBERT R. WINTER, Rhode Island College.

The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. By Bernard B. Fall. (New York: Praeger, 1963. Pp. xii, 493. \$7.95.)

South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. By ROBERT SCIGLIANO. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963. Pp. ix. 227, Plus unbound insertion "Epilogue: The Coup d'Etat," 9 p. \$3.50; \$1.95 paper.)

Written by two scholars of different backgrounds, and appearing almost simultaneously. these two works achieve an amazing degree of analytical and evaluative convergence as to the events and personalities making up the story of Viet-Nam in the 1954-1963 decade. Scigliano's work is compact with well-organized and accurate information (except for the error on the beginnings of the Vietnamese press, p. 177). The main body of the analysis, consisting of Chapters 4 to 8, gives much emphasis to administrative behavior. His study of political personalities and party system in South Viet-Nam is perhaps the best short treatment available, even though the casual reader may find it quite hard to keep track of the numerous unfamiliar names mentioned. A good case-study of recent U.S. foreign relations can be found in the last chapter. Unequal to the main analysis are Chapters 2 and 3, as well as the hastily put together epilogue on the November 1, 1963 coup which toppled the Diem regime. Other factors favoring his book are its relative brevity and a stylistic restraint which takes the sting out of his critical comments.

Unlike Scigliano's book, Fall's The Two Viet-Nams is not his first major work on this topic in which he has specialized for about a dozen years. Even to this day he seems to be better known for his The Viet-Minh Regime and Street without Joy than for this impressive compendium in which the common background as well as the separate ways taken by North and South Viet-Nam since partition are treated. Despite some technical shortcomings, this work might well be the most important study of contemporary Viet-Nam since Philippe Devillers' Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952 and Jean Lacouture-Philippe Devillers' La fin d'une guerre (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952 and 1960 respectively). The best part of Fall's book is found in Chapters 8 and 9 dealing with political organization and social changes in North Viet-Nam, and Chapters 15 and 16 dealing with the revolutionary insurgency in South Viet-Nam. In these two chapters, Fall speaks his mind on the political and military miscalculations of both Saigon and Washington. His asperity on the subject has undoubtedly provoked negative reactions from Foggy Bottom and Pentagon men. This otherwise good book is also marred by the apparent haste in editing. For example, the complex events of 1945-1954 are fragmented by artificially dividing them between Chapters 6-7 and Chapters 10-11. Source indications are missing in several instances, notably in quotes of Dean Acheson (p. 61), François Mitterand (p. 221), and Ngo Dinh Diem (p. 237). Also scattered misspellings, and especially the randomized and partial use of some Vietnamese diacritical marks give the impression that the book was not proofread carefully. (In my opinion, diacritical marks are better left out completely in a publication of this kind, as is done in Scigliano's book.) These editing defects should not, however, detract the reader from the generally sound substance of both of these works.

Addressing themselves mainly to Americans, Fall and Scigliano devote a great part of their works to the past American involvement in Viet-Nam and to its future course. They remind the reader that the United States has in various ways been involved in Viet-Nam since 1940, and especially since the Dulles-Eisenhower's commitments first to help the all-but-defeated French before 1954 and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime thereafter. Yet U.S. dealings withthe Vietnamese and the French have been so confused and improvised that a network of mutual distrust now envelop all three governments. For both the U.S. and South Viet-Nam, the lack of a concerted overall policy except for a sterile anti-communist negativism has had the effect of a self-fulfilling delusion. Thus for example, the 1956-1962 "sink-or-swim-with-Diem" line had resulted in preventing the consolidation of any serious alternative to the Diem regime besides the Communist-led National Liberation Front which directed the anti-Saigon guerilla war. Fall emphasizes the fact that for too long the U.S. has engaged in "wildly wishful thinking" and indulged in "illusion[s] of victory" which were reinforced at dependable intervals by high-ranking executive, military, and Congressional spokesmen. For both authors, the U.S. has also for too long refused to recognized the nationalistic-revolutionary character of the anti-Saigon insurgents. At any rate, these were fast capturing peasant support, beginning at least as early as 1958, while the U.S.-backed Diem regime was shrinking steadily from contacts-except propped-up ones-with the people. Both Washington and Saigon were above all preoccupied with "security," unfortunately defined in almost exclusively negative, static, and military terms. Fall's description of the routinized outmaneuverings of Washington by Saigon (p. 270) is amusingly-or rather pathetically-apt. For both authors, South Viet-Nam appears to be the classic case of "a puppet who pulls the strings" (Scigliano, p. 216), a situation most frustrating to a superpower.

Much more solid substance is contained in these books than could possibly be reviewed in an article of this length. These works are to be recommended for those who seriously desire some indepth understanding of the Vietnamese problem. It is also recommended that they be read with self-restraint, for not only the reality they relate is often unpleasant, but also because Viet-Nam has been and continues to be a puzzle of bewildering complexity. And while there appeas to be no easy solution offered in these honestly written books, their contribution has been indeed substantial toward a better comprehension of the current situation.—Phan Thien Chau, University of Denver.

The Court of European Communities: New Dimensions in International Adjudication. By Werner Feld. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. viii, 127. Guilders 13.50. \$3.75.)

The Court of European Communities, replacing the Court of the Coal and Steel Community, is an institution novel in its scope and setting. Although the Court has been in existence for a relatively short period of time, it has achieved a stature and status in its work for the Common Market to cause the writer of this book to say, "If the United States of Europe should become a reality in the future, it is highly probable that the Court of Justice of the European Communities, now sitting in Luxembourg, will be transformed into the supreme court of the new federation" (p. vii). He thinks the Court has achieved this status because it handles conflicts both in the economic and in the political fields, and it has "developed a body of 'European' case law which, in time, is likely to have favorable implications for the eventual unification of Europe" (p. vii). The impact of the decisions of the Court has been felt and has been reflected in the public policy of the members of the Community.

The author makes no claim that his treatise is a legal study, in the narrow sense, but he does examine the legal problems which the Court of necessity must decide. He says, "These problems are not analyzed and evaluated in depth; rather emphasis is placed on the economic and political implications which some of these problems have within the context of the struggle for a new Europe" (p. 3). He coes describe, however, at some length and in depth the professional background and qualifications of the judges, the organization, procedure, and jurisdiction of the Court, and the factors and forces which affect the decisions of the Court.

The Court is one unit of the over-all governmental structure. There is an executive composed of four bodies: the High Authority of the ECSC, the Commission of the EEC, the Commission of

Euratom, and the Council of Ministers. The legislature is the European Parliament composed of 142 delegates appointed by the legislatures of the six Members. "The Parliament is not authorized to legislate nor does it have full budgetary control" (p. 9). The structure of the Court is defined in the provisions of the treaty between its members (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). It is composed of seven judges chosen by the six Member States for a period of six years, with election on a staggered basis. Only nationals of the Members are eligible to serve on the Court. One special feature of the Court is that its judges may be removed by the other judges if "in the unanimous opinion of the other members of the Court, they no longer fulfill the required conditions or meet the obligations of office" (p. 15). Access to the Court may be had by the Member States (the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such cases and the treaty provides a Member State may not use the International Court of Justice in disputes under the treaty), by the major organs of the Community, by private persons and by private enterprises, and by the Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank. A unique feature of jurisdiction is that the Court itself may be sued in civil service matters. The Court finds its sources of law from: the Treaties between the Members, the acts and regulations of the institutions of the Community, municipal laws, and the Court's own jurisprudence. International law has played a minor role as a source of law before the Court.

In numerous instances the author compares and contrasts the work and function of this Court with that of the Supreme Court of the United States. A more important and apt comparison, however, is made with the success and effectiveness of this Court and the Central American Court of Justice. Although the latter Court had compulsory jurisdiction over cases between private persons and between states, it handled only 10 cases during the ten years of its existence, 1908 to 1918. "In contrast to the performance of the Central American Court, the Court of European Communities rendered during the first eleven years of its existence—specifically up to February 18, 1964-113 decisions and opinions and over 90 cases were pending on that date" (p. 106). The major litigations came from private persons, although a number of cases came from Member States, and a few came from organs of the Communities.

This book deserves careful reading and study by laymen and by students interested in the field of jurisprudence. It shows careful and intensive research on the part of the author. He not only describes what the Court is now, but he shows, from a realistic viewpoint, what the court *might* become. It is a work tinged with a high degree of imagination.—James A. Gathings, Bucknell University.

The Changing Structure of International Law. By Wolfgang Friedmann. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xvi, 410. \$8.75.)

Many books in this century dealt with change in international law. The present volume, from the learned and prolific pen of Columbia's professorial Director of International Legal Research, belongs to those which primarily describe rather than urge the development which the law has taken or ought to undergo. Using the sociological approach made popular in this country's legal writings by Roscoe Pound, the author first analyzes the profound horizontal and vertical changes which the last generation has seen in the structure and scope of international relations. their effect upon helpless individuals and sovereign states, and the conflicts of power, of interests, and of values or the co-operation generated by common or diverse objectives. Conflict and cooperation, he argues, demand and gave rise to two types of international law: the traditional "diplomatic" international law of co-ordination confirming sovereignty and aiming at the preservation of the status quo and the peaceful coexistence of states, and a new, modern, or progressive international law of co-operation, welfare, or reciprocity hostile to sovereignty and concerned with economic, social and cultural matters. Both of these laws move on a regional or universal, a transnational, supranational, or international level of structure, scope, and intensity. The author next inquires into the reality and validity, the sanctions and consensual basis, of international law, the principles and processes of procuring change in it, and the new fields-tentatively described as international constitutional, administrative, labor, criminal, commercial (including economic development), corporation, anti-trust and tax law-added by these methods to international welfare or co-operation law. Change, while leaving the state as the main, the only full, the only law-making subject of international law and the basic unit of international society, has also brought the recognition of international organizations, private corporations, and individuals as more or less limited, even only ad hoc, subjects of this law. Further, the forces behind change have created a complex pattern of international status quo or security and progressive or welfare organizations. These too move on a regional or universal level and have more or less intensive functions, powers, organization, and success depending on the conflict or harmony of the institutionalized human purposes. Change also poses the problem of the actual or potential universality of international law in the face of the political,

economic, and ideological diversity of the world. On this we read that diversity leaves unaffected the conditions of coexistence of differing sovereign states, thus permitting a universal international law of coexistence, but that divergence restricts the international law of co-operation to homogeneous value groups. A summary and conclusions close the volume. There is a list of writings cited and an index.

The great merit of this book lies not so much in its originality as in its thorough, systematic, and readable survey of the more recent literature on the new trends in international law and organization and in its attempt to analyze these changes in their importance and interdependence. While primarily descriptive and analytical, the book, however, also provides intellectual stimulation. It bristles with suggestions for improvement or solutions of the problems encountered. Throughout discussion is objective and balanced even if sympathies on the side of law and order vs. conflict and anachronistic sovereignty orientate, as they always do, judgment regarding improvement and solution and construction regarding trends. The volume also tenders food to critics. Sometimes, breadth seems achieved at the expense of depth and historical accuracy. The division of international law and organization into coexistence and co-operation institutions, the claim regarding new fields of this law, and the arguments concerning its theoretical foundations. its sanction, sources, and subjects will not remain unquestioned. Some might criticize a few repetitious statements, a few errors of fact, a few logical contradictions, a few printer's misspellings and botched sentences, a reader's deficiencies in compiling the list of writings and the index, the author's English way of spelling. Few will, however, deny on any of these grounds the merits and usefulness of the book. It still makes very meaty, very interesting, very fluent, often eloquent, and always learned essential reading for the political scientist interested in or teaching international relations, organization and law .-- George Man-NER, University of Illinois.

In Pursuit of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations. By Richard N. Gardner. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 263. \$4.95.)

The basic theme permeating this analysis was expressed by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who wrote the Introduction: "... the most powerful nation in the world is less able to employ its power alone, in pursuit of national ends, than at any previous point in history." Building upon and elaborating this theme, Richard N. Gardner—who has been intimately involved in American foreign policy in the United Nations since 1961—discusses the evolution and future of the UN, as

it relates to the fulfillment of the diplomatic goals of the United States.

Although the author does not say so, it seems clear that his appraisal is designed for the general public, rather than for the informed student. It appears to be aimed specifically at those groups who are apprehensive, dubious or otherwise uncertain about the United Nations. And this group in turn is composed of two antithetical schools of thought: those who regard the United Nations as an instrument inimical to, and potentially destructive of, America's global interests; and those who feel that the United Nations (owing largely to the failure of American leadership) has not reached the standards set in 1945 or measured up to its true potential.

It should occasion no surprise that Mr. Gardner belongs to neither school. If he freely admits the UN's limitations, he also is impressed with its accomplishments; and if he believes the organization has considerable potential for future growth, he is no less aware that Utopian expectations may impair its future as certainly as undisguised opposition. The author seems to be telling the reader something like this: "Many valid criticisms can be, and have been, made about the United Nations. Throughout the entire range of its activities-from involvement in the Congo, to disarmament proceedings, to the operation of UNESCO—there is room for much improvement. No one understands this fact better than American officials. Yet they are also aware-more aware than most members of the public-of the UN's achievements, of its expanding influence on the global scene, and of its capacity for continued growth. In the vast preponderance of cases, it is in the interest of the United States both to support the United Nations and to lend its influence to efforts directed at enhancing its powers."

In short, the author is endeavoring to dispel two conflicting myths: the idea that the UN is infringing upon national sovereignty—or the myth of UN usurpation; and the idea that it has no future—or the myth of UN impotency.

Mr. Gardner's qualifications for this assignment are impeccable. On the basis of first-hand experience at the UN, he obviously has command of his subject, familiarity with relevant documentary and secondary materials, and a perceptive grasp of the intricacies of the issues with which the UN is concerned. Most of the time, he is able to communicate his ideas smoothly, lucidly, and readably.

Yet occasionally his volume is also tedious; written like a guidebook describing the scope of UN activities; and content to reiterate official policy statements. In terms of space devoted to various aspects of his subject, the author suggests that the function of the United Nations as a peace-keeping agency is of equal importance with

the achievement of international agreements on outer space; both topics receive approximately the same coverage. By the same standard, the UN "decade of development" is on a par with the Soviet Union's role in the organization. Put differently, out of a total of 263 pages, well over half is devoted to the non-political aspects of the UN's work.

Intrinsically, of course, there is nothing wrong with this division. In practice, however, it means that sometimes the author's discussion of bedrock political problems confronting the UN—and causing deep anxiety among some groups in American society—boils down to little more than assurances that all is well for American interests; the description of the operations of the International Monetary Fund, on the other hand, reaches a complexity of treatment fully understandable by, and of interest to, only expert economists.

In most respects, however, Mr. Gardner has written an informative, helpful, and provocative book which ought to contribute significantly to raising the level of American enlightenment about the United Nations.—Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Vassar College.

Law and Politics of the Danube. By STEPHEN GOROVE. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xiv, 171. \$5.80.)

In his introduction to Gorove's book Hans Kohn regrets that more attention has not been paid to the role of the Danube in international relations and law in recent years. Unfortunately this study does not fill the need.

More than half of the study is devoted to Soviet-American relations. While those relations have greatly influenced the status of the Danube after World War II they have also been covered in many books. Mr. Gorove adds very little that has not been known before and has consulted few original sources. The Danube is occasionally out of focus. When its problems reemerge clearly one looks in vain for an analysis in depth. The subtitle of the book is "An Interdisciplinary Study." One wonders what approach the author believes he has employed other than a somewhat traditional historical one?

The author does provide an adequate, though extremely brief (pp. 22–36), historical survey of the status of the Danube up to World War II. The main part (pp. 67–132) covers the 3 post-World War II years which culminated in the 1948 Belgrade Convention. It is in this section that the author rehashes alleged American policy failures in not preventing the consolidation by the Soviet Union of its control over Eastern Europe. While the author occasionally admits that power relationships were at the root of Soviet diplomatic successes, he cannot refrain from suggesting that the United States was bested in Eastern Europe

because of our inability to recognize the nature of the Soviet challenge. The author does not support his allegations with any new documentary evidence.

While the last chapter (pp. 133-156) purports to bring the account up to 1962 it does this only in the most superficial manner by relating the announced accomplishments of the periodic meetings of the New Danube Commission. The relevant activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) are referred to briefly in a footnote. The exciting history of the stresses and strains of the Eastern European satellites (aside from Tito's defection) is not even mentioned.

It would have been useful if some of the treaties and agreements regulating the Danube had been reproduced in an appendix. The bibliography is extremely brief, however the footnotes are useful guides for further research.—Curt F. Beck, University of Connecticut.

The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions. By Kazimierz Grzybowski. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 300. \$7.50.)

This volume is a chronology of the formal bodies which have been created in Eastern Europe primarily during the last decade in the hope of giving the so-called socialist commonwealth an institutional and legal basis. The author has reviewed the charters, agreements and communiques of the various bodies and given them a legal interpretation. The difficulty in using official Communist commentaries without weighing and interpreting them in the light of the overall political picture and other evidence available is that it is impossible to separate fact from fiction. Furthermore, the official works do not permit a penetrating analysis of even the legal questions to which the communists seem to want to give maximum publicity. For example, the author points out that Eastern European states consider the pattern of their trade relations to be unique because of its planned and unexploitive character and because governments are the sole trading partner under socialism. But except for a few superficial points of difference as shown in the basic agreements the author is unable to show how this special relationship has worked in practice, developed over the years, and how disputes in fact are resolved under the system.

From this survey of the formal relations among the members of the Soviet bloc the reader is struck by how undeveloped the institutions are compared to the West and how the bloc has borrowed extensively from its neighbors. Apparently this was done not only to retaliate against Western integration and defense moves as in the case of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, but in the hope of copying the success of Western integration and economic development. Another incongruity of these formal institutions is that they have developed only as the solidarity of the Soviet bloc manifested so absolutely during the Stalin era is falling apart. Apparently the various forms of economic cooperation were conceived to replace the political and military coercion of the earlier period but it is questionable whether they can reverse the disentegration. Unfortunately the author does not deal with these questions. The volume, however, is a useful tabulation of the multilateral economic and military agreements within the Soviet bloc as they have developed thus far. - DAVID T. CATTELL, University of California, Los Angeles.

The Scientific Revolution and World Politics. By Caryl P. Haskins. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. ix, 115. \$3.50.)

The President of the Carnegie Institution is a research biologist of wide-angled perspective, at home in both science affairs and foreign affairs. In The Scientific Revolution and World Politics he discusses issues in which the two kinds of affairs intersect. It is not the dramatic scientific developments of the atomic age to which Caryl Haskins addresses himself in this slender volume of essays: the scientific revolution is for him the revolution in the search for truth which has flourished in Europe and the Europeanized world since the time of Isaac Newton. The world politics of which he writes is, on the other hand, defined narrowly; he is concerned with contemporary issues of American foreign policy as they affect or are affected by the uneven and unevenly growing acceptance of scientific ways of thinking in various parts of the world. One finds in this book no clarion call for the mobilization of American and "free World" science to "win" the cold war or to defeat the Soviet opponent in actual hostilities. Success in the Apollo Project will do little, he suggests, to solve problems which are his most immediate concern, those connected with the spread to the non-Western world of the West's scientific revolution.

Mr. Haskins is not insensitive to the Soviet threat and quotes approvingly a reference to the Soviet state as "the scavenger of transition." If the adoption of new scientific ways of thinking losens some of the ties that hold traditional societies together, it offers at the same time a new basis for binding them back together; it is for this "extremely vulnerable" transition period that the United States choices must be most carefully made.

Mr. Haskins differentiates the truly new nations in which, as one West African educator put it, the need is not for "prestige projects but the answers to our own witch doctors" from the intermediate nations whose educated élites already

have some experience of the scientific revolution but have as yet no autonomous scientific tradition. In the new nations the problem is the absolute scarcity of men attuned to the modern world's scientific "style"; in such "intermediate" nations as Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey available scientific talent is not yet organized and deployed to serve such nations effectively.

So far as Western Europe is concerned, Carvl Haskins is content to preach the gospel of Jean Monnet. The United States followed Europe's lead in basic science down to the Second World War: and it has since forged ahead, he thinks. largely because of the absence of intra-continental barriers to the free flow of ideas and men. As for the Soviet Union his estimate is guardedly optimistic; the scientists and technologists may be a liberalizing element, and the Soviet monolith may not be able to sustain scientific advance as evenly and on as broad a front as the pluralistic American system. The Soviet Union, however, in contrast with China, has been able to mount its scientific effort on the basis of a Western scientific tradition that antedates the Soviet regime.

It is no criticism of The Scientific Revolution and World Politics that it provides no answers to questions which its author does not ask, e.g.: How is the spread of the scientific revolution likely to affect the relative position of the powers in the coming decades? What are the political consequences of unequal rates of scientific change among various states and groups of states? Is the gap in scientific and technological achievement between the leading states and the others likely to widen or narrow? What may be the consequences for world politics of varying degrees of mobilization of science in the interest of national security? With arms control agreements to what extent would scientists be liberated to work on non-military problems and with what consequences? How is state behavior affected by the incorporation of scientists into the highest levels of national decision-making? Etc., etc.

What Caryl Haskins does do is to argue in a reasoned and humane way for a number of policyrelevant propositions such as the following. Zones of free inquiry need to be wider than the territory of most existing states, and especially some of the new states. The new states especially need 'crossnational co-operative training centers." The most relevant technologies for the new nations are not necessarily nuclear. The intermediate nations can be shown how to use the scientists they now have with much greater effectiveness. Scientists of North America and Western Europe need to organize advisory groups to offer policy counsel to the scientists of less advanced nations. Above all, the gains in winning races to the moon and in being first in other prestige projects are ephemeral as compared with the gains to be derived from

ministering to the needs of nations on the threshold of the scientific revolution.—WILLIAM T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

International Stability. EDITED BY DALE J. HEKHUIS, CHARLES G. MCCLINTOCK AND ARTHUR L. BURNS. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964. Pp. xii, 296. \$6.00.)

This anthology grew out of a study project originally undertaken by the author-editors for General Electric's Technical Military Planning Operation (TEMPO), "exploring the military, economic, and political nature of the future international environment and identifying possible alternative strategies for coping with various contingencies." Identifying it as a pragmatic approach, the small volume draws together a number of items that have been published elsewhere, woven around the central theme "International Stability" (or rather, the lack of it) and arranged according to the unsolved problems in underdeveloped areas, mutual deterrence, disarmament-arms control and international organization.

Robert C. Tucker joins the primary authors in a collegial introduction which asserts that the two overriding realities of our day are the "thermonuclear balance of terror" and the "social revolutions in the underdeveloped areas of the world." Stability is defined to assume constant change within and among the constituent elements of world society, but within a system that has the propensity to preserve its members "against destruction or elimination, not merely by resisting or precluding change, but by adjusting to it through rearrangement." The succeeding essays strive to identify threats to stability in the system and to suggest strategies and specific measures for promoting international order.

Lucian Pye's piece on underdeveloped areas (Ch. 3) is a good analysis of the slowly evolving realization in the United States public that the end of colonialism, even with technical and financial aid, was not an unmixed blessing. Indeed, it has added new challenges to our national security wholly unrelated to the Communist threat. The dimensions examined are (1) strain on the existing nation-state system, (2) strain between advanced and developing states, (3) rivalries among developing states and (4) uncertain controls within themselves. Pye forecasts growing tension through 1975.

Paul Rosenstein-Rodan joined Hekhuis in canvassing the most promising programs for alleviating instability in underdeveloped areas. Six suggestions in the technical assistance field seem to be the brightest prospects, but here it is noted the U.S. is particularly weak. Among 26 "Free World Nations" offering on-the-job train-

ing exchange programs the United States ranks 18th. Beyond this distinctly pragmatic method, the authors displayed a pronounced confidence in the efficacy of research itself.

Those familiar with the writing of Robert Osgood and Tom Schelling will already have seen their worthwhile contributions on nuclear deterrence and arms control. Arthur Burns' look at the Nth Country problem, however, is novel. He assumes a 4-power world in 1970-the USA, USSR, Europe and Communist China; or, alternatively, a bi-polar world with other blocs forced into dependence on the now-familiar East-West goliaths. While exploring rather thoroughly numerous alternatives, the assumptions and variables become so profuse as to produce a model containing too many "ifs" to be even mildly reassuring that stability is more than an accidental possibility. Sample reservation: "The Russians . . . might not share (in its entirety) the West's conception of rational behavior" (p. 129).

A common pattern throughout the book, both useful and disjunctive at times, is the opening of chapters with a set of hypotheses. This technique, so essential to scientific precision, often leads the student of politics into the employment of unstated assumptions or, a worse fault, the construction of a model that may have little recognizable similarity to reality. In Chapter 7, McClintock and Hekhuis excellently evaluate the merits of an independent European deterrent based on the assumptions that (1) current NATO deterrent strategy based on U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability is inadequate and inappropriate for strategic defense of Europe, and (2) formation of a European Community organization with independent strategic force is both desirable and feasible. However, one senses that the solution is dependent on the unstated assumption that historic nationalistic drives and rivalries that appear to defy logic will somehow succumb to this superior logical analysis.

Burns is somewhat more candid in this regard when in his chapter on "Problems of Disarmament" he opens by citing the argument that "the fortunate accident of a stable deterrent system or 'balance of terror' makes disarmament undesirable," and even if desirable currently impossible; but amid the evaluation of evidence observes, "It may turn out there is no way of arriving at stable disarmament. But if so, neither is there a substitute for it." As much as anything in the book, this is an admission that the facts with which we work are as unstable as they are alarmingly real.

Taken as a whole, the collection of writing that makes up this book would be most useful to the people least likely to read it—those who are inclined to oversimplify issues and plunge into easy solutions. The concluding chapter (U.N. as Peace-

Preserving Force) is characteristic. In analyzing problems and contingencies the work is excellent. In providing solutions, or even fruitful methods for identifying solutions, there is apt to be more frustration than illumination. Although alluded to, none of the co-authors of this book ever comes to grip with the common element of destabilizing force that permeates most of their actual and assumed situations—the heterogeneity of value systems and inability to communicate among ideologies and cultures. For me, at least, there is something very incomplete about discussions of international stability in terms of "thermonuclear deterrence" in an age in which the greater number of world troublespots are inhabited by people who could not care less-even if they understood its significance.—James A. Riedel, State University of New York, Graduate School of Public Affairs.

The European Community and Its Role in the World. By Max Kohnstamm. (Columbia, Mo.: The University of Missouri Press, 1964. Pp. 82. \$2.50.)

This slender book by Max Kohnstamm (former member of the Dutch Foreign Service, High Authority of E.C.S.C., and now Vice President of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe) constituted the John Findley Green Foundation lectures at Westminster College in March 1963, in which the author examined the philosophy behind the European Community, its relationship with Britain and the United States, and its prospects for the future. Because of events in 1963—especially the test ban treaty and the death of President Kennedy—Kohnstamm added an epilogue in January 1964, but the story is still anticlimactic, though he believes that the British entry has been only delayed.

Kohnstamm's basic assumption is that Europe can become a force for peace only if it is federalized. War had been a traditional necessity, to right the balance when disturbed, but when both economics and politics became aspects of nationalism, the law of the jungle applied to both. Only after World War II was it evident that economic nationalism and war were so catastrophic that the old system was unable to provide civilization with a framework in which it could continue. A common interest had to be created between peoples whose interests had heretofore been divided by national boundaries. "A common interest leads to a common view." The Coal and Steel Community was an appropriate beginning, and its institutions permit Community decisions, the essence of the new system.

In 1945 Britain reverted to its traditional role of being both in and out of Europe at the same time. Standing at the center of a group of interconnecting circles and not belonging completely to any one of them, Britain refused to join the Coal and Steel Community, EDC, and at first the Common Market. Although the United States had also withdrawn from Europe after World War I, it understood in 1945 that this could happen again only by accepting Soviet comination of Europe. The United States could escape from Europe only by helping Europe to unite, which she did, until Europe is now no longer a protege but a partner of America. Given this new situation, Britain moved to join the European Community.

Kohnstamm says that most of the British-Community problems were soluble, and were largely solved during the negotiations. The fundamental difficulty resulted from a French failure to recognize that the Community is a process and not a new bloc or a new Power. While trying to mold the Community into a 19th century coalition, France acted contrary to the spirit of the Community, which is that of common action collectively decided upon. The free nations will unite only if they can establish the necessary collective mechanisms. It is a clear phoice: states are condemned to remain in the jungle or they must build the institutions which permit collective action. They must choose between the 19th century and the 20th century.

Many Council decisions now requiring unanimity can be taken, after 1965, by majority decision. But the parliamentary influence within the Community's institutions must be strengthened. The procedure for nominating the Commission must be revised to give citizens a direct influence. A delegation of foreign policy and defense powers must be made, though unity here can be reached only gradually. The Community and America must be interdependent.

Little in this book is new. The student of contemporary affairs will not need to tarry long. The book provides, rather, a general knowledge of the European Community, told in a clear fashion that can be understood by the general public which, after all, is the type of audience for which it was intended.—Donald G. Bishop, Syracuse University.

The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Forces. By John C. Ries. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. Pp. xviii, 228. \$6.50.)

This provocative book by a member of the Department of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy is an account of the continuing problems of armed services unification and defense organization. Essentially it is a thoughtful and spirited attack upon the "myth" that control can be established through centralization.

By analyzing the response to the lessons of the

second World War, the debates leading to the National Security Act of 1947 and to amendments to the Act of 1949, and to the defense reorganizations of 1953 and 1958, Ries contends that "the folklore of organizational efficiency and control" have largely been unsuccessful. According to this folklore, efficiency and control are achieved by "the all powerful executive who sits at the apex of a tightly organized, tightly run organizational pyramid—the man who makes all decisions, the man who runs things from the top down." As a matter of fact, however, the efforts of defense reformers to create such a structure have brought about a vast, centralized bureaucracy that is beyond control.

The concept of control through centralization of authority is derived from the principle of hierarchical organization inherited from the United States Army. This principle, however, is based upon assumptions that are disproved by contemporary studies in organizational behavior. As the structure becomes larger, the executive at the top becomes increasingly removed from the operations he seeks to control. He is reduced to endorsing proposals from his subordinates, and he retains little real influence other than indicating general approval.

The prototype of Ries' ideal organizational model is found in the Operations Division of the World War II War Department. In this central command post, no attempt was made to separate policy and administrative functions. The flow of information and decisions was both upward and downward. By avoiding all operational and support responsibilities, OPD maintained control by dealing only with the broadest policy guidelines and by providing a link between goals and the instrumentalities to achieve these goals. It served as an agency by which the operators were brought into the policy process as a part of a two way continuum.

It is Ries' conviction that means and ends cannot be separated. The statesman's task does not end with a declaration of goals and the soldier's task is more than providing the means in terms of men, ships and planes. Each task shades off into the other. Thus both the statesman and the soldier must participate in policy-making. This being the case, control of defense organization is more a matter of political leadership than of administrative authority. Successive secretaries of defense have lost control when they have failed to recognize that the authority of the office depends not upon the degree of uniformity imposed upon the defense organization, but upon the agreement that can be developed among the various parties who, because of expertise, knowledge and responsibility, participate in the ends-means adjustment of policy-making. Ultimately the authority of the secretary depends upon skill in

negotiation and ability to persuade others to accept a course of action by convincing them that it is in their interest to do so.

Although Ries retraces much of the ground covered by Hammong, Kintner, Schilling, Stanley and other students of defense organization, he brings to this material a fresh analysis derived from his critical use of recent contributions to the theory of organizational behavior. He is successful in this effort. Yet apart from conclusions developed in his analysis of experience between 1942 and 1958, he does not attempt to set forth recommendations for action. While recognizing that control of defense policy and organization depends more upon executive behavior than upon organizational structure, he does offer some general observations on administrative decentralization. Ries suggests only in bare outline how such decentralization might be achieved. He concludes with an almost wistful hope that Congress is the most likely source of initiative in this direction. Although not within the scope of this book. one wishes that Ries had applied his insights to the development of recommendations in the context of the administration of the Department of Defense by Secretary McNamara.-John W. MASLAND, Dartmouth College.

Problems of the Trusteeship System. Travaux de Droit, D'Economie de Sociologie et de Sciences Politiques, No. 24. By George Thullen. (Geneva, Librairie Droz, 1964.)

There are at least two good reasons why a scholar might rework a well plowed field. He may, on the one hand, uncover new data leading to a more complete or different description of a subject. Or, he might approach the same data with a new perspective, reorganizing the subject around different concepts. Professor Morgenthau's treatment of international politics, organized around the concept of power, comes to mind as an example of the latter.

The subtitle of George Thullen's, Problems of the Trusteeship System, "A Study of Political Behavior in the United Nations," offers the promise to treat in a new way a—by now—old subject. And, indeed, in his Introduction, while nodding politely in the direction of other works on trusteeship, he laments their failure to deal with "the political climate shaping the decisions taken during the different post-war phases" (p. 13). Unfortunately, the introductory promise is largely unfulfilled in the body of the work.

The book is divided into three distinct parts. Part I amounts to an unexceptional description of the formation of the trusteeship system, which adds nothing to the prior literature on the subject. Part II examines some of the procedural and substantive issues encountered by the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly, while Part

III is a case study of the Togoland issue, which is a well documented repetition and extension of James Coleman's work on the subject.¹

The most interesting chapter (V) in the book is to be found in Part II. Here the author attempts to relate developments in the trusteeship system to the changing international environment, as well as noting the contributions of members of the Secretariat to the working of the system. He indicates the connection, for example, between the shift in Soviet tactics after Stalin's death and the "package deal" of 1955, which expanded United Nations membership considerably, with the growing acceleration of anti-colonial sentiment in the General Assembly. These relationships are rather sketchily traced, however, and what might have been the basis of an interesting work on the politics of trusteeship is but a ten page essay of intriguing speculation.

The basic difficulty of the book, given its stated purpose, is that the author seems to be unclear about just what he means by politics. If one attempts a study of "political behavior," surely it ought to be clear to the reader just what is meant by that term. This is not to argue that the writer is obligated to survey completely the ever increasing mass of literature concerning concept and method in political science. But it is to assert that it is incumbent on him to make clear just what he means by "politics." The difficulties arising from a failure to do this are apparent throughout the book, especially in those parts which attempt to describe political behavior in the trusteeship system.

Consider the following paragraph concerning

¹ James S. Coleman, "Togoland," International Conciliation. No. 509 (September, 1956), pp. 1-91. the question of the Trusteeship Council's Annual Report to the General Assembly:

In essence, this long-winded dispute over the layout of the Council's report merely underlined a tendency to politicize issues brought before the Trusteeship Council, resulting from balanced membership of increasingly hostile groups and government [sic] rather than expert representation. Continuing insistence by nonadministering members that equal prominence be given majority and minority, administering and non-administering views grew out of this basic mistrust. If information supplied by administering powers were assumed to be a misrepresentation of facts, then naturally the only protection would lie in structuring the report to the advantage of the opposing group by giving equal weight to factual corrections-or counterpropaganda. Although all members claimed they were interested primarily in protecting the interests of trust territory inhabitants, this jockeying for position reflected the importance of Council members' own prestige considerations rather than of the search for a mutually acceptable objectivity. (p. 70.)

If this means anything it means: (1) politics involves conflict (a proposition to which we may all readily subscribe); but (2) something called "mutually acceptable objectivity" is a possible, indeed desireable, substitute for politics. This, to make a wild understatement, is not a widely held view among contemporary students of political behavior, whatever differences they may have.

In emphasizing the negative attributes of the book, I do not mean to imply that there is not considerable merit in it, especially in terms of thoroughness of description. But in any work purporting to contain political analysis, it is critical—particularly in the field of international organization—that the author go somewhat further than writing in terms of "politicizing" issues through conflict of policy, and "depoliticizing" them through "mutually acceptable objectivity." The point is too important for the study of international organization to pass unremarked.—James N. Murray, University of Ioua.

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- TINT, HERBERT, The Decline of French Patriotism 1870-1940. (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicholson Limited. 1964. Pp. x, 272. 40s net.)
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- TRUMAN, DAVID B., The Congress and America's Future. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1965. Pp. 185. \$3.95.)
- Van Chi, Hoang, From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1964. Pp xv, 252. \$6.50.)

- VAZQUEZ, MODESTO SEARA, El Mundo en Transicion. (Cuadernos Americanos. 1964. Pp. 72. paper.)
- Von Stein, Lorenz, The History of the Social Movement in France 1789-1850. (Totowa: The Bedminster Press. 1964. Pp. 467. \$10.00.)
- WAGGAMAN, JOHN S., Health Regulations and the Indiana Food Industry. (Bloomington: Institute of Public Administration. Indiana University. 1965. Pp. iv, 81. paper.)
- WAINHOUSE, DAVID W., Remnants of Empire. (New York: Harper & Row Inc. 1964. Pp. x, 153. \$1.95, paper.)
- Webb, Colonal Lester A., Captain Alden Partridge and the U. S. Military Academy. (Northport, Alabama: American Southern Publishing Co. 1965. Pp. 224. \$7.50.)
- WHEELER, GOFFREY, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1964. Pp xi, 272. \$7.00.)
- WILKINSON, B., Constitutional History of England in the Fifteenth Century. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1964. Pp. x, 418. \$8.50.)
- WIONCZEK, MIGUEL S., Latin American Free Trade Association. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. 80. 50¢, paper.)
- WRIGHT, LOUIS B., The Dream of Prosperity in Colonial America. (New York: New York University Press. 1965. Pp. 96. \$3.50.)
- YANAGA, CHITOSHI, Japanese People and Politics. (New York: Science Editions. 1965. Pp. 408. \$2.25, paper.)
- ZETTERBERG, HANS L., On Theory and Verification in Sociology. (Totowa: The Bedminster Press. 1965. Pp. 177. \$4.50.)
- ZINNER, PAUL E., Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia 1918–1948. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1963. Pp. xi, 264. \$6.50.)
- ZUBER, RICHARD L., Jonathan Worth: A Biography of a Southern Unionist. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1965. Pp. 351. \$7.50.)

NEWS AND NOTES

1965 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1965-66

The 1965 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8-11 at the Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D. C. Dr. H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Brookings Institution, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee (comprised of James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina, Chairman; Bernard C. Cohen, University of Wisconsin; Alfred Diamant, Haverford College; Robert Horn, Stanford University; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; and Ruth Weintraub, Hunter College) will propose the following officers for 1965-66:

President Elect: Robert A. Dahl, Yale University

Vice Presidents: Manning J. Dauer, University of Florida William T. R. Fox, Columbia University

Rupert Emerson, Harvard University Secretary: John H. Kautsky, Washington University, St. Louis

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D. C.

Members of the Council for two years:

James C. Davies, University of Oregon Alex N. Dragnich, Vanderbilt University Heinz Eulau, Stanford University Samuel Hendel, City College of New York Wallace Mendelson, University of Texas Laurence I. Radway, Dartmouth College William H. Riker, University of Rochester Victor G. Rosenblum, Northwestern University

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1966 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1966 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in New York City at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, September 6-10. Early appointment of the Program Committee for the meeting makes it timely now to invite anyone having program suggestions for the occasion to convey them as soon as convenient, and prior to October, 1965, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Members of the Committee are:

Chairman, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

American Government-Donald Matthews, University of North Carolina

Civil Order and Violence—Guy Pauker, Rand Corporation

Comparative Politics: Developed Systems-Lewis Edinger, Washington University, St. Louis

Comparative Politics: Developing Systems-Myron Weiner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Comparative Politics: Communist Systems-A. Doak Barnett, Columbia University

Data Bases for Political Science—Hayward Alker, Yale University

International Relations-James Rosenau, Douglass College, Rutgers University

Judicial Processes-Yosele Rogat, Stanford University

Operations Analysis in Government—James March, University of California, Irvine Political Modernization in the U. S.—Norton Long, Brandeis University Political Processes—Dwaine Marvick, University of California, Los Angeles Political Psychology—Herbert McClosky, University of California, Berkeley

Political Theory—David Spitz, Ohio State University

Public Administration—Herbert Kaufman, Yale University

State and Local Government-James Wilson, Harvard University

Strategic Studies-Albert Wohlstetter, University of Chicago

The Program Committee invites younger members of the Association to submit papers for consideration to the appropriate section chairman listed above. This procedure replaces separately organized selected-paper or volunteer-paper panels but is designed to afford the same opportunity. To be considered, papers should be submitted no later than December 1, 1965.

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

Congressional Study Project.-In a statement appearing in the Congressional Record of May 21, Sen. Carl Hayden of Arizona described progress of the Association's Study of Congress project. The text of his comments follows:

Mr. President, a good many Members of Congress participated in the discussions that led to establishment by the American Political Science Association of its comprehensive Study of Congress. Supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, this project today is focusing the attention of more than 16 persons on various aspects of congressional organization and operations. The purpose of the study is to contribute to informed public discussion of the problems of Congressional reorganization—a timely thing, considering the current hearings by the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, established under S. Con. Res. 2.

As the report to the Senate said, "During the

past several years there has developed an ever-increasing conviction among Members of Con-gress, reinforced by many expressions of opinion from the public at large, that a study and review of the present congressional machinery is a real necessity if Congress is to continue to be an effective co-equal partner in our tripartite system

of government."

In coming to this conclusion, it was necessary that those within Congress communicate in a meaningful way with their constituents who share a meaningful way with their constituents who share the constituents who can be considered to the constituents where the constituents which is the constituents where the constituents who can be considered to the constituents where the constituents wher many viewpoints. And in turn, those in the outside community who wish to contribute to any changes must help to develop a better understanding of the unique qualities of this institution in order to successfully interpret it. As an out-standing journalist and student of Congress in a recent speech put it,

"The members of Congress have valid cause for reacting with suspicion to much of the intellectual community for a latent hostility toward Congress permeates the thinking of many leaders of public opinion outside Congress. It is evident in the books of political scientists, in newspaper editorials, and even in the witticisms of our humorists. It is most evident of all in many of the reforms of Congress that are suggested. Too often, proposed reforms smack of an obvious intent to reduce Congress from its status as a separate and independent branch of the federal government."

This does not seem to be the case with the Study of Congress. Its initiation and organization was the product of a cooperative effort between Members of both Houses on both sides of the aisle working with the Association's executive director, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, and his associate, Donald G. Tacheron.

In announcing the Study, which is being carried out under the direction of Ralph K. Huitt of the University of Wisconsin, Kirkpatrick said:

"The vitality of legislative bodies is essential to the preservation of individual freedom, to democracy and to the maintenance of social and economic viability.

Before considering drastic changes in Congress -an institution which has served this nation very well-we must first clarify various assumptions regarding the role of Congress in our system, identifying and analyzing major prob-lems of Congressional operation and explaining the character and probable consequences of realistic alternatives for structural or procedural change."

Mr. President, I feel that these are words of wise counsel in our present deliberations, and I want to take this opportunity to bring to the attention of my colleagues the names and aca-demic affiliations of the scholars who are engaged in this important undertaking, so that Members who are interested will find it convenient to contact them for their views and assistance:

Milton C. Cummings, The Brookings Institution Richard F. Fenno, University of Rochester Lewis A. Froman, Jr., University of California at Irvine

Charles O. Jones, University of Arizona John F. Manley, Syracuse University Roy E. Moor, George Washington University Kenneth G. Olson, formerly at Smith College,

Kenneth G. Olson, formerly at Smith College, and now a consultant David M. Olson, University of Texas Samuel C. Patterson, State University of Iowa Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University Randall B. Ripley, The Bookings Institution Leroy N. Rieselbach, State University of Iowa James A. Robinson, Ohio State University John S. Saloma, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Technology Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University

Committee Staff Assignment.-A political scientist, Nicholas A. Masters, of Pennsylvania State University, is participating directly in the activities of the Joint Committee on Organization of Congress. Masters' appointment as staff research consultant was announced April 14 by Sen. A. S. Mike Monroney (D., Okla.) and Rep. Ray J. Madden (D., Ind), co-chairmen of the committee. A former research fellow in Sen. Philip A. Hart's office, Masters has been granted temporary leave by the university for the duration of the Congressional assignment.

Congressional Staff Fellowship Program.—The Association on May 6 announced approval of grants totaling \$99,000 for study and research projects planned by nine Congressional Staff members. The awards were made Association's Congressional Staff Fellowship Program, designed to encourage the further development of a permanent and highly professional staff system in Congress. Winners were selected by a bi-partisan Advisory Committee, composed of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Senators Thomas Kuchel and Russell

Long; Representatives Leslie Arends and Hale Boggs; and Donald Herzberg, director, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.

Competition for the awards, made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation, was open to all professional House and Senate office and committee staff employees. Winners undertake study and research projects related to their professional responsibilities and goals at the college or university of their choice. The awards carry a stipend of up to \$14,000 for a full year and up to \$8,000 for six months of study. The 1965–66 Congressional Staff Fellows are:

- Samuel J. Archibald, staff director, House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee
- RICHARD L. BOWEN, Legislative Assistant, Senator Karl E. Mundt
- HAROLD F. EBERLE, Jr., Administrative Assistant, Representative Robert J. Corbett
- RICHARD W. C. FALKNOR, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
- HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, Legislative Assistant, Senator E. L. Bartlett
- WILLIAM T. KENDALL, Administrative Assistant, Representative Peter Frelinghuysen
- WILL ERNEST LEONARD, Jr., Legislative Assistant, Senator Russell B. Long
- STANLEY L. NEWMAN, Legislative Assistant, Representative William F. Ryan
- KENT WATKINS, Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Standing Rules

Seminar in Legislative Operations.—The fifth in the series of Legislative Operations Roundtables, jointly sponsored by the Association and the Office of Career Development of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, was held May 10–14 for 20 Federal executives. The sessions were conducted at Georgetown University and at the Capitol. The program is part of a continuing effort to improve the federal career executive's knowledge and understanding of executive-legislative relations through an examination in depth of Congressional functions and processes. Discussion leaders and their subjects were as follows:

Max Kampelman, A.P.S.A. Treasurer and Counsel, "Congress and the American System"

- Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University, and Robert L. Peabody, The Johns Hopkins University, "Congressional Organization: Leadership and Rules Changes in the 89th Congress"
- Richard M. Scammon, Director of Elections Research Center, Governmental Affairs Institute, "The Congressman and His Constituency"

- Stanley J. McFarland, Assistant Director, Federal Relations Division, National Education Association and Mary C. Gereau, Legislative Consultant, N.E.A., "External Pressures on Congress"
- Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System"
- Senator George D. Aiken, Vermont, "Representing and Informing the People: The Senate"
- D. B. Hardeman, Administrative Assistant to Majority Whip Hale Boggs, and Eugene Eidenberg, Congressional Fellow of the American Political Science Association, "The Legislative Process"
- Wilfred Rommel, Deputy Director, Office of Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget, "Central Legislative Clearance and Legislative Liaison"
- Robert Clark, Clerk, Committee on Appropriations, U. S. Senate, "Financial Policy Determination and the Appropriations Process"
- Francis J. Keenan, Administrative Assistant to Rep. Florence P. Dwyer and Kenneth Kofmehl, Purdue University, "Work behind the Scenes—The Congressional Staff"
- Carl B. Swisher, The Johns Hopkins University, "Congress and the Courts"
- Ralph K. Huitt, University of Wisconsin, "Legislative-Executive Branch Relations"

Social Studies Teachers' Seminars.-A group of Arlington County, Virginia, high school teachers explored the current state of political science and government during an eight-week series of seminars, which started March 29. Entitled "Political Science and the Social Studies," the seminars were co-sponsored by the Association and the Division of Instruction, Arlington County Public Schools. The sessions were conducted by leading members of the legislative and executive branches of the government, political scientists and other experts in the field of public affairs. About 50 of the Arlington Public School system's social studies teachers participated. Carried out as part of the Association's Social Studies Project, the seminar leaders and their subjects were as follows:

- Richard M. Scammon, Director of Elections Research Center, Governmental Affairs Institute, "The Electoral Process"
- Rep. Ken Hechler, Fourth District, West Virginia, "The Congress and the Presidency"
- William B. Prendergast, Director of Research, House Republican Conference, "Political Parties"
- Max Kampelman, A.P.S.A. treasurer and counsel, "The Judicial Process"

Norman Beckman, Assistant Director, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Local Government"

Field Haviland, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, "Foreign Policy and International Relations"

Harold Seidman, Director, Office of Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget, "Organization and Management"

Evron M. Kirkpatrick, A.P.S.A. Executive Director, "Political Science and the Social Studies"

Internship Evaluation Conference.—The Association sponsored a conference April 15–19 to consider implications of various forms of political internship for the educational process. Included among those attending the sessions, supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation and held near San Juan, Puerto Rico, were directors of all such programs involving more than a single campus. Seven of the participants presented papers on the potential—and problems—of political internship. They were:

Everett Cataldo, Ohio State University, "Evaluation of the Congressional Fellowship Program"

Bernard C. Hennessy, National Center for Education in Politics, "The Nature and Scope of College Political Internship Programs: Survey and Commentary"

Donald G. Herzberg, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, "The Care and Feeding of Interns"

Harold D. Lasswell, Yale Law School, "The Professional and Public Service Potential of Internship Programs"

James A. Robinson, Ohio State University, "Internships, Participant Observation, and Research"

John G. Stewart, Office of the Vice President, "The Intern Crisis: Some Thoughts on the Overextension of a Good Thing"

Sidney Wise, Franklin and Marshall College, "The Administration of an Internship Program"

Also attending the conference were the following:

Donald Bacon, Newhouse National News Service

Rep. John Brademas, of Indiana

Donald Balmer, Lewis and Clark College

Preston Edsall, North Carolina State College

D. B. Hardeman, Office of Democratic Whip, House of Representatives

Stephen Horn, Legislative Assistant to Sen. Thomas Kuchel

Victor Jones, University of California, Berkeley

Max Kampelman, A.P.S.A. treasurer and counsel

Evron M. Kirkpatrick, A.P.S.A. Executive Director

Malcolm Moos, The Ford Foundation Richard Neustadt, Harvard University

J. W. Peltason, University of California at
Irvine

Donald G. Tacheron, A.P.S.A. Associate Di-

Paul N. Ylvisaker, Public Affairs Division, The Ford Foundation

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Eighth Annual Conference of the District of Columbia Political Science Association was held on December 5, 1964, at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D. C. Panel I was chaired by Pio Uliassi of the State Department who presented four discussants on the "International Implications of the Sino-Soviet Dispute." They were Franz Michael, George Washington University; Cary Fisher, editorial staff of USIA's Problems of Communism; Eric Willenz, Department of State; and Samuel L. Sharp, American University. Panel II chaired by Edna Fluegel of Trinity College presented a discussion formally titled "Consensus and the Two-Party System." Discussants were Robert J. Corber, chairman of the Virginia Republican Party; Franklin L. Burdette, University of Maryland; and Wesley McCune, president of Group Research, Inc. Panel III chaired by Nathaniel Preston, American

University, probed "Political Science, Public Administration and the Technological Revolution." Paul W. Howerton and Terence G. Jackson, Jr., of American University and Stanford Research Institute respectively, presented papers on "The New Technology and Its Application" and "Points of Impact between Technology and Political Science: Some Researchable Propositions." Outgoing president Richard M. Scammon presided over the business meeting which elected the following Association officers: president, Charles L. Clapp, Legislative Assistant to Senator Saltonstall; 1st vice president, Valerie Earle, Georgetown University; 2d vice president, Richard T. Greer, executive director of Operations & Policy Research, Inc.; council member (2 years), Hugh LeBlanc, George Washington University; and council member (2 years), Walter Kravits, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

The Midwest Political Science Association met at Indiana University April 22 and 23 and commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Department of Government there. John E. Stoner, Indiana University, president of the association, presided. The program arranged by John E. Turner, University of Minnesota, consisted of considerations of the following topics with the leader of each: political theory, Thomas L. Thorson, University of Wisconsin; national government, Philip Wilder, Wabash College; comparative government, J. B. Christoph, Ohio State University; state and local government, David Minar, Northwestern University; public law and judicial process, Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky; international relations and foreign policy, David Farnsworth, University of Wichita; political parties, Paul Smith, Grinnell College; political behavior, Kenneth Prewett, Washington University (St. Louis); and developing nations, J. Gus Liebenow, Indiana University.

Two special features were an applied demonstration of simulation arranged by Raymond Tanter, Northwestern University, and a panel arranged by graduate students.

The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy held its annual meeting April 24–25, 1965 in Washington, D. C. Richard B. Brandt, chairman of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, was named president-elect. J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College, was appointed editor and John W. Chapman, University of Pittsburgh, associate editor of Nomos, the annual publication of the Society. Forthcoming volumes of Nomos will stress "Equality," the topic of the Washington meeting, and "Representation," the topic of the joint meeting with the American Political Science Association in September, 1965. The editors invite suggestions on potential contributors.

In the future, depending upon the topic selected for consideration at the Annual Meeting, the Society will meet in conjunction with the annual meetings of other social science disciplines.

Indiana and Purdue Universities served as hosts to the University-Federal Agency Conference held at Bloomington, Indiana, April 25 to April 28. The conference was sponsored by the U. S. Civil Service Commission and was attended by educators and government agency officials interested in the problems of career development and continuing education.

The Department of Government and the Division of University Extension of Indiana University, in cooperation with the Atlantic Council of the United States and the WFBM stations of Indianapolis, sponsored a conference on the United States and the Atlantic Community in February.

Rutgers—The State University sponsored a conference on International and Comparative Urban Studies and American Higher Education on June 6-8 in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

A conference on Liberty and Loyalty in a Free Society, sponsored by the Institute of Governmental Affairs and the Department of Political Science, was held March 27, 1965, at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Speakers included Supreme Court Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Thomas Fairchild, David Fellman of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Dean Reynolds Seitz of the Marquette Law School, Harry Kalven, Jr. of the University of Chicago Law School, Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern University, and Allan Dionisopoulos of Northern Illinois University.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, in collaboration with the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, will hold sessions for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. in Berkeley, California, December 26-31, 1965.

Association members interested in presenting a paper at these sessions should forward titles and abstracts of some 300 words not later than September 1 to Donald P. Ray, Director, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D. C. 20044.

Papers should be based on research current or recently completed by the author. Subjects may concern any field of political science, and especially science and public administration, political sociology of semi-developed countries, and international relations and the political science of national security.

Selected materials of the sessions will be published by the National Institute. The annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. is the largest professional meeting in the world.

Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., have announced the establishment of the John Fitzgerald

Kennedy Memorial Award of \$10,000 for a "book of general interest which illumines the influence of an individual or individuals on his or their times and which fosters an understanding of this country or its role in the world." The publishers expect to make the first award to a manuscript received prior to December 31, 1965, and to make similar awards regularly in ensuing years. Judges for this year's manuscript will be Senator Robert F. Kennedy; McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President; and Allan Nevins, professor emeritus of American History at Columbia University. Interested persons should contact the publishers at 49 E. 33rd Street, New York, New York 10016 for further details.

The Weil Institute for Studies in Religion and the Humanities is offering eight 1966 summer fellowships, each yielding \$1,200. Those eligible are faculty members working on publishable papers in the humanities (literature, art, history, philosophy, etc.) dealing with religion. The purpose of the grant is to enable the recipient to forego summer teaching in order to further his research or writing in connection with his paper, at a location of his choice. Preference in the past has been accorded to younger candidates in the lower academic ranks. While the project may ultimately be incorporated in a book, the essay should be an end in itself, and not a segment of a proposed book. Applications must be submitted by September 1, 1965, to the Weil Institute, 3101 Clifton Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45220.

A seminar on State Politics in India was held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology on December 21–23, 1964. The seminar was sponsored by the South Asia Committee of the Association for Asian Studies and was organized and chaired by Myron Weiner of M.I.T. Papers were read by Wayne Wilcox of Columbia, Baldev Raj Nayar of McGill University, Hugh Gray of L.S.E., Lawrence Shrader of Mills College, Marcus Franda of the University of Chicago and Paul Brass of Bryn Mawr. These papers, along with several others, will be published in a volume on the comparative study of the Indian states.

The University of Pennsylvania has received a total of \$545,000 in grants to initiate a five-year cross-cultural study of the social values which influence the community leaders of countries in the process of political development to make decisions whose effect is to pull the society together. The main focus of the study will be on the identification, comparison and measurement of those values held by community leaders which influence their policy decisions.

In order to secure cross-cultural comparisons,

the study will be conducted along parallel lines in several countries and regions within countries. During the first year, it will concentrate on India, Yugoslavia and Poland as well as the United States, and on the basis of this experience extend it to other areas.

Philip E. Jacob, professor of political science at Pennsylvania and director of the University's Program of International Cooperative Research on Social Values and Political Behavior, will direct the international study. Operationally based at Pennsylvania, it will be conducted with the collaboration of political and social scientists from various American and foreign universities.

Indiana University has been chosen by the National Institute of Public Affairs to conduct special mid-career training for government officials in the field of Science, Technology and Public Policy. Universities now cooperating with NIPA in various program facets of government mid-career training are Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Chicago, Virginia and Indiana.

The ninth annual Institute on United States Foreign Policy was held in the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Union on March 6, 1965. Speakers on the topic, "Break-up of the Bipolar World?" included Oliver E. Clubb, Jr. of Syracuse University; Alexander Dallin of Columbia University; James F. Leonard, Department of State; and Theodore C. Achilles, Atlantic Council, Washington, D. C.

BETTY BRAND BURCH, Tufts University, chaired the New England Regional Conference for the Association of Asian Studies held at Tufts last November.

ARDATH W. BURKS, Rutgers University, did field work in Japan during the first semester of 1965-66 on a grant from the Rutgers Research Council.

James L. Busey, University of Colorado, served as Fulbright professor of political science at the School of Sociology and Politics, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, during the spring semester of 1964.

George Carey, Georgetown University, was on leave of absence during 1964-65 to do research with Charles Hyneman at Indiana University.

THOMAS H. CLANCY, S. J., Loyola University, New Orleans, has been awarded a cross-disciplinary postdoctoral fellowship by the Society for Religion in Higher Education of New Haven, Connecticut. He will study at Oxford University during the 1965-66 academic year. GORDON B. CLEVELAND, University of North Carolina, will spend the summer and fall in Italy conducting research.

George A. Codding, Jr., University of Colorado, has been granted a one-year faculty fellowship for 1965-66. He will take up research residence in Geneva.

Patrick J. Conklin, University of Missouri, was on leave of absence during most of 1964, serving as a staff member of the State Reorganization Commission of Missouri.

ROBERT T. DALAND, University of North Carolina, will spend the summer in Brazil at the request of the School of Administration of the University of Bahia. He will serve as a consultant on the research program of the School and assist in the program of the Institute of Public Service.

RAYMOND H. DAWSON, will return to his position in the department of political science at the University of North Carolina after one year on leave at King's College, University of London.

JOHN C. DONOVAN has returned to teaching (Bowdoin) after an absence of six years which he spent in Washington. During that time he served in several capacities: as Administrative Assistant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie; as Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Labor and during the past year as Manpower Administrator in the Department of Labor.

ARTHUR DOWELL, Indiana State University, was on sabbatical leave during the spring semester.

Marion Doro has returned to Connecticut College as a regular member of the staff. During 1963-64 she was a visiting professor at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, on a University of Chicago Exchange Program supported by the Department of State.

Leo M. Egand, formerly of the New York City Planning Department, has been appointed Senior Management Consultant in the office of the Mayor of New York City.

Henry W. Ehrmann has been named Joel Parker professor of law and political science at Dartmouth.

AMITAI ETZIONI, Columbia University has been appointed to the editorial board of the Administrative Science Quarterly.

RICHARD R. FAGEN will be on leave from Stanford University for the academic years 1965-67 on a Ford Retraining Fellowship in Latin American politics.

STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM, Rutgers University, will be on research leave during 1965-66 on a grant from the Rutgers Research Council.

LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, Brandeis University, will be on leave during 1965-66 as a senior scholar at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii.

FEDERICO G. GIL returned in February to his position as chairman of Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina.

HENRY F. GOOLNOW will spend 18 months at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, to aid the university's public administration program.

GEORGE GRASSMUCK is serving as acting director of the Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Michigan during the academic year 1964-65.

RICHARD I. HOFFERBERT, Williams College, has been awarded an NCEP fellowship and will serve from July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, as special assistant to Governor Lane of Colorado.

DAN N. JACOBS, Miami University (Ohio), has been awarded a university grant for summer research in the Soviet Union.

C. Herschel Jones, Bucknell University, directed a week-long Institute of Public Personnel Administration for New York State, February 15-19. The Institute is part of New York's Public Administration Internship and Trainee program.

JOSEF KALVODA, University of San Diego, College for Women, has been awarded a research grant by the Hoover Institution on Revolution, Peace, and War, Stanford University.

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ, Notre Dame, has received a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

WILLIAM KINTER, University of Pennsylvania, received the annual award of the Assembly of Captive European Nations in February. Medals are awarded to journalists and political writers who have directed their concern toward Eastern Europe and the cause of freedom there.

Norman Kogan, University of Connecticut, spent his 1964-65 sabbatical leave in Rome, Italy.

DAVID KURTZMAN, University of Pennsylvania, is serving as a member of the Pennsylvania State Planning Board and of the Governor's Committee on Tax Administration by appointment of Governor Scranton.

HUGH L. LEBLANC, George Washington Uni-

versity, was on sabbatical leave during the spring semester of 1965.

Kurt L. London, George Washington University, has been invited to lecture on American foreign policy and the Sino-Soviet conflict at Keio University, the Imperial Japanese Defense Academy and the University of Kyoto in the fall of 1965.

H. Malcolm Macdonald, University of Texas, has been granted a research leave for the summer of 1965.

Daniel S. McHarque, formerly of the University of Michigan, has completed a two-year assignment as visiting professor of public administration with the University of South California's Public Administration project in Pakistan. He will now act in the same capacity for the University's Indonesian Public Administration project.

WARREN L. MASON, Miami University (Ohio), has returned from a month's study in India, sponsored by the Indian government.

CURTIS W. MARTIN has returned from a year's stay in Australia as Fulbright professor. In Australia he divided his time between the University of Sydney and the University of Tasmania at Hobart.

DONALD R. MATTHEWS has returned to the University of North Carolina after being on leave of absence at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, California.

L. VINCENT PADGETT, San Diego State College, was on leave during the spring quarter. He will spend the academic year 1965-66 in Colombia under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

CHARLES J. PARRISH, University of Texas, has resumed his post there following a year in Chile on research leave.

Howard Penniman, Georgetown University, combined a Fulbright research grant with sab-batical leave in southern France, during 1964-65.

EMMETTE S. REDFORD, University of Texas, will serve part time during the fall semester in the Graduate School of Business Administration.

DONALD R. REICH, Oberlin College, will spend the 1965-66 year as a fellow in the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science at Palo Alto. JOHN P. ROCHE, Brandeis University, will be on sabbatical leave in 1965-66. He has received a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

George K. Romoser, Connecticut College, received grants from the American Philosophical Society and the American Council of Learned Societies. He spent the 1964 summer in Berlin conducting research and lecturing at the Free University.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, University of Bridgeport, has been elected an honorary member of the *Instituto de Ciencias Sociales* of Spain.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW, Columbia University, is on sabbatical leave during the spring and fall terms of 1965. During the spring term he was NATO visiting professor in international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

ROBERT SELTZER, Indiana State University has been on sabbatical leave.

JOSEF SILVERSTEIN, Rutgers University, will teach at Cornell during the summer of 1965 and while there will counsel a group of secondary school teachers in a special Cornell program.

Karl N. Snow, Brigham Young University, is currently on leave to complete his doctorate at the University of California.

JOHN E. STONER, Indiana University, has received a research grant from the National Safety Council.

MORTON J. TENZER has resigned his position as associate director of the U. S. Civil Service Commission's Executive Seminar Center to become a staff member of the Institute of Public Administration in New York.

EARL WALLACE, University of North Carolina, served on the Evaluation Panel for the Selection of Fellowships for the National Science Foundation in Washington in February, 1965. He also served as a member of a committee to study the feasibility of expanding the coverage of the advanced test of the Graduate Record Examination.

ARTHUR M. WILSON has been named Daniel Webster professor at Dartmouth College.

DAVID O. D. WURFEL, University of Missouri, is spending the current academic year in the Far East. Much of his time has been devoted to a Fulbright lectureship at the University of Singapore.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

DAVID B. ABERNATHY, assistant professor, Stanford University, September, 1965.

JOHN BATCHELDER, instructor, University of Iowa.

George D. Beam, assistant professor, Chicago Circle Branch, University of Illinois, September, 1965.

EDWARD M. BERSHTEIN, associate professor 3 and chairman of the department, University of Hartford, Connecticut.

LEWIS BOWMAN, assistant professor, University of Virginia, September, 1965.

PETER K. BREIT, instructor, University of Hartford, Connecticut.

WILLIAM BRILL, assistant professor, Georgetown University.

MILTON C. CUMMINS, associate professor, Johns Hopkins University.

JOHN C. DONOVAN, professor, Bowdoin College.

VLADIMIR REISKY DE DUBNIC, associate professor, University of Virginia.

Marion Doro, assistant professor, Connecticut College.

DAVID V. EDWARDS, assistant professor, University of Texas.

MORTON GORDON, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Donald Hancock, assistant professor, University of Texas.

Harold C. Kinton, associate professor, George Washington University.

JAMES R. JENSEN, professor and coordinator of Instructional Television, University of Alabama, beginning February 1, 1965; formerly of the University of Houston.

Harold S. Johnson, assistant professor, Michigan State University, September, 1965.

JACK T. JOHNSON, professor and director of the Bureau of Government Research, Indiana State University.

WILLARD R. Johnson, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

MELVIN A. KAHN, associate professor, Indiana State University.

Bradley Karan, instructor, Michigan State University.

WILLIAM KEECH, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

ROBERT O. KEOHANE, instructor, Swarthmore College, September, 1965.

DAVID C. LEEGE, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

WILLIAM MATTHEWS, Indiana State University; formerly of the University of Vermont.

WILLIAM MAXAM, Indiana State University; formerly research analyst, Committee on Intergovernmental Relations.

Franz Michael, professor and director of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, Georgetown University; formerly of University of Washington.

STANLEY MILLET, professor and chairman of the department, Adelphi University, September, 1965.

ROBERT A. PACKENHAM, assistant professor, Stanford University, September, 1965.

RENE PERITZ, Indiana State University.

JOHN M. PHELPS, assistant professor, University of Southwestern Louisiana.

THEODORE L. PUTTERMAN, instructor, University of Arizona.

BERNARD REICH, assistant professor, Georgetown University.

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, professor and director of the Institute of International Law and Relations, the Catholic University of America.

Edward T. Rowe, instructor, University of Denver.

ROBERT S. SHARTLET, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

ROBERT H. SOLVEP (Col. U. S. Army, retired), associate professor, Brigham Young University.

HERBERT J. SPIRO, professor, University of Pennsylvania.

Newell M. Stultz, assistant professor, Brown University, July, 1965.

JOSEPH TANENHAUS, professor, University of Iowa; formerly of New York University.

PAUL WALLACE, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

WILLIAM O. WINTER, professor and chairman of the department, University of Colorado.

· JOHN C. WITHEY, lecturer, Whittier College.

PETER WALL, associate professor, Brandeis

University.

STEPHEN WOOD, associate professor, Connecticut College, September, 1964.

PAUL DE YOUNG KAY, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

JAY K. ZAWODNY, professor, University of Pennsylvania.

TEMPORARY AND VISITING APPOINTMENTS

BRUCE BORTHWICK, Georgetown University (1964-65).

HAROLD R. BRUCE, Dartmouth College: visiting professor, Scripps College.

ARDATH W. BURKS, Rutgers University: visiting lecturer, University of Hawaii, summer, 1965.

Heinz Eulau, Stanford University: visiting professor, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1964-65.

ROBERT H. FERRELL, Indiana University: visiting professor, University of Connecticut, 1964-65.

HERMAN FINER, University of Chicago: visiting professor, Chicago Circle Branch of the University of Illinois, 1965-66.

LEE GREEN, visiting professor, University of Georgia, spring, 1965.

REVERDY GLIDDON, University of Missouri: visiting professor, University of Texas, summer, 1965.

HENRY F. GOODNOW, University of California: visiting professor, University of California.

ROBERT F. KARSCH, University of Missouri: visiting professor, Jadavpur University, Calcutta, India, 1965-66.

Wolfgang H. Kraus, George Washington University: visiting professor, University of Heidelberg, summer, 1964.

H. MALCOLM MACDONALD, University of Texas: William A. Johnson visiting professor, Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School.

EUGENE J. MEEHAN, Rutgers University: visiting professor, Brandeis University, 1965-66.

LINDA MILLER, instructor, Barnard Collège, 1965-1966.

RANDALL H. NELSON, Southern Illinois Uni- leversity: visiting professor, University of California, spring and summer, 1964.

CHESTER NEWLAND, North Texas State University: visiting professor, University of Texas, summer, 1965.

A. F. K. Organski, Brooklyn College: visiting professor, University of Michigan, winter, 1965.

ROLAND I. PERUSSE, University of Maryland: visiting associate professor, Texas Western College.

HERMAN C. PRITCHETT, University of Chicago: lecturer in American democracy, Stanford University, winter quarter, 1965.

CHARLES B. ROBSON, University of North Carolina: guest professor, University of Cologne, summer, 1965.

ROBERT A. RUPEN, University of North Carolina: lecturer, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, July-December, 1965.

LALITA PROSAD SINGH, Australian National University: visiting assistant professor, University of Missouri, 1965-66.

Byron S. Weng, instructor, Miami University (Ohio), 1964-65.

PHILIP S. WILDER, JR., Wabash College: visiting lecturer, University of Illinois, second semester, 1964-65.

RICHARD B. WILSON, University of Colorado: visiting professor, University of California at Santa Barbara, spring, 1964.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

CHARLES F. BALDWIN, Diplomat in Residence, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, formerly Ambassador to Malaysia.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY, Barnard College: chairman of the department.

LEE W. FARNSWORTH, Bringam Young University: coordinator of the International Relations Program.

PAUL FOWLER, Indiana State University: Seting chairman of the department.

Louis G. Kahle, University of Missouri: chair-

man of the department beginning June 1, 1964.

NORTON E. LONG, Brandeis University: chairman of the department, 1965-66.

EDWIN B. MORRELL, Brigham Young University: coordinator of the newly established Russian Studies program.

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT (formerly of Columbia University): associate dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration and director of the new Institute of Politics to be connected with the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

MAURICE K. TOWNSEND, Moorhead State College: academic dean.

JAMES R. WOODWORTH, Miami University (Ohio), chairman of the department, beginning February 1, 1965.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

MICHAEL A. ARMACOST, Pomona College, assistant professor.

WILLIAM ANDREWS, Tufts University, associate professor.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY, Barnard College: associate professor.

George Carey, Georgetown University: associate professor.

PATRICK J. CONKLIN, University of Missouri: associate professor.

HARVEY GLICKMAN, Haverford College: associate professor.

JACOB LANDYNSKI, The Graduate Faculty, The New School: associate professor.

HERBERT R. MARSHALL, Stanford University: professor.

DALE A. NEUMAN, University of Rochester:

assistant professor.

L. VINCENT PADGETT, San Diego State College: professor.

ROBERT L. PEABODY, Johns Hopkins University: associate professor.

GEORGE K. ROMOSER, Connecticut College: associate professor.

MARTIN SHAPIRO, Stanford University: associate professor.

JAN TRISKA, Stanford University: professor.

LLOYD M. WELLS, University of Missouri: professor.

MARVIN WEINBAUM, Colby College, assistant professor.

DAVID O. D. WURFEL, University of Missouri: associate professor.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

JOSEPH E. BLACK has resigned from the chairmanship at Miami University (Ohio) to be director of Social Sciences and Humanities, Rockefeller Foundation.

GENERAL WILLIAM C. CHASE retired at the end of the spring quarter, 1965, as visiting lecturer at the University of Houston.

DAVID W. KEPPER retired at the end of the spring quarter, 1965, after twenty years as professor at the University of Houston.

Louis Mexer resigned from the University of

Arizona to become administrative assistant to Governor Sam Goddard.

THOMAS P. PEARDON will retire from Barnard as of July, 1965.

JOHN SCHMIDHAUSER resigned his professorship at the University of Iowa to take over his new duties as U. S. Representative from the first congressional district of Iowa.

JACOB VAN Ex, University of Colorado, retired in June, 1965. He had served as dean of the College of Arts and Sciences from 1929 to 1959.

SSRC PROGRAMS, 1966

The Social Science Research Council's programs of Research Training Fellowships and Faculty Research Grants are currently under review, and it is not yet certain what form these may take for the coming year.

The Council will again offer grants to mature scholars, not candidates for degrees, on essentially the same basis as before, for research on American Governmental and Legal Processes, and for research on International Organization.

Under joint sponsorship of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, several programs of fellowships and grants for training and research on certain foreign areas will be continued; inquiries concerning these should be directed respectively to the offices indicated:

Grants to mature scholars for research on Africa, Contemporary China, Latin America, and the Near and Middle East are administered by the Social Science Research Council; for research in Asian Studies and in Slavic and East European Studies, by the American Council of Learned Societies (345 East 46th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017);

Fellowships for training in foreign area studies are administered by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program (444 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y 10022).

Inquiries, and requests for a final announcement to be issued in late September, should be addressed to Social Science Research Council Fellowships and Grants, 230 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

To avoid missing deadlines, prospective applicants should correspond with appropriate office by early October.

IN MEMORIAM

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN, professor of political science at Northwestern University, died December 12, 1964, at the age of 67. Born in Brooklyn, N. Y., he spent most of his childhood in the Orient. He obtained his Doctor of Philosophy degree from Christ Church College, Oxford, England, in 1922, and joined the faculty of Northwestern University in 1929. In 1937 he left the University to report the developing war in the Far East for the Chicago Times, returning in 1940 to lecture at Harvard University. Beginning in 1941 he served in the Navy as a special advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On his discharge from the Navy he held the rank of commander and received the Legion of Merit. He then returned

to full time teaching duties at Northwestern and also participated actively in public affairs both in party politics and in various capacities in the national government.

Professor McGovern was the author of eleven books. Their range reflects the spectrum of his life's interest: Modern Japan, Colloquial Japanese, An Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism, Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, To Lhasa in Disguise, Jungle Paths and Inca Ruins, Growth of Institutions, Early Empires of Central Asia, From Luther to Hitler, Radicals and Conservatives, and Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow.

He is survived by his widow, two daughters and a son.—R. BARRY FARRELL

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(September 8-11, 1965)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Washington, D.C. meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U.S. Employment Service. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa.

The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants at the Convention.

FOLLOW UP: Orders and applications will be returned to the local Employment Service Office after the Annual Meeting. The office will determine if a satisfactory placement occurred and, if not, will make further recruitment or placement efforts.

All State Employment Service local offices accept orders and applications in the field of political science on a year-round basis as a regular part of their professional service.

If you plan to attend the Conference and utilize the Placement Service, please mail the form below as soon as possible, but not later than August 5, 1965. Application and/or employer order forms will be forwarded to you upon receipt of the following information:

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August 7 to September 1

Association members may still join the 1965 Latin American Tour-Seminar . . . twenty-four days in seven countries in this critically important region. Final arrangements for this unique travel-study opportunity are now being made by the Association, but a limited number may still make reservations to participate.

In addition to direct conversations with governmental leaders of the countries on the itinerary, tour-seminar participants will meet with members of the faculties of local universities, U.S. Foreign Service Personnel, foreign press representatives, etc. Opportunity will be provided for personal research and sightseeing. The entire trip is being planned with the cooperation and support of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Information Service.

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For further information concerning this educational, research, and travel opportunity, write immediately to: APSA 1965 Latin American Tour-Seminar, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036. A brochure giving full details and reservation information will be mailed to you.

Notice

Resolutions at Annual Business Meeting

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution, this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 7, 1965, in the Wilmington Room, Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C.

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
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VOL. LIX

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NO. 3

THE TRANSFORMATION OF ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN*
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

The pattern of international relations has always been in flux. The further we are removed from a period, the easier it is to discern its most salient features. So the fifteenth century now emerges as the time of the birth of the nation-state which was to become the key factor in international relations. Yet the supra-national church was not successfully challenged until the next century. Today it is clear that the French revolution completed the conversion of dynastic states into national states. In retrospect the 18th and particularly the 19th centuries are seen as the high point of the world expansion of Europe and the extension of its system of international relations. Now we realize that the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904-1905 marked the beginning of the counter-offensive against Europe. But what emerges sharply now was obscured then by a welter of incident.

Is the twentieth century the century of the ideological polarization of politics, or will it be the century of the end of ideology? At the end of the twentieth century will its first half seem to have been the period of world wars and its second half the period of peace? Fifty years from now it will be much easier to discern which features of the present international scene were transient, which permanent; now it is only possible to peer at the mass of events and try to make out some of the pattern. The hypothesis of this paper is that, first, the increased destructiveness of world war and the very small likelihood of its occurrence and, second, the establishment and expansion of a Communist state system have transformed the nature of international relations.

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

I. WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

The investigation will begin with an examination of the change in the conception of war as an instrument of policy, treating separately the periods before the First and Second World Wars and the period since the Second World War.

A. Pre-World War I

Before World War I statesmen believed, on the whole, that war could be profitable. Political leaders initiated wars, expecting gains commensurate with costs. The classic case comprised Bismarck's three wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, which achieved the unification of Germany at a cost probably no greater than expected.

The corollary to this assumption that some wars were worth the price was that some were not. Price was calculated not only in terms of prospective gain but also in terms of avoiding losses. Thus Great Britain reluctantly entered World War I pursuant to the guiding principle that no single nation—Germany in this case should be permitted to dominate the European continent. Had any of the major powers before World War I foreseen its consequences, each would probably have been willing to accept greater shifts in the balance of power before engaging in war. The low tolerance for political loss in the European capitals of 1914 was a function of their underestimate of the cost of a general war.

B. Pre-World War II

For the victorious powers, the terrible, unexpected destructiveness of World War I produced a conception of war midway between that of 1914 and that of the present. Clausewitz's remark, made in a different context, 1

¹ Karl von Clausewitz, On War (Modern Library, New York, 1943), p 332.

that "a conqueror is always a lover of peace," also applied to the Entente powers, since after 1918 a new war could bring them no great benefits. A profound anti-war spirit permeated all levels of British and French society. Consequently, in contrast with their position before World War I, Great Britain and France were willing to tolerate great and unfavorable changes in the balance of power before judging war to be necessary.

The defeated powers, on the other hand, in particular Germany after 1933, were too absorbed in the consequences of defeat to worry much about the possible hollowness of victory in a new war. The harsh, punitive nature of the Treaty of Versailles had outraged practically all Germans who felt, at the very least, that guilt for the war was not exclusively theirs. (Increasingly this judgment on war guilt was shared outside the country, especially in Great Britain and the United States.) The more moderate elements in German society expected an eventual voluntary modification of the terms of defeat. The German right wing, however, scorned concessions from the victors and proposed to get, by an aggressive policy, and quickly, what they believed to be their due. The great depression that hit Europe in 1931 greatly enlarged the dissatisfaction and frustration in German society and two years later helped bring Hitler to power. Hitler promised radical solutions for Germany's external and internal problems. The Nazis were convinced and acted upon the conviction, that the Versailles Treaty should be revised only by force, or the threat of its employment. Hitler continued and hastened the rearmament of Germany begun, in part secretly, during the Weimar Republic. Finding himself unopposed by the West, he became more bold in throwing off the hampering restrictions of Versailles. Since Britain and France felt that war could only produce further national decline, while Germany felt that only the threat of war, and perhaps war itself, could restore the nation, retreat followed upon retreat until London and Paris were driven to choose reluctantly between the two extremes: to acquiesce in Hitler's aims—which was tantamount to complete defeat in war, though without fighting-or to face up to him, with ostensibly inferior armaments, at the grave risk of highly destructive general war. Either course seemed to promise only disaster, but war was finally accepted as the lesser evil.

In the 1930s Germany viewed war as an instrument of policy, as "have-not" nations have traditionally done. Hitler's strong desire for German expansion was coupled with a belief that his enemies could be beaten one by one. Had he foreseen how many, how powerful, and

how united his enemies would be, he might have been slower to provoke war. Between the two world wars Great Britain and France followed the traditional policy of victors: they upheld the status quo established by the last war, eschewed agression for themselves and deplored its practice by others. Their attitude toward war as an instrument to prevent losses had become more cautious since 1914, for they feared that air bombing would make the next war a cataclysm of destruction. Consequently, they tolerated great defeats in Europe before resorting to war and exposed themselves to further defeats in the early years of the armed conflict.

C. Post-World War II

Today, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has any goals commensurate with the expected cost of a nuclear war. Hence, given the present balance of military power, the initiation of total war is unacceptable. With the development of nuclear weapons, both major powers have now all but ruled out large-scale nuclear war as an instrument of policy.

In the past the initiator of a war seldom thought it would be a total war; he always hoped to control the arena and intensity of war so as to maximize his chances of victory. Today it is commonly believed that a possible consequence of a direct military confrontation between the two super-powers would be a rapid transition to total war accompanied by unprecedented destruction. Both sides now say they will, and presumably intend to, retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked with them on a large scale; but it is quite uncertain what lesser assaults, if any, would move them to nuclear war. Obviously both sides want to avoid such difficult decisions, and this is the basis of whatever mutual understanding exists. What differentiates the present situation from that preceding the outbreak of World War II is that both sides rather than one have rejected total war as an instrument of policy. Furthermore—in contrast to the situations preceding both world wars—the Soviet Union and the United States now have a very low tolerance for any changes in the balance of power in Europe. Since 1948 no changes comparable to those that took place in the periods 1904-1914 and 1933-1939 have occurred. The comparative rigidity of the present arrangements in Europe is to be explained, first, by the mutual awareness of the conse-

² Chamberlain, particularly, and even Churchill, expected that aerial bombing would produce far more casualties than it actually did. However, 50,000 British civilians died in German air raids, a figure that would have seemed horrible enough to the statesmen of 1938.

quences of a nuclear war and, second, by the fear on both sides that any shift in the balance of power would cause the losing side to suffer further losses in rapid succession. Dominoes falling, has been the favored image. As early as December 1953, when the United States still enjoyed what was practically a monopoly in nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower stated the conviction that has dominated American attitudes ever since. By asserting that a nuclear war would mean the end of civilization, he implied that only the gravest threat to American interests could justify a decision to launch nuclear war. By maintaining American superiority in weapons, he reduced the likelihood that such threats would emanate from the Communist world.

In the Soviet Union, as early as 1954, Malenkov said that a nuclear war would mean the destruction of world civilization. Khrushchev, who was soon to replace him as the head of the Soviet government, rejected that view. As long as the Soviets had no significant nuclear capabilities of their own, the victorious Khrushchev faction insisted that a nuclear war, undesirable as it might be, would mean the destruction of the capitalist part of the world, not of the whole of civilization; and that Communism would rise like a phoenix from the ashes. The Soviets probably feared that if they accepted a cataclysmic view of nuclear war, while only their opponents had the means to wage it, they would be inviting pressure from the West to yield political positions under the threat of such a war. However, after the Soviet Union itself gained acceptance for its claim to possess substantial nuclear capabilities, Khrushchev moved to Malenkov's position that a nuclear war would be a common disaster for all mankind. In fact some Soviet writers, referring to nuclear war, now deny the validity of Clausewitz's doctrine, adapted by Lenin, that war is the continuation of politics. In simple terms, they mean that nuclear war does not pay.

At present, the public Chinese Communist position is similar to that taken by the Soviet Union down to about 1958 or 1959, although somewhat more stridently expressed. The Chinese apparently are reluctant to admit that nuclear war would mean the end of the world while their enemies are the only ones in a position to wage such a war. The Soviet Union, they charge, has become a status quo power that sees more advantage in freezing present arrangements by agreement with its opponents than in a forward policy that entails some risk of conflict with them. Since the Chinese are willing to risk conflicts between the Communist world and its enemies—as an essential condition for altering the status quo—they cannot say that a total nuclear war would mean the end of mankind. The Chinese argue that the opponent is a "paper tiger;" that an aggressive joint Communist policy would produce concessions, not war, but that if capitalism initiated a war, it would be the tomb of that system. Communism, however, would survive. But the Soviet Union, with fewer unfulfilled aspirations than the Chinese, has put forward a much more apocalyptic view of nuclear war than the Chinese and has been less willing to take risks, especially to promote the objectives of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese have recommended that the whole Communist camp combine in pursuit of their objectives, but they have failed to impose their view on the others. In their consequent isolation, the Chinese have scrupulously avoided actions that might have provoked the United States to employ its nuclear weapons against them. Whether Communist China's policy will become bolder as it develops nuclear weapons, only time can tell.

Meanwhile, the two super-powers have rejected war as an instrument of policy because of their fear of its consequences. How this has influenced international affairs we shall shortly see.

II. IS WAR LIKELY?

Before World War I, wars were more frequent than today. More than a dozen regular wars were fought between 1870 and 1914, almost all bilateral, and many of them could have expanded into larger wars.³ In addition, many international crises, almost all multilateral, threatened war. Since some of the wars of this period, including the two largest, the

- 3 The following is a partial list:
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- Tripolitan War between Italy and Turkey, 1911-1912.
- p. The First Balkan War, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece against Turkey, 1912-1913.
- q. Second Balkan War, Bulgaria against Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey, 1913.

Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese War, 1 yielded benefits to the victor that were apparently commensurate with the sacrifices, the recurrence of similar wars was not "unthinkable."

At present the chances of a large-scale war with the most modern weapons seem small, certainly very much smaller than in say, 1913 or 1938. But the awful realization that the human race could be in jeopardy often dominates the imagination, obscures the reduced likelihood of war, and produces the emotionally based conviction in times of crisis, that war is likely, or inevitable in the long run unless radical changes are made in the international system. The truth, however, is that statesmen in the competing camps share a catastrophic view of the consequences of nuclear war, and this has made warfare less likely.

Not only general war, but apparently also wars on a smaller scale, with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, have become less likely. Only a few years ago it was generally expected that limited wars would become more likely when the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear parity. With both sides in possession of nuclear weaponry, the reasoning went, either side, trading on the common fear of a general nuclear war, might conduct war on a lower scale with relative impunity.

The validity of this prediction has not undergone a genuine test, since the United States has maintained nuclear preponderance. Although the Soviet Union has disposed of a substantial nuclear capability for some years now, the United States has enjoyed a mutually recognized superiority. In this situation both sides have been concerned about the escalation of local conflicts and have sought to avoid them. Whether local wars would be more likely if and when the Soviet Union achieved rough nuclear parity, or when China achieves a real nuclear capability, can only be a matter for speculation.

III. THE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

A. Pre-World War I

The great powers before World War I were organized in a balance of power system first systematically described by Machiavelli. A power shifted from one alliance to another,

⁴ It is not generally appreciated that the Japanese, despite their naval victories, were staggered by the extent of their losses and probably would have soon taken the initiative in suing for peace, had not Russia done so because of the revolutionary situation in the latter country. I am indebted to Paul Langer for this realization.

either to "balance" another power or a coalition which had become too strong, or to place itself in a position to gain territory at the expense of a former ally. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nations sought territorial alterations within Europe, competed for empire in Asia and Africa, jockeyed for positions of advantage in the expected demise of the Ottoman Empire. Some, but not all, of their goals were interchangeable. Thus Italy, by alliance with the Central Powers, increased its chances of getting the territories it claimed on the French Riviera, but thereby relinquished claims to irredenta in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And Bismarck tried, but failed, to compensate France for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine by holding out opportunities in Africa. But it was not only the prospect of gains that caused nations to shift from one alliance to another. Fear of loss could be equally, or more impelling. Thus, the German naval program of the turn of the century played a major role in persuading France and Great Britain that they had more to fear from Germany than from each other.

In contrast to the present, ideology was not an inhibition to diplomatic realignments (renversements des alliances). The ideological differences between Imperial Russia and Republican France and Liberal England were residual; for neither the Russians on the one hand, nor the French on the other, were intent on a political revolution within the other country (unlike the period from 1791–1815). These nations formed an entente which survived the crisis preceding the war, three years of war, and the democratic revolution of February 1917, only to collapse after the victory of the Communists in October 1917.

Great powers shifted their alignments rapidly and radically. For example, in 1898 in the Fashoda crisis, Great Britain and France were on the brink of war over competing ambitions in Africa. The crisis that erupted brought the two countries closer to war than they had been for many years. The French, for a combination of domestic and foreign policy reasons, yielded and war was avoided. The name applied to this easement was détente. Several years later, largely because of a changed perception of the danger from Germany, the two powers formed an entente-practically an alliance-first settling territorial disputes between themselves on a basis of give and take. Thus, they proceeded from the brink of war immediately to a détente and eventually to an entente. A détente sometimes developed into an entente; enemies sometimes became friends. How much, or how little, this has changed we shall examine shortly.

Remaining outside the alliance system was

only possible for countries without territorial ambitions and against whom others did not have territorial claims. Even so, in time of war or imminent war, another power might invade for strategic reasons: Of course, distant and powerful nations separated by oceans, like the United States, could remain outside the system of alliances.

B. Pre-World War II

By World War II the character of the system had begun to change in that the status quo and the revisionist groups were more firmly fixed in their positions. France, Great Britain, and the new states of Eastern Europe, created in part at the expense of Germany and of Russia, supported the status quo. Germany, especially after Hitler's rise to power, was revisionist, and the Soviet Union shunted between the two positions, although it was basically revisionist.5 Neither the Soviet Union nor any other major power was able to remain neutral. Small powers like Austria, the Baltic States, and Finland, outside the major alliance systems, or secured only by bilateral nonaggression pacts, lost their independence to the revisionist powers. Even within the status quo alliance system, weaker powers did not enjoy genuine security. Although the great powers never formally renounced their obligations to Czechoslovakia, in essence they abandoned her to Germany. Before the First World War neutrality would not necessarily survive the outbreak of war; before the second, even membership in an alliance did not protect weaker powers from absorption before the inception of general war. How different the position of the weak and unaligned has become!

In the interwar period, the threat of internal revolution inhibited the formation of alliances. For example, the Franco-Russian treaty of mutual assistance signed in 1935 was never implemented by joint military arrangements as in the case of the Franco-Russian alliance

⁶ The Soviet Union was revisionist when Germany was weak, a defender of the status quo after Hitler came to power, and revisionist again in 1939 when it seized the opportunity to gain territory and remain neutral in a war between its foes. The status quo position of the Soviet Union at various times must be distinguished from that of Great Britain and France, for unlike them it had great expectations of radical favorable chances in the future. The Soviet Union favored the status quo when its relative weakness permitted no other course, but was prepared to shift when opportunities for aggrandizement offered themselves. Professor Vernon V. Aspaturion suggested this and other formulations.

whose negotiation was completed in 1894. Although the alliance proved abortive for more reasons than the ideological tension between Republican France and the Communist Soviet Union, ideology did play a major role.

C. The Present

1. General Character

Alliances now differ in three large respects: (1) political goals have superseded military; (2) the relative power and the number of participant states have altered significantly; and (3) ideology has become a major factor.

a. The primacy of political goals. The determination of the major powers to avoid war, noted above, has caused a qualitative change in international relations. The expectation that war can be avoided makes the primary purpose of alliances deterrence of war rather than preparation for its conduct. Although success in the former purpose is dependent on the latter, the primacy of deterrence is of great consequence. The great questions of war and peace are the almost exclusive concern of the Soviet Union and the United States; the secondary powers in both alliances benefit, or suffer, from the military balance produced by the rivalry of the two greatest powers. But the influence of secondary powers on the balance of power in comparison with their influence in earlier alliances is modest. The relations between the two greatest powers are increasingly conducted on the assumption that outstanding issues will be resolved only by political means. The secondary members of both alliance systems pursue their particular goals in the confidence that there will be no world war. Thus conflicts with the hegemonic power within each alliance involve only political and economic costs. The question of isolation and abandonment in a world war need hardly be considered. The Chinese Communists would hardly have permitted relations with the Soviet Union to deteriorate to the point of withdrawal of Soviet military aid if they had expected war with the United States; de Gaulle would not have presumed to challenge the American position in Western Europe if he expected a world war. Hence secondary powers, while less influential in alliance military arrangements, enjoy more freedom of action within the alliance. The consequences of this increased freedom of action are quite different for each system. They will be examined at the point where intra-alliance arrangements are discussed.

b. The increase in the number of participants in the international system and the change in their relative power. Since the Second World War the distribution of power within the international system has changed significantly. Earlier there were greater powers (more than two); secondary participants in alliances who, at the lower end of the power spectrum, merged with client states protected by a major power and without a genuinely independent foreign policy; and finally a great fraction of the world's population, largely non-European, lived in colonies or semi-independent political entities.

At present there are two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. In time, probably, Communist China and, possibly, a united Western Europe will join the ranks of the super-powers. But now the gulf in power between the largest power in each alliance and the next largest is greater than ever before. Consequently, the very magnitude of the power of the two greatest states creates, despite their rivalry, some common concerns and common interests not shared by their allies.

By now almost all the former colonies and semi-independent states have become independent and have largely remained unaligned. The reduced likelihood of world war makes it possible for them to contemplate continued existence without becoming minor members of a diplomatic system. They no longer worry that their independence would constitute the victor's spoils in a new world war. From being the objects of international politics they have become active participants, adjusting and readjusting their relationships with each other and with the major powers. And client states, especially in Eastern Europe, as we shall see, are increasingly asserting some control over their own foreign policy.

c. Ideology. Soon after the conclusion of the Second World War it became a truism that ideology was the major determinant in international relations. But like many truisms it turned out to be a half-truth. As early as 1948 Yugoslavia, after ejection from the Communist camp, was able to survive as an "unaligned" nation. The Soviet Union failed to gobble up weak nations on its periphery and communize them on the model of the Eastern European nations largely because, both before and after it acquired nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union feared a large war that might result from aggression against a small country protected within the American alliance system. The American system of guarantees and alliances of the 1950s has been much criticized of late on the ground that the Soviet Union was really unaggressive and that the system extended American commitments beyond American strength and willingness to play a world role. But the success of the policy of the containment of Soviet expansion by superior military strength

does not prove that containment was unnecessary. It was just because some countries joined in the effort to contain the Soviet Union that other countries could afford non-alignment and enjoy the freedom of a position between the two main antagonists. But whatever the origin of the present security of the smaller powers, the present reality is that both diplomatic and ideological non-alignment are realistic policies for the weaker nations in the international system.

After 1947 it was widely believed, on both sides, that the passage of a particular country from one camp to the other, regardless of its size, would precipitate a series of such changes. In the West this fear rested on the over-facile assumption that Western European nations. which had not been occupied by Soviet troops. were as much in danger of communization as the Eastern European countries had been. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, it was feared that the successful departure of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite system would be emulated. This fear lay at the basis of the brutal imposition of strict police controls in all the satellite states after 1948. Since then in Europe both sides have felt that any alteration of the status quo would produce a chain reaction.

But the very stability, caused in part by the mutually shared apprehension of the consequences of change, has produced a measure of relaxation. The conversion of some of the satellite states of Eastern Europe into client states with incipient independent foreign policies has been an embarrassment, and may presage serious losses; but it has not been a disaster for the Soviet Union. Castro's personal conversion to Communism, which (given his position) meant the communization of Cuba. caused great agitation in the United States. But it is now tolerated largely because of Castro's failure to spread the revolution, the relatively minor importance of Cuba, and the frustration of the Soviet attempt to make a major strategic change on the basis of a political victory in a small country.

In the overall balance of power, new Communist states, ideologically much diluted and little controlled by the largest Communist state or states, may become important. If, again, modernizing dictators adopt Communism and impose the new faith on their people like the pagan princes converted to Christianity, will it be an extension of the international power of Communism or a dilution of its strength? It all depends on what happens to such states. If some stumble and founder, then the pattern maintained since 1920 when Hungary ceased being a Communist state will have

been broken—communization will no longer be irreversible, and each case can be separately assessed on its own terms. If on the other hand, each new regime consolidates itself (and no established regimes abandon Communism), then forceful measures to prevent what will seem to be permanent losses can be expected. Thus, ideology will play a greater role in international relations or a reduced role; the present situation seems to be transitional.

Very likely the importance of ideology in foreign policy calculations will persist longest in areas vital to the interests of the greatest powers. For example, it is difficult for the near and proximate future to imagine political changes in Europe in which ideology would not figure largely. Reckoning on the basis of power politics alone, the Soviet Union would have much to gain from the abandonment of the Communist regime in Eastern Germany. A serious proposal to Western Germany for reunification on the basis of demilitarized neutrality would have good chances of acceptance and at the very least would precipitate a major political crisis in Western Germany. Such a settlement, presumably including the settlement of the Polish (and Czech) western borders, would constitute a political settlement in Europe which would probably bring in its train major modifications of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The enormous saving in money would greatly ease the dilemma of resource allocation within the Soviet Union. This projection of future events seems unrealistic only because the ideological value of Eastern Germany cannot be exchanged for other values. But the reconversion of Castro, or the collapse of his regime would probably not be viewed as fraught with disaster by the Soviet Union.

2. Inter-Alliance Relations

a. As between the United States and the Soviet Union. Earlier the familiar point was made that the Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war. But beyond that common interest, rivalry is the keynote of the relationship. In that rivalry, relative military strength is crucial. At present both sides accept United States superiority in nuclear weapons, but Soviet acceptance followed upon efforts to create a balance more favorable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union failed to convert its priority in ballistic missiles into a superiority in intercontinental forces, largely, probably, because of its industrial and economic inferiority. It also failed in its effort to alter the military balance by the expedient of putting medium and intermediaterange missiles into Cuba in the fall of 1962. For the Soviet Union, a test-ban treaty promised

to, and has tended to, stabilize the weapons balance at roughly the present level, namely an inferior Soviet position in intercontinental nuclear weaponry. The Soviet Union probably accepted such a state of affairs for the interim, at least, because the alternatives might be worse. A continuation of the arms race at a faster pace might well produce no relative advantage. The economic cost, which the Soviet Union can ill afford, might well be paid without military and political improvements relative to the United States, perhaps even with a decline in the Soviet Union's relative position. The United States, on the other hand, enjoying a military superiority which it believes has contributed to the frustration of Soviet aims in Cuba, West Berlin, and elsewhere, is willing to continue the present situation. It is uncertain, of course, whether opportunities, especially in the technological sphere, to alter the weapons balance will emerge and be exploited by the Soviet Union. But at present the United States and the Soviet Union seem to accept roughly the present balance because the former finds it satisfactory and the latter can see no way to alter it significantly for the better.

An unusual feature of the treaty, and significant for the altered nature of international relations, was that both the Soviet Union and the United States knew that a major ally of each would refuse to sign it. The leading powers of the rival alliances thus agreed on a major issue concerning which, one differed with France and the other with Communist China-both disagreements being between allies. Furthermore, the conclusion of the treaty legally bound the signatories to resist their allies' demands for assistance in developing nuclear weapons. Whatever political costs were involved in opposing the wishes of their alliance partners the United States and the Soviet Union were ready to bear. Both major powers opposed the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the treaty represented a common resolve not to assist in such proliferation. It was generally recognized, however, that even without help France and Communist China could acquire nuclear weapons by their own efforts.

The corollary of the Soviet and American determination to reduce the danger of war by controlling nuclear weapons as much and as long as possible by themselves is the determination to avoid small-scale conflicts which could grow into larger ones, eventually threatening war. Most often this has meant the frustration of a secondary ally's desire to use force to his own advantage. The two super-powers, in a sense, have a tacit pact to keep the peace even if it frustrates an ally's ambitions. Thus the United States vetoed the Anglo-French-Israeli adven-

ture in Suez, with the Soviet Union adding menace from the sidelines. Whatever the extent of Chinese desires in India in the fall of 1962, the joint—though not concerted—United States and Soviet support of India set limits on Chinese objectives. In both cases it was a non-aligned nation that was protected against an ally. As a consequence, the United States and Soviet partnership in keeping the peace reduces the policy alternatives traditionally enjoyed by secondary members of an alliance. Thus, not only the nuclear powers, but their weaker allies, also must pursue their foreign policy objectives with much less reliance on military force as an instrument to attain desired goals.

The recognition of an area of common Soviet-American interest, symbolized by the test-ban treaty, has been referred to as a détente. But unlike the traditional détente, the present arrangements cannot be converted into an entente, i.e., the alliances cannot be reshuffled because several essential features are lacking.

First, the present situation is essentially bipolar, since as has already been remarked, the difference between the power of the strongest member of each alliance and the next strongest is unprecedentedly great. Traditionally, great powers shifted from one alliance to another because another power of the same size was perceived as threatening. Thus the British Entente cordiale with France in 1904 required the existence of a Germany. At present the Soviet Union and the United States have no peers in power.

Second, in most reversals of alliances at least one partner was revisionist, that is, considered territory held by another power as rightfully belonging to itself. Thus the Anglo-French entente cordiale of 1904 eventually brought Alsace-Lorraine back to France; the Italian shift from the Triple Alliance to the Triple Entente brought them Fiume, etc. Now both the Soviet Union and the United States, having been victorious in the last war, are essentially status quo powers. This generalization requires serious modification only when the present arrangements for Germany are challenged, but hardly at any other time.

Concerted action to keep the peace between two powers is not equivalent to common action to ward off a common threat from a third power, or to gain something at the expense of third powers. Unless and until the Soviet Union and the United States perceive a threat from a third power of equal rank, or both develop aggrandizing goals which can be achieved only at the expense of third powers of equal rank, the necessary basis for the conversion of détente to entente, for the reversal of alliances, does not exist.

Thus even if the ideological tension between the Soviet Union and the United States diminishes rather than intensifies, they can only become more friendly; they cannot become friends.

But from the point of view of secondary allies, this partial accommodation between the two super-powers has some of the features of a reversal of alliances, especially if the accommodation is in an area of vital interest to the secondary power. Thus, in the Chinese view, the Soviet accommodation with the United States on the peace issue has deprived the Chinese of practically every advantage which the alliance had afforded. But unlike the classic reversal of alliances, the Chinese do not find themselves in another diplomatic constellation. The improvement in the relations between the two superpowers does not lead to the reshuffling of alliances but to alterations within each alliance which will be considered subsequently.

b. As between a super-power and a secondary power in a rival alliance. On several occasions the United States and the Soviet Union have given limited support to a secondary power in the rival system in order to increase the leverage of that power in relation to the hegemonic power, with the object of reducing the cohesion of the rival system. American aid to Yugoslavia was an example of such a tactic—after the fact to be sure, but relevant nonetheless. After the increase in Poland's independence in 1956, United States aid to Poland was offered in the hope of consolidating that independence rather than out of any farther reaching community of Polish and American foreign policy interests. Recently, Rumania has taken first steps toward similar arrangements. Other East European Communist states may well follow suit. Thus far these measures have not caused departures from the Warsaw Pact, but have rather contributed to the process of desatellitization in Eastern Europe.

Similarly in Cuba, the Soviet Union offered Castro, then not yet a Communist, limited political and economic assistance with the purpose of reducing the cohesion of the American diplomatic system in the Caribbean. Castro, a modernizing caudillo, deemed it necessary to provoke sharp conflict with the United States in order to demonstrate that he was not merely another dictator, who after eloquent promises of reform would relapse into corruption. In order to guarantee continued Soviet support and also to control his own Communist Party, Castro declared himself and Cuba to be Communist. If Paris was worth a mass to Henry IV, Cuba was worth a party card to Castro. In contrast to the Russian and Chinese revolutions, which derived largely from internal impulses with subsequent effects on foreign policy alignments, the basic impulse in Cuba was in the realm of foreign policy with subsequent effects on domestic policy.

Attempts by both the United States and the Soviet Union to weaken the rival coalition by approaches to some of its members seem to be a permanent rather than a transitory phenomenon.

c. As between secondary members of rival alliance systems. The main purpose of cross-alliance relationships between secondary alliance members is to gain leverage as against the alliance hegemon, often on issues which are of secondary importance to the hegemonic power but of primary importance to the weaker power. For the United States, relations with Pakistan are important, but no more important than relations with a dozen other powers. For Pakistan nothing is more important than the Indian problem. Hence Pakistan's arrangements with China have as their main motive the improvement of her position vis-à-vis India.

The Franco-Chinese exchange of courtesies (rapprochement would describe more than has occurred), was motivated by considerations of lesser urgency than the Pakistani-Chinese gestures of friendship. The French desire a larger voice in allied policy in general, and in Southeast Asian policy in particular, but their national interest in that area can only be residual and sentimental. It is more a case of, "I will be heard." For the Chinese it represents a symbolic escape from the diplomatic isolation caused by the Sino-Soviet breach.

Recently, both the French and the Germans have sought to improve their relations with some of the Eastern European countries. In part the motive resembles that of the United States in seeking to stimulate the growth of the independence of these states from the Soviet Union, but in part it expresses the rivalry of France and Germany for dominance in Europe.

In these cases, to greater or lesser extent, the approaches of second-rank members of one alliance to second-rank members of another alliance have been un-ideological and represent an effort to satisfy desires thwarted by the hegemonic power. Thus Pakistan wants a settlement of the Kashmir dispute which the United States will not support; France wants to be the first power in Western Europe; the countries of Eastern Europe want to improve their bargaining power with the Soviet Union by establishing better relations with France and especially West Germany.

Since only the hegemonic power can satisfy the demands represented by these cross-alliance overtures between secondary powers, these overtures do not lead to switching alliances. After all, it is the United States, not China, to whom Pakistan must look for effective pressure for its solution of the Kashmir question. France wants American acceptance of its claim to primacy in Europe; Soviet or Chinese assent is meaningless. Poland and Rumania require Soviet acceptance of their desire for greater freedom in foreign policy. West Germany or France cannot satisfy that wish, they can only serve as instruments for its accomplishment. Therefore, these approaches to members of the rival alliance are really methods of improving negotiatory power against the hegemonic power. The basic impulse is from within the alliance, not from without.

d. As between non-aligned powers and alliance members. (1) Competition between members of rival alliances for influence with the non-aligned. In the immediate postwar period, only the Western alliance system drew non-aligned states to itself. These states fell into several categories: first, states against whom the Soviet Union or China had territorial claims or was presumed to have territorial ambitions (Turkey and Iran in the Near East). In the Far East, South Korea and South Vietnam were under threat when not under attack.

A second category of states entering the American mid-eastern and far eastern alliance systems comprised those who wanted American economic or political aid but were under no immediate threat from either the Soviet Union or China. Iraq, Pakistan, and the Philippines are the obvious cases. Most new states, however, perceiving no threat from the main Communist states, and hoping for economic support from both systems, have remained unaligned.

When it was realized that the Soviet Union had abandoned the policy of the absorption of contiguous states out of fear of the consequences, states in the tier beyond those immediately bordering on the Soviet Union and China dropped whatever ideas they had had of joining a Western defense system, thus putting a term to the Western process of alliance building.

Furthermore, beginning in 1955, the Soviet Union began to furnish military, and sometimes economic, support, especially to former colonies who were at odds with their former imperial masters. Indonesia and Egypt are the two most important in this category.

For the great majority of the non-aligned countries, national interest is best served by joining neither alliance system and being wooed by both. Above it was argued that the international tension produced by the communization of new states (the unaligned or underdeveloped, or both, being the most likely candi-

dates) would not remain at its present level. It would either increase or decrease. If concern increases, efforts to draw unaligned countries into alliance systems would resume, with the leaders of the unaligned countries seeking to exploit the advantages of the middle position. In a period of intense rivalry for their allegiance, the leaders of non-aligned countries could combine appeals to magnanimity with the threat or promise to move from one camp into another. But this is a threat of limited utility, because all concerned know that the first choice for the unaligned is the medial position.

If fears for the definitive passage of presently unaligned (or loosely aligned) powers to one of the systems decline, the bargaining power of the unaligned will be sharply reduced. They will be reduced to a position commensurate with their power. They can appeal to the magnanimity of the great powers, but they cannot negotiate effectively because they have little to give or withhold.

The super-powers in their rivalry and mutual fear of war have permitted the birth of a host of new nations and have protected their independence. These now act on the international stage, but the political importance of any single one of these nations becomes a multiple of its true power only when it becomes an object of rivalry between the two super-powers.

(2) Competition between members of the same alliance system for influence among uncommitted states. The first area of Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in underdeveloped countries has been Southeast Asia. By the time of the Bandung Conference at the latest, it was clear that Sino-Soviet rivalry for the adherence of the unaligned was at least as important as Communist-capitalist rivalry.

Since the Soviet signature of the test-ban treaty, the Chinese have challenged Soviet influence wherever they could: in Africa, in the Near East, in Latin America, and even in Europe. This competition is really a function of intra-alliance dissension, to the examination of which we shall now proceed.

Competition within the non-Communist alliance for influence among the unaligned, by contrast, is of slight significance, because no conflict comparable to the Sino-Soviet conflict exists. Greek-Turkish rivalry in Cyprus, however sharp, is consequently localized; and French oil interests in North Africa, as against other European powers are not the occasion of NATO's troubles.

a. The non-Communist alliance system. The purpose of the non-Communist alliance system or, more correctly, systems, is the containment of the Communist states, This is a familiar goal in international diplomacy, namely,

not allowing an opponent to grow too strong. Two novelties characterize this effort: its geographical scope and its duration. The French Revolution, in its time, also presented a threat to the established political order, but it was essentially confined to Europe, and conclusively contained in 1815, only a quarter century after its beginning. The Communist Revolution is almost half a century old and still presents challenges in many parts of the world.

The ideological character of the Communist system has impelled a search in the non-Communist alliance for a suitable ideological label for its system, but none has been found, for the internal regimes of the member nations are based on different principles. Outside of Western Europe, only in countries populated by settlers from Northwestern Europe, and in Japan, are societies based on a broad consensus. In most of Latin America, the Near and Middle and Far East, ruling strata are too narrow and middle classes too small to make representative democracy a genuine possibility at present. Although frequently deplored, this political diversity in the non-Communist alliance is a source of strength rather than weakness, as we shall presently see.

The non-Communist alliance system truly deserves the appellation of polycentric because it is a congeries of alliances with different purposes suited to the different threats posed by Communism in various parts of the world. In each of these alliances the hegemonic power, the United States, plays a different role.

In the NATO alliance, after setting into motion the economic and political restoration of Western Europe, the United States by the maintenance of nuclear military superiority has limited the options open to Communist expansion. Since 1948 when Czechoslovakia became a Communist country, the Communist state system has made no progress in Europe. Hence the anti-Communist purpose of the NATO alliance has receded into the background, and NATO's main task is to maintain a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union. Since this task has been successfully accomplished, its importance tends to be forgotten, except when the Soviet Union offers a challenge such as the Berlin crisis, or even more dramatic, the Cuban missile crisis.

With security against both internal and external threats seemingly assured, the nations of Western Europe can and do devote much of their energies to jockeying for favored positions, as against each other, and as against the hegemonic power of the United States. France has put herself forward as the claimant for leadership in Europe. Western Germany cannot compete for this position despite her

greater economic resources, because the unresolved problem of unification makes her politically dependent on the United States. The issues on which the NATO allies differ are well publicized: the sharing of nuclear control in NATO, the terms of economic integration, support for Western Germany's position on the Berlin issue and what lies behind it—the political future of all Germany. Yet despite these very genuine differences, the system is not disintegrating, but is rather rearranging the relationship of its parts. After all, the economic integration of part of Western Europe goes forward; economically Western Europe and the United States are growing closer rather than apart. The basic stability of the NATO alliance can be explained on two grounds. First, no claimant for second place presents a genuine challenge to United States power. China may someday be a greater power than the Soviet Union, but neither France nor Germany can challenge the preeminence of the United States. Thus de Gaulle is claiming the position of the first among the secondary powers in the alliance, rather than the position of first in the alliance. Since goals are limited, the conflict does not pass beyond a certain point. Second, the modesty of NATO's goals makes of it an alliance which can withstand a great deal of turbulence. Since its main purpose is to prevent the spread of Communism and Soviet power in Europe, differences which do not threaten the accomplishment of that objective are not really subversive. If the purpose of NATO encompassed a common political direction of all Western Europe, or a common economic policy directed from the center, then NATO would be even more disrupted than the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. It is because the true purpose of NATO is merely anti-Communist that the alliance is capable of accommodating so much change.

A striking feature of the NATO alliance system is the limited power of the hegemonic partner. The Cyprus issue illustrates the increased independence of the weaker power within the alliance. In a traditional alliance system, both Greece and Turkey would have had to consider the consequences of defying the wishes of the hegemonic partner for peace in Cyprus. The Turks would have had to calculate that bad relations with the United States might encourage the Soviet Union to press its claims once again for irredenta in Eastern Anatolia. The Greeks, for their part, would have had to worry that bad relations with the United States would encourage Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, or both, to renew claims for Greek Macedonia. But neither Greece nor Turkey need concern themselves overmuch about such contingencies, because in a common desire to avoid territorial conflicts which might cause even greater conflicts, the Soviet Union and the United States have consistently avoided territorial conflicts in Europe in which both alliances were involved. The consequence has been to make territorial conflict within alliances easier.

The problems of the hegemonic power in the CENTO and SEATO alliances are very different from those in NATO. In the band of territory stretching from the Bosporus to the China Sea, the economic base for political institutions of the Western European type does not exist. Unresolved internal, political, and economic problems of varying intensity characterize every member of the CENTO and SEATO alliances. And in Vietnam, a situation exists which the Communists expected would be common to the majority of the former colonies.

The speed and relative ease of decolonization since World War II has come as a surprise to all. Communist theorists expected that the imperial powers and the colonies would have been involved in long armed conflict, during which the national liberationist movement would have been captured by Communist parties. However, only in Indo-China is the Communist Party engaged in active combat to become the successor to a colonial regime.

In Vietnam, therefore, the United States is trying in the midst of a civil war to create the political conditions in which democracy might be able to grow, and it is not an easy task. Had the British been as reluctant to face the necessity of liquidating empire as the French, Burma today might be in the position of Vietnam, rather than an independent and unified country.

In the CENTO and SEATO alliances the hegemonic power has two tasks: first to create the conditions for economic growth, which it is hoped will permit the establishment of broadly based governments of the West European type in which the internal threat is practically nonexistent; and second, as in Vietnam, to aid a regime actually engaged in a civil war with Communists.

The role of the United States as the hegemonic power in Latin America is again very different. Opposition to the extension of the Communist state system is a very different task in Latin America than in Europe or Asia. The geographical proximity of part of Latin America enables it to play a role in the military relationship between the two super-powers. The United States' successful opposition to the emplacement of missiles in Cuba was in pursuit of the goal of maintaining strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. As pointed out earlier,

Soviet acceptance of this relationship is the condition of the existing *détente* between the super powers.

A second United States purpose in Latin America is to prevent the establishment of Communist regimes in these countries. The hegemonic position of the United States in this alliance is complicated, first, by the circumstance that the danger from Communism is internal rather than external. The United States and Latin America are in a very uneasy relationship because of their different assumptions about the nature of their relationship. Although Latin American countries display a very wide variety of stages of development, they share the belief that the United States plays a dominant role in the affairs of each country. For each country of Latin America the United States is the most important foreign power; for the United States, each Latin American country is only one of many. The natural consequence is resentment at neglect.

Second, the belief is almost universal in Latin America that United States policy toward Latin America is largely determined by American private investors in Latin America.

Third, any United States involvement in the internal affairs of Latin American countries awakens the suspicion that North American imperialism is again active.

Yet the very formulation of the problem necessitated active North American involvement in Latin American internal affairs. The operative theory in the United States is that the unresolved developmental problems of Latin America may create good opportunities for Communism, and that therefore it is in the interests of the United States to help Latin American countries develop their economies.

In Latin America, however, the danger of Communism from within is not perceived as so great, and the dominant feeling is that the United States owes Latin America assistance because of the profits that American business has made in the last century. Moreover, the United States, it is believed, owes such a debt even if the businesses of its citizens are confiscated.

The situation is further complicated by vacillations in the United States judgment as to the danger of Communism in Latin America. The Cuban conversion to Communism, at first seen as a pattern for the future, is now increasingly perceived both by the Soviet Union and the United States as unique. As the danger of Communism is perceived to diminish, quite naturally United States interest in Latin America declines.

The Rio Pact is not, then, a traditional alli-

ance against a foreign threat but an agreement about United States economic and military assistance against internal threats, variously perceived by the signatories of the pacts. Is this a transitional or a permanent feature of the international scene? The answer seems to depend very much on the future prospects of Communism discussed above. If Communism loses as well as gains, then new variants of syncretic Communism in Latin America, if they emerge, will probably be viewed as reversible phenomena which might do world Communism more harm than good in the long run. If on the other hand, Communism continues to gain, the pressure for intervention before and after the fact of conversion will be high.6

b. The Communist alliance system. The members of the Communist alliance system share with the members of the non-Communist alliance system the security from war which results from the common interests of the two super-powers in keeping the likelihood of war low. But beyond this the resemblance ceases. The major distinguishing features of the Communist alliance are the following: (1) It is a fragmented system meant to be universal. (2) It is divided into revisionist and status quo powers. (3) Its members have territorial and economic claims against each other.

The greatest difficulty in the Communist alliance system to is establish a common agreement on its goals. As we have seen in the non-Communist alliance system where the purpose is essentially to contain Communism, the alliance system is divided into different parts in accordance with the nature of the task, with the United States being the hegemonial power in each of the sub-alliances. No such satisfactory solution is possible in the Communist alliance because its goals go far beyond containing the opponent; they encompass, eventually, overwhelming him. It has not been possible to reach agreement on how to do so safely in a world full of nuclear weapons.

For a long time the Communist camp could preserve the fiction of the existence of a correct political and military strategy to be discovered by divination from the entrails of Marxism. While the pontifex maximus was established in Moscow, the question of variant interpretations never arose. But just as the United States and the Soviet Union finally succeeded in es-

⁶ These lines, like the rest of the paper, were written in March 1965. No changes have been made in the text to accommodate subsequent events like the Dominican crisis.

tablishing the security of their respective allies from attack, the primacy of Moscow was challenged from within the Communist alliance system by China, and the leadership of the United States within the Atlantic Alliance was sharply disputed by de Gaulle. The protected secondary powers challenged the hegemon, but the consequences were much more serious for the Communist system.

For one, the main challenger, Communist China, was potentially a greater power than the Soviet Union, which lent a special bitterness to the conflict. Second, the problem of mutual economic aid is much more severe in the Communist camp than in the other. In the non-Communist system, in each of the sub-alliances, economic demands have been made only on the hegemon, that is, the United States. In Western Europe economic assistance is no longer necessary; in other areas the extent of economic assistance is under continous assessment. But in the Communist camp the direction of demands has been reversed. The Soviet Union at one time exploited Eastern Europe. but since 1956 it has responded to demands upon itself from Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union also exploited China by reasserting Tsarist rights in the Treaty Ports and on the Manchurian railroad. Moreover, as has been revealed since, the Chinese Communists had to pay for Soviet military aid during the Korean War. After Stalin's death the flow of demands was reversed until 1960, when the Soviet program of military and economic assistance came to an end.

These reversals in the flow of economic wealth are profoundly disturbing to the Communist camp because a critical goal for all its members, including the hegemonic power, is the attainment of the standard of living of the advanced Western capitalist countries. Since the United States has already attained this goal, offering assistance to its allies does not mean postponing the achievement of the aim of an adequately fed and clothed population.

A further cause for division in the Communist alliance is the existence of *status quo* and revisionist powers. These claims are not only against members of the non-Communist alliance, but against each other.

The Soviet Union, being a victor in the last war, is essentially a satisfied power territorially. Communist China is not, having active claims to Taiwan and inactive but not abandoned claims in Southeast Asia. A common policy of pressing these claims would produce gains for China, not the Soviet Union, and what is more, the costs to the Soviet Union are

higher. Soviet support of Chinese territorial claims could cause conflict with the United States, but even if that were avoided it would most probably produce a new phase of the arms race with the attendant economic embarrassment of the Soviet Union. Since China is too far behind the United States in weapons to be in competition, this cost does not enter into her calculations.

Thus in the Communist alliance, agreement cannot be reached on a common policy of promoting the expansion of Communism, nor on some scheme for sharing economic resources to build Communism in each country. The frustration produced by these differences is so high that Communist China has raised her territorial claims against the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia and has encouraged Rumania to raise the question of Bessarabia obliquely. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have not claimed the territory they lost to the Soviet Union, but these demands are just beneath the surface.

Originally, in the Communist system the tendency was for each country's internal institutions to be pressed into conformity with those of the Soviet Union; but since Stalin's death diversification rather than Gleichschaltung has been the trend. This aggravates internal political problems in the Soviet Union. For example, the freedom of action of Soviet leaders in domestic agricultural policy is limited by the existence of a Poland without collective farms.

Within the Western system the necessity to maintain uniformity in the political regimes of all its members has never been felt, and centrifugal tendencies do not create pressures for domestic reforms. As the originally looser system becomes more so, there is little feedback in internal politics. As the rigid system loosens, however, the feedback is significant and, what must be deeply disturbing, of dimensions difficult to foresee and assess.

Thus it is hard to imagine Eastern Europe as anything but much altered ten years from now and Western Europe as remaining essentially the same. Paradoxically, it seems that the cohesion of the Communist alliance system, once pressed into a rigid mold, will suffer much greater disintegration than the always loose non-Communist system. And the multiplication of ideological variants of Communism probably will eventually attenuate the ideological force of Communism.

Perhaps the second half of the twentieth century will indeed be the time of the end of ideology and a time of peace.

DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF A CROSS-POLITY SURVEY*

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Since the publication of David Easton's The Political System,1 it has become increasingly common for political scientists to speculate as to the basic factors which may be common to all political systems and which, in their varying manifestations, determine the unique styles of political behavior within each. Efforts to identify the basic political phenomena and their complex relationships have generated a variety of cross-national conceptual schemes and propositions. Some authors speak of structural and functional requisites, some refer to equilibrium conditions for system maintenance.2 Others, employing more traditional concepts. refer to power, legitimacy, ideology, instability, consensus, influence, and bargaining. Regardless of the form these efforts assume, they all posit the existence of factors or dimensions which are common to all political systems.3 Such attempts at cross-national theory raise two questions. If basic dimensions can be said to underlie the complex behavior within political systems, how can the dimensions be identified? And, what set of concepts have the greatest empirical relevance for describing the dimensions?

1. THE EMPIRICAL SEARCH FOR BASIC "DIMENSIONS"

This kind of theory construction and these questions are not a unique outgrowth of political science. Psychologists began grappling with similar problems sixty years ago. Anthropolo-

- * We are indebted to Professor Karl F. Schuessler for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.
 - ¹ New York, 1953.
- ² For an attempt to integrate the structural and functional approaches with the systems approach, see Almond's introductory essay in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64.
- ³ The terms "factor" and "dimension" are here used as equivalent, non-technical concepts. Henceforth the former will be employed in reference to the mathematical result (the columns of variables' loadings in the factor matrix) of the factor analytic calculations; the latter will refer to the phenomena of the real world which the factor delineates.

gists, sociologists, economists and political scientists, who are plagued by more complex units of study, have been struggling along behind.

What is unique to political science is the near absence of systematic empirical tests of the many propositions about basic dimensions. In addition to entertaining such propositions, the other social sciences have begun testing them. The psychologists, led initially by Spearman and later by Thurstone, have developed a statistical technique, factor analysis, for testing hypotheses as to the basic dimensions of intelligence and personality. In discussing the particular relevance of factor analysis for identifying basic dimensions and organizing concepts in the social sciences, Thurstone says:

A factor problem starts with the hope or conviction that a certain domain is not so chaotic as it looks. . . . If no promising hypothesis is available, one can represent the domain as adequately as possible in terms of a set of measurements of numerical indices and proceed with a factorial experiment. The analysis might reveal an underlying order which would be of great assistance in formulating the scientific concepts covering the particular domain. . . .

The exploratory nature of factor analysis is often not understood. Factor analysis has its principal usefulness at the border line of science. It is naturally superseded by rational formulations in terms of the science involved. Factor analysis is useful, especially in those domains where basic and fruitful concepts are essentially lacking and where crucial experiments have been difficult to conceive.⁵

In spite of this ground work by psychologists the broader potential of the method was largely ignored until 1949, and even then a psychologist led the way. In a seminal article, the psychologist Cattell adapted the technique to the measurement of common dimensions of

- ⁴ For a brief history of factor analysis, see Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 3-11.
- ⁵ L. L. Thurstone, Multiple Factor Analysis: A Development and Expansion of the Vectors of the Mind (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 55-56.

cultural organization. Subsequently, Berry introduced geographers and economists to factor analysis.

Rummel's 1963 study, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," was the first cross-national application of the technique in political science. A year earlier, Schubert had published a factor analysis of Supreme Court voting patterns. More recently, Alker has published a similar analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly. Both Rummel and Russett are currently conducting factor analyses which in part replicate Cattell's measurement of the dimensions of cultural organization within nations. 11

Even though a growing number of political scientists are employing factor analysis, none have used the technique to address the questions: "What are the basic dimensions of political systems and what concepts best describe them?" One major obstacle has been a lack of variables with which to tap the phenomena of political institutions across all nations. Publication of A Cross-Polity Survey represented, in part, an effort to remedy this deficiency. 12

- ⁶ Raymond B. Cattell, "The Dimensions of Culture Patterns by Factorization of National Characters," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 44 (October, 1949), pp. 443-469.
- ⁷ Brian J. L. Berry, "Basic Patterns of Economic Development," Allas of Economic Development, ed. Norton Ginsburg (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 110-119 and "An Inductive Approach to the Regionalization of Economic Development," Essays on Geography and Economic Development, ed. Norton Ginsburg (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 78-107. For a collateral, but less ambitious study by a sociologist, see Leo F. Schnore, "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development," Land Economics, Vol. 37 (August, 1961), pp. 229-245.
- ⁸ Rudolph J. Rummel, in *General Systems Year-book*, Vol. 8 (1963), pp. 1-50.
- ⁹ Glendon Schubert, "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (March, 1962), pp. 90-107.
- ¹⁰ Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," this Review, Vol. 58 (September, 1964), pp. 642-657.
- ¹¹ Rudolph J. Rummel, Harold Geutzkow, Jack Sawyer, and Raymond Tanter, Dimensions of Nations (forthcoming); Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions" Empirical Studies in International Relations, ed. J. David Singer (New York, the Free Press, forthcoming).
 - ¹² Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A

The Survey data are particularly relevant to questions about the common dimensions of political systems and their organizing concepts because the variables operationalize many of the concepts and categories used in recent attempts at cross-national theory. The authors, after canvassing the existing literature, "attempted to select and adopt—experimentally at least—every possible raw characteristic that gave promise of being workable and analytically powerful." 13

II. THE RESEARCH PURPOSE

Given a relevant domain of data and an appropriate statistical technique, this paper seeks to answer the following questions:

- (1) What factors emerge when the Survey data are factor analyzed?
- (2) What dimensions can be inferred from these factors?
- (3) What relevance have these dimensions for cross-national study?
- (4) What specific propositions about conflict behavior are suggested by the findings?

The first question is straightforward and is answered with the factorial results. The second question is answered by inferring from the factors the existence of dimensions or "latent variables" which give rise to the intercorrelation of variables within the independent clusters.

The third question is more complex and requires elaboration. Once a dimension is identified and named, the label used becomes a concept which is operationalized by the factor. In this sense the labels are highly significant concepts, for theoretical purposes, because of their lawful (statistical) relationships with all the other variables included. Thus the interrelationships among all the variables are explained by their relationships to a limited number of concepts. In other words, the factor labels comprise a set of concepts with high generalizing power for cross-national study.

The fourth question is answered by examin-

Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1963). A somewhat related effort is Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964). The compilers of the Handbook, however, set themselves the task of assembling a large number of interval-scaled data series which are ecologically relevant to political research, but which are not, in the main, substantively political in character.

13 Banks and Textor, op. cit., p. 6.

ing the factorial results for the relationships of the conflict variables with the factors.

III. THE DATA

The present study is based on a factor analysis of the political component of A Cross-Polity Survey. The input data comprise 68 variables, all but five of which were derived from the 57 polychotomous characteristics of the Survey. We omitted 16 Survey characteristics of an essentially ecological characteristics of an essentially ecological characteristics we wished to analyze relationships within the political domain itself, rather than between the political system and its environment. 15

In addition to the 16 non-political characteristics, three additional characteristics, 41 (Party System: Qualitative), 47 (Vertical Power Distribution), and 56 (Character of Legal System), were deleted from the factor analysis for distributional reasons.

Of the remaining 38 Survey characteristics, 27 were ordinal-scaled and 11 were nominal-scaled. Each nominal-scaled characteristic was "decomposed" according to its attribute components, as may be seen in Table I. 16 In order to examine the relationship of conflict to other political phenomena, we included five non-Survey ordinal variables: System Stability, Demonstrations, Domestic Killed, Expulsion of Ambassadors, and Foreign Killed. All but the first of these are taken directly from Rummel's work in conflict behavior. 17

The System Stability variable is of a composite character. Standard scores were calculated for the domestic conflict factor scores

¹⁴ Since each of the Survey variables is discussed in the Survey itself, it seems unnecessary to provide a set of definitions for purposes of the present article. For those unfamiliar with the Survey, one variable that appears in Table I may, however, require specification. "System Style" refers to the degree of "mobilization" (to attain political or social objectives) present in the system.

polychotomous characteristics of the Survey and an eleven-factor solution, four non-political factors ("Economic Development," "Size," "Population Density," and "Religion") emerged. The remaining seven factors closely resembled those reported on below. The four nonpolitical factors correspond to factors identified by Berry, op. cit.; Rummel et al., op. cit.; and Russett, op. cit.

¹⁶ The numbers in parentheses in Table I indicate the Survey raw characteristics from which the variables have been derived. Thus variables 22–24 are all derived from Survey Raw Characteristic 26 (Constitutional Status).

17 Rummel, op. cit.

appearing in Rummel, and then weighted on the basis of his figures for percent of common variance. Standard scores were also calculated for an "Executive Stability" index derived largely from data appearing in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. 18 The latter scores were weighted on the basis of twice the mean of the weights assigned to the Rummel-based scores. The four weighted scores were then summed into a composite stability index which, for present purposes, was dichotomized into "high" and "low" components.

The range for each of the ordinal variables is either 2 or 3. The range for each nominal variable component (as it appears in Table I) is, of course, 2.

IV/ THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE: FACTOR ANALYSIS

Technically speaking, factor analysis is "that branch of multivariate analysis which deals with the internal structure of matrices of covariances and correlations." More simply, it is a technique by means of which a large number of variables may be clustered on the basis of their intercorrelations, each set of which is presumed to reflect a single dimension which is "causing" the association within the set of variables. In the context of the Survey data, the factors which emerge summarize the major components of variation among the 68 variables.

Scoring and Correlation Procedure. The first step in the factor analysis was to construct a correlation matrix of the Survey data. The original data were in the form of polychotomous characteristics. For this study they were collapsed into two and three place variables which were then correlated using the product moment coefficient. This procedure, which, in effect, consists of assigning interval values to non-interval data for correlation purposes, is not wholly orthodox. We adopted it on the pragmatic ground that it provides a measure of the relationships among the Survey variables from which the major clusters can be factored out.

The suitability of various scoring and correlation techniques in factor analysis has been extensively debated by the psychologists. Thurstone advances the following argument corroborating our position:

The factorial methods are sufficiently powerful

- 18 Russett et al., op. cit., pp. 101-104.
- ¹⁹ D. N. Lawley and A. E. Maxwell, Factor Analysis As a Statistical Method (London, Butterworths and Co., 1963), p. 1.

		Factor							
		I	II	III	IV	v	VI	VII	h²
1.	East European Areal Grouping (1)	58	.22	.26	06	.36	.00	24	.64
	Advanced Western Areal Grouping (1)	.45	.25	.66	13	11	17	01	.70
	Latin American Areal Grouping (1) Asian Areal Grouping (1)	.21	.31	59	~.49	.17	.12	14 00	.73
	Asian Areal Grouping (1) African Areal Grouping (1)	16 05	.13 90	24 .02	.55 05	06 10	.22 .06	.00 16	.40
	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping (1)	06	.17	08	.31	20	25	.50	.4
	Freedom of the Press (13)	.80	22	.17	17	.08	. 13	13	.7
	Date of Independence (19)	.06	.66	.29	36	33	05	27	.8
	Westernization (20)	.32	.60	.50	30	.16	12	13	.8
	Ex-British Dependency (21) Ex-French Dependency (21)	39	.14 51	.35	.69	.01	01	14 $.49$.7
	Ex-Spanish Dependency (21)	.10	.54	.10 47	13 71	15 .09	04	24	1.0
	Early European Political Modernization (22)	.37	.17	.45	.07	19	.06	06	.4
14.	Later European Political Modernization (22)	04	.46	07	67	.32	16	22	.8
	Non-European Political Modernization (22)	17	.21	02	.12	50	.15	13	.3
	Developed Tutelary Political Modernization (22)	09	.14	26	.70	.06	.01	.39	.73
	Undeveloped Tutelary Political Modernization (22) Political Modernization—Periodization (23)	01 .03	93 .76	01	11	.03	.07 15	05 .18	.89
	Developmental Ideological Orientation (24)	.00	83	25	10 02	.16 .12	.07	.29	.8
	Conventional Ideological Orientation (24)	.73	.46	.29	20	.02	01	10	.8
	System Style (25)	74	.11	.13	.14 ·	.37	.14	.19	.7
	Constitutional Regime (26)	.93	.02	.11	08	.28	.04	.05	.9
	Authoritarian Regime (26)	32	18	36	.13	÷.70	06	.04	.7
	Totalitarian Regime (26) Governmental Stability (27)	81	.21	.26	07	.39	.05 .07	18	.8
	Representativeness of Regime (28)	.15 .85	.10 .15	.89 .05	01 .02	.01 .27	02	03 08	.8
	Electoral System (29)	.94	.22	01	.12	.04	08	15	.9
	Freedom of Group Opposition (30)	.92	.16	04	.00	01	11	04	.8
29.	Political Enculturation (31)	.33	.21	.54	08	.13	.22	02	.5
	Sectionalism (32)	.02	09	07	.41	23	01	15	.2
	Articulation by Associational Groups (33)	.63	.54	.27	13	.06	04	.09	.7
	Articulation by Institutional Groups (34) Articulation by Non-Associational Groups (35)	83	01	36	.21	03	10 .05	.02	.8 .8
	Articulation by Anomic Groups (36)	28 43	58 17,	33 51	.52 .35	24 16	08	.06 10	.6
	Articulation by Political Parties (37)	.68	.20	16	.00	.03.	55	16	.8
36.	Aggregation by Political Parties (38)	.06	10	.34	.12	.01	.82	.20	.8
	Aggregation by Executive (39)	.19	48	.15	.00	.18	.46	.61	.9
	Aggregation by Legislature (40)	.73	.38	.28	07	.08	32	.05	.8
	One-Party System (41) One Party Dominant System (41)	77 .14	23 24	26 24	14 02	.13 .08	.23 .15	02	.8
	Two-Party System (41)	.43	.20	.15	.17	.00	.50	19	.5
	Multi-Party System (41)	.47	.22	18	09	.08	69	06	.7
43.	Stability of Party System (43)	12	.14	.84	03	.19	.28	.08	.8
	Personalismo (44)	.00	08	66	22	34	12	09	.6
	Elitism (45)	70	.41	18	.03	17	01	41	.9
	Charisma (46) Horizontal Power Distribution (48)	33	37	04	.20	21	.29	.44 08	.6
	Presidential System (49)	.86 .01	.29 26	.19 59	.02 47	.20 03	07	.21	.7
	Parliamentary-Republican System (49)	.27	.04	.20	.13	.08	35	.15	.2
	Parliamentary-Royalist System (49)	.47	.01	.28	.33	.01	.02	35	.5
	Status of Legislature (50)	.87	.01	.29	.02	.10	01	.03	.8
	Unicameral Legislature (51)	49	51	03	11	.28	19	.04	.6
	Bicameral Legislature (51)	.49	.51	.03	.11	28	.19	04	.6
	Status of Executive (52) Modern Bureaucracy (53)	82 .52	18 .22	11 .65	C3 O1	21 10	25	.13 ,06	.8 .8
	Semi-Modern Bureaucracy (53)	29	.54	46	10	.47	.22	.01	.8
	Post-Colonial Transitional Bureaucracy (53)	.00	92	05	.01	.05	.00	06	.8
58.	Traditional Bureaucracy (53)	22	.11	10	.21	80	02	04	.7
	Military Interventive (54)	03	.18	60	06	15	28	.04	.5
	Military Supportive (54)	77	.19	.16	.12	12	.00	08	.6
	Military Neutral (54) Role of Police (55)	.73 75	32 06	.34	07	.21	.20 — 11	.05	.8 .8
	Communist System (57)	75 71	06 .25	45 .26	11 .06	16 .40	11 .04	.10 16	.8
	System Stability	.20	.03	.82	09	02	.05	09	.7
	Demonstrations	.24	.00	39	05	11	21	.06	.2
66.	Domestic Killed	.05	06	62	.21	,06	.06	01	.4
	Expulsion of Ambassadors	06	.09	.03	12	.20	.00	.51	.3
o 8. .	Foreign Killed	.00	.01	33	.21	03	.06	.49	.4
	Percent of Total Variance	24.6	13.5	13.2	6.4	5.4	4.7	4.3	72.
	Percent of Common Variance	34.1	18.7	18.3	8.9	7.4	6.6	6.0	100.0

that one can take considerable liberties with the raw scores without seriously affecting the results. If we take a factor analysis in which several fundamental and meaningful factors have been clearly identified, it would be instructive to subject the factor methods to a severe test by radical changes in the original raw scores. . . . The correlation coefficients to be analyzed would then be markedly different from those used in the original analysis, but it seems quite likely that the same basic factors would be identified. This demonstration has not been made,* but it probably would be successful in showing the power of the factorial methods in isolating the underlying order among the test variables and the basic factors that determine the individual differences.20

In the context of the present study, this position is substantiated by correspondence between our factors and those identified by Berry, Rummel, and Russett in three independent factor analyses. (See the section below, entitled "Interpreting and Naming the Factors.")

Factorial Procedure. The next step was to factor analyze the product moment correlation matrix. Unities were inserted in the principal diagonal of the matrix. The principal-factor (or principal-component) technique was selected over competing methods on the ground that it yields a mathematically unique solution in which the first factor accounts for the maximum amount of variance within the data, while each succeeding factor extracts the maximum of the remaining unexplained variance.²¹

In order to identify the most invariant factor structure, we rotated the principal-factor solution. Using the inflection point criterion for practical significance, we selected the first seven factors for rotation. Each of these factors accounted for more than 4.0 per cent of the total variance, and the seven, when summed, accounted for 72.0 per cent of the variance. The factors were rotated to an orthogonal and to an oblique solution using Kaiser's varimax and Carroll's oblimin biquartimin criteria respectively.²² The orthogonal solution best fulfilled

²⁰ Thurstone, op. cit., pp. 66-67. The asterisk refers to the following footnote in the revised edition of Thurstone's original work: "Since this chapter was written, the demonstration has been made, and is described in Chapter XV."

²¹ This technique is explained by Harman, op. cit., in ch. 9, "Principal-Factor Solution."

²² Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytic Rotation in Factor Analysis," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 23 (September, 1958), pp. 187– 200; John B. Carroll, "Biquartimin Criterion the simple structure criteria and was selected for presentation. 23

Interpreting and Naming the Factors. The interpretation and naming of the factors involve further methodological considerations. However, by including the entire population of nations in the factor analysis, we have avoided one issue. We are not faced with the problem of estimating the significance of inferences from a sample to a larger population.

One important consideration is whether to adopt the descriptive or the inferential approach in interpreting the meaning of the factors. ²⁴ The former considers a factor to be a set of coefficients which conveys only descriptive information about the clustering of variables on a factor. The inferential school takes one step further and assumes that the factor indicates the presence of a basic dimension or "latent variable" which "causes" the array of variables along the factor. The composition of the variables loaded by the factor and the percent of total variance which the factor explains determine the appropriateness and strength of the inferential interpretation.

In the light of these criteria, we first employ the descriptive and then, when appropriate, the inferential approach for interpreting the Survey factors. Thus, in the discussion that follows, we first present the extreme clusters of each factor (all are bimodal) and interpret them descriptively as opposite types. We then consider what basic dimension might be inferred. When each variable's rank can be interpreted as representing more or less of a phenomenon common to all of the variables in the extremes, we label the factor with the appropriate ordinal concept. The inferences implied by the labels are, of course, weaker when the factors account for small portions of the total variance.

The next consideration is the validity of the factors. If our factors identify basic phenomena operating within political systems, they will also be delineated by other factor analyses. Even though no comparable political study has

for Rotation to Oblique Simple Structure in Factor Analysis," *Science*, Vol. 126 (29 November, 1957), pp. 1114-1115.

²³ Calculations were performed by the Indiana Research Computing Center's IBM 709. The MESA-3 program employed was developed by John B. Carroll at Harvard, coded by R. A. Sandsmark at Northwestern, and revised by Norman Swartz with the assistance of Gary Flint at Indiana.

²⁴ Sten Henrysson, Applicability of Factor Analysis in the Behavioral Sciences (Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1960), pp. 86-88.

been completed, we found partial correspondence between our factors and those of independent studies by Rummel, Russett, and Berry. Rummel's and Russett's factor analyses of social, economic, and political variables yielded the following five factors: "Economic Development," "Communism," "Intensive Agriculture" or "Density," "Size," and "Catholic Culture" or "Religion." ²⁵ These factors correspond to five of eleven which we calculated in an earlier factor analysis of the social and economic in addition to the political variables of the Survey. The remaining six factors closely resemble the political factors reported on below. Berry's study of economic data identified three factors ("Technology, Demography," and "Size"), which also correspond to factors calculated from the Survey data.26

From this convergence, we conclude that the earlier Survey factors are valid measures of the dimensions suggested, including one that is political in character. More importantly, the earlier results encourage the expectation that future factorial studies will add to the validity of the political factors yielded by the present study.

A further consideration is raised by the communality value 1.08 for the variable "Ex-Spanish Dependency" in Table I. This high communality (the normal range is zero to one) was caused by missing data.27 We did not estimate values for missing data, therefore the number of cases entering into each correlation is not the same. As a consequence, the correlation matrix does not exhibit Gramian properties, and the variances and communalities in the factor matrix are slightly inflated. With this consideration in mind, we rely on the relative, rather than absolute, values of the factor loadings and communalities in interpreting the factors. Also, we adopt a high value, ±.50, for identifying the significant variable loadings. This value is safely above the $\pm .30$ generally suggested by factor analysts.

V. THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

Before examining Table I in detail, the single most important implication of the factor matrix should be noted, viz., that the Survey

data are highly structured along factors largely independent of each other.

The seven factors account for 72 per cent of the total variance among the 68 variables, i.e., an average of 72 per cent of the variance of each variable. Of the 68 variables, only seven failed to be loaded higher than \pm .50 by at least one factor, while only three were loaded higher than \pm .50 by more than one factor. Hence, except for three overlapping variables, the solution employed yields mutually independent factors.

These findings indicate that the political phenomena measured by the data do not occur randomly from one polity to the next; they occur in highly associated patterns or dimensions. In other words, basic dimensions do underlie the complex behavior within political systems.

In the following sections these factors are interpreted and the dimensions are inferred. It must be remembered, when hypothesizing with regard to dimensions, that the inferences are made with varying degrees of confidence. The large proportions of total variance accounted for by each of the first three factors (24.6%, 13.5%, and 13.2%) support strong inferences. The smaller amount of variance explained by the last four factors (6.4%, 5.4%, 4.7%, 4.3%) sustain successively weaker inferences.

Factor I: Access. Table II displays the highly loaded variables comprising the extreme portions of Factor I, which accounts for a large portion, 24.6 per cent, of the total variance. In examining these variables, the following dichotomies emerge: hierarchical as opposed to competitive bargaining processes; consolidated as opposed to distributed authority and force; executive and single-party politics as opposed to legislative and group politics; totalitarian restrictions as opposed to institutionalized openness of political channels. The dichotomies refer generally to restrictive as opposed to permissive institutions and interaction. Or, to use Truman's concept, Factor I reflects the degree of access to political channels.28

This conclusion is further substantiated when we examine the rank order of the areal groups on the factor (Table III). The high loadings of the Western, Latin American, and East European groups correspond to documented fact. The low loading of the African group reflects political channels which, due to their variety, absence, lack of differentiation, and newness are randomly rather than systematically distributed in terms of access. For

²⁵ Rummel et al., op. cit. and Russett, op. cit.

²⁶ Berry, op. cit.

²⁷ Due to an artifact of coding procedure taken over directly from the *Survey*, the variable "Ex-Spanish Dependency" exhibits an unusually high missing data component. For this variable, in addition to normal missing data attrition, only excolonial dependencies were assigned substantive codings, some 40 countries being regarded as "irrelevant" to the coding category.

²⁸ David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, 1955), p. 264 ff.

TABLE II, FACTOR I: ACCESS

TABLE IV. FACTOR III DIFFERENTIATION

Factor Loading	Variable	Factor Loading	Variable
.94	Electoral System	.76	Political Modernization—Periodiza-
.93	Constitutional Regime		tion
.92	Group Opposition	.66	Date of Independence
.87	Status of Legislature	.60	Westernization
.86	Horizontal Power Distribution	. 54	Articulation by Associational Groups
.85	Representativeness of Regime	.54	Semi-Modern Bureaucracy
.80	Press Freedom	. 54	Ex-Spanish Dependency
.73	Aggregation by Legislature	. 51	Bicameral Legislature
.73	Military Neutral	.46	Later European Political Moderniza-
.73	Conventional Ideological Orientation		tion
.68	Articulation by Parties	.46	Conventional Ideological Orientation
.63	Articulation by Associational Groups	.41	Elitism
.52	Modern Bureaucracy	.38	Aggregation by Legislature
	•		•
	•		•
	•		
58	East European Areal Grouping	37	Charisma
70	Elitism	48	Aggregation by Executive
71	Communist System	51	Ex-French Dependency
74	System Style	51	Unicameral Legislature
75	Role of Police	58	Articulation by Non-Associational
77	One-Party System		Groups
77	Military Supportive	83	Developmental Ideological Orienta-
81	Totalitarian Regime		tion
82	Status of Executive	90	African Areal Grouping
83	Articulation by Institutional Groups	92	Post-Colonial Bureaucracy
		93	Undeveloped Tutelary Political Mod- ernization

similar reasons, the random distribution of North African and Middle Eastern nations is not surprising.

Specialists in political development, consensus, and conflict will note that these phenomena are not highly associated with degree of political access.

Factor I yields empirical evidence supporting the widespread use of measures of constitutionalism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and representation in comparative and theo-

TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION OF AREAL GROUPING VARIABLES ALONG THE ACCESS FACTOR

Factor Loading	Variable
.45	Advanced Western Areal Group
.21	Latin American Areal Group
05	African Areal Group
06	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Group
16	Asian Areal Group
58	East European Areal Group

retical work. In addition, the factor suggests a need for more precise measurement of the quantity and quality of restrictions imposed on competition for control of political channels.

Factor II: Differentiation. Table IV rank orders the variables loaded heavily by Factor II, which accounts for 13.5 per cent of the total variance. The extremes of the factor contrast late stages of modernization against undeveloped tutelary modernization, conventional against developmental ideology, semi-modern against post-colonial bureaucracy, and aggregation by legislature against aggregation by executive. Note that the extremes do not contrast the westernized democracies with traditional monarchies. The factor does not, therefore, measure the full range of phenomena which could properly be interpreted as "political development." In the light of these findings, we interpret the factor to reflect a dimension of differentiation of political institutions within former colonial dependencies.

Factor II lends empirical support to the com-

parative and theoretical focus on measures of institutional differentiation and specialization within the ex-colonial nations. It also indicates the need to develop more sophisticated typologies than presently exist for the classification of transitional political systems. For example, the two polity groups most directly involved in the variable extremities of this factor (the Latin American and the African) are classified according to quite different sets of typological criteria in Almond and Coleman.29 Thus, while the negative loadings might be regarded as according with one or more components of the "Almond-Shils" schema (e.g., "Tutelary Democracy" or "Terminal Colonial Dependency"), it is evident that no element of the same typology applies to the set of high positive loadings for Factor II.

The latter extreme loads characteristics of older ex-colonies whose political institutions have at least in a structural sense been substantially westernized. The other extreme loads characteristics of recently dependent territories which have yet to become accommodated to other than rudimentary institutions of self-government. While one might expect polities exhibiting high positive scores for this factor to be more democratic, more stable, and more consensual than those exhibiting high negative scores, variables indexing these phenomena are, by and large, conspicuous by their absence.

We hypothesize, therefore, that this factor measures what may be termed the political counterpart to social differentiation. This is to suggest that if a large number of variables indexing social structure had been included in the present study, a "social differentiation" factor would undoubtedly emerge and many of the high loading Factor II variables might also be expected to load heavily on such a factor.

Certain of the positive loading Factor II variables may also represent, or suggest, necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for a stable democratic political system in a highly differentiated social and economic milieu. Indeed, the presence of a moderate degree of elitism, when coupled with articulation by associational groups and legislative aggregation does not appear to be inconsistent with this hypothesis when viewed in the context of Kornhauser's theses as to the preconditions of democracy and totalitarianism, respectively.³⁰

Factor III: Consensus. The extreme loading variables of Factor III, which accounts for

TABLE V. FACTOR III: CONSENSUS

Factor Loading	Variable
.89	Governmental Stability
.84	Stability of Party System
.66	Advanced Western Regional Grouping
.65	Modern Bureaucracy
.54	Political Enculturation
. 50	Westernization
	•
	•
	•
51	Articulation by Anomic Groups
59	Latin American Areal Grouping
 59	Presidential Legislative-Executive Structure
60	Military Interventive
66	Domestic Killed
66	Personalismo

13.2 per cent of the total variance, are presented in Table V. Examination of the variables reveals the following dichotomies: personalistic party politics as opposed to party system stability; governmental stability as opposed to military intervention; overall system stability as opposed to domestic killed; political enculturation as opposed to articulation by anomic groups. These dichotomies reflect agreement as opposed to dissent with regard to the basic channels and institutions of political participation. Factor III seems to tap the degree of consensus and cooperation among participants as to the rules governing political activity. Note that the negative pole of the factor reflects not only dissent and opposition, but direct, physical

The rank order of the areal groups on the factor (Table VI) adds further substance to this interpretation. The positive loadings of the Western and East European nations are as

TABLE VI. DISTRIBUTION OF AREAL GROUPING VARIABLES ALONG THE CONSENSUS FACTOR

Factor Loading	Variable
.66	Advanced Western Areal Grouping
.26	East European Areal Grouping
.02	African Areal Grouping
08	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping
24	Asian Areal Grouping
59	Latin American Areal Grouping

²⁹ Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 522-567.

²⁰ William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Chicago, 1959).

expected. The low correlation of the African nations reflects a widespread lack of consensus as to the structure of political institutions in the area. However, this lack of consensus is not typically accompanied by a high incidence of open conflict (domestic killed and military intervention) between opposing groups. Lack of consensus in Latin American and Asian countries, on the other hand, gives rise to open dissent, coups, and conflict. This contrast raises the question, "What are the forms and causes of open opposition when political consensus is absent within a nation?"

The emergence of this dimension supports the comparative and theoretical use of concepts bearing on agreement, consensus, cooperation, dissent, opposition, and conflict. Most of these phenomena fall within that area of the discipline now focusing on political culture and attitudes. The findings suggest that in addition to measuring attitudes of consensus and dissent researchers should more systematically explore the overt behavior resulting from these attitudes. 31

TABLE VII. FACTOR IV: SECTIONALISM

Factor Loading	Variable
.70	Developed Tutelary Political Modernization
. 69	Ex-British Dependency
.55	Asian Areal Grouping
. 52	Articulation by Non-Associational Groups
.41	Sectionalism
.35	Articulation by Anomic Groups
	· ·
36	Date of Independence
47	Presidential Legislative-Executive Structure
49	Latin American Areal Grouping
67	Later European Political Moderniza- tion

³¹ Rummel has initiated an examination of "causes" of domestic conflict but has encountered a lack of relevant survey data. See Rudolph J. Rummel, "Testing Some Possible Predictors of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," Proceedings of the Peace Research Society, Vol. 1 (1963). A useful pilot study in this regard is Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).

TABLE VIII. FACTOR V. LEGITIMATION

Factor Loading	Variable
.47	Semi-Modern Bureaucracy
.40	Communist System
.39	Totalitarian Regime
.37	System Style
.36	East European Areal Grouping
.32	Later European Political Modernization
	•
	•
	•
50	Non-European Political Moderniza- tion
70	Authoritarian Regime
80	Traditional Bureaucracy

Factor III also serves to substantiate the usefulness of typologies delineating clusters of characteristics that contrast "stable" with "unstable" political systems.

Factor IV: Sectionalism. The fourth factor, accounting for 6.4 per centof the total variance, is only one-fourth as strong as the first and one-half as strong as the second and third, and therefore provides a weaker basis for inference. For this same reason, inferences based on factors five, six, and seven cannot be made with the high degree of confidence earlier expressed.

The extremes of the factor (see Table VII) contrast colonial developmental characteristics in much the same manner as does Factor II. An important difference is that the earlier set of ex-French, African characteristics is here replaced by an ex-British, Asian configuration. The extreme loading variables are, however, less amenable to interpretation than in the case of Factor II. The ex-British dependencies are, in certain respects, more "developed" than their ex-French counterparts, yet the internal developmental cleavages between social sectors are obviously more pronounced. This is reflected in the loadings of sectionalism and anomic group activity. For want of a better term, we therefore interpret this factor as tapping a specific pattern of institutional differentiation occurring in a political system exhibiting high sectionalism.

Factor V: Legitimation. The extremes of Factor V, as exhibited in Table VIII, contrast totalitarian regimes against authoritarian regimes, semi-modern bureaucracies against traditional bureaucracies, and later European political

TABLE IX. DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES REFLECT-ING PHENOMENA OF LEGITIMATION AND AUTHORITY ON THE LEGITIMATION FACTOR

Factor Loading	Variable
.47	Semi-Modern Bureaucracy
.40	Communist Regime
.39	Totalitarian Regime
.37	System Style
.28	Constitutional System
.27	Representativeness of Regime
.21	Military Neutral
.20	Horizontal Power Distribution
.12	Developmental Ideological Orienta-
	tion
02	Conventional Ideological Orientation
12	Military Supportive
15	Military Interventive
16	Role of Police
17	Elitism
21	Charisma
24	Articulation by Non-Associational
	Groups
34	Personalismo
70	Authoritarian Regime
80	Traditional Bureaucracy

modernization against non-European political modernization.

Most of these variables reflect the source and distribution of authority within political systems. More specifically, they refer to the means by which political authority is legitimized. As demonstrated by the rank order of variables in Table IX, they can be construed as falling along a continuum between the classical Weberian ideal types of rational-legalistic legitimation and traditional legitimation. In examining the variable positions, the characteristics of rational and legalistic authority fall at one extreme, while the characteristics of traditional and charismatic authority occupy the other.³²

Factor VI: Interest. The extreme loading variables of Factor VI are exhibited in Table X. In addition to contrasting two-party and multi-party systems, this factor identifies the role which political institutions assume in patterns of interest circulation. It should be stressed that this factor is typological in that it contrasts patterning rather than the amount of

TABLE X. FACTOR VI: INTEREST

Factor Loading	Variable
.82	Aggregation by Political Parties
. 50	Two-Party System
.46	Aggregation by Executive
	•
	•
	•
32	Aggregation by Legislature
35	Parliamentary-Republican
55	Articulation by Political Parties
69	Multi-Party System

interest circulation. The Access factor, which contrasts systems with large numbers of interest articulation points against systems with few access institutions, measures the volume of interests processed by the system.

Also, it is significant that this factor does not measure all components of the Almond-Coleman articulation-aggregation schema,³³ It identifies only the distinctly political institutions for handling interests injected into the system, rather than the full range of interest-bearing groups.

This factor highlights the importance of the channels of interest circulation in the political process. It also provides support for the generalizing power of typologies of party systems.

Factor VII: Leadership. Factor VII loads only 4.3 per cent of the total variance and does not exhibit the pronounced bimodal configuration of the others. The positive extreme of the factor loads variables which reflect strong executive leadership in both domestic and foreign affairs.

TABLE XI. FACTOR VII: LEADERSHIP

Factor	
Loading	Variable
.61	Aggregation by Executive
. 51	Expulsion of Ambassadors
.50	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping
.49	Foreign Killed
.49	Ex-French Dependency
.44	Charisma
	•
	•
	•
41	Elitism

³³ Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33 ff.

³² Cf. Leonard Binder's neo-Weberian typology in *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Soci*ety (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962), pp. 44-45.

This dimension calls attention to the need for systematic studies of executive roles and leadership style in both comparison and theory. The random distribution of other leadership variables along this factor indicates the complexity of the phenomena in question. The relatively low strength of the factor indicates that its typological value is limited.

Unexplained Variables. The factor structure accounts for less than 50 per cent of the communalities (h²) of the variables exhibited in Table XII. However, as indicated by the factor loadings in parentheses, six of these variables correlate above .50 with one of the factors. In other words, at least one major source of variation for each of these six variables is identified by the factor matrix. We conclude, therefore, that only five exhibit variation substantially independent of the factors identified.

Of the regional groupings, the North African, Middle Eastern and the Asian display considerably less explained total variance than do the others. In short, political phenomena in these countries are not highly structured along the dimensions discovered. These areas may, of course, exhibit characteristics that structure themselves along other dimensions, possibly religious or cultural, that the present study is not designed to tap.

VI. CONCLUSIONS: RELEVANCE OF THE FINDINGS FOR CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY

In the preceding sections, we have proposed the following answers for the first two research questions: the Survey data are highly correlated along a relatively limited number of factors; these factors provide evidence for inferring seven basic political dimensions—Access, Differentiation, Consensus, Sectionalism, Legitimation, Interest, and Leadership.

Theory and Research. The third question asks. "What is the relevance of these dimensions for cross-national study?" The dimensions have impact in the following areas: theory and research, comparison, and typology construction. First, they suggest a basic set of concepts around which theory construction and research should proceed. According to our findings the seven underlying dimensions are systematically related to ("cause") a wide variety of manifest political behavior. In this sense, the concepts naming the dimensions are theoretically significant; they are lawfully related to much political behavior and therefore can be used as basic concepts within a large body of interrelated generalizations. And this is the first step toward empirical theory. However, to facilitate their use in theory and research, the concepts need to be operationalized by simple definitions rather than by elusive factors. This is done by devising variables which correlate highly with each of the factors. If future factor analyses vield similar factors and a set of corresponding variables is devised, theoreticians and researchers will have advanced an enormous step toward an important goal—empirical theory.

Comparative Study. Second, the seven factors can be used as composite scales for comparing political systems.³⁴ For example, the political system of Great Britain has a higher score on Factor I (which measures the degree of political access) than does that of Poland.³⁵ By

³⁴ Russett, op. cit., develops a very useful method for applying the factors as comparative scales.

³⁵ We have not actually calculated factor scores in order to compare nations on the factors. The loadings of the areal grouping variables do, of course, provide insight as to what nations might

TABLE XII.	VARIABLES	LEAST	EXPLAINED	$\mathbf{B}\mathbf{Y}$	THE	SEVEN	FACTORS

Highest F. L.	Variable	Communality
24	One Party Dominant System	.16
.41	Sectionalism	.26
39	Demonstrations	. 27
35	Parliamentary-Republican System	.28
(.51)	Expulsion of Ambassadors	.32
(.55)	Non-European Political Modernization	.38
(.51)	Foreign Killed	.40
.45	Early European Political Modernization	.42
(62)	Domestic Killed	.44
(.55)	Asian Areal Grouping	.46
(.50)	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping	.49

knowing the scores of a nation on all seven factors, we are in a position to make statistical predictions as to the probabilities with which phenomena measured by the 68 variables of Table I will occur within the political system in question. This capability seems especially useful with regard to phenomena indexed by variables such as government stability, articulation by anomic groups, stability of party system, military intervention, demonstrations, and the like.

Typology Construction. The findings have import in a third area of cross-national studytypology construction.36 The latter approach seeks a middle ground between the powerful but scarce results of theory and the multitudinous but mundane yields of comparison. Instead of focusing on the dimensions common to all systems, it involves the construction of a small set of categories which will adequately describe the range of relationships across a variety of systems. Generally, the elements of a typology are a set of definitions mixed with propositions, each of which is assumed to describe a cluster of phenomena that is highly recurrent (predictable) in each of the system types specified.

The usefulness (generalizing power) of a

be expected to correlate most strongly with the various factors. However, the loadings of the areal grouping variables lose their meaning when the nations are quite heterogeneous with respect to the dimension that the factor taps. On this point, see Lawley and Maxwell, op. cit., pp. 88-92.

²⁵ For an excellent discussion of the methodological status of typologies in the social sciences, see the remarks of Carl G. Hemple in "Symposium: Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," *Science, Language, and Human Rights* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), I, 65 ff.

typology depends on the number of characteristics and political systems which it can explain. For example, Aristotle's three-type classificatory scheme (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) seems to have described adequately all political systems of the classical Greek period with reference to a single set of characteristics having to do with authority structure. In a somewhat similar manner, Almond and Coleman's basic typology (traditional, transitional, modern) is useful as a means of categorizing contemporary political systems with reference to a set of characteristics centering on specialization of political structure.³⁷

The objective of the approach is to develop the most parsimonious set of categories that will serve as the basis of generalization about the greatest number of political systems. Success depends on delineating the most frequently recurring types which are mutually independent and not simply disguised mutations. In this sense, the underlying assumptions and criteria of typology construction and factor analysis correspond. Both endeavor to delineate sets of variables which are highly associated across many cases. When only the highest loading variables on each factor are considered, they reflect a small cluster of phenomena occurring simultaneously in a specific set of nations. The simple structure criterion guarantees that the cluster and the set are mutually exclusive of all others along their respective factors. In this way, factor analysis utilizes systematic methods for identifying sets of variables that are analogous to typological constructs.

Therefore, the results of this factorial study provide information as to what clusters of characteristics will yield types of greatest inclusiveness and generalizing power. Table

³⁷ Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33 ff.

TABLE	XIII.	MAJOR	CLUSTER	TYPES	\mathbf{or}	SURVEY	VARIABLES

Survey Factor	Loading	Cluster Type		
I	Positive	Polyarchic System		
I	Negative	One-Party Totalizarian System		
II	Positive	Westernized Democratic System		
II	Negative	Undeveloped Democratic System		
III	Positive	Stable System		
III	Negative	Unstable System		
\mathbf{V}	Negative	Traditional Authoritarian System		
VI	Positive	Two-Party System .		
VI	Negative	Multi-Party System		
VII	Positive	Modernizing Authoritarian System		

1.64

XIII displays the cluster types suggested by the Survey factors.³⁸

These categories, inductively derived from the Survey data, provide confirmation for many types which political scientists currently employ. For example, the Survey-derived type, "One-Party Totalitarian System," exhibits the same characteristics that Friedrich and Brzezinski label "Totalitarian Dictatorship."39 The types "Two-Party System" and "Multi-Party System" substantiate many of the propositions that Duverger sets forth in his party system typology.40 The Survey types "Westernized Democratic System," "Undeveloped Democratic System," "Traditional Authoritarian System," and "Modernizing Authoritarian System" add support to Shils' and Almond's types, "Political Democracy,"
"Tutelary Democracy," "Traditional Oligarchy," and "Modernizing Oligarchy."41 "Polyarchic System" encompasses most of the characteristics which Dahl subsumes under the label "Polyarcal."42

Conflict Propositions. The final research question posed asks, "What specific propositions about conflict in political systems are suggested by the findings?" Examination of the conflict variables (Demonstrations, Domestic Killed,

- ³⁸ We have not named those factor clusters which are not readily interpreted or which duplicate other clusters.
- ³⁹ Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 9-10.
- ⁴⁰ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York, 1963), p. 203 ff.
 - 41 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 53-55.
- ⁴² Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 63 ff.

Expulsion of Ambassadors, and Foreign Killed) leads to the following propositions:

-30 to 1

- (1) The political dimension, leadership, which accounts for foreign conflict does not account for domestic conflict.
- (2) The presence of strong executive leadership is frequently accompanied by both diplomatic and violent foreign conflict.
- (3) Access to political channels, differentiation of political institutions, sectionalism within developing systems, kind of legitimation, and type of interest circulation tend to be unassociated with violent and diplomatic foreign conflict.
- (4) The political dimension, consensus, which accounts for most of the domestic conflict does not account for diplomatic conflict, but is moderately associated with violent foreign conflict.
- (5) An absence of political consensus is associated with violent domestic conflict.
- (6) An absence of political consensus is moderately associated with non-violent domestic conflict.
- (7) The degree of differentiation of political institutions, kind of legitimation, and type of leadership tend to be unassociated with violent and non-violent domestic conflict.

These propositions, in large measure, substantiate those advanced by Rummel and Tanter in their conflict research.⁴³ In addition, they identify the two political phenomena (lack of consensus, strong executive leadership) which are most frequently associated with domestic and foreign conflict, respectively.

⁴³ Rummel, "The Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," p. 24; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955-60: Turmoil and Internal War," Proceedings of the Peace Research Society, Vol. 3 (1964).

A SCALE ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING RECORDS OF SENATORS KENNEDY, JOHNSON AND GOLDWATER, 1957–1960

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This article reports the results of a scale analysis of the votes cast by three prominent senators, two Democrats and a Republican, on legislative measures pending during the second term of the Eisenhower administration. My method employed the Guttman scaling technique1 to identify the ideological issues presented in the roll calls and to rank the senators according to the positions they took on these issues, looking separately at their records in the 85th and the 86th Congresses. My purpose was twofold: first, to distinguish objectively the differences in the public postures the three men assumed as they voted; and second, to look for movement in the stance of each as the 1960 campaign approached.

. 8

John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater came to the Senate at different times, with different backgrounds, by different routes, from different constituencies; they held different committee assignments and stood in different relationships to both the formal and informal structures of the Senate. Since 1960 their fates have taken equally diverse paths. Nevertheless, during the interval from 1957 to 1960 they had at least two relevant things in common: as senators together they were called upon to vote on the same succession of bills, amendments and motions; and they had their eyes on a nomination for the presidency.² Hence, their selection for this study. Of the three, Johnson, as majority floor leader, had the largest party responsibility for the legislative record on which-or against which—the presidential race would be run.

Guttman scaling, applied to a sufficient number of cases, enables a student to sort a set of roll call votes so as to eliminate systematically those that are only ambiguously related—or not related at all—to one or more governing ideological variables. And it identifies the variables at the same time that it pro-

¹ For Guttman scaling, refer to Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton University Press, 1950).

² So did Nixon, the Republican nominee in 1960, as the event proved, but he could not make a voting record in the Senate over which he presided; so did Humphrey, but he had not the resources to put hinself in the same league with Kennedy and Johnson as aspirants.

duces a rank ordering of the senators' overall positions with respect to each. Accordingly, it is possible to delineate individual combinations of stands on distinct issues, as well as to note shifts that may occur with the march of events, as purposes or strategies alter.

The study on which this report is based analyzed all roll call votes in the Senate during the 85th and 86th Congresses covering the four years from 1957 through 1960.3 Of the 729 roll calls, 171 were dropped because of near unanimity, leaving 558. Of these, 393, or 70.4 per cent, were sufficiently clear in their ideological meaning to form items of twenty scales, ten for each Congress.

The number of scales is in itself significant. If American politics revolved around a single major cleavage, for instance a liberal-conservative cleavage, then roll call votes would by definition form one single scale or rank ordering of the senators from the most consevative to the most liberal. Analysis would be easier but life would be different. The senator who is pro-foreign aid, however, is not necessarily prolabor or pro-civil rights. Consequently, an accurate estimate of the ideological positions of any senator requires analyzing his position on each of a number of scales.

Of particular interest for comparing Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater are the scales that represent continuing conflicts in American politics. Five such scales in the 85th Congress, and five also in the 86th, form pairs covering very similar content. Together they contain roughly two-thirds of the scale data. These continuing issues are: (1) Domestic Economic Welfare; (2) Agricultural Price Supports; (3) Civil Rights; (4) Military Foreign Aid; and (5) Internationalism.

Where did Kennedy, Johnson, and Goldwater stand on these persistent questions, and how did they rank in relation to each other and the rest of the Senate? Did their positions remain the same from one Congress to the next?

Ι

The Domestic Economic Welfare Scale of the 85th Congress deals predominantly with

³ Charles Howard Gray, Coalition, Consensus and Conflict in the United States Senate (1957-1960), Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado, 1962.




FIGURE 1. Domestic Economic Welfare Scales

issues that have separated economic liberals from economic conservatives since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, especially labor regulation and public housing. Their importance can be seen in the fact that sixty roll calls, more than the next three largest scales combined, fit this scale. The major labor issue (culminating in the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959) was the effort of the conservatives to turn the reports of union corruption into legislation that would restrict union officials in the management of union funds and the conduct of union elections. Kennedy and Johnson both voted consistently with the liberals against such restrictions while Goldwater was equally consistent on the side of the conservatives. On one issue of interest to labor, Kennedy and Johnson differed: Kennedy voted for the extension and liberalization of the Unemployment Compensation Act while Johnson opposed it. On one public housing vote, an effort to increase the number of low-rent housing units, Johnson also favored the conservative position in opposition to Kennedy. Their differences on these two votes were sufficient to place Kennedy on the edge of what might be called the strong liberals and Johnson among the moderate liberals. From the pro-labor, pro-housing, liberal end of the scale Kennedy ranked 16th among the 96 senators, Johnson 34th and Goldwater 81st.

These relative positions on the major liberalconservative scale changed only slightly in the 86th Congress. Issues of interest to labor were again dominant though of somewhat different content: minimum wage, unemployment compensation, aid to depressed areas and jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Housing loomed as somewhat more important than in the 85th Congress, with numerous votes on public housing and urban renewal. The relatively new issue of medical care joined the list that marked the traditional liberalconservative split.

In the overwhelmingly Democratic Senate of the 86th Congress, Kennedy, if anything, became more liberal while Johnson moved closer to the middle, and Goldwater voted with the most extreme conservative group. These small changes put Johnson and Kennedy further apart. Though Johnson voted on the liberal side over 80 per cent of the time, he broke with Kennedy and the liberals on four roll calls that dealt with a withholding tax on income from interest and dividends, an increase in welfare authority of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, a limit on the investigating powers of the Antitrust Division

of the Department of Justice, and an increase in funds for urban renewal. In addition, it seems plausible to infer from the scale pattern that his absence from a vote on the unemployment compensation act could have been politically motivated. These differences produced a voting pattern placing Johnson at rank 38.5 in contrast to Kennedy's 12.5 and Goldwater's 92.

Johnson's relatively stable pattern as a liberal moderate is in sharp contrast to the marked shift of most Southern Democrats between the 85th and 86th Congresses. While twenty of the twenty-two Southern Democrats voted at least as liberally as Johnson in the 85th Congress, fourteen voted much more conservatively in the 86th Congress.

This extreme shift on a scale representing the major cleavage in American politics—corresponding as it does with a change from Republican to Northern Democratic pressure on civil rights—suggests that a sizeable portion of the Southern Democrats were modifying their votes on labor, housing, and welfare measures according to who supported their opposition to civil rights. This tactical switch does not apply to Lyndon Johnson who held to a moderately liberal position in both Congresses.

FIGURE 1 shows the scales indicating the liberal-conservative rank of the three senators relative to the rest of the Senate. The voting pattern as shown is simplified in that neither the absences nor the approximately 5 per cent of the votes that were inconsistent with the major pattern are included. Following statistical custom, when a number of senators had equal voting patterns, their ranks were averaged and the average was assigned to each. The number of senators whose ranks were so averaged is indicated in each case by a bracket.

 \mathbf{I}

A much smaller but persistent economic issue in the Senate which does not fit the liberal-conservative continuum is the question of agricultural price supports. On this scale Kennedy voted with those favoring high supports, Johnson took a moderately pro-position, while Goldwater voted with those seeking to cut or eliminate the program. Though this is not true of the Senate as a whole, the relative positions of the three senators are quite similar to their positions on the labor-housing-welfare scales. Figure 2 indicates their ranks on the

¹ Space does not permit a detailed description here of the roll calls fitting this or subsequent scales used in this report. Such a description, and the ranks of all senators, may be found in the study cited in the previous footnote.




FIGURE 2. Agricultural Price Support Scales

Agriculture scales in the 85th and 86th Congresses.

Ш

The growing battle over civil rights produced the second largest set of scales, accounting for 18 roll calls in the 85th Congress and 38 in the 86th. Contrary to popular belief, a senator's voting position on civil rights bears no strong relationship to his position on the liberal-conservative continuum; i.e., laborhousing-welfare issues will not form a common scale with civil rights. Striking evidence of this fact is seen in the 85th Congress where most Republicans, including Goldwater, ranked closer to the apparent pro-civil rights end of the scale than either Kennedy or Johnson. Actually, Kennedy's position seemed somewhat ambiguous. On one vote he deviated from his general pattern by trying to save the provision of the Civil Rights Bill that would have allowed the Attorney General to institute civil actions for preventive relief in civil rights cases under the 14th Amendment. In general, however, he joined a majority of the Northern Democrats in shunning any but the mildest




FIGURE 3. Civil Rights Scales

civil rights proposals. His position may have been part of a strategy aimed at getting votes for a cloture motion. The civil rights issue was entangled with the filibuster issue.

Goldwater was only slightly less hostile to strong measures. He did not join the Republican leadership in championing civil rights and so found himself temporarily in the odd company of Northern Democrats, his usual enemies.

Johnson, perhaps because of his anxiety to get a bill that could pass against a filibuster, took the most anti-civil rights stand of the three, though he broke with the hard core of the South and voted for the much weakened final bill and against Southern efforts to prevent its consideration.

The passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act was only the opening round for the great civil rights debate of 1960 which consumed more hours of Senate time than any issue since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. The major issue

⁵ For a detailed account of the struggle over the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and the strategies of the contestants, see the I. C. P. case study, *Eisenhower*, *Brownell and the Congress* (University of Alabama Press, 1964).

was the extension of the federal government's authority to guarantee voting rights. The influence of this major question probably produced the highly correlated voting pattern on some of the other issues which also fit the common scale—election reforms, the cloture rule, and Hawaiian statehood. A civil liberties issue, the loyalty oath required of students seeking funds under the National Defense Education Act, also fits the Civil Rights scale—whether by accident or because of an underlying ideological unity, cannot be determined by scale analysis.

Positions of the parties and of the three senators changed more radically on this scale than on any other between the two Congresses. In the campaign year of 1960 the Northern Democrats took over as the champions of civil rights while most Republicans moved into the position just above the Southern Democrats.

The most dramatic shift was made by Kennedy, who with twelve other senators voted pro-civil rights on every roll call. While Kennedy moved from a moderately anti position to a strong pro position, Goldwater moved, from about the same starting point but in the contrary direction, to a spot just above the most die-hard Southerners. He differed from

them by favoring statehood for Hawaii and in opposing efforts to block consideration of civil rights completely. Johnson, on the other hand, moved up the scale to the lukewarm position from which Kennedy and Goldwater had departed in opposite directions. Though voting in favor of the milder civil rights proposals, Johnson opposed most efforts to strengthen the federal government's hand in protecting voting rights. He also opposed invoking the cloture rule, and he differed from Kennedy on the lovalty oath question by opposing efforts to free students from the requirement of filing effidavits that they did not belong to specified subversive organizations. In all, Johnson ciffered from Kennedy on seventeen of the thirty-eight votes on the Civil Rights scale. The average ranks of the three senators and the changes between the two Congresses can te seen in Figure 3.

TV

Like civil rights, foreign policy votes do not fit the liberal-conservative scale. In fact, within the foreign policy field quite different voting blocs are produced when the issue shifts from foreign trade to military aid to support for international organizations. The latter two issues formed separate scales in both Congresses. The larger scale in both cases was one embracing primarily military foreign aid programs and to some extent reciprocal trade extension, the U. S. Information Agency, and the Antarctic and international atomic energy treaties.

On these issues Kennedy and Johnson took identical stands in both Congresses. They were moderately pro-foreign aid in the 85th Congress and both moved toward a stronger proposition in the 86th. Goldwater, on the other hand, generally favored large cuts in aid. He also voted against extension of the reciprocal trade program, thereby placing himself at the extreme anti-aid end of the scales.

In both Congresses most Republicans backed the Eisenhower Administration on foreign military aid, and in both Congresses most Southern Democrats opposed it; the 86th Congress alliance of Southern Democrats and Republicans on labor and civil rights issues did not extend beyond domestic affairs. The Military Foreign Aid scales are shown in Figure 4.

V

Forming distinct scales, separate from the




FIGURE 4. Foreign Military Aid Scales




FIGURE 5. Internationalism Scales

military aid program, were various votes concerning the American commitment to internationalism. In the 85th Congress this scale was composed of roll calls on the Food for Peace program, a permanent U. N. police force, the U. N. emergency force in the Middle East, an international development authority, and an ambassadorial nomination. Kennedy supported the internationalist position on every vote and Johnson deviated from this pattern only on the seemingly peripheral issue of Scott McCleod's nomination as ambassador to Ireland. In contrast, Goldwater's straight nationalist stand was modified only by the fact that he was absent from three of the votes.

The content of the internationalism scale in the 86th Congress varied somewhat from that of the 85th, though the Food for Peace program was common to both. Other items included contributions to the World Bank, international development funds, support of a convention of private citizens of NATO countries, and military support aid to Spain. The internationalists on this scale voted against aid to Spain, a stand consistent with the long associa-




FIGURE 6. Public Power Scale, 83d, 84th, 85th Congresses

tion of anti-fascist and internationalist movements.

In the 86th Congress Johnson joined Kennedy to support the internationalist position on every vote, while Goldwater voted with equal consistency for the nationalists. Figure 5 shows the senators' ranks on these scales.

VI

Thus far we have dealt only with ideological issues that were prominent in both the 85th and 86th Congresses. An issue which, though not salient in both these Congresses, has frequently recurred in American politics is the controversy over private or public power development. Using somewhat similar scaling techniques, Francis Carney has obtained a Public Power scale covering the 83d, 84th, and 85th Congresses. This scale included votes on TVA, and the Niagara, Hell's Canyon, and Columbia River power projects. Of the 71 senators who served throughout this period. Kennedy had an average rank of 21.5 from the pro-public power end of the scale; Johnson, differing from Kennedy on one vote, ranked 28.5; and Goldwater, voting against public power on every occasion when he was present, ranked 61.5. These ranks are shown in Fig-URE 6.

⁶ Francis M. Carney, "Ideological Groupings in the United States Senate, 1953–1958, as Indicated by Scale Analysis," unpublished monograph, University of California, Riverside. From the foregoing analysis John Kennedy as a senator emerged as a strong supporter of liberal labor, housing, and welfare programs, a moderately strong backer of public power programs, an advocate of high agricultural price supports, an active though recent convert to civil rights legislation, a moderately strong backer of foreign military aid, and a firm incernationalist.

Barry Goldwater appears the exact antithes:s to Kennedy on the labor-housing-welfare scale, and on the farm price support, public power, and internationalism scales. He also strongly opposed the foreign military aid program. On civil rights he moved from a moderate negative position to one just slightly above the hard-core Southerners.

Lyndon Johnson, though between Kennedy and Goldwater on the domestic economic scales, was much closer to Kennedy, emerging in 1960 as a moderate liberal. In the area of foreign policy, Johnson moved from a moderate to a strong internationalist position equal

to Kennedy's. In the area of civil rights, however, Johnson was closer to Goldwater though he moved toward a moderate position in the 86th Congress.

In the role of president, Kennedy seems to have acted quite in accord with the positions he adopted in his last two years in the Senate. This does not justify a prediction that any other senator, if he became president, would necessarily do the same. The vastly different demands on the president, his national responsibilities and constituency could easily modify the ideological image he developed as a senator. It is an old adage that a platform is something to get in on, not to stand on; and an ideological posture may be adopted calculatingly as well as compulsively. The scaling and ranking data presented above indicate pretty clearly that the lure of the presidency exerts a magnetism. as the time for nominations approaches, capable of altering the public stands that senators, qua senators, have previously taken on issues with an ideological content.

AN APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE AND ITS CLIENT AGENCIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

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This paper presents an effort to adapt techniques of content analysis and measurement to the study of relations between a House appropriations subcommittee and the agencies whose budget estimates it reviews. Since Arthur Macmahon's pioneering work on the topic observers have depended on interviews and impressionistic readings of the published record for their evidence.1 They have identified a variety of attitudes on the part of the committee members, ranging from the obsequious to the pugnacious. And they have noted various techniques of committee control and agency compliance or evasion. They have also expressed varying opinions about the efficacy and utility of congressional oversight.

The existing literature leaves at least one question partially unanswered: how does the subcommittee divide its supervisory and control efforts among the agencies within its jurisdiction? This study deals with this question, and illustrates a method that may have wider application in the systematic study of legislative-executive relations. Limitations of my own confine it to a sample consisting of a single subcommittee—headed by Congressman Fogarty (D., R.I.)—four agencies under its jurisdiction, and a span of budget years from 1949 to 1963.²

¹ Arthur W. Macmahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 58 (June and September, 1943), pp. 161-190; 380-414. See also Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling et al., Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 1-266; Edward Banfield, "Congress and the Budget: A Planner's Criticism," this REVIEW, Vol. 43 (December, 1949), pp. 1217-1228; Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1950); Seymour Scher, "Conditions for Legislative Control," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (August, 1963), pp. 526-551; Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston, 1964); Richard Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), pp. 310-324.

² Calendar years 1948 to 1962. A given budget (or fiscal) year (e.g., 1963) begins for the subcom-

I. SUBJECTS

Experience with an earlier study identified the Fogarty Subcommittee as a body that shows a high regard for compiling a "complete public record" about its annual review of agency budget requests. Although the subcommittee members do not rely solely on the hearings for their information about agency operations, they try to collect for the record all the information they consider pertinent to their budget decisions.3 In this way, they say, they hope to make it relatively easy for other congressmen and interested members of the public to evaluate the subcommittee's budget recommendations. Much of the information the members elicit at the formal hearings they have already reviewed independently. Moreover, the members also show some genuine dependence on the annual hearings as a source of information. Subcommittee and agency staff aides report that members generally confine their administrative-oversight activities to the period of the hearings. Between the passage of one appropriations act and the next year's hearings there is little direct contact between subcommittee members and agency officials. The subcommittee staff maintain contact with the agencies during the year, but much of this is in preparation for the formal hearings. Because most of the data for this study come from the published record, the "records orientation" of the Fogarty Subcommittee was an important factor in its selection.

The Fogarty Subcommittee has a reputation for being generous in granting funds to the agencies within its jurisdiction,⁴ but this may not bias the relationships with the agencies that are the subject of this study. There is no necessary connection between generosity in appro-

mittee with the opening of hearings in the early months of calendar 1962. Dates in this study are in terms of budget years.

² For a member's comment to this effect, see House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations for 1959: Hearings, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, G.P.O.), p. 201.

4 Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 87.

priations, and a posture of laxity or severity in the subcommittee's supervision and control over agency operations. Also, a comparison of Fogarty subcommittee members with other members of the Appropriations Committee over the 1949-63 period indicates that the subcommittee members are not atypical in two respects that might affect their supervisory and control efforts. Their skills for the tasks of supervision and control—as measured by their pre-congressional occupations and length of service both in congress and on the Appropriations Committee—and their positions on political issues—as measured by their voting record on the New Republic's index of domestic liberalism5—score much the same as those for the Appropriations Committee as a whole.

The four agencies that provided the sample for this study are the Children's Bureau (CB), the Office of Education (OE), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Howard University (HU). These agencies have remained within one administrative unit (at first, the Federal Security Agency, then the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) over the 1949-63 period, and they represent various phases of H.E.W. activity. CB and OE are disseminators of grants-in-aid, concerned with

⁵ See Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, (New York, 1960), pp. 276-78.

⁶ On the basis of pre-congressional occupations, the members of the Fogarty subcommittee appear somewhat less able, on the average, to deal with ecmplex technical and political matters than other members of the Appropriations Committee. During the 1949-63 period, only 70 per cent of the subcommittee members came from occupations that would suggest a high level of relevant skills (i.e., law and other professions, journalism and politics), while 81 per cent of all Committee members came from these fields. The difference in skill-potential disappears, however, if long experience in Congress or on the Appropriations Committee can make up for an unimpressive occupational background. Subcommittee members have had more experience in both areas: 78 per cent of them in the 1949-63 period entered Congress before 1950, while only 63 per cent of all Appropriations Committee members entered so early; and 60 per cent of the subcommittee members joined the Appropriations Committee before 1950, in ecmparison to only 51 per cent of the entire comm_ttee.

During the period of the study, subcomittee members voted in accord with the New Republic's conception of domestic liberalism 48 per cent of the time, while the full committee voted that way 42 per cent of the time.

health and welfare, and education respectively. FDA is a regulatory agency concerned with health. HU is one of the units in the Department that has special status as a "Federally Aided Corporation." The sample agencies also differ greatly in the amounts of their recent appropriations requests, in increases in requests over the past decade, and in demonstrations of independence toward the supervisory and control efforts of the subcommittee. Each of these characteristics may have an impact on subcommittee-agency relationships.

The sample agencies are entirely civilian. Secrecy was not a significant obstacle to an observer's reliance on published records, as it might be in the case of agencies involved with military or international activities.

II. MEASUREMENTS

This study relies almost exclusively on an analysis of subcommittee hearings, subcommittee Reports and agency budgets. Interviews served only a secondary role, as a means for clarifying and checking relationships perceived in the published records. Some distinct benefits derive from such a heavy reliance on published materials. The raw data are widely available in federal depository libraries for any student who wishes to test the findings on the same data, or on similar data about the behavior of other actors. Furthermore, problems of rapport between interviewer and informant do not bias the data collection. Although faulty schemes of classification may bias the use of published records, the basic materials remain unmarred, and the student can reclassify them as he proceeds.

The primary task in analyzing quantitatively the contents of published documents is their reduction to units that "make sense" as valid indicators of certain behavioral traits. This may be a formidable task. The records relevant to the present study include monetary

⁷ In the last year of the study's time span, the agencies' requests were: OE, \$598 million; CB, \$80 million; FDA, \$28 million; HU, \$13 million. Over the period 1951-63, the percentage increases in budget requests were: OE, 2120; FDA, 565; CB, 335; HU, 280. A comparative study of the agencies' budget strategies vis à vis the subcommittee revealed that OE was generally the most aggressive toward the subcommittee, HU was generally least aggressive, while CB and FDA fell in the middle range. See Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and An Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies," Midwest Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).

data, workload data, prose statements, questions and answers. No single codification could meet all the analytical needs. The literature on content analysis provides some guidance in the development of techniques, but it contains little beyond some general principles, and highly specialized operations useful only in a limited number of problem areas. Since one of the cardinal principles states that the nature of the research problem and the available data are crucial in determining the techniques that are fruitful and feasible, a great deal is left to the inventiveness of the student.⁸

The concept of "administrative oversight" has many facets and it is necessary to devise measures that will accommodate its components. Subcommittee supervision may vary in the attention paid to agency operations, in the thoroughness of supervision and in its incisiveness. Variations may also be observed in the efforts of subcommittee members to make independent investigations of agencies—as opposed to inquiries that rely on the cooperation or cues of agency officials. Among types of formal control efforts—publicly recorded—subcommittee adjustments of appropriations may be distinguished from the directives written into committee Reports. Measures can be defined that indicate the variation in each of these factors shown by subcommittee behavior vis à vis particular agencies. The product of the analysis accordingly will be a profile of overt administrative oversight, showing the relative severity of supervisory and control efforts directed at each agency.

(1) A count of individual questions directed at witnesses from each agency provides a gross measure of the attention the subcommittee members devote to the affairs of each agency. A "question" is defined here as a unit of discourse that includes one inquiry. At times, a sentence ending in a question mark may include several inquiries. In making this analysis, each distinct inquiry was regarded as a separate question. Also, some statements not followed by a question mark were so defined when they seemed to be treated as such by the participants in the hearing, e.g., when they elicited a reply from a witness, or when a following statement indicated they were meant to be inquiries.

⁸ See Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, 1952); Robert C. North, Content Analysis (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963); Harold Lasswell, ed., Language of Politics (New York, George Stewart Press, 1949); and Ithiel de Sola Poole, ed., Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1959).

The score for each agency in Table I represents the mean number of questions asked by subcommittee members during hearings in the odd years from 1949 to 1963.

(2) The proportion of agency activities covered by subcommittee questioning provides a measure of the thoroughness with which the subcommittee supervises each agency. Making this measure operational involved two complex tasks: (a) defining the field of activities encompassed by each agency; and (b) defining a level of questioning that is "minimum coverage" of an activity.

The Annual Reports of the agencies, budget statements read at the opening of each year's hearings and New York Times articles about the agencies provided a list of their activities. A preliminary effort to code the members' questions into their subject-matter categories resulted in a redefinition of this list. It became evident that some closely related categories could be combined, while some additional categories were necessary to accommodate distinctions in the minds of legislators and administrators.⁹

Plainly, Congressmen cannot question thoroughly every agency activity during each year's hearings. In measuring "coverage," therefore, it is necessary to use a double standard that considers an item to be covered if it receives either frequent attention at a fairly low level of intensity, or less frequent attention at a higher level of intensity.¹⁰

While coding the questions, it became evident that individual inquiries may have a latent, as well as a manifest content. That is, the context of some questions suggests that they might have several meanings to either the interrogator or the respondent. Congressmen frequently leave qualifying nouns or adjectives out of their verbiage, making it necessary

⁹ For a list of the categories used, see Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and An Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Relations," unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1964, ch. 3.

10 This study defines an item as "covered" if it received mention in 5 per cent of the questions directed at the agency over the odd years 1949-63, or in at least 10 per cent of the questions in one year's hearings. Admittedly, "coverage" of an activity is a rough measure of thoroughness. It does not mean that the subcommittee members give their attention to every issue and ramification related to an item.

¹¹ See Alexander L. George, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Poole, ed., op. cit., pp. 7-32.

TABLE I, AGENCY SCORES ON MEASURES OF SUBCOMMITTEE SUPERVSION AND CONTROL

Measure		Agency Score				
Measure	OE	СВ	FDA	HU		
1. Subcommittee attention:						
Mean number of questions asked each agency, odd years 1949-63	321	159	123	104		
2. Subcommittee thoroughness:						
Percentage of items receiving "minimum coverage," odd years 1949-63.	45	58	57	64		
3. Subcommittee incisiveness:						
(a) Percentage of questions asking witnesses to justify activities, odd years 1949-63	. 39	29	37	22		
(b) Percentage of questions asking witnesses about cost, odd years 1949-63	21	24	18	44		
4. Independence of supervision:						
(a) Difference between mean percentage of questions about items highlighted in cues and the mean percentage of						
questions about all agency activities, 1951, 1957, 1963	+3	+6	+8	+10		
(b) Ratio of questions asked department to questions asked agency, 1961, 1963	1:4	1:6	1:8	1:9		
5. Control over expenditures:						
Median difference between original agency requests and subcommittee recommendations, 1959-63 (in millions)	-\$31	-\$1	-\$9	\$5		
6. Control via Committee Report:						
Number of directives about agency affairs in Committee Reports of 1951, 1957, 1961	17	5	2	9		

to infer their referents from the surrounding context. Questions that could refer to several items accordingly were coded into as many categories as their contents—manifest and latent—seemed to require. This appeared safer then attempting the doubtful procedure of deciding what was "uppermost" in the minds of the actors.

i3) The frequency with which subcommittee members ask agency witnesses to justify their activities, and the frequency with which they ask about the cost of agency operations provice two crude measures of the relative incisiveness with which the members supervise agencies. Each of these question-types are probes. Justification questions call on agency officials to go beneath the surface to explain the need or utility of specific budget requests, while cost questions impose the discipline of calculation on administrators. The data in Table I represent the percentage of questions asked in odd years 1949-63 that were "justification questions" and "cost questions."

(4) Two measures provide indices of the relative independence with which the subcommittee supervises each agency: (a) the frequency with which members avoid a reliance on agency cues while fashioning questions at the annual

hearings; and (b) the frequency of questioning about agency affairs directed at witnesses outside the agency itself. The significance of an inquiry into the subcommittee's independence derives from the realization that members are hard pressed for time and staff assistance to be used for administrative oversight. Because of this, they frequently rely on the agencies themselves to provide cues about the items worthy of questioning. The items that tend to attract members' attention are those highlighted in agency budget documents, and in the opening statements read by the lead-off agency witness. By questioning an item that is expensive, or that has changed markedly in cost from the previous budget, or one that is featured in an oral statement, 12 subcommittee members can

¹² Agency officials as well as subcommittee members perceive these as cues that will elicit Congressional questioning. Agency budget officers write the opening statements for the hearings, knowing that these are the final communications legislators will receive before questioning agency witnesses. And they know that large items, or items showing a marked change from the previous budget tend to attract attention. One of the considerations in requesting funds for an activity

feel they are examining something that is "important" in some sense. An index of subcommittee non-reliance on agency cues to items worthy of questioning should stand as an indication of the members' independence in going beyond a superficial examination of the agency's presentation. In order to construct this index, it was first necessary to list the activities given prominence in the agency presentations.13 The difference between the mean percentage of questions referring to the items highlighted in agency statements or budgets, and the mean percentage of questions asked about all activities was then computed. The greater the incidence of questions directed at items emphasized in the agency's presentations, the less is the subcommittee's independence.14

An index of the subcommittee's attention to non-agency sources of information about agency affairs gives another indication of the legislators' independence in going beyond a superficial examination of the agency's presenta-

is, "How will it look?" If a request might appear out of place, it may be postponed in part, or divided into smaller pieces and distributed among inconspicuous budget headings. See Wildavsky, op. cit., ch. 3.

13 This study considers an item to be emphasized in the opening hearing statement of an agency if it is mentioned in at least 10 per cent of the statement's lines. An item is of "large absolute magnitude" if it is at least 20 per cent of the agency's total request. An item has shown "significant change" if it has shown an absolute increase or decrease of \$200,000 since the last budget, or a percentage change amounting to 10 per cent of the total change in the agency's budget.

14 For example, suppose that the items emphasized in the budgets and statements of each of two agencies received mention in a mean 10 per cent of the subcommittee's questions, and that in the case of one agency, all its activities-both those emphasized and unemphasized-received mention in a mean 5 per cent of the questions. The index of subcommittee non-reliance would then be 10 minus 5, or 5. If in the second agency's case all activities received mention in a mean 8 per cent of the subcommittee's questions, the index of subcommittee non-reliance would be 10 minus 8, or 2. The congressmen would be showing less reliance on the cues of the second agency. The data for this analysis came from the hearings of 1951, 1957 and 1963, chosen because they fall near the beginning, middle and end of the period studied.

tion. While it is not practical to measure the subcommittee's attention to each non-agency source of information, it is possible to gauge the relative attention to non-agency witnesses who testify at the annual hearings. These include the Department Secretary and his aides, interest group spokesmen and other congressmen not members of the subcommittee. The best available measure of subcommittee attention to outside sources of information is the ratio of questions about each agency directed at the Department Secretary and his aides, to the questions directed at the agency witnesses during the same year's hearings. This measure is suitable because subcommittee members have an opportunity to question the Secretary and his staff at length about each agency. In contrast, the members have little opportunity to question interest group spokesmen, or non-subcommittee congressmen about the agencies that attract few or none of these witnesses.15

(5) A comparison of each agency's request for funds, and the appropriation recommended by the subcommittee provides a measure of the legislators' attempts to impose controls over agency operations by means of adjusting the level of expenditures. In this study, the measure is defined by the median difference be-

15 Because the Department Secretary and agency officials share an identity with the Administration, it might be said that the Secretary and his staff are not sufficiently independent of the agencies to be considered "non-agency" sources of information. Yet there are significant budget disputes between agency and departmental personnel. Department officials report in formal hearings and in interviews that agencies typically demand more funds than the department can allow them. From the agency view, the department is a brake against desirable expansion. Over the 1959-63 period, the department budget office reduced the requests of our sample agencies by \$290.8 million, or 11 per cent of the agencies' original requests. In the hearings, departmental witnesses have been critical of agency operations. In contrast, none of the interest groups or non-subcommittee congressmen testifying in the odd years 1951-63 criticized agency operations. They either supported agency requests, or urged the replacement of budget cuts made by the department Budget Office or the Bureau of the Budget. The data for the analysis of subcommittee questioning of non-agency witnesses came from the hearings of 1961 and 1963, chosen because it has only been in recent years that the legislators have paid significant attention to non-agency witnesses.

TABLE II. AGENCY RANKINGS ON MEASURES OF SUBCOMMITTEE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

Measure	Agency ranking			
	OE	СВ	FDA	HU
1. Subcommittee attention	1	2	3	4
2. Subcommittee thoroughness	4	2.5	2.5	1
3. Subcommittee incisiveness				
(a) Justification questions	1	3	2	4
(b) Cost questions	3	2	4	1
4. Independence of supervision				
(a) Non-reliance on agency cues	1	2	3	4
(b) Questioning non-agency sources	1	2	3	4
5. Control over expenditures	1	4	2	3
6. Control via Committee Reports	1	3	4	2
Mean ranking	1.6	2.6	2.9	2.9

tween the agency's request and the subcommittee's decision over the years 1959-63.16

(6) The subcommittee includes in its Reports directives about each agency's operations. A count of these provides a measure of control efforts by means of verbal instructions. The Reports used for this analysis are those written in 1951, 1957 and 1963.17

Table I provides the raw scores for each agency on the measures covered in the foregoing discussion. Table II provides the rankings for each agency on the various measures. In each case, the top rank of (1) indicates that an agency has been the subject of the most severe supervisory or control efforts.

Table I demonstrates the substantial differences in severity that mark the supervision and control efforts of subcommittee members toward agencies within their jurisdiction. However, Table II suggests that the subcommittee is not consistent in the degree of severity it maintains with respect to each agency. For instance, the Office of Education tends to receive a generally more severe treatment than the others dealt with—as defined by the mean

¹⁶ It was only in these years that information about the agencies' original budget request to the Department Budget Office was included in the hearings record.

¹⁷ These years were chosen because they fall near the beginning, middle and end of the research span.

rankings—but this is the only distinction among the agencies that is prominent across several measures. Somewhat less prominent is the finding that the Children's Bureau is treated more severely than the Food and Drug Administration and Howard University.

The Office of Education may receive greater attention than the others because its budget is substantially greater and has increased more rapidly. Or, the attention paid to OE may come as a result of its record of being more adventurous than the others in its disregard for subcommittee directives. A comparative study of agency behavior established that OE, among those covered, was most likely to evade questions asked by subcommittee members at the hearings, and most likely to disobey specific prohibitions that Committee Reports and appropriations acts imposed on policy. The subcommittee devoted a secondary level of supervisory and control efforts toward CB, and this agency scored second to OE in budget magnitude and aggressiveness vis à vis the subcommittee.18

The greater attention shown to OE and CB may not represent a conscious decision by the subcommittee members, so much as a subtle attraction to the affairs of agencies that are more prominent than others in the public eye. Just

¹⁸ Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies," op. cit.

19 Ibid.

as the legislators are most likely to question items that are salient in the agencies' budgets or their witnesses' statements, so they may gravitate without design to more severe supervisory and control efforts for prominent agencies that spend much money and receive much political attention. My comparative study of agency activities demonstrated that more interest groups and non-subcommittee congressmen testify on behalf of OE than the other sample agencies, and that budget statements of the Department Secretary and the President devote more space to OE activities than to those of other units. CB was in second place on each of these measures. An analysis of representative news media might also reveal that they pay more attention to the affairs of OE and CB than to the others.19

Another finding indicated by Table II is that each of the sample agencies receives the brunt of rather severe supervision on some dimension of subcommittee activity. The Children's Bureau scores second highest in the average number of questions and cost questioning; the Food and Drug Administration scores second highest in justification questioning, and Howard University scores highest in the proportion of items covered by questioning, and in cost questioning. This may suggest that subcommittee members try to probe all agencies in at least some respect. They may be "fishing" for in-

stances of errant administrative behavior, or trying to put the fear of discovery into the minds of any administrators who might contemplate a deviation from subcommittee wishes.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This study provides some systematically collected data about the behavior of an appropriations subcommittee in its dealings with four agencies. Evidently, the legislators vary their oversight activity among agencies. They devote more than the average amount of supervisory and control efforts to the agencies that spend the most money, whose requests have increased the most rapidly, and whose behavior toward the subcommittee has deviated most frequently from subcommittee desires. In a sense, they allocate their time and staff assistance to agencies most "in need" of supervision and control. If disproportionate attention to this type of agency is typical of legislative-executive budget relations, then it may be said that the legislators maximize their resources for oversight.

Beyond these specific conclusions, the study has shown the practicality of using content analysis of appropriations hearings to devise indexes of Committee behavior—crude indexes, to be sure, but sufficient to support objective rankings along various measures of attitudes and activities.

CONSENSUS AND CLEAVAGE IN BRITISH POLITICAL IDEOLOGY*

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One of the most perplexing questions to students of politics since the mid-1950s has been whether western societies are now approaching, or have reached, a condition called 'the end of ideology." Numerous answers have been propounded, both by those who regard such a development as desirable and by those who view it with disquietude. But difficulties have arisen because exponents of one view or the other have had recourse to markedly different, and often shifting, concepts of the terms "ideology" and "end." If this important controversy is to be saved from sterility, social scientists must both reflect more upon the nature of the terms employed and descend from the level of sweeping cultural generalizations to examine the condition of ideology in particular political settings.

It is my purpose here to try to shed some light on the debate by surveying the state of political ideology in present-day Britain from the standpoint of two different uses of the term. My position is that if we adopt one view of ideology, we find that British politics are profoundly non-ideological; but if we define the concept in different but still meaningful terms, we discover that in fact it does play an important role in the British system. In other words, by compressing extant concepts of ideology into two distinct molds we may be able to fashion tools for judging the ideological condition of countries such as Britain. These I will designate the Weltanschauung and the "attitude structure" versions of the term.1

The first refers to the more traditional meaning of ideology, the alleged decline of which has occasioned the debate of the past decade. It has been characterized as a "comprehensive, consistent, closed system of knowledge, to which its adherents turn to get answers to all their questions, solutions to all their problems." Its

* A paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September, 1964.

¹ For discussion of the varieties and uses of the concept, see David W. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (November, 1961), pp. 317-31, and Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York, 1962), ch. 1.

² Herbert J. Spiro, Government by Constitution (New York, 1959), p. 180.

connotations are familiar: commitment (both intellectual and emotional), orientation toward action, distortion or simplification of reality, hostility to critics and opponents, and goal-orientation (often of the millennial variety). Perhaps its best-known paradigms are classical Christianity and classical Marxism.

The conception of ideology as attitude structure is more difficult to set forth because it falls short of the total belief system and tight logic of a "world view." Like a Weltanschauung, it partakes of a generalized view of man; it has moral and normative content; it "places" the individual in relation to his fellows; and it calls forth commitment and points to desirable actions. It consists of many separate but related attitudes which function to relate, and give meaning to, the different political events experienced by the individual. On the other hand, this concept of ideology is less apt to provide its holders with a total explanation of life or a full vision of human destiny. It is more earthbound, culture-bound and diffused, both in its sources and its scope. Ideology in this sense refers to a more or less institutionalized set of beliefs about man and society.3 It is likely to be a composite of prevailing generalized views of man, the goals that he does and should seek, the means he uses to achieve them, the outlook for progress under present or alternative institutions, and so forth. Because such an ideology may have many sources, it is less likely than the "big" world views to be intellectualized, comprehensive, systematic or consistent, and more likely to be fragmentary, limited, even inconsistent. Yet when political man operates with reference to this organized bundle of views, he may derive from it some of the certainty and security that accompany a commitment to fuller, better articulated ideologies. While undoubtedly many would reject this use of the term, it is noteworthy that most of those who have attempted to measure the presence and effects of ideology in the Anglo-American polity have favored this definition, or one similar

³ Milton Rokeach et al., The Open and Closed Mind (New York, 1960), p. 35.

⁴ Among them Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York, 1960), ch. 9; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in

Without attempting here to defend my preference for viewing ideology in this two-fold way, I would assert that an awareness of the distinction is necessary for any exploration of the state of ideology in Britain today. In addition, I make two other assumptions that need to be stated explicitly. First, I am assuming that the pertinent kind of ideology for this discussion is one with a fairly direct political implication, i.e., one which relates to questions involving the relations of rulers and ruled and the principles of governnce. While these aspects of ideology may be torn from a larger context (general belief systems), no attempt will be made to delve into such related problems as the psychological functions served by the holding of ideologies. 5 Second, I proceed on the assumption that a country's ideology is not wholly concentrated among its intellectuals and political leaders, but in a participant political culture like the British also operates in and is expressed by the lives of "average people." For this reason, it will be necessary to examine (in Lane's terms) both forensic ideologies—the articulated, differentiated, well developed political arguments put forth consciously by the elite and latent ideologies—the loosely structured and often unreflective statements of the common man-and to see how they relate to each other.

I. THE REJECTION OF TOTAL IDEOLOGY

The kind of ideology associated with a complete world view emerged and flourished under certain historical and social conditions. Many of these conditions were indeed present during the period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the so-called "age of ideology," just as they appear to be present today in a number of the new developing countries.

American Politics," this Review, Vol. 58 (June, 1964), pp. 361-82; Robert E. Lane, op. cit.; and S. E. Finer, H. B. Berrington, and D. J. Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955-59 (Oxford, 1961), chs. 2-3. Cf. Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics (Chicago, 1962), p. 50: "Politics is an activity and so cannot be reduced to a system of precise beliefs or to a set of fixed goals. Political thinking is to be contrasted to ideological thinking... the idea of an ideology of freedom is a contradiction in terms."

⁸ For an example, see M. Brewster Smith et al., Opinions and Personality (New York, 1956).

⁶ Frederick M. Watkins, The Age of Ideology—Political Thought, 1750 to the Present (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964).

⁷ Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., The Ideologies of the Developing Countries (New York, 1963).

Ideology in this sense seemed to flourish especially in societies that experienced the upheavals of modernization in violent and concerted forms—that pitted classes and religious groups against each other in passionate struggle, that aroused a strong sense of deprivation among underdogs and losers, and that fragmented the community into subcultures alienated from the value patterns of the dominant political system. Put another way, total ideologies were most likely to gain ground in societies with political systems that failed both the test of effectiveness (success in solving the problems put onto them) and the test of legitimacy (widespread agreement on their propriety).8 Where these conditions are lacking, or disappearing, it has been argued, ideology of this variety cannot really flower. Recent critics have extended the argument to read that when a society achieves modernity (seen as a matter of industrialization, urbanization, secularization, economic prosperity, middle class expansion and working class access to political power), then the passionate attachment to total ideology not only subsides, but becomes dangerously dysfunctional to the system.9

I have no desire to put an oar into the choppy seas of this latter controversy. My point is simply that Britain has not provided the conditions favoring the growth of this kind of ideological thinking. The British have shown a marked disinclination to take up total ideologies for a host of reasons, many of which are familiar and only a few of which can be mentioned here. ¹⁰ In the past three hundred years

⁸ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, 1960), chs. 2-3.

Notable examples are Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, 1960); S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," Daedalus, Vol. 93 (Winter, 1964), pp. 271-303, and Political Man, pp. 403-17; Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," Social Research, Vol. 24 (1957), pp. 127-56; and Mark Abrams, "Party Politics After the End of Ideology," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 56-63.

10 "The term 'ideology' is not in very good odour in serious political discussion in this country, except in purely historical or descriptive connections. The grounds of the distaste for the term centre around the feeling, perhaps, that an ideology is something totalitarian in tendency, or at least involves an uncompromising fanaticism inappropriate to liberal democracy of the British type." Bernard Williams, "Democracy and Ideology," Political Quarterly, Vol. 32 (Oct.-Dec. 1961), p. 374.

Britain has avoided, or seriously blunted, the traumatic revolutions that many other countries have undergone, and the main changes in its political, economic and social systems have cccurred gradually. The mounting demands of cisadvantaged groups have been met in a piecemeal way, with the result that with the exception of the Irish (whose fate was finally settled by truncation) no major group has failed to be integrated in some way into the political systam. As is well known, neither the communists nor the fascists have gained substantial followings or political leverage. The non-revolutionary character of the British working class is equally well known; and while a distinct working class subculture may exist, as Williams and Hoggart have argued, it does not involve working class alienation from the values of the poltical system. 11 Social mobility in Britain may not be as great as elsewhere, but it has always been present and visible, and with the postwar changes in the educational system and the rapid expansion of white collar occupations, most Britons see it as increasing.

Another explanation for the lack of enthusiasm for total ideologies is imbedded deep in British political culture: it is the much-cited attechment to precedents and usage in preference to the logic of rational blueprints. In a system where there is widespread agreement on fundamental institutions and on a considerable range of current policies, it is possible to operate without continual reference to eternal verities, large schema, or articulated belief syst∈ms. The tendency to settle issues on the basis of accepted usages and through the means of implicit "understandings" is indeed great, to the frustration of those who plump for a fuller rehearsal of arguments or an enlightening confrontation of basic doctrine. Whether the scurce of this political style is the common law tradition, the evolutionary character of the British constitution, the norms of parliamentary and bureaucratic behavior, or the social homogeneity of the ruling elite is impossible to ascertain, and really beside the point. Political styles develop from many sources. They are bound to be both causes and effects of other phenomena. What can be asserted is that British political leaders have become habituated to thinking in terms of concrete problems and familiar responses; and that this-when coupled with a general complacency toward the outputs of such behavior-serves as a barrier, a disincentive, to the adoption of total ideologies. Thus, however circular the logic may seem, the British tend to be immune to extreme ideological views because they have not been used to thinking along these lines, and they have no strong motivation to abandon the habit.

The point can be put more strongly. Pragmatic norms in Britain have been elevated into something approaching a national cult—so much so, I would argue, that we can speak without sophistry of an ideology of pragmatism, which serves as a foil to the ideology of total ends. For many Britons pragmatism is not simply a descriptive term for the way they approach or grapple with political problems; it is also a particularly British virtue and an object of pride, which they would not trade for what they consider to be the inflexible, irrevocable, and inhumane (in the sense of denving the variety of human nature) qualities of this or that "world view." Thus pragmatism easily becomes imbued with nationalistic affect, and preference for it is supported by other values into which Britions are socialized. The content of this socialization is both positive and negative in character: positive in the sense that Britons learn, both from formal teaching and from informally picking up the views of those around them, that the success and stability of the British parliamentary system is due in large part to the pragmatic frame of mind displayed by its practitioners; and negative in the sense that they also learn that the turbulent, unstable and often grotesque pattern of Continental politics derives from the European habit of looking at the world through the distorting spectacles of total ideologism. What they have learned may be a caricature, but it has had consequences. It has, for example, affeeted the British Labour Party's relationship with the European socialist movement; it has been partly responsible for the lack of enthusiasm for venturing too fully into experiments in European integration, and undoubtedly it has helped strengthen Britain's relationships with the United States and the older Commonwealth—peoples reputed to be fellow pragmatists under the white skin.

These conditions, and many more, add up to a general climate in which the total ideological structuring of politics is difficult to achieve. The skeptic might counter that the case has yet to be proved, that these generalizations are no more than the accumulated clichés of historians and journalists, who have selected their examples to suit their preconceived case. Fortunately, political scientists have begun to amass more empirical data bearing on the subject and tending to confirm these assertions. Thus far, to be sure, no one has made a comprehensive, systematic exploration of the distribution of ideological propensities among the British peo-

¹² Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (London, 1961); Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (London, 1957).

ple or the political elite. We have, for example, no British counterparts of the extensive surveys of political attitudes made by the Michigan Survey Research Center and by McClosky, Prothro and Grigg, or of the intensive psychoanalytical probing by Lane into the political ideologies of a handful of east coast residents. Nevertheless, in the past several years a small number of rigorous empirical studies of the character and distribution of British political attitudes have appeared, and in an indirect way they offer evidence as to the role of ideology in contemporary British political thinking, both at the mass level and among political activists.

If it can be shown that the mass of Britons are not alienated from the system in which they live, that they look tolerantly on those who hold different political beliefs, and that they tend not to be polarized on policies presumed to be highly charged with ideological affect, then we can reasonably conclude that total ideology has not taken hold of them. And if we can demonstrate further that this same pattern prevails among the political elite as well, we will have further confirmation of the generalization.

Data on Alienation. In an ambitious crossnational survey carried out in 1959, Almond and Verba found that the British ranked comparatively low on social and political alienation and high on willingness to trust and cooperate with other people. For example, 84 per cent of the British sample agreed with the statement, "Human nature is fundamentally cooperative," compared to 80 per cent of the Americans, 58 per cent of the Germans and 55 per cent of the Italians. Another query designed to measure generalized trust ("Most people can be trusted") drew affirmative replies from 49 per cent of the British, 55 per cent of the Americans, 19 per cent of the Germans, and five per cent of the Italians.13 Almond and Verba not only find in the United States and Britain a widespread belief that people are basically cooperative, trustworthy and helpful; they also show that in these countries social trust is translated into politically relevant trust, thus reducing the alienation of people

¹² Campbell et al., op. cit.; Herbert McClosky, op. cit.; Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this Review, Vol. 54 (June, 1960), pp. 406-27; James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy," Journal of Politics, Vol. 22 (May, 1960), pp. 276-94; Lane, op. cit.

¹³ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963), p. 267, Table 4.

from the system. From spontaneous and unstructured responses to another survey question designed to test emotional attachment to certain aspects of the nation, the same investigators found that the features mentioned as objects of pride most frequently by Britons were their country's governmental and political system (46 per cent), its social legislation (18 per cent), and its position in international affairs (11 per cent). (Only three, one and two per cent, respectively, of the Italians who were asked the same question named these areas as objects of pride. They chose instead the physical attributes of their country [25 per cent], contributions to the arts [16 per cent], and "nothing" [27 per cent].)14 These are admittedly fragments of indirect evidence, but they seem to point to the presence in Britain of the kind of social and emotional climate in which total ideologies are not apt to flourish.

Intensity of Partisanship. A related consideration is the strength of partisan feeling that runs through a country. If we assume that in the modern state the political party is likely to be a major channel for the expression of ideological thinking, then one would expect to find in countries characterized by Weltanschauung politics a high degree of hostility among one party's followers toward rival partisans. Here again, recent surveys of British attitudes show this to be far from the case. While the images of their own and the opposite party's supporters held by Britons are somewhat sharper and more polarized than in the United States, they fall far short of intense hostility. Almond and Verba did find that 28 per cent of Conservative party supporters, and 29 per cent of Labour party supporters, believed that "selfish people" support the opposite party; that nearly one-fourth of the Conservative respondents viewed Labourites as "ignorant and misguided," and that 10 per cent of the Labour respondents characterized Conservatives as "militarists and imperialists." On the other hand, almost no followers of either party (three per cent in each case) accepted the view that the followers of the other were "betrayers of freedom and welfare."15 Furthermore, when asked the hypothetical question, "How would you feel if your son or daughter married a supporter of the Labour (Conservative) party?"; only 12 per cent of Conservatives and three per cent of Labourities expressed displeasure at the thought of intermarriage, and 87 and 97 per cent, respectively, professed indifference.16

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102, Table 1.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 126, Table 2.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 136, Table 8.

An even stronger indication of the tolerance of the British electorate toward political opponents is found in the results of the survey made in 1960 by Mark Abrams for Socialist Commentary magazine. On the basis of that poll, Abrams reported that

... between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of Labour supporters thought that the Conservatives could dc as well as their own party in standing for the nation as a whole, in giving fair treatment to all races, in respecting British traditions, and in working for world peace and against nuclear war. Of those who opposed Labour, at least 40 per cent were prepared to describe Labour as equally qualified with the Conservatives in giving fair treatment to all races, working for peace, and opposing nuclear war.¹⁷

The same survey revealed that supporters of both parties, as well as uncommitted voters, when asked to choose the characteristics they looked for in a good party leader, picked identical traits in the same order and nearly the same degree—the top three being strong leadership, willingness to make unwelcome decisions, and honesty and sincerity.¹⁸

Policy Attitudes. This tendency toward doctrinal flexibility within the electorate can also be demonstrated by referring to policy attitudes which, in view of their historical importance to the parties, are apt to be imbued with considerable ideological affect. Consider the concept of nationalization, which for many years was linked by the Labour movement with the ideas of economic rationality and social equality, and which was painted by Conservatives as the epitome of economic tyranny and socialist inefficiency. The Socialist Commentary poll found "no homogeneous, blanket attitude toward public ownership," and concluded that "views on this subject are apparently not the outcome of either blind faith or blind rejecticn."19 When asked to assess the condition of the nationalized industries, Conservative and Labour voters made practically identical judgments, discriminating mainly on the grounds of performance rather than ideology. For example, among Conservatives favorable attitudes toward public ownership exceeded unfavorable ones for four of the industries (electricity, gas, atomic energy and the airlines), while more Labour supporters termed the nationalization of coal and the railways a failure than a success. Eighty-four per cent of Conservatives and 58 per cent of Labourites expressed themselves as opposed to any further nationalization. Finally, when asked more generally how much government regulation of industry they thought was necessary, 10 per cent of the Conservatives and only 18 per cent of the Labourites chose "a good deal," while at the other pole 25 per cent of the Conservatives and 10 per cent of the Labourites replied "practically none." Majorities in both parties accepted the need for a fair amount of regulation, and within each there was goodly support for the "wrong" ideological position on this issue.²⁰

Low tension between party supporters also tends to characterize foreign policy attitudes. This is borne out by the analysis made by Davis and Verba of British mass opinions during the period 1947-56 on selected foreign policy issues, many of them presumed to be vested with ideological affect. The polls they examined dealt with respondents' orientations toward the following issues: internationalism, armament, colonialism, the choice between the United States and the Soviet Union, European alliances, the Far Eastern policy.21 On only 13 per cent of the questions was there a low degree of interparty agreement, as compared with 59 per cent high agreement; and had the Suez crisis not been included, the interparty differences would have virtually disappeared. Davis and Verba conclude that "for the most part adherents to any one political party generally express the same sorts of opinions on international issues as adherents to another party; and a high degree of unity within a party is not so much evidence that the party tends to unify the sentiments of its supporters as that it expresses the sentiments of a highly unified nation."22

Insofar, then, as the attitudes of the mass public reveal the extent of ideological modes of thinking, these varied data show not only that a good deal of pragmatism does prevail, but also that the conditions associated with the politics of total ideology—distrust of and hostility to opposing views, a considerable alienation from societal values, and marked polarization on policy questions—are not characteristic of contemporary Britain. It is still conceivable, of course, that these attitudes are not shared by the elite among political activists, and we must

¹⁷ Mark Abrams, Richard Rose, and Rita Hinden, *Must Labour Lose?* (Harmondsworth, 1960), p. 19.

E8 Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 31, 35-36.

²¹ Morris Davis and Sidney Verba, "Party Affiliation and International Opinions in Britain and France, 1947–1956," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 24 (Winter, 1960), pp. 590–604.

² Ibid., p. 601.

now turn briefly to an examination of this possibility.

Again it must be noted that full and systematic data on the basic beliefs of British political leaders are lacking.²³ Nevertheless, several important studies of elite opinion in Britain have appeared recently. They indicate that ideological views at this level too, while more substantial and coherent than within the general public, are not especially prevalent and tend to keep conflict within manageable bounds. The studies that I shall cite here are those of constituency party attitudes and backbench opinion in the House of Commons.

For some time it has been assumed that the real seat of ideologism in the British political system is the parties' constituency associations. The argument runs something like this: while the top parliamentary leaders of the major parties must blunt any ideological tendencies they might have, for electoral reasons as well as because they are dealing with the realities of governing, the activists who man the local parties are not under these constraints and thus are more likely to be involved in politics for reasons of ideological principle. They work zealously for their party not to advance their own careers, but to further the abstract principles in which they believe passionately. They are more likely to be purists or extremists, more reactionary than the national leadership if they are Conservatives, more radically socialist than the national leadership if they are Labourites. Several demonstrations of this pattern appeared in the 1950s, notably the continuing support for Bevanism in the constituency Labour parties and the stiff punishment meted out to leftward deviating Conservative M.P.s by Conservative associations when their Members failed to support the government on issues such as capital punishment and Suez.24 These gave the impression that the constituency parties are apt to be composed of die-hard, dogmatic, irresponsible ideologues, who are neither representative of grassroots partisan thinking nor, unless they are kept at arm's length from policy-making, assets to responsible party leadership.

²³ Herbert McClosky's studies of the ideological differences between political leaders and the electorate in the United States, for example, have no British counterpart. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," loc. cit.

²⁴ Leon D. Epstein, Britain—Uneasy Ally (Chicago, 1954), chs. 5-7; Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis (Urbana, 1964), ch. 6; and Nigel Nicolson, People and Parliament (London, 1958).

This argument has some validity, although a closer look at the local parties shows it to be quite exaggerated. In a painstaking study of resolutions sent by local parties to the annual conferences from 1955 to 1960, Rose has shown that the image of local parties "as a force constantly pressing extremist views upon national leaders" is overdrawn.²⁵ He found, for example, that the total proportion of resolutions containing ideological elements was 54 per cent, while the remaining 46 per cent dealt with nonpartisan questions of little ideological content-expressing mainly views derived from general cultural values or specific interest group demands. Furthermore, most of the resolutions Rose classifies as ideological were simply in line with the standard programs of the parties (e.g., concerning support for or opposition to the present organization of secondary education, the need for or danger of more economic planning, and so on) and were a far cry from the categories of total ideology. Rose also analyzed the resolutions for their "extremism" content, i.e., whether they deviated markedly from the prevailing doctrine of the party in the direction of purism. He found that in the period in question 66 per cent of Conservative and 38 per cent of Labour associations had submitted no extremist resolutions whatever; while in 11 per cent of Conservative and 18 per cent of Labour associations, over half the submitted resolutions were of this variety.26 Rather than finding these attitudes to be geographically concentrated in a few constituency parties, however—which might function as party subcultures—Rose determined that they were randomly distributed around the country. So he concluded that there is much less hot partisanship in the local parties than has been thought, and that the supposed doctrinal differences between these parties on the one hand, and either rank and file party voters or parliamentary leaders on the other, are really not great.

We have also recently been given a glimpse of the attitude structure of the House of Commons in the research of Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew of Keele University.²⁷ Recognizing that strict party discipline and caucus decision-making have made it virtually impossible to penetrate behind the unified ranks of the Division List into the real attitudes of individual M.P.s, the Keele group turned instead

²⁵ Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of British Party Activists," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), p. 364.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 366.

²⁷ S. E. Finer et al., Backbench Opinion, op. cit.

to an analysis of another expression of parliamentary opinion—the Early Day Motion which is both publicly available and amenable to statistical treatment. Motions of this type can be made by any M.P. and customarily are signed by those who agree with their expressed sentiments-occasionally as many as 300 Members. They are rarely debated, and support for them is not subject to the party whip. By tradition they are never signed by the Government or its Whips, and seldom by members of the Opposition front bench; hence their description as "spontaneous unwhipped backbeach manifestoes." Obviously any study of these motions is subject to the difficulty that these expressions are often casually made and ar∈ not always representative of total parliamentary attitudes. Still, when examined in quantity they afford a rough-and-ready profile of one type of leadership attitudes.

The Keele study focused on nearly 300 Early Day Motions signed by Labour and Conservative M.P.s from 1955 to 1959. They included 111 cross-bench motions and 178 motions signed by members of a single party, again revealing the absence of watertight exclusiveness among dedicated partisans. On the Labour side, the study showed—both in the subject of the motions and in the extent of their support -a fairly unified set of concerns and positive correlations between different attitudes. Thus on the seven sets of attitudes which the authors group as "the syndrome of socialism"—humanitarianism, civil liberties, foreign policy, welfare, cost of living, health and education-all attitudes were correlated, on the average, to the degree of .267.28 But when examined separately, as pairs, these attitudes showed marked differences in their distribution among various types of M.P.s (such as trade-union sponsored, cooperative sponsored, and constituencyparty supported Members). In particular, a group of about fifty Labour M.P.s consistently supported all the motions with maximum zeal, forming "the permanent core of the otherwise fluctuating Left." In the judgment of the Keele group, the data from the Early Motions bear out the view that British socialism, at least as represented by Labour backbenchers, does not repose on a single coherent universalistic body of coctrine but instead is better described as "a set of propositions or attitudes, which when all or many of them are simultaneously held, constitute socialism."29

The Keele group's data for the Conservatives tend to confirm the impression that it is ex-

tremely difficult to find clear-cut ideology or even persistent left-center-right factions in this party. While positive correlations were established among a few issues (e.g., attitudes toward Suez policy and penal reform, social progressivism and concern for civil liberties, devotion to national sovereignty and attachment to the Commonwealth), numerous ideological inconsistencies emerged: e.g., many Conservatives displayed enthusiasm for both social reform at home and militant policies abroad, for both world government and intervention in Suez. In contrast to the attitudes of Labour backbenchers, those of the Conservatives did not scale statistically and could only loosely be termed a syndrome. If these data are persuasive, then apparently the average Conservative M.P. does not approach his tasks from a prepared emotional or intellectual position, but rather, as the Keele group has put it, "the Conservative party acts or thinks as unrelated, ad hoc groups of Members, groups whose members join together to contend for one specific objective, and then fall apart once the goal has been attained or has been by-passed by events."30

II. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF CONSENSUS AND CLEAVAGE

If Britain lacks the normal concomitants of the politics of total ideology, she is not altogether free of the pull of ideology in the second sense that I have used the term. The British political system manifests certain important beliefs which, though they do not add up to a Weltanschauung, nevertheless embody values and principles of action connected to larger views of man, society and the state. These attitudes, however general, affect the functioning political institutions, and substantial changes in them, when they occur, are likely to be reflected in the balance of the political order. I have mentioned a few of them in the preceding section, in the context of an effort to deny the grip of sterner doctrines on the British people. For example, it seems quite clear that two ideological elements which facilitate democratic politics—a relatively optimistic and trusting view of human nature, and a measure of toleration of political opponents—have a firm place in present British attitudes. In this section I will discuss briefly several more of these elements and show not only some of their consequences for politics, but also some recent additions to more firmly established, historic beliefs. Finally, I will attempt to give the character and flavor of various recent challenges to this bundle of attitudes. No attempt can be

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 56-58.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 48.

made here to present a comprehensive inventory of such beliefs, or to offer empirical evidence of their distribution, salience or intensity.

My argument is not only that certain attitudes in Britain fulfill the functions of an ideology; it is also that they serve as forces making for a balance between consensus and cleavage in the political system. Obviously these attitudes may be deeply held by some Britons and only casually by others. But the overall effect is the maintenance of a moving balance between general agreement on some values and well distributed disagreement on others—the conditions Parsons refers to as a "limited polarization of society."³¹

Consensus. To illustrate both the persistence and changing character of the political belief system, four ideological elements will be cited as fundamentally consensual in nature: the conception of governmental leadership, devotion to procedures, "pragmatism," and the "new feudalism." The first three have been constants in British thinking for many decades, while the last-named has entered the consensual stage only recently.

Britons are widely agreed that the principal duty and task of government is to govern: however important it may be in this age to couple the authority of government with a substantial measure of mass participation, the more populistic elements should not be allowed to paralyze the powers of the Crown. This attitude is a mixture of predemocratic attachment to the notion of a natural ruling class and a recognition that democratic government requires stable and responsible leadership, on the one hand, and a commitment to mass participation and the control of governmental experts and elites by amateurs and non-elites, on the other hand. Its importance as an attitudinal underpinning of political behavior cannot be overestimated. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the modern British parliament is its provision and maintenance of a stable majority that permits the government to rule legitimately. Numerous informal institutions which facilitate the conduct of parliamentary business, such as Cabinet hegemony, party discipline and the circumscribed powers of backbench M.P.s, can be linked directly to a general acceptance of the need for strong leadership. This is not simply the ideology of the political elite, for the norm pervades British soci-

³¹ "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 92.

ety in a wider sense. For example, respondents to Socialist Commentary's 1960 poll, when presented with a list of 15 possible characteristics of a good party leader, opted most for "strong leadership" (56 per cent) and "strength to make unwelcome decisions" (47 per cent). Conservative and Labour supporters showed no significant difference in their preference for these qualities.³² No evidence suggests any weakening in this attitude in recent years; on the contrary, if anything it seems to be increasing in its pervasiveness.

The flavor of ideological commitment attaches also to the place of procedures in the British polity. Whereas they may display flexibility and a willingness to bargain over the content of public policy, the British often show an unbending dogmatism in regard to the process by which policy is established. As Eckstein has aptly observed, "... the British invest with very high affect the procedural aspects of their government and with very low affect its substantive aspects; they behave like ideologists in regard to rules and like pragmatists in regard to policies."33 Numerous examples of this disposition might be cited. The intricate fabric of rules, formal and informal, that bear on the conduct of Parliament has shown amazing resistance to reform, despite the enlarged scope of governmental activity and the agitation for more efficient methods coming from both inside and outside Westminster. Many of them have developed their own mystique and are approached by M.P.s of almost every stripe as akin to absolute values. Interest groups are likely to refuse to accept policies affecting them if they have not been consulted during their formulation. The parties have shown themselves willing to examine critically, and often to abandon, a number of their historic policies; but almost invariably they have held firm in their attachment to time-honored procedures, which are seen as fundamental agencies of legitimation. Thus, the closer it came to actual power, the more the Labour Party divested itself of its radical system-reformers and stressed its adherence to the traditional rules of the game. Conceivably it was their acceptance of the ideology of parliamentarism as much as their growing middle class character that made Labour leaders palatable to large numbers of non-socialists in the electorate.

When important procedural questions on oc-

³² Must Labour Lose?, op. cit., p. 25. These were multiple responses.

³³ Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton, 1961), pp. 30-31.

casion become mixed with arguments over the substance of policy, the temperature of politics r_ses appreciably; or, alternatively, disputes over procedure tend to elbow out those over content. The heated Commons debates at the time of the Suez crisis are a case in point. A sitting of the House had to be suspended by the Speaker because of an uproar caused by the refusal of the Prime Minister to answer what Labour M.P.s believed to be a legitimate parliamentary question (whether the country was or was not at war with Egypt),34 and almost as much criticism was leveled at Eden for allegedly not consulting with his own parliamentary supporters and the leader of the Opposition on government plans as was directed against the wisdom of his decision to take military action.35 A concentration and fixity of dogmatic concern tend to attach to this one aspect of the political system, then, even if they do not carry over into other areas equally.

A third component of this ideological structure, also deeply embedded in British political culture and high in affect, is the concept of pragmatism, already noted. It has come to be shorthand for the belief that sweeping change is unnecessary and dangerous, that effective change is that which comes gradually and builds on, rather than obliterates, previous forms and practices. The test of any institution or any policy, accordingly, is not its esthetic form or logical consistency but its success in performing the fairly immediate task for which it is designed. Anomalies and loose ends are no problem. The rhetoric of British politics is filled with tributes to this mode of thinking (e.g., "Britain is ruled not by logic but by Parliament" [Disraeli]; "Logic is a poor guide compared with custom" [Churchill]), and no description of the working of basic institutions, from the City of London to the University Grants Committee, seems complete without the proffered explanation that "It may seem ocd to you, but it works."36 Pragmatism is bred into the bones of modern Britons by a self-conscious celebration of its virtues and an insistence that it serve as the most suitable guide to political decision-making.

³⁴ 558 House of Commons Debates 1620-25 (Nov. 1, 1956). For more discussion of the significance of the procedural aspects of the crisis, see Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston, 1964), pp. 232-33.

³⁵ Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, op. cit, ch. 5; Robert T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, 2d ed. (London, 1963), pp. 585-89.

³⁶ Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain (London, 1962), passim.

The attachment to larger principles may often be modified or supplemented by an equally intense belief that translation of these principles into practice should take pragmatic form. The policies adopted by the two major parties toward nationalization and colonialism are illustrative of this tempering. Not only did Labour go slow in implementing the social ideal of public ownership when the party came to power in 1945; it also devoted much of the 1950s to a reappraisal of the place of nationalization in its program, with the resultant deemphasis-but nct extinction-of the older ideal. Conversely, traditional Conservative opposition to nationalization did not prevent the party when in power from retaining in the public sector most of the industries nationalized by its predecessor. Again, though dedicated to ending colonialism and raising the remaining outposts of empire to self-governing status, the Labour Government began gradually by concentrating on the Asian flank, and left to succeeding Conservative governments the continuation of the process, step by step, in Africa and the Caribbean. The defense of these actions, as with nationalization, has been largely in terms of the kind of pragmatic outlook that Britons understand and approve.

Pragmatism, then, is closely related to other basic beliefs—in stability, in peaceful solutions in mixed institutions, and in the legitimating effect of gradual change. It serves as a brake on rapid, root-and-branch societal transformation. In practice, it may also have the effect of reinforcing a preference for amateurs (who are presumed to be more pragmatic in their outlooks) over specialists and technicians (who are thought more likely to be narrow dogmatistsin Keynes's famous jibe, "slaves of some defunct economist"). As I will show very shortly, critics may be found to argue that pragmatism has been raised into a dangerous cult which the country can no longer afford to perpetuate; but of the pervasive hold of pragmatism on British political thinking there can be little doubt.

These three elements of consensus—belief in leadership, attachment to procedures, and pragmatism—have been present in British political culture for many years. Nevertheless, the composition of the bundle of attitudes that comprise the ideology is not static or immutable. As society changes and the role of government is modified, basic attitudes are also likely to undergo transformation. One of the most important recent ideological adjustments involves changing attitudes toward the private and public spheres of British life. These newer attitudes, sometimes referred to as "the new feudalism," parallel ideologically the development

of the welfare state and the highly controlled economy. They are attitudinal adjustments to the new balance of social forces created by corporatist developments in the polity, which have given to many private groups what amounts to veto power over public policy. The vast responsibilities now thrown onto government can be carried out only if important affected groups in society agree to go along. By withholding capital, talents or cooperation such groups could make a shambles of any government's program. The requirements of this quasi-corporatism evoke the danger that Britain might reach what Samuel Beer has called the point of "pluralistic stagnation."37 One reason why this has not yet materialized is that, as Beer has noted, the Keynesian revolution in economics succeeded after the Second World War in altering popular ideas about the role of government and the pursuit of unlimited private gain. In particular, the almost complete acceptance of the neo-mercantilism associated with Keynesian doctrine, which gives to government the role once played by Adam Smith's "invisible hand," provides new standards for judging group values, demands and behavior. In a sense the ethic of bargaining has displaced what has remained of the ethic of competition, and personal acquisitiveness has given way in large measure to the search for security guaranteed by the community. Put another way, despite the powers of blackmail inherent in the position of interest groups in British society today, the potentialities of this power have generally been held in check by a consensus derived in part from the recognition of governmental responsibility for maintaining the economic equilibrium and in part from the decline of acquisitiveness in favor of the more medieval standard of just rewards. The acceptance of a national incomes policy, for example, depends upon the pervasiveness of this attitude.

Cleavage. Along with these consensual elements, other basic attitudes divide the British community and foster some degree of ideological tension. Some of the forces making for cleavage are built into the political party system; others are less organized and function as generalized outside pressures. Broadly speaking, this constitutes the distinction between party competition on the one hand and intellectual criticism on the other. I shall deal first

that the country has gone so far as to reach the point of moving with unanimity or not at all." Samuel H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (March, 1956), pp. 15-16.

with ideological differences between and within the two main parties and second with the challenges to the prevailing ideology from the outsiders.

In spite of the growing trend toward interparty agreement on many policies, the Conservative and Labour parties continue to espouse somewhat different conceptions of human nature, society and the state. Their ideological centers of gravity are distinct, and to the extent that activists and supporters are socialized into the historic norms of the parties, significant differences between them will remain. Even when they are forced to support similar programs, it is often for basically different reasons. The ideologies of the parties do not function solely as symbols and myths; they are potentially operative (so long as they have not atrophied completely), and on occasion they fix the boundaries and direction of policy decisions. For Conservatives, the belief in the naturalness and usefulness of inequality, the inevitability of hierarchy, and the positive values of nationalism and empire may have been muted by the necessities of Britain's contemporary situation, but it has not been abandoned in favor of a wholly different value system. Similarly, Labour's attachment to the values of equality, social democracy, classlessness and pacifism, while also tempered by the exigencies of the moment, has remained fairly fixed. As a motivation and a standard for political action, it has not declined to the level of cynical rhetoric. So long as this ideological gap between the parties continues to be perceived by their partisans—and I believe that at the moment it still is-talk of the politics of Tweedledum and Tweedledee is premature.38

In addition, each party has within its ranks militant individuals and groups concerned with preserving the party's doctrinal purity and historic values. The persistence of such forces, which may or may not take the form of factions, cannot be disregarded as strictly of nuisance value, for they often represent ideological cleavages within the electorate as well. As ideological pressure groups within the party's structure they may serve to set limits beyond which the leadership ventures at its peril. The Labour Party has long been beset by internal doctrinal cleavages, which not only affect the

³⁸ One study asserts that only a decided minority of the electorate seems to be able to appraise the ideologies of the parties in any meaningful way. Donald E. Stokes, "Ideological Competition of British Parties," paper given at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1964.

struggle for leadership but create an image with the electorate. During the 1950s and early 1960s, for instance, the party was almost constantly engaged in internecine disputes between left-wing factions and the dominant right-wing leadership. The splits that occurred over the Bevanite view of socialist priorities, over German rearmament, over the status of the commitment to nationalization, and over nuclear disarmament are familiar examples. In each case the disagreement turned at least in part on the question of how strictly the party should adhere to the historic body of doctrine known as "socialism" and "socialist foreign policy." And while the Attlee-Gaitskell forces were usually successful in fending off the leftwing accusations that they had betraved the fundamental tenets of the Labour movement, the leadership could not afford to be wholly impervious to the substantial body of opinion represented by the Beavanites and their successcrs. Nor, as the disputes over the party's constitution and over nuclear weapons revealed, was the moderate leadership able to subjugate the radical wing so completely as to foreclose the possibility of a resurgence of doctrinaire opinions within important sections of the party. When Gaitskell attempted after the 1959 election defeat to persuade the party to amend Clause IV of its constitution in the direction of virtually eliminating the commitment to nationalization, he was set upon not only by the left but also the center of the party, and forced to beat a hasty retreat. The controversy over Clause IV showed convincingly that the ideological reflexes of the party are not atrophied, and that electoral calculation has nct completely replaced them as the mainsgring of Labour's program.39

The Conservative Party is much more homogeneous than Labour in its social composition, its relation to outside groups, and its public loyalty to its leadership. But it is not altogether free of ideological dissension. It has its stalwart and reformist elements, who occasionally succeed in moving the party in one direction or the other, often on the basis of very different views of man and society. These forces are apt to take a rather different form from their counterparts or the Labour side. Whereas in the Labour Party the usual instrument of ideological dissension is the faction, a stable set of politicians organized for political activity, the more common form among the Conservatives is what

Rose refers to as a "tendency," a stable set of attitudes expressed in Parliament by less organized, more fluctuating groups of politicians. Thus as the Keele study of backbench opinion made clear, the Conservative leadership has encountered significant internal party opposition on a number of issues invested with ideological affect, such as crime and punishment, colonialism, and the maintenance of free enterprise (e.g., public vs. private television). However, the M.P.s who pressed dogmatic views on these issues did not form a stable group but tended to fall apart and regroup along different lines when other controversies arose. Single issues, such as the Suez crisis, may split Conservatives into right, left and center groups, with strong ideological disputation between the extremes; but continuing factionalism, with the risk of intra-party polarization, runs counter to the traditional Conservative belief in loyalty to the chosen leadership. The Conservative Party, like Labour, shows both consensus and cleavage on ideological questions. Unlike the pattern in the Labour Party, the Conservative balance is skewed strongly in the direction of consensus, with ideology generally secondary to more tangible interests.

The overall picture of the condition of ideology in Britain shows, therefore, a continuing mixture of consensus and cleavage, of attitudes making for stability and attitudes fostering change. These attitudes are not distributed uniformly through the population or within the political system; but neither are they polarized in separate groups, and they coexist at almost every important level of political structure. In sum, the process of government rests upon a combination of strong commitment and lowtemperature pragmatism. "If too much principle can kill a government," Eckstein has observed, "so can the lack of principle at all . . . what is wanted is 'programmatic' government, and this must of necessity blend principle with pragmatic adjustment."40 The prevailing distribution of attitudes in Britain goes some distance to satisfy this condition.

Critics. The content of British political attiudes has not escaped criticism, especially in the era of the Common Market. If the 1950s were the heyday of the angry young men of letters, the early 1960s spawned a number of

⁴⁰ Harry Eckstein, op. cit., p. 33. In a sophisticated analysis bearing on this point, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., has distinguished between parties and compromises based upon the concepts of consensus and program. "Party Government and the Settlement of 1688," this Review, Vol. 58 (December, 1964), pp. 933-46.

³⁹ For further examples, see Richard Rose, "Farties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," *Pclitical Studies*, Vol. 12 (February, 1964), pp. 33-46.

critics concerned with the condition of the nation's political values. Some of them, notably the so-called "New Left" and the marching and squatting foes of nuclear weapons, are in the long tradition of radical protest in Britain. Although their targets are contemporary, their moral and social values are not markedly different from those of the 1930s.41 Rather than focusing on this fairly familiar pattern of outgroup protest, I shall concentrate on another group of critics whose concern is less singleminded and whose methods are less spectacular than the "angries" of the traditional left, but whose belief that the nation's values are dangerously outdated is equally strong. I refer to those intellectuals who are devoted to exposing the alleged loss of Britain's élan vital and to pleading for the modernization of basic attitudes as well as institutions.

This unorganized group of critics, whom Henry Fairlie has termed disdainfully "State of England" writers, is difficult to fit into ready-made political categories. It numbers, among others, several right-wing Labour M. P.s, a couple of leftish Oxford economists, a few mildly left-of-center journalists, a professor of government known mainly for works on France, the industrial editor of the Financial Times, and Arthur Koestler. 42 What they have in common is a reformist outlook, born of disillusionment with the tenacity of certain historic British attitudes in the postwar world. This has led them to strike out without discrimination against left and right alike-in Crosland's phrase, "the conservative enemy," wherever found. Because they share this motivation, their chief ideas can be lumped together for convenience without serious distortion, so long as it is remembered that what fol-

⁴¹ For the views of these groups see Norman Birnbaum, "Great Britain: The Reactive Revolt," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962), pp. 55-68, and Henry J. Steck, "The Re-emergence of Ideological Politics in Britain," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18 (March, 1965), pp. 87-103.

⁴² Thomas Balogh, "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante," in Hugh Thomas (ed.), The Establishment (London, 1962), pp. 72-115; Brian Chapman, British Government Observed (London, 1963); C. A. R. Crosland, The Conservative Enemy (London, 1962); "Suicide of a Nation?," Encounter, July, 1963, especially the articles by Albu, Altrincham, Cole, Shanks, and Shonfield; Anthony Sampson, op. cit.; Michael Shanks, The Stagnant Society (Harmondsworth, 1961); and John Vaizey, Britain in the Sixties: Education for Tomorrow (Harmondsworth, 1962).

lows is a composite of themes scattered in many writings.

Underlying these critics' attack is the non-Marxian assumption that what ails Britain is not so much its material conditions or its new place in the world as its cultural attitudes. "We are faced," Koestler writes, "with a 'functional' rather than a 'structural' disorder. Structural diseases have objective, material causes, functional diseases have subjective, psychological causes."43 It is a lack of dynamism, of incentives (in more than the pecuniary sense), of social discipline bred by a sense of community, that lies at the root of the malaise. The aftermath of empire, the decline of Britain's power in world affairs, the effects of the welfare state, the challenge of new Europe-all are but proximate causes; the real sources of the present difficulties lie deeper, in attitudes toward society and government which stretch back into British history. Paradoxically, it is said, it has been the almost unbroken character of British development, its vaunted evolutionary stability, that now holds back the creation of the types of modern attitudes so badly needed. Having been spared the upheavals of radical social revolution, the interruption of its political regime, the destruction of its land and economy, and the psychological trauma of invasion and alien rule, Britain has not been forced to agonize over, or to reconstruct, its fundamental values. In the view of many of these critics, the very traits so much admired by outside observers-the blending of the pre-industrial and the modern, the conscious preservation of aristocratic institutions, the taste for new wines in old bottles-have unfitted the country for the tasks of survival in a rapidly changing world.

It is hardly surprising that one of the targets of this line of criticism is the alleged historicism of the British, their compulsive fixation, as one writer has put it, on either the glories or the miseries of the past. The consequence in both cases is a retreat into unreality, frustration and passivity. All too many Britons remain, it is asserted, who hanker after the day when Britannia was top-dog and could solve any problem by sending a gunboat. While Suez was supposed to be their lesson, they have refused to hearken to it. More important, others refuse to believe that Britain can learn anything from the rest of the world, in particular from the political and economic experiments now under way in western Europe. Thus Henry Fairlie:

I am extremely doubtful whether we have anything to learn from either the Fifth Republic in

⁴³ Arthur Koestler, "The Lion and the Ostrich," Encounter, July, 1963, p. 8.

France or the Federal Republic in West Germany about the manner of ordering and sustaining a free society; I am not even sure whether we have much to learn in the matter from the French and Germans as peoples... for the moment, I am prepared to wager fairly heavily that our own social and political arrangements will outlast theirs. Any takers?

Still others, it is maintained, are mesmerized by the ancient rituals and dominant values of Oxford and Cambridge—"fairylands in the heart of modern Britain"—the essence of whose magic is that it is pre-industrial.

This satisfied, even complacent, immersion in the British past is coupled, usually at the other end of the social scale, with the equally corrosive tendency of Britons to view the presert in terms of the miserable and insecure days of the 1930s, the period when so many leaders of the Left came of age. Here the prime target is usually the trade unions: their restrictive practices, their security-mindedness, their suspizion of innovation, their unwillingness to acopt business unionism and provide their leaders with adequate powers, their division of the industrial world into "Them" and "Us," and their "I'm All Right, Jack" response to their own rising affluence. Again, though the causes of this malaise are recognized as partly structural, it is argued that at the base of the problem are attitudes derived from situations and days long past. The result of conservatism in this major area of British life is that the unions are proving themselves "the natural allies of the forces of stagnation and conservatism in industry-and not those of expansion and dynamism."45

From this target it is but a short step to another: the alleged cult of amateurism and pragmetism. These seemingly valuable traits, it is argued, have been transformed into fetishes in contemporary British usage. The amateur has become not the curious and adaptable allrounder, but the dilettante; and pragmatism, rather than being synonymous with the experim∈ntal outlook, has shrunk to cautious, narrow tinkering. Teleology has given way to functionalism, the spirit of inquiry to the norms of adjustment and conciliation. Not surprisingly, the institutions most under fire for the inculcation of these attitudes are the educational system and the civil service, which at their higher levels are seen as extensions of each other. Hence the claim that the dominant humanist tradition of the top public schools and Oxbridge, while perhaps suitable for the days of laissez-faire and empire, is now hopelessly out of keeping with the requirements of industrial society and positive government. The defense of the prevailing values of British education in terms of training the generalist for the tasks of policy-making is really a deception. In the civil service, as in industry and Parliament, the domination of those possessed of (in Balogh's phrase) the "crossword-puzzle mind, reared on mathematics at Cambridge or Greats at Oxford," is inimical to the kind of rational, comprehensive, long-range planning that British society now requires.

The prevailing low esteem for science, technology and business enterprise particularly agitates the critics, who attribute to it much of Britain's slow economic growth, the "brain drain," and the nervous ambivalence toward the Common Market. This attitude, they argue, is one of the negative residues of aristocratic values in a democratic age. Whereas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the progress of technology and the promise of economic growth were the special ideology of the business class in its struggle with the land-owning aristocracy, over time the ideology faded out as the rising masters of technology and entrepreneurial power gave in to the tempting possibility of emulating the life of the landed squire. "The combination of a sharply divided class society—and the possibility of rising from one class to another held in greater esteemmeant that the ambition of the sons of many manufacturers was to leave their family businesses and to become landowners (or, at least, 'professional men')."46 Business, manufacturing and applied science continue to exist, but top creative talent refused to associate with these activities, and their controllers became increasingly docile, unadventurous and apologetic.In the view of the non-socialist wing of this school of critics, the reforms needed to achieve greater efficiency and expanded production have been stymied by the unwillingness of Britons to put these values above those of short-run group security and "fair play." "We are unwilling to advance if it means that anybody is going to get hurt. . . . This is in many ways an admirable trait, but it is a sure recipe for national decav."47 What these writers call for, then, is a reorientation of basic values in the direction of recognizing that whatever may have been the

⁴⁻ Henry Fairlie, "On the Comforts of Anger," ibid., p. 12.

⁴³ Michael Shanks, op. cit., p. 93.

⁴⁶ Austen Albu, "Taboo on Expertise," ibid.,

⁴⁷ Shanks, "The Comforts of Stagnation," Encounter, July, 1963, p. 31.

contributions in the past of aristocratic, unspecialized and humanistic standards of performance, the new Britain requires the upgrading of those attitudes which will foster technological innovation and organizational efficiency. Such a reorientation hinges upon the ability of Britons to sublimate, and finally eliminate, the class-bound attitudes of the past, which have stood as barriers not only to a democratic life, but also to national growth.

These cries are also echoed by critics of the process of government, especially those who view with misgivings the increased corporatism of policy-making. A notable example is Brian Chapman, whose slashing broadside, British Government Observed, significantly is subtitled "Some European Reflections." Although Chapman is critical chiefly of what he believes to be the archaic, nineteenth century character of the machinery of government-its "rich Byzantine structure"-he attributes much of this condition to the lack of doctrinal value attached to the concept of public service in Britain. In contrast to the trends in Continental countries, he asserts, British government remains in the grips of the luxuriant amateurism of centuries past and has not developed a genuine pluralism based upon the sentiment that public office carries with it public responsibility. Its pragmatism is a mask for weak-kneed, expensive abdication to whatever pressures happen to be brought to bear. Thus public policy is "simply equated with finding the least controversial course between the conflicting interests of vociferous private groups. It is not a doctrine of government; it is a doctrine of subordination."48 Other critics sharing these views have added the argument that a system that acts as much on the basis of "understand-

⁴⁸ Chapman, op. cit., p. 61. For a challenge to this interpretation, see D. N. Chester, "British Government Observed," Public Administration, Vol. 41 (Winter, 1963), pp. 375-84.

ings"—unarticulated, unstructured, implicit responses to new situations—does not encourage bold solutions or positive action.

This small sample of the expanding literature of discontent testifies to the survival of ideological concern in Britain today. True, these particular critics are not of a single mind, and few of them present fully drawn prescriptions for reform (aside, perhaps, from a common emphasis on the need to reconstruct the educational system). But they do share two strong interests that have influenced their analysis and their prescriptions. First, they are impressed by many of the recent developments occurring on the Continent, and they would shake Britain out of its traditional belief that nothing positive can be learned from that quarter. Thus they would seem to pin their hope of change in part on the prospects of closer union with Europe, if only because this might jolt the country out of its complacent ways. Second, they believe that the primary force making for attitudinal change will be the rising power of the newer, more modern and classless elements in British society—the managers, scientists, technicians and white collar workers—who have reaped the benefits of the 1944 Education Act, and whose occupational skills and roles have removed them from the attitudes of the older England. In this sense, but not in others, these critics would agree with the diagnoses of the "end of ideology" writers.

None of this cluster of critics offers a new "world view" ideology to the British, but most of them are concerned with the reordering of basic political attitudes in the second sense that I have used the term "ideology." While acknowledging the need to retain many of the historic values associated with the British polity, they would nevertheless adjust the equilibrium of ancient and modern values in the direction of modernity. This can be achieved, they believe, in the best British tradition, without resort to cosmic theories or to the intolerance of closed systems.

SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: SOME SOVIET AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COMPARISONS

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It is hardly surprising that most investigations of Soviet bureaucracy have emphasized the unique aspects of that system rather than its relation to broader problems of administration.1 Yet the importance of Soviet experience makes a beginning in comparative analysis highly desirable. The purpose of this article is to identify some (by no means all) of the ways in which Soviet administrative behavior resembles or differs from administrative behavior in Western Europe, which is assumed here to be the norm of administration in a politically and economically modernized society.2 Where Sovist and Western European administrative behavior coincide, it is assumed that the behavior arises from requirements of the economically modernized societies which prevail in both the USSR and Western Europe at present, Where acministrative behavior differs in the two areas, tentative explanations are sought in (1) the circumstance that the Soviet economy has become modernized more recently and more rapidly than the economy in Western Europe; and (2) the difference between the Communist pclitical system and the pluralistic systems prevailing in Western Europe.3

Materials on the structure and functioning of Soviet administration, as on so many other features of Soviet society and government, have been very scarce. The present analysis depends heavily upon previous studies of various aspects of the Soviet bureaucracy, but I found

- ¹ I use "bureaucracy," "organization," and "administration" in the sense employed by Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott in Formal Organizations (San Francisco, 1962), pp. 7-8; since the formal organizations I deal with are highly bureaucratic and engaged in administration, the terms are frequently interchangeable.
- I make the distinction between economic and political modernization which Joseph LaPalombara clarifies on pp. 37 ff. of "Bureaucracy and Political Development" in the book which he ed ted on Bureaucracy and Development (Princeton, 1963).
- ⁵ Obviously a different set of assumptions about the relation between the Western European and the Soviet political systems would have produced a different model leading to a different approach to the problem.

it essential to augment such data by systematically interviewing Western European administrators who in recent years have had direct personal contact with parts of the Soviet administrative apparatus.4 The data I obtained in this manner consist, of course, of the perceptions of outsiders; but this fact makes them especially valuable for comparative purposes, for the Western Europeans were able to compare the administrative behavior they observed in the USSR with their experience of their own systems, for which they qualify as expert informants. Reliance on interviews (especially in view of unavoidable time limitations binding both interviewer and informant) restricted the examination to certain salient features of the Soviet bureaucracy which visitors could observe. As a consequence, the most sensitive political structures (Party, police, and military)

4 During 1963-64, I interviewed twenty-seven German, twenty-four British, and twenty French administrators who had either visited the USSR for professional or business purposes or who (in a small minority of cases) had dealt extensively with Soviet administrators in Western Europe. The wide commercial and official contacts of Western Europeans (in comparison to Americans) with Soviet administrators made these informants especially valuable. While it was not feasible to select a "sample" of the Western Europeans, I was careful to secure a distribution that was broadly representative of the European government officials and private businessmen and of welfare as well as "line" or industrial administrators within the official group. The interviews were open-ended, but highly structured, so as to cover a fairly standardized range of topics yet to permit intensive probing of informants who turned out to have made unusually significant observations of Soviet administration. I intend to deal more fully with the backgrounds of the informants in a subsequent article which will treat the differences in role perceptions of the various types of Western European administrators. At this point I should express my gratitude to the American Council of Learned Societies and the Graduate School and the International Studies Program of the University of Wisconsin, which provided the grants for extensive interviewing in Europe and a brief visit to the USSR.

cannot be analyzed directly. Many important features of bureaucracy, such as centralization vs. autonomy, personnel selection and socialization, rules formation, responsiveness to publics, participation in policy formation and involvement in power conflicts, are scarcely touched upon. Focus upon the contemporary period of foreign contact limits consideration of the dynamic elements of bureaucratic development, though these could be treated briefly in some contexts. Within these limitations, however, it is possible to present a series of interrelated propositions which may serve as hypotheses for future investigation as more data become available.

I. FORMAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOVIET COMMAND STRUCTURE

A. In comparison with Western European administration, departures from hierarchical principles in the formal structure of Soviet administration are greatest in spheres concerned with human welfare.

Western European informants who were administrators of welfare or service agencies (social security, public health, and education) were almost unanimous in feeling that hierarchy was replaced by multiple chains of command in the Soviet counterparts of their agencies. For example, a school system director pointed to the formal subordination of local school administrations in the USSR to higher school authorities and to the local soviets (legislative bodies). He believed that the education committees of the Soviets occupied a significant role in the supervision of the schools and that teachers deliberately played off the committees against their hierarchical superiors. Similarly, a highly placed social security administrator was aware that local social security officials in the Soviet Union are legally subordinate both to the Union Republic ministry of social security and to the local soviet. When he visited the USSR he asked how possible conflicts of authority were resolved. He was informed that in case of conflict the social security director resigned; but the visitor remained unconvinced that any simple solution to the problem of dual subordination was possible.

Nearly all of the Western European welfare administrators believed that their own agencies were, in contrast, basically hierarchical in organization: *i.e.*, that they conformed essentially to Max Weber's "ideal type" in which each administrative official is subordinate to a single superior. Without overlooking the importance of informal relationships in welfare

agencies, one can hypothesize that, in Western Europe at least, hierarchical relationships (closely related to rules specificity and impersonality) have prevailed to a great extent in agencies administering service affairs which have traditionally been the concern of government. As a recent study suggests, "government by law is the most bureaucratic of all institutions because to a greater extent than other institutions it feels bound by its own rules." In the USSR, on the other hand, administration of schools, social security, and health-"administration of people" in contrast to "administration of things"—has always had a high political content. The totalitarian ideology demands that every administrative action concerning people be carefully fitted to the political aims of the regime. Consequently, dual subordination, with frequent intervention of "mass organizations" like the soviets, directed by the Communist Party, is essential. In the welfare agencies which Western European informants could observe this indeterminacy in the command structure apparently permitted some leeway to "grass-roots" pressures as well. Nevertheless, the general concept is in close accord with studies of more highly politicized elements of the Soviet administrative system. For example, the extremely politicized wartime partisan movement (in contrast to the regular Red Army) had a very indeterminate command structure.7 In the higher political structures examined by Barrington Moore, "because of the need for means to check up on the execution of policy decisions there apparently exists a vested interest in confusion, and particularly confusion in the allocation of authority."8 Similarly, Merle Fainsod, in his study of the Soviet political structure notes that

The leaders of the regime guard their power jealously. They are willing to forego the advantage of a single, clearly defined administrative hierarchy, and they blur lines of authority by multiplying

- ⁵ Peter M. Blau's *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago, 1955) is, of course, concerned with just such relationships in an American welfare agency.
- ⁶ Marshall Dimock in Robert K. Merton et al., ed., Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), p. 399.
- ⁷ John A. Armstrong and Kurt DeWitt, "Organization and Control of the Partisan Movement" in John A. Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, 1964), pp. 133-34.
- ⁸ Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 286.

controls at every point of the government structure.9

As the passages just cited suggest, Communist doctrinal insistence on an extreme degree of political control may involve a certain sacrifice of efficiency. Welfare administration is evidently less crucial politically than administration in the higher echelons of Party and government. To a regime which places first priority on economic modernization welfare administration is also less important than industrial directions. Other differences between welfare and economic administrators which appear to be definite consequences of the emphasis on modernization will be noted later. At this point, it is important to suggest that the differences between Soviet and Western European administration in the welfare sphere are due not only to the communist ideology but to the relative deemphasis of governmental welfare functions which rapid economic modernization-in contrast to political modernization—entails.

E. In Soviet industrial production and foreigr-trade, departures from hierarchical command principles are similar to those in the same administrative spheres in Western Europe.

This observation runs counter to the conclusions of some studies of Soviet administration, which have tended to generalize the principle of indeterminacy in the command structure to include economic management as well. Nevertheless, the consensus of Western European informants is overwhelming on this point. Perhaps the earlier studies, viewing the Soviet system in isolation, tended to exaggerate the comparative importance of departures from hierarchical principles in its formal economic administration. Businessmen, regardless of the size or nature of their own firms, were convinced that the agencies they dealt with in the USER were as much under "one-man managemert" as their own. So were most Western European government administrators in "line administration" or in state industrial management. The only exception these men made to their generalized view of the hierarchical formal structure of Soviet administration was the influence of the Communist Party; but they could rarely specify the nature of this influence. One businessman did note that the director of Sovsudoimport (the agency concerned with purchasing ships) also occupied a high Party post, which seemed to endow him with an unusual degree of authority in the agency.10

It would appear (as several informants spon-

9 How Russia Is Ruled, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 245.

taneously noted), that a considerable measure of adherence to hierarchical administrative principles is necessary to the highly modernized economies which now prevail in both Western Europe and the Soviet Union. The command structure need not, and for the sake of efficiency should not, be rigid in either system.

C. In Soviet industrial administration, the principal departure from hierarchical principles in the formal command structure consists of the authority acquired by staff or functional agencies through their power of reporting directly to the

top of the command structure.

Informants who observed foreign trade agencies saw little if any evidence of departures from formal subordination to a single superior. The advantages of maintaining at least the appearance of unity of command for the Soviet side in trade negotiations is obvious. Businessmen and government officials who were able to penetrate to the production agencies in the USSR obtained a somewhat different conception of the Soviet administrative system. But it frequently took considerable probing to unearth their observations, for the type of divergence from hierarchical principles described below did not strike the Western European administrators as unusual in the light of their experience with their own administrations.

The most interesting line of inquiry concerned relations between the state committees and the councils of national economy (sovnarkhozy), which in 1957 had replaced the central ministerial apparatus for directing industry. Formally, the state committees were made responsible only for research and design; in other words, they were staff or functional agencies. Implementation of state committee proposals, often even at the experimental stage, however, depended on the cooperation of line agenciesthe sovnarkhozy and the industrial enterprises under them. Though none of the Western European informants spontaneously noted the significance of this relationship, several had made extensive observations of state committee-sovnarkhoz interaction. One (a civil servant) believed that formal committees set up to coordinate relations between the agencies were effective. Nearly all informants agreed, on the other hand, that harmony had not been attained by this device. Instead, the state com-

¹⁰ As indicated below, the informants were fully convinced of the the operation of *informal* mechanisms such as *tolkachi* (expediters) which circumvented the *formal* structure of the agencies they dealt with, but they denied that these mechanisms were sanctioned by the rules or ideology of the system.

mittees had to resort to pressures exerted through top-level bodies such as the Council of Ministers.

Apart from the overloading of vertical communications and the friction between line and staff officials which the sovnarkhoz-state committee relationship entailed, it resulted in delays which the Soviet administrators openly regarded as intolerable. One businessman with intimate contacts in the USSR was told that the proposed remedy for these deficiencies was to transform the state committees into khozraschet (profit-and-loss) agencies. They would then perform eighty percent of their research operations on contract with production agencies, or would independently develop processes for licensing to factories. Since Khrushchev's ouster, this solution has apparently been abandoned; instead, a partial return to the ministerial system of centralized control of development and production appears likely. It is entirely clear, however, that the independent chains of command of development and production agencies were too inefficient to be maintained in a modern industrial economy. In the view of the Western European administrator, such a failure in an administrative experiment is not unique to the Soviet system, but the emphasis on centralized control aggravated the situation in the USSR. While the nature of the Soviet-type economy poses special difficulties, the informants were inclined to believe that no insuperable ideological barriers stood in the way of a solution.

D. Friction between line administrators and staff officials is somewhat greater in the Soviet economic administration than in Western Eu-

rope.

The sources of the friction have already been noted in the previous section. The line (industrial direction) administrators feel a compulsion to respond, at least in part, to "suggestions" of the staff agencies because the latter have independent channels of communication to the top authorities." This forced responsiveness is not, however, based on informal cooperative mechanisms, but emphasizes divergent organizational interests, leaving a residue of antagonism.12 The immediate aim of the industrial director is short-run production, which is the criterion by which his effectiveness is judged. The experimental innovations of the state committee specialists are almost certain to disrupt production in the short run, however fruitful they may later turn out to be. Informants who had observed personal relations between Soviet staff officials and industrial directors were almost unanimous in detecting friction. A high-ranking Western European planning official found that Soviet plant directors-nearly all engineers by training-became noticeably more cordial when they learned that he was also an engineer by background rather than (as they had assumed) an economist, as are many Soviet planners. An official of a steel firm found production men referring contemptuously to "long-haired researchers." "Practical" industrial managers looked down on research specialists as "theoreticians" and on foreign trade specialists as "grocers" who did not understand the real needs of production, according to a businessman who speaks Russian fluently. None of these observers found this kind of friction unusual in comparison to their Western European experience, though it was more intense. Nor was it surprising that the production directors were more aggressive in expressing their dissatisfactions. Here again the Soviet experience appears merely to reproduce in somewhat aggravated form the frictions common to modern administrative systems.

II. COMMUNICATIONS

A. In comparison with Western European administrative systems, vertical communication channels are overloaded in Soviet administration.

As was indicated above, overloading of vertical communication channels is partly a result of the tendency, even in industrial direction, to allocate independent reporting channels to staff agencies. This tendency, which apparently springs from the doctrinal desire to maintain centralized control, is even more noticeable in aspects of the administration which lack production goals but which are more immediately sensitive from the political standpoint.13 It is reinforced by the fear of subordinates of being harshly punished for "mistakes"—i.e., exercises of their own judgment that turn out badly—and their consequent tendency to pass the buck by asking for permission or instructions before making any move. The whole question of communication channels in the Soviet administration is a crucial one, but it is extremely difficult to observe their actual functioning. Consequently, the discussion of this subject must be limited to a few principal points.

B. Formal communication is relatively inefficient in the Soviet administration.

¹³ See especially Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

¹¹ Cf. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York, 1961), p. 168.

¹² Cf. John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (New York, 1959), p. 96 ff.

Nearly all the Western European informants believed that formal communications in the Soviet agencies they had observed were grossly inadequate. One industrial manager with unusually broad experience in the USSR asserted that the Soviet administrators were under pressure to make ten times as many reports as their counterparts in his very large industrial firm. Furthermore, he added, the European firm had a special section constantly concerned with reducing routine reports, while such an agency was unknown in the USSR. As a result the reports continued to pile up, but were neither informative nor readily available. A French exporter even warned his compatriots that they must not expect their publicity materials to be distributed to the Soviet agencies which could effectively utilize them.¹⁴ Most information concerning the formal communications system was elicited in response to questions concerning the extent to which telephone calls were used by Soviet administrators in lieu of writing. My original hypothesis was that Soviet administrators resort to telephoning (or other oral communication) because administrators in a totalitarian system fear to commit themselves in writing. Most informants rejected this explanation. Instead, they believed that the major reason for extensive telephoning (not all agreed that it was more extensive than in Western Europe) is the extremely poor clerical facilities available to the Soviet administrator. Office space is limited and poorly arranged, with file cases crowding the corridors even in such a high-level agency as the skyscraper headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("the Smolenskaya"). Relatively simple items of equipment, such as typewriters and carbon paper, are in short supply and poor in quality. Most important, the ratio of secretaries, typists and file clerks to administrators is very low. According to a calculation recently made by the British economist Alec Nove, there were only 130,000 stenographers and typists in the USSR (about 1960), as compared to 559,000 in Great Britain in 1951.15 He writes

... there are remarkably few clerks in the Soviet Civil Service, and this, one suspects, is generally true of their way of doing business. Visitors to large Soviet enterprises have often noticed the

¹⁴ M. Bonnier, Directeur Général Adjoint, Société Bénoto, "L'Expérience d'Exportation d'une Entreprise de Construction de Matériel d'Equipement," *Hommes et Techniques*, Vol. 15 (July-August 1959), pp. 687-89.

¹⁵ Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics: Or Was Stalin Really Necessary? (New York, 1964), p. 276. smallness of the offices. Much more seems to be decided by more senior staff, and by word of mouth, by personal dealings or at meetings.... Far fewer cases are handled by correspondence in Government offices. The administrative pyramid is much narrower. This explains why so much time is wasted by officials and others in the waiting rooms of various institutions, waiting to see some senior official (this is a traditional feature of Russian administration). 16

Similarly, a businessman remarked to me that he frequently met Soviet administrators in the corridors of their office buildings; this convinced him that Soviet administrative organization was poor, for, he said, in a well-run organization administrators are in their offices dealing with the flow of properly channelled written communications rather than running back and forth for personal consultations.

Seeking the reasons for the inefficiency of Soviet clerical assistance, one encounters a peculiar combination of tradition and ideology. As Nove suggests, reliance on oral communication and neglect of correspondence is traditional in Russia; in a sense the present situation represents simply the failure of a modernizing regime to overcome cultural lag. But Leninist doctrine aggravated the situation. Lenin stressed the primacy of production work as contrasted to clerical and record-keeping operations, and his successors, while constantly adding to the burden of paper work, have maintained this emphasis.

C. There is strong internal pressure for improving formal communications in the Soviet administration,

The waste inherent in an inefficient system of formal communications was perhaps tolerable as long as the Soviet economic system was not fully modernized, but the present system calls for much more careful allocation of administrative as well as other resources. Recently a spate of articles in the Soviet press has urged the need for improving clerical services and "restoring" the role of the business letter, which, one writer complains, has "lost its force, the force of an obligation assumed in making a personal promise or in a telephone conversation." Another writer refers obliquely to the continuing detrimental influence of the ideology by pointing out that "when workers

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 269, 275.

¹⁷ "The Director's Time," Pravda, June 2, 1964, trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI, No. 22, pp. 25–26. Cf. similar articles, ibid., XVI, No. 13, pp. 17–18; No. 31, pp. 11–12; No. 46, pp. 14–19.

in these [clerical] categories are nevertheless cut down, their duties are usually shifted over to production personnel, who are as a rule more highly paid." In at least two instances Soviet managers have explicitly sought systematic advice on office procedures from Western European business management sources.

An even more sweeping change may be introduced into the flow of communications by the introduction of modern electronic data processing and computing machinery. In recent years the regime has admitted the relevance of cybernetic theory, which had been banned during Stalin's lifetime. Two informants who are experts in that field and in computer techniques found virtually no evidence of the use of data processing machines or computers for management control—as contrasted to manufacturing control-during visits about 1960, but Soviet interest in management applications was intense. One of these informants remarked that the administrators who were concerned with installing the new equipment were all young, recent graduates of technical higher schools who generally formed a group apart from the older bureaucrats. It is possible, therefore, that the introduction of new methods of communicating information will proceed hand in hand with a turnover in generations in the Soviet administration. Such a "computer revolution" may enormously increase the effectiveness of formal communication channels. This in turn may permit a considerable increase in centralized control. It is quite possible therefore that modernization of communication may have the paradoxical effects of forcing the abandonment of the Leninist ideological exaltation of production at the expense of clerical work at the same time that it actually enhances totalitarian control by making a fully centralized network of administrative communications channels really feasible.

III. INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. While informal relationships are highly important in Soviet administration, they are not much more so than in Western European administration.

Theoretical considerations would lead one to expect that a bureaucracy like the Soviet, where the formal communication system is weak, would be strongly influenced by informal relations. Most treatments of Soviet ad-

¹⁸ "For Flexible Economic Management of Enterprises," *Pravda*, August 17, 1964, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XVI, No. 33, pp. 13-15.

ministration have fully recognized this aspect. As David Granick writes, "with this absence of formal clarity, it is natural that emphasis has always been placed on the need for the closest ties and a comradely atmosphere between the management and the plant's Party organization." Other students of Soviet administration have stressed the importance of "protective family circles" and pull. The general tendency of these analyses has been to view informal relations as dysfunctional from the standpoint of the Soviet system, as the following passage by Barrington Moore indicates:

It does not appear that this pattern [of exerting pressure on managers through indeterminate command structures] is in general the product of deliberate creation, although some sophisticated individuals at various levels of the bureaucratic hierarchies are undoubtedly aware of some of the principles by which it operates. As might be anticipated on the basis of the preceding information, there is a tendency within the bureaucracy for informal groupings to spring up and serve as defense against the competitive pressures induced by the system.²¹

Certainly the prevalence of informal relationships, the decision of cases on the basis of personal associations rather than strictly impersonal rules, violates a cardinal principle of the traditional bureaucratic model. But, as Peter Blau notes, "Weber's decision to treat only the purely formal organization of bureaucracy implies that all deviations from these formal requirements are idiosyncratic . . . [and] that any deviation from the formal structure is detrimental to administrative efficiency." Blau goes on to point out that this approach is misleading, for "informal relations and unofficial practices often contribute to efficient operation."

Most of my informants definitely shared the view that informal relations in the Soviet bureaucracy were not very different in degree from those prevailing in Western European administrations, and therefore made little difference in the relative efficiency of the organizations. For example, one businessman reported that a very high Soviet official had told how, when he directed one of the major steel plants

¹⁹ Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR (New York, 1954), p. 229.

²⁰ Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, p. 92; Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 204.

²¹ Moore, op. cit., p. 290.

²² Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York, 1956), pp. 35-36.

in the Urals, he had maintained special agents (tclkachi—though he did not use the term) to carry on informal negotiations with the railways when he encountered difficulties in obtaning boxcars. But only one Western Europe administrator believed that Soviet Communism had advanced far enough toward its ostensible goal of creating the "new man" to have overcome the "general" propensity of administrators to resort to informal mechanisms.

B. Informal relationships in Soviet administration are based, far more frequently than in Western Europe, on career contacts.

Most informants were very strongly impressed by the fact that the Soviet administrators whom they had observed had formed almost all of their friendships in the course of careers. ... Many interviewees, strongly impressed by the extent of informal relationships in the Soviet system, argued that physical circumstances prevented intimate social contacts away from the place of work. The most important factor, many informants believed, is the extreme pressures upon the successful Soviet administrator that virtually preclude his cultivating interests outside his work. This observation is in accord with previous discussions based on Soviet publications.23 Few meeting places of a non-institutional nature like cafés—are available for informal meetings outside the places of work. The very small apartments assigned even to major officials make private social gatherings highly inconvenient. Lack of space prevents the official from carrying on most hobbies or avocations at home, while "clubs" at the place of work provice special facilities for many such activities (sports, photography, etc.). As a result, according to one informant, even adult members of the same family are apt to be separated during a considerable portion of their off-duty

These observations cast considerable doubt on the hypothesis that residential proximity could form the basis for informal relationships. Nevertheless, in view of the important trend in the United States and some parts of Western Europe toward dormitory suburbs inhabited by families of homogeneous income levels—resulting in considerable informal contact among administrators holding equivalent status in diverse organizations—one should not neglect the possibility of a similar Soviet development. In earlier years, such a development was precluded in many Soviet areas by the fact that major industrial enterprises provided apart-

²³ I advanced this hypothesis in *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 11.

ments for their administrative personnel; in view of the extreme housing shortage the administrators from a single organization were obliged to live together as well as to work together. This situation appears to prevail to a considerable extent in provincial Soviet cities even today. In Tula, according to one informant, coal mine trust directors lived in the same quarter of that relatively small city and frequented a neighborhood restaurant. Even in Volgograd (a city of nearly a million inhabitants) a Russian-speaking Western European administrator found that his Soviet counterparts from a given enterprise lived in a single apartment building. On the other hand, a businessman who had visited numerous factory sites in the provinces in connection with the installation of equipment his firm was supplying found that the managerial staffs lived in scattered locations. The information available on Moscow tends to bear out the official position that new apartments are assigned without regard to the place of work of the applicant, except insofar as he requests an apartment in a quarter of the city near his job. Even then, due to the immense size of the city and the scope of construction, no concentration of employees of a single agency results.

A few informants thought that the Soviet regime deliberately restricts private housing facilities to loosen family and friendship ties, but a majority inclined to the belief that construction priorities rather than totalitarian objections to uncontrolled associations are a sufficient explanation. Similarly, the extreme degree to which the successful administrator must be absorbed in his job seems to be a concomitant of the intense emphasis upon work rather than the direct result of a desire to prevent outside activities.24 On the other hand, communication between officials which is not related at least ostensibly to the performance of their duties is suspect, and, if it has political connotations, can easily give-rise to the charge of "fractionalism," which Leninist doctrine has always regarded as a most heinous offense. On the whole, therefore, it appears that the restriction of informal relationships to career associations is primarily the result of the pressures of modernization, though these are greatly enhanced in the Soviet case by the "work ethic" of Leninism.

C. Persisting associations between former classmates form the basis of informal relation-

²⁴ However, as I argued, *ibid.*, the regime does frown upon the development of hobbies and avocations which do not indirectly improve an official's work ability.

ships in Soviet administration to a degree comparable to that existing in Western Europe.

The observation that informal relationships in the Soviet administration center about career associations, is, of course, only the starting point in the search for sociological factors which tend to promote such relationships. While the outsider is especially limited in his opportunity to observe these factors, the subject is so important that it was a central concern in my interviewing. One possible factor is common educational experience. The importance of the "old school tie" (in rather diverse forms in different countries) in Western European elite associations hardly needs emphasis. Some studies of the Soviet bureaucracy have found evidence of the development of similar ties. In some cases Party apparatus officials retain associations originally based on distinctive training in different branches of Party schools.25 Joseph Berliner noted (after interviewing administrators who had left the USSR during World War II) that "one hears remarks oddly reminiscent of 'the old school tie'."26 Even so, it was surprising to hear one of the first interviewees spontaneously remark that he had encountered several Soviet administrators who explained that their affairs were expedited when they were dealing with their former classmates in higher technical schools. Few subsequent informants could provide definite corroboration for this phenomenon, and some regarded it as improbable. But indirect confirmation came from the observation (noted earlier) that young administrators trained in computer technology maintained a group feeling and from two separate reports that coal mine directors in the Tula and Donets fields are in each case almost without exception graduates of local schools of mines. In fact, there seems to be—contrary to Karl Deutsch's hypothesis that high geographical mobility is an index to modernizing tendencies27—a strong tendency for the lower and middle levels of Soviet administrators to originate and to be trained in the regions where they work.28

25 Ibid., p. 40.

²⁶ Berliner, op. cit., p. 261.

²⁷ Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this Review, Vol. 55 (September 1961), pp. 495 ff.

²⁸ An analysis of the backgrounds of industrial Party secretaries (to appear in *Soviet Studies*, Jan. 1966) suggests that these officials—dealing with the most modernized sector of the Soviet economy—have exhibited only half as much geographical mobility during their careers (during and since higher education) as Party secretaries of

The persistence of school ties is undoubtedly contrary to Soviet ideology, but it is probably to some extent an indirect result of the highly competitive system marked by extraordinary suspicion which developed during Stalin's lifetime. It is reasonable to suppose that ties formed at an impressionable age would influence administrators to trust each other more than colleagues whom they had come to know only in the heat of career rivalry-which was often literally a struggle for existence. At the same time, it seems likely that the stress on technical education in any modern social system will tend to form permanent associations among the products of its higher schools. The stress on technical education in the USSRhigher education there is almost always rigidly directed toward forming specialists—probably enhances this tendency. School comrades have shared narrow curricula (in the case of administrators, usually in some branch of engineering), which constitute direct preparation for the first stages of their careers. While their career activities may diverge somewhat in subsequent years, it is likely that the common professional outlook fostered by their training is as important in perpetuating associations as is mutual trust-and indeed may be a source of trust.

D. As compared to Western Europe, certain kinds of ethnic solidarity are more important in forming the basis for informal relationships among Soviet administrators.

While some Western European observers detected no indications of ethnic differences among Soviet administrators, many-including nearly all those who traveled extensively or who knew Russian-found evidences not only of differing backgrounds but of ethnic solidarity. Observations on the peculiar role of Armenians were most definite. It is, of course, relatively easy to identify Armenians (their surnames nearly always end in "-yan"), but many informants who were sufficiently knowledgeable to make other ethnic identifications insisted that the Armenians formed much the most distinctive group of non-Russian administrators. Armenians occupy many important posts in trade organizations. One businessman reported that he had found many Armenian fiscal officers, and had the impression that Armenians preferred handling money to production assignments. Another businessman, disagreeing on the latter point, noted that the deputy director of Sovsudoimport, with major responsi-

the same status and age group supervising the less modernized (agricultural and political) sectors. bilities for industrial procurement, was an Armenian. A businessman with extensive contact in Soviet chemical manufacturing had encountered numerous Armenian factory directors in this field.

Mildly anti-Armenian jokes are common such as the frequent use in official circles of the derisory term "Armenian broadcast" to mean rumors. A current joke, "Sir Humphrey Trevelvan is one of the two most influential Armenians in Moscow" is a play on the termination of the British Ambassador's name. The other "Influential" is, of course, Mikoyan, but most informants doubted that Mikovan had deliberately insinuated his fellow countrymen into high administrative posts during the course of his long and varied career. Of course, some tendencies toward ethnic differentiation of administrators are almost inevitable in the complex multi-national Soviet society, as compared to the relatively homogeneous Western European sccieties. But the Armenians, at least, do seem to meet special needs of the administrative system. Their "southern" warmth and approach-ability makes them more flexible in human contacts -a notably deficient side of Soviet administration—and these qualities are intimately related to Armenian skill in trade negotiations. Armenians also possess to an unusual degree the propensities for education, geographic mobility, and adaptation to urban environments. needed in a newly modernized society. Traditionally, Jews provided these qualities in a relatively traditional Eastern European economic system, but anti-Semitic prejudices limit (without by any means wholly eliminating) their role in contemporary Soviet administration.29 Quite possibly many rapidly

29 Informants found ample evidence of discrimination against Jews in administration. While one German businessman was told by a Soviet official that the presence of Jews in the Ministry of Foreign Trade proved that there was no anti-Semitism in the USSR, another was told jokingly, "all of our Jews have been sent to their own province in Siberia." Other informants encountered more sharply anti-Semitic jokes, especielly when the Soviet administrators had been drinking. An informant of Russian parentage overheard a young Russian woman remarking that she refused to dance with his superior (in a Western European administrative delegation) because he was obviously Jewish. It seems evident that Jews in Soviet administrative positions are subject to uncomfortable pressures, but it is noz so clear that they develop a defensive solidarity. Some informants (but by no means all who commented on the ethnic situation) believed that modernizing societies will provide special roles for minority ethnic groups which have traditionally developed skills in human relations, but have not completely succumbed to the overpowering production ethic which tends to make the majority ethnic elite inflexible in human relations. Certainly the peculiar role of the Armenians is entirely contrary to Leninist prescriptions, and is wholly unrecognized by official Soviet sources. Here the pragmatic needs of modernization seem to have won a small but definite victory over Communist doctrine.

IV. MOTIVATIONS

A. As compared to Western European production administrators, Soviet production administrators exhibit intense career achievement orientation.

At several points in the preceding discussion I have assumed that the Soviet system, by some means or other, has imbued most of its administrators with a very strong production ethic. The extent and nature of such a motivating ethic, of course, make an extraordinarily difficult subject of study in any culture; evidence concerning the Soviet elite is particularly hard to obtain. Crude though the approach necessarily was, it seemed worthwhile to secure Western European administrators' observations on this topic, for they had had unusual opportunities to observe their Soviet counterparts in informal situations. A large majority of the informants were convinced that Soviet administrators were more intensely involved with their work and exhibited a stronger drive for promotion than Western Europeans. This consensus coincides with the extreme achievement orientation which Fainsod found in examining the Smolensk archives.30 It also agrees with Berliner's contention that even in Stalin's day few managers were obsessed by fears of getting into trouble or wanted to "live peacefully," for men with such propensities were eliminated at an early stage from the fierce competition for advancement.31 The most extensive examination of this question has been conducted by Inkeles, Bauer, and Kluckhohn, who note the "persistence of goal striving" of the elite and its acceptance of the Party's stress on unlimited achievement.32 Increasingly, suc-

Ukrainians in the administration also tended to stick together.

³⁰ Smolensk under Soviet Rule, p. 92.

³¹ Berliner, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

³² Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 58.

cess in the USSR has been defined, as in the United States, as advancement along the occupational ladder, and, especially at higher levels, satisfaction is correlated with intrinsic qualities of one's job.³³

One further line of inquiry tended to confirm the impression of the persistence of an unusually strong career achievement orientation among Soviet administrators. A possibly crucial test of a man's devotion to his calling, as contrasted to more or less fatalistic acceptance of his circumstances, is his occupational aspirations for his children. Inkeles and Bauer have suggested that the post-1941 generation of nonmanual workers in the USSR shows a slight tendency toward greater emphasis on self-expression as contrasted to achievement goals for its children.34 Some current reports by travelers to the USSR have also suggested that better educated parents may dislike the thought of their children marrying bureaucrats or entering bureaucratic careers. Instead, parents prefer strictly "intellectual" careers for their children. Such a development would be analogous to the nineteenth-century capitalist's effort to buy his children's way into the aristocracy or the liberal professions or the eighteenth-century French merchant's effort to secure a magistrate's post for his son. Most of my informants had never discussed children's prospects with their Soviet counterparts. Those who had, found that Soviet fathers who were administrators placed enormous emphasis upon their children—especially their sons-obtaining higher educations, and were willing to pull strings (in complete violation of the ideologically proper attitude) to get them assigned to superior secondary schools (outside their neighborhoods), or to enable them to avoid the work assignment interruptions required during 1958-64. Since students in the natural sciences frequently were not required to take work assignments, while engineering students were, administrators who were engineers by training sometimes advised their sons to become research scientists—despite the line administrator's aversion to "long-hairs." Most administrators, however, seemed sincerely glad to have their sons get the type of higher education that the regime indicated was desired. For example, a trade official indicated that he was happy that his son was studying chemistry, because Khrushchev had said that there lay the career of the future. With one exception, fathers were glad that their sons were studying engineering

and similar technical subjects that are, in the USSR, the most common preparation for administrative careers. This does not necessarily mean that administrators definitely wish their sons to become administrators, but the fathers must have envisaged this possibility with equanimity.

B. Performance criteria tend to replace eschatological criteria as the production administrator's motivations.

If the evidence is strong that striving for achievement in one's career is prevalent in the USSR, what are the motivations? Obviously this is a case where multiple causation is highly likely. Several Western European administrators contended that a certain proportion of men in any society must find outlets for their ambitions in striving for advancement. The Soviet regime has stressed the principle "to each according to his work" for over four decades; administrators, especially in industry, are highly rewarded in comparison with members of other occupations. Hence it is scarcely surprising that most informants indicated material rewards as a major motivating factor, at least as strong as in Western Europe. High status, extraordinarily closely related in the USSR to superior occupational attainments, was also cited. A few informants thought that sincere belief in the vision of a Communist society was a major motivating factor among production administrators. A businessman had suggested to a very high Soviet official (whose primary career was in industrial direction, who had traveled abroad extensively, and who spoke a Western European language fluently) that professional technological interests might form a stronger bond than Communist eschatology. The Soviet administrator rejected this suggestion vehemently.35 But most informants-including several whose Soviet experiences go back to the 1930s—felt that ideology in the sense of conscious concern with Leninist doctrine, particularly in its eschatological aspects, had atrophied.

While some informants saw traditional Russian patriotism as the major motive replacing Communist ideology, more defined contemporary Soviet patriotism as a kind of amalgam of traditional Russian sentiment and belief in the Soviet system. One businessman volunteered the suggestion that the main motivating factor is that people have seen their own careers progress in accordance with the growth of Soviet

³³ Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1959) pp. 96 ff. 120.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 226-27.

²⁵ Cf. the very similar quotation from the Stalin-period press in John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1961), p. 182.

strength. Similarly, a school administrator remarked that most Soviet administrators started life as peasants, and in their present relatively exalted posts naturally believe that the Soviet system has accomplished great things.³⁶

In believing that the Soviet system ought to be furthered because its success has been correlated with his own personal success rather : than because Communism promises a glorious future for mankind, the administrator is replacing an eschatological by a pragmatic performance criterion. Probably this is a concomitant of economic modernization, since the highly upwardly mobile individuals tend to identify with the successful system. There is an apparent paradox here, however, for we have already noted that economic modernizaticn requires intense achievement orientation; yet this orientation is, according to the preceding analysis, motivated by identification with a successfully modernized economic system. A more dynamic model, based on historical study,37 would indicate that the initial impulse toward achievement orientation did come in large measure from Communist doctrine (semetimes regarded as a surrogate for the Protestant ethic), but that in the recent system (as, perhaps, in the contemporary United States) achievement motivation is, for the time being, derived from secondary phenomena. In other words a modernized society, whether Soviet or Western, tends to maintain its achievement momentum—though perhaps not indefinitely-whereas the crucial question for a moderrizing society in its early stage is how the achievement ethic is to be inculcated.

C. As compared to Western European welfare administrators, Soviet welfare administrators are lower in career motivation.

While the number of informants was far too small to provide conclusive evidence, this is one of the most striking suggestions advanced by the Western European administrators who were in close touch with their Soviet counterparts. Visiting Western European school officials who were impressed by the Soviet school system in general, nevertheless found that Soviet educational administrators in particular seemed to be low both in ability and in motivation. Many apparently owe their posts to political reliability rather than educational criteria. The better teachers, on the other hand, tend to avoid promotions to administrative

posts in order to remain in truly educational work. It is particularly noteworthy that these remarks were all made by Western Europeans who were themselves committed to careers in educational administration; similar views were expressed by social security and public health officials concerning their Soviet counterparts.

To a considerable extent, this situation is a result of the low priority placed upon welfare administration as compared to production by Communist ideology, for this priority inevitably results in less capable people being drawn into welfare administration, and in their having slighter prospects of career rewards. On the other hand, the "new man" in Communist society, (if he were really achieved) should not be influenced by such considerations. In fact, as indicated above, the more capable candidates tend to reject welfare administrative posts because they prefer technical activities to involvement in a politicized administration. These considerations seem at least in part a result of economic modernization, which has at the same time encouraged greater concern with personal values and choice of occupation and weakened ideological motivation. In a sense then, welfare administration in a modernizing totalitarian context would seem subject to a vicious circle of deterioration, in which the administrators (but not the practitioners) tend to become constantly lower in quality. Obviously the evidence is too slight to sustain a longterm projection, however.

D. Eschatological criteria are more important for Soviet welfare administrators than for Western European welfare administrators or Soviet production administrators.

This finding is almost a corrollary of the previous proposition; it is also borne out by more direct observations. Welfare administrators were prepared, usually, to argue doctrinal points more than were production officials. For example, a Western European social security administrator noted that despite the very evident problem of alcoholism, Soviet health administrators contended that the need for psychiatric treatment had drastically declined because Communism has eliminated alcoholism and prostitution. As suggested in section IV. B. above, however, this greater conviction of the validity of Communism's millenial promises is not incompatible with a belief (among school administrators) in the concurrent success of the system and the individual. To the extent to which the Soviet political and social system is less modernized than the economic system, one would expect welfare administrators and other more politically involved officials to be the more eschatologically motivated group.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 81.

³ See Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modern zation: The Russian and Soviet Case," in LaPalombara, op. cit.

E. An engineering approach or technocratic approach toward human problems is more characteristic of Soviet than of Western European administrators.

A subject holding a peculiar fascination for many Western European informants was the possibility of a tendency toward technocracy in the USSR. While some disagreed on the meaning of this term, a fairly broad consensus prevailed that it implied a social system in which numerous highly skilled technical experts disposed of great material resources without notable political interference. To some informants, the strength of the ideological motivations described above precluded the Soviet administrator's rejecting political direction. To others, it was precisely the ability to dispose of vast resources which constituted the appeal of the Soviet system for administrators of engineering background. Such an appeal is understandable. Social theory notes that some groups, such as corporation management in Western societies, tend to adopt a single aspect of another group's ideology-in this case the engineer's approach to broader problems.38 It would hardly be surprising if Soviet administrators, so many of whom were trained as engineers, unconsciously accepted elements of the "engineering" approach to human problems.

To some informants, the Soviet administrator's engineering approach to human problems appeared to be a source of callousness. A director of a Western European civil service training school was dismayed by the lack of human feeling in Soviet administrators (trained as engineers), their readiness to pass judgment upon others, and their unwillingness to admit sociological and psychological causes for delinguencies. There is no necessary contradiction between these harsh attitudes in interpersonal relations and the tendency, which a Western European planning official found very prominent, for high Soviet planners to be aware of and concerned with broad problems arising from developments like automation. There is a general trend, apparently, for really first-class administrators to become less parochial in outlook and more concerned with the broad problems of their society as they rise higher in the bureaucratic scale.39 A modernized economic system both encourages and requires such administrators. But the values they bring to these broader concerns do not usually transcend those stressed by the ideology in which the administrators have been indoctrinated.

V. RECAPITULATION

Western European and Soviet administrative behavior are essentially similar in the following characteristics:

- B. The extent of departures from hierarchical command principles in industrial production and foreign trade.
- III. A. The importance of informal relationships.
- II. C. Persisting associations between former classmates.
- IV. B. Replacement of eschatological by performance criteria as motivations.

In addition, the following, though accentuated in the Soviet administration, do not present very marked differences from Western European administrative behavior:

- I. C. The authority acquired by staff or functional agencies through their power of reporting directly to the top of the command structure.
- D. Friction between line and staff administrators.

Following the assumption that Western Europe represents the norm of administration in a politically and economically developed society, and that a modernized economy now prevails in the USSR, one can tentatively conclude that the above characteristics are requirements of an economically, but not necessarily a politically modernized society.

It is more difficult to separate the factors of Communist doctrine and the requirements of economic modernization in explaining the differences between Western European and Soviet administrative behavior, since no direct detailed comparison of the Soviet administration and that of a non-totalitarian modernizing system has been made. Both factors probably influence most of the differences, but one can attempt an analytic differentiation. The influence of doctrine seems to be the prime determining factor for:

- A. Departures from hierarchical principles in the formal structure of Soviet welfare administration.
- C. The authority acquired by staff agencies through their power of reporting directly to the top of the command structure.
- I. D. Friction between line and staff administrators.
- II. A. Overloading of vertical communication channels.

³⁸ Vernon K. Dibble, "Occupations and Ideologies," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (1962), pp. 229-241.

³⁹ Ibid.

- II. B. Inefficiency of formal communication.⁴⁰
- III. B. Basing of informal relationships on career contacts.
- IV. C. Lower motivation of welfare administrators.
- IV. D. Higher ideological motivation of welfare administrators.

All of the above characteristics are also heavily influenced, directly or indirectly, by the factor of recent and rapid economic modernization, except (to a large extent) I. C. and I. D. which are precisely the characteristics which represent the least difference (in this group) between Western European and Soviet administrative behavior. The following characteristics, on the other hand, appear to be primarily determined by the extent to which modernization has been rapid and recent, though they are all heavily influenced, directly or indirectly, by Communist doctrine:

- II. C. Internal pressures for improving formal communications.
- -0 Russian tradition is a third factor influencing at least this characteristic.

- III. D. Ethnic solidarity as a basis for informal relationships.
- IV. A. Intense career achievement orientation among production administrators.
- IV. E. An engineering or technocratic approach toward human problems.

If these latter characteristics are really due to rapid and recent modernization, they should, of course, decline in importance as the Soviet economy becomes fully modernizedthough the fruition of II. C. depends on overcoming political barriers. Consequently, apart from the difficulty of obtaining confirmatory data, they should be relatively easy to test. Whether or not these characteristics actually apply to all administrations in societies with rapidly modernizing economies can, of course, be tested only by extensive comparative studies. The second group of propositions, on the other hand, despite a certain measure of incompatibility with economic modernization, will prevail unless political modernization takes place—i.e., unless Communist doctrine ceases to be a significant force. That question, of course, requires consideration in a far broader context than the study of comparative administration.

IDEOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF RIGHT WING POLITICAL ALIENATION IN MEXICO*

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Evaluations of single-party democracy in Mexico have yielded a substantial literature from the researches of contemporary scholars.¹ Their primary subjects of treatment have been the institutionalized agents of moderation and compromise that have made Mexico one of Latin America's more stable political systems. In prosecuting these studies, however, only scant attention has been given to political groups outside the officially sanctioned "revolutionary family" of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. The PRI has maintained a virtual monopoly of elective and appointive offices since 1929 and traditionally has been thought of as affiliating to itself the only politically relevant groups in Mexico.

Modern Mexican political life has always had its "out groups" and splinter parties. Mostly, they have come and gone, leaving little or no impact upon the political system which they have attempted to influence. Howard Cline has contended that opposition groups in Mexico find it impossible to woo the electorate away from the PRI and thus feel forced to adopt demagoguery and other extreme postures which serve only to reduce their popular

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¹ Cf. L. Vincent Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System: A Re-Evaluation," this Review, Vol. 51 (Dec., 1957) pp. 995-1008; Martin C. Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico," ibid, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp 308-312; Philip B Taylor, Jr, "The Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmation of Authoritarianism," Western Political Quarterly, Vol 13 (Sep., 1960), pp. 722-744; Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1959); Howard Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960 (Oxford University Press, London, 1962); William P. Glade and Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Mexico (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1963); David T. Garza, "Factionalism in the Mexican Left: The Frustration of the MLN," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17 (September, 1964), pp. 447-60.

appeal.² Cline writes further, "in nearly every case, the dissidents return quietly to the PRI ranks, without prejudice or reprisals." The historical accuracy of these contentions goes unquestioned here. Rather, I seek to explore, using modern analytic techniques, the possibility that Mexico is becoming a less rigid single-party authoritarian system, that it may be moving instead toward a cooperative two-or even three-party system surrounded by a number of alienated but relevant satellite groups.

I undertake this with due deference to the works just cited, whose authors have told much of the Mexican story and told it well. In addition, I respond directly to Merle Kling's recent dictum that it is time to "assume the risks of creating and testing hypotheses, formulating generalizations and theories" about the nature of change in contemporary Mexican politics.4 This cannot be done if potentially relevant "out groups" continue to be neglected. Kling refers to "risks." One is surely the chance that the Mexican "out groups" selected for study are not indeed politically relevant. My criteria for relevance, stated below, are intended to obviate that difficulty. Perhaps a more severe risk is conservative resistance to the very suggestion that groups outside the "revolutionary family" may be gaining political relevance within the Mexican system. But to offer such a suggestion is my prime purpose.

Ι

When the Mexican Revolution was scarcely one year old, the following challenge was hurled against its leader:

Mexicans: Consider that the cunning and bad faith of a man are shedding blood in an outrageous manner because of his incapacity to govern ... we turn arms against him for having betrayed the Revolution ... (Emiliano Zapata et. al., Plan de Ayala, 1911, as quoted in Heriberto Garcia Rivas, Breve Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, México, Editorial Diana, 1964, p. 112)

² Cline, op. cit., p. 168.

³ Ibid.

^{&#}x27;Merle Kling, "Area Studies and Comparative Politics," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 8 (September, 1964), p. 10.

Those words were voiced in outrage over a promised land reform that had not materialized. After a half-century of equally inspiring promises, and of progress along many lines, one still hears words faintly reminiscent of those above.

Citizens: by means of the vote you can once and for all put an end to the lies, exploitation and fraud of those who would profiteer from the Revolution. With no other arms than your honorable and clean vote, citizens, National Action is confident of victory. (From a speech by José González Torres, presidential candidate of Partido de Acción Nacional, as printed in La Nación, 17 mayo, 1964, p. 32)

Both expressions are examples of political alienation, but there is an important difference in degree. The one is a call to armed rebellion; the other acknowledges the silent force of popular challenge in an honestly counted vote. Measurement of such contemporary political alienation in Mexico is the immediate task of this paper. Political alienation is one element in a larger theoretic formulation that I have described elsewhere as an analytic approach to the study of stability and instability in the Latin American political culture.5 In Mexico, political alienation will be understood to mean a specific and identifiable syndrome of ideology and behavior which is manifest in support for, sympathy toward, or participation in political extremism. This, in turn, is defined (for Mexico) as advocacy of violence, advocacy of a conspiratorial interpretation of Mexican political life (including the doctrine that the political system is manipulated by hostile foreign powers or by a treasonable internal cabal), advocacy of turning the government of Mexico or its major subdivisions over to private enterprise or to the Roman Catholic Church, or advocacy of the total abandonment of constitutional government. This definition was designed with right wing alienation in mind but a modified version of it could prove suitable for left wing alienation as well.

Before coming to the present scene, let us look back briefly over the development of right wing ideology in Mexico. One sees it nurtured in the Querétaro Club of 1810 that produced Hidalgo and Allende and in the subsequent rebellions against the gachupines. Reactionary ideology thrived during the regimes of Iturbide and Santa Anna, and burst forth in the clerical

opposition to Lerco, Juarez, Ocampo and to the Liberal Constitution of 1857. Ultra-conservative thought was rejuvenated for thirty-five years by the cientificos during the Pax Porfiriana, and passed thereafter into the hands of the cristeros who fought Calles and Vasconcelos who unsuccessfully opposed Ortiz Rubio. Ultimately, it was crystallized in the organized popular reactions to Lázaro Cárdenas's reform era during the 1930s. The latter period is particularly important for this study since it included the genesis of two groups that are of chief concern here.

Especially bitter targets of reactionary attack were Cárdenas's sweeping nationalizations of industry, accelerated distribution of agricultural lands via the usufructory device of ejidos, and stricter enforcement of the anticlerical provisions of the Constitution of 1917. Those who organized against Cárdenas and his political predecessors embraced an ideological outlook that persists in Mexico today and is gaining political relevance. I shall term it "restorationism." Mexico's restorationists are those who would return to the Church its political and financial privileges, to the great families or abolengo the land, and to the unhampered forces of the marketplace business and commerce.

They are, to some extent, those whose aspirations for socio-economic advantage are thwarted by restricted access to places of influence within the governing single-party system. In short, the revolutionary machinery has not accommodated itself adequately to the psychological and material requirements of all relevant and active political sectors in Mexico. True to the prototype of France's experience following 1789, the Mexican Revolution scored a violent dislocation of the political status quo, radically changed the social structure, but preserved seeds of potential unrest by its failure to supplant entirely the reactionary right. Today, Mexico's restorationists have two principal organized forms, Unión Nacional Sinarquista and Partido de Acción Nacional.⁶

The term sinarquismo is a corruption of two words, sin anarquia, without anarchy—or in better English, with order. Order, orden, as the name of its official journal implies, is the hallmark of Union Nacional Sinarquista. It is an

⁶ Several lesser groups that have been variously affiliated with PAN and UNS are Acción Católica Mexicana (which cannot legally call itself a party because of the constitutional prohibition against use of religious titles in political organization), Unión Nacional de Pacres de Familia, and Partido Nacionalista de México.

⁵ Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17 (September, 1964), pp. 432-446.

order of Christian democracy, first under God, then under a God-fearing state. UNS members are ardent practicing Roman Catholics, disciplined soldiers of a theocratic faith. The movement was born (according to official doctrine) amid an explosion of enthusiasm, faith, and courage.7 The basic committee that proclaimed UNS from León. Guanajuato in 1937 consisted of José Antonio Urquiza, José Trueba Olivares, Manuel Zermeño, Juan Ignacio Padilla, Rubén and Guillermo Mendoza Heredia. So intense was the local popular frenzy in response to their declarations that the Governor of Guanajuato, an appointee and puppet for President Cárdenas, drove the committee from his state, whereupon they established offices in Mexico City and began publication of a mimeographed El Boletín in an effeort to develop a national organization.8

Although José Antonio Urquiza is most often called the Founder of UNS, its first national chief to hold working office was José Trueba Olivares who still lives as a retired attorney in his native León. Soon after taking office, Trueba resigned for "economic reasons" and was followed by Manuel Zermeño.

The assassination of José Antonio Urquiza in 1938 was the first of many crises for UNS. Its stepped-up counter-offensive against an alleged Communist design to liquidate it produced a period of ambiguous rioting and bloodshed about the country, which lasted throughout the war years in the 1940s and which the sinarquistas stubbornly blame on the political left. The same disorders were blamed by the

⁷ Juan Ignacio Padilla, *El Sinarquismo* (2d ed., Ediciones UNS, México, 1953), p. 25.

Cárdenas regime on fascist elements within sinarquismo.

It is fair to say that the sinarquistas did cause a great amount of trouble for Cárdenas and for his successors. But since the labor riots around the time of the 1958 presidential succession (blamed officially on both leftists and rightists), sinarquismo has tended to function as a pacific, although not passive, civic opposition. As an ideology that is essentially restorationist, sinarquismo finds little likeness between its own image of the ideal state and the political realities of contemporary Mexico.

The second major political group in Mexico that reflects a restorationist ideology is the Partido de Acción Nacional. PAN was founded two years later than UNS, as a distinct part of the conservative reaction to Cárdenas. Sinarquistas are quick to point out that they antedate PAN and that it was formed out of splinter elements from their own group. Although many panistas deny this, enough agree with it to make the contention plausible. Most scholars of Mexican politics have agreed that PAN is the only serious opposition to the official PRI.

PAN emerged as a political party in September, 1939, at a convention held in Mexico City, and claims as its founder Manuel Gómez Morín, an attorney who is still active in the party's national organization. Unlike UNS, PAN has always considered itself a political party and, except in 1940 and 1946, has offered congressional, state, and presidential candidates throughout Mexico. In its appeals, PAN

UNS members indicate that it could be easy to mistake religious vehemence and anti-semitism for a full-scale commitment to Nazi or Fascist doctrine. I take issue with Cline only in suggesting that branding this group as a "fascist type organization" does not give the *sinarquistas* credit for the truly progressive civic spirit which I have known them to demonstrate. See footnote 10, below.

to protest unfair property taxation and public service scandals); Agrupación de Iniciativa Privada Pro-Morelos (formed in Cuernavaca during 1962 in protest over fiscal mismanagement of statefunds); Unión Civica Defensora de los Intereses del Pueblo (formed in Tepic, Nayarit to protest abuses in meter reading and collection of water charges by the municipal government during 1964).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ On July 11, 1939, in Celaya, Guanajuato, a woman sinarquista, Teresita Bustos, was murdered while performing in a UNS rally. As a symbolic gesture of unity each outgoing national president of UNS delivers to his successor the flag which she was carrying at the time of her death (Orden, 31 de mayo, 1964, p. 2). The ceremony is repeated annually in the main plaza of León, Guanajuato, where the sinarquistas hold a mass pilgrimage, normally during March. Sinarquista leaders wear armbands bearing a geographic shape of Mexico. They march in a semi-military fashion that has given sinarquismo the largely erroneous appearance of being Fascist- or Nazioriented. Use of a Hitler-type hand salute reinforces this image. In an earlier work, Howard Cline developed the theme of fascism in sinarquismo, The United States and Mexico (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p. 320. My own experiences in interviewing and knowing

carefully avoids direct attacks upon those institutions which are traditionally mexicano and are important symbols of nationhood. Thus the Constitution of 1917 (except for Article 3) is upheld as a basis for freedom and equality among Mexicans. PAN charges the PRI with "bastardization" of this great work through administrative abuses of liberty. Principal foci of the PAN attack are the anti-clerical provisions of the Constitution11 and the extension of state capitalism into the traditionally private sector. Today's panistas include the abolengo, old estabished families whose wealth and position have been reduced or threatened, certain of the nouveaux riches who aspire to greater places, many of the upwardly mobile middle class who "never quite made it," and an uncertain base of peasants and artisans whose susceptibility to clerical propaganda has placed them within PAN ranks. Philip Taylor correctly observed that FAN claims a heavy female membership.12 Having never been able to claim more than 12 percent of the officially reported vote in a presidential election, PAN carries the image of a wear and ineffectual alternative to PRI.

II

Few contemporary observers will deny that Unión Nacional Sinarquista and Partido de Acción Nacional represent bodies of alienated political sentiment. But are they politically relevant and, if so by what criteria? Politically relevant alienation must be of sufficient magnitude to pose a threat (latent, incipient, or actual to the stability of a political system. The threat can be judged by the adaptive responses it is able to force upon the operative power structure, upon the incumbent custodians of the political status quo. Merely to direct frustration and aggression against the state is not erough. The stewards of political power must actually see an organized group as a threat to system stability and condition their behavior to that belief; i.e., they must react adaptively or defensively. Thus a recent study

11 Arcicle 3 of the Constitution of 1917 prohibits priests, ministers, and ecclesiastics generally from participating in primary or secondary religious nstruction. The Revolutionary regime has interpreted this to include the teaching of religion in public schools as well. Under the López Mateos regime (1958-64) a program of gratuitous distribution of textbooks was initiated by the national government. The texto único has preoccupied much of the right-wing attack on officialdom because it deliberately does not mention religion or the name of God.

by David Garza points to the low political efficacy of fragmented leftist groups in Mexico that are associated with the Movimiento de de Liberación Nacional. It is questionable whether these formations are politically relevant in the Mexican system, since they are not so viewed by the status quo regime. In the light of recent events surrounding the 1964 presidential succession, however, there is a strong basis for arguing that Mexican rightist alienates are coming to be viewed as politically relevant.

Elsewhere, I have described in some detail the machinations of political groups during the 1964 presidential campaign.14 The evidence I have to present in support of the contention that UNS and PAN are viewed as politically relevant by the status quo regime may be shortly summarized here. Several months prior to the voting in July, Union Nacional Sinarquista entered into a coalition agreement with a nearly defunct splinter party, the Partido Nacionalista de México. The latter, PNM, enjoyed official recognition by the Secretaría de Gobernación and was to be placed on the official ballot as a registered opposition party. When word of the UNS-PNM alliance became public, the Secretaria de Gobernación cancelled the PNM registration, ostensibly on the ground that the party lacked the legally required membership of 75,000. Confidential sources in PAN, UNS. PNM, and even in PRI itself admitted that the cancellation was a reaction to the threat of a large sinarquista vote for PNM candidates for the Cámara de Diputados. UNS spokesman claimed it could muster a popular vote somewhat in excess of one million. Under Mexico's new electoral law, this could place up to twenty sinarquistas, or their sympathizers, in the Congress.15 Moreover, I was informed

18 Garza, op. cit., passim.

¹⁴ See my "Political Alienation in Mexico: A Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN," The Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal, Vol. 2 (May, 1965), pp. 155-63.

15 The reformed electoral law was a major issue in the campaign and was stressed by PRI candidate Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and incumbent President Adolfo López Mateos as the Revolutionary party's guarantee of an honest and "clean" election (Novedades, 12 de junio, 1964, front page). The new law provided a "mixed system" of proportional representation for the Cámara de Diputados. A registered party could win either electoral districts or deputies at large known as diputados de partido, or both. For deputies at large, the party would have to win at least 2.5 per cent of the total national vote for deputies, a means of

¹² Taylor, op. cit., p. 741.

that the original demand for the cancellation came from the national committee of Acción Nacional which feared loss of its own "privileged" status as the "official opposition party." This testimony came from highly placed sources in the groups involved, whose confidence I had cultivated over the past several years, and whose testimony could be viewed as reliable.

We may say, therefore, that the incumbent regime's defensive reaction to the threat of a UNS-PNM alliance is an indicator of the potential, if not actual, relevance of that combination in the Mexican system. By coopting PAN as its official opposition, PRI recognized the relevance of that group as well. Maintenance of a favored opposition party may be an instrument for periodic legitimizing of what still remains a single-party democracy. Significantly, and for the first time in post-revolutionary Mexican politics, an opposition candidate publicly admitted honest defeat without disparaging the election and was warmly thanked by the winner for this gesture of "political maturity."17 This points to an important fact that was independently corroborated in confidential interviews. The upper hierarchy of PAN is no longer as acutely alienated toward the single-party system as it was in recent years.18 The main body of

eliminating parties which contested in only a few states. Winning the 2.5 per cent vote meant an automatic receipt of five deputy seats. Then, one additional seat would be awarded for each one-half per cent of the national total, up to a limit of twenty seats. PRI, Primera Reunión Nacional de Programación (México, 1963), pp. 292-293.

18 In return for its guaranteed status as an "official opposition," PAN leaders gave its pledge to support the official election returns. As an additional bonus, PAN was guaranteed twenty diputados de partido, less those elected from districts. Two panistas were declared district winners in Chihuahua and León and the total national vote for PAN candidates was sufficient to guarantee the remaining eighteen deputies. According to informed sources in both PRI and PAN, the official returns of the election were reported honestly but the official regime was prepared to keep its commitment to PAN regardless.

¹⁷ Novedades, 11 de julio, 1964, front page. On June 15 the same periodical carried a cartoon whose caption wryly summarized the plight of PAN as follows: "hay algo peor que no ganar.. perder, sin fraude." [There is something worse than not winning...losing without fraud.]

¹⁸ The 1958 presidential campaign period was marked with severely alienated pronouncements

severely alienated sentiment that can be properly attributed to the Mexican right wing, therefore, continues to be the sinarquistas and lower echelon panistas who do not see themselves as beneficiaries of deals—"sweetheart contracts," in the terminology of labor relations—such as the recent rapprochement of PAN and PRI.

If working relationships exist between PRI and PAN there is little sympathy for them in the lower echelons of Acción Nacional. It became patently clear in interviewing panistas that many have defected out of disgust for alleged deals betweeen the rival parties, even at the local level. A number of former PAN members were found working in the context of UNS, boycotting the 1964 election, or casting ballots for independent rightist candidates. Repeatedly, I found rank and file PAN members harboring intense resentment and hatred toward developments in their political arena. These restorationists, along with many of their sinarquista counterparts, frequently volun-

by PAN's leadership. Luis H. Alvarez blamed all the ills of Mexico and of the world on the PRI. He cursed his defeat as an enormous fraud leaving strained relations between the two parties. There was certainly a great amount of fraud in the 1958 election, but not enough by itself to have taken the presidency away from Alvarez. However, the election was conducted in a tense atmosphere that involved the murder of one PAN campaign worker and several attacks on Alvarez himself. This writer interviewed Luis H. Alvarez after the election and did not find him to be the demagogue that Taylor pictured him, op. cit., p. 741. The violence of the opposition to his presidential candidacy undoubtedly accounted for much of PAN's extreme alienation in 1958. None of these misfortunes were visited upon José González Torres in 1964, which—in all likelihood due to the rapprochement of PAN and PRI-made the most recent campaign appear much less antagonistic. Significantly, the campaign's only reported violence of serious proportions was directed against the PRI. An attack by stone-throwers on Díaz Ordaz in Chihuahua city (see Indice, 7 de abril, 1964, front page) and a frustrated dynamite attempt in Nuevo Casas Grandes (see La Nación, 26 de abril, 1964, p. 11) were officially blamed by the regime on the leftist splinter group Frente Electoral del Pueblo. One of their leaders, Braulio Maldonado Sández (a former governor of Baja California Norte) was deported as a result of the incident. Similar happenings during the 1958 campaign were blamed exclusively (and in many cases unfairly) on Acción Nacional and the sinarquistas.

teered the belief that violence of 1910 proportions would again be an ultimate necessity in restoring true democracy to Mexico.

On the basis of the preceding observations, it will be the major contention of this paper that Partido de Acción Nacional has been partially coorted into the Mexican single-party system and that Unión Nacional Sinarquista now serves as the principal catalyst for articulation of alenated restorationist sentiment in Mexico. It is contended further that ideological differences between UNS and PAN are amenable to emp rical verification and measurement.

Quantitative techniques for multivariate analysis were utilized in order to examine these contentions and to isolate correlates of political alienation among Mexican rightists. On the basis of the author's previous fieldwork, the state of Guanajuato was selected as a research site. Guanajuato offered the advantage of being relatively compact, with all major urban centers accessible by bus. It is also the symbolic home of sinarquismo and a traditional stronghold of the Partido de Acción Nacional. The author and a graduate assistant arranged a series of interviews with UNS and PAN leaders in the four principal cities of the state, León, Irapuato, Guanajuato, and Celaya. Their cooperation was secured for purposes of distributing a measuring instrument to key members of each group.

UKS and PAN have an overlapping membership. Because neither group would divulge its total membership list it was impossible to draw two independent samples. Definition of the proper universe for which population parameters would be generalized was handled, therefore, on the basis of an exhaustive sample of what might here be called the "esoteric" members of each group. In practical terms, this meant the basic municipal committees for both UNS and PAN in each of the cities specified above. Between twenty-five and thirty intensive nterviews were held with group leaders who in turn promised to distribute the questionnaires to all of their municipal committee members. A return of ninety-six percent was secured by mail and later by personal follow-up. Although the sample is not necessarily adequate for generalization about the total Mexican universe of UNS and PAN members, the results of processing the data using standard tests of significance yield strong inferences that, in all likelihood, do represent Mexico's restorationist ideologues.

Although, as just stated, it was not possible to draw two completely independent samples of UNS and PAN members, the responses were sorted on the basis of answers to question

thirty-four which asked the respondent to state which political party or group he preferred to see gain political power during the next five years. This item discriminated the respondents into roughly equal groups, and so provided a basis for statistical comparison. The questionnaire consisted of forty items including standard SES and attitudinal variables together with scalogram items of the Guttman-Himmelstrand type. ¹⁹ Most of the correlations were without major statistical significance. Those that achieved significance appear in Table 1.

From these data it is apparent that the sinarquistas have a much more instrumental orientation to concrete human problems (such as unemployment) than do the panistas in this sample. The UNS respondents seem geared for concrete action while more of the PAN respondents are willing to take refuge in an emotive "resort to principle" approach. The sinarquistas are decidedly less optimistic about their future chances for improvement in status. This corroborates the general impression I have gathered in knowing and interviewing members of both groups. PAN members scored much higher on the SES index than did the UNS members. Although the sinarquista scores on social gregariousness point toward withdrawal, at least in terms of discussion outside the primary group, it is well to remember that sinarquismo is something of a large primary group in itself and it would be possible, therefore, for members to see themselves as operating within esoteric confines. The incidence of sinarquista-led pressure movements throughout Mexico that was cited earlier is adequate testimony to the fact that UNS members do not generally feel that they lack political efficacy as a result of their being denied overt participation. Finally, and significantly, the sinarquistas took a decidedly jaundiced view of public morality while panistas expressed a more laudatory evaluation. This finding lends weight to the contention that Acción

19 The questionnaire represented this author's second pilot attempt to devise an instrument for attitudinal measurement for use among a specialized Latin American clientele. The scalogram components yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of .63 in the instrumental items but failed to scale at all in the emotive or "High L" items (cf. Ulf Himmelstrand, Social Pressures, Attitudes, and Democratic Processes, Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1960). While insufficient to be reported here, these findings did provide insight into the problem of instrument construction in the Spanish vernacular.

TABLE I. ALIENATION CORRELATES OF PAN AND UNS MEMBERSHIP

Item	Partido de Acción Nacional (N = 45)		Unión Nacional Sinarquista (N = 52)		p under H₀ that x≥chi square
	%	N	%	N	MARKET LA
R's participation in organizations					
that seek to solve such community					
problems as unemployment				,	
often	32	15	33	17	
sometimes	27	12	48	25	
rarely or never	41	18	19	10	.05
It's easy to make up my mind					
about solving the unemployment					
problem. It's just a matter of					
principle.*					
agree	28	13	21	11	
undecided	42	19	25	13	
disagree	30	13	54	28	.05
R's optimism as to his own chances					
for socio-economic mobility					
high	36	16	17	9	
medium	39	18	28	15	
low	25	11	55	28	.01
R's discussion of social and eco-					
nomic problems with persons out-					
side the primary group					
often	35	16	18	9	
sometimes	42	19	. 23	12	
rarely or never	23	10	59	31	.001
R's view of change in the morality			,		
of Mexican public officials during					
the past twenty years.†		•			
improved	27	12	10	5	
the same	48	22	21	11	
worse	25	11	69	36	.001

^{*} This was one of the Himmerstrand-type items which produced a statistically significant correlation with group partisanship. In an earlier work I suggested the hypothesis that "High L" political actors may be the most acutely alienated toward the political system (cf. "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," op. cit.) The data above do not at all confirm that hypothesis.

† Admittedly, there is some ambiguity in the second response category for this item. It could be

Nacional is gradually being coopted into the single-party system.

III

The foregoing results of an attitudinal survey in one Mexican state are insufficient to call into question Philip Taylor's assessment in 1958 that Mexico seemed to be a "smoothly running authoritarian regime." The potential

threat to the stability of the system that is repsented by restorationist ideologues is not at the moment large enough to justify alarm. If PAN is being coopted into the "revolutionary family," other rightist formations may come to be similarly blessed, especially under the conciliatory new regime of Gustavo Díaz

[†] Admittedly, there is some ambiguity in the second response category for this item. It could be argued that answering "the same" meant "the same old immorality" to the PAN and UNS respondents.

²⁰ Taylor, op. cit., p. 729.

Ordaz. Thus we could expect to see an enlarged brotherhood of revolucionarios dividing eventually into a smoothly running multiparty system. Then, UNS and its leftist counterparts would no longer occupy satellite positions. The probabilities of such a development are difficult to calculate.

The nexus between political alienation and potential instability must not be forgotten, however, and the direction taken by such relevant "out groups" as *Unión Nacional Sinarquista*, either toward or away from integration into the national political life, will be critical for any effort to hypothesize the broad outlines of Mexican political change. Continued rightwing political alienation of the restorationist variety could have serious implications for stability within the Mexican political system.

Mexican restorationists view social conflict as the product of a sinister design engineered by political cabals. Their ideology does not embrace a rationalized concept of human misunderstanding and error. Restorationists feel they are denied both political participation and equality of socio-economic opportunity. Competitive material consumption, which Robert E. Lane found to be a stability factor for American political ideologies,21 does not operate to reduce ideological polarization in Mexico. In fact, the sinarquistas and some panistas moralize their demands for status and deference to a degree that encourages polarization and political cleavage. The Mexican restorationist does not "morselize"22 his conceptual approach to political issues but rather looks beyond the dayafter-tomorrow issues in life to an ethereal vision of the perfect future. Estranged from the main thrust of Mexican revolutionary ideology, the restorationist hoists the spectre of his martyred heroes and withdraws his support of the political status quo. He expects the system to respond only to his minimal needs of personal security, not to his aspirations for mobility and achievement. Protest movements against established government policies, therefore, are designed more to dramatize evil and injustice than to bring about a constructive redress of grievances.

Is the system just? Indeed not, in the minds of Mexican restorationists. Unintentionally, but poignantly, the spirit of their dilemma was captured by Carlos Fuentes in these lines from La Muerte de Artemio Cruz:

It is a sin, a very grave sin against the Holy Spirit to refuse to receive the gifts of heaven . . .

everyone should go forth to farm the land, to harvest the crops, to deliver the fruits of the earth to their legitimate landlord, a christian landlord who pays for the obligations of his privilege by promptly delivering a tenth to Holy Mother Church. God punishes disobedience.

-And justice, father?

—Final justice is imparted up there, son.

Do not look for it in this vale of tears.²³

There can be no felt sense of justice in this life, say the *sinarquistas*, when the political system which governs them is manipulated by one or all of several protean cabals. No one cabal will do for every occasion. Jews, Masons, Communists, *gringos*, all are believed to interact concertedly in a voracious web of planned aggression against the Mexican nation.

The practical implication of this evaluation can be stated briefly. Conspicuous supporters of the official regime will be, and are, targets for the wrath of alienated "out groups." Accurrately or not, United States Ambassador Fulton Freeman was quoted as having endorsed the candidacy of Díaz Ordaz in May, 1964. In a rare moment of affinity between left and right, the allegation brought outcries from editors of PAN and UNS publications as well as from a leading left wing publication (Politica) with strong marxist leanings.24 Ambassador Freeman was likened to former ambassadors Poinsett and Wilson, two damaging symbols of influence in Mexican-American history. Such an event takes on added significance if, although momentarily, it forces opposing "out groups" into a negative coalition of anti-Americanism.

More common are the cases of defensive adaptation by the status quo regime in the face of restorationist pressure. A dramatic example of this occurred during February, 1963, when the official regime in San Luis Potosí seized and destroyed the first printing of a restorationist-oriented book that exposed local government corruption.²⁵ Later that year, PAN and UNS came out openly together protesting

²³ Carlos Fuentes, La Muerte de Artemio Cruz (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1962), p. 46.

²⁴ Politica, 1 junio, 1964, p. 19.

²⁵ Antonio Estrada M. La Grieta en el Yugo (2d ed., México, no publisher cited, 1963). The first edition was destroyed and the press that produced it wrecked by the government of San Luis Potosí. The work is a crude tabloid but contains photographs of documents and detailed accounts of events in San Luis Potosí which were largely corroborated by independent observers interviewed by this author.

²¹ Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (Glencoe, 1962) p. 80.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 346-363.

electoral fraud in the municipal elections of Apaseo el Grande, Guanajuato.²⁶ More recently in the same state, *sinarquistas* were jailed after a public protest meeting at Celaya.²⁷

Mexico's right wing alienates are not yet ready to launch a violent revolution. But they say that they desire one and are building the social and ideological base for it. Finding no external promise of psychic security in a gemeinschaft society of spiritual brotherhood, they

²⁶ Based on interviews in Apaseo el Grande and on handbills and other printed propaganda bearing the insignia of both PAN and UNS that are currently in the author's possession.

²⁷ Based on confidential communications recently received from informants in Celaya. A founder of *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* and currently an important member of its national executive board, Juan Ignacio Padilla, was reportedly kidnapped from a public street in Ensenada, Bcfa., at gunpoint by members of that state's judicial police (see *La Suegra de la Cotorra*, 29 de noviembre, 1964, front page). There is little doubt that harassment of political restorationists continues throughout Mexico.

take solace in an ideological view that promotes cleavage in the body politic. Excluded from effective involvement in a political system that offers few gestures toward immediate change, the restorationists have constructed an apocalyptic view of eventual salvation and relief. We must place the restorationists at the negative end of the allegiance-alienation continuum. The future of their ideology and behavior, indeed perhaps of political stability in Mexico, will be determined by the direction of change and flexibility in the single-party system.²⁸

²⁸ The only other published effort to measure political attitudes among Mexican rightists is included in the recent work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, 1963). Almond and Verba did not include UNS within their sample and they do not isolate alienated nuclei within the Mexican system. They do make the interesting broad contention that Mexicans generally are more alienated from governmental output than respondents of the other four nations (not Latin American) surveyed in their study (p. 495).

MAKING THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A FURTHER LOOK

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American scholars generally take a dim view of the 1946 Constitution of Japan. Because it carries the imprint of a foreign political philosophy and, more particularly, because it was allegedly imposed through the willful and covert action of an American field commander, that instrument, they feel, is off key and should be rewritten. Their case was well stated some years ago by Harold S. Quigley, in these words:

... the SCAP draft Constitution ... has been regarded widely in Japan as a foreign imposition not wholly suited to a people of very different legal and social traditions. . . . [It was] written hastily by men without adequate knowledge of Japanese civilization and with little regard . . . for the national right of self-determination. . . . The decision to prepare a constitution was made by General MacArthur, who interpreted directives from Washington liberally. These directives . . . did not require SCAP to write a new constitution. . . . they specifically laid down . . . that the new-government should be established "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Moreover . . . "any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure . . . " were to be "issued only following consultation and the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission."1

Quigley partisans cling to the basic tenets of this case despite the presentation of new and strong counter-evidence by an official Japanese study mission, sent to the United States in late 1958 to obtain additional information on the

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1 "Revising the Japanese Constitution," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1959), p. 140. The Far Eastern Commission, created at Moscow in December 1945, supposedly to make Allied occupation policy, was composed of four veto powers (U. S., Great Britain, U.S.S.R., China) and nine other members (Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, and—after November 1949—Burma and Pakistan).

origin of the new Constitution. The investigation conducted by this group, according to its leader, Professor Kenzo Takayanagi, "resulted in the explosion of a number of erroneous and harmful surmises."2 The Takayanagi party found, as Quigley relates to the detriment of his own case, that the Supreme Commander in drawing up a model constitution "merely desired that the Japanese Government prepare a draft similar in fundamental principles and basic forms"; that the Mac-Arthur draft was advisory, not mandatory; that it did not contravene the Moscow Agreement of December 1945 creating the Far Eastern Commission; that MacArthur's action "was still following the policy of his home government" for establishing a new political system "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people"; and that "The surmise that it was the intention of SCAP to impose an American type constitution... loses sight of the Allied pressure on SCAP."3 But Takayanagi, as we shall see, did not give MacArthur—as distinguished from the United States government—a completely clean bill of

Notwithstanding these findings by agents of the country presumably adversely affected, Quigley refused to give ground. He remained "concerned . . . with the propriety and possible consequences of exerting great influence upon the process of constitutional reform in another state," and he repeated that "this concern was felt by the Far Eastern Commission."4 Thus he continued to believe essentially that Japan was saddled with an ideologically incompatible constitution by the arbitrary action of an American general; and because of this belief, he forecast "a conservative-minded revision . . . [which] would reflect the view of those who characterize the present instrument as alien in authorship and idiom, destructive of the traditional status of the dynasty, disruptive of the family system and restrictive of military power."5

- ² Kenzo Takayanagi, "Making the Japanese Constitution: What Really Happened," *Japan Times*, March 16, 1959.
 - ³ Quigley, op. cit., p. 142.
 ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 144. Quigley based this prediction on the probability of a Socialist Party split which subsequently occurred.

Although Quigley's argument is persuasive on first reading, on further examination it is found wanting in certain respects. For instance, it is not entirely consistent in its approach to the naturally conflicting aims of the United States and Japan's conservative leadership regarding the question of constitutional reform. When dealing with the U. S. side, it concedes that much is to be said for the way MacArthur handled a very complex and thorny problem; but on turning to the Japanese side, it tends to interpret MacArthur's part in the drama as being imperious and pernicious. It is partial to the Japanese side. §

Then, too, Quigley's argument treads on shaky ground by giving Americans concerned with Japanese affairs at that time a de facto classification of "bad guys" and "good guys." GHQ in Tokyo is composed of the former and the American home government—meaning the small "Japan Crowd" in the State Department—of the latter. Ignored is the fact that

6 Ardath W. Burks reflects this ambivalence by writing, on the one hand: " . . . Yoshida Shigeru ... feels that [the new Constitution] is well designed for modern Japan. Dr. Takayanagi . . . denied . . . that the constitition was . . . imposed. ... Had the MacArthur Constitition been presented . . . as a sharp break with tradition . . . it might possibly have been accepted and have been acceptable." But on the other hand: "...the historic fact [is] the constitution represents alien authorship, in that it was imposed ... by SCAP. . . . it is safe to predict that public opinion will steadily mobilize behind the movement for limited revision." Ardath W. Burks, The Government of Japan, 2d ed. (New York, 1964), pp. 17-30.

7 To suggest that GHQ arrogated to itself a function which the State Department's Office of Far East Affairs had intended to perform through the instrumentality of the Far Eastern Commission, Hugh Borton writes, relative to the obstinacy of the Japanese government against proposing fundamental constitutional changes: "This situation resulted in the Government Section of SCAP taking steps to make sure that it would play the dominant part in the revision of the Constitution." F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton and B. R. Pearn, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Far East, 1942-1946 (London. 1955), p. 329. In a slightly different manner, Theodore McNelly suggests that MacArthur usurped the constitutional revision role: "[Inasmuch as] 'any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure ... will be issued only following ... agreement in the Far Eastern Commission' . . . it would apthe President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Congress, and the American press and public did not interpret MacArthur's actions on governmental reform as in contravention of U. S. policy, disobedience of orders, or disregard of the will of the Japanese people. It follows from this that if governmental change in Japan had taken a course to satisfy the Quigley school of thought, most segments of the American scene would have viewed the results with alarm, and MacArthur would have been denounced for dereliction of duty.

In other respects the Quigley case does not stand up well under close scrutiny. It fails, for example, to give enough weight to the fact that the Japanese side strongly supported Mac-Arthur's approach to the problem of governmental reform; that the Japanese people. having lost faith in their traditional system of . government, showed enthusiasm for a democratic basic law; that the ruling classes which controlled the Cabinet, the Privy Council, the Imperial Household, and the Diet, being realistic, subscribed—not surprisingly with some resistance at first-to the United States government's reform program as presented to them by MacArthur.8 Furthermore, it offers no alternative procedure to the one followed by MacArthur for accomplishing the paramount political aim of the United States; it makes no

pear that constitutional reform in Japan could not be unilaterally carried out by the American occupation authorities." Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston, 1963), p. 29.

 8 "... The final draft ... as ... approved by GHQ . . . contained much that the Cabinet as a whole could not bring itself to agree to, particularly regarding the position of the Emperor. . . . when it had been ascertained that His Majesty had been heard to say that . . . there seemed to be nothing particularly wrong about the definition in it of the position of the Emperor... the conclusion was reached . . . to accept the final version sent to us from GHQ. . . . " Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs-The Story of Japan in Crisis (Boston, 1962), p. 135. "After the draft ... had been completed, it was submitted for discussion to the Privy Council, the Lower House of the Diet and the House of Peers, the members of which official assemblies included Japan's foremost authorities on law and administration. . . . therefore, it is correct to say that the best informed elements among the Japanese people had a hand in shaping it, a point which is in these days too easily and too often ignored." Ibid., p. 145.

attempt to explain how the Far Eastern Commission, with State Department coaching, or the Japanese, acting alone without some kind of a primer on democracy, could ever have fulfilled this requirement.

In any event, Quigley and other scholars insist on two categorical prerequisites for making fundamental changes in the Imperial Constitution: consent of the Far Eastern Commission and approval by the Japanese people. Since in their opinion these conditions were not met in drawing up the 1946 Constitution, that document is *ipso facto* an alien imposition and should, therefore, be amended. But cause for amendment would not exist, according to this reasoning, if fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure had been made by the proper procedure, that is, following agreement in the Far Eastern Commission and approval by the Japanese people.

It is significant that these writers subordinate the substance of the new Constitution to the method by which it was drafted and adopted, i.e., to its legitimacy. By narrowing the discussion to the procedural side of constitutional reform they place blame for an alleged injustice done Japan on the shoulders of a soldier in the field and thereby avoid pointing the finger at the United States as a whole. Thus, however unintentionally, they pillory MacArthur without establishing his guilt and, more important, hint at a remedy on the presumption of his culpability that could generate misunderstanding between the American and Japanese people. 10 For this reason alone

⁹ Though not a member of the Quigley school, John M. Maki is bold enough to mention, but not explain, three novel and impractical alternative solutions to the problem of constitutional reform: indefinite continuation of the contradictory situation between the occupation reforms and the Imperial Constitution; suspension of that Constitution to eliminate the contradiction; step-by-step development by the Japanese of their own basic law under occupation tutelage. John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan—The Road to Democracy (New York, 1962), p. 78.

¹⁰ When Premier Nobuske Kishi proposed in 1957 to discuss restoration of the Emperor's status to that of "Head of State"—which, he pointed out, would not change the functions of the Throne—the New York Times commented: "It would, however, give some emphasis to the way in which Japanese thought is moving. Any such discussion will be closely watched by the United States." New York Times, March 17, 1957.

we are justified in looking further at the major premises of their version of the origin, composition and adoption of the new Constitution of Japan.

This paper proposes, therefore, to call in question generally accepted assumptions regarding governmental reform in Japan, to challenge specifically the premises that the Supreme Commander: had a major part in devising either the substance or the procedure of the radical plan for incorporating the political philosophy of the West in the new Japanese Constitution, schemed to violate the Moscow Agreement vis-à-vis the prerogatives of the Far Eastern Commission, prepared a model constitution without authorization to do so, and imposed a new form of government on the Japanese people against their will.

Ι

To begin with, neither the plan nor the procedure for revising the Imperial Constitution of 1889, as Quigley and other writers imply. originated with MacArthur. On the contrary, MacArthur was explicitly instructed by the United States government to perform major surgery on that charter; and to do so by one of three methods. The full details were spelled out in a 14-page paper entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System" which was sent to the Supreme Commander in draft form on December 4, 1945, and in final form on January 9, 1946. This document is identified as SWNCC 228 after the interdepartmental State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, under whose auspices it was prepared. On December 18, 1945, in SWNCC 228/1, a two-page annex, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on a draft of SWNCC 228, recommended inclusion in that paper of what the JCS conceived to be the short-term and long-range objectives of the occupation, points that will be elaborated below, A copy of SWNCC 228/1 was sent to MacArthur on December 28, 1945.11

Although SWNCC 228 is the master key to an understanding of what happened to the Meiji Constitution, this singularly important Washington policy paper appears to have been examined by no more than a half-dozen scholars and comprehensively treated by none of them. The first published reference to it was made in 1953 by one of its authors, George H. Blakeslee; in 1955 Hugh Borton, another of its authors, gave Washington credit for suggesting to MacArthur the principles to be incorporated in the new Constitution—dis-

¹¹ The Department of State made available to the writer the contents of the SWNCC 228 folder.

claiming Washington responsibility, however, for the no-war clause.12 Ardath Burks and Theodore McNelly in more recent studies on Japanese government and politics, like Blakeslee, quote a single sentence from SWNCC 228 to prove that MacArthur's method of revising Japan's Constitution was contrary to the spirit if not the letter of Washington's orders:13 but they do not mention the passage which definitely authorized him to employ that particular method. The missing passage had been supplied in a provocatively unique earlier study by Professor Robert E. Ward, whose major interest in SWNCC 228 was that it faced up to the Allied commitment to establish a form of government in Japan "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." He subordinated the determination of the United States to establish a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" in Japan to "the problem of the ultimate Japanese reaction to such a stand." He feared that the Japanese would interpret the "freely expressed will" proviso "as an absolute guarantee, and the United States' stand in SWNCC 228 as evasive, legalistic and essentially moral...."14 The legalistic and moral as-

¹² George H. Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission—A Study in International Cooperation, 1945–1952 (State Department Publication 5138, Dec. 1953), p. 45; Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York, 1955), note 5, pp. 423–24.

¹³ Burks, p. 26; McNelly, p. 39; Blakeslee, p. 45.

14 Robert E. Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (December 1956), pp. 990-91. In this 30-page article. Ward is highly critical of the U.S. government for demanding drastic revision of the Meiji Constitution and of the Supreme Commander for doing the bidding of his government. He holds that the Allied powers and the Supreme Commander could favor and support but not impose a democratic form of government on Japan. Appreciating why both the United States and Japan, for somewhat different reasons, opposed participation of the Far Eastern Commission in constitutional revision, he complains nevertheless because that international body was not permitted to perform this function. Forgetting that in August 1945 Japanese Cabinet members "sobbed loudly" on accepting the terms of surrender (Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the "Missouri" [New Haven, 1950], p. 253), he notes that members of the Shidehara Cabinet in February 1946 tearfully endorsed, at MacArthur's urging, a U. S. plan for democratizing Japan's traditional form of government in fulfillment of the terms of pects of American policy are not questioned by other writers.

A sixth scholar who uses SWNCC 228 to prove a particular point is Takayanagi, referred to above. Chairman of Japan's 39member Commission on the Constitution which recently completed a seven-year study on the origin and propriety of that country's organic law, he, too, directs special attention to the familiar line in SWNCC 228 about Japanese initiative to prove that MacArthur deviated from the Washington-prescribed procedure for effecting constitutional revision. On the basis of this one sentence, 31 of the 39 members of the Commission on the Constitution take the stand in the 5,600-page final report submitted to Premier Hayato Ikeda on July 3, 1964, that "the postwar constitution was forced upon the country by the occupation authorities . . . and should therefore be replaced by a document based upon the free will of the Japanese...." Takayanagi makes MacArthur responsible for what happened by reasoning as follows:

It was...the policy of the American home Government that the constitutional revision necessitated by the Potsdam Declaration...be effected by the Japanese voluntarily.... This policy is clearly stated in ... SWNCC 228 SCAP followed that policy ... until ... February 1946.... [Then] Gen. MacArthur ordered the Political Section to make a draft.... This extraordinary step was taken without the knowledge of the American home Government.... 16

To leave no doubt about the meaning of this 1959 statement, Takayanagi repeated in 1964: "The policy of the American home government as shown by SWNCC 228 was to make the Japanese draft revision of the Meiji Constitution, subject to SCAP review, and not for the Supreme Commander to suggest any concrete plan to the Japanese as a model. From

surrender. Notwithstanding Japan's remarkable progress under the new Constitution, he insists that the Japanese electorate is in a state of shock from conducting governmental affairs by an alien political philosophy. Conceding that the Supreme Commander was under orders to carry out a radical governmental reform plan, he damns MacArthur and his staff for doing the job in an inelegant and overly thorough manner. *Ibid.*, pp. 980–1010.

¹⁵ New York Times, July 4, 1964. This report is summarized and also made the subject of a lengthy editorial in the Japan Times Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 28, International ed., July 11, 1964.

16 Takayanagi, Japan Times, March 16, 1959.

this angle . . . [MacArthur's action] seems to be an 'extraordinary step'.... "17 In other words had GHQ not prepared a constitutional guide for the Japanese but instead followed Takaranagi's construction of SWNCC 228 for revolutionizing Japan's political system—that is, awaited voluntary action by the Japaneseno "e=traordinary step" would have been taken and hence no reason given the majority of the Commission on the Constitution for favoring revision now. What Takayanagi does not say is that SWNCC 228 specified two other procedures for MacArthur to fall back on in the event the Japanese did not voluntarily effect the constitutional revision necessitated by the Potsdam Declaration.

It would be extremely difficult for anyone to read EWNCC 228 in its entirety and not conclude that Japan, whether from the Supreme Commander or from the Far Eastern Commission-both Allied creations-was to receive a Western-style basic law, and in a form not at all compatible with Japan's traditions. SWNCC 228 begins by stipulating the democratic reforms "which the occupation authorities should insist be carried out in Japan": a responsible government based on wide suffrage, an executive branch responsible to the electorat = or to a fully representative legislative body a legislature with full budgetary controls, guarantee of fundamental civil rights, provision for popular amendment of the constitution. Next in SWNCC 228 appears the oft-quoted sentence said to prove that Mac_rthur violated his orders: "Only as a last

17 Fersonal letter from Professor Takayanagi to the writer, December 8, 1964. He opposes those in Japan who have "the idea that since the new Japanese Constitution was one imposed by force on the Japanese, it might be thrown overboard whatever its contents, and that they ought to write the Constitution anew themselves. This smaczs of a political strategy of accelerating revision by stimulating nationalist (or xenophobic) sentiment. I do not approve of the strategy." Ibid. On tLis point the late Kazuo Kawai wrote: "The react-onaries . . . obviously want to discredit the present constitution in order to make way for a return to the past." Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago, 1960), p. 69. "Significently enough," writes Edwin O. Reischauer, "the pharge of foreign origin has been repeatedly leveled ... by those who wished to see it changed." Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, rev. ed. (New York, 1957), p. 254. According to Quigley, the old Liberal Party, as of 1954 "would come close to restoring the Meiji Constitution." Quigley, p. 145.

resort should the Supreme Commander order the Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future."18 This injunction is amplified in the following paragraph of SWNCC 228 which cautions the Supreme Commander not to proceed with the job of revision piecemeal and head-foremost. "The effectiveness of governmental reforms in preventing the resurgence of military control in Japan," it pontificates, "will depend in a large measure upon the acceptance by the Japanese people of the entire program. In the implementation . . . the Supreme Commander must take into account the problems of sequence and timing, as well as the measures which might be adopted to prepare the people to accept the changes, in order to insure that the reforms are lasting in strengthening representative government in Japan."19

What Washington meant, and what the above-mentioned scholars, excepting only Ward, thought too insignificant to point out, is elucidated in SWNCC 228, Appendix B. "Discussion." The first paragraph of this section defers dutifully to the "freely expressed will" commitment and then gets down to brass tacks thus: "... the Allies ... are fully empowered to insist that the Japanese basic law be so altered as to provide that . . . the government is responsible . . . and the civil is supreme over the military branch...."20 Devoting the next five paragraphs to an exposition of governmental shortcomings that should be remedied, the Discussion in paragraph 7 directs the Supreme Commander to insure constitutional reform in one of three ways. First, according to this paragraph, the necessary changes "should be initiated and carried into effect by the Japanese Government out of a desire to eliminate elements of the national structure which have brought Japan to the present pass and to comply with . . . the Potsdam Declaration. [Second,] Failing such spontaneous action by the Japanese, the Supreme Commander should indicate the reforms which this Government considers necessary [Third,] Only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued . . . specifying in detail the reforms to be effected."21 Until the beginning of February 1946, as Takayanagi indicates, MacArthur followed the first of these

¹⁸ SWNCC 228.

¹⁹ Ibid. Italics added.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

alternatives. But then, when he became convinced that the Japanese leaders would not or could not initiate and carry into effect a farreaching constitutional reform program, far from taking an "extraordinary step" he simply turned to the second alternative of indicating—graphically, to be sure—the reforms Washington considered necessary. The third alternative of issuing a formal instruction to the Japanese government was held in reserve and never used.

MacArthur's obedience to the spirit as well as the letter of his orders on constitutional reform is further confirmed by the degree to which his action harmonized with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on this matter. A powerful body in shaping American foreign policy during and for some time following World War II, the JCS dispatched all official orders to MacArthur; and MacArthur, with an ear ever tuned to the locus of power, was particularly deferential to it. Consequently SWNCC 228/1 which reflects the attitude of the JCS toward the substance of SWNCC 228 is of more than passing importance. As indicated above, it offered suggestions on two points, long-range and short-term military interests. "The principal short-term military interest," it says, "is the possibility that the implementation of the proposed reforms may foment unrest in Japan to such a degree as to require increases in the occupation forces."22 This put MacArthur on notice that it was his responsibility to accomplish a difficult political and diplomatic mission without giving rise to violence, civil war, and chaos.

From the long-range military point of view, the major concern of the JCS as stated in SWNCC 228/1 was that "no nationalistic or military clique or combination should again be able to dominate that country and lead it into a war of aggression."23 How effectively this objective would be achieved, MacArthur was told, "will depend in large measure upon acceptance by the Japanese people of the entire program."24 This thought, it will be recalled, is incorporated in SWNCC 228. A military man with less of MacArthur's penchant for personalizing his actions might have interpreted such emphatic language as a mandate to devise and espouse, as the Supreme Commander and Premier Kijuro Shidehara actually did,25 the famous no-war clause of the Constitution. Whatever else may be said of Article 9 renouncing war as a sovereign right, there is no denying that it accomplished, at least for a generation, the long-range aim of the occupation as defined by the JCS. Moreover, JCS insistence in SWNCC 228/1 that the Supreme Commander, in the process of reforming the government, should destroy for all time Japan's potential for military aggression casts serious further doubt on Takayanagi's finding that the American home government expected MacArthur merely to review a Japanese draft revision of the old Constitution without taking the liberty, if necessary, of making concrete suggestions for the Japanese to follow. Such a hands-off course would have been totally at variance with the rationale by which the occupation of Japan was conducted in the winter of 1945-1946. Whether by MacArthur or by others, military or civilian, a drastic change was to be made in the Meiji Constitution and, as in the case of surrender some six months before, it simply could not be made painlessly. All that can safely be said is that the operation might have been monumentally botched if it had been performed by fits and starts on the advice of the delegations of eleven different nations residing in Washington.

What does this add up to? Simply that the United States government's unalterable objective, with three optional procedures for accomplishing it, was to democratize Japan's traditional form of government. Naturally, for both military and political reasons, a maximum of Japanese popular support for the new form of government was desirable. But such support, to repeat, was not mandatory. The "freely expressed will" proviso was, as every student of the subject knows, inserted in the Potsdam Declaration without enthusiasm and only at the last minute, not to accord the right of full constitutional self-determination to the Japanese, but rather, in line with Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew's urging, to facilitate Japan's surrender by opening the prospect that the monarchy might be retained.26 If Japan's

Japanese Constitution," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77 (September 1962), pp. 350-78. According to MacArthur himself: "... I knew that it was exactly what the Allies wanted at that time for Japan. They had said so at Potsdam and they had said so afterwards...." Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964), p. 304.

²⁶ Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 2 vols. (Boston, 1952), II, ch. 36. In this chapter Grew writes: "If it had not been for [Secretary of War Henry

²² SWNCC 228/1.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid. Italics added.

²⁵ The collaboration of MacArthur and Shidehara on this point is explained in Theodore McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the

new Constitution is in fact, as Quigley describes it, "a foreign imposition not wholly suited to a people of very different legal and social traditions," that circumstance must be attributed not to any "extraordinary step" taken by MacArthur but to its democratic character as prescribed by the American home government in SWNCC 228. How suitable any democratic constitution would be for Japan and whether the existing one should be amended are not questions at issue here.

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If MacArthur's Washington orders gave him sufficient procedural latitude to assist in revising the Meiji Constitution, he obviously had no reason to harbor a scheme of his own for achieving that purpose. Yet on the books stands a heretofore uncontested charge that he proceeded surreptitiously with the reform of Japan's governmental system. Used to prove that MacArthur contravened United States policy, the charge was initially made by one-time United States officials who might have been unduly concerned with the prerogatives of the Far Eastern Commission. Little consideration need be given the Far Eastern Commission, for that international body never

L.] Stimson's wholehearted initiative, the Potsdam Conference would have ended without any proclamation to Japan being issued at all. But even Mr. Stimson was unable to have included in the proclamation a categorical understanding that unconditional surrender would not mean the elimination of the dynasty if the Japanese people desired its retention." In a footnote he quotes a psychological warfare expert to the effect that "the analysts [of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the Office of War Information] thought that the Emperor might be turned to good use in lowering resistance if the enemy were told that the decision regarding his fate after an Allied victory would be up to the Japanese themselves." Henry L. Stimson puts it this way: "... Some maintained that the Emperor must go. . . . Others urged that the war could be ended much more cheaply by openly revising the formula of 'unconditional surrender' to assure the Japanese that there was no intention of removing the Emperor if it should be the desire of the Japanese people that he remain as a constitutional monarch. This latter view has been urged with particular force and skill by Joseph C. Grew...." Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), p. 626. "... we made a clear bargain. . . . American lives for an emasculated monarchy." Reischauer, p. 261.

made and was not intended to make an impact on American policy toward Japan. This was confirmed by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes himself who wrote in 1947 regarding the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan:

At the time the commission and the council were established, I stated that the authority of General MacArthur should not be obstructed by the inability of the commission to agree on policy or of the council to agree on advice for carrying out that policy events have proved that the two bodies have not interfered with MacArthur's administration. He and his staff have continued to carry out their difficult task with an efficiency that has won the plaudits of the people in other Allied nations besides the United States.²⁷

Not from any action of the Far Eastern Commission, then, but rather from a Tokyo visit of members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, predecessor of the Far Eastern Commission, arose the allegation of GHQ deviousness.

What are the facts? At one of the early GHQ briefings of this group in January 1946, as George H. Blakeslee recalls, MacArthur explained that he had held frequent personal conferences with Japanese state ministers to clarify to them Allied policy on constitutional reform "as interpreted in more specific form by the American Government." At another session on January 30, just before their return to the United States, he told them that constitu-

²⁷ James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 218. The U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy approved by President Truman on September 6, 1945, states: "... in the event of any differences of opinion among [the Allies], the policies of the U.S. will govern." Jones, Borton and Pearn, op. cit., Appendix 10. The Far East subcommittee of SWNCC recommended on October 16, 1945, that the U.S. hold to its position of maintaining final authority in the control of Japan, and the President, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Office of Far East Affairs in the State Department supported the recommendation; "but . . . certain of the European experts in the State Department favored additional concessions to the British and Soviet proposals." Blakeslee, p. 13. "... the Japanese constitution . . . is probably the single most important accomplishment of the occupation. . . . I am certain that it would never have been accomplished had the occupation been dependent on the deliberations of the Far Eastern Commissionwith the Soviet power of veto!" MacArthur, p.

tional reform "had been taken out of his hands by the Moscow Agreement." Having had up to this point neither an opportunity nor a compelling reason to explore fully the implications of the newly created Far Eastern Commission, MacArthur's comment on that occasion was at best a horseback opinion; presently he would reverse himself, as was his right, but not until he had taken a hard look at the overall situation.

The sincerity of MacArthur's assurance to the Commisioners that he was not then planning to effect changes in the Imperial Constitution has been sharply challenged by two scholars who had been members of the United States delegation to the Fir Eastern Commission. One of these, George H. Blakeslee, puts it this way: "Two days after General MacArthur had stated to the member: of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission that he had ceased to take any action in regard to the revision . . . he felt forced to take vizorous measures."29 Another United States delegate, Hugh Borton, writes: "Prior to their return . . . [the Commissioners] had been told by General Whitney that the problem of constitutional reform was a matter for the Japanese to consider and that no work was being undertaken by SCAP."30 The implication is, of course, that MacArthur and members of his staff de iberately misrepresented the situation.

Both the innocence of the accused and the misjudgment of the accusers can be substantiated in this instance by the minutes of a meeting held in the Government Section on January 17, 1946, when the Far Eastern Advisory Commission visitors sat down to discuss occupation affairs with seven Army and four Naval officers, a group that included Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of the section, and his deputy, Colonel Charles L. Kades. The proceedings or that occasion were recorded in a 41-page paper written the same day. 31 which discloses what GHQ's thinking on constitutional reform realls was, and was not, at the time. It leaves no doubt that Mac-Arthur, as he informed the Commissioners, was following the first Washington-prescribed procedure of giving the Japanese every op-

²⁸ Blakeslee, p. 44.

portunity to initiate the desired changes; and it disposes of the conspiracy theory.

Kades opened the meeting by reading a prepared statement which reflected GHQ's attitude. "Conforming to the policy . . . that the Japanese Government be permitted to initiate its own reorganization to the greatest extent practicable," he said, reading from the paper, "the Government Section . . . makes every effort . . . to encourage the Japanese to correct defects in their governmental system through their own administrative reforms." The paper ended on this revealing note: "The [civil rights and purge] directives of 4 October [1945] and 4 January [1946] will accomplish politically what has already been achieved militarily. . . . the election of a new Diet by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people from candidates untainted with militant nationalism will be a long step toward establishment of the peacefully inclined and responsible government in Japan contemplated by the Potsdam Declaration."32 If this position paper erred, it was in the too complacent assumption that the Shidehara Government's draft revision of the Meiji Constitution, soon to be completed and submitted to GHQ, would incorporate as a minimum the occupation-induced political reforms of the previous four months.

Then followed a question and answer period which included this dialogue:³³

- Q. Mr. Thomas Confesor [Philippines member]: Are you considering amendments to the Constitution?
- A. Col. Kades: No. The Government Section has understood that that is a long range problem concerning fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure which is within the province of your Commission.
- Q. Mr. Thomas Confesor: I do not understand ... why constitutional revision is not part of your work.
- A. Col. Kades: Because formal revision of the written document would constitute a fundamental change in the Japanese constitutional structure, and as such be within the Commission's jurisdiction.
- Q. M. [Francis] Lacoste [French member]: I think that the alterations in the Japanese governmental system which are being carried out under the guidance of the headquarters are in fact con-

²⁹ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁰ Borton, note 7, p. 421. "Whatever faults may be inherent in the military character, evasive misrepresentation has never been one of them." MacArthur, p. 287.

^{31 &}quot;Government Section Report to the Far Eastern Commission," dated January 17, 1946. A copy is in the writer's personal files.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

stitutional changes which should be ultimately in a revision of the written Constitution.

* * *

Q. Sir George Sansom [U. K. member]:... Have you made any formal studies on this? A. Col. Kades: No, Sir George, we have not.

Although Kades' answers were an open admission that GHQ had not done its homework on the implications of the Far Eastern Commission, they definitely disprove the charge that GHQ was holding in reserve a plan of its own for revising Japan's Constitution.

What, then, was MacArthur's thinking on constitutional reform? As of January 1946 he assumed on the basis of oral instructions he had previously given Japanese leaders that the Shidehara Cabinet would in good time produce a suitable preliminary draft of a democratic constitution for GHQ consideration within the framework of United States policy. MacArthur's crystal ball had not revealed that the character of the Cabinet revision plan to be laid before him in early February 1946 would completely change the constitutional picture and require a different procedural approach to governmental reform within the context of SWNCC 228.

Nor had the Supreme Commander anticipated the necessity of having the Government Section assist him in preparing a model constitution for the guidance of the confused and unresponsive Japanese leaders. Because the qualifications of Government Section personnel to perform such a task have been questioned, it is in order to examine briefly the part they actually played.

III

An appraisal of the role of the Government Section involves answers to three questions: Was it necessary to prepare a model constitution to implement SWNCC 228? If so, did it have to be prepared on short notice? Were the Government Section people competent to do that part of the job entrusted to them?

By coincidence, as already indicated above, the answer to the first of these questions was supplied by the Japanese government within a day or two of MacArthur's final meeting with the Far Eastern Advisory Commission on January 30. That answer consisted of the "unacceptably reactionary" constitution revision plan drawn up by State Minister Joji Matsumoto's Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee during the previous three months and submitted to GHQ on February 1,

1946.34 Matsumoto's revision, found by GHQ to be "no revision at all,"35 served notice that the conservative forces of Japan, without the help of an Allied blueprint of some kind, would never be able to reach a consensus on the reform program they had been told repeatedly by MacArthur to initiate and carry out. It demonstrated that Japan's leaders were no more willing to curtail the prerogatives of the Emperor in January 1946 than they had been in August 1945 when they were contemplating surrender: and without taking this drastic step, it would have been utterly impossible for them to comply with the unheard-of and unsuspected SWNCC 228. Still the best evidence that they had no intention of incorporating Western concepts in the Meiji Constitution as demanded by Washington is that supplied by Tatsuo Sato, member of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau who worked more intimately with both GHQ and the Japanese government on the new Constitution than any other Japanese. He wrote in 1957 concerning the real intention of his superiors regarding revision:

The Potsdam Declaration did not mention any explicit obligation to revise the Meiji Constitution...in the subconscious minds of the Cabinet members there was some expectation that the Potsdam Declaration could be executed even under the Meiji Constitution, if the application of the supreme law were improved.³⁵

This avenue to constitutional reform bore no resemblance to that envisaged by the authors of SWNCC 228 who seemed to favor abolition of the Throne but were willing to settle for a constitutional monarchy with a figurehead Emperor.

At first MacArthur reacted to the Matsumoto draft by instructing Whitney to prepare a detailed answer rejecting it. 37 After further consideration, however, not only of the

³⁴ Courtney Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History (New York, 1955), p. 249.

35 Ibid., p. 248.

²⁵ Tatsuo Sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitution," reprinted from Contemporary Japan, Vol. 24 Nos. 4-6 and 7-9 (Tokyo, 1957), p. 2. The Matsumoto Committee draft, according to Maki, "clearly revealed the unwillingness or, perhaps, complete inability of the Government and its leaders to respond to the challenge." Maki, op. cit., pp. 78-79

³⁷ Report of Government Section, SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, 2 vols. (Washington, n. d. [1949]), I, 102. Cited hereafter as Political Re-

orientation.

Matsumoto submission but of all aspects of the situation—Japanese, American, international—he came to the conclusion that a different tactical approach to governmental reform was required if the objectives of the occupation were to be achieved satisfactorily, in an orderly manner, and within a reasonable period of time.³⁸ MacArthur's own recollection of the Matsumoto affair, which he recorded only months before his death in April 1964, stresses the time element:

I was now confronted with a time problem [he wrote]. Earlier, at my suggestion, the legislative body had revised the election laws, giving those who had been disenfranchised the right to vote. With this new law in effect, the government had called for a general election on April 10, 1946. I had expected that the new constitution would be finished by then and that the voting would, in fact, be a plebiscite. The way things stood after Dr. Matsumoto finished his work, the people would be voting on whether they wanted to keep the old constitution or one just like it. Accordingly, I directed my staff to assist... in the formation of an acceptable draft.³⁹

Other courses were open to MacArthur but they all appeared to be less desirable than the one he took within the context of his instructions. He was acutely aware of the abrupt confrontation between the aims of the American government and those of the Japanese government. With Japan's conservative leaders angling to salvage the Meiji Constitution and the United States-not to mention other Allied powers-determined to make sweeping changes in that instrument, Mac-Arthur was not privileged to arrive at a leisurely decision in an ivory tower. He was confronted with a fast-moving situation.

Once persuaded of "the prime importance of immediate constitutional revision," MacArthur switched to the second SWNCC 228 alternative of indicating to the Japanese in more specific form the nature of the changes to be made in the existing structure of government. This he did in full realization that time was running out. Crucial to the success of the move was complete understanding and prompt sponsorship of the reforms by the Japanese government. MacArthur's popularity in Japan

and elsewhere was now at its peak. With his reputation as a civil administrator at stake, and the advice of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the JCS not to take a leap in the dark fresh in mind, he characteristically planned this step carefully, taking into account the many tricky domestic and international factors involved. This done, he unfolded the entire plan before the Japanese on the assumption that from enlightened selfinterest alone they would decide to cooperate. "I did not . . . try to force an American version of a Japanese constitution," he recalled: "and then order them to adopt it. The revision had to be made by the Japanese themselves and it had to be done without coercion."41 The Shidehara Government opted to sponsor the new Constitution—aware, among other things, that if it did not do so it might not outlast the stepped-up cry through-Japan for immediate and genuine constitutional changes, which reached a crescendo immediately following the Mainichi Shimbun's February 1 exposure of the innocuous Matsumoto revision plan.42 Shidehara like Premier Higashi-Kuni before him might have chosen to say no and resign. But had he and the Emperor and the Japanese people not backed the Supreme Commander at this critical stage of the occupation, "the results," MacArthur informed Takayanagi years later, "would have been catastrophic."43

It seems strange that anyone would question the competence of the Government Section staff to perform the modest chore of incorporating in a model constitution the elementary democratic principles set forth with great clarity in SWNCC 228. Specially selected for their qualifications to deal with problems of government in Japan, the officers of this section were fully capable of comprehending the plain language and equally plain intent of the

³⁸ Whitney, p. 248. Pertinent here is Government Section's Feb. 1, 1946, memorandum on "Constitutional Reform," in *Political Reorienta tion*, II, 622-23.

³⁹ MacArthur, p. 300.

⁴⁰ Political Reorientation, I, 90.

⁴¹ MacArthur, p. 299.

⁴² Sato, p. 8; Political Reorientation, I, 101; Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan: The Second Phase, 1948-1950 (New York, 1950), p. 3; Douglas G. Haring, ed., Japan's Prospect (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), p. 301; Whitney, pp. 283-84; Yoshida, pp. 134-36.

⁴³ Takayanagi, Japan Times, March 16, 1959. MacArthur has this to say regarding the part played by the Emperor: "... I always explained carefully the underlying reasons for occupation policy, and I found he had a more thorough grasp of the democratic concept than almost any Japanese with whom I talked his loyal cooperation and influence had much to do with the success of the occupation." MacArthur, p. 288.

Washington planning experts who prepared that document.

The Supreme Commander himself, nevertheless, was unwilling to give Government Section personnel a free rein in preparing a draft constitution. Because of his own heavy responsibility, he personally controlled with a firm hand the brief and delicate task of drawing up a democratic model for the Japanese to imitate. To insure complete conformity with the basic principles contained in SWNCC 228, MacArthur personally dictated the parts of the draft bearing on sovereignty, demilitarization, and feudalism. On these and other points he counseled and advised constantly Whitney, who in turn kept the situation in hand through his own Steering Committee composed of Kades, Commander Alfred R. Hussey, and Lt. Colonel Milo E. Rowell, all, like Whitney, experienced lawyers.

How the Government Section acquitted itself during the eight-day "constitutional convention," so-called, beginning February 5, has been disclosed partially in published writings of some of the participants:44 but the more incisive details have been concealed for years in a secret Government Section "Memorandum for Record," written the following year.45 This 7,000-word paper, prepared from notes jotted down during the "debates," reveals how MacArthur with the help of Whitney and the Government Section Steering Committee directed the proceedings. The Steering Committee, of which Kades was chairman, vetoed all proposals of staff members that were not in accord with SWNCC 228. Steering Committee differences were appealed to Whitney for settlement by Mac-Arthur. For example, on February 8,46

... A sharp and fundamental difference of opinion developed... in the discussion of Article IV, that asserts that no future Constitution... shall limit... the rights guaranteed in this Constitution, or subordinate... democracy to any other consideration.

Col. [Pieter K.] Roest defended this Article by premising that... we must guarantee for all time the social and moral advances made up to the present. Mr. [Harry Emerson] Wildes ex-

44 Political Recrientation, I, 101-05; Whitney, p. 249ff.; Harry E. Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York, 1954), ch. 4.

⁴⁵ The Government Section, SCAP, "Memorandum for Record," dated December 16, 1947, prepared by Ruth Ellerman. A copy is in the writer's personal files.

46 Ibid.

pressed the belief that the omission of Article IV inevitably opened the gates to Fascism in Japan....

No satisfactory compromise could be reached. It was decided to submit Article IV to General Whitney for decision. . . . (In the final draft of the document, this Article was omitted.)

Also on February 8, agreement could not be reached on proposals giving "detailed orders for the establishment of social welfare, public health, free education, orderly adoption and child labor laws in Japan." According to the memorandum:⁴⁷

... Col. Rowell objected that ... these provisions might cause so much resentment that the Japanese Government might reject our constitutional draft in toto. Mr. Wildes answered that we do have the responsibility to effect a social revolution in Japan....

No compromise solution could be found.... General Whitney recommended that the minutia of social legislation be omitted and a general statement made that social security shall be provided.

In the final Government Section review of the draft on February 12, the Steering Committee made at least 16 additional changes, some of major importance. It changed, for instance, a February 8 compromise amendment vesting executive power "in the Prime Minister as head of the Cabinet" to read: "The executive power is vested in a Cabinet." But help from outside was needed to settle a week-long dispute between Kades and Hussey. Hussey insisted on language in the Preamble to the effect "that this Constitution draws its sovereignty not only from the will of the people but from the principles of universal morality." Kades protested that "political morality and sovereignty have nothing to do with each other." Whitney entered the discussion, listened to Kades' recapitulation of the opposing arguments, and sided with Hussey.48

Thus was fashioned in conformity with SWNCC 228 a working paper to help the

⁴⁷ Ibid. Wildes wrote later: "Some of the more radical officers favored . . . an elective president, the initiative and referendum, social insurance, a compulsory eight-hour working day, and proportional representation; but, as this received no support outside Socialist ranks, it was dropped." Wildes, p. 44.

48 Government Section, "Memorandum for Record."

Japanese write the democratic philosophy of the West into their country's organic law. Without a sample showing in graphic detail what was meant by such expressions in the Potsdam Declaration as "responsible government," "democratic tendencies," and "fundamental human rights," Japan's conservative leaders would not have been able to reach agreement on the revolutionary governmental changes demanded of them.

IV

Finally, a brief look should be taken at the question of Japanese acceptance of the new Constitution. The Potsdam Declaration promised that the occupation forces would be withdrawn when a responsible government had been established. As between a responsible government taking the form of a republic and one taking the form of a constitutional monarchy, the Japanese were free to choose. But the choice did not extend to a form of government that was not responsible to the electorate.49 On the safe assumption that the ruling forces of Japan preferred a constitutional monarchy to a republic, MacArthur's model constitution retained the Emperor but only as a symbol. After recovering from the shock of MacArthur's reform program, and after considering the even more disagreeable alternative of a republic of some kind, Japan's leaders, impressed by the sincerity and good will (if not by the rhetorical flourishes) of top Government Section staff. 50 elected to string along with MacArthur. The individual Japanese leader who left an indelible trace through his part in converting the ruling classes to the idea of a constitutional monarchy was Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida like Shidehara

49 Grew, II, ch. 36.

⁵⁰ Yoshida, pp. 133-37, 141-46. "... at the time of its initial drafting . . . General Mac-Arthur's headquarters did insist, with considerable vigour, on the speedy completion of the task, and made certain demands in regard to the contents of the draft. But during our subsequent negotiations with GHQ there was nothing that could properly be termed coercive or overbearing in the attitude of the Occupation authorities towards us. They listened carefully to the Japanese experts . . . and in many cases accepted our proposals . . . they would often adopt the attitude that we were perhaps too steeped in the ways of the old Constitution we might at least give their suggestions a trial if they did not work, we could reconsider the whole question at the proper time and revise the necessary points. And they meant it." Ibid., p. 143.

was able to perceive that the mass protests against the constitutional revision plan of the Matsumoto Committee at the beginning of February 1946 might become so intense as to cause the downfall of the existing conservative government and the establishment of a people's republic. With this in mind, and with a helpful nudge from the Emperor himself, Yoshida concluded—however reluctantly—that, balance, it would be in Japan's best interest to accept the SWNCC 228 program in some such form as MacArthur recommended. 51 The most stubborn convert to the new Constitution thus became its greatest champion. As Premier he sponsored legislation for revising the Imperial Constitution which required approval by the Privy Council and both houses of the Diet.

It now became Yoshida's responsibility, not MacArthur's, to win Diet support for the Government's Draft Constitution Bill. As Yoshida saw it, Japan's foremost authorities on law and administration were in the Diet. and "despite the fact that the nation was . . . under foreign Occupation, these men were able to give free expression to their opinion without any restraint whatsoever."52 GHQ, he said, "maintained in general an attitude of watchful silence throughout the discussions in the Diet, but . . . did intervene once or twice."53 He noted that the "Occupation authorities carefully studied the reports of the discussions in progress. . . . "54 How GHQ managed to study these reports, and in what way such study contributed to the Diet's freedom of debate. Yoshida did not say; but since there was a close connection between GHQ's exact knowledge of Diet proceedings and GHQ non-intervention in the normal legislative processes, this gap in the story of the making of the Japanese Constitution should be closed.

Mindful of the long record of Japanese resistance to any change in the Meiji Constitution, and still dubious of the real intentions of Japan's conservative leaders regarding fundamental reform, MacArthur kept a watchful eye on Diet discussions by means of special Government Section memoranda on deliberations of the 90th Diet, which examined the

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 135-36; Harold Wakefield, New Paths for Japan (New York, 1948), pp. 131-32, 136-37; Political Reorientation, I, 101. "It is now . . . apparent that the Japanese leaders at the time saw eye to eye with SCAP, far more than we had previously believed possible" Burks, p. 28.

⁵² Yoshida, p. 145.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 140.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

Draft Constitution Bill from late June to early October 1946. Prepared under the personal and completely autonomous direction of the writer⁵⁵—from continuing interviews with Diet leaders and from thoroughly reliable information furnished systematically and expeditiously by Japanese officials covering Diet activities—the original of each Government Section memorandum, or "Diet Report," by command of General Whitney, was hand-carried to MacArthur's office, and only then were copies distributed to Whitney himself and his top staff.

Through these special Diet reports, GHQ's initial doubts concerning Yoshida's integrity and true intentions were substantially mitigated if not totally erased. The reports depicted a forthright and commanding figure who earnestly defended the principles incorporated in his own Draft Constitution Bill. He pulled no punches as he told the Japanese repeatedly that the substance of the new Constitution was required under the terms of surrender. As one of the earliest of the Diet reports brought out, Yoshida in addressing the House of Peers showed his insight into the situation by calling for "sincere and prudent consideration . . . with exact understanding of international and internal circumstances, as the draft was made with due consideration of these circumstances." This meant that Yoshida and his associates had been well briefed by Mac-Arthur and the Government Section staff on the purport of SWNCC 228 and on the fluid and highly uncertain international situation, facts that would be established later by the Japanese Commission on the Constitution.⁵⁷ It meant, also, that Japanese public support for the new form of government was won by Yoshida's power of persuasion, not by Mac-Arthur's fiat.

Only in relation to the discussion of national sovereignty, or "national polity," were Yoshida and his chief assistant on the Constitution, Tokujiro Kanamori, called into conference by GHQ officials. With SWNCC 228 insistence on a responsible government in

55 Government Section, SCAP, "Diet Report" series. Eighty-five such reports were prepared on deliberations of the 90th Diet. Similar reports were prepared on the proceedings of subsequent Diets until the end of the occupation. The writer has copies of these reports in his personal files.

56 Government Section, "Diet Report," No. 7, June 23, 1946.

⁵⁷ Theodore McNelly, "The Japanese Constitution: Child of the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (June 1959), pp. 187-89.

mind, MacArthur became disturbed over an issue growing out of charges made in the House of Peers that the new Constitution downgraded the Emperor and thus changed the fundamental character of the state. Out of deference to Japanese sensibilities on this subject, Premier Yoshida answered: "The spirit of the revised constitution is 'absolutely consistent' with the idea of the fundamental character of the state."58 How the matter was resolved to the satisfaction of both the Yoshida Government and the Supreme Commander was related in a July 28 Diet report which, typically, omitted mention of a recent informal conference between representatives of Yoshida and MacArthur to clarify the burning sovereignty issue, but signified nevertheless that the matter had been resolved in that manner. The report said in part:

The Constitutional Sub-Committee [of the House of Representatives] agreed yesterday to state in the Preamble...that 'sovereignty rests with the people.' This statement is thought to be clearer than 'sovereignty of the people's will.'59

The revised statement insured establishment of a government that would be responsible to the people as prescribed in SWNCC 228.

To guard against future misunderstanding between GHQ and the Japanese government on this basic issue, as a Diet report of August 2 informed MacArthur, the House Sub-Committee's final recommendation on the Draft Constitution Bill, before going to the parent Special Committee, "will be submitted to SCAP for examination." This was not an indication of GHQ coercion but rather a measure of the spirit of cooperation between the two sides. It revealed GHQ's part as that of referee allowing the Japanese the widest latitude under the basic rules prescribed by Washington.

Unlike its reception in the House of Representatives, whose members had been recently elected, the Draft Constitution Bill was not enthusiastically received in the House of Peers. Speaking freely for the record while shutting their eyes to the realities of Japan's predicament, an articulate minority of the scholars and intellectuals in that body of noblemen and distinguished citizens, representing neither the Japanese government nor the Japanese voters, bitterly attacked Yoshida and his constitutional revision plan. In a five-

⁵⁸ Government Section, "Diet Report," No. 12, June 28, 1946.

⁵⁹ Ibid., No. 37-A, July 28, 1946.

⁶⁰ Ibid., No. 40-A, August 2, 1946.

page Diet report to General MacArthur on August 31, the following excerpts from replies of Kanomori and Yoshida to Peers' interpellations recapitulate the Government's case for the new Constitution and suggest why GHQ's doubts regarding Yoshida's sincerity were removed:

Mr. Kanamori.... The Meiji Constitution and its lax enforcement caused the downfall of this country. There is no way out... except by adopting the democratic system.... The Potsdam Declaration provides that the political system of Japan shall be decided by the free will of the people....

Mr. Yoshida.... Although the international situation predominantly overshadowed the drafting of the Constitution, the demands of the people have not been denied.

Thus the Supreme Commander kept track of how the Premier persuaded his countrymen to approve the new Constitution. Satisfied, in part by these special reports covering Diet deliberations, that the Japanese leaders were acting in good faith, MacArthur reciprocated by respecting the democratic right of the Diet to carry on its deliberations in an atmosphere of complete freedom. And because the Japanese people through their Representatives openly and freely accepted the entire SWNCC 228 program as incorporated in the Draft Constitution Bill, thanks to the statesmanship and leadership of Premier Yoshida, General Mac-Arthur, in consonance with the views of the United States Government, acknowledged publicly that Japan had fulfilled the requirement of the Potsdam Declaration.62

V

What is said in these pages is intended to place in better focus the making of the Japanese Constitution. Unavoidably, issue is taken with those American scholars who feel that this instrument is bad, that it is bad because it is alien in philosophy, and that it is alien in philosophy because it was imposed by an American military man in violation of his orders and in contravention of the policy of his government. Issue is also taken with the finding of the Japanese Commission on the Constitution that MacArthur forced a constitution on the Japanese against their will, in that his approach to the matter did not conform to a

specific procedure prescribed by the United States government; Washington's thought, reasoned the Commission, was to have the Japanese conduct the excercise without any GHO coaching from the sidelines.

The effect of these interpretations, it seems, is to cast that epochal event in a narrow mold of ulterior motives and subjective judgments. rather than in the broader context of the changing post-World War II situation where it belongs. Looked at in the latter setting, the 1946 Constitution appears to have served its purpose reasonably well.63 The alien philosophy embodied in it is Western democracy, which the Japanese people warmly embraced. Instead of being imposed, this philosophy was approved by the Japanese government when it accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.64 Instead of taking unilateral action. MacArthur was obeying both the letter and the spirit of his orders when he showed the Japanese by example how to fulfill their commitment to establish a "responsible government." Instead of contravening United States policy by not leaving constitutional reform to the Far Eastern Commission, the Supreme Commander adhered strictly to the set resolve of President Truman "that MacArthur would be given complete command and control . . . in Japan," that "We were not going to be disturbed by Russian tactics in the Pacific."65

63 From a study of the Commission on the Constitution's 5,000-page stenographic report on public hearings held throughout the country, "... the richest single source of information on the thoughts and feelings of a representative group of Japanese about the state of their society under constitutional democratic government," Maki concludes: "... the longer the people live under a fundamental law that has yielded them desirable benefits and has revealed no basic defects . . . the less they will consider it in need of change" Maki, op. cit., pp. 206-12. When the Commission's final report was submitted to the Japanese government in early July 1964, Japan's leading English language newspaper commented in its weekly edition: "[it] cannot be said that there has been anything like a popular demand for constitutional changes. . . . " Japan Times Weekly, July 11, 1964.

64 See the Aug. 25, 1946, memorandum by Government Section's Judge Alfred C. Oppler on "Powers of the Diet with Regard to Constitutional Amendments under the Meiji Constitution," in Political Reorientation, II, 662-66.

⁵⁵ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. One, Year of Decision (New York, 1955), p. 412.

⁶¹ Ibid., No. 60-A, August 31, 1946.

⁶² Fearey, op. cit., p. 3; Political Reorientation, II, 765.

Without a model of some kind for their guidance, the Japanese demonstrably could not have complied with the Potsdam Declaration requirement, as amplified by SWNCC 228, to establish a democratic form of government. The United States government has consistently regarded the present Constitution of Japan as satisfactory compliance with the Potsdam Declaration on this point. What Robert A. Fearey, a State Department of

ficial, wrote in 1950 still holds good in 1965: "It is doubtful whether SCAP and the U.S. Government should have acted differently if the events of the past four years could have been foretold.... By and large...it is doubtful if the democratization program would, or should, have been carried out much differently from the way it has been."66

66 Fearey, pp. 97-100.

REASON AND REVELATION IN HOOKER'S ETHICS

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This essay has two complementary purposes. It seeks principally to clarify the basis of the political philosophy of Richard Hooker, the great Elizabethan divine, and, in so doing, to clarify as well certain of the limits of political speculation itself. We hear quite often now that reports of the death of political philosophy have been greatly exaggerated. If this is indeed a time of its resuscitation, it is important that its limits be recognized and that inquiry be liberated from doctrines which cannot be based on unassisted reason alone. The ancillary purpose of this study is a contribution to such a disentanglement.

Hooker's political thought itself also repays the attention of modern political scientists, if only as a remarkably comprehensive model of pre-modern or "traditional" society. Hooker wrestles with one of the difficulties which had much to do with ending "traditional" society in Europe and in those places Europe has influenced: the bitter and conflicting claims of church and state, and especially of various churches. Hooker's is a revealing endeavor to solve the political problems inherent in revealed religion, without abandoning-as his "enlightened" successors did-Christianity as a decisive constituent of politics or Aristotle as · the secular guide of politics. Hooker's thought is thus a peculiarly revealing combination of Christian revelation and Aristotelian political philosophy.

This essay does not explore the whole range of Hooker's political philosophy, however, but only the views which constitute its basis: his ethics. Hooker's view of what is good for man decisively conditions the core of his political views, the common good for man. In fact his ethics determines the very status of politics in his political philosophy. What follows will show by a comparison of Aristotle's and Hooker's ethics the manner in which the theologian subtly reshaped a philosophic ethic to comply with a doctrine of Christian salvation, thereby necessarily displacing politics from its Aristotelian status.¹

To begin with, Hooker surely follows Aristotle in the broad defining principles of his

¹ For very helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay I wish to thank several friends, especially Thomas S. Schrock of Chicago and Walter F. Murphy of Princeton.

ethics. That cannot be gainsaid. It is impossible to follow those who see Hooker as partly modern, as having one foot in the camp of such great modern critics of Aristotle as Machiavelli and Locke. Thus Hooker agrees with Aristotle in holding that man inclines by nature to a twofold perfection, speculative and moral, Philosophy and moral virtue are the two goods most appropriate to man, bringing to fruition the best that may be in him. "Speculation of truth" and "exercise of virtue," Hooker says, are the activities "beseeming man's excellency."2 And of the two philosophy is the finer, most reflecting man's distinctive rationality. Philosophy, Hooker says, is that "wherein the excellency of his kind doth most consist." Still, Hooker remains consistent with Aristotle in holding that moral virtue is also a genuine perfection of man, if not quite measuring up to philosophy. There is such a thing as moral virtue, that is to say, an excellence of human character apart from the unequivocal excellence of the reason's theoretical activity.

If the stature of moral virtue in Hooker's teaching resembles that in Aristotle's, the general shape of moral virtue is similar as well. The ethics of each can be divided into two parts or levels. There is a minimal level and a higher level. The first consists of those necessary duties or acts which must be performed by all men. And the second comprises the finer moral dispositions, the virtues proper, which distinguish the character of the peculiarly fine man. One might say (what I am not the first to say) that the ethics of Hooker no less than that of Aristotle is bounded by natural necessity on the bottom and natural excellence on the top. It is as if Hooker says "...you can lay down a flooring of acts required by necessities of human nature, and known by man generally, and a ceiling of finer dispositions which the best inclinations of human nature call for, and of which only the finer men are aware. Everything between depends in good part on circumstance. Presuming that you perform the things which

² Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker, arranged by John Keble, revised by R. W. Church and F. Paget (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888), Bk. V, ch. lxxvi, sec. 3; hereafter cited V lxxvi 3.

³ I x 12. See also I v 3, I xi 1, 3, 4, I viii 5 (end).

necessity requires, you should try to be as excellent a fellow as circumstance permits." But the interesting questions concern what are to be regarded as the moral necessities of men and what as their excellences. I shall consider the first at disproportionate length, contenting myself with a brief consideration of the latter, since the necessary duties of man assume a great and even preeminent importance in Hooker's teaching, for non-Aristotelian and theological reasons.

I. THE LAW OF REASON

The necessary flooring of Hooker's ethics comprises those moral duties encompassed under the prescriptions of the "law of reason," as Hooker calls his equivalent to Aristotle's natural justice. Hooker's definition of this law is succinct. "... the nature of Goodness being . . . ample, a Law is properly that which Reason in such sort defineth to be good that it must be done. And the Law of Reason or human Nature is that which men by discourse of natural Reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their actions." These things so commonly required are common indeed, a kind of lowest common moral denominator. The Law of Reason prescribes only things of "so mean a degree of goodness,"4 as Hooker puts it, that all men can perform them.

The conspicuous importance Hooker attached to the law of reason itself indicates a variation from Aristotelian thought. Aristotle's single thematic discussion of natural justice occupies but a slight and, it must be said, obscure page in his Nicomachean Ethics. The discussion occurs in the context of the chapter on political justice. Hooker's elaboration of his "law of reason," however, occupies a most conspicuous place in Book I of his Laws, a book whose theme is not political but divine justice. Both the laws of reason and of political society appear as but manifestations of God's government of His creation. With minor exceptions, the context of the law of reason resembles the deductive theology of Thomas and not the apparently unschematic ethics of Aristotle.

Perhaps it is not so obvious that revealed religion determines the character as well as the context of reason's law. To one who reads lightly chapters v through x of Book I, it may seem that reason's law is what its name proclaims—the product of unassisted reason, not of revelation. In those central chapters where Hooker lays his "new foundation" for an ecclesiastical polity, he seems to draw his laws of

reason from calculations based on human nature alone. In chapter viii Hooker expressly holds the law of reason knowable "without the help of Revelation supernatural and divine," and generally he cites the pagan philosophers profusely. "A law of reason," he writes, is a rule "whereunto by the light of reason men find themselves bound in that they are men." 5

Whatever might be the appearance of an appeal solely to unassisted human reason, however, Hooker's true appeal is ultimately to revelation. His religious bent shows itself in a simple qualification. By "reason" in its fullest sense, Hooker means perfect reason in the Christian sense—reason unspotted by original sin. Only by such an intelligence is the law of reason to be fully understood. Signs of this view appear to the careful reader even as Hooker deduces his law of reason. In chapter vii, for example, he would not "be understood" to say that "man's natural understanding" can "rightly perform its function as oft as we cause God in his justice to withdraw." A more explicit remark occurs in later manuscript comments on his Puritan critics' Christian Letter: "Reason can find every necessary good when it is supported by divine aid, but none at all without it. It has in itself sufficiently all good by which it can prove itself to a man who is painstaking and diligently pays heed. But our sloth [the effect of original sin] turns us away in other directions until the Holy Spirit stirs up zeal for virtue."6

This understanding implies that reason is subject to revelation. For original sin is known only by revelation. The point may be made in another way. No man's reason has been free of original sin since the "first foundation of the world." Reason as men without revelation have possessed it—as all pagans including the philosophers knew it—is then inferior to that perfected reason portrayed by revelation. It is no accident that, in the later or supernatural sections of Book I, Hooker concludes that sacred scripture is the final authority for determining doubtful parts of the law of reason. In short, the natural foundations of the early chapters are dependent upon doctrines of reason discernible only in the unspotted supernatural light shed by the later. Equipped with this sketch of the basic principle underlying Hooker's argument, we may proceed to con-

⁵ I xvi 1, I viii 9.

⁶ Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book Five, edited by Ronald Bayne (London, Macmillan, 1902), p. 594. I viii 3. Cf. Works, II, 539, 239. Sloth in the exercise of reason is the manifestation of man's original sin. I vii 7.

⁴ II viii 2, I viii 8.

sider the way in which the developed principle is reflected in the law of reason's details. First we will consider the law's end or defining object, then the content of its duties and the manner in which they are discovered, and finally its very status as law or command.

The end or final cause of the law of reason is salvation, which is to say immortal life together with literal union of the soul with God in both understanding and moral virtue. Although this is a divine and other-worldly object, Hooker nevertheless held it to be the goal of reason's law, not of divine law alone. His argument is this: a divine end is appropriate to human nature as such and hence can be appropriately discerned by the guide of human nature, reason. To expand upon this particular point, let us consider Hooker's general treatment of the various objects appropriate to human nature.

Hooker, like Aristotle and Thomas before him, understands these objects as the goods to which men naturally incline, the things which men naturally desire. He presents two accounts of the desires, one in chapter v, a definitive second in the later chapter xi which speaks from the perspective of the "external" perfections man receives from God. The first distinguishes man's desires to continue in being, to perform his function well, and to proceed in virtue and knowledge. The second differentiates the things desired as "sensual," "intellectual," and those "spiritual and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we tend by supernatural means here, but cannot here attain unto them." Hooker elaborates this last object. Men seek something above "vital use," which "exceedeth the reach of sense," even "somewhat above capacity of reason, somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than conceiveth." So attractive is this prospect that "all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire." "So that Nature even in this life doth plainly claim and call for a more divine perfection than either of these two that have been mentioned." Only God is sufficient to satisfy our desires and "therefore he [is] our felicity and bliss."8

It might be wondered whether man's natural desire for a divine end necessarily implies the existence of such an end for him. Hooker replies to this objection with an argument borrowed from Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. "It is an axiom of nature that

natural desire cannot utterly be frustrate." Since only a divine life satisfies man's desires, they would be frustrate without it. Hence it exists.

The difficulty of treating this argument as dependent solely upon premises discernible by unassisted reason, may be readily shown. Hooker's conclusion does not follow from his premises as literally stated. Suppose it be granted that men desire a happiness beyond that permitted by life on earth. Perhaps their nature, blended of earth's matter no less than a divine soul, renders them capable of only a qualified happiness, of only the "hidden exultation" accompanying "surmises" of divine happiness, and not of the divine happiness as such. It may be granted that natural desire may not be "utterly frustrate." Nevertheless, it may be somewhat frustrate. It may need to be contented with only a composite happiness not fully contenting the best desires of man's composite nature.

Moreover, if reason should teach the "surmised" object of desire to be impossible, desire would not be frustrate at all. "Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest." Hooker himself asserted that the possibility of the soul's life after death was rarely susceptible to discovery by the unassisted natural reason and that bodily life after death had never been so discovered.¹⁰

Perhaps reasons also exist, apart from Hooker's own premises, for wondering if the existence of a provident deity providing divine benefits for men can be naturally proven. In any event it is enough here to say that Aristotle—whom Hooker classed as "the head of all philosophers," who has "alone... performed more very near in all parts of natural knowledge" than "the whole world" has since done in "any one part thereof"—seems not to have believed it could be proven. Aristotle seems to judge the belief in gods with human capacities as but a salutary opinion rendering the multitude more docile and men generally more law-abiding.¹¹

This seems to imply not only that Aristotle's ethics is not pointed to a religious salvation, but also that it is intimately connected with a political way of life. And such an implication is surely true of at least the minimal level of "the philosopher's" ethics. Natural justice, that right which was available to men generally, seems to mean no more to Aristotle than the

⁷ I xi 3; cf. I ix.

⁸ I vii 5.

⁹ I xi 4.

¹⁰ I xii 2; cf. III viii 8; I vii 5.

¹¹ Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, viii; I vi 3.

minimal principles of justice needful for the enduring existence of any polity and hence commonly present in all polities.¹²

Hooker's peculiar use of Aristotelian references disguises his variation from Aristotle. In fact, every passage from a great Greek or Roman philosopher, that Hooker uses in Book I to substantiate the truth of a provident deity, in its original context urges religious duties only as civically useful or speaks philosophically of only a non-providential divinity. Hooker's most charming distortion of a philosopher occurs in chapter iv, where Aristotle's Metaphysics is implied to be "plainly teaching" the way in which God moves the angels.

A more revealing example of Hooker's art occurs in the crucial proof that God punishes violation of the law of reason and rewards obedience. The proof itself consists in no more than an inference of divine reward or punishment from the common belief that even secret actions are rewarded or punished. In the course of this Hooker quotes in a footnote, without citation, a Latin passage which may be translated: "They will approach the gods in purity, bringing piety, and leaving riches behind. Whoever shall do otherwise, God himself will punish him." Keble locates this passage in Cicero's Laws. There it occurs as the very first of the laws on religion proposed by Cicero himself for his polity. In the preface to his laws, Cicero emphasizes only the political utility in inculcating beliefs that the gods rule all things, being "great benefactors of man, observing the character of every individual, what he does, of what wrong he is guilty." Cicero's particular commentary on the law mentioned is characteristic: "The provision that no human judge, but God himself, is to punish the disobedient would seem to strengthen the power of religion through the fear of immediate punishment."13

Hooker's own philosophic authorities, then, fail to confirm his contention that an immortal

¹² Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V vii. Cf. Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace, trans. Alan F. Gewirth (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951), II xii 7; I iii 4, I xix 13. See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 156-64. It is a great pleasure to acknowledge that my interpretations of Aristotle, Marsilius, and even Hooker owe their best parts to Professor Strauss's instruction. Cf. his "Marsilius of Padua," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1963).

¹³ Cicero, *De Legibus* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1928), II viii 1, x 25. Hooker, I ix 2.

life in union with God is a good naturally knowable to man and thus a possible fruition of his natural desires.

Still, Hooker might have a reply. He might reject the philosophers' view that immortality cannot be naturally discerned. For practical purposes, indeed, sacred scripture is the safest authority for "such natural duties as could not by light of Nature easily have been known." In principle, however, an end beyond this life is naturally knowable. For the imperfections that philosophers think inseparable from man's composite nature—even the imperfections in man's ability to grasp with reason his divine future—issue only from nature's corruption, not from nature itself. Deficiencies in man's actions, as in nature's actions generally and even in speculative reason itself, originate in man's original sin.14 This reply, however, has the decisive difficulty already suggested. The speculatively known cause of nature's manifest deficiencies is known only from revelation. In principle as in practice the law of reason is pointed to a perfection which is not manifest to reason unperfected by revelation.

From the religious object of Hooker's law of reason follows its distinctively religious content. Its two chief precepts might be summed up as "Worship God" and "Love your neighbor." To begin with the second, the love of each man or your neighbor which the law prescribes is a duty to men generally. The precept does not prescribe a duty principally to one's fellow citizens. It thus reminds of Biblical universality, not of the essentially particular polity to which Aristotelian natural right is attuned. The brevity and difficulty of Aristotle's thematic discussion makes it difficult to give examples of Aristotelian natural right. But there is good reason to follow Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in inferring two illustrative maxims from a nearby passage. According to Aristotle, it is natural justice that a citizen peculiarly oppressed in the line of civic duty should be aided. Similarly, it is natural justice that the highest honors or sacrifices be paid to the city's heroes or to the city's gods. One might also add as an illustration, if with some qualification, the minimum principles of commutative justice which ensure a just reciprocal exchange of good for good and a just repayment of evil with evil. "The very existence of the polity," Aristotle emphatically asserts, depends on allowing men the opportunity to trade on the one hand and to obtain recompense for injuries on the other. It is clear

¹⁴ I xii 3, I vii 7, xi 5, iii 3. See editor's note in *Works*, I, 222-23.

that the spirit of Aristotelian natural right emphasizes the minimum requirements of a polity.¹⁵

The secondary status of political justice in even that precept of Hooker's law which concerns duties toward man can be more vividly demonstrated. In a manner foreign to Aristotle. Hooker distinguishes between "primary" and "secondary" precepts of his law of reason. While primary precepts are appropriate to man's true nature, secondary precepts are required only by man's fallen nature. Secondary laws of reason guide men with respect to potential evils rather than potential goods, evils of the state of corrupted nature. They include precepts that "men always knew," so that they might defend themselves from force and injury, and keep others from injuring a third party, and so that no one might decide his own case, or rule others without their own consent.16 Among the secondary precepts alone does any concern for a polity appear. The natural primacy of the polity has disappeared and with it the primacy of the citizen's point of view.

The disappearance is even more striking in Hooker's account of the other and principal precept, prescribing love of God. Far from being set forth as part of political justice, it is deduced from the natural theology which has been discussed. Worship of God is primary because in the decisive respect God and not the polity governs. "Presuming some knowledge," Hooker remarks, "not only that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisdom, and other properties that God hath, and how all [benefits] depend on him [as their principal cause]," each man can be brought to perceive that God ought be honored. The religious tenor which results is apparent not only in the basic precepts but

¹⁵ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V vii. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago, 1964), V L.XII C.1024.

16 Secondary Laws of Reason are not explicitly expounded as such. Only some time after Hooker has stated them (Ix10) does he name them, and he never does call them Secondary Laws of Reason. Yet the principles of section 10, paraphrased in the text, cannot but be those mentioned in section 13. The fact that men have always known them is a sure sign they are Laws of Reason (see I viii 3, 9). Also, they could not be international laws or laws of polity and regiment, the other types of Secondary Laws mentioned in 4 end, 5 beginning, since they precede the establishment of the latter; the former, as well at the latter, are treated elsewhere in chapter x.

throughout those maxims which can be necessarily deduced from them. "That which is simply against [the law immutable of God and nature]... can at no time be allowable in any person, more than adultery, blasphemy, sacrilege, and the like." 17

If Hooker's law of reason is distinct in its purpose and content from Aristotle's natural justice, it differs as well in the manner in which it is known. Since the principles of Aristotelian natural right comprise no more than the minimal foundations of justice needed for the maintenance of any polity, they are of a kind apparent to the sense and equity of most politically active men. To know them would require little more than a consultation of the common customs of polities. Perhaps the Averroist Marsilius of Padua catches the spirit of Aristotle when he remarks that the recognition of such principles comes "not as a result of profound inquiry, but solely by the common dictate of reason and a certain duty of human society."18 But knowledge of Hooker's law of reason requires "profound inquiry," for its deduction rests on theological premises.

Indeed, when Hooker begins his account of the way reason discovers its laws, he seems to resign himself to a discussion premised merely on popular opinion. He distinguishes between "knowledge of the causes" of goodness and "observation of [its] signs or tokens." He largely forgoes the first for the second, "which being the worse in itself, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecility the fitter and likelier to be brooked." Of these mere signs of good action, the most certain is "the general persuasion of all men." Hooker's reason for putting such a premium on common opinion is important. "... For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught." Merely by use of his naturally acquired reason man can and does know the chief duties naturally required of him. Among these manifest principles are such as this, "that the greater good is to be chosen before the less," "God [is] to be worshipped," "parents [are] to be honored," "others [are] to be used by us as we ourselves would be by them."19

Soon, however, Hooker's account turns abruptly from "signs" to "causes." He turns from common opinion as the indication of what reason commands to be good, to speculative investigation into the true reasons for what is good. Whatever might be the principles that are apparent to men, they were "at the first

¹⁷ VII xv 14, I viii 7.

¹⁸ The Defender of Peace, I iii 4, I xix 3.

¹⁹ I viii 5, 2, 3.

found out by discourse, and drawn from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth." Hooker dwells on the extent to which "the knowledge of every the least thing in the whole world" serves as "mother of all those principles" in the law of reason. He spells out the process of birth. In consequence of observations that the best things, unhindered, produce the best operations, and that the best thing in us is our soul and especially its "diviner part," "the soul then ought to conduct the body, and the spirit of our minds the soul." This is the first law. Hooker then goes on to deduce the "several grand mandates" which the understanding faculty, its superiority established, imposes. Here, in chapter viii, he only "presupposes" some kind of discourse whereby "the minds even of mere natural men" have grasped God's providential power and our consequent dependence on Him. From this presupposition, the axiom directing honor, worship, and prayer to God has arisen. Similarly, "my desire to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection."20

Two characteristics especially distinguish Hooker's account of the way reason knows the moral law. On the one hand, Hooker relies upon speculative reason to establish the very precepts of ordinary morality. On the other, these precepts are understood to be grasped by most men in a thoroughly calculating manner. To realize the peculiarity of Hooker's teaching, it is helpful to compare it with that of St. Thomas Aquinas, to whom Hooker's doctrines are commonly traced with only qualified accuracy.

With respect to the place of speculative reason in moral reflection, Thomas's views are not without subtlety. Nevertheless, his massive and conspicuous teaching holds that the practical or moral reason is self-sufficient. It is guided by naturally known basic principles of practical conduct, from which all the other precepts of the natural law may be in various ways deduced. These basic principles are grasped by a kind of natural "habit" or faculty of practical principles, synderesis, the application of which is conscience. Crudely speaking, Thomas holds that a kind of natural conscience imposes the law of nature's basic principles on

man's reason. This doctrine is not present in Aristotle, and it is absent from Hooker's teaching as well.

Hooker supposes no natural faculty of right principles—no synderesis or conscience in the Thomistic sense. I believe that the term "synderesis" is absent from Hooker's works: it surely is absent from Keble's index. Moreover, nothing in Hooker's teaching corresponds to synderesis. There is indeed certain language which reminds of Thomas's doctrine and which seems to have misled even such a close student of Hooker as J. W. Allen.²² Occasionally Hooker will speak of "conscience," or of "that law which is written in all men's hearts," or of "... an infallible knowledge imprinted in the minds of all the children of men...."23 But Hooker seems to use the words "heart" and "conscience" only to refer metaphorically to what we call "feelings" and he called "affections." He asserts that the persuasion of hearts or consciences ought to depend upon probable or necessary reasons. And if he does refer to certain "seeds" of Godliness, they are of a kind "sown in the hearts of many thousands" by religious feasts.24 While he speaks of the "imprinting" of knowledge of nature's law in two senses, neither implies that precepts are by nature grasped by the practical intellect. Usually, "imprinting" refers to the general manner in which knowledge is obtained by reason.25 But the term also indicates the impression upon man of his natural faculties-reason, for example. Only the faculty of reason is the "infallible knowledge imprinted in the minds of all the children of men, whereby both general principles for directing of human actions are comprehended and conclusions derived from them." The Law of Reason is imprinted only in the sense that the faculty of reason is imprinted, by whose light the law's precepts may be discovered.26

²⁰ I viii 6, 5.

²¹ Summa Theologica, in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York, 1945), I II, Q. 94, A. 2, 3; Q. 90, A. 3, ad 3, 4 ad 1; Q. 91, A. 2, ad 2, 3, ad 2; Q. 51, A. 1, 2; Q. 63, A. 1, 2, ad 3; Q. 100, A. 2; cf. I, Q. 79, A. 11, Truth, XI, 1.

²² J. W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London, Methuen, 1941), pp. 188ff. See also F. J. Shirley, Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas (London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1949), p. 80.

²³ II viii 6, III vii 2.

²⁴ V lxxi 2. Cf. Summa Theologica, I II, Q. 63, A. 1, 2 ad 3; Q. 51, A. 1. Preface, i 3; Works, III, 613. Preface, vi 6; cf. vi 3.

²⁵ "The soul of man being therefore at the first as a book, wherein nothing is and yet all things may be imprinted; we are to search by what steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge." I vi 1.

²⁶ II viii 6. "The Apostle St. Paul having speech

In all this I do not mean to slight Hooker's opinion that men generally sense the beauty and appropriateness of actions according to the law of reason and, moreover, recognize the law's prescriptions as apparent once they have been suggested for consideration. Indeed, the laws have been "generally known." The question concerns the way in which these laws are generally known and, especially, first suggested. That suggestion does not originate in the prompting of a practical faculty which has grasped the first practical principles, but rather in the grasp by speculative reason of human nature "and other things in relation to" man. "Notwithstanding whatsoever such principle [of the Law of Reason] there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, and drawn from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth." Probably Hooker's quite explicit preference for the term "law of reason" over "natural law" can be traced to his law's ultimate dependence on a discourse of reason rather than an inherent natural prompting.27

If Hooker's deduction of his moral precepts from speculatively known premises distinguishes him from St. Thomas, it distinguishes him from Aristotle as well. Indeed, it seemed essential for Aristotle to introduce at the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics an argument establishing the superiority of soul to body, the beginning copied almost literally by Hooker.28 But the Anglican divine then departs from Aristotle by proceeding also to deduce the specific practical duties from speculative premises. Whatever the Aristotelian relation between proper moral action and man's distinctive rationality, in no simple sense does Aristotle deduce either moral virtues or minimal natural duties from speculatively given premises. It would seem that this difference may be traced to the theological basis required for Hooker's primary precept.

To some extent the distinctly calculating

concerning the heathen saith of them, 'They are a law unto "themselves." 'His meaning is, that by force of the light of Reason, wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from falsehood, and good from evil, do thereby learn in many things what the will of God is; which will himself not revealing by any extraordinary means unto them, but they by natural discourse attaining the knowledge thereof, seem the makers of those Laws which indeed are his, and they but only the finders of them out." I viii 3.

cast of Hooker's law of reason also may be explained by his concern for a salvation above and beyond the happiness of this life. The object of Hooker's law is finally individual or private, and hence it is to be discovered not by consulting what is good for the community but rather what is good for the individual soul. The law's practical precepts are deduced from each man's desire to obtain all good, coupled with a calculation that he will not be benefited by either God or his neighbor unless he treats each rightly. "My desire therefore to be loved of my equals in Nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection."²⁹

Moreover, the chief duties of this life are in good part, if by no means solely, means to happiness in another. "We labor to eat, and we eat to live, and the good we do is as seed sown with reference to a future harvest." Hooker has distressed some of his closest admirers because he never tires of the refrain that divine happiness issues in part as a reward for "such duties performed as are rewardable."

Probably the key to the law's calculating cast, however, is its stature as law which men generally can know, coupled with the peculiar manner in which Hooker finds it to be known. To the few who love fine things for their own sake, who come nearest to God's perfection in their own understanding and virtue, no need for calculation exists. The finer men desire the finer things naturally or spontaneously. "The greatest part of the world" are, however, "better able by sense to discern the wants of this present life, than by spiritual capacity to apprehend things above sense, which tend to their happiness in the world to come."31 And the law of reason with its elevated aim must nevertheless cater to the capacity of that "greatest part." Now it might be possible to resolve this difficulty without emphasizing the usefulness of duties here to obtaining another life there. St. Thomas managed to do it with his doctrine that all men are spontaneously guided to the most necessary duties by naturally known principles in the reason. Hooker rejected that doctrine. He sought instead to deduce the law of reason from man's desires. Unable to deduce

²⁷ I viii 1, 5; cf. 6, 7.

²⁸ Cf. I viii 6 with Nicomachean Ethics, I vii 13-16.

²⁹ I viii 7.

³⁰ I xi 5, 1. See I x 6, I xii and Works, III, 598ff., 609, and editor's note, 626-7, 641. R. W. Church notes that "... the doubtful explanation of the shortest and easiest way is a favorite one with Hooker." Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Bk. I, ed. R. W. Church (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1905), p. 121.

³¹ V xxxv 2.

it from man's better desires which perhaps few men share, he deduces it from the most reliable desire characteristic of all men-the desire for eternal life. "It is the demand of nature itself 'What shall we do to have eternal life?' The desire of immortality and the knowledge of that whereby it may be attained, is so natural unto all men, that even they which are not persuaded that they shall, do notwithstanding wish that they might, know a way how to see no end of life." "There never was that man so carelessly affected towards the safety of his own soul, but knowing what salvation and life doth mean, though his own ways were the very paths of endless destruction, yet his secret natural desire must needs be, not to perish but to live."32

This solid basis of the minimal duties in Hooker's ethics receives a certain illumination from comparison with the philosopher who systematically grounded his whole politics on the most solid and minimal basis possible. That philosopher was Thomas Hobbes. Searching for a law effective among all men, Hobbes was led to found men's duties on the strongest and steadiest natural passion, the fear of death and especially of violent death. By no means does Hooker ground his minimal law of reason on a mere repulsion from pain nor his politics on minimal duties alone. There is a useful analogy nevertheless. Hooker's search for a natural law effectively prescribing man's relation to God leads him also to base man's most necessary duties on the desire to continue in being eternally, a desire common even to the most "desperate despiser of God and godliness living."

I have dwelled on the manner in which the end, the content, and the knowledge of Hooker's law of reason distinguish it from its Aristotelian equivalent. But it is also distinct in its very legal form. Hooker set forth not merely principles of reason but laws of reason.

This differs decisively from the Aristotelian teaching. Aristotle speaks of natural justice or right in his thematic discussions, but not of natural law. He even emphasizes that all right among men is changeable, whatever may be the situation among the gods.³³ Interpretation of

³² Works, III, 511, 615-16. "That sovereign good, which is the eternal fruition of all good, being our last and chiefest felicity, there is no desperate despiser of God and godliness living which doth not wish for. The difference between right and crooked minds, is in the means which the one or the other do eschew or follow." Works, III, 599: cf. I, 648, 697, 511.

33 Nicomachean Ethics, V vii.

It is true that Aristotle in Book II, vi, 18, re-

this passage is not easy, but it seems to mean that all rules of political justice need be qualified in extreme cases in order to preserve that very polity whose justice is their object. The rescue of a citizen from undeserved suffering on his country's behalf might entail a potentially disastrous war. To repeat, the principles of natural justice are means to preserve a just community and therefore dispensable when their application might endanger that community or its justice.³⁴

For Hooker, however, the laws of reason are indispensable means to an object superior to all earthly considerations. They are therefore superior to all exceptions here on earth. "Natural laws direct in such sort, that in all things we must for ever do according unto them." The precepts' unequivocal generality cannot be due to the grand dignity of the acts they prescribe. It will be remembered that the laws of reason concern only things of a "mean . . . degree of goodness." Rather, it is owing to the fact that these duties, ordinary in themselves, are nevertheless the necessary means prescribed by God to the greatest good. Thus the generality distinguishing Hooker's "law" is occasioned by its stature as God's command. Law as distinguished from counsel implies mandatory counsel, advice that is in some wav enforced by sanctions in the counsellor. Hooker holds that a provident God rewards man with a happiness far more perfect than that available in this life only if man strictly performs what "the law of nature and God" prescribes. "The light of nature," Hooker assures us in chapter xi of Book I, "is never able to find out any way

marks that certain acts such as adultery are always "extreme," which implies that they are absolutely wrong. But is is not certain that this brief remark represents Aristotle's developed doctrine as presented in Book V. Compare the treatment of adultery in *Politics*, VII, 1335b, 38.

It is also true that Aristotle does speak in the Rhetoric, I, 13, of laws "based upon nature." His bare references there, however, occur but incidentally to his task of providing materials useful for persuasion—especially when positive law is against the advocate. In addition, neither of his illustrations occurs in his own name, but rather as a quotation from other writers. Neither illustration, moreover, seems free in the original from an association with divine, rather than natural, origin. At least one implies a doctrine—all slavery is unnatural—with which Aristotle elsewhere expressly disagrees.

³⁴ See Leo Strauss, "Marsilius of Padua," in *History of Political Philosophy*, p. 243. Cf. Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 156-64.

of obtaining the reward of bliss, but by performing exactly the duties and works of righteousness."35

II. PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL VIRTUE

The demands of divine justice decisively condition Hooker's treatment not only of the necessary qualities but also of the finer ones. Indeed, Hooker writes frequently that the performance of "virtuous duties" is all that "the gospel of Christ requireth" even from fallen nature in order that immortal happiness be obtained. Those who commend the "love of equity and right itself," for its own sake, "though they speak not of religion, do notwithstanding declare that which is in truth her only working."36 Perhaps this partly explains the "rationalism" which some have observed in Hooker's teaching; it surely accounts for his reliance upon philosophers such as Aristotle. In them can be found both an exposition of the virtues fitting man's nature and a speculative account of nature generally. But Hooker's reliance on the philosophers is qualified, just as the adequacy of their views on virtue and speculation is qualified. For the philosophers did not recognize the unqualified perfection of which nature is capable, especially the literally divine end possible for man. This culminating knowledge occasions the differences distinguishing the place of philosophy and moral virtue in Hooker from their place in the ethics of "the head of all philosophers," Aristotle.

To begin with, philosophy itself is depreciated. Indeed Hooker celebrates speculation, but this is not inquiry by the unassisted reason. It is inquiry whose difficulties and doubts are resolved and decisively enlightened by revelation. The queen of the sciences is not philosophic reason but "theological reason, which out of principles in Scripture that are plain, soundly deduceth more doubtful inferences."37 What Aristotle saw as queen serves the King of Kings. It might be said that the theoretical perfection of philosophy becomes ultimately inferior to the moral virtue of justice, to divine justice which commands obedience to its laws and essential beliefs. This is only to say again that divine justice leads where philosophy alone does not go: to an immortal and divine happiness.

With respect to moral virtue proper, the

chief effect of Hooker's theology is a depreciation of the more or less aristocratic manliness praised by Aristotle, in favor of a somewhat less political and more dutiful Christian righteousness. I do not wish to overstate this. Hooker's doctrines are fervidly Aristotelian compared to the powerful attacks on aristocratic morality and politics launched by Machiavelli, followed up by Hobbes and Locke. Hooker surely follows Aristotle in taking his ethical bearings from the gentlemanly excellences, no less for their "beauty" than for their "fitness for use." To his readers he counsels "the cherishing of those virtues . . . , wherein if nobility do chance to flourish, they are both an ornament and a stay to the commonwealth wherein they live."38 And thus he praises among the virtues not only the courage, moderation, and prudence which are politically necessary, but also the more splendid Churchillian virtues of liberality and grandeur of soul less closely tied to utility. Liberality and even magnificence befit great men. They "always know that great things are at their hands expected. . . . For actions which must be great, mean instruments will not serve. . . . " Even in matters of religious worship "devout magnificence" is a fitting tribute. If charity to the poor is a necessary work, the splendid raising of churches is even in God's eves "an honorable work." Hooker's words seem to point toward the peak of moral virtue for Aristotle: magnanimity or greatness of soul. Knowing its own excellence, noble pride pursues only what Hooker like Aristotle calls "the chiefest" of "earthly blessings," "reputation" or "honor."39

But if Hooker prepares a celebration of magnanimity, he does not consummate it. His writings include no discussion of noble pride comparable to that in Book IV of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The reason seems to be the equivocal place of pride occasioned by Hooker's Christianity.

Magnanimity presupposes an unflawed excellence of character and a proud awareness of that excellence. But this disposition is at variance with the Christian's insistence that all men are flawed by sin and that fallen man's well-doing proceeds fundamentally, if indirectly, from God's providence. This insistence implies that man's disposition ought always to contain an element of humility, of subservience to his true superior, God. The status of pride is then doubtful. It is quite striking that Hooker does not, like Aristotle, treat vanity as merely

³⁵ I xi 5, cf. ix 1, II viii 2; Works, III, 599, 619.
I viii 8, 11, III ix 1, VII xv 14, V ix 1, lxxxi 4,
IV lx 5, 6, 7.

³⁶ V i 2, 3, lxxi 2, II i 2.

³⁷ Works, III, 594-95. Cf. II iv 7, vii; III viii 7-10, esp. 11, 12-17.

³⁸ VII xviii 10, cf. xxiv 5.

³⁹ V lxxvi 2, 3, lxxvii 14; VII xxiv 18; V xv 3, 4; V xv 5 lxxix 14.

one kind of vice. Hooker calls vanity the crowning "mother" of "all" vice. His readers are exhorted repeatedly to "meekness and tenderness of heart." "God doth load with his grace the lowly, when the proud he sendeth empty away," he writes, and then interprets a Biblical parable.

The Pharisee and publican having presented themselves in one and the same place, the temple of God, for performance of one and the same duty, the duty of prayer, did notwithstanding, in that respect only, so far differ the one from the other, that our Lord's own verdict of them remaineth (as you know) on record, "They departed home," the sinful publican, through humility of prayer, just; the just Pharisee, through pride, sinful. So much better doeth he accept of a contrite peccavi, than of an arrogant Deo gratias. 40

Similarly, Hooker's praise of liberality and magnificence is qualified by his view that virtue's importance depends essentially on one's intention as perceived by God, rather than on the grandeur of one's means. "... The meanest and the very poorest amongst men yielding unto God as much in proportion as the greatest, and many times in affection more, [may be assured] that in his sight from whom all good is expected, they are concerning acceptation, protection, divine privileges and preeminences whatsoever, equals and peers with them unto whom they are otherwise in earthly respects inferiors."41 In short, the more splendid and aristocratic virtues culminating in magnanimity are kept from their Aristotelian place by the Christian tendencies in Hooker's thought which advance patience, humility and dutifulness. Greatness of soul is somewhat presumptuous in the light of divine justice.

The preeminence of divine justice depreciates not only the magnanimity which crowns the fine man, but also the more or less aristo-

⁴⁰ Works, III, 702. Hooker expands upon all the evils occurring in "private families," "greater societies," and the Church. He then says that by "... naming pride, we name the mother which brought them forth, and the only nurse that feedeth them. Give me the hearts of all men humbled; and what is there that can overthrow or disturb the peace of the world? wherein many things are cause of much evil; but pride of all." Works, III, 606, cf. 647, 614. Cf. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1240b, 21-24.

"The good man never finds fault with himself at the moment of his act, like the incontinent, nor the later with the earlier man, like the penitent, nor the earlier with the later, like the liar."

cratic distributive justice which crowns the fine polity. These two are inextricably combined in Aristotle's thought, in fact, for the claims of the outstanding man justly extend to political rule, if not to unqualified political rule. If the flooring of Aristotle's ethics is attuned to the necessities of politics, the ceiling is attuned to the best in politics, the best regime. The peak of aristocratic virtue is matched by the peak of distributive justice, an appropriate distribution of office and privilege to the finer man. While the manner of distribution or the form of government is crucial to the consummation of Aristotle's ethics, it is not so crucial to Hooker's. "... The kinds [of regiment] being many, Nature tieth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrary."42 It is perfectly characteristic of Hooker that his only thematic elaboration of justice passes up human justice (briefly summed up as "distributive, commutative, and corrective") to dwell upon divine justice. Justice is considered as "the bond" of the very "world," whereby each thing benefits from the rest. God's distributive justice "yields unto each person that which is due according to the difference of their quality." God's corrective justice punishes sins. No commutative justice is mentioned, perhaps because there are no transactions in divine justice between parties sufficiently equal so that each can benefit the other.43 God's goodness cannot be increased by man; man's goodness comes as the free gift of God. Thus justice consists fundamentally in dutiful righteousness. If its manifestation lies partly in helping other men according to law, its fundamental tenor consists in righteous obedience to God's law. Human justice is but a reflection of the dictates of divine justice.

The substitution of divine for political justice yields a tone of dutiful resignation to Hooker's politics which further distinguishes it from Aristotle's. For the excellence of political justice is never unqualified in Aristotle's teaching, whereas Hooker's divine justice is in an important sense always perfect. Apart from its general inferiority to philosophy, political justice is so rarely perfect in practice that its very stature in Aristotelian principle is somewhat questionable. It prescribes the most excellent kinds of action and character only in the best regime. In all others-in the overwhelming majority of cases, that is—justice prescribes goods inferior to that of which the fine man is capable. The good citizen and the good man are rarely identical. For Hooker, however, divine justice is always perfect, and that perfection

⁴¹ V lxxix 8.

⁴² T x 5

⁴³ Works, III, 615ff.; cf. I ii, iii.

conditions his treatment of all human justice. Even that which may appear as chance or evil falls under the law of God—if it be only his first and unknowable eternal law. Even the faults of earthly justice are in a decisive way the dictates of divine justice. Perhaps no other part of Hooker's ethics indicates so graphically the distinction between his Christian Aristotelianism and Aristotle's own political philosophy.

To conclude, Hooker's ethics is given its decisive tone by his Christian understanding of man as finally a spiritual animal, not simply a

rational and political animal. The religious content, the elaborately calculated derivation, even the strict legality, of Hooker's law of reason reflect its important stature as a providential deity's command of the necessary means of salvation. Similarly, the aristocratic and political tone of Aristotelian moral virtue is qualified by Hooker with a tenor of humility and a-political dutifulness befitting obedience to a justice not human but divine. The distinctive basis of Hooker's political philosophy is obtained not by philosophy alone, but only with the decisive assistance of revelation.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL IMAGINATION

TO THE EDITOR:

Joseph S. Murphy, in his review of The Crisis of Political Imagination in your June, 1965 issue, p. 460, has handled my main ideas with considerable carelessness. Most of the views he attributes to me I do not recognize as those I tried to set down in the book; and his main criticism seems to me patently fallacious as well as misleading concerning my argument. Some of the fault here is undoubtedly mine. If I were rewriting the book now I think I could be clearer; and there may be faults in the book which he has sensed but has not succeeded in bringing into focus. Nevertheless, more sympathetic readers have gained a very different impression of the book than the one described in the review. Hence the same intention which led me to write the book constrains me to attempt a brief clarification and rejoinder.

1. The reviewer states that the book's chief theme is "the alleged failure of political theory to do away once and for all with all the world's ills and to rectify the tragedy of the human condition." In contrast, my own notion of the book's chief theme is that it concerns the failure of political theory to attend with sufficient fidelity to those ills which cannot be rectified. I dwell particularly on the primary and unrelievable gravity (as well as relevance to political theory) of death and of sin. What I tried to argue is that politics, with its responsibility for the general setting of life, must be concerned with trying to assure such a setting that these insuperable ills can be confronted with dignity and composure. I am perhaps in error on this matter; but if so, my error is certainly not that of suggesting that political theory can "do away once and for all" with death and sin.

2. Murphy asserts that alienation is an "exceptive" concept and that it would be senseless to assert that "everyone, everywhere and always," is alienated. To begin with, this is certainly not true. None of the main concepts through which we envision man—rationality, freedom, and the like—are "exceptive"; otherwise, they would not serve to characterize man as such. By way of analogy he asserts that it would be senseless to assert that all men, in all times, are selfish. But it is not, as Christian arguments concerning original sin show. These arguments may be false; men may be less universally selfish than the more pessimistic Christians suppose. But the doctrine of original

sin is not senseless. Likewise it is not senseless—although it may be false—to assert that man as such is an alienated being.

In suggesting that this was my point Murphy seriously oversimplifies the view I was trying to present. I did try to show that alienation is present in a great many aspects of our lives today; and I argued too that present-day estrangement characterizes human life as such. Alienation, as well as death and sin, is among the ills which I argued could not be completely rectified. But surely it is reasonable to hold that there are degrees of alienation and that man is more alienated now than he has been at some periods in the past. This seems to me a rather complex matter, but I do not think I am guilty of quite so unqualified and indiscriminate an application of the concept as he charges.

The reviewer implicitly acknowledges that I draw some limits in applying the concept when he imputes to me belief in a past "veritable Golden Age of Fulfillment." But here he misconstrues my viewpoint in the other direction. I did not intend to put forth such a notion and I really cannot see how a reasonably conscientious reader could think that I did. I do have the impression that life in the Athenian polis or the medieval town often involved less estrangement than does life in a modern city or suburb. But I do not know how I could have made clearer my belief that no "Golden Age of Fulfillment" is possible within history nor my conviction that even the best of earlier societies have suffered from the radical flaw of class conflict and exploitation. Indeed, one aspect of my chief theme is that, because of the poverty which has always afflicted mankind, no earlier societies have had our opportunities for achieving community.

3. Finally, the reviewer states that "it is sheer folly to suppose that a possible solution to these problems lies in the resurrection of ancient and well interred religious institutions." While "sheer folly" is a little strong, I share his conviction that such a view would be seriously in error, and ask, who indeed holds it? Some Anglicans and some Catholics, perhaps. But I certainly do not. Again he has made my argument seem something very different from my intention. I was trying to pose the question as to how religious truths can be recognized by a society in view of this very fact: that the ancient religious institutions cannot (and I think I pretty clearly said should not) be re-established.

Further, I devoted many pages to distinguishing between the religiously significant but undogmatic insights of artists, philosophers, and various secular figures—many of whom may be professed atheists—and the revelations on which religions are built. I explicitly stated that only the former, free of all dogma and orthodoxy, should in any way be officially supported. I confess that I am still not satisfied with this argument and am convinced only that the problem is serious, and that I am on the right track. But when a critic implies that I desire to resurrect the Holy Roman Empire I can only feel that he ought to pay more attention to what I said.

The Crisis of Political Imagination is centered upon these hypotheses: that man is properly and inevitably concerned above all with questions concerning eternity; that serenity and dignity in personal existence depend on achieving an intuition, even if unformulable, of the answers to these questions; that one's

sense of the meaning of his existence is not derived mainly from dogmas or even from churches but from the whole society in which he lives; that government, as the present administration in Washington has clearly knowledged, is necessarily and increasingly concerned with the quality of the whole society; and that consequently the simple and extreme secularism of the modern democracies, while embodying some important truths, cannot be an historical resting place. These hypotheses seem to me to state some of the main conditions of community. The crisis of political imagination I see as lying in our loss of serious and deep concern for community. I readily admit that these are vast issues, which I have by no means mastered. I had hoped, however, in writing The Crisis of Political Imagination, that we might discuss them.

GLENN TINDER University of Massachusetts (Boston)

MATCH TO TINDER

TO THE EDITOR:

I very much regret that Glenn Tinder finds my review of his *The Crisis of Political Imagination* careless. I am certainly inclined to agree with his assertion that "some of the fault is undoubtedly" his own in failing to make his arguments clear. My quarrel, however, is not with the clarity of his writing, but with the intellectual utility of the concepts which constitute the heart of his arguments.

It may be, as he complains, that he does not recognize the views attributed to him, a circumstance about which there is little to say; that my main criticisms are "fallacious as well as misleading," is a somewhat more grave charge and requires examination.

He denies that it is senseless to use the concept of alienation in the way he does. He argues that my objections to the use of 'alienation' would apply equally to 'rationality,' 'freedom,' and the like. I quite agree. If these concepts are used, as they often are, in the same fashion as he uses 'alienation' they are indeed meaningless. I fully understand his desire to have such statements characterized as, at the very least, false, rather than meaningless. For then his talk about alienation would have the appearance of empirical legitimacy. After all, the denial of a false proposition is a true proposition. My objection is that he has asserted no propositions, but rather a host of meaningless statements which can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed. Saying, as he does, that the doctrine of original sin, though it may be false, is not senseless, does not make the doctrine of original sin meaningful—and the same holds for alienation and other similarly misused concepts. It is a simple rule of thought that a property, quality, or condition which can be predicated universally is uninformative—it tells us nothing about the world or its contents.

I agree, in this context, that talk about varying degrees of alienation is a complex matter. It becomes all the more complex in the absence of a clear and unambiguous statement about what sort of condition the alienated condition is supposed to be.

As to the rest I can only ask: How does one go about confirming or disconfirming the hypothesis that "man is properly and inevitably concerned above all with questions concerning eternity"? What is one to do with the statement: "Serenity and dignity in personal existence depend on achieving an intuition (sic), even if unformulable of the answers to these questions"? I do not know. I do not know how one can know.

Tinder mentions at several junctures what his intentions were. I am, of course, pleased to know something about these, though it must be clear that I reviewed what I took him to be saying in his book, not what he intended to say.

The pity of this exchange is that what separates Tinder from my own position is what separates political theory, at least as it is done in some quarters, from political theory as it is done in others. Yet we have done little to narrow the breach.

Joseph S. Murphy

Brandeis University

ON ELECTORAL MYTH AND REALITY

TO THE EDITOR:

One item, at least, in the article by Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clauson and Warren E. Miller: "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election" (this *Review*, June, 1965) deserves comment.

In attempting to explain the Goldwater loss in 1964, the authors offer some strikingly original observations. In their effort to explain the Goldwater strategy, they construct a rationale (pp. 332-6) which is supposed to reveal what might have served to mislead the Goldwater forces into thinking that they could win the contest against President Johnson. The authors suggest, in effect, that practically everyone in the country knew that Senator Goldwater had little chance of winning in November. Therefore, there must be some explanation as to why Goldwater and his aides were so badly misled. There is an explanation. But it cannot be obtained by employing the theory of games, which in this case would place victory as the sole or major objective of all participants.

According to the authors, Goldwater was misled by the intensive efforts of his supporters which led him to believe that he had a larger base of support than actually existed. In their words, "... the large bulk of letters to public officials or the printed media come from a tiny fraction of the population, which tends to write very repetitively.... [and] as these few people write more and more letters over time, they are counted again and again..." (p. 333). We are thus to conclude that inasmuch as "public opinion is a protean thing," (p. 332) the Goldwater forces committed a most understandable error: they simply failed to realize how weak their base of support really was.

But 1964 was not an orthodox election year. The quest for winning elections, which had always serve to guide the decision-making process in the past, was absent to a large degree from the 1964 Republican nominating convention. How could such a thing happen? People dominated by ideological considerations and dedicated to Senator Goldwater captured control of the delegate-selection process. For them, being "right" was far more important than winning the contest for the presidency. To para-

phrase one of them: they had won with echoes but they much preferred a choice.

In these circumstances, the standards used by the authors to try to explain what probably took place in the minds of those advising Goldwater were not necessarily the standards employed by the Goldwater people. The Goldwater forces may have been comforted but were not misled by their own fan mail. When one is called to duty, one goes without regard to cost or consequence. How else does one explain the uncompromising and ideologically "heavy" tone of the Goldwater acceptance speech? "Southern strategy" notwithstanding, a man eager to win does not snub party leaders and millions of the rank-and-file.

Moreover, we have had benefit of the type of analysis offered by Richard Neustadt in Presidential Power long enough to realize that our ex post facto analyses of political events often impose a degree of order to the happenings which the participants wouldn't recognize. Even the 1964 Republican nominating convention and campaign, filled as they were with examples of great single-mindedness, were nonetheless the products of decisions and events which were at times disparate and isolated. Senator Goldwater probably did feel an obligation to his dedicated followers who had long been begging him to run. His original plan was set in motion before the assassination of President Kennedy and although this plan may have depended upon his running against Kennedy, it was still allowed to continue after November, 1963. And, what ideologue wouldn't jump at the chance to present his case before a nation-wide audience? In the meantime, Goldwater supporters worked hard lining up delegates who would not stray from the fold in the face of threats, including that of almost certain defeat at the polls in November. This last factor was the key to the Goldwater nomination. His followers may not have won more than temporary control of a major party, but they did gain command of the delegate-selection machinery. And as they showed us so clearly, this can mean much more than what members of the Gallup panel say.

WILLIAM C. BAUM

Creighton University

ERRATA

The Review regrets two editorial mistakes resulting in the misidentification of men named in Avery Leiserson's article on "Scientists and the Policy Process" in the June issue. On p. 412, in the acknowledgement footnote to Table I,

the correct name is David Z. Beckler. On p. 415, in the second paragraph of footnote 19, the correct name is Edward C. Wenk, formerly on the staff of the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOK REVIEWS

The Symbolic Uses of Politics. By Murray EDELMAN. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. Pp. 201. \$5.00.)

This is one of those lucid, tightly reasoned books that are an intellectual pleasure to read, because its argument-and its virtues and defectsare so pellucidly visible. The book discusses how symbols affect political action generally and how political symbols influence what people specifically expect out of government. As the title implies and as the content verifies, it is not a book about the relationship between what people individually want and how these wants are collectively, politically symbolized. Rather, the subject matter is verbal and non-verbal symbols, in the sense in which Pavlov or J. B. Watson analyzed them: as cues which are received by the brain and produce conditioned responses. The subject matter is not the food fed to the dog but the bell or other stimulus to which the dog responds in order to get the food. Occasionally and only peripherally, the author considers the political hungers that relate political responses to symbolic cues, but his candid, central concern is with the symbols of hunger and of food and not the elusive reality of hunger and

Edelman analyzes a variety of symbolic activities, including the ritual of leader-follower relationships and of authority. He nicely describes the rituals involved, for example, in law enforcement, collective bargaining, and in the practices of regulatory agencies. He persuasively argues that these rituals are a basic characteristic of these political practices in America. Law enforcement in this book becomes a ritualistic game in which both citizen and government test enforceability of legal rules by symbolic acts probing the limits of coercion and compliance that lie just this side of force. Collective bargaining becomes a verbal exchange in which each party tests the willingness of the other to demand and concede-and in the process symbolically reassures the public (which will likely pay the bill in the form of higher prices) that the end of bargaining has achieved the best interests of labor, management, and the public. Regulatory agencies similarly limit and are limited by the demands of the regulated industry and similarly reassure the public that its interests have been served.

Leadership is analyzed in terms of a public official's availability, his conspicuousness, and above all his ability to give the impression of being able to cope with the great problems which confront the polity. A major goal of the leader is to maximize acquiescence. To achieve this he

must establish the symbolic and artificial semblance of coping with these problems. The test of his effectiveness is the establishment of a consensus on norms. The occurrence of the dissensus that in extreme form is called rebellion is an ambivalent response to a variety of political value symbols.

The book contains the virtues and vices of reducing political analysis to the symbolic, to which semanticists and stimulus-response psychologists at times tend to reduce human action. To establish agreement on the meaning of the symbols of loyalty and dissent is difficult but it is far easier than to establish agreement on the ways that concrete acts abstractly labeled, for example, identification and alienation affect loyalty and dissent. Purely verbal units of analysis are more readily demonstrable and manipulable than those which include non-symbolic origins of behavior. It is indeed unnecessary to consider non-rational roots of behavior to be able to demonstrate what the author has so cogently shown: that our political actions are to an enormous degree amenable to symbolic analysis and people do act politically in response to symbols. It is similarly unnecessary to probe deeply into the meaning of meaning, for semanticists to point out how bound people are by their words. And stimulus-response psychology has produced a wealth of highly valuable research with specific, discrete, demonstrable units of analysis like the conditioned stimulus of Pavlov's bell.

The defects of symbolic analysis relate to the excessive emphasis on symbols, which in this book is symbolized by Edelman's bold assertion that we can learn more about the behavior of elites and masses from esthetic theory than from anthropology and social psychology. In his frank uneasiness about symbolism, he keeps peering over the edge of the symbolic into the, to him, obscure world of human wants and other mental processes. Rebellion, he says, correlates with a bimodal value pattern and he seems to say that this bimodality causes rebellion. But he declines to let things rest with the symbolic: particular wants of people must be satisfied to produce "political contentment." And he does not quite argue that the stage settings and ritual actions of policy makers and administrators are sufficient conditions for contentment. Dramaturgy is not enough: popular anxiety about ultimate consequences remains.

But Edelman shies away from this obscure, non-symbolic, non-rational world whose existence he seems to acknowledge anxiously. Symbolic satisfactions are not enough, but what the real needs are he does not seriously discuss. He treads over

the psychology from which he says we can learn so little with the uneasy awkwardness of a city-slicker suffering from agoraphobia and muddy feet as he steps into these vast, well-tilled, and fertile fields of scientific endeavor. To let rebellion be symbolized as an ambivalent response to signs and as a bimodal value pattern, leaves much to be said about not only revolution but also about more orderly political conflict.

What people mean when they say "you can't eat the constitution" remains verbal in this book. Hunger and the lack of food remain not quite brazen sound, but they are regarded as little more than tinkling cymbals. The actual state of the stomach is not deemed very relevant to the discussion. This limitation of the book delimits its contribution, which in its own terms indeed is very worthy of our attention.—James C. Davies, University of Oregon.

Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis. By William T. Bluhm. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Pp. vi, 502. \$7.95.)

This stimulating book is an imaginative and bold attempt to relate the classics of political thought to modern political analysis. Bluhm seeks, in this way, to build a bridge (1) between the traditional masters of political philosophy and modern political scientists, and (2) "between the varying tendencies with political studies today." He seeks to demonstrate the continued relevance of the classics to the approaches, problems, and ambitions of the modern political scientist. Hopefully, the outcome may be the synthesis of classic and modern, "noumenalist" and "naturalist." In this synthesis justice would be done to philosophy, science, and statesmanship, to the good life, empirical politics, and prudential judgment.

Bluhm supports his argument in a provocative series of critical essays in which he compares classic and modern. The illuminating, heuristic juxtaposition is best captured, initially, in his chapter titles which also reveal the book's contents, most of the men treated, and clues as to the meaning of such terms as "naturalist," and "noumenalist": "Naturalistic Political Science: Thucydides and Snyder;" "Noumenalist Political Science: Plato and Strauss:" "The Aristotelian Bridge: Aristotle, Lipset, Almond;" "The Augustinian Bridge: St. Augustine, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau;" "Thomas and Neo-Thomism: St. Thomas and Maritain;" "Naturalistic Prudence: Machiavelli and Neustadt:" "Mathematics in Naturalistic Political Science: Hobbes, Downs, and Riker;" "From Political Science to Ideology: Lockean Theory;" "Naturalistic Political Science as Interest Group Theory: Harrington and Bentley;" "The Theory

of Democratic Virtue: Rousseau, Friedrich, and Burns;" "Conservative Immanentism: Burke and Lippmann;" "Marxian Theory: Marx, Engels, Mills;" "Scientific Liberalism: John Stuart Mill and Christian Bay."

Bluhm argues that a critical, comparative review of classic theories and certain modern analogues will (1) greatly enhance our methodological sophistication, (2) help transform ideology into knowledge, and (3) advance the building of a general political theory which will accommodate partial insights and illuminate the whole discipline. Bluhm urges a fruitful dialogue among contending schools, classic and modern. He believes that such a dialogue would lead to that synthesis which would do justice to an integrated political science, one in which the integrity of individual approaches would not be sacrificed in the resulting union. In such a science, "political ethics would not swallow up descriptive science, nor would ethical questions be reduced to behavioral ones." The "Socratic dialectic of the Platonists would not be outmoded," but would "work with more elaborate and sophisticated data." The desirability and possibility of democracy, communism, and other systems and theories, would be tested in the light of broader ethical and scientific inquiry. Moreover, there would be room for many approaches: of decision-making, group process, conditions of democratic stability, the structure of freedom. Bluhm's disposition to relate ethics, science, and statesmanship is reflected in his critical acceptance of these approaches. Thus, "Neustadt's recipes for power would not be outlawed but would be combined with, and perhaps modified by, a theory of the uses of power." Similarly, "game theory, from which the students of political ethics can learn canons of clear and precise reasoning about ends and means, could no longer be criticized as a science of sharp practice but would become one aspect of a science of the human political good." And, ultimately, "the mathematical vocabulary which has been developed by the game theorists and some of the other decision-making theorists might become a vehicle for expressing the principles of the entire unified discipline, both in its ethical and behavioral dimensions."

What can be said of this ambitious, stimulating, very suggestive book? Two main points need to be stressed. First, this book should be welcomed as another major effort to reconcile the normative, empirical, and prudential components of the discipline of political science. It will unquestionably be an exciting book for students in political theory who are interested in exploring the possibilities of constructing a grand theoretical design. They will be encouraged to read the classics with an eye to universal ideas; they will see in the

classics most of the methodologies and assumptions that underlie the "discordant variety" of modern political science; and they will be helped to weave together the diverse threads of the discipline's several fields into a more meaningful theoretical fabric.

Second, one hopes that the partisans on both sides of Bluhm's bridge will not shoot him down without seriously examining his thesis and argument. If the traditional theorist or modern empiricist attempt to discredit him by sniping at what they consider his faulty interpretations of the men treated, they will be missing his main point: the continued relevance of the classics for modern political science, and the need to develop a more "catholic" political theory for modern men. In those places where Bluhm's exposition and analysis may be incomplete cr questionable, let those concerned not rip the bridge down but constructively assist in its completion-or at least suggest an alternative bridge. Happily, we are now far along in the task of clearing the air of the often stultifying smoke produced by the extremist guns in the behavioral-traditional battle. As a result, we can now see better the remaining problems that face us as we seek, in our respective ways, to advance the five major tasks of the discipline: unity, clarification of the good political life, illumination of empirical political behavior, prudent guidance, and significant research. To the more intelligent accomplishment of these tasks Bluhm has made a major contribution. I venture to predict that this book will be the most widely discussed theory book of the year.—NEAL RIEMER, The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. By Louis Hartz. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. Pp. xi, 236. \$6.50.)

Professor Hartz has undertaken a difficult if not impossible task. By elaborating on the thesis of The Liberal Tradition in America, he has sought to propound a general theory of the principles governing the development of "fragment" societies—that is, societies that have grown out of a fragment of an older culture. At the same time he has tried to combine his general treatment with specific studies of four countries, each written by a different person. (Hartz himself contributed the study of the United States.)

Almost every paragraph of this impressive book bristles with challenging ideas, with insights, and with difficulties. Take its opening sentences. "There is a problem of traditionalism and change common to the societies studied in this book, and it derives from the fact that all of them are frag-

ments of the larger whole of Europe. . . . For when a part of a European nation is detached from the whole of it, and hurled outward onto new soil, it loses the stimulus toward change that the whole provides. It lapses into a kind of immobility." (p. 3) One wonders whether the problem of immobility and change is not common to almost every nation on the face of the earth, including the countries of Europe. Moreover, has the United States been more afflicted with immobility than has the United Kingdom? Perhaps the author is thinking of ideology rather than of events; but (whether or not that would solve the difficulty) this seems to be only partly true.

Professor Hartz's style, often poetic and somehow Hegelian, also adds both charm and (frequently) obscurity. The following passage is perhaps typical of the best of his writing: "When fragmentation detaches [the European ideology] from this context, and makes it master of a whole region, all sorts of magic inevitably take place. First of all, it becomes a universal, sinking beneath the surface of thought to the level of an assumption. Then, almost instantly, it is reborn, transformed into a new nationalism arising out of the necessities of fragmentation itself." (p. 5) (Incidentally, Professor Rosecrance later tells us that "one of the strange outcomes of Australian history . . . is that social and political reform did not lead to the consolidation of a nation-state in the mid-nineteenth century." (p. 291)

The fragments, Hartz argues, are not cross-sections; they are horizontal cuts. In one place they may be feudal (Latin America), in another liberal (the United States), and still elsewhere radical (Australia). They do not reproduce a likeness of the original, but the transplanted element proliferates the ideology it brought with it. Today however the fragments are at the end of one era and the beginning of a new one. Just why it should come at the same time for all of them or what is the reason in each case is not always clear, although it appears to be the race problem that explains why the mechanism of rigid conservatism is producing insecurity rather than security in South Africa and in the United States and which will therefore, with a new revolution, bring to an end the "fragment" phase of history. Indeed, Hartz declares that the new era is already "igniting again a spark of philosophy" that had long been dead.

The author finds the lack of ideological conflict in the various fragments the most significant factor in determining the development of ideas (and events?) in those countries, although he also recognizes, secondarily, the role of more concrete factors. The latter, incidentally, are uniformly accorded much more significance by his collaborators.

Professor Leonard M. Thompson, for instance, declares that the "primary phenomenon" in South Africa is that the two European fragments which settled there "have been established amidst more numerous peoples of non-European origin." (p. 179) Interestingly enough, the word "fragment" escaped my eye, if indeed it appeared, in Richard M. Morse's interesting chapter on Latin America. Professor Rosecrance, struggling manfully to bring his enlightening discussion of Australia into accord with the Hartzian theory, finds support in the fact that "Australia's various schemes for meeting the problems of the Great Depression were far less radical in relation to the social context in which they were evolved and applied than were the parallel policies of the New Deal in the American context." (p. 312) The statement would appear to be equally applicable to Britain and many other non-"fragment" societies.

Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with the attempt to spread a theoretical net so wide is that the theory tends to become so complicated that it can explain anything. "The American fragment absolute," writes Hartz, "comes out then in many ways: civil rights, economic life, the intricacies of political alignment. It is a jewel of many facets." (p. 116) Indeed it is. It includes the absolutistic polarity by which we can switch from keeping the Negro in subjection to insisting on the most absolute equality; and at the same time it also includes pragmatism. (p. 115) It is remarkable that the latter term appears so seldom in a discussion of American political philosophy; but it does appear, and by its inclusion in the explanatory scheme, in addition to what has gone before, it would seem that the theory receives a saving flexibility that would render disproof impossible.

Many of my remarks have been critical. Perhaps I have indulged too freely the scholarly penchant for picking on the flaws and taking the gems for granted. Primarily, I would stress, however, that this book's value lies in its insights, its comparisons, its richly textured relating to each other of ideas and tendencies seldom contemplated together. From this kind of experience the reader may draw his own fruitful conclusions without accepting those of the author.—J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College.

The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life. By James David Barber. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. Pp. xx, 314. \$5.00.)

Professor Barber's study can be read with profit by any interested student of government, layman or professional. With an understanding and sympathetic feel for the day-to-day life of the freshman state legislator, it explores imaginatively the

patterns of recruitment into and adjustment to legislative life. The results of this exploration are a worthwhile contribution toward understanding the psychology of legislative behavior. This contribution is rare, however, in that the work attempts not merely to describe and account for certain types of political behavior and attitudes but also to relate the findings to questions about the functioning of the legislative sub-system in the larger political system. It is also of more than usual methodological interest in that it analyzes coherently three varieties of data not often combined in one research operation-pre- and postsession mail questionnaires (to 150 freshman Connecticut legislators of the 1959 session), intensive interviews with a sample (27) of the ninety-six legislators returning either or both of the mail questionnaires and basic documentary data such as legislative records and census reports.

The book's substance can be readily described. On the basis of a legislative-activity index, calculated from legislative records, and a willingnessto-return-to-legislature index, derived from answers to questions about such willingness, legislators are classified as Lawmakers, Reluctants, Advertisers, or Spectators, Attitudes and behaviors associated with each category are delineated by a series of tabular "profiles" and analyses of interview materials and further amplified by extended discussion of three case-typical individuals of each sort. Each of the four types of legislator is examined with respect to the character of community and nominating processes which seem to produce the type, the personal reactions of the new arrival in the legislature, his perceptions and conceptions of self, his strategies for managing the personal stresses and strains of adapting to legislative life, the implications of that type of behavior for the working of the legislative system, and the probable political future for legislators of a given

Critical readers, especially those tending to be skeptical of behavioral research on principle, will find some likely targets for criticism in this work. The basic assumption "that the individual's political behavior represents a collection of adjustive techniques or strategies by which he attempts to maximize the satisfaction of his needs" (p. 213) will seem weak to some because it is "too psychological," and to others because it is too eclectic psychologically. Similarly, the inference of diverse psychic needs and complex psychic states from relatively scanty interview data will be unconvincing to many readers besides those who are cold to psychoanalytical approaches in general. More specifically, it is difficult to explain or justify in terms of any body of psychological or political theory the enormous weight put on the two par-

ticular variables which serve to put each of the subjects into his proper typological niche. Skeptics and more friendly critics may both question the happy accident that all the Procrustean beds for Barber's data seem to be of the same size, that, in Barber's own words, "The world begins to arrange itself in fourfold tables." (p. 261) For example, it is remarkably convenient that there are exactly four types of legislator and exactly four alternative strategies by which legislators can adjust to legislative life. Critics may also be made uneasy by the fact that each type of legislator is described mainly, so far as proportionate allocation of space is concerned, through excerpts from case-typical interviews, so that the reader has no way of knowing just how general or typical the illustrative data really are.

These are all legitimate methodological queries. But one should not make more of them than they deserve. The author is well aware of the limitations of his methods and his objectives, and makes no exaggerated or misleading claims for his wares. He knows and explicitly recognizes the character of the psychological foundation on which his work rests. He is by no means claiming, as careless critics might erroneously assume, that each legislator is wholly and fully accounted for as a person or as a legislator by classifying him into one of the four categories described. His typology is an analytical distinction intended to account for limited classes of legislative behavior, not to account once and for all for everything about the legislators classified. More specifically, one should not overlook the fact that substantial independent and objective validation of the typology is provided in the tabular profiles of each type of legislator, although for some reason the author does not exploit these data as fully as it appears he could. Moreover, the typology seems to point to patterns of behavior which have been found by other means in other studies, although the author makes little effort to relate the patterns he found to patterns or typologies used in other works. Finally, the work is not a test of hypotheses drawn from a specified theory but an effort to infer speculative hypotheses for future testing from a body of empirical data not organized into any particular theoretical mold.

Indeed, one of the book's most attractive features is the author's constant effort to speculate well beyond his data, to do more than just describe what he has found. More than most research reports and certainly more than most doctoral dissertations, Barber's never loses sight of the body of knowledge to which it is supposed to be ultimately relevant. He has chosen to emphasize the bearing of his data and findings on the problem of recruiting personnel into legislatures

more than their bearing on the problem of operating a legislature after they are recruited. As a result, despite lip-service recognition of the institutional utility of Advertisers, Spectators, and Reluctants, there is no doubt that it is the Lawmakers who are Barber's legislative heroes. The concluding discussion of improving the caliber of legislative bodies therefore sounds suspiciously like the naive pleas of some civic reformers of an earlier age. But even if one is unsympathetic to such pleas, he must applaud the effort to keep research relevant to such problems.—John C. Wahlke, State University of New York at Buffalo.

Home Place: The story of the U.S. House of Representatives. By William S. White. (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1965. Pp. 175. \$4.00)

Perhaps it was inevitable that William S. White would get around to writing a companion volume to Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate (1957). The result is disappointing. White, former chief congressional correspondent for the New York Times and now a nationally syndicated columnist and confidant of President Johnson, has been away from the House of Representatives too long. Instead of analyzing basic differences between the two institutions, he pontificates on the ways in which the Senate is better than the House. Many of the common myths about the House are perpetuated. White adds a number of misinterpretations and inaccuracies of his own. Home Place consists of a series of partially developed themes, impressions of the House as of the 1940s and 1950s as viewed by a congressional correspondent; who, almost from the beginning, "was unable to bring himself to go to the House when anything at all was doing in the Senate" (p. 43). Most of the book's themes are grand oversimplifications. The House is dominated by senior members from small-town and rural America. In essentials it is no different than it was a century ago. Its primary concern is domestic policy. Foreign policy is left to the more sophisticated Senate. The Senate can always outthink the House, although never outwork it. Occasionally, the House stampedes, but, fortunately, the Senate, in its wisdom, comes to the rescue. Nevertheless, the House has its virtues. It is the home place in our government, a forum, above all, for the average American.

Many of these themes, when developed at all, are based upon misinterpretation, if not errors of fact. For example, take White's contention that the House is dominated by senior members from small-town and rural America. This is so, White argues, because "one rarely finds [safe one-party districts] in any essentially urban areas of the country, although they do turn up occasionally in states like New York and Massachusetts . . ." (p.

32). In fact, there are over 100 urban congressional districts, the great majority of which consistently return Democrats to office. Many of these members rise to positions of considerable authority in the House-to mention only a few, Speaker McCormack of Massachusetts, chairmen such as Celler and Powell of New York, and influential committee members such as Kirwan of Ohio, Keogh and Rooney of New York, Bolling of Missouri, Thomas of Texas, and Shelley and Roosevelt of California. At the time when White was covering the House, one would also want to include Sabath of Illinois, Buckley of New York, and the late Tom O'Brien of Chicago and William Green of Pennsylvania. There is, of course, a partial truth in White's simple thesis about rural domination, but the far more interesting questions are barely touched upon. He says very little about the working relationships between big-city, machine Democrats and rural southern Democratic chairmen which have long controlled the organization of the House. He says even less about challenges to this control since 1958 by a younger, different type of northern liberal organized into the Democratic Study Group. Furthermore. White's simple thesis obscures the fact that there are at least ten Republican "safe" urban districts and an even larger number of suburban districts which consistently return Republicans to the

A sampling of the more obvious errors and inaccuracies illustrates White's failure to do his homework. He has the party leaders rather than committee chairmen controlling floor time on legislation (p. 25). He asserts (p. 85) that "never in all history has a topmost House National reached the Presidency, save for James Madison . . ." (Polk? Garfield? McKinley?). The Committee on Education and Labor is incorrectly assigned jurisdiction over pensions and medical-care legislation (p. 90). The Republican Committee on Committees is not "composed of the senior Republicans in the House from each of the fifty states," and cannot be said to come under the influence of the Ways and Means Committee (p. 96). The appellation "Judge" is not "bestowed by the House upon chairmen of the Rules Committee with no known past judicial distinction . . ." (p. 114). Both the late Adolph Sabath of Illinois and the current chairman, Howard W. Smith of Virginia, were judges for more than eight years prior to their election to the House of Representatives.

Irritating as such blunders are, it is even more aggravating to find White perpetuating distinctions between foreign and domestic policy and arguing that the Senate reigns supreme in the former and the House dominates the latter. In the process of supporting this dubious thesis, defense policy becomes a home affair, House involvement

in questions of foreign aid and the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities is largely overlooked, and the crucial roles of House Appropriations subcommittees on defense and foreign operations are barely acknowledged in passing.

White is at his best in his character sketches of House "Nationals," the members who rise above local interests and concern themselves with nation-wide and world policy. Yet even after these intimate glimpses of the men who stayed-Rayburn and Mahon of Texas, Mills of Arkansas, Judd of Minnesota, Curtis of Missouri, and Smith of Virginia-and the men who left the House-Garner, Dirksen, Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson-Home Place is singularly thin. The last four or five chapters, in particular, are curious fragments of themes, hurriedly presented, as if the author, pressed by his publishers and longing to return to viewing the Presidency and the Senate, had all but given up on this book.—ROBERT L. PEABODY, The Johns Hopkins University.

Soviet Foreign Propaganda. By Frederick C. Barghoorn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. 329. \$6.00.)

Probably this book attracted more initial attention than any other published by a university press last year, for it appeared less than three months after its author had been secretly held for seventeen days by the Soviet security police. Professor Barghoorn, like many less involved observers, believes that his arbitrary imprisonment was designed to interfere with communication between Soviet and Western intellectuals: it was a kind of "propaganda of the deed." Considering the fact that Barghoorn has devoted his scholarly career to the study of how ideology and tactics are related in the Soviet system (his earlier works examined the Soviet propaganda image of the United States, the mixture of Russian nationalism and Communism in Soviet ideology, and Soviet manipulation of foreign cultural contacts), his victimization by the security police was at least symbolic of the Soviet desire to maintain a kind of iron curtain. The present volume is an attempt to describe how the Soviet regime, despite its essentially defensive attitude, has maintained an offensive posture in the world-wide competition for public support.

It is fair to call Soviet Foreign Propaganda a description, for Barghoorn's treatment consists primarily of detailed coverage of the content of Soviet propaganda themes rather than analysis of the communication process. The central chapters of the book are devoted to the themes of nationalism and anti-American propaganda which Barghoorn treated in his earlier books, but this time the subjects are examined as part of the continuing Soviet international propaganda campaign

rather than as elements of domestic indoctrination. In this part of the book Barghoorn also discusses the extremely important "peace" theme in Soviet propaganda abroad and the advocacy of the Soviet model for modernization. The first part of the book is devoted primarily to a discussion of Soviet concepts of the role of propaganda. While this subject has been treated many times, Barghoorn points out significant new developments, such as the virtual discarding of the distinction between "propaganda" and "agitation" in Soviet terminology. The last three chapters, which deal with techniques, organization, media, and effectiveness, are the weakest. Even in a purely descriptive approach, one would have hoped for a more detailed discussion of such highly important themes as the organizational and physical divisions between foreign broadcasts to Western and to Asian countries (e.g., the role of Radio Tashkent) and recruitment and training of propaganda personnel. While the author has skillfully utilized some of the published surveys designed to assess the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, he has not pursued such investigations himself nor has he exhaustively examined the available journalistic reports.

In a book of this kind, however, one certainly cannot expect depth analysis of all aspects. Only a scholar with Barghoorn's long personal familiarity with Soviet life and with a full command of Russian could have produced what is a veritable encyclopedia of the subject. One can expect that future monographs by students who necessarily lack Barghoorn's special qualifications will build on his solid foundation by relating Soviet propaganda activities to communications theory and especially by systematic investigation of why, as well as to what extent, this propaganda has really succeeded. In the meantime, Barghoorn has presented an extraordinarily balanced overall judgment of the success and limitations of Soviet propaganda efforts, which he believes have often been overrated and are now diminishing in effectiveness, at least in the advanced countries.-John A. Arm-STRONG, University of Wisconsin.

The Life of Lenin. By Louis Fischer. (New York, Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. viii, 703. \$10.00.)

Fischer's biography of Lenin is a monumental study of a historical figure whose full impact on the course of human destiny and civilization has not yet been exhausted or expended. Imaginatively conceived, excitingly written and thoroughly documented, The Life of Lenin is authentic biography in the classic mold. The author admirably refuses to cater to the prurient, the sensation-seekers, or the demonologists. He demolishes myths intended to exalt or degrade, traces rumors

to their source, unearths new data, creatively synthesizing and integrating familiar information with new material released by the Soviet authorities. Scrupulously faithful to the facts, he has scoured libraries, research institutes, and archives; he has consulted scholars, specialists and experts; but above all he has called upon his own incomparable and unique experience as a correspondent in Russia during the formative years of the Soviet experiment. It is something of a tribute to Fischer's scholarly impartiality that in spite of the vicissitudes of personal ideological traumas and transfigurations he has been able to describe personalities and events with a detachment that is not wholly deceptive. Although he was ideologically engaged, disengaged, and outraged, knew personally and intimately many of the characters in his biographical drama, and was an observer and semi-participant in many of the events, he surveys the terrain with a remarkably determined aloofness and wholly unnecessary diffidence.

As a consequence, Fischer's book is genuine biography, not iconography. Neither is it an exposé, searching out the seamy side of Lenin's life, breathing false life into groundless rumors or outlandish fabrications, catering to the sensational and prurient. He focuses on Lenin the man, the revolutionary, the statesman, the husband, colleague, friend, boy, son, and brother, not Lenin the prophet, the philosopher, the messiah, scoundrel or demon. The Life of Lenin is obviously a magnificent labor of love, not love for Lenin or his ideas, but love for Lenin the subject. It is likely to remain the most comprehensive and authoritative treatment for many years, although it is unlikely to receive an enthusiastic welcome in that third of the world ruled by Lenin's followers. The study falls just short of being definitive, but only because of the secretiveness of the Soviet regime and through no fault of the author. Some of the most basic facts concerning Lenin's life, such as his precise ethnic origins, remain locked in the Soviet archives. Fischer surmises on the basis of available data, that not only Tartar blood, but Jewish as well, flowed through Lenin's veins. "The Kremlin's secretiveness," Fischer writes, "may be explained by the wish to create a nationalistic image of Lenin as a one hundred per cent Great Russian without infusions of non-Russian blood." But, according to the author, "Reliable facts to prove Dr. Blank [Lenin's maternal grandfather] was or was not a Jew have not been made public," although the records are undoubtedly available in "Russia's bulging archives."

Lenin was a man of seemingly inexhaustible energy, a massive intellect, and a complicated personality, whose mysteries Fischer attempts to unravel with the aid of psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, not always with happy results. Lenin's

written output alone is sufficient to stagger the imagination and paralyze the neophyte. From 1893 to 1923, Lenin wrote an estimated 10 million words, nearly all of them preserved in millions of volumes in more than a dozen languages. The deathless character of Lenin's prose, however, is not a tribute to his literary genius, but a hieratic monument to his success as a revolutionary prophet. As Fischer aptly puts it, "Lenin wrote endlessly, but he was not a literary man."

In Fischer's biography, we see Lenin in all his guises and moods: the compulsive revolutionary, the dedicated fanatic, the artful conspirator, the quarrelsome politician, the expedient statesman, and the devoted but not always faithful husband. We live with Lenin the fugitive, in hiding and in exile; we see him at home, in his office, at the ramparts, on the soapbox, at war and at peace. We hear his boisterous laughter, his shrill invective, and we see him with Trotsky and Stalin, alternately insulting, praising and despairing. We witness Lenin at the height of his mental and physical powers, the prototype of the virile intelectual condottiere, and we also see him crippled by a debilitating infirmity.

What is Lenin's proper place in history? Fischer hardly raises this question, yet it is obviously both an embarrassing and burning question for Western historians. If historical greatness is to be measured in terms of lasting impact, imprint and influence on the course of human destiny, then surely by any standard Lenin must be accounted among the most monumental figures not only of this century, but in all recorded history. Western historians are understandably reluctant to place Lenin in the historical pantheon of greats while his ubiquitous eponymous followers are still frantically dedicated to preempting both the future and the past in his name. Yet Lenin almost certainly will join the company of Alexander the Great, Mohammed and Napoleon rather than that of those ephemeral flashes of destructive and malevolent genius like Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and Adolf Hitler. Already one-third of the world is ruled in his name, another third is animated and motivated by his theory of colonialism and imperialism, while the remaining third alternately quakes and thunders before his battalions distributed everywhere.

Thus, Fischer is rightly more concerned with the man of action rather than the man of thought. Lenin resembles Alexander the Great more than he does Aristotle, in spite of his prolific and often prolix output. He is more properly the founder of an empire-civilization than a philosophical system, and his successors are more like diadochi and epigoni than apostles or disciples, but he is even more than this. He has been rein-

carnated as a God, whose philosophical exegeses have been transmuted into Holy Writ and whose utterances have been converted into aphorisms and beatitudes. "The iconoclast," writes Fischer, "is now a modern Russian icon."—Vernon V. Aspaturian, Pennsylvania State University.

Nationalism in Iran. By RICHARD W. COTTAM. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 332, \$6.00.)

Probably as many crimes have been committed in the name of nationalism as in the name of religion—particularly in modern times. Among these offenses, though hardly conspicuous, lurk the academic. Library catalogues bulge with titles like The Paradox of Nationalism, Nationalism: The History of an Idea, Nationalism and After, Essays on Nationalism, and even Modern Nationalism and Religion. Yet, despite the proliferation of publications, very few useful empirical studies of the phenomena of nationalism exist. This book is to be placed among those worthy few.

The subject has an importance only slightly exceeded by its complexity. As nationalism seems to be setting in the West (save, perhaps, in the 5th Republic—better labeled the 3rd Empire), it is rising in the East. In the West it has recently been most strongly associated with Hitler, Mussolini, racism and international violence. In the contemporary East it is more likely to have the aureole of nation-building, integration and sorely needed consensus. One worries how to damp it in Europe and encourage it in much of Asia.

Actually, no paradox is present here. In developing societies, extending the social and political units with which the individual is acquainted. with which he feels involved, and with which he identifies is a basic problem. In the absence of identification with far more comprehensive units than the traditional family, clan, village and tribe. valued developmental programs have bleak prospects. Consequently, political scientists search keenly for those factors which induce expanded horizons of political allegiance. But we also recognize grotesqueries that are aspects of the same phenomena. Nationalism becomes jingoism, patriotism becomes chauvinism, and identification degenerates into xenophobia. As part of our quest we must also discover the when and why of these aberrations.

Other vital queries also abound. For instance, at times it seems as if there is a fixed capacity for change in an individual's political attachments. He seems to exhaust his affect on the first new unit he learns and thereafter refuses to extend himself again. At other times it appears that the initial extension of political allegiance is the hardest, and that each subsequent extension is easier.

Certainly we do not at present have a definitive grasp of these problems of political identification, including nationalism. But it seems no less clear that well planned empirical investigations—surveys, experiments, and case studies—are the stuff from which the necessary theory must arise.

Professor Cottam, formerly a foreign service officer in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, has given us a case study of Iranian nationalism, which he regards as a "major key" to fathoming intricate Persian politics. His theme is the impact of nationalism on Iranian political behavior, and he presents it through historical analyses of a number of crucial actors on the Persian scene. After a very sensible introduction and after three excellent background chapters, the author inspects in turn: the tribes, including the Kurds; the non-Muslim minorities; the localities and regions; foreign influences; and the "Nationalist" movement (i.e., Mossadeg's National Front). In this process he also offers many astute comments on other actors, such as the Pahlevi Shahs, the landowners. the military, the Tehran mob including the chaqukeshan (bully boys who are semi-professional rioters), and the mollahs (religious leaders).

Particularly perceptive are the comments on prevailing myths that orient Iranian political attitudes-especially the legacy of the frustrating 1906-1917 period in which the early constitutional impetus petered out. In fact, the British presence in Iran, well discussed by Cottam, is a telling illustration of the more subtle but durable disasters of foreign interference. The British narrowly pursued the goals of short run internal stability for Iran and protection of British economic interests. The contrast between this policy and avowed British principles strongly impressed the Iranians. Like other Near Easterners, they attributed it mainly to duplicity, and they created the exaggerated image of insidious British intrigue that students of the Near East know so well. But the tragedy of the encounter was its long run internal effect on Iranian politics. The easy charge of treason, refutable only through nationalist extremism, was tossed at nearly all prominent politicians and found plausible by a conditioned, already insecure public. Furthermore, all failures could be attributed to some sort of foreign manipulation, adding to the prevailing disillusionment, but getting some politicians off the hook. As a result, the practical sense of national responsibility that is so essential for inter-group cooperation and domestic strength seems to have been retarded.

Many facets of this story should sound familiar to students of American foreign policy. Indeed, Cottam strenuously urges that the United States misread the dynamic of the Mossadeq movement and lost its best chance to promote an escape from the perilous political juggling act that has been going on in Tehran for over a decade now. Though Cottam would seem, retrospectively, to have a strong if oversimplified case, its implications for the current political situation are far from clear.

The political scientist interested in nationalism will find in this book many fascinating observations. However, he must formulate their broader theoretical significance for himself. Cottam leaves his work at the observational level or, at best, at the level of interpreting the specific import of his findings for the Iranian political system. More general implications are rarely discussed. At the same time, it seems to me that Cottam's work offers the best political history of modern Iran now available, despite the fact that its focus on nationalism and several critical group actors compels a more compartmentalized and repetitive treatment than a conventional history. His comments on many salient power relationships in Iran are quite acute. For example, the ability of the bazaar merchants to paralyze portions of the economy, the power of the mollahs to arouse South Tehrani masses, the lack of unity among religious leaders, the attentiveness with which the British scrutinized intra-tribal wrangles to control the tribes, and Reza Shah's strategy of isolating his enemies are all sharply depicted.

The book would be even more useful if it had a bibliography and a less capricious index, if Persian titles had been translated into English, and if certain words like "prescience" and "atavistic" had been less worked. More disturbing is the author's lack of reference to the discussions of nationalism by Deutsch, Doob and others and his failure to consider several relatively recent major contributions to the analysis of Iranian politics. Though Leonard Binder's important Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society came out too late for reference, there are many points where the recent works of Banani, Upton, and even Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi are relevant to the author's concern but are unnoted. All the same, these are minor flaws and, it is gratifying to observe that, with works such as this, we are at last being given some basic, probing, empirical political studies of one of the most academically neglected and intriguing polities in the world.-FREDERICK W. FREY, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy.

By Raymond Aron. (Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday and Co., 1965. Pp. 265. \$4.95.)

If proof were needed that Raymond Aron ranks among the ablest students of international affairs, it is supplied by his latest book, appraising the national defense implications of the thermonuclear age for governments on both sides of the Atlantic. Planned initially as an attempt to explain American defense policies to the French society, the work has been re-written and broadened into a thorough and searching analysis of strategic doctrines advocated by the Pentagon, of General de Gaulle's concept of the force de frappe, of Soviet defense capabilities and dogmas, and of other issues intimately related to the maintenance of international security in an environment dominated by the threat of nuclear devastation.

Aron's work serves as a model of succinct, tightly organized, and forceful expository writing. He gives us more food for thought in less than 300 pages than other commentators sometimes give us in two or three times that space. With a kind of relentless logic, Aron supplies one insight after another, as he evaluates the complexities inherent in concepts like massive retaliation, deterrence, and the "rationality of irrationality" (the term he employs for the assumption that a French nuclear force could actually "deter" Soviet aggression). Thanks in no small measure to the successful labors of translator Ernst Pawel, Aron emerges as an epigrammist. Nearly every page has its bon mot. Deterrence, we are told, is "in essence, a form of diplomacy" since never in the history of diplomacy "have unused weapons weighed so heavily"; the transition from the atomic to the thermonuclear age "was at least as radical as that from so-called conventional chemical explosives to atomic . . . bombs"; "maximum deterrence does not necessarily coincide with maximum security"; "one cannot use joint suicide as a constant threat"; in nuclear strategy it "is impossible, by definition, to ward off one danger without thereby automatically increasing another": (in reference to developments like the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow) "the meaning of messages remains equivocal up to the very last moment"; and the "entire American theory" of thermonuclear deterrence is "based on rationality," while the "risk of irrational decision increases with the number of countries acquiring nuclear arms."

Aron's analysis challenges hallowed doctrines in Europe and in America. In surveying technological developments during the fifteen year period after 1945, for example, he attacks the long-standing assumption that, save for American possession of nuclear weapons, the Red Army would have swept across Europe after World War II. Moreover, he asserts that in the period 1945-50, the American monopoly of nuclear weapons played a minimum role diplomatically—far less than unilateral possession of weapons of this magnitude might have led observers to expect. In his exami-

nation of the strategic doctrines underlying NATO. Aron advances many ideas which we have now come to associate with General de Gaulle. At the heart of the continuing debate over NATO's future lies a dilemma that has existed since its inception: "leaders were not too clear about the differences between a strategy of deterrence and a strategy of use [of thermonuclear weapons] following failure of deterrence." Yet his analysis of recent American nuclear strategy-and particularly his appraisal of Secretary Robert McNamara's refinements-will gladden more hearts in Washington than in Paris. Aron credits Mr. McNamara with possessing a subtlety of mind in perceiving a number of deficiencies in the American defense posture, and the leadership capacity required to correct many of the lacunae.

At the same time, Aron is equally forthright in discussing continuing defects in American nuclear strategies, particularly as they appear to European eyes. Many American defense experts, he charges, are more concerned with arms control and safeguarding military communications than with the military "susceptibility of their European allies." McNamara's doctrinal innovations "left Europeans more troubled than convinced" about the soundness of the Pentagon's strategic assumptions. Europeans were rightfully apprehensive "that war could be fought on European soil and devastate that continent while the territories of both the United States and the Soviet Union were spared out of a desire, strategic or moral, to prevent extreme escalation." McNamara's concept of "graduated deterrence" in effect minimized "the risk of a big war that might involve the continental United States at the price of putting up with little wars (little, that is, when viewed from across the ocean) in which only Europeans would be killed."

These reservations about American policy do not, however, add up to a defense of Gaullist strategic contentions. If anything, Aron is even more searching in his appraisal of Gaullist, than of American, defense postulates. After examining all the arguments advanced in support of the force de frappe, he concludes that the Gaullist case "postulates a highly implausible situation in which, moreover, the French deterrent would be absolutely worthless." De Gaulle's nuclear strategy represents nothing more than a "fatal rehash of the massive retaliation concept, and it is a miniature version ten years behind the times." If Paris actually endeavored to deter a hostile Soviet thrust (not already deterred by the American arsenal), then its action would convey to Moscow "nothing but a convincing impression of its own insanity."

In the last section of his book, Aron is at pains to supply a dimension to his treatment which is not infrequently neglected in earlier pages, an omission which leaves the reader to wonder how applicable his (and other experts') extremely rationalistic strategic models are to the real world of policy-formulation. In the concluding pages, Aron emphasizes the importance of "psychological understandings," of human emotions, of mind sets, and of deeply held convictions on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Here he notes, for example, that the French force de frappe may be even more a psychological instrument of French power than a needed addition to the Western military arsenal. Here, he discusses the prospects and implications of defense concepts resting upon a foundation of paradox and irrationality, such as the possibility of highly rational responses by the nuclear giants in an age when global warfare itself approaches a form of human madness. And here he evaluates the likely characteristics of a world in which the revolution in military technology has "abolished traditional forms of peace as well as conventional war. . . ."

Aron's appraisal is a challenging, readable, and significant work—ranking perhaps as the most indispensable treatment available for anyone seeking to understand the impact of thermo-nuclear weapons upon military strategy and diplomacy.—Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Vassar College.

How Nations Negoticte. By Fred Charles Iklé. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xii, 274. \$5.95.)

Diplomacy is still more of an art than a science, but perhaps, in the nuclear age, a systematic analysis of one of its prominent techniques, namely negotiation, may be useful as a supplement to the standard works on diplomatic practice and the memoirs of practicing diplomats. Such an analysis might well be undertaken by a scholar trained in behavioral research, rather than by a professional diplomat. The volume under review admirably meets these specifications.

Professor Iklé has effectively combined research in the records of diplomacy in recent years, interviews with persons who have had extensive experience in negotiation (mostly Americans and Europeans), and clinical analysis. His research has been supported by the RAND Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, under whose auspices the book was written. His study is therefore the work of a behaviorally trained political scientist and a keen observer, not of a professional diplomat or a longtime student of diplomacy. It has the virtues and the weaknesses of the author's background. It lacks the flavor of a diplomat's memoirs and the authority and the grace of style of the classic works on diplomacy. It cites historical examples in bewildering numbers, but because most of these examples are drawn from current diplomatic experience, the treatment lacks real historical dimensions. Almost all the illustrations are taken from the recent diplomacy of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Most of the rest of the world (including all of the new nations) is almost wholly neglected; yet many of the new dimensions and characteristics of contemporary negotiations arise from the entrance of so many new nations into the diplomatic arena.

The author is well aware of the limits as well as the possibilities of negotiation. He warns against the common cliché, frequently heard at the present time, that "the act of negotiating is in itself meritorious" (p. 54). He points out that negotiators face a "continual threefold choice": to accept "available terms," to choose no agreement, or to continue the bargaining process. His longest chapters deal with the "Rules of Accommodation" and "How the Parties Come to Terms." He gives due heed to the effects of domestic pressures and concerns, and to the role of personalities.

In a study which concentrates largely on the diplomatic as well as the political cold war between the Soviet Union and the West, it is not surprising that the book's greatest practical value, and its most impressive insights, lie in the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union. In this area the author finds the main differences in negotiating styles. (If he had also studied the diplomacy of the new states, he might have found other interesting examples of differences in negotiating styles.)

Iklé maintains that "Western fortes show up mainly in negotiations with other Western governments but are of little value with Communist opponents" (p. 236). In a long "inventory of Western weaknesses" in negotiating with the Russians (pp. 238-253) he emphasizes "letting the opponent determine the issues," being "shy about counterdemands," being "afraid of making unacceptable proposals," and "denying oneself available threats." Soviet negotiators, on the other hand, have certain advantages over their Western counterparts. They are "backed by an authoritarian government"; they "need not feel constrained by domestic public opinion as much as Westerners do"; they can "support their long-term strategy and day-to-day tactics with fully coordinated propaganda machinery" (pp. 226-235).

But "the shrewd and skillful negotiating style of the Soviet government turns out to be a myth" (p. 234). Soviet diplomats commit many blunders. They often fail "to take advantage of Western vulnerabilities"; "they often ask for a whole loaf where they could get half a loaf—and wind up with nothing"; "they fritter away the credibility of their threats and the value of their promises"; "they cannot find the right dosage of demands and inducements"; "they are bold rather than shrewd, brazen rather than cunning" (pp. 234-235).

The contemporary negotiator, in short, is often lacking in the qualities most needed in the "compleat negotiator," notably realism, flexibility, and patience. Thus Professor Iklé, after his long clinical analysis of negotiation under contemporary conditions, ends by emphasizing the qualities of a diplomat prescribed in Sir Ernest Satow's A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, or even, as he recognizes, in "seventeenth- and eighteenth-century manuals on diplomacy" (p. 253). The conditions under which international relations must be carried on have greatly changed, but apparently, for better or for worse, successful diplomacy in the nuclear age calls for essentially the same qualifications as in former days.

This book, which is also available in a text edition, will be useful as supplementary reading in courses in international relations and diplomacy. Professional diplomats and other practicing negotiators could also read it with profit, although no doubt few of them will.—Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania.

Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. By Austin Ranney. (Madison and Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 298. \$6.50.)

Ever since the renascence in the forties and early fifties of the case for greater "responsibility" in American political parties, scholars have been taking a longer and cooler look at the British system upon which the "responsibility" model seems implicitly to be based. The inquiries have revealed not only a much more complex and variegated pattern of relationships within and among British parties than had been assumed by the reformers; they have also served to cast into doubt the likelihood—even the desirability—of an easy replication elsewhere of the British model. Yet most of the recent studies have focused almost exclusively on the parties as national, parliamentary, policy-making institutions, and none has delved more than fitfully into the consequences for party cohesion of the pattern of local-national relationships. It is a welcome departure that the author of this book, who has already explored the doctrine and condition of party responsibility in the United States, should turn his attention to this neglected but important question in the reputed home of strong democratic parties. In doing so he has put in his debt students both of British politics and of parties generally.

Ranney begins with the assumption that candi-

date selection matters in the British system of government. Despite the prevalence of party voting by the electorate and the frequency of bloc voting in the House of Commons, the parties, he believes, are not so monolithic that it makes little difference who is selected by the constituency parties to stand for Parliament. That up to now the process of candidate selection has been cloaked in secrecy and neglected by scholars does not mean that it is either impossible to fathom or of marginal importance to an understanding of how British parties behave.

In producing the first really comprehensive study of candidate selection in Britain, Ranney has succeeded in bringing to the surface a very large part of the iceberg. His data are impressive. They consist of three main types: (1) his own interviews with national party leaders and workers, regional organizers, constituency association officers, agents and activists, M.P.s and candidates; (2) accounts in the press of controversies over the selection of candidates; and (3) information about candidates and their constituencies for general and by-elections from 1951 to 1964 punched on cards and subjected to various statistical analyses. This combination of sources has enabled him to derive explanations and inferences which reliance on any single type of data would have made difficult, and to invest his statistical tables with the flavor of political life.

The result is a rich mine of information about the kinds of candidates adopted, the process by which and the conditions under which they emerge, the comparative power of national leaders and local parties in the selection process, and differences on these questions within and among the three main parties. Much of the analysis tends to confirm pre-existing generalizations, but on several questions the data either add substantially to or throw into doubt standard interpretations. Three such deserve mention here.

First, Ranney's evidence rebuts the widespread view that the parties' central leadership tightly control the selection of candidates and use this power to discipline backsliding or recalcitrant M.P.s. Notwithstanding a few highly publicized cases of Transport House vetoes and expulsions, the findings indicate that central control of candidate selection-and in over two-thirds of the constituencies adoption is tantamount to election -makes only a minor contribution to British party cohesion. It simply is not that strong, as Ranney's cases and statistics show. Not only have the impressive formal powers of the national headquarters fallen into desuetude; since 1945 far more Conservative and Labour M.P.s have been disciplined by their constituency parties than by national officers. To a much greater extent than

commonly supposed, the de facto local control of candidate selection in Britain resembles the de jure local control in the United States—though the results for parliamentary cohesion remain different, for, as Ranney suggests, "the national leaders do not need to control local candidate selection in order to maintain party cohesion in Parliament; the local activists do the job for them" (p. 281).

Second, the data support the established belief that politics in Britain are elite-dominated. Not only in social status, outlook, and personality do the chosen candidates of all three parties resemble each other much more than they do their respective supporters. They are also selected in fact by a tiny minority of local activists, a few of whom control the gates to the short list. Much of the time this local elite shares the broad presuppositions of the national leadership, but Ranney's evidence also shows that what the locals look for in a candidate (more often than not demographic and personality rather than ideological traits) does not always square with the needs and preferences of the national leadership, and a certain amount of conflict between the levels is endemic.

Third, the data point to the conclusion that the two major parties in Britain do not diverge greatly in the way they select parliamentary candidates. While Ranney does find more differences between the parties at this level than someone like Robert McKenzie would likely admit, he comes down none the less on the side of those

who view the parties as remarkably similar in the realities of organizational power. His discussion of the motives, procedures, and sensitivities of grassroots activists is one of the strongest features of the book, but it also points up the need for much more knowledge of the process by which people are recruited into politics at this level.

This study, then, is first-rate in almost every respect. Admittedly there are a few places where the reviewer's eyebrows rose. The author's decision to eliminate all incumbent M.P.s from his statistical analysis of the identifiable characteristics of candidates adopted by the local parties may well have skewed some of his results, and the figures he has used to construct categories of "winnability" are not altogether convincing. And in view of his declared belief that the study may provide "some basis for estimating the extent to which British practices are exportable and constitute a model other democracies should follow," (p. xi) it is disappointing to note that he does little to follow up this theme. Nevertheless, as raw material for more genuinely comparative analysis his work is bound to prove useful and in this respect is an important contribution to comparative politics.—James B. Christoph, Ohio State University.

[The foregoing review, of a book written by the Book Review Editor of this journal, was commissioned by the Managing Editor.]

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Political and Sociological Theory and Its Applications. By George E. G. Catlin. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 118. \$3.95.)

The title is misleading; this is not a manual of research methods but five light essays on weighty topics, presented with insight and verve in a style at once intriguing and irritating. Professor Catlin, who has combined a long scholarly career (The Atlantic Community, Systematic Politics) with practical operations to shape up the Western world (Prohibition repeal, Indian independence, building the Labour Party, advancing Churchill and Willkie), expounds on peace and war, democracy, and the First Amendment, the social sciences as a "Third Culture," and the existence of political science, in 118 pages.

Three themes recur in Catlin's exposition. One is the "Theory of the Political Market," analyzed at greater length in his Systematic Politics. "Men make certain demands for political goods, for which they are prepared to pay the costs, even in terms of abridgment of precedent freedoms. According to Marx-Engelism both demands and goods are ultimately material or economic. A profounder analysis is that they are demands of varieties of power to achieve, or to guarantee freedom to achieve, whatever we want. Controls and governments of all kinds . . . are concerned to adjust those goods to those demands, having reckoned the costs." A second theme is the need for Western self-criticism: "One half or more of the world is patently wrong-headed. Are we then, all of us, patently right-minded?" And a third is the tripartite division of the study of politics as art, philosophy and science, particularly as this bears on liberal education.

In the first of four chapters developed from lectures at the University of Washington, Catlin asks whether political science offers anything practical for problems of peace and war. After a call for political scientists to come "up from their cloistered caves of speculative doubt into the daylight of the common forum"—but not as anxious "for-God's-sakers," who "too often commit blasphemy against the scientific spirit," he asserts that social science "begins with practical needs and, when its pure theory moves over to application, makes a circle back to practical needs." In between, "an empiric political or sociological science is now in process of being constructed, cumulative in its

conclusions." Much as modern economics has dispelled the myth that God wills unemployment, political science may replace the belief that wars are inevitable with practical advice as to how to end them.

What, then is the substance of political science's contribution? That "the days of the national powers are over and the day of the superpowers alone has arrived." Neither anarchism nor crude Marxist anti-imperialism is the answer, but the development and effective enforcement of law through world authority with "teeth and not afraid to use them." This will require first Atlantic (not just European) union, and then "some kind of understanding or adjustment in coexistence between the free world and the communist blocs." The blind alleys include too much and too little reliance on force, Gaullism, and irrelevant ideological arguments.

In the next three chapters, the author dashes about the political landscape, incinerating straw men and planting his flags. He does point to several crucial new developments in the character of democracy, although each is exaggerated. Mass communications and polling mean that leaders are in closer touch with followers, so that neither need depend for guidance on the inherent ambiguities of elections. "The authentic representative vision is to be found not so much in representative persons for all matters as in wellchecked polls of all persons on particular matters." Political parties, increasingly manned by professionals, are the essential posers of alternatives for the public, but "what really matters is that each of these parties, if called upon to form the government, should be competent to put into power men who can produce efficiently the political goods which the majority of the public wants." Thus "the future, it may be, belongs to men of the McNamara and Beeching type. . . . Among the consumers there will be equality and among the producers quality."

The gist of the chapter on "Political Philosophy and the First Amendment" is that a moral code should be inculcated "directively" (primarily through education) rather than "coercively." The teaching of Marxism should be permitted and the Analects of Confucius required. The essay on "The Third Culture: The Role of the Social Sciences in Education" develops the idea that political science has a special part to play in linking

those other two cultures, since it contains both a humanistic and a scientific dimension. The final chapter, "Political Science: Does It Exist?", contains a succinct summarization of the main features of Catlin's conceptual system. The list bristles with significant questions, some of which are probably researchable.

As a piece of witty gadflyery unencumbered with evidence, as an incitement to dig into Catlin's more thorough work, and as a collection of personal affirmations by an experienced "pious Erasmist," this book is worth reading. The discourse is often disconnected and it falls short of demonstrating how political theory applies to the big questions. But perhaps it was meant mainly to stimulate, and that it does.—James David Barber, Yale University.

Tocqueville and England. By SEYMOUR DRESCHER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 254. \$6.00.)

This is a challenging and original study. It calls into question previous interpretations of the origin and meaning of Tocqueville's thought; it breaks new ground in its emphasis upon the critical importance of his English experience. This is not to say that its argument will be universally accepted; this reviewer found some of the book to be based upon inadequate evidence. Often the texts cited by Drescher do not fully bear the weight he puts upon them. Yet by assembling and analyzing so vigorously the materials thus far available on Tocqueville's visits to Great Britain, Drescher has made a genuine contribution.

The thesis of this book is that as the result of his British travels and friends, Tocqueville altered permanently the concepts and models he used to deal with society and politics. Abandoning the contrast between aristocratic and democratic societies that dominates De la Démocratie en Amérique, Tocqueville in his last and most mature work, L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution, placed his entire emphasis upon another dichotomy—that between those regimes that are free and those others that are not. Thus by the end of his life, so Drescher argues, Tocqueville had discarded the United States as the model he recommended to his French countrymen. England was far more suitable:

England clearly presented a case in which the disintegration of medieval society had not led to the permanent alienation of its constituent classes, and it still afforded viable political machinery for the transfer of political power by peaceful means. England, more than America, proved that a nation could successfully combine national cohesion with a maximum of local self-government, and could remain free while sustaining the tremendous economic transformation that placed her at the forefront of the industrial revolution.

And from what he saw and heard in the British Isles. Tocqueville came to see the connection between the rise of democracy and that of centralized bureaucracy; the conditions determining the evolution of aristocracies: the reasons why revolutions occur in some countries and not in others; the necessity for certain political and economic reforms in France; and, finally, what ought to be a great power's goals and methods in its foreign and colonial relations. Thus Drescher claims that some parts of the Démocratie originated in Tocqueville's English experience, rather than his visit to America. It was from his view of the industrial revolution in England that Tocqueville came to write that famous chapter on how industrialists may come to constitute an aristocracy in an ostensibly egalitarian society.

Using the method first applied by Professor G. W. Pierson to Tocqueville's and Beaumont's visit to the United States, Drescher has given a thorough account of what and whom these same two saw on their travels in England and Ireland. What Tocqueville learned there impressed him with the significance of voluntary associations for the politics of a free society; with the differences between an aristocracy that performs real functions, such as administering justice, and another that does not. Such laissez-faire economists as Nassau Senior imposed their views upon their French friends. Tocqueville thus came to adopt mid-Victorian theories of economic liberalism and of punitive treatment of the poor. Finally, he was brought to see that laws of inheritance concerning land did not have the importance he had once attributed to them.

Many of these assertions are well substantiated by the evidence offered in this book. But Drescher goes on to make further and more dubious claims. He sees drastic discontinuties everywhere in Tocqueville's thought, and all of them are due to the impact of England. The assumption that underlies this book is that Tocqueville once held rigidly defined and systematically constructed theories and that he abandoned them for other and incompatible ones. But there are good reasons for rejecting such an interpretation. Tocqueville had a way of adapting his views so that they could be relevant to what was happening in French politics at a given time. Although his political values remained relatively constant, his emphasis did not. Thus he tended to refer to whatever foreign model seemed most likely, at that particular juncture, to realize his own political preferences. During the Second Republic, he once again placed great importance upon the Constitution of the United States. After the coup d'état that established the Second Empire, Tocqueville referred more often to England. But in neither case did such a reference prove a basic change in Tocqueville's ideas.

Equally relevant to such an interpretation is the question of Tocqueville's distinctive style of thought. He was not the sort of thinker who cared much for careful definition or internal consistency. There are striking incompatibilities between his successive treatments of even his favorite subjects. But such discrepancies were due to forgetfulness, lack of system, and a boundless fertility of intellectual imagination. This type of mentality Tocqueville shared with Montesquieu: both were aristocrats trained as magistrates rather than as professional philosophers or as university professors of the social sciences; both had penetrating but eclectic minds. Their concerns, to which they constantly returned, so far from being mutually exclusive, were interrelated-how may political regimes be classified in terms of the person or persons who dominate? how much and what sort of liberty is enjoyed by the citizens of such regimes? what is the distinctive spirit of the society? None of these questions ever received an overriding priority. Certainly, as Drescher states, liberty is a great theme in the L'Ancien Régime. But is democracy unmentioned in that volume? One has only to read the last chapter to see how much equality weighed on the mind of Tocqueville. both as a force that helped destroy the Old Regime and as a political value that ought to be reconciled with liberty, although, in French experience, it had not been.

Drescher's assertion that the different phases of 'Tocqueville's thought were based on quite discrepant themes is not always based upon close textual analysis. To take one example, Chapter III closes with the following sentence: "When the first part of the Démocratie finally appeared early in 1835, England was the contemporary example of the aristocratic principle and all its workings." The evidence cited is Appendix B to the first part of the Démocratie. Within that text, Tocqueville wrote: "However until 1832 the amount required to qualify as a voter remained what it had been during the fifteenth century, which proves that the English Constitution became far more democratic with time." [Tocqueville, Oeuvres Complétes, ed. J. P. Mayer (Paris, 1951), Tome I, p. 451.]

Despite such lapses, this is a book that deserves to be widely read. It is full of general hypotheses worth discussion; it calls attention to English influences upon Tocqueville, a subject previously little known or understood.—Melvin Richter, Hunter College of the City University of New York.

Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence. By Fellx

GILBERT. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 349. \$6.50.)

This well written book by an able historian should be of considerable benefit to students and teachers of Western political thought. Professor Gilbert expertly employs contemporary source materials, in particular Florentine official documents and early sixteenth-century memoirs, to produce a persuasive portrait of the social and political environment from which emerged a new way of thinking about politics and history.

Concentrating initially on the explosive career of the short-lived Florentine republic (1494-1512), the author lays bare the source and character of its class struggle, which produced competing aristocratic and republican ideologies. Even more significant was a rapidly spreading disillusionment with then-customary ways of viewing and evaluating political life. The traumatic French invasion of Italy in 1494, the patently sham constitutionalism of the Medicis before and after the republican interlude, and the obviously self-interested claims of the disputants on both sides of the continuous debate over republican institutions, led many Florentines to doubt the traditional beliefs that the city's institutional structure had been ordained by God and that all political troubles were the fruit of individual sinfulness. The internal and external difficulties faced by republican Florence, leading eventually to the overthrow of that regime, contributed to a spreading conviction that only egoism and force are significant in politics; moral principles and individual goodness or evil seemed irrelevant to an apparently autonomous political

Professor Gilbert builds on this carefully detailed foundation his interpretation of Machiavelli's political thought, to which I shall return. In the second part of the book is presented a clear, concise discussion of Florentine historiography around the year 1500. The author indicates how Renaissance humanism's aping of classical historians gave way gradually to a more realistic approach to political history, reaching its culmination in the writings of Machiavelli's younger contemporary, Francesco Guicciardini.

Of perennial interest to students of political ideas are the many varying interpretations of Machiavelli. Professor Gilbert's treatment presents no radically new insights, nor does he claim to have found a key to the single true and definitive manner of understanding Machiavelli's intent as a theorist. But his presentation strikes me as among the most lucid, informative, reasonable, and well-substantiated treatments of this topic. In his view, Machiavelli's great originality lay not in his ideas, most of which had become common coin in Florentine political circles, but in artfully weaving

them together in a manner so dramatic and forceful as to present a new vision of political life.

Unlike some intellectual historians, Professor Gilbert seeks to penetrate to the philosophical foundations of Machiavelli's thought and not merely to link his ideas to the context of his times. For example, Machiavelli's veneration of the Roman republic was shared by many of his fellow Florentines, but in his writings it did not represent Renaissance man's desire to imitate the ways of a great classical age; rather it was a call to return to living according to natural instincts for the sake of a truly efficacious political virtue. This meant that Machiavelli sought to be neither immoral nor amoral, nor even to create a new moral code. He simply presented in the most extreme and consistent form possible the growing conviction that politics is an autonomous realm of human endeavor, with behavioral laws and normative standards appropriate only to the political sphere.

On certain points that are constantly debated by commentators on Machiavelli, Professor Gilbert presents illuminating observations. In his view there is no contradiction between Machiavelli's championing of one-man rule in The Prince and his favorable attitude toward republican government in The Discourses. The two works were written as responses to differing external stimuli, and in both the problem of political leadership is a central concern. Further, it is erroneous to conclude from the final chapter of The Prince that Machiavelli was the forerunner of modern Italian nationalism; at most he sought a temporary league of Italian states in order to expel foreign invaders and had by no means given up on the prospects of the city-state in Italy.

My one regret concerning this book is that the author did not specifically subject to critical examination interpretations of Machiavelli that have been published by other scholars. In particular, I missed a consideration of what is perhaps the most audacious, controversial, and exciting of all such works, Professor Leo Strauss' Thoughts on Machiavelli. Certainly Professor Gilbert is at odds with Strauss in many ways; for example the former says of Machiavelli that "he was not a man who builds a system in which every detail has an appointed spot and forms part of a whole" (p. 167). A more decisive entry into debate with Professor Strauss and with other interpreters of the great Florentine theorist would have made even more valuable for students of political ideas what must yet be considered a most distinguished contribution to our understanding of the matrix from which emerged so much that is distinctive of modern political thought.—Fred H. WILLHOITE, JR. Louisiana State University.

The Devine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan. By F. C. Hood. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 263. \$7.20.)

Recent scholarship on Hobbes emphasizes the need to re-examine some common views of his work. One such view is that the extensive treatment of religious and theological matters in the Leviathan is a grand and ironic tour de force. Hobbes found it safest to proceed as he did because he wanted to undercut the challenge to civil authority represented by organized religion without, however, giving dangerous offense to the established orders. All Hobbes's protestations of sincerity, according to this view, are disingenuous and he is described as one of the founders of the new and secular politics.

Professor Hood calls this view into question. His book argues that Hobbes was a religious thinker whose political theory was a consequence of his Puritan belief in the primacy of Scripture. In so arguing, Professor Hood develops the idea, also considered by A. E. Taylor and Howard Warrender, that the concept of God is necessary to give coherence to Hobbes's political theory. But, while Taylor and Warrender treat the concept of God as a necessary (or useful) implicate of the political theory, Professor Hood holds that Hobbes's political theory flows from his religious beliefs and that the critical problems associated with the former are best interpreted by reference to the latter.

Hobbes's materialism seems to be a formidable objection to this argument; but Professor Hood suggests that Hobbes, in attacking "school divinity," was attacking an interpretation of Christianity rather than Christianity itself. It was the political uses of dominant modes of theology to which Hobbes objected. Christian "spiritualism" was used to intimidate and confuse the faithful. While Hobbes's materialism was incompatible with this spiritualism, it entailed an idea of God like Tertullian's: since God has being He necessarily has extension or body because the idea of being involves the idea of extension. Christian materialism was not, for Hobbes, a contradiction in terms.

Professor Hood's interpretation brings into new perspective old problems in the analysis of Hobbes's theory. Professor Hood is concerned, as all the important critics of Hobbes have been, with the logic of his doctrine of civil society and with the key aspect of that doctrine, the concept of obligation. Professor Hood finds that for Hobbes obligation means the obligation of conscience. But conscience is a moral or religious concept which, given Hobbes's view of the limits of philosophic (i.e., scientific) thought, cannot be fully comprehended by Hobbes's new civil philosophy. Hobbes's analysis of the human passions

and of the rational articulation of those passions in the new a priori science patterned after Euclid does not yield the doctrine of moral obligation which is necessary for the rational construction of the commonwealth. Conscience is necessary for politics but it is beyond politics or the science of politics.

Professor Hood regards Hobbes's teaching about the obligation of conscience as a "fiction" in his civil philosophy, like the idea of a point in geometry. Since obligation transcends the limits of the new civil philosophy, which is necessary in itself to bring order into societies marked by disorder, Hobbes must surreptitiously introduce supernatural obligation into his naturalistic theory concerning the human passions. He does this by importing obligation through a stipulated definition as Euclid would. Hobbes's problem is set for him by the fact that obligation always implies one who obliges. Within civil society the meaning of this is clear, on Hobbes's theory. But the obligation creative of civil society involves God as the One who obliges; however, Hobbes's science of civil society cannot accommodate God within its rubrics.

Professor Hood's study adds another dimension to the controversy in scholarship about Hobbes. He tells us that he came to this interpretation of Hobbes in an attempt to "make sense of his moral and political thought as a whole" (p. vii). While it is true that Professor Hood has given us a new examination of Hobbes, the old problems remain even though many of them are newly described. Previously we had to worry about getting Hobbesean man from the state of nature into civil society; now we must worry about getting him from the kingdom of grace into civil society. In either case, it is an arduous logical journey.

The presentation of Hobbes as a figure in the history of political piety may strain the credulity of some readers. His sensibilities, his judgments, and his definition of political (and thereby religious) truth would seem to make Hobbes indifferently disposed toward the inward dimensions of religious life. That he was interested in the political outcomes of religious positions there can be no doubt; that his argument proceeds out of such a position remains at issue even after the reading of so able a book as this.—J. A. Schwandt, St. Olaf College.

John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton. By Samuel J. Konefsky. (New York: Macmillan, 1964. Pp. viii, 274, \$5.95.)

Subtitled "Architects of the American Constitution," Professor Konefsky's work principally seeks to show modern American democracy—"grown" from a "living Constitution"—what it owes to two of its early republican founders. The book explores "the manner in which Marshall and Hamilton helped to mold the Constitution into the dynamic implement of government it has proved itself to be." Rightly observing some differences between these two architects, moreover, the author wishes also to give a "comparative study of the ideas of Marshall and Hamilton."

Simply confining himself to exposition and summary of these two statesmen's writings, Konefsky generally manages to portray the important and obvious essentials of their policies. He rightly points out that all of Hamilton's proposals for America were "republican," at least in the sense of resting directly or indirectly "on the solid basis of the consent of the people." Quite properly, too, he deduces the great Treasury Secretary's overwhelming anxiety for an "energetic and powerful national government" from his "pessimistic" view of the usual "interests" and "passions" of human nature. Great powers are needed to deal with "the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs." If the nation's powers are to be great and liberally construed, however, their objects are narrowly confined to the preservation of the individual and his property. To assure respect for individual rights sovereign power is separated and thus checked, with the Supreme Court as key check in our popular government on "the more popularly constituted branches." In a helpful review of Marbury v. Madison Konefsky shows this Hamiltonian understanding to be shared by Marshall as well.

Generally, Konefsky summarizes with some skill the great judgments of the Marshall Court, exhibiting the Chief Justice's devotion to "the sanctity of property," an independent national government of "great and sovereign powers," a domestic and foreign commerce unhindered by the states. He does make a mistake or two. It is not true, for example, that in Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company "there was no specific federal legislation" according to which Marshall might have decided the case differently.

This study is indeed useful, but it must be added that its utility is principally that of an introduction for the general reader. It lacks the reflective, subtle, and comprehensive investigations of statesmanship, of modern America, of the architects' thought, which would be required for an original treatment. That Hamilton "contributed" to a powerful economy, a great central government, a supervising judiciary, that Marshall made these unequivocally part of the country's basic laws, is true but well known. The book does not bring out more subtle traits of modern America whose connection with the framers is not so widely known: a pervasive concern for personal

comfort and security, respect for law and order, a thorough-going organization of society in productive effort, anxious careerism, etc., etc.

The old founders are treated considerably better than our modern country, but still not satisfactorily. The book only sketches Hamilton's views. It does not clarify in a decisively helpful way most of the notions basic to Hamilton and Marshall alike-their "republicanism," for example, and their individualistic and capitalistic "liberty." If this study often brings in contrasting opinions like those of Jefferson and Justices Gibson and Holmes, it commonly slides away from an extended confrontation which might expose the deeper if more subtle strengths and weaknesses of the architects' thought. These interesting subtleties might also have been developed by a more extensive exposition of the architects' style of architecture: the liberal political thought of Blackstone, Smith, Montesquieu, Hume, and Locke.

The book is also rather unsuccessful in bringing out the differences between Hamilton and Marshall, a subject where an original contribution might easily be made. It is doubtful whether Marshall ever embraced the "high-toned" oligarchic or aristocratic republicanism advocated by Hamilton at the Constitutional Convention, even if he retreated from what perhaps he alone would call his "wild and enthusiastic democracy" of Washington's early adminstration. Similarly, Marshall was a stickler for law and proper procedures, while Hamilton's temper was of a bolder cast. Beveridge concludes that Marshall's constitutional scruples blocked the Federalists' Disputed Elections Bill of 1800. Hamilton, however, urged a blatantly partisan course on Governor Jay in the same year, to recoup the prospective defeat of Federalist electors by New York's Republican legislature. Marshall, moreover, would never have carried on what Julian Boyd calls Hamilton's "bold" and "devious" endeavors to shape American diplomacy by secretive correspondence with a British intelligence agent. Finally, Marshall expressly disavowed Hamilton's avoidance of the Constitution's enumeration of powers by deduction of plenary power from the "general welfare" clause. Only the last of these differences is noted by Konefsky, and that in a footnote not calculated to draw out a general comparison of the two statesmen. Unfortunately, the footnote is typical of the book's deficiencies for the scholar, whatever its merits for the general reader.—ROBERT K. FAULKNER, Princeton University.

Legalism. By Judith N. Shklar. (Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 246. \$5.95.)

This is an excellent study of selected ideas about law, primarily about legalism. Thus, it

should be noted at the outset that the book is not a study of law. Nor is it—nor does it pretend to be—a balanced treatise on jurisprudence. The author wrote: "The object here . . . is not only to understand legalism, but also other ways of thinking about law." (p. 3) In thinking about law, not of law, she presents a skillful analysis and criticism of what legal scholar-philosophers—a number of whom were trained solely in civil law—have written in their textbooks and treatises. The common law as a base familiar to Anglo-American scholars is not emphasized.

It is possible that one may find implied in this study a reaching toward participants in a larger audience than that of theorists who content themselves with mere analyses and criticisms of what jurists and other theorists have written. The large mass of social scientists-excepting those who have immersed themselves in "numbers games"need to cope with processes, procedures, and ends of law as they relate to scholarly work. So it is that such scholars must at least understand "about law." In their work they scarcely can avoid making effective use of such basic tools as statutes and judicial decisions, material that scoffingly may be characterized as "a plumbers' manual." (p. 32) But, as well, they must understand something of theories of law (including legalism) in order to employ fragments of law effectively. Broadly trained social scientists can hardly accept the idea that legal concepts are based on nothing more firm than the speculations of theorists.

In reading this volume one misses the "little" cases that contribute richly to understandings within common law systems. Indeed, the author of this book has stressed little more than a few so-called "big" cases, highly publicized politicolegal trials: the Rosenberg and Dennis affairs, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and propaganda shows in Moscow. Professor Shklar reviews and dissects these incidents with consummate skill. In doing so, she has been able to examine ideas of many legal philosophers as these men have concerned themselves with their conceptions of natural law, of higher law, of legal positivism. However, an examination of seemingly small but deeply meaningful actions in private law merits greater attention. The mass of such decisions may guide both lawvers and social scientists more effectively than can a few tenuously connected and widely publicized judicial actions. The little things that have "grown up without benefit of much ideology" (p. 139) might well become the head of the

Legalism is not a textbook (p. vii), and fortunately so. Teachers and mature and intellectually disciplined students who have carried on studies in law will find Professor Shklar's study provoca-

tive—due to the author's directness, confidence, and clarity—for she offers more intellectual excitement than can be found in textbooks on jurisprudence. The author expressed the hope that this volume will "open a debate" (p. viii), and one anticipates that this hope will be realized.

Legalism is a finely planned study. It is certain to give pleasure to many and to irritate legalists and other newly found "adversaries."—Charles Aikin, University of California (Berkeley).

The Politics of Bureaucracy. By Gordon Tullock. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. 228. \$4.50.)

Political scientists have been writing about the inter-relationships of politics and administration for more than a generation, but they have neglected the politics of administration itself. Gordon Tullock, an economist, has sought to remedy the gap in the literature in this volume. His approach is similar to that which he used in collaboration with James Buchanan in The Calculus of Consent. He is concerned with the individual "politician" in organizations and develops a model of rational behavior based upon the self-interest of the individual. He rejects mathematical or abstract speculation as well as empirical method in favor of what he terms "understanding." As he puts it, "For a number of the assertions that will be made in this book, the supporting evidence must be found in the mind of the reader. That is to say, instead of presenting concrete evidence, I shall simply try to convince the skeptical reader by appealing to his own intuition and experience." (p. 15)

Tullock starts with the premise that political relationships are those involving superior and subordinate status in contrast to economic relationships which are those among equals. All governmental units and many business firms are political in nature. The individual, or politician, in organizations is motivated primarily by advancement of his own goals, irrespective of the stated organizational goals. With this in mind the author develops his model of the organizational process from the standpoint of the individual politician. He divides his analysis into two parts. In the first he writes from the vantage point of the politician somewhere in the middle (hierarchically) of the organization. He examines relationships with superiors (sovereigns), peers and subordinates. In the second part he examines the same system from the standpoint of the individual at or near the top, describing relationships with subordinates and spelling out the problems associated with supervision, control and coordination. His analysis leads him to the conclusion that complex and centralized bureaucracy is essentially inefficient. In an economic setting, pursuit of self-interest is always functional to the organization. But in a political setting it is often dysfunctional, and the tools for control, coordination and supervision are inadequate to provide efficiency. His solution is to localize, decentralize, and reduce organizational size so that the limited tools of supervision available in a non-economic setting can be maximized.

Some readers might conclude that this is a sophisticated presentation of Barry Goldwater's Conscience of a Conservative. Perhaps it is, but I am satisfied that it is a serious attempt to develop an approach to the study of the administrative process. Unfortunately I think to some extent the author has failed in his mission.

The premise that the politician is moved by self-interest sounds reasonable, but as developed by Tullock, the politician is an overly simplified combination of Machiavelli's Prince and "economic man." As Robert Dahl has stated:

What one views as his "self" depends on one's identifications, and evidently these vary a good deal. How one perceives the "self" is not wholly instinctive, it seems, but also a matter of social learning. Likewise, what one considers to be in the "interest" of the self is shaped by learning, experience, tradition and culture. Consequently, to attribute an act to self-interest does not explain very much. (Modern Political Analysis, p. 66).

An example of the shortcoming of Tullock's use of self-interest is found in his description of peer relationships. He sees the politician playing a zero-sum game in which it is essential for him to upgrade himself and downgrade his peers in the eyes of the superior. Even if this kind of activity is handled so subtly that no one else is aware of what is happening, it fails to account for the great number of situations in which self-interest is enhanced by the improvement of the status of many, if not all, members of the group. Even in the individualistic setting of the university organization (one of the two sources tapped by Tullock for most of his illustrations) the zero-sum game is probably becoming less and less consequential.

Tullock devotes a chapter to a discussion of culture, subculture, and general environment, but only in terms of their influence on strategy and tactics of politicians. There is every reason to believe that these phenomena are themselves among the important determinants of the motivations of politicians and Tullock's failure to deal with them in this context is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the volume.

Another particularly weak point in the work is found in Tullock's discussion of the inadequacy of the control system. He refers to a high frequency of what he calls bureaucratic free enterprise, by which he means that lower units in an organiza-

tion become essentially autonomous of their superiors and are uncontrolled. What he fails to recognize, perhaps because of the peculiarities of an agency like the State Department from which his illustrations are derived, is the presence for most organizations of an elaborate system of relationships with individuals and groups in the external world including appropriation subcommittee members, professional peers, consumers of the service provided by the agency, etc. Each of these exercises controls and is a source of agency accountability. The irony of this particular failing in Tullock's work is that his analysis from the standpoint of the middle management politician rejects, quite convincingly, the Weberian notion of hierarchy, but his analysis from the standpoint of the top level politician retains the Weberian concept of hierarchy and encourages the blind spot described above.

Despite my disappointment in the work, I believe that Tullock has attempted a groundbreaking effort in an important area of study. His limited acquaintance with the literature of sociology, social psychology, and even political science has handicapped him, but this volume ought to stimulate individuals in all of these disciplines to pursue the study of the politics of administration.

—ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN, University of Michigan.

Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others. TRANS-LATED BY ALLEN GLIBERT. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965. 3 vols. Pp. xiii, 1514.)

Students of political theory and other admirers of Machiavelli will welcome this new, three-volume translation of his works. Professor Gilbert has essentially retranslated even those works included in his 1941 collection, and has added a great many others. While not absolutely complete, the new collection is very extensive, ranging beyond Machiavelli's well known political books and his two comedies, to include a wide selection from his poetry, letters and dispatches. Finding that "most translators of *The Prince* and other works

make little effort—to my ear—to bring over into their own tongue the qualities of Machiavelli's style," Professor Gilbert strives "to secure Machiavellian emphasis" in English. Each selection is briefly introduced by the translator, and there are illustrations and an index.—Hanna Pitkin, University of Wisconsin.

Statistical Concepts: A Basic Program. By Jimmy R. Amos, Foster Lloyd Brown, and Oscar G. Mink. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965, Pp. 125. \$1.75 paper.)

A useful elementary introduction to basic statistical concepts intended for students of the behavioral sciences with little background in statistics.—A. R.

Liberalism vs. Conservatism. Liberty vs. Authority. By C. William Hushaw. (Dubuque, Ia.: Wm. C. Brown Book Company, 1965. Pp. 113. \$1.40 paper.)

Definitions of "liberalism" and "conservatism" as the terms have been used historically and are curently used in American political debate.—A. R.

Data Processing: Applications to Political Research. By Kenneth Janda. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Pp. 288. \$3.45 paper, \$7.50 cloth.)

Another in the Northwestern series of handbooks of research techniques in political behavior, this volume gives an elementary and clear introduction to the use of punchcard equipment for recording and processing data of various types, with some introduction to programming, using political data and illustrations throughout.—A. R.

Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions. BY STEPHEN A. RICHARDSON, BARBARA SNELL DOHR-ENWEND, AND DAVID KLEIN. (New York: Basic Books, 1965. Pp. 380. \$7.50.)

A manual on interviewing techniques.—A. R.

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- 1. Real Estate Research Corporation, Chicago
- 2. University of Virginia
- 3. University of California, Berkeley
- 6. Florida State University
- 7. Johns Hopkins University
- 9. University of Chicago
- 10. Claremont Graduate School
- 11. Harvard University
- 12. Washington State University
- 13. Oxford University
- 14. University of Michigan
- 15. McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario
- 16. University of Southern California
- 17. Northern Illinois University
- 18. State University at Groningen, Holland
- 19. University of Illinois

- United States Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California
- 22. San Diego State College
- 23. University of California at Los Angeles
- 24. System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California
- 28. University of North Carolina
- 29. Michigan State University
- 30. Ohio State University
- 32. West Virginia University
- 34. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- 35. University of Texas
- 36. University of Kentucky
- 38. Emory University
- 39. State University College, Potsdam, New York

- 40. New York University
- 41. University of Minnesota
- 42. State University of New York at Buffalo
- 43. University of Washington
- 45. University of Wisconsin
- 46. University of Lund, Sweden
- 47. Columbia University
- 48. Yale University
- 50. National Institute of Mental Health
- 51. Brown University
- 53. University of Notre Dame
- 54. State University of New York at Stony Brook
- 55. Washington University
- 56. Western Michigan University
- 57. Purdue University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The National Guard in Politics. By Martha Derthick. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 202. \$4.95.)

The stated purpose of this book is to analyze group power through the examination of a single case. The case concerns the politics of the National Guard expressed by its organized interest representative, the National Guard Association. This organization is characterized by the author as one of the most successful pressure groups in our political system.

What distinguishes this work from that growing body of longitudinal studies of single organized interest groups is its unique concept of group power. According to Professor Derthick, a group's power is the ratio of its achievements to its goals. Goals are claims communicated to government. Achievements are actions taken by government in fulfillment of the claims. To establish that a group has power, however, it is not necessary to link specific governmental actions as responses to group activities. "An achievement is a goal fulfilled whether or not it can be established that the group "caused" the fulfillment by conscious effort beyond mere assertion of the claim." (p. 13)

In this formulation group power is at a maximum when achievements and goals are in "balance." Power increases as achievements increase if goals remain constant or as goals decrease if achievements remain constant. Power decreases as achievements decrease if goals remain constant or as goals increase if achievement remain constant.

To account for variance with this notion of power requires establishing magnitudes for goals and achievements. Professor Derthick proposes that the magnitude of goals is determined by the degree of

resistance to them. Resistance to goals is a function of three factors: the number and range of political actors involved in processing claims (i.e. the more numerous the actors, the more resistance the group will encounter); the attitudes of the actors i.e. the more hostile the actors the more resistance the group will encounter); and the incidence and intensity of competing or supporting claims (i.e. the more numerous and intense are competing claims, the greater the resistance the group will encounter). The magnitude of achievements is determined by relating them to the magnitude of the expressed goals. "If all claims made are perfectly fulfilled, then the magnitude of the group's achievements equals that of its goals, and its power is at a maximum. To the extent that claims go unfulfilled, the magnitude of achievements falls short of the magnitude of goals (and power is accordingly less)." (pp. 13-14)

With this perspective on group power three major phases in the political experience of the National Guard are identified: a period of offense and success illustrated by such legislation as the Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916, both highly favorable to the Guard; a period of stability of claim and achievement lasting until 1950; and third, a period of decreasing success and increasing defense necessitated by such actions as the recent proposal by the Secretary of Defense to merge the Guard with the Army Reserves. While the conceptual statement deemphasizes the importance of group resources and strategies, the highly readable account of the National Guard's politics since 1879 places about the same emphasis on organization, leadership skill, and socio-economic bases as other case studies of interest groups. For the National

Guard, the author concludes, "In retrospect, the impression generally is one of power—of goals fulfilled; but for this fulfillment, the Guard owes as much to fortuitous circumstance as it can claim credit for on account of its own political activity." (p. 164)

This summary interpretation is representative of the limitations of the concept of group power as a system of general explanation. Power as conceived in this study is not necessarily related to group activity at all. As noted, the only link provided between the group and public policy is an "assertion" of a claim which is "communicated" to government. The terms "assertion" and "communicate" are not clarified further. All that is necessary is for the group to be satisfied with a governmental action which, as in the case of the National Guard, may well be the result of "fortuitous circumstance." This condition of group satisfaction is called achievement and achievement is equated with power. Few suggestions are offered to render the extraordinarily complex processes subsumed under the deceptively simple notion of group satisfaction amenable to empirical inquiry.

The problem of assessing magnitudes also is intriguing. Goal magnitude is held to be wholly a function of external resistance. Most other interest group theories make magnitude at least partially dependent upon the intensity with which a goal is supported by the group making the claim. But if goal magnitude can be thought entirely a function of external resistance, it might be as plausible to focus on the groups which cluster around an issue as to focus in detail on the activities of the single claimant group. A more precise statement of goal magnitude, crucial here to the determination of the power of the National Guard, would seem to require a closer analysis of the activities of such groups as the Department of the Army, the Reserve Officers Association, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Resistance to goals might also be the function both of the kind of issue involved as well as the political setting in which the conflict takes place. Theodore Lowi suggests some very useful analytical categories in his important review article "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," in World Politics XVI (July, 1964) pp. 677-715.

Understanding of political life will be advanced mainly through careful empirical inquiry generated by precisely stated theory. The National Guard in Politics does provide a theoretical emphasis distinct from other single longitudinal studies. But unfortunately, it is not entirely satisfying as a formal guide to inquiry and the organization of information.—Charles R. Green, Macalester College.

Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area. By William C. Havard and Floyd L. Corty. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 181. \$5.00.)

Interest in methods of adapting local governmental arrangements to changing urban needs increases each time a proposed solution is adopted in a specific area. The recent consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, makes a study of the earlier (1949) consolidation of City of Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish especially timely.

The book examines the results of the Baton Rouge consolidation in the light of more than a decade of experience in its operation. It is an "evaluation of the way in which the consolidated government has worked in practice . . by means of a survey of the organization of the city-parish government and of the administrative programs of the most important consolidated departments in the city-parish government," including a comparison of costs of the new plan of government with the costs of the old separate city and parish governments. The authors focused their inquiry on the effects of consolidation on the rural sector of the parish.

The political fragmentation in the East Baton Rouge Parish before 1949 was typical of the situation in many other metropolitan areas characterized by rapid industrialization and population growth—a parish government, the City of Baton Rouge, several small incorporated places, and a variety of special districts. The parish government in itself was diffused among a number of semiautonomous boards, commissions, and offices. The solution originally proposed was a consolidation of the city and parish governments. Pressures were sufficient to turn the original plan into a partial functional consolidation rather than a complete unification. Separate councils were continued for the urban and rural areas but with overlapping memberships and a single elected "mayor-president." The need for compromise necessitated the continuation of the parish constitutional officers.

In spite of the limitations imposed by the modifications designed to make the plan acceptable, substantial functional consolidation was achieved in planning and in the development of public works. The department of public works became an excellent example of "compound-functional consolidation" with administrative consolidation of supervision, purchasing personnel, central garage, and major works planning, but with a clear separation between urban and rural areas in budgeting.

If any lessons are to be learned from this ac-

count, one is that consolidation does not assure lower costs of government. Even when adjustments were made for changing dollar values, expenditures per capita were greater after consolidation than they were before. In a sense, it was through increased spending that the greatest benefits of the new plan were demonstrated to the inhabitants of the rural parts of the parish. The physical changes brought about by unified planning and construction of road, drainage, and sewer systems prepared the rural area for the increasing urbanization it was constantly undergoing and at the same time produced a favorable public reaction.

The authors believe that the most valuable object lesson in the Baton Rouge experiment is found in "its demonstration of the limits on what is possible in local government change." Herein lies the reason for the success of the plan—the willingness of its originators to make the kind of concessions to the interests concerned necessary to win their support. This pragmatism also may be an important element in what the authors find to be the system's "capacity for self-correction of weaknesses and possible adaptability to further consolidation."

The book has its rough spots. Typographical errors add to the difficulties inherent in comparing the text with the Tables in the Appendix.

A fitting sequel to this publication would be a study of the political factors involved in the adoption of the new government and a survey of the attitudes of both urban and rural residents toward the system in effect today.—Alice L. Ebel, Illinois State University.

The Negro and the First Amendment. By HARRY KALYEN, JR. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 190. \$4.75.)

One of the less happy incidences of the behavioral revolution in the study of public law has been a tendency on the part of the "rebels" to ignore legal doctrines in their analyses. This tendency undoubtedly represents an over-compensation for those years in which doctrinal analysis was the dominant staple of public law scholarship. But whatever its derivation, it is a tendency which should be modified. For studying the behavior of judges without the doctrinal outputs is as incomplete as studying doctrines as abstractions.

It is the virtue of this skillfully written book that it tries, however marginally, to focus on one of the many questions arising out of the relationship of doctrinal development to social forces impinging upon the judiciary. Professor Kalven takes as his main theme the impact of the civil rights movement on the First Amendment, with specific emphasis on the development of a "theo-

ry" of the free speech portion of that Amendment. His analysis also sheds considerable light on the other side of the same coin-namely on the responses of the Supreme Court justices to a major social movement. The analysis does not succumb to the establishment of an easily dichotomized relationship between judge and litigant. It does not suggest that the only relevant variables are the judges' attitudes toward the claims of such groups as the NAACP. Rather it assumes that the judges' responses to the cases involved are complex crystallizations of their attitudes toward many things, including the need for satisfactory doctrinal development, and a commonly shared sympathy towards the goals of the NAACP.

Professor Kalven uses three sets of cases to support his analysis. Each set focuses on a particular doctrine which has been invoked before the Supreme Court to protect the NAACP from different forms of harassment by state governments and their instrumentalities—the most frequent forms being public exposure of NAACP activities and membership lists and state encouragement of private discrimination in public accommodations.

The first of these doctrines, that of group libel and seditious libel, is of major importance to any theory of the First Amendment, but of minor importance to the civil rights movement, since, as Professor Kalven reluctantly concludes. NAACP has shown no inclination to depend on this approach. The second doctrine involves the right of association, and poses for the Court some major problems of bothersome precedents. In order to extricate the NAACP from a variety of predicaments, the Court must establish a principle which would support the right of a state to regulate certain types of organizational activity, but would prohibit it from obtaining the membership lists of the NAACP; and to meet another challenge it must re-examine the states' traditional prerogative of regulating litigation under the common law rules of barratry, champerty, and maintenance.

The third set of cases is perhaps the most fascinating, for it deals with the Court's handling of convictions of sit-in demonstrators. Here the Justices were faced with two competing strategies—lawyers for the demonstrators and the Solicitor General were urging upon the Court a broadened view of the state action principle while lawyers for the southern states and communities were urging it to hold that state trespass laws could be used to enforce private discriminatory actions. It is fairly clear that it was the Court's purpose to protect the demonstrators as much as possible without endangering useful doctrines still needed for

nonracial purposes, and it is a tribute to the Court's ingenuity that it was able to accomplish its goal.

Professor Kalven has whetted the reader's appetite with his descriptions of the impact of the civil rights movement on some aspects of the First Amendment. But he has also left considerable room for further scholarship. Some of the major variables have been identified, but others have not been explored. And the author's theme, while highly plausible, is the product of insight rather than strict empirical analysis. The former is useful; but the latter is also called for.

A final word should be added on what is perhaps the least satisfactory element of this bookthe author's use of the term theory. The notion that it is necessary to formulate a theory of the First Amendment has become prevalent in law review circles, and Professor Kalven seeks to build upon it. But it is not clear from this book how the term theory is being used. It is certainly not being used in its empirical sense to describe and predict the relationship between two or more variables. And I doubt if it is being used here in the simpler sense of describing the meaning of the First Amendment as expounded by the Supreme Court. If it has any meaning for this study, it is a completely normative concept-i.e. a theory of the First Amendment being one's organized thoughts about what it ought to mean. But this is unsatisfactory, either for purposes of this study or for general use in modern scholarship, and is in need of further clarification.—JOEL B. GROSSMAN, University of Wisconsin.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. By WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG. (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1963. Pp. xvii, 393. \$6.00 cloth, \$2.45 paper.)

Having been delayed in doing this review for nearly two years, I can console myself (and even more importantly, the editor) with the thought that I am in a position to write what is *indeed* a review, not simply a quick first impression. For I read this work in manuscript; I read it when it first appeared; I've been through it with care twice since; and I've dipped into it repeatedly.

As one who has spent so much time with this book, I can report that my first impressions were correct. Leuchtenburg has written a richly detailed, carefully balanced, and thoroughly reliable survey of the New Deal era. This is unquestionably the standard one-volume treatment of the period for this generation, far surpassing its only serious rivals, Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938 (1944) and James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (1956).

Fortunately it has been, from its moment of publication, available in paperback, thanks to the happy policy of its publishers. It has been my pleasure, as a teacher of graduate students in recent American history, to see this book attract and hold an audience dissatisfied with the superficial glibnesses of Richard Hofstadter's interpretations of the New Deal in his The American Political Tradition (1948), and The Age of Reform (1955), and vaguely unhappy with Burns' treatment.

I cannot judge whether political scientists will find Leuchtenburg's book as satisfying as political historians have judged it to be. Certainly those who still believe with Professor Burns that Roosevelt missed a great opportunity to reorganize American political parties along liberal-conservative lines will find little comfort in Leuchtenburg's book. Here the New Deal is seen as something essentially new, in spite of the Progressive-World War I era origins of many of its elements, and emphasis is given to how Roosevelt was able to change the essential nature of American politics by his reform of the Democratic Party. Leuchtenburg looks at his subject with sympathy and with concern, yet he never sees it through rose-colored glasses. He has many funny and telling anecdotes to relate-some of them never before in printyet he never seems to be striving for mere literary effect. He is generous to other scholars. Thus he pays tribute to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.'s analysis of F.D.R.'s "administrative talent" in The Coming of the New Deal (1959); and he says that Carl N. Degler in Out of Our Past (1959) "has written the best analysis of the permanent significance of the New Deal." But he is also skeptical when he cannot find evidence to support a thesis, such as Rauch's contention that F.D.R. deliberately turned away from domestic reform in order to win the support of restive Southern Democrats for his foreign policy. On this Leuchtenburg says simply: "Little evidence has been cited for this view. The New Deal seems to have sputtered out for quite other reasons."

Leuchtenburg has based his work upon widely scattered archives, in addition to the enormous body of published materials on the New Deal. This is not merely a synthesis of what others have written about the New Deal, although that is certainly one of its most obvious characteristics. It is essentially a work of original scholarship, written with restraint and judgment. It is one of the best volumes in the somewhat uneven "New American Nation" series edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris. Like other works in the series, it has a full bibliography and it has footnotes where footnotes should be, at the bottom of the pages. No matter what a person's interest in

the New Deal and F.D.R. may be, he can benefit from a reading of this book. As for political scientists, even those of the most advanced behaviorist persuasion could profit from a study of Leuchtenburg's book, for he shows how fine "traditional" political history can be when it is done by a man who combines a first-rate intellect with imagination, energy and a personal knowledge of practical politics.—ROBERT E. BURKE, The University of Washington.

The Higher Civil Service: An Evaluation of Federal Personnel Practices. By David T. Stanley. (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1964. Pp. 145. \$3.50.)

Perhaps it is a mark of growing political maturity that we have become concerned about the quality of our higher civil service. Stanley's work is a useful addition to empirical studies of this problem. He centers on the background, performance, and morale of some 16,000 officials in grades 15-18 whose decisions touch so many aspects of American life. Generalizations are based on a sample of 559, two-thirds in headquarters jobs, the others in the field. Twenty-seven per cent are in the Defense Department; 34 in other Cabinet departments; and 38 in various other agencies. Almost 200 men are former employees, whose views, as might be expected, are less positive. Interviews, questionnaires, secondary analysis, and reviews of earlier studies provide the means of analysis. Valuable comparisons are made with earlier studies such as those by Warner and Kilpatrick. The material is nicely organized and the data clearly presented.

Regarding typical career lines, the theme is one of slow, steady advance at the rate of one grade every three years. No meteoric rises occur, and the initial rate gradually slows to one grade for every five years. Regarding occupational role, the largest proportion are in engineering, general administration, science-math-statistics, and law respectively. Continuous and focused federal service is the rule. Over eighty per cent had served in only two departments and in only two major occupational fields during their entire career, again indicating that rotation is fairly uncommon in the federal service. Five out of six had college degrees and one out of three had advanced degrees. Average age of the group was almost 50, most of whom plan to retire within the next 5-10 years. making the problem of replacing them compelling.

Data on the views of top management people are presented, based on interviews with 67 men. Following the caveat that responses of the group are likely to be biased in favor of a system which brought them to the top, Stanley concluded that about half of them feel generally positive about

the higher civil service. One of their major criticisms (40 per cent) is the lack of any system for forecasting future personnel needs and meeting them. Here, apparently, is one area where some improvement can be made. Contrary to current reports from Washington about the difficulty of finding competent high-level administrators, almost half the officials said they had no trouble filling responsible positions. Those who did attributed it mainly to salary limitations, quotas on the super-grade jobs, and occasional rigidities in classification. Almost two-thirds of such jobs were filled from within the agency or department.

This happy picture is clouded, however, when we learn that getting rid of incompetents is an unsolved problem, even at the GS 15-and-over levels. More than half of the respondents feel that reassigning such men is the proper course, while the next most favored technique is to force them out. One-quarter concluded that nothing could be done.

When asked what changes they would like to see at their own level, most of the officials said they were satisfied with things as they are. Those who wanted change stressed higher salaries and more felicitous classification practices, including a "rank-in-man" system. They also wanted agencies to be able to make their own supergrade assignments. Greater mobility between agencies and departments was recommended.

Regarding general attitudes about the higher federal service, once again most officials are generally satisfied. The challenge and variety of work is the most common source of satisfaction, with "public service" third. Here, an interesting difference between scientific-technical men and generalists appears: public service is a poor third in the eyes of the former, yet ranks first among the administrative group. Regarding dissatisfactions, there is greater unanimity and indeed almost half of the entire sample cites "government complexity" as the major source of disenchantment. Second, again by a fairly wide margin, is timid or otherwise inadequate supervision. Here we find a nice similarity with Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings' broader survey which also stressed poor supervision and delays and complexity in the federal bureaucracy. Comparing their jobs with those in business, present federal officials believe the only advantage would be better pay. Those who had left the government, however, regarded their jobs in the private milieu as better on all counts.

Responses regarding the "advisability of a young person following a career leading to a position such as your own" are somewhat dampening insofar as satisfaction and the vital problem of recruitment is concerned. Combining former and

present employees, less than half of this highly successful group give an unqualified "Yes." Scientists and engineers are the least positive, which is consistent with their tendency to regard "public service" as a less compelling work incentive and their significantly greater belief that "red tape" is a major frustration.

Stanley turns finally to a general analysis of his findings to determine what can be done to improve the higher civil service. Here again, as he notes, the usual recommendations appear: better forecasting of personnel needs; more imaginative and vigorous recruitment; better evaluation, with less dependence on subjective judgments; selective increase in training and development, particularly in long-term assignments; better selection with more recruitment from outside the service. One must wonder about the competitiveness of appointments when, as the survey data show, most of the officials received their present positions through personal associations and 71 per cent of them believed their own replacement would come from within their own agency.

In reading once again these various prescriptions, one must ask whether they really touch the heart of the matter. Perhaps the continued emphasis upon better recruitment, encouraging bright young people to enter the service, the advantages of rotation and training, etc., is really beside the point. Is not the essential problem the system itself? As Weber noted, only inspired charismatic leadership can overcome the castration of bureaucracy. As the careful study by Kilpatrick shows, among the more successful and brighter members of the general employed public and among students, federal employment is seen as personally restrictive and frustrating: "over and over again, variations on this theme were repeated: the government is a vast organizational machine in which the individual is in danger of losing his identity and autonomy." (p. 122) "The special stress on lack of self-determination and too much bureaucracy . . . is another way of saying there would be too many restrictions on the individual's autonomy in the work situation." (p. 123) The desire for autonomy, moreover, is highly associated with personal competence and initiative: "The evidence is strong that the occupational satisfaction

offered by the federal service is relatively lower for the high-level federal employee than for his colleague of lower rank." (p. 118) And most sadly, "the appeal of federal employment is lowest among those kinds of employed adults for whom the government's qualitative needs are the greatest and for whom the competition will be keenest in the future." (p. 117) Such evidence suggests that more effort should be devoted to modifying the system to provide a milieu in which senior officials have more opportunity to use their skill and initiative and to which young people can come with better assurance that their talent will find an outlet.—Robert Presthus, Cornell University.

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EDITED BY JOSEPH S. CLARK. (New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell Co., 1965. Pp. 364. \$2.50, paper.)

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Narrative of the 1964 preconvention and election campaigns by the *New York Times* staff. Much useful information, little interpretation.—A.R.

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DAVID B. TRUMAN. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.;
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The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present. (New York: Horizon Press, 1965. Pp. 789. \$9.95.)

Census materials on many subjects updated to 1962.—A. R.

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Public Liberties in the New States. By David H. Bayley. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. Pp. 152.)

India and Ghana both make use of preventive detention acts. How do these laws compare in their terms, in the use that is made of them, and in the validity of the arguments advanced in their justification? This book provides us with a welcome basis for answering such questions; or at least it gives us a start in that direction. It is not a systematic survey of public liberties in each of the new states; that would be a mammoth undertaking. But under the headings of "Personal Lib-

erty," "Freedom of the Press," "Freedom of Association," "Freedom from Discrimination," "Economic Welfare and Human Rights," and "Agencies of Freedom," it does provide a large amount of descriptive material from many of the new states. Even more importantly, it discusses justifications, providing a considerable basis for evaluating, in the light of more evidence than can be encompassed within this slender volume, the state of public liberties in any given new nation and for reaching an intelligent conclusion as to whether the restrictions that are in effect can be justified. The author's own use of evaluative tools within

the limits of the information available to him seems eminently reasonable.

Bayley is well aware of the difficulties: he sees no easy answers: yet he is not a defeatist. A few sentences will help to convey the flavor of his approach. "Since the dedication of the modernizing elite in the developing nations is often in question, democratic theory would lead one to the conclusion that democracy's homeostatic mechanisms are even more essential in the developing than in stable democratic situations. However, for the very reason that these mechanisms are needed, they are likely not to work. Indeed, precisely in order to create the requisites of democratic privileges widely enjoyed, the power of the court system and the effect of free elections may be curtailed." (p. 137) And again: "Those who sincerely try to utilize a measure of autocracy to tutor in freedom must realize that they must continually sow the seeds of their own demise. They are the new colonialists, and the measure of their achievement will be a second revolution of independence in the new states—the independence of the individual within a scheme of human rights." (p. 144) -J. ROLAND PENNOCK, Swarthmore College.

Sequel To Colonialism: The 1957-1960 Foundations for Malaysia. By WILLARD A. HANNA. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc. 1965. Pp. 288. \$7.50.)

Mohammed Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism. By Jeanne S. Mintz. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1965. Pp. viii, 246. \$6.00.)

These two books are quite different in scope and style, but both add, in their own way, to the gathering collection of material on two Southeast Asian protagonists, Malaysia and Indonesia. Willard Hanna's contribution is primarily a collection of his reports for the American Universities Field Staff on what was then Malaya, Singapore and Borneo. Written between 1957 and 1960, these onthe-spot reports present a panorama of events and places including party politics in Malaya and Singapore, rubber and tin development, early Indonesian-Malayan relations and a series of short descriptions of various places and problems in what became Malaysia. These include studies of Malacca, Brunei, Kuala Lumpur, Kedah, Perlis and the Pangkor racial troubles of 1959.

Hanna's very style is personal, often journalistic and full of editorial asides. There is little trouble in ascertaining his biases, although from the observation point of this reviewer's own prejudices his position is usually correct. Each report is dated and there is a feeling of immediacy about them which adds to the pleasure of reading the book. However, this system also leads to a certain

redundancy as different reports re-explain various events. A more serious problem in the compilation of AUFS reports is that events have outdistanced or explained actions or personalities described as of 1957-1960. The use of footnotes or postscripts to explain these changes and clarifications would be of immense use.

One must forgive these minor faults, however, as the author has presented a good deal of valuable material, available previously only to AUFS subscribers. The early chapters display interesting insights into the complicated politics of the area while the last chapters do that as well as providing local portraits comparable to those found in the better travel magazines. Of particular interest are the biographies of Malaysian leaders. Perhaps this book is not always for the scholar, but it is a pleasure to read.

The book of Jeanne Mintz is described as a study of the roots of Indonesian socialism. It is something more than that, including as well a general description of Indonesian history and the political process. The first chapters present a survey of the rise of socialist power and particularly the Communist Party (PKI). This section tends to go over material that has been covered by others such as Brackman and Hindley. There are a number of new insights and the author disagrees with some of the interpretations of others such as George Kahin. A second section deals with the post-independence political parties and the author argues that "neither the doctrine nor the programs of Indonesia's socialist parties are concerned more than peripherally with economic policies," (p. 125). The final section, a study of the growth and pattern of Guided Democracy is one real contribution to our understanding of contemporary Indonesia. This is the first extended description of the operation of Sukarno's scheme and it clarifies a number of points covered only tangentially by other writers.

The book presents a scholarly survey of several vital points of Indonesian politics. A number of the author's interpretations are open to debate, but she usually backs her position with a strong case. Fast-moving events in that country have made some of her points out-of-date while others, such as her remarks on Partai Murba, have been borne out by those events. In the latter case Miss Mintz argued that the strength of Murba was in its relationship to Sukarno. This was later evidenced by the continuation in power of Murba men after the party was suspended. One statement in the conclusion is not supported by the evidence presented in the book when the author states, "Put bluntly [guided democracy] is a cloak for a power struggle, a façade built out of myths and slogans to shield a system of autocratic personalized rule." (p. 225) This may be true but it needs more proof.

Both of these books deserve consideration by the serious student of Southeast Asia.—Fred R. von der Mehden, University of Wisconsin.

Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology.

Edited by Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen.

(Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, Volume X. Pp. 463. 14.20 Finnmarks.)

After an introductory description of international cooperation in political sociology, by Stein Rokkan, this important mixed bag falls into two major parts-dealing with consensus and cleavage and with party systems and party organizationfurther divided into approximate halves. Under the first major heading, five authors deal with changing conditions of ideology and partisanship: S. M. Lipset on political cleavages in developed and emerging polities, Mark Abrams on British party politics after the end of ideology, Radomir Lukić on political ideology and social development, Yrjö Littunen on social restraints and ideological pluralism, and Erik Allardt's theory of solidarity and legitimacy conflicts. Still under the first heading, three additional papers deal with dimensions of political alignment: Erik Allardt on patterns of class conflict and working class consciousness in Finnish politics, Roger Girod on the geography of the Swiss party system, and Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen on regional contrasts in Norwegian politics. In the second major part of the volume, four authors discuss party systems and the division of political power: S. N. Eisenstadt on bureaucratization, markets, and power structure, Szymon Chodak on societal functions of party systems in sub-Saharan Africa, Jerzy Wiatr's analysis of one-party systems, and Juan Linz' account of the Spanish political system. The final section includes five papers on party organization and patterns of political recruitment: Warren Miller on majority rule and representative government in the United States, Ulf Torgersen on the structure of urban parties in Norway during the late nineteenth century, James Cornford on the adoption of mass organization by the British Conservative Party, Junnosuke Masumi's profile of the Japanese Conservative Party, and Martti Noponen and Pertti Pesonen on legislative careers in Finland.—Marvin Rintala, Boston College.

Russia after Khrushchev. By Robert Conquest. (New York: Praeger, 1965. Pp. viii, 267. \$5.00.)

The record indicates that all commentators on Soviet affairs were caught unaware by the sudden downfall of Chairman Khrushchev in October 1964. But some must have been more surprised than others. For since the removal of Khrushchev's major rivals from the ruling group in 1957, a lively dialogue over the nature of his power had occurred in various quarters. Some analysts deductively or intuitively contended that by 1958, Khrushchev had finally emerged as the absolute dictator of Kremlin policy, subject only to such restraints as he might care to impose upon himself. Others rejected this theory of the self-restrained dictator after they had inductively reasoned from contradictions in official conduct that certain associates of Khrushchev were disputing his viewpoint on important questions of policy and personnel, and occasionally thwarting his ambitions. The events surrounding Khrushchev's demise would appear to be more plausible in terms of an ongoing conflict situation like the one hypothesized by representatives of the latter-mentioned school of thought.

One such representative is Robert Conquest, whose Power and Policy in the USSR can profitably serve as a basic text for university courses on the subject. Several of the probabilities about past maneuvers in the Soviet system of closed politics which were stated in that work have, incidentally, been confirmed since its publication in 1961. The aim of Conquest's present book, completed in January 1965, is to offer a detailed appreciation of current-day Soviet realities and set forth the potentialities of national development. The most valuable chapter for purposes of instruction is the concise "Logic of Faction." Here the general laws of Soviet politics are clearly presented with well-deserved emphasis on the top bosses' utter ruthlessness, urge to supreme power, opportunities for negotiation of internal differences, and "general polarization on many essentials between a 'forward' and a 'conservative' attitude." This chapter should indeed be reflected upon by some post graduates in the field of Soviet politics.

The most controversial parts of this engrossing volume relate to political stability and prospects. While outlining numerous perspectives of the future, Conquest yet seems to believe that there are formidable limits to the adaptiveness of any Communist leadership in the USSR and its capacity to control the growing popular impulses toward democratic freedoms. He also has doubts about the leaders' ability permanently to calm their factional tempers. In conclusion, therefore, he does not exclude from the range of possibilities such notions as a breakdown of regime authority, the eruption of autonomous states from the Baltic to Kazakhstan, and a civil war featuring the spectacle of "a group of Central Committee members, like the minority of cardinals during the Great Schism, decamping to Leningrad or Kiev and

electing an anti-Presidium!" This type of speculation at least has the merit of prompting discussion about the assumptions of less imaginative forecasters.

My biggest complaint about his writings is that by and large they always tend to minimize the importance of specific quarrels over policy matters in the Soviet hierarchy. Of course, "in general, power takes precedence over policy." But is not power sometimes jeopardized for the sake of imposing one or another policy conception? Concretely, I think misleading the assertion that the proposal of Professor Liberman on the use of a profit index for gauging the efficiency of industrial enterprises was opposed in 1962-63 merely because of "petty quasi-doctrinal habits at a rather superficial level." As spokesmen of the reformist wing of the CPSU argued at the time, Stalin, idol of the inner-party "conservatives," justified the practice of preferential development of heavy industry by making an ideological virtue of the chronic unprofitability of entire branches of that sector of the economy. We may hence infer that the implications of Liberman's profit scheme were disturbing to heavy engineering partisans at the highest level of the dictatorship.

Nonetheless, I respect Conquest's very serious approach to a difficult subject and recommend his latest work to both general readers and area specialists.—Sidney I. Ploss, *University of Pennsylvania*.

Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany. By Klaus Boel-Ling. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1964. Pp. 276. \$6.50.)

The author, a well known former editor of the Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel, has been the political commentator of the North German Radio Network for a number of years. In this book he presents his readers with a critical-analytical history of the Federal Republic. His commentary accompanies the state in the heart of Europe (Herzland Europas) from the year, nay, from the moment Zero—Surrender 1945—to the accession of the chancellor and architect of the Wirtschaftswunder, Ludwig Erhard.

Perhaps the first and principal fact in German attitude toward the new and certainly rather small state to which the author can point is the affirmative and positive basic element: quite contrary to the average German's position when discussing the much bigger and much less damaged Republic of Weimar of some four decades ago. The Germans of the 9th of November (1918) had been able to pull their country away from the conquerors' grip, after the loss of her overseas possessions—which, by the way, the then victorious

nations had since lost by granting independence, and of a few regions in Europe. It must be said, too, that eventually, in the Twenties and beginning Thirties, just before Hitler's coming to power, the Weimar Republic had reached an influence in the field of national and international Kultur Germany never had enjoyed since the days of the Weimar Olympians, Goethe and Schiller, whose great names were to protect the constitutional assembly of 1919—just as Beethoven and Bonn were to arouse kindly thoughts within and without Western Germany for the Federal Republic.

Of course, the defeat of 1945 was so absolutely complete, the country to such a degree tohu wa bohu (without form, and void) that any creative personality would have found a certain measure of adulation and admiration just because of that creative power.

Naturally, it would be an exaggeration to call the occupational authorities of the "allies" creative in—let us say—Nietzsche's sense who equated creativeness with, and even placed it above, moral righteousness. However, no lesser man than the great historian Meinecke applauded the allied endeavors and admonished his fellow Germans to assist the foreign occupiers in their attempt to root out the vestiges of nazism and to reestablish, as it were, to recreate Christian-Occidental morality within the boundaries of the Fatherland.

In the author's presentation, no doubt well justified by the events as they have evolved since, the second phase of German post-war history started with the famous speech that Secretary of State, James Burnes delivered at Stuttgart in September 1946. Boelling is of the opinion that by this speech the United States, with the western allies following, accepted Germany back into the community of the civilized Occident. Already future conflicts with the Soviet Union could be foreseen. Quite naturally, too, the doctrine of the general guilt of all the Germans had shown its weaknesses since the occupiers themselves found many thousands of the guilty nation in jails and concentration camps, although suddenly almost every German proclaimed his hatred for Hitler which he had to hide during the latter's evil reign.

There are arguments possible as to when the third phase of the Federal Republic started—a phase of recovery and prosperity which still is going on. The appointment of Adenauer, the creation of the new currency, the D-Mark, and Erhard's initiation of the Wirtschaftswunder, the joining of the NATO or the EEC:—each of those events enumerated and many others could be used as a starting mark. Yet, there can be no doubt that somehow Adenauer is to be regarded as the Bundesgründer just as Bismarck was to be regarded as the Reichsgründer. Der Alte had the almost

charismatic quality of dwarfing all the other political personalities, including his successor. The early death of Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the socialist party, robbed that party and Germany of the only personality to rival Der Alte.

Boelling furnishes an excellent picture of conditions, parties and problems. The chief problem remains reunification which, of course, would close the third phase of the Federal Republic and that Republic itself insofar as it stands just for Western Germany. Reunification remains the loftiest aim of the Federal Republic: it is the latter's raison d'être and because of it Western Germany actually tries to be as democratic and as "western" as possible. It is the status of suspense which—a fascinating contradiction-many friends of Germany, and many good Germans, would like to see lasting as long as possible, practically for many generations to come. Suspense in permanence: it promises a Germany, firmly tied to the west and to western ideals and a peaceful coexistence in Central Europe.

A change in this status of suspense would assure dangerous uncertainty.

Boelling himself advocates a more perfect democratisation of the Federal Republic, a true and faithful adherence of its citizens to the western ideals so that one day both Germanies could be united in peace and liberty with the consent of all nations interested—even of the Soviets.

Here Boelling is carried away by his honorable patriotic feelings. The doctrine of the One Germany (Hallstein) is not backed up by the facts, and there is no doubt that the two Germanies have begun to live separately and go in different directions. The partition of the country is one of the prices the Germans have to pay for tolerating Hitler, adjusting to his reign if not actually backing him up, and enjoying the bygone super-greatness of Greater Germany. No peace treaty with either Germany has been signed yet. However, your reviewer thinks that its stipulations are already carried out somewhat like an effect before its cause.—Robert Rie, State University College, Fredonia, N.Y.

Ulbricht: A Political Biography. By CAROLA STERN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965. Pp. xi, 231. \$5.95.)

Among the men who control the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe Walter Ulbricht is unique in having held the top position in the DDR from the inception of the Communist regime in East Germany to this day. More than this: in the internecine warfare for position and leadership which went on in the German Communist party in the more than twenty years preceding his rise to power, Ulbricht likewise managed to be always

in positions of influence, if not control. What manner of man is he? Is he a political genius, a born leader of men, or an opportunist who knows how to side with the mighty and profit from this?

The book under review, the first biography of Ulbricht in English, and the first political biography-as distinguished from East German panegyrics-in any language, answers this question with great clarity. What Hannah Arendt has called the "banality of evil" has found in Ulbricht its almost perfect Communist realization. Ulbricht is the apparatchik par excellence. He is not that opportunist who seeks power for power's sake; rather he goes for the jugular as "true believer" whose Weltanschuung-"narrow gauge Marxism," as the author calls it-was formed in the pre-World War I socialist educational environment of his youth. To this he has clung ever since. No doubt ever tempted him, and no supervening event, be it Nazism or Stalinism, the partition of Germany or the rise of nuclear powers, could affect his creed. By 1918/19, when the KPD established itself, he was the ready-made revolutionary bureaucrat. As East German boss he still believes that he puts unadulterated Marxism into practice. Whoever criticizes or opposes him is out of step and has to be destroyed. And if, as in 1953, the masses themselves rise against him, the masses must have been misled by "fascist agitators." As Bert Brecht put it at that time: "The people have lost the confidence of the government; therefore, the government dissolves the people."

It had always been like this. In the pre-Hitler period he rose to the top in the fashion customary with Communist parties: through the "apparatus" of the party bureaucracy. He went down to defeat with a party that consistently had taken "the fourth month of revolutionary pregnancy for the ninth." only to reappear, twelve years later, in the rear-guard of the victorious Soviet armies. In the meantime he again had chosen the right way to subsequent success, namely, exile in Moscow rather than in the West. More surprising than his eventual arrival at the top of the DDR leadership in the postwar period was his political survival of de-Stalinization, since he had been the most loyal of all the dictator's henchmen. But he apparently convinced post-Stalin leadership that they could rely on him, and, probably, that there was nobody to replace him. Surely the Moscow leaders are aware of the liabilities which his ruthless, oppressive, unimaginative, and often inept rule constitutes. They seem to be afraid that by sacrificing him they would risk their own control of East Germany. Thus, as the author points out, Ulbricht has always been the perfect "deputy", faithfully serving the precepts and policies of someone higher up, whether Marx and Lenin in the doctrinal sphere or Stalin, Khrushchev et al. in that of power. Only once did he kick, namely, when early post-Stalin leadership seemed to toy with the idea of "liberalizing" East-German rule in preparation for reunification; this is understandable since it would have involved Ulbricht's demise. But again he had placed his bets wisely, since Beria disappeared from the scene shortly thereafter.

Carola Stern's book is the model of a "political biography." It traces Ulbricht's political fate, and therewith that of German-Communism, through all the often incredible shifts and tergiversations of the "line." That there are hardly any intimate, more personal data testifies to the drab, colorless character of a perfect bureaucrat, a "spiritually warped German petty-bourgeois who has been helped to undeserved power by the upheavals of this century." No outstanding—or even mildly original—statement of his remains, but perhaps his memory will survive due to a feature of his outward appearance, his goatee, which gave rise to the immortal ditty:

Ziegenbart und Brille Sind nicht des Volkes Wille.

History sometimes goes in for bad jokes. A Walter Ulbricht the first to put in practice in Germany what the great German socialist dreamed of and hoped for? The incongruity must be clear even to most of those who sympathize with the DDR, and in this there may be some hope for a change.—John H. Herz, City College of the City University of New York.

Social Science Research on Latin America. Edited with a Preface and Introduction by Charles Wagley. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 338. \$4.00.)

There must be some kind of law to the effect that the amount of academic concern which is devoted to a given subject varies in direct proportion to the inches of newspaper space directed thereto, and is in no way dependent upon or correlative with the scholarly insights which may be derived from its pursuit. In the case of Latin America, a few hardy specialists spent years trying to persuade a deaf academic world that their region of interest was rich in comparative data which might lead to the uncovering of important understandings about social phenomena. But it was not because of their cries that the community of scholars awoke to the existence of Latin America. It was because, in the spring of 1958, a vice president of the United States was assaulted by a mob; because, on January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro's revolution overthrew the regime of Fulgencio Batista and began a headlong dash into the arms of the U.S.S.R.; and finally, because many Latin

Americans seem quite determined that the rest of the Hemisphere should also join the Cuban descent into the Soviet sphere.

In the present book, editor Charles Wagley, anthropologist and Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia University, makes frequent allusion to the impact of political events on the development of scholarly interest about Latin America. Latin Americanists should be pleased that the foreign affairs of the United States have had this effect. One cannot but speculate, that so much was missed for so long. Must our academic interest always await the arrival of the morning paper? Is it not possible that valuable hypothesization and even theory may be derived from the comparative study of the political process of State Y, even before they spit on our vice president or threaten to join our opponents?

This volume provides a genuinely useful contribution to the rapidly expanding scholarly work on Latin America. There is an introduction by the editor, along with articles on scholarly literature about Latin American geography (James J. Parsons), historiography (Stanley J. Stein), anthropology (Arnold Strickcon), political science (Merle Kling), economics (Carlos Massad), sociology (Rex Hopper), and law (Kenneth L. Karst).

Wagley's publication statistics reveal that the strongest offerings on Latin America are made by history, anthropology, political science, and geography, in that order, with economics and sociology falling far behind. However, he persists in the belief, quite justified a few years ago, that the Latin-American interest of political scientists still falls behind that of geography. What was a fact now becomes a legend, and the legends die hard.

For the researcher who is concerned with new questions for examination, the book is full of valuable proposals. Almost every chapter contains a long list of rich suggestions for the development of significant research. There are certain topics that recur in each one, though with varying stress: (1) the impact of contemporary concern with methodology on Latin American studies, (2) the principal trends in writing on Latin America, and their proponents, (3) the work of Latin Americans themselves in the field, and (4) possible guidelines for the development of more meaningful research.

With exception of a few passages that are inevitable in a day when widespread misunderstanding of profound methodological proposals has led to the substitution of incomprehensible jargon for significant implementation of the proposals themselves, it is refreshing that this important bibliographical work is generally presented in a lucid style that demonstrates a balanced understanding

of the need for scientific caution and care in the use of research tools, but still respects the contributions of older scholars. Most of the writers seem to appreciate that the older approaches to social science research were not so devoid of the virtues of scientism as we are sometimes led to believe; and that the new approaches may not always be so filled with scientific virtue or even so productive of final insight as they claim.

The book possesses a value that is peculiar to its type. It explores the present work of social scientists in a rather untrod field. To this more or less virgin Latin American territory it brings a review of contemporary behavioral method as well as a survey of the traditional literature. In this rather raw frontier of research, it enables us to compare the concerns of political science with those of sister disciplines. Partly because Professor Merle Kling is a Latin Americanist who is well schooled in our modern trends, and partly because scholarly work on Latin American politics and government is now undergoing significant expansion and improvement, the present volume should encourage gratification among political scientists regarding the state of their field in general and of their research on Latin America in particular.

Kling portrays contemporary political science as being aware of modern needs without being dogmatically critical of former contributions; and as having begun a meaningful application of that point of view to the Latin American scene. He omits mention of several works by authors who might have been thought significant; but his lists are not designed to be all-inclusive or exhaustive, and are certainly not intended to be the most important part of his contribution. His proposals for new research in Latin America are among the most potentially fruitful pages in the book.

The book, including Kling's article, is more useful as scholarly comment on a developing field than as bibliography. For that reason, all of its chapters should be extremely useful to all social scientists concerned with Latin America. The knowledge of the work of others in a common area of interest can provide a most significant contribution to comprehension of the needs, shortcomings, and merits of one's own specialty.—James L. Busey, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs.

Federal Government in Nigeria. By EME O. AWA. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964, Pp. vii, 349. \$8.00.)

Education and Politics in Nigeria. By Hans N. Weiler, Ed. (Freiburg, Germany: Verlag Rombach, 1964, Pp. 294 \$9.00.)

Eme Awa's contribution to the growing literature on African government involves a description and analysis of constitutional developments leading to independence, a description of the governments organized under the independence constitution of 1960, and an analysis of what he believes to be Nigeria's major political difficulties. It may be noted that much of the material has been covered elsewhere by the growing corps of Nigerian specialists, and by two Nigerian scholars in particular (see Kalu Ezera's Constitutional Developments in Nigeria, 1960, and Oluwole I. Odumosu's The Nigerian Constitution: History and Development, 1963). However, this is no more to be criticized than the constant appearance of new American government texts. The presentation does not always have the sharpness of other works on the same topics. The major points and the chronology are there, but their significance is often left implicit rather than made explicit. For instance, in dealing with the problems of the viability of the state, it is not emphasized that although British acquisition of territory began in 1862, it was not completed nor was unified administration established until 1914, nor that although independence came in 1960 most of the preparatory work was done during fifteen short years of worldwide tumult and change after 1945. Thus the work lacks some world and African perspective broader than the country itself.

Part I deals with the nature of politics, political parties, and particularly the constitutional development of the Federation of Nigeria. Emphasis is given to the number of ethnic groups, their jealous preservation of cultural and linguistic identity, the slow growth of a common nationalism, the retarded growth of national political parties, and the development of strong regional parties and leaders. The problem of unity is focused in terms of the disagreements over the number of major subdivisions into which the country should be divided. The author contends that it was the division of the country into three tremendous regions by the Richards constitution which was accepted by most Nigerians in the prelude to independence that is responsible for problems of constitutional development today. That tripartite federalism led to extreme regionalism and a weakening of the idea of central authority was evident in the national election debacle of December, 1964. Since this study was completed, however, a new constituent unit called the Mid-Western Region has been carved out of the Western Region bringing the present total to four. Awa gives a detailed analysis of the divisive forces but less attention to developments in national, political, and social integration and support for the central government.

Parts II and III, which in format resemble a typical American Government textbook, very usefully describe the organization, powers, and functions of the federal and regional governments. It is here that the author is at his best.

Part IV returns to the author's recurring theme, the federal relationship in terms of the fears of minorities, and the idea that the regions are too large for the development of national unity.

Hans Weiler's Education and Politics in Nigeria is a laudable bilingual effort to begin to come to grips on an interdisciplinary level with the reciprocal relationship between the development of political institutions and ideas, and the pattern and content of education in the most populous new African state. The editor points out that "a systematic analysis of this relationship under the specific conditions of a new state was considered premature . . ." and that it is a "rather random survey of the various ways in which the mutual relationship between education and politics in a new state may, and actually does, take shape" (p. 14). The book grew out of discussions of some research projects at the Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute at the University of Freiburg.

Phoebe and Simon Ottenberg and Rachel Yeld have looked into segments of Nigerian traditional society to investigate the social and political significance of education from the standpoints of anthropology and sociology. Political scientists Kenneth W. J. Post and James O'Connell examine the role of political groups and institutions in education. The relationship between education and the directions being taken by the new Nigerian elite are the concern of Hugh H. Smythe. Historian Helmuth Peets examines the role of education in British colonial policy and its impact in the present in Nigeria. Leonard John Lewis and Willfried E. Feuser devote their essays to the political implications of the educational system from the educationist point of view.

The essays in English by the Ottenbergs, Yeld, O'Connell, Post, Smythe, and Lewis are followed by summaries in German while English summaries are provided for the essays in German by Peets and Feuser. Also included are selected statistics on education in Nigeria and a selected bibliography on education and educational policy in Nigeria.

Both books are useful analyses of the problems of one of the world's more important new states.

—ROY OLTON, Western Michigan University.

East African Unity Through Law. By Thomas M. Franck. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 184. \$7.50.)

"To those people who would wait until the countries [Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda] are separately independent I say that they do not

know human nature. You must rule out the question of federation after we take our seats as sovereign states in the United Nations." With this prophetic statement by Julius Nyerere, Professor Thomas M. Franck closes a significant book on the development of federal institutions in the former British territories of East Africa. Nverere's statement was prophetic because independence brought with it certain conditions that militated against the maintenance and establishment of federal institutions. The author explains that after these countries gained their independence, they began to harden "into the molds of their several sovereignties." In effect, the logic of national politics outweighed the logic of supranational institution and any proposed economic benefits that might derive from them.

Conflicting national interests over the creation of an East African federation were exacerbated by the opposition of Kwame Nkrumah to the scheme. For whatever reason, it appears that his blueprint for implementing the African desire for continental unity is more comprehensive than those of East African leaders such as Nyerere, Kaunda and Mboya. The author, utilizing the models ascribed to David Apter, places Nkrumah in the mobilization design (total mobilization of resources to tackle the continent's problems) and the latter three leaders into the consociational design (building story by story through regional cooperation to accomplish the pan-African mystique).

Opposition to federalism in East Africa was not due entirely to forces unleashed by independence. It was also an unfortunate legacy of the colonial period when federal institutions became equated by the Africans, and perhaps rightfully so, with European domination. A product of this era, too, was an equally persistent opinion held in Uganda and Tanganyika that Kenya would be the beneficiary, at their expense, of any federal union.

The impediments to establishing federalism in the area were many, but lest the impression be given that this is the major thrust of the book, it should be emphasized that the preponderant, and most significant portion, examines the buildingblocks of federation. Indeed, Professor Franck's presentation of events in the colonial period might be best described as a teleological design for federalism. He shows how a common market, free movement of persons, statutory uniformity for such matters as licensing of professions, integrated public services, central banking and a common court of appeal provided the furnishings in this era for "a sophisticated federation." With such a foundation upon which to build federal structures, the writer feels that Britain should have applied pressure to bring about a federation agreement before granting independence to the territories. Certainly, Britain had demonstrated previously little diffidence about intruding into the politics of the area. Whether such pressure would have rendered a successful result is a matter of conjecture, but Britain "held a fairly strong hand in 1960" which would have enabled it to "synchronize the plunge to independence of the East African territories." Such synchronization would have presumably made federalism a more obtainable goal.

The American Society of International Law, under whose auspices the book was written, must be gratified by it. The book is unusual because of the comprehensiveness of its appeal. It is valuable for its historical content and will be a welcome addition to the growing number of histories of Africa. Its contribution to the literature of federalism is most important and should open interesting areas of comparison with the federal and supranational systems in the more developed countries. To the student of British colonial affairs it will be unusually impressive because of the lucid manner in which Professor Franck treats the intricacies of British colonial administration.—CLAUDE D. DAVIS, Texas A. & M. University.

Bantustan: The Fragmentation of South Africa. By Christopher R. Hill. (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. 112. \$2.25.)

As Colin M. Tatz so ably demonstrated in his penetrating work, Shadow and Substance in South Africa: A Study in Land and Franchise Policies Affecting Africans, 1910-1960 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1962), South African racial policy has been remarkably constant despite the variations in terminology and institutional arrangements. Professor Julius Lewin, the noted South African anthropologist at the University of the Witwatersrand (in Johannesburg). also came to the same conclusion in his unusually incisive volume, Politics and Law in South Africa: Essays on Race Relations (London: Merlin Press Ltd., 1963). Apartheid, for these two students of South Africa, is merely the continuation of traditional policies.

The Government of South Africa, naturally, rejects this point of view and points out that "separate development," a term which it now favors in preference to apartheid, is something altogether different, something better, than the previous policy that the international community found to be so abhorrent. This "new look" is clearly seen in a recent full-page advertisement the Information Service of South Africa placed in the March 31, 1965 issue of the Washington Post which declared that "In South Africa a great new social plan is at work. The creation of a community of politically independent, economically interdependent states.

Basic to this plan is the right of self-determination for each of the different nations, which constitute the multi-national population of South Africa."

The Assistant Director of the Institute of Race Relations in London, Christopher R. Hill, has recently visited the Republic of South Africa and has reported in this slim book on the difficulties and future prospects of the "politically independent, economically interdependent states" for Africans known as Bantustans. Bantustans may be defined as those territories which, over the years, have been reserved for the exclusive residence of the various African tribes in the Republic and which have been, or are scheduled to be, groomed for some type of limited home rule that, at some indeterminate date, may conceivably be transformed into fully independent and sovereign states. They are the institutional devices which the leaders of Afrikaner nationalism and the architects of apartheid hope to use to meet the mounting challenge of African nationalism with its claim for self-determination. In 1963, the Transkei, an African reserve lying on the southeastern coast of the Cape Province, received its grant of self-government, thus becoming the first Bantustan and the pilot project of the whole Bantustan program. This Xhosa-speaking area has its own chief minister, legislature, cabinet, flag, and national anthem, although the locus of real power still resides in Pretoria and Cape Town.

Hill has included in his book a discussion of the theory of apartheid, the practice of apartheid, the economic aspects of the Bantustans, the separate South African universities for the non-whites, the Bantustan experiment in the Transkei, the outlook for similar experiments in the province of Natal, and the prospects of the Bantustan program. In a postscript he deals with the achievements of the 1964 session of the Transkei Legislative Assembly and in two appendices provides information about the system of registration and voting in the Transkei and about the program of the opposition party in the Transkei. The book also contains a map of the African reserves in the Republic and one of the Transkei, as well as a table showing the expenditures contemplated under the Five Year Plan (1961-1965) for the development of African reserves.

The book does have a number of attractive features. First, Hill is able to handle his subject matter in a calm, unemotional manner, which is not altogether easy to do nowadays considering the well-nigh universal distaste for South African racial policies. He is not, however, oblivious to the conspicuous grievances of and hardships endured by the African peoples of South Africa under the rigors of the apartheid system, which all too

often has a de-humanizing effect upon such peoples. Second, he is fully cognizant of the economic forces at work which, in the long run, go counter to the aims and plans of the engineers of apartheid. He makes it clear (p. 109) that, over the long run, the new Bantustan program will not prove to be a viable one. Third, he is keenly aware of the interrelationship of this policy to external political forces, such as African nationalism outside the Republic which make their weight felt in the forum of the United Nations, the possibility of sanctions against South Africa, and the possibility of future independence for the three British High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. Fourth, his survey of African development within the framework of "separate development" includes an absorbing account of the so-called African "tribal colleges" at Turfloop, Fort Hare, and Nygoya which are intended to educate the future élites of the Bantustans. Finally, Mr. Hill provides an interesting and concise description of the drafting of the 1963 Transkei Constitution by the Recess Committee of the Transkei Territorial Authority.

Unfortunately, the book is marred by a number of deficiencies which, in all probability, are due to the haste with which it was published. Some of these shortcomings could be overcome were a second edition of the work issued at a later date. First, the book is not tightly organized enough and should have included chapter sub-headings to enable the general reader to follow the descriptions and the arguments. Second, at several places charts and diagrams could have been used to clarify certain institutional patterns, such as the Bantu Authorities system and the governmental structure of the Transkei. Third, the inclusion of a relatively simple chronology of relevant South African history would have given the work wider appeal for the non-specialist reader. Fourth, although the text is adequately footnoted, no bibliography has been appended. Fifth, Mr. Hill failed to include in the appendices the text of the 1963 Transkei Constitution to which the reader could have referred while attempting to follow his description of that document in the text. Sixth, the writer devoted scant attention to the Five Year Plan for the improvement of the African reserves, political developments in the Northern Transvaal Territorial Authorities, to the disturbances in Pondoland and Sekhukuneland, and to the extremely significant Odendaal Report (which envisages a Bantustan-type development for the Africans of South West Africa). Finally, his brief sketch of the theory of apartheid was altogether too shallow, as was his historical background of the land, labor, and franchise policies affecting Africans. For some unexplained reason, he did not appear to be familiar with some of the common secondary sources on these subjects, such as the one by Tatz mentioned earlier.

This book is not the first to appear on the subject, for it was preceded by Paul Ginewski's Bantustans: A Trek towards the Future (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1961) and possibly by W. A. Bellwood's Whither the Transkei (Cape Town: Howard B. Timmins, 1964), which the reader will find reviewed in African Affairs (London), October, 1964 and January, 1965, respectively. Probably the most comprehensive and authoritative book on the Transkei will be that written by Professors Gwendolen M. Carter, Newell M. Stultz and Thomas G. Karis of Northwestern University, Brown University and C.C.N.Y., respectively, which is to be published in the very near future.-RICHARD DALE, Northern Illinois University.

South Africa: Crisis for the West. By Colin and Margaret Legum. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 309. \$6.95.)

Colin and Margaret Legum are sensitive and perceptive writers of South African origin who are deeply committed to the fight for racial justice in their homeland. Now living in London, they have written a powerful plea for intervention to force the Afrikaner Nationalist Government to abandon its segregationist policy of apartheid before it leads to a disaster with world-wide repercussions. It is a volume of 200 pages of incisive political and economic analysis of the internal power structure in South Africa, followed by a 100-page critique of the arguments for and against the use of sanctions. The Legum's analysis of the power structure is a contribution of permanent value, while the plea for sanctions may soon appear dated.

The book must be judged not as a dispassionate treatise in political science but as a timely and intelligent commentary on a critical issue. As such, it is highly readable and well-informed, and full of illuminating insights. Since the authors are engaged in special pleading, however, their tone is occasionally dogmatic and they naturally tend to avoid qualifications that might weaken their generalizations.

In their analysis of the power structure of "Afrikanerdom," the Legums present a series of short but valuable sketches of the electorate, the Broederbond secret society, the Dutch Reformed Churches, the intellectuals, the Party and its press, financial and special interest groups and the Afrikaner worker. As a good example of how the Afrikaner power structure operates, the authors might have mentioned the way in which Professor N. J. J. Olivier and other reform-minded Afrikan-

er intellectuals were purged from the executive of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs in August 1961.

One of the highlights of the treatment of "English-Speaking South Africa," is the Legum's sharp analysis of the South Africa Foundation, an organization composed mainly of white business leaders who claim to be non-political but really buttress the Government by presenting to the outside world a one-sided version of a booming South African economy.

The authors have attempted to double check the accuracy of their facts, but the statistics on the number of "non-white students in university" (p. 165), in 1963 seem much too low. Although they do not say sc, the Legums thereby imply that the official statistics of the Government are one hundred per cent too high (4837 non-white students vs. the Legum's 2400), which is not plausible.

When they turn to sanctions, the Legums state that they "share the general distaste for economic weapons as a means of settling international disputes," because the consequences of sanctions "cannot be easily foreseen or controlled." But, they contend, it is a question of alternatives—either international economic sanctions or a disastrous race war. The real issue, therefore, is to determine which of these alternatives holds the greater risks for the peoples of South Africa, the international community, and the West.

The argument of the authors contains several assumptions that cannot be substantiated. History may well prove them right, but the decision makers in the United States are not at present willing to employ sanctions on the basis of these assumptions. This is because of such factors as the natural limits of foreign policy in changing things outside our control; the higher priorities of the United States in Europe, Latin America and Asia; the built-in inertia of a giant bureaucracy; the official skepticism about the view that the South African imbroglio could escalate into a world-wide racial conflict; and the fact that the key words in the conservative American climate of opinion are "moderation," "stability," and "orderly progress" -concepts that are cut of tune with the revolutionary realities of Africa today.

Africa changes so rapidly, however, that it may well build up unbearable pressures, forcing the United States to vote for sanctions sooner or later in the U. N. Security Council even though Washington still considers them impractical and unwise. The Legums have many allies in the continuing campaign to develop such pressures.—Vernon McKay, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University.

The South African Economy. By D. Hobart Houghton. (Cape Town, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 261. \$4.10.)

As a member of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister of South Africa, Vice-President of the South African Institute of Race Relations, former President of the Economic Society of South Africa, and Professor of Economics at Rhodes University (in Grahamstown, South Africa), D. Hobart Houghton is eminently qualified to discuss the economic structure of the Republic of South Africa.

An exceptionally well-written book, The South African Economy is tightly organized into ten chapters covering such topics as agriculture, African migratory labor, transportation, mining, the balance of payments, manufacturing, wages, the national income, standards of living, foreign trade, labor policy, banking, population, labor, and resources. The central concept around which his analysis of the factors of production in the Republic is structured is taken from Walt W. Rostow's well-known study, The Stages of Economic Growth (A Non-Communist Manifesto), which depicts five levels or steps of economic development ranging from the traditional society to the age of high mass-consumption. The author avers that South African traditional society terminated in 1820, the date of the major wave of British emigration to the Cape. For approximately one hundred and ten years (1820-1933), South Africa remained in the second stage, meeting the variegated pre-conditions for its "economic take-off." The "take-off" into sustained economic growth lasted but a brief twelve years (from 1933 to 1945), and now South Africa has, in his estimation, gotten well into the penultimate stage known as "the drive to maturity," which he predicts will last until approximately 1993.

Professor Houghton is deeply concerned about this "drive to maturity" and elucidates the various obstacles South Africa faces in its search for greater affluence, such as the need to expand the manufacturing sector (to absorb not only the natural population growth but also those South Africans who, in the course of time, will leave mining and subsistence agriculture for other more promising sectors of the economy), to forge ahead with exports, to increase the productivity of the labor force, and, in general, to effect a more desirable allocation of economic resources. He is quite distressed, both as an economist and as a humanist, that "... racial attitudes and the political policies which they inspire will undermine the forces making for economic growth and destroy the momentum towards continuous progress. This would be doubly disastrous, because not only would it involve the sacrifice of higher standards of living so clearly within our grasp, but the possibility of peaceful racial co-existence would be greatly reduced by economic stagnation, poverty and unemployment, which must certainly increase social tensions." (p. 208)

What is the "solution" to these grave problems which this unusually thoughtful economist suggests? His "solution" represents an admirable and realistic synthesis of two schools of South African thought, the southern (or Cape liberal) and northern (or Transvaal, Orange Free State, and often Natal conservative) approaches, which have clashed time and again in South African history (usually to the detriment of the southern position). On the one hand, he endorses the southern position (expressed in part, at least, by the 1948 Fagan Commission Report) that the urbanized, detribalized, industrially oriented African is here to stay and that, in ever so many ways, he is in a pivotal position with respect to the future of South Africa. On the other hand, he does not reject completely the northern viewpoint (which is crystallized in part, at least, by the 1955 Tomlinson Commission Report) that the "true" home of the African is in his traditional tribal areas, such as the Transkei. He is aware of the potential benefits that the Transkei, for example, may offer to a limited number of its Xhosa inhabitants, and his attitude towards the Bantustan program is one of the most cautious optimism. Although he feels that this program can only deal with a relatively small percentage of the Africans in the Republic. it is nonetheless a feasible means of coping with the alarming poverty and inefficient subsistence agriculture of the African peasant.

The author would combine these two approaches by suggesting that the oligarchy of South Africa be gradually transformed into an achievement-oriented, rather than ascriptive-oriented, industrial democracy in which political decision-making power would be shared by all those South Africans, irrespective of race, who are fully committed to the modern exchange economy of the Republic. In addition to this "co-determination" policy, Professor Houghton suggests that the affluence of South Africa be utilized to provide for a more equitable distribution of the national wealth in terms of skills and productivity levels and implies that the "disinherited" of South Africa be extended the fullest opportunity to acquire and expand the necessary education and skills in order to participate in the modern sector of South African life. He realizes, of course, that such a transformation of the South African body politic would both give the modernizing African elites a direct stake in the viability of "their" mother country and would alleviate to no small extent the psychological disabilities (such as alienation or anomie) which beset the urban, Western-oriented African in the Republic. Such a "solution" appears to be practical, just, and remarkably farsighted. It will be interesting to observe the African response to such a proposal as well as that of the South African electorate.

In summary, then, Professor Houghton has done an admirable job of presenting an exceedingly complex subject with marked clarity. His book is undoubtedly one of the finest in the field of South African affairs and should be required reading for all those who are seriously interested in both the problems and prospects of this portion of Africa. The South African Economy is all the more valuable a work because of its complete index, solid bibliography, ample footnotes, numerous charts and graphs, and map. Indeed, it represents South African scholarship at its finest.—RICHARD DALE, Northern Illinois University.

Political Awakening in the Congo. By RENÉ LEMARCHAND. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. x, 357. \$7.95.)

The stormy course of Congolese independence since July, 1960 has served to focus more than usual attention on the Belgian system of colonial administration with its strengths and with its many and glaring shortcomings. In the present volume, Professor Lemarchand sets out "To unravel the tangled skeins of nationalist developments in the Congo during the terminal phase of Belgian colonial rule," and to provide "at least part of the factual and analytical background necessary to an understanding of contemporary developments."

In one aspect, at least, the book succeeds admirably. The presentation of the Belgian colonial structure and, in particular, the organization of the "colonat" vividly outlines the conservative nature of the Belgian business community in the Congo and its absolute blindness to the growth of African nationalism in the surrounding territories. The author cites from a Leopoldville newspaper of 1944 the statement that, "The European element . . . repudiates the principle of democratic equality and the political organization of the colony cannot, therefore, be based on this principle." A decade later, de Maleingreau's proposals for wider representation in the Conseil de Gouvernement revealed an equal insensitivity to the political ambitions of the African élite in the pat statement, "The whites are the sole guides and carriers of the civilization of this country." It is an unfortunate commentary on the acumen of the white community of southern Africa still a decade later that these same words could be echoed by the leader of the white minority party in Rhodesia.

Lemarchand's succeeding chapters on the impact of Western economic forces and on educational policy in the Congo fill in the picture of the Belgian position in the colony in greater detail. His observations on the educational system are particularly apt. In trying to suit education to the special needs and conditions of the Congo he points out that the administration failed to create the supra-ethnic patterns which would have encouraged the growth of a unified nationalist movement whose presence might have prevented the disintegration which followed independence.

The chapters dealing with the genesis and emergence of Congolese political parties and with their organization and operation are less satisfactory. While there can be no question of the difficulty of trying to sketch clearly in a few pages the tangled interaction of parties and personalities in the months preceding independence, Lemarchand's valiant attempt to combine historical account with functional analysis tends to be somewhat confusing rather than illuminating. To sort out the major political attitudes prevalent among African leaders in the pre-independence Congo is a major task which the author has not been able to accomplish fully. There is a tendency, moreover, to cite the views of particular individuals and to assume, without further explanation, that these views necessarily represented those of a larger group. It would appear also that little use has been made of the detailed material on Congolese parties which has appeared over the past two years from CRISP in Léopoldville and which sheds some light on hitherto unexplained facets of political conduct in the Congo.

The volume ends on a note of pessimistic doubt of the ability of the central government to create any sense of national unity in view of the open revolts in the interior and the increasing inroads of subversive foreign influences. Events which have taken place since the book was completed lead to a somewhat more hopeful picture although the deficiences of administration in the Congo may take years to rectify. There appears to be growing acceptance of the Tshombe regime by the members of the African community; Ivory Coast President Houphouët-Boigny's comment that Tshombe is as good a nationalist as Lumumba ever was (and even better because he is "constructive") is indicative of the moderate African view. Internally, Congolese stability is being improved (ironically) by the return of some fifty or more Belgian administrators to their former posts.

In a book otherwise remarkable for its accuracy, there are a number of editorial lapses. Occasional Gallicisms creep into the translations and into the text. It is hard to believe, moreover, that Raymond Scheyven, then Minister of Economic Affairs for the Congo, really did say in commenting on the *loi fondamentale*, "We have presented the Congolese with a political system similar to ours... where the head of state is irresponsible."

All in all, Lemarchand's analysis of the colonial background to the contemporary Congolese scene is perceptive and original; his material on Congolese parties had already been superseded by more recent and more detailed studies.—L. Gray Cowan, Columbia University.

Morrocco: Problems of New Power. By I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 276. \$7.95.)

Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society. By I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 108. \$3.00 cloth, \$1.00 paper.)

After years of neglect by American scholars, North Africa is at last getting at least a part of the attention it deserves. Professor Zartman's two volumes are valuable additions to the growing list of analyses of Moroccan political development in the years before and after independence. In his Problems of New Power, Zartman has definitely adopted a methodological approach based on decision-making analysis; the second volume under consideration is in large degree composed of two further case studies in the organizational growth of Moroccan government. The latter two cases are more descriptive than those treated in Problems of New Power but the basic analytical structure remains much the same.

The method used in the longer book is to select five specific problems faced by the independent government of Morocco and to trace out in detail the decision-making process used in finding solutions to them. They cover major areas of governmental concern, diplomacy (the evacuation of American bases), the military (organization of the army), economic development (agrarian reform), education as a social problem (the Arabization of primary and secondary education) and politics (the organization of elections). Each of these questions is subjected to close scrutiny to determine not only who was responsible for decisions on them within the government but also the forces which were at work in Moroccan society which influenced those in whose hands the decision-making power lay.

Of the five cases studied, the first, evacuation of American bases, is the most successful in illustrating the complexity of the question and the limitations of choice, both internally and externally imposed, under which the Moroccan decision-makers were forced to operate. The second case, the organization of the army, is an excellent review of the elements present in the problem of the role of the military in the new state and of the personal role in the ultimate decisions played by the crown prince who, "rarely concerned himself with particulars, and when he did, it was with a characteristic impetuousness that was occasionally regrettable." The two cases dealing with economic and social problems are less successful as case studies because their subject matter is less susceptible of concrete delineation and the interplay of forces at work in the decision-making process is therefore less easy to evaluate.

The methodology employed by the author is of substantial help in pointing up the forces behind these decisions and the limited range of choice within which the Moroccan officials were forced to act. The method does not have quite the degree of originality claimed for it; it is hard to believe that, "This book is the first study to use the tools of decision-making analysis to examine an underdeveloped country's government." One has the impression, moreover, that despite the claims made for it, the methodology entails a great deal of purely descriptive writing which is sandwiched in between an opening and closing methodological comment for each chapter.

It is, moreover, somewhat difficult to reconcile the author's stricture in the introduction to Problems of a New Power that, "functional and institutional approaches are not only unhelpful; they are misleading, inappropriate, and suggestive of normative judgments about institutions not yet established" with the statement in the introduction to Destiny of a Dynasty, "It [Destiny] is an analysis of the state's deliberate search for institutions of government during the process of political development." If the institutional approach is really "unhelpful," as the author maintains, why does he contend that, "the approach used in this analysis . . . may even have relevance in a broader sense for studies of non-monarchical forms of government in the process of political development."?

In both volumes the methodological structure is useful, but it would appear to be only a secondary consideration compared to the value of the detailed information which has been assembled on Moroccan development. The study of the monarchy and its evaluation, as well as that of the formation of representative institutions in Morocco provides real insight into the struggle between tradition and modernisation and the value of the stabilizing force provided by the monarchy in a difficult period of transition. One might regret that other African states did not have a modernizing monarchy upon which to rely; it is clear that the charismatic nationalist leader is no substitute for a traditional ruler who can command

the national respect given to the King of Morocco, at least in terms of the maintenance of post-independence stability of the regime.—L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia University.

Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: the Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. By Christina Phelps Harris. (The Hague, London, Paris: Mouton & Co. for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. Pp. 277.)

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by an Egyptian provincial school teacher named Hasan al-Banna, a fundamentalist who believed that Islam was being fatally undermined by the spread of European ideas and practices in Egypt and that as in past centuries Islam, as a system of social as well as theological prescriptions, must be regarded as the basis of a self-contained civilization. As the Brotherhood grew rapidly in strength it expanded its activities from religious preaching into educational, social welfare, industrial, and eventually political fields. In the latter the ardor of its mass following, its conspiratorial organization, its totalitarian aims, and Banna's leadership enabled the Brotherhood to emerge after 1945 as a powerful revolutionary force in an ill-governed country demoralized by severe economic and social problems. After the Brotherhood had assassinated two Egyptian prime ministers and the chief of the Cairo police. Banna was murdered in revenge in 1949. His successors survived to challenge the military regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser after the 1952 revolution, until in 1954 an attempt on Nasser's life led to the forcible suppression of the Brotherhood. Six of the leaders were hanged and hundreds of others jailed.

Apart from brief treatment of the Brotherhood's ideas and activities in various book chapters and articles, there have been only two substantial western-language studies: J. Heyworth-Dunne's Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt, admirably done but published four years before the Brotherhood's demise and long out of print, and the abominably translated English version of I. M. Husaini's detailed but one-sided apologetic, The Moslem Brethren: the Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements (1956). A Ph.D. dissertation on the Brotherhood written some years ago by Professor R. P. Mitchell of the University of Michigan, when eventually published, should become the definitive work on the subject.

In the meantime, while we wait for Mitchell's book, Professor Harris has provided an acceptable summary of some of the previously published research. Only the last 100 pages deal with the Brotherhood itself: the majority of the space is filled by three preliminary chapters. Two of these recount, along familiar lines, the main events of

Egyptian diplomatic and political history from 1798 to about 1930; the third describes several of the main currents and issues of modern Islamic reform. These chapters are intended to set the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in historical perspective, and to project it as the culmination of the growth of both political and religious sentiments of intransigeance against the western penetration of Egypt. This is an unexceptionable theme, but the diffusion of the author's attention in the first two chapters (competent though they are) and the lack of critical analysis in the third, tend to dissipate their relevance.

The most useful, though less well written, part of the book is the section on the Brotherhood itself, since here the material is not as widely familiar. These chapters present a good summary of Hasan al-Banna's career and describe the Brotherhood's organization, activities, and ideas. Here the author makes a number of sensible points. One is that the Brotherhood's economic enterprises and social welfare programs served to demonstrate their conviction that the Islamic religious commitment should inspire rather than retard material progress and social conscience. Related to this is her point that the Brotherhood and the military junta were natural rivals, not only as conspiratorial militants, but as purveyors of social and eco-

nomic regeneration. But while the Brotherhood demanded a specifically Islamic form of government, they never made clear what they meant by this. Nor did they explain satisfactorily how a purely Islamic legal system could meet modern needs. Consequently, what was nominally a conflict of principles between them and the officers may better be viewed as simply a power struggle. The author stretches her point too far, however, in suggesting that it was anomalous for Muslim fundamentalists to use such western devices as printing presses and microphones. Finally, few will disagree with her that the Brotherhood's resort to terrorism was unconstructive.

The passages dealing with the 1952-1954 period appear to have been written no later than 1956, and much of the description and evaluation of Nasser's regime is badly out of date.—Malcolm H. Kerr, University of California, Los Angeles.

Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom. Edited by William John Hanna. (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1964. Pp. 651.)

Thirty-two essays on various aspects of contemporary African politics by such authors as James Coleman, Thomas Hodgkin, David Apter, Lucian Pye, Edward Shils, Tom Mboya, and Julius Nyrere.—A. R.

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

RICHARD L. MERRITT, WITH ELLEN B. PIRRO Yale University

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

The Atlantic Alliance. By ALVIN J. COTTRELL AND JAMES E. DOUGHERTY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 248. \$5.50).

This book is a political guide to the politics of NATO. It is the fault of the reviewer that this report comes a year late. Neither Professor Cottrell's nor Professor Dougherty's feet can be held to the critic's fire for what has happened in the past twelve months. One suspects, however, that both would be game for the try. For both are on record that NATO has proved its worth and both insist that confidence and not panic is the order of the day. This is not to say that criticism of the Alliance is shrugged off or that the authors believe in "justification by faith alone". They simply present a sturdy defense of NATO as a concept and as a program and ask those who would place it in disarray to measure the faults against the accomplishments and count the short straws.

The authors start the reader off with a thorough and clear discussion of the nature and scope of the North Atlantic Treaty and its organizational structure. In so doing, they bring into sharp focus current debates about nuclear strategy and the limits and possibilities of waging conventional warfare. They remind the reader that NATO has not only contained the Soviet military threat to Western Europe, but that it has also quietly and effectively prevented any potential German unilateral moves, a point sometimes ignored by critics. A short critique is made of the various proposals for disengagement, all of them boiling down to the fact that after disengagement there would be no power in Europe capable of opposing Russian will. Left generally undiscussed is the point that NATO policy has emphasized armament rather than arms control.

The book then moves from discussion of military doctrines to analysis of the economic integration of Western Europe, showing how this has developed and in the process invalidated, before European eyes, the Leninist thesis of the "contradictions of capitalism." The shield for this development has been and remains the nuclear umbrella of America and the soldiers of NATO. The problems which arise because of conflicting national policies within the European Community, the intra-NATO disputes, are also treated, though in limited detail.

Neither author feels that General de Gaulle will

bring the NATO tent down. Indeed, if there is a major weakness in this otherwise excellent book, it is the too easy dismissal of the General as but a passing irritation. As "realists" neither author can accept the possibility that de Gaulle is the reincarnation of Vercingetorix and is thus a couple of thousand years old. His mischief making is almost at an end, they argue. This reviewer is less sanguine.

Cottrell and Dougherty therefore conclude that the Alliance can weather its "time of troubles" and that it is already well on the way to being the force that will create a true Atlantic Community, and, thus, it deserves to remain the linchpin of progressive American foreign policy. Theirs is a reasoned argument and one that offers NATO critics a fair and open challenge. This reviewer knows of no better guide to the politics of NATO.

—MILTON COLVIN, Washington & Lee.

China's Foreign Policy. By VIDYA PRAKASH DUTT (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964. Pp. 336. \$10.75.)

This study concentrates on Communist China's foreign policy in the years 1958-62 since this is the period when China's policy changed from "sweet reasonableness" to the new "hard line." In the two and a half years which have elapsed since there is little evidence of any substantial change in China's foreign policy so that the author's observations and conclusions appear valid even as applied to contemporary events.

The author sees a close relationship between domestic and foreign policy. In the domestic field the "hundred flowers" movement, which began in April, 1957, and lasted barely two months, resulted in disillusionment and shock, and was followed by drastic economic experimentation. The Great Leap Forward and the organization of the Communes were in full swing in the Fall of 1958. These radical domestic policies were reflected in a more radical foreign policy.

Among the factors influencing China's foreign policy is Mao's hatred of the United States which stands in the way of almost all of China's major objectives, a place in the U.N., unfettered trade, recovery of Formosa. A burning desire to achieve status, after a century of humiliation at the hands of Western "barbarians", is a strong factor in shaping China's foreign policy. Mao's "sense of humiliation and frustration constantly erupts in manifestation of aggressive nationalism whether within the Communist bloc or outside."

Mao's antagonism toward the United States centers on our protection of Taiwan. He bitterly opposes the two-China policy. Fuel was added to the flames when the United States backed the U.N. resolution supporting Tibet in December,

1959, and when we signed a Security Pact with Japan in January 1960. Any accommodation by the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. such as Khrushchev's visit with Eisenhower in September, 1959, was considered a great mistake. U.S. imperialism is the "deadly enemy of the people of the world." Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan in June, 1960, engendered a "national denunciation of U.S. imperialism, mankind's public enemy number one." This theme was stressed in press, radio, cinema, theater, handbills, organized military demonstrations. The President of the All China Federation of Trade Unions referred to Eisenhower's visit as the "gangster trip" made by the "God of plague."

The Kennedy administration was considered worse than the Eisenhower regime "because it was more subtle and clever in pursuing the same ends." The difference in method came not because the "nefarious imperialist robber" had "turned into"—"a benevolent Buddha of Mercy" but only because he was "more cunning," his gestures "more sophisticated."

China's relations with Russia are, of course, a crucial factor in her foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950 committed Russia to aid China if she were attacked by Japan or by any power based on Japan. With Stalin's death the Chinese felt that his mantle belonged on Mao's shoulders. Since Khrushchev did not concede this, the Alliance weakened.

A new economic agreement between Russia and China, signed in February, 1959, provided for \$1,250 million in trade between the two countries, China to supply raw materials and Russia to furnish machinery and technical aid, including the nation's first experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron. At this time China did not stress her opposition to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy. After the Russian leader had visited Eisenhower the following Fall he immediately flew to Peking seeking to win Chinese cooperation for a more peaceful stance. His efforts were fruitless. The Chinese leaders seemed not to fear a nuclear war. Mao in a conference with Nehru in Peking in 1955 is quoted as saying he was not "so struck by the danger of nuclear war." "What are a couple million people?"

The following year, however, at the 43rd anniversary of the October Revolution, China went along with the joint statement issued by the leaders of 81 Communist parties, which endorsed in general the Khrushchev policy. The rest of the Communist world was not ready to follow Chinese leadership. The deplorable agricultural situation in China caused doubts, "the 'big leap' had turned into an agonizing fox trot."

The split between China and Russia widened. China gave increased support to Albania, which had defied Moscow, and she repudiated the Soviet Union's stand on the search for disarmament. In the words of Professor Dutt "The Sino-Soviet split has almost reached the point of no return."

Other chapters of this book deal with China's relations with her neighbors in Asia with emphasis on the unprovoked attack on India, the increasing friendliness with Pakistan and Indonesia and the attempts to woo Japan.

The author also details China's efforts to win the support of the emerging African nations by stressing the racial aspects of their common effort to oppose white imperialism. She blames the U.S. for the situation in the Congo and she stresses the need for continued revolution even in the nations which have obtained "nominal" independence.

In summary this book presents a thorough and well documented study of China's foreign policy in the years 1958-1962. It brings into sharp relief the militant stance which China has adopted, and analyses the reasons therefore and its significance for the world at large.—HAROLD A. VAN DORN, Kent State University.

Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years. By George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos. (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. ix. 218, Guilders 23.25).

Professor George Ginsburgs and Mr. Michael Mathos have written a comprehensive account of the first dozen years of Communist China's relations with Tibet. Their compilation is not a wholly scholarly work, for it lacks necessary documentation, first-hand observation, and sufficient use of Chinese Communist sources. It is true that students of contemporary China are handicapped by the restrictions that have been placed in their scholarly inquiries. Furthermore, there is a dearth of reliable Tibetan materials. The authors have therefore made a valiant attempt at the reconstruction and analysis of a difficult and crucial period of Sino-Tibetan relations.

The clearest statement of the thesis of the book is found in Chapter VI, entitled Epilogue: Peking-Lhasa-New Delhi, which had appeared in the September 1960 number of the Political Science Quarterly. The present work represents an enlargement and elaboration of that early thesis. The authors' main argument is that Sino-Tibetan relations and their ramifications must be understood primarily in geopolitical terms. For China, Tibet has not been independent of her influence and concern for hundreds of years. For India, Tibet has been a center of contention especially since the time of the establishment of British rule. Tibet had survived as an autonomous theocracy due to a delicate balance of power: the British acceptance of the reputed Chinese suzerainty and the Chinese acquiescence in British influence. This relationship was disturbed when the Chinese People's Republic came into being. British withdrawal from India, and the subsequent inability of India to sustain her influence made the Chinese resurgence in Tibet inevitable. The general apathy of the outside world and the isolationist attitude of the Tibetans reduced the scope of conflict to a struggle between the emerging Communist state and the feudalistic monarchy of the Dalai Lama. The outcome of the confrontation was hardly unexpected.

What makes Communist China and Tibet a worthwhile study is the detailed depiction of the manner in which the Chinese People's Republic extended its influence, and later established its rule, in Tibet. Although lacking in sufficient documentation, the conclusions are convincing by virtue of their logic and creative insight. Within the context of Mao Tse-tung's known policies toward ethnic minorities in the border regions of China, as well as set in the light of long-standing Chinese popular feelings about Tibet, one must agree that the authors have not misinterpreted the Communists' programs for the subjection of Tibet.

Moreover, operating within the legal framework of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, Peking asserted an effort at strengthening Chinese military power in Tibet through a network of new roads and improved communications. It also executed systematically and adroitly political manipulations and social reforms that were aimed at weakening the resistance of the ruling elite and at gaining the support of the Tibetan peasants. Peking's willingness to do these things was the most important element fitting into the grand design of eventually transforming Tibet into an integral part of the Chinese state.

Skillfully the authors have shown that "the course of Sino-Tibetan relations since 1951 has passed through a number of distinct stages, differentiated by varying emphasis on alternate goals, changes in the modalities of operational strategy, shifts in the choice of tactics and executory instrumentalities." The retreat of the Chinese in 1957 and the response of Peking to the Tibetan uprising in March 1959 gave evidence of the Communist tactical flexibility and opportunism.

Besides adding to what is known about Peking's domestic and foreign policies, this work poignantly reveals the nature of international politics in Asia. Fittingly, the authors have placed the problems of Sino-Tibetan relations within the larger framework of the Sino-Indian struggle for Asian leadership. Finally, Ginsburgs and Mathos conclude by reviving the old proposition: "He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he

who dominates the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of South Asia within his reach and, with it, all of Asia." How valid this axiom is remains to be proved.—Otis H. Shao, Florida Presbyterian College.

The United States and the United Nations. Edited by Franz B. Gross. (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. Pp. 356. \$6.95.)

From the first page of the Preface to the last speech in the Appendix, the overall analytical framework of The United States and the United Nations is abundantly clear, a relatively "hardline" approach based on the concept of "protracted conflict" with Communism. Thus, the book equates a just world order with Western concepts of man and legality, and asks if the United Nations can help promote such an order, though it recognizes that most of the new states in the organization are non-Western and that few of them are now governed democratically. The Soviet Union is charged with continuing to seek a dictated universal peace by the ultimate destruction of nations opposed to Communism. Of Soviet behavior in the United Nations, it says: "Communists participating in any non-Communist organization seek to subvert it and thus bend it to their purposes or, failing that, to destroy it." Attributing to the Western democracies a view of the United Nations as a world organization for cooperation. peaceful settlement, and containment of aggression, it declares the United Nations is only an instrument of protracted conflict for the Communists. It suggests, therefore, that the United Nations must be an important battleground for the United States in that protracted conflict. It concludes, nonetheless, that Western survival depends less on the United Nations than on the development of regional political organizations to maximize the economic, military, and moral power of the Free World. Such a summary of the book's dominant theme is undoubtedly an over-simplification, but by eliminating verbal underbrush it may serve to clarify the point of view expressed.

In The United States and the United Nations, there is no consideration of any alternative analysis, no marshalling of pros and cons as is done so carefully on a variety of issues by Inis L. Claude, Jr., in Swords into Plowshares. A parallel summation of an alternative point of view is possible and not difficult to set down. To help build a just world order, the West may find it useful to be less insistent about acceptance of its own values and institutions and more aware of the values and in-

stitutions of others-and their interests, and ask if the United Nations can be of assistance in promoting a mutual exchange of ideas and increased. understanding. It may be that most of the new non-Western states are not governed democratically for excellent reasons; that, in fact, the basic prerequisites of democracy-if such there be-are presently lacking in many of them. If the Soviet Union still voices Communist doctrines with vigor, it has adjusted with some degree of pragmatism its internal institutions and its external behavior. It is unlikely that the somewhat trite, symbolic utterances on either May Day or the Fourth of July should be taken at full face value. If the words are an echo of 1848 or 1776, they have a 1965 meaning. The Western democracies found the United Nations an exceptionally useful world agency in the organization's early days, not only because of their cooperative nature but also because their influence dominated its councils and its votes helped protect a world balance of power favorable to the West. The United Nations is indeed one instrument employed by the Soviet Union, if not yet by the Chinese Communists, in its attempt to alter the old balance in recognition of new power relationships. The United Nations is, therefore, an important forum for planning peaceful change to rationalize emerging realities in order to reduce the likelihood of over-frustration and the escalation of conflict beyond limited war. If Western interests must in the short run be partially dependent upon regional and functional groupings for survival, over time it is from the functional as much if not more than from the regional groupings that the broad consensus required for further steps toward world community is likely to evolve. The future is not necessarily one of "protracted conflict," but it is quite likely to be one of prolonged competition.

Whatever the assessment of the book's overall analytical theme, or of any possible alternative analysis, The United States and the United Nations is well worth reading, for it provides a look at the U.N. from an American policy perspective through the eyes of thirteen experienced, wellknown, and even distinguished contributors. If most of the participants pay lip-service to the Cold War theme and to the concept of "protracted conflict", some of the individual analyses are considerably less constricted. Representative of a more flexible view which "surfaces" occasionally, but which is not carefully developed or considered in the book as a whole, is Norman D. Palmer's perceptive comment: "There seem almost no limits to what the United States can do by patience and persistence, coupled with a genuine desire to consider other countries' points of view and to reconsider its own policies in the light of these

other viewpoints." After an "Introduction" by Robert Strausz-Hupé, Franz B. Gross explores "The United States National Interest and the United Nations": Hans Kohn, "Nationalism in the United Nations"; Waldo Chamberlain, "Arms Control and Limitation"; William P. Kintner, "The United Nations Record of Handling Major Disputes"; Palmer, "The Afro-Asians in the United Nations"; Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Latin-American Bloc"; Gross, "Western Europe and the United Nations"; and Harold Karan Jacobson, "Economic and Social Matters." In addition, the Appendix includes addresses by President John F. Kennedy, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Undersecretary of State George A. Ball, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Professor William Y. Elliott.

As did Ernest A. Gross in The United Nations: Structure for Peace, this book tends to justify many if not most past American policies in the U.N. Though there is discussion of blocs and caucus groups, the book largely ignores the informal politics at Turtle Bay stressed by Andrew Boyd in United Nations: Piety, Myth and Truth. It does not deal with problems of staffing the Secretariat, raised by Boyd and discussed at some length in Sidney D. Bailey's The Secretariat of the United Nations. An American U.N. strategy for the future is less positively defined than by Lincoln P. Boomfield in The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy. These things are not said in criticism but to help define the nature of the approach and subject matter limits. The book has both the advantages and disadvantages of multiple contributors. Its authors write as experts in their areas of concern, but there is a less organized progression of ideas than in Bloomfield's thought-provoking earlier effort.-Robert E. Elder, Colgate University.

The War—Peace Establishment. By ARTHUR HERZOG (New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Pp. xiii, 271. \$4.95.)

Bewildered as are many other thoughtful people by the contradictions between governments' simultaneous pleas for disarmament and rearmament, by the mathematicians' recondite slide-ruleand-computer analyses of our defense policies, and by the numerous quarreling groups all of whom profess to have discovered the true road to world peace, Mr. Herzog decided to "... talk to the nation's leading theoreticians on war and peace of varying opinions, to see who they are, what they want and why, and ask them what hopes for permanent peace they foresee." Forearmed with preliminary acquaintance with their writings, he sought out one hundred or so of them for interviews in which he sought their answers to the fundamental questions of how to preserve the peace. There follows a 260-page report about what he found, written in the easy style of the professional journalist. At least one thing emerged clearly from the survey: if war is too important to be entrusted to the generals, the avoidance of war is too important to be entrusted either to them or to the statesmen or politicians. In this overview of the myriad avenues to peace and security, one looks almost completely in vain for the names of senators, cabinet officers, and other men in official life: it is the scientists and other civilian intellectuals who are at center stage.

Herzog starts off with the "deterrers," men who seek to preserve the peace by maintaining various levels of deterrent force. Here are surveyed the ideas of Strausz-Hupé and Teller, among others. The "analysts" (Kissinger, Schelling, Wohlstetter, Kahn) come in for extended treatment; then the realists (Morgenthau, Niebuhr) and the idealists in the Department of Defense and elsewhere; next the experimentalists (Bethe, Wiesner, Riesman) who wish to try a variety of approaches and international cooperative forms in the effort to attain lasting peace; and finally the "survivalists" (Cousins, Melman) and the pacifists (Pickus, Muste). In each case one is given a thumbnail sketch of the ideas involved in the particular school of thought.

One wonders just what public will be served by the overview accomplished in this book; presumably it is the general public which wishes vignettes of a wide variety of ideas. It is doubtful that the serious student of defense and peace policy will be much enlightened, for the book skips over a wide range of ideas in minimum time and is deficient in analysis, criticism, and comparison of ideas. The reader who wishes to pursue the subject more deeply will be unhappy over the lack of footnotes or of bibliographic guides to further reading.

This reader for one would have relished a book which delved more deeply into the views covered and which provided analysis of their strong and weak points. As it is, with the exception of off-hand editorial remarks here and there, the major burden of analysis falls on an all-too-short eight-page concluding appraisal in which the author, probably like most readers, concludes that there is greater wisdom and safety in a middle ground than in either extreme. Probably the general reader will be the one best satisfied by this book, and he will discover that the problems of war and peace are not to be as simply solved as some politicians aver at campaign time.—Hollis W. Barber, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. By Phillip H.

COOMBS. (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xvi, 158. \$3.50. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations)

This brief volume, one of a series of policy books of the Council on Foreign Relations, is in part a report on the expanding emphasis on educational and cultural factors in American foreign policy, but it is also an appeal for a greater appreciation of the human aspects of foreign policy and for a doubling of efforts in this dimension of our policy. While not deprecating the political, economic and military components of policy, the author suggests that our long-range influence in the world might be enhanced by a further increase in emphasis on educational and cultural exchange.

Mr. Coombs is uniquely qualified to write this report. When President Kennedy established the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Coombs was the original appointee. He had previously served as educational program director with the Ford Foundation and is currently Director of the International Institute for Educational Planning in Paris. In preparing the book he was provided with a fifteenmember advisory committee and, in addition to sponsorship by the Council on Foreign Relations, he received aid and support from the Carnegie Corporation and The Brookings Institution.

The author reports on past developments and recent trends in educational and cultural exchange activities of the United States, and compares our efforts with those of France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Soviet Union. He points out that private efforts in the United States have outweighed the governmental role, and that, relatively, we have given less emphasis to the human factor in foreign policy than have major European states.

In order to bolster his arguments for an expanded program in educational and cultural affairs Coombs has mustered the best objective evidence available. For this purpose he relies heavily on the report compiled for Congress in 1963 by the U. S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, known as the Gardiner Commission. The Advisory Commission's report is based on thousands of interviews with participants in educational and cultural exchanges and with U.S. foreign service and education personnel. The conclusions speak of abundant and conclusive evidence of the contributions of educational and cultural programs to the long-range goals of American foreign policy.

In spite of this evidence one must be aware of the limitations of our knowledge of the real efficacy of such programs and of the difficulties of gathering empirical data to prove contributions to the goals of foreign policy. The goals are admittedly long-range and the educational and cultural contributions are inter-mixed in their effects with political, economic and military factors. The persons involved in interchanges may find difficulties both in being detached observers and in assessing the role of exchanges in the total pattern of evolving policy. Coombs' book is replete with normative statements and his appeal may have to rest more on intuititive opinion (to borrow his own phrase) than on scientifically demonstrable results and probabilities.

Despite these difficulties the author deserves a hearing from those who determine the course of U. S. foreign policy. He concludes his book with a blueprint for strengthening and better coordinating our program in educational and cultural affairs. The available evidence, logic, and informed opinion support his suggestions. Since the costs of doubling the program are relatively low, and since the prospects for positive returns are as high as they are for many of our conventional aspects of foreign policy, Coombs' strong recommendations are worthy of full consideration by the Congress and the Administration.— A. LeRoy Bennett, University of Delaware.

An End to Arms. By Walter Millis. (New York: Atheneum, 1965. Pp. vi, 301. \$5.95.)

Despite its title, this book is not about disarmament. Rather, in the words of the author, "it is an examination into the possibility of a demilitarized international society" in which disarmament and demilitarization are viewed as distinct if related processes. Sponsored by the Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, the subtitle claims that An End to Arms is a new vision of the end of the arms race and the beginning of a demilitarized world. That Mr. Millis has vision there can be no doubt; whether it is grounded in a sufficiently realistic and accurate framework, however, may be questioned by professional students of international politics.

The book opens with the familiar thesis developed by Millis and others regarding the end of the organized war system brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons. The author then develops a succinctly written historical sketch of the rise of the militarized international system which is blamed for the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. Millis argues that disillusionment with the militarized system began shortly after 1919 and was unfortunately interrupted by the emergence of military-populist dictatorships that revived the old system and precipitated World War II. In this connection, a most controversial assumption is advanced which forms the basis for his later vision of a demilitarized world: that the struggle for power at the international level arises primarily

out of the breakdown of domestic order rather than from the clash of opposing national interests. While some correlation exists between domestic instability and international disorder, Millis propounds it as an absolute without recognizing that stable national states conflict over the allocation of international resources.

More controversial are the author's assumptions and data which form the bases of his vision of a fully demilitarized world. Arguing that the language of international politics is antiquated because it fails to reflect the increasing disutility of force, Millis calls for a new conceptual system to fit "observable facts." He is particularly critical of those who cling to the conceptual system of the arms-tensions dilemma. But suppose this system is a fairly accurate reflection of the problem? Millis insists that it is not and suggests a clarification based on a reexamination of the interrelationship between law, coercion, and power.

In several chapters he explores these concepts in the hope that the theoretical discussion will break the circularity of the arms-tensions dilemma and pave the way for the acceptance of his practical proposals for a demilitarized international system. These chapters are stimulating and incisive but they are also replete with questionable assumptions: that the diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional states will not materialize; that the major power centers of the world will continue to be stable indefinitely; that the power struggle among nations results from conflict over the control of the future rather than out of concrete rivalries of the present; that conflicts over contemporary tangible interests are reconcilable since they do not involve power competition; that both the United States and the Soviet Union genuinely desire general and complete disarmament.

On the basis of these and other assumptions the author describes his new vision of world order in the final chapter. It turns out to be a not particularly novel scheme for "limited" world government in which Millis projects an Orwellian glimpse of the international system of 1984, but with a utopianism that rivals the Clark-Sohn proposals. Through an intuitive prophecy of the course of world affairs to 1980, in which no major war occurs but armed forces establishments continue to menace world peace, we are informed that the nations of the world will become so dissatisfied with the dangers of the system that they will convene conferences in Moscow and Washington in 1980 to modify it.

A transformed United Nations equipped with a veto-free supranational police authority will be created to preserve more securely a demilitarized system which has existed since 1945; judicial machinery will be strengthened to resolve any future

disputes; and a general and comprehensive program for disarmament will be instituted, leaving nation-states with only national police forces. National police forces, however, are to be the major coercive agencies in the demilitarized system since Millis assumes international conflict to be the result of the inadequacy of police to restrain revolutionary elements. As a consequence, the supranational police authority is to be small and relied upon only in those comparatively rare instances where intervention may be required to preserve domestic order.

The traditional pattern of idealistic arrangements for the control of international conflict and violence is thus reversed. In the Millis plan demilitarization of the international environment is assumed to be a reality as a result of the excessive costs of nuclear or conventional force by major powers; therefore the emphasis is not on disarmament but on preserving the nonviolent character of the international system through a coercive supranational authority buttressed by national police forces. Yet the interconnection between demilitarization and disarmament is recognized since supranational arrangements are to be followed by a gradual and general disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons.

This reviewer would argue that the gravest weakness of An End to Arms is the conception of power in military terms and in the consequent simplistic notion that armaments alone are the principal cause of the international power struggle. Many analysts emphasize in recent studies that the nature of international conflict should be approached eclectically on the assumption that its roots are multiple. Others would stress the necessity of political accommodation as prerequisite to disarmament and question the assertion that since nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 we are now in a demilitarized international system. They might cite as recent evidence the willingness of the United States to risk wider war through the employment of repeated and heavy conventional air strikes over North Viet Nam.

Even if it is admitted that the use of force as a means of attaining national objectives is less rational than in any preceding historical era, there may be a vital flaw in the author's prophecy of a transition from the highly armed system of 1965 to an incipiently disarming world of the 1980's. It could be plausibly argued that if the world is able to survive from 1945 to 1980 without nuclear annihilation, motivations among nation-states for drastically transforming the system, however insecure, may not be nearly so high as Millis predicts.—Ronald J. Yalem, University of Southern California.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

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Molnar, Thomas. Neo-Colonialism in Africa? Modern Age. 9:2 (Spring 1965), 175-86.

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South and Southeast Asia

Abdullah, Mohammad. Kashmir, India and Pakistan. *Foreign Affairs*. 43:3 (April 1965), 528-35.

Ansprenger, Franz. China in Afrika. *Dokumente*. 21:1 (February 1965), 29-38; and 21:2 (April 1965), 109-18.

Bell, Coral. South East Asia and the Powers. World Today. 21:4 (April 1965), 137-50.

Buchan, Alastair. The Security of India. World Today. 21:5 (May 1965), 210-16.

Carver, George A., Jr. The Real Revolution in South Viet Nam. Foreign Affairs. 43:3 (April 1965), 387-408.

Chiu, Hungdah. Communist China's Attitude Towards Nuclear Tests. China Quarterly. No. 21 (January-March 1965), 96-107.

Deviller, Philippe. Le conflit entre la Malaysie et l'Indonésie. *Politique Etrangère*. 29:5-6 (May-June 1964), 553-73.

Halperin, Morton H. Chinese Nuclear Strategy. China Quarterly. No. 21 (January-March 1965), 74-86.

Halpern, A. M. China in the Postwar World. China Quarterly. No. 21 (January-March 1965), 20-45.

McFarlane, Bruce. India: The Political Economy of Crisis. Australian Quarterly. 37:1 (March 1965), 9-23.

Smoker, Paul. Sino-Indian Relations: A Study of Trade, Communications and Defense. *Journal of Peace Reasearch*. 1:2 (1964), 65-76.

Taylor, Alastair M. Sukarno—First United Nations Drop-out. *International Journal*. 20:2 (Spring 1965), 206-13.

Warner, Geoffrey. Escalation in Vietnam—The Precedents of 1954. *International Affairs*. 41:2 (April 1965), 267-77.

Far East and Pacific

Australia: Geographical Basis of Foreign Policy. Round Table. No. 218 (March 1965), 177-84.

Briessen, Fritz van. Traditionalismus und Kommunismus in Ostasien. Aussenpolitik. 15:11 (November 1964), 751-67.

Sakata, Shōichi, et al. A Statement by Scientists Concerning the Call of Nuclear Submarines at Japanese Ports. *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* 2:2 (August 1964), 103.

Storry, G. R. Japan's Position as a World Power. World Today. 21:5 (May 1965), 217-22.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER

Deputy Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1964 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Additions

Larry L. Adams, The Political Psychology of Edmund Burke. California (Santa Barbara).

Claude Ake, A Machiavellian Model of Political Integration. Columbia.

Howard Ball, Moral Responsibility and "Social Justice": An Examination of the Supreme Court's Ethical Valuations As Seen in Selected "Equal Protection" Cases, 1940-1964. Rutgers.

Darryl H. Baskin, The Ideas of Political Community, Citizenship, and the Public Interest in Selected American Political Thinkers. California (Berekley).

Jane H. Bayes, The Concept of Participation in Politics. California (Los Angeles).

Leonard Billet, The Political Prerequisites of Economic Development. California (Los Angeles).

Stanton Burnett, Machiavelli's History of Florence. New School.

William I. Buscemi, Arthur F. Bentley: His Influence on American Political Science (An

* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW annually since 1911, except for 1915-19, 1921 and 1923-24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1964 list and which are still in preparation without change are not repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes, and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

The lists printed in the Review are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science; to avoid misunderstandings, entries are not accepted from individual candidates for degrees. The subject matter classification of an entry by the department concerned, if given, is followed. Each entry is listed under one classification only.

For a fuller note about coverage and subject matter classification, and for references to dissertation lists in cognate fields, see the 1960 list, LIV, 816.

For a chart which classifies, by subject category, the numbers of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this REVIEW, LII, 916.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Analysis of the Development of the Group Theory of Politics from Bentley to the Present). Notre Dame.

Charles Butterworth, Reason and Rhetoric: A Study of Averroe's Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Chicago.

Irving C. Carrig, The Political Implications of Descartes' Epistemology. Chicago.

Leo S. Chang, An Investigation into the Relationship Between the Nature of Human Political Behavior and Epistemology in Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law. Georgetown.

Richard A. Chapman, Self-Interest and the State in Hume and Hobbes. California (Los Angeles).

Peter N. Crossland, A Comparison of Classical and Contemporary Democratic Theory with Reference to the Significance of Voting and Elections, Duke.

Martin Edelman, Democratic Theories and the Constitution. California (Berkeley).

Charles S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius: Theory and Implications. Princeton

Winston P. Fan, The Political Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei: A Sociological Study of Religious Syncretism. Michigan State.

Adolph B. Fields, The Adjustment of the French Intellectual to Current Trends in French Political Life. Yale.

Fred Frohock, The Relationship Between Classical Political Philosophy and Contemporary Behavioral Theory. North Carolina.

John F. Gallagher, The Theoretical Basis of American State Legislation Dealing with Church-State Relationships. Pennsylvania

George J. Graham, Jr., Consensus: An Explication for Normative and Empirical Theory. Indiana.

John A. Gueguen, The Roger Williams—John Cotton Debate on Tolerance: A Study of the Relations between Politics and Religion. Chicago.

George S. Haggar, The Political and Social Thought of G.D.H. Cole. Columbia.

Mark Hagopian, The Political Theory of George Santagyana. Boston University.

Arnold Hall, Contemporary Asia Political Theory.

Claremont.

- Robert A. Heineman, Approaches to a Science of Politics and the Problem of Social Control: An Inquiry into the Thought of Some Representative Thinkers. American
- John D. Holm, A Comparison of Marxism and African Socialism: A Study in Ideologies of Transition. California (Los Angeles).
- George A. Kelly, Migrating Utopia: Paradigms of the Fulfilled Political Order (1760-1830). Harvard.
- Farshi K. Koshbafe, Attitude of Winston Churchill Toward Communism. Illinois.
- Young Kun Kim, Master and Servant in Hegel. Columbia.
- William J. Kirsch, Contemporary European Protestant Thought on Natural Law. Illinois.
- Aaron Kirschenbaum, Agency in Roman Law. Columbia.
- Paul M. Leary, The Romantic Reaction: Politics and Utopia in Contemporary Social Criticism. Rutgers.
- Harlan J. Lewin, Charisma: A Critique of the Concept. California (Berkeley).
- John A. Long, Pluralism and the Group Approach to the Study of Politics: English Political Pluralism Reconsidered. Missouri.
- John W. McDonald, Jr., Milovan Djilas: Communist Heretic—Unique or Traditional. Columbia.
- Robert J. McKenna, Contemporary American Protestant Thought on Church and State. Catholic University.
- Robert McShea, The Political Philosophy of Spinoza. Columbia.
- Harris Mirkin, The Domestication of Conflict: The 'Right of Revolution' in America. Princeton.
- Richard Muller, The Open Society: A Critique. Indiana.
- Willard Mullins, Ideology and Theory in Practical Politics. Washington (Seattle).
- Deane D. Neubauer, On the Theory of Polyarchy. Yale.
- John F. Newman, A Conceptual Analysis of Community Studies, 1953-1963. Florida.
- Raymond L. Nichols, Modern Intellectuals and Politics: Julien Benda and the Case of France. Princeton.
- Walter T. Odell, The Political Theory of Civiltá Cattolica as Developed from 1850-1870. Georgetown.
- John L. Pierce, The Revival of Natural Law Thought in Post-War Germany. Duke.
- Edward L. Plafkin, Freedom, Law and Crisis. California (Berkeley).
- Thomas A. Quaynor, Negritude. Southern Illinois. Leonard Rosenberg, The Political and Juridical Thought of William Patterson. New School.
- Israel Rosenfield, Freud and Ethics, Princeton.

- Richard H. Schweitzer, Jr., The Federalizing Process and Political Integration: A Quantitative Analysis. California (Los Angeles)
- Richard T. Scully, Alexis de Toqueville's Concept of Freedom. Virginia.
- Abdelmonem Shaker, Islamic Concepts and Socio-Political Thought in Contemporary Arab Life. New York University.
- Alfred L. Stocki, The Political and Sociological Theory of Lester Frank Ward. Brown.
- Corey B. Venning, The Political Writings of Joseph Alsop. Chicago.
- Richard R. Warner, The Political Thought of Richard E. MacIver. American.
- John L. Washburn, An Analysis of the Political Significance of the Thought of B.F. Skinner. Duke.
- Morris M. Wilhelm, The Political Philosophy of Friedrich von Havek. Columbia.
- George R. Wills, The European Policies of General DeGaulle, Duke.
- Mitchell H. Zimmerman, Lower-Class Mobilization and Democratic Organization: A Participant-Observer Study of a Southern Civil Rights Group. Princeton.

Changes

- Jerome Boime, Violence and Myth: A Study of Georges Sorel. Chicago.
- Vilma A. Cavallaro, Antonio Gramsci—His Political Philosophy. New York University.
- Adolph B. Fields, Student Politics in France: l'Union Nationale des Etudiants de France. Yale. Charles I. Lumsden, Contemporary Ideology, An Analysis of Castroism. Toronto.
- Alasdair Morrison, Individuals and Collectivities. Chicago.

Deletions

- Spyros Dialismas, The Origins and Development of Athenian Democracy. American.
- Cecil H. Williams, On the Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Christian Perspective. Virginia

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

- Weldon V. Barton, Interstate Compacts in the Policy Process. Florida State.
- Jonathan L. Bayer, Legislative Attitude Toward Foreign Aid: A Case Study of Congress and United States Aid to Yugoslavia, the 87th and 88th Congress. Pennsylvania.
- Robert E. Cecile, Crisis Decision-Making in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. Oklahoma.

- George Cole, The Decision to Prosecute. Washington (Seattle).
- Rev. Royden B. Davis, S. J., The United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1957-1963: Its Place and Functions as an Executive Factfinding Commission. Georgetown.
- Owen deLong, Dean Acheson as Secretary of State. Harvard.
- Charles W. Dunn, The Interrelations of the Congress and the Presidency During Crisis Situations: A Communications Model. Florida State.
- Charles C. Fishburne, U.S. Policy toward Iran 1959-1963. Florida State.
- Sister M. Annunciation Flannelly, RSHM, The Role of the White House Office in the Administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and President John F. Kennedy. Notre Dame.
- David A. Frier, Conflict of Interest in the Eisenhower Administration. Southern Illinois.
- Robert S. Gilmour, Policy-Making for the National Forests. Columbia.
- Carolyn S. Griffis, A Study of the Variables Affecting the Efficacy of the Presidential Veto: The Housing Act of 1959. Florida.
- Fred W. Grupp, The John Birch Society in Wisconsin. Pennsylvania.
- Jonathan P. Hawley, The Politics of National Park Establishment: A Comparative Study of the Sleeping Bear Sand Dunes of Michigan and the Ozark Rivers Basin of Missouri. Missouri.
- Thomas A. Henderson, Congressional Supervision of Administration: The House Committee on Government Operations, 1946-1963. Columbia.
- Richard D. Humphrey, Patterns of Recruitment to the U.S. House of Representatives: A Study of Six Selected Congresses. Chicago.
- Lynne B. Iglitzin, The Anatomy of Violence: The Role of Violence in the Social System. Bryn Mawr.
- Charles C. Jones, An Analysis of the Organization, Policies, Purposes, and Functions of the Peace Corps. West Virginia.
- Bernard W. Klein, Political Partisanship in Four State Legislatures. Michigan State.
- Thomas Landye, The Politics of Desegregation. Chicago.
- Mary K. Lepper, Demands and Supports for the Moscow Test Ban Treaty. Florida State.
- Christopher A. Leu, The Quest for Consensus in U.S. Foreign Aid Policy: A Study of the Roles and Relation of Congress and The Executive with Reference to Aid to Africa, 1957-1964. California (Los Angeles).
- Marilyn McCurtain, An Investigation of the Voter's Decision Process and His Political Behavior. Washington (Seattle).
- Bhanwar L. Maheshwari, Foreign Aid and the

- Policy Process, 1963. Pennsylvania.
- J. Carl Metz, The President's Veto Power, 1889-1964: An Instrument of Executive Leadership. Pittsburgh.
- Ronald C. Moe, COMSAT: The Politics of Communications Satellites. Columbia.
- James E. Moran, Catholic Church Involvement in Selected Issues in American Politics. Maryland.
- Wayne Muller, An Analysis of Recent Political Activism in the Presbyterian Church. Washington (Seattle).
- David S. Myers, Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Election of 1964. Maryland.
- Roger M. Nichols, Voter Motivation in Two Florida Primary Elections. Florida State.
- Dennis J. O'Keefe, A Study of Decision-Making in the House District Committee. Maryland.
- Thomas A. Parnell, Jr., The Legislative Process under Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson. New York University.
- Rebecca R. Polland, The Impact of Political Transition on the Administration of Federal Food Surplus Distribution Programs. California (Berkeley).
- Laurellen Porter, The Interrelations of Foreign and Domestic Policy. Illinois.
- Winston Riddick, The Politics of National Highway Policy, 1953-1965. Columbia.
- Donald L. Robinson, The Negro Question in American Politics, 1776-1808. Cornell.
- Ira S. Rohter, Radical Rightists and Negative Voters: An Empirical Comparative Study of Their Attitudes, Values, and Social and Personality Characteristics. Michigan State.
- Robert W. Russell, The United States Congress and the Power to Use Military Force Abroad. Fletcher School.
- Gordon T. Saddler, The President's Appalachian Commission: Selective Aspects of Institutions and Processes with Respect to Natural and Human Resource Development. West Virginia.
- Orville Schmidt, The Political Aspects of the Communications Satellite Program. West Virginia.
- Marilyn Shapiro, The Philanthropic Foundation in Public Affairs. Columbia.
- Kenneth Sherrill, Regional Variations in the U.S. Political Culture. North Carolina.
- Norman L. Simmons, An Analysis of the Opposition to the United States Arms Control Policies.

 American.
- William C. Spragens, A Conflict Analysis of the Press Coverage of Congressional Elections. Michigan State.
- John L. Stanley, The Negro and Politics: New York State, 1820-1860. Cornell.

- George T. Sulzner, III, The Politics of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. Michigan.
- Ralph J. Thomson, U.S. Policy and Pressure in Western Europe: The European Defense Community and the Multilateral Nuclear Force. Fletcher School.
- Larry J. Warner, American Federal Judges: A Study in Socio-Economic Backgrounds and Decision Making. Princeton.
- Jerry B. Waters, The Agricultural Policy Stalemate: A Study in the Conflict of Beliefs and Values. Michigan State.
- Hugh S. Whitaker, The Right to Vote: The Effects of Negro Enfranchisement in Selected Mississippi Counties. Florida State.

Changes

Benjamin T. Hourani, Lawyers and Politics: A Study in Political Involvement. Michigan State.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

- Donald F. Anderson, The Legacy of Succession: A Study of William Howard Taft. Cornell.
- Edward N. Beiser, Reapportionment in the Lower State and Federal Courts. Princeton.
- A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., The Expanding Judicial View of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause. Chicago.
- Herbert J. Brown, The "Economic Constitution": The Political Process and the Development of Judicial Responsibility for Anti-Trust Policy. Columbia.
- Truett L. Chance, Presidential Attitudes Towards Judicial Review. Texas.
- William J. Daniels, Attitudes of Lower Courts Toward the United States Supreme Court: The Lower Courts Practice Discretion. Iowa.
- Margery Elfin, The Nature and Effect of de facto Segregation Rulings on Three Selected Communities in New York State. Columbia.
- Gerald L. Hallworth, Constitutional Law and Police Practices in a Texas City. Texas.
- Jerome J. Hanus, The Writ of Certiorari as a Political Instrument. Maryland.
- Gerald E. Kerns, Innovation and Imitation in the Constitutional Decisions of John Marshall: The Hamiltonian Impact. Indiana.
- Joseph Lesser, The Port of New York Authority and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. Columbia.
- Martin A. Levin, The Criminal Judiciary in Two Cities. Harvard.
- Doyle Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Georgia.

- Kenneth F. Mott, Indirect State Aid to Education: The Continuing Challenge. Brown.
- Richard Nunez, Impact of Public Authorities upon Local Government in New York State. Syracuse.
- Marian Oberfast, The New York City Superintendent of Schools and His Interest Group Constituency, 1950-1965: A Study in the Effects of Instability. Columbia.
- Paul K. Pollock, Justice William O. Douglas: Liberalism and the Law. Cornell.
- Charles Pulver, The Judicial Rights of the Indigent Under the Federal Statutes. Syracuse.
- Robert L. Rabin, Constitution, Court and Community: The Problem of Racial Stability in the Northern Urban Schools. Northwestern.
- Stephen Sachs, The Supreme Court and National Emergency. Chicago.

Changes

- Luther W. Odom, Justice Holmes and the Reasonable-Man Rule. Texas.
- Bruce Wilson, The Right to Vote: An Autopsy of the 15th Amendment. Claremont.

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Robert Agranoff, Organization Theory and Political Parties: A Study of State Party Organization. Pittsburgh.
- Betty Jo Bailey, The Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of New York. Columbia.
- Charles G. Bell, Suburban Political Behavior in Los Angeles County, Southern California.
- David R. Berman, Problems of Relief in the Legislative Reapportionment Cases: An Analysis of Lower Court Decisions 1962-65. American.
- David Brower, Public Control of the Physical Development of Small Cities. Indiana.
- John Cook, County Financial Administration in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania.
- Donald Epstein, The Political Influence of the Mass Media. Princeton.
- Lawrence Fahey, Politics of Education in California. Claremont.
- William V. Ford, A Community Decides: Policy-Making in Arlington County, Virginia. American.
- Donald L. Fowler, Presidential Elections in South Carolina: 1948 through 1960. Kentucky.
- Douglas Fox, Puerto Ricans in New York City Politics. Columbia.
- Kenneth Gervais, Negro Leadership in Los Angeles: A Study of Minority Political Leadership. Claremont.

- Jack Goldsmith, The Role of the Initiative as a Tactic of Interest Group Politics in California. California (Los Angeles).
- W. Robert Gump, A Functional Analysis of Patronage: The Case of Ohio. Ohio State.
- Thomas F. Hadac, The Growth of Political Areas: The Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District. Princeton.
- Leland E. Hall, The 1964 Illinois At-Large Election of the House of Representatives. Illinois.
- Samuel B. Hamlett, The Metropolitan Problem in Tarrant County, Texas. Texas.
- Ronald D. Hedlund, The Socialization of Legislators into the Iowa General Assembly. *Iowa*.
- Clyde House, The North Carolina Fund: An Experiment in Private-Public Poverty Policy Making in North Carolina. North Carolina.
- David A. Johnston, The Budget Process in Ohio: Alternative Approaches. Ohio State.
- Michael Lipsky, Rent Strikes and the Politics of Low-Income Housing in New York City. Princeton.
- Peter Loder, Factors That Account for Local Government Autonomy in the United States. Pennsylvania.
- John E. Mueller, Reason and Caprice: Ballot Patterns in California, California (Los Angeles).
- Gunnar P. Nielsson, Denmark and European Economic Integration: A Small Country at the Cross Roads. California (Los Angeles).
- Saul Orkin, New Jersey Democratic Party Politics, 1949-1953: A Case Study in Leadership Succession. Columbia.
- Ernestine Patterson, The St. Louis Human Relations Council. Saint Louis.
- Janet W. Patton, Intergovernmental Decision Process: A Case Study of Selected Provisions of the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965 as Implemented in West Virginia. California (Berkeley).
- Chester B. Rogers, The Relationship of Governmental Structure to Policy Outcomes: An Examination of Different Local Government Structures. Northwestern.
- Alan Shank, New Jersey Reapportionment Politics: An Examination of the Strategies of Apportionment Solutions on Legislative Power. Rutgers.
- Reuben J. Snow, The Local Expert as a Conflict Manager in Municipal and Educational Government. Northwestern.
- Charles P. Sohner, Representation Theory and Apportionment Models: A Study of California Constituency. Southern California.
- Jean E. Spencer, Representation: Its Nature and Function in the Governmental Setting, with Special Reference to Local Government in Maryland. Maryland.

- Donald Sprengel, Gubernatorial Influence and Authority in North Carolina. North Carolina.
- Jean Stichcombe, A Study of Political Influence in an Industrial City: The Impact of the Reform Tradition in Toledo. Michigan.
- Leonard A. Stitelman, Non-Partisan Muncipal Elections—A Case Study (Boulder). Colorado.
- Donald G. Tannenbaum, Government and Negro Ghettos in New York City. New York University.
- Glenn Thomas, The St. Louis Bar Association. Saint Louis.
- Meredith W. Watts, Jr., The Response of State Legislative Representation to Social and Economic Change. Northwestern.
- John D. Wenum, Spatial Growth and the Central City: Problems, Potentials and the Case of Phoenix, Arizona. Northwestern.
- H. Dwight Wilson, Centralization and Democracy: A Study in the Theory of Local Government. Michigan.
- Thomas D. Wilson, Representation on County Governing Boards. Illinois.
- Fred W. Zuercher, The California State Superintendent of Public Instruction: A Study in Politics and Administration. California (Los Angeles).

Deletions

Herbert C. Phillips, Depressed Areas Legislation and West Virginia Politics. Pittsburgh.

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

- James E. Anderson, Canadian Party System: Coalitions and Competition. Princeton.
- David C. Davies, The Development of Canadian Socialist Thought. Toronto.
- Brian T. Donaldson, The Liberal Party in Ontario. Toronto.
- William H. McConnell, Judical Review of Prime Minister Bennett's New Deal Legislative Programme. Toronto.
- Harold J. Sutphen, Canadian-American Defense Cooperation 1945-1963. Fletcher School.
- John W. Warnock, Jr., An Analysis of Canada's Present and Future Role in NATO. American.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

- K. Abdel-Kawi, The Administrative Philosophy of Leonard D. White. New York University.
- Anis-ud-din Ahmed, Administrative Reorganization in Pakistan. Southern California.
- Joan Aron, Administrative Obstacles to Metropolitan Regional Cooperation. New York University.

- Allan Austin, Local Administration in Peru. New York University.
- Morris Bloom, An Evaluation of Pupil Transportation in New York City. New York University.
- Abraham P. Chess, The Role of Civilians in a Police Agency. New York University.
- Neil K. Coleman, A study of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints as a Social System: Its Structure and Maintenance. New York University.
- James L. Cox, Development and Administration of Water Supply Programs in Metropolitan Denver. Colorado.
- John S. Cutlar, An Analysis of Public Service Internship Programs in Selected Governmental Agencies. New York University.
- Harry Diamond, A Systems Approach to the Administration of Criminal Justice. Southern California.
- Robert L. Dove, The Problems of Administration and Coordination in the Protection of Civil Rights in America. Duke.
- Stanley Drabek, Headquarters-Field Relationships In The Ontario Department of Lands & Forests. Toronto.
- Harvey Flumenhaft, Alexander Hamilton on the Executive. Chicago.
- Stephen Fraser, The Strengthening of Local Government in Yugoslavia: Administrative Decentralization and the Commune. Johns Hopkins.
- Lawrence S. Graham, Public Personnel Administration in Brazil: An Analysis of Conflicting Values. Florida.
- Martha J. Harris, Organization for Federal Personnel Program Evaluation: With Particular Reference to the U.S. Veterans Administration.

 American.
- Warren Hatcher, A Study of Administrative Behavior in Relation to the Use of Budget as a Management Tool in a City General Hospital.

 New York University.
- John Hunger, Administrative Officers in North Dakota. Indiana.
- Nasir Islam, A Comparative Analysis of the Compensation System for Public Officials in Commonwealth Countries with Special Reference to Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. Southern California.
- William S. Koschny, An Analysis of the Ramifications and Effects of the Postal Modernization Program on the Postal Unions in the Post Office Department since 1952. American.
- Jackson M. McClain, State Capital Budgeting. Alabama.
- James Marshall, Effects of In-service Training Program on Styles of Operation of Local Government Officers. Connecticut.
- Robert J. Massey, Information for Research Man-

- agement: An Analysis of Information Needed for Application of Economic Choice in Planning and Procuring Contract Research and Description of Relevant Information Available in a Federal Research Support Agency. American.
- William Moffitt, Water and Government: Water Resource Management in a Small City. Southern California.
- Lawrence B. Mohr, Determinants of Extent of Non-Traditional Activity in Local Health Departments. Michigan.
- Charldean Newell, A Theoretical Model of Political Threat and Administrative Decision-Making Style. Texas.
- Eugene A. Olsen, The Organization, Administration and Finance of Area Vocational-Technical Schools in the State of Connecticut. New York University.
- Edwin D. Palmer, Negro Leadership and the Civil Rights Crisis: New York City 1964. New York University.
- Joseph C. Pilegge, Jr., The Role of Federal, State, and Local Governments in Planning for Selected Developmental Programs. Maryland.
- Gedaliah A. Rabinowitz, The Role of the Kibbutz in Israel's Development. New York University.
- Karl R. Rasmussen, A Comparative Study of the Coordination of Delinquency Prevention Services in Selected Neighborhoods in New York City. New York University.
- John A. Rehfuss, Metropolitan Multi-Purpose District Legislation for California—A Case Study. Southern California.
- Harold E. Riehm, State Supervision of County Revenues in Colorado—1965. Colorado.
- Zahid Shariff, An Analysis of the Treatment of Comparative Public Administration in Comparative Politics Scholarship. New York University.
- Mujib Sheikh, Executive Use of Time in a Comparative Study of Brazil, Pakistan and America. Southern California.
- Arnold Steigman, Mayor Council Government: A Case Study. New York University.
- Octavio J. Tocchio, Legislation and Law Enforcement for the Protection of the Physically Battered Child. American.
- Carol Twersky, The Role of the Press in the Executive Branch of the New York City Municipal Administration. New York University.
- Ernest Voss, Suggested Graduate Curriculum in Medical Care Administration. Southern California.

Changes

*Donald R. Norton, Organization and Administration of Municipal Courts in Colorado Home Rule Cities. Colorado. Catherine Papastathopoulos, Western Bureaucratic Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of American State Executives. Iowa.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Abdelkader Abbadi, Moroccan Labor Movement as a Mobilization System. California (Berkeley).
- David Abbott, Political Alienation in Mexico and Italy. North Carolina.
- Robert Abrams, The Local Soviets under Bolshevik Rule, 1917-1921. Columbia.
- Paul R. Abramson, Education and Political Socialization: A Case Study of English Educational Reform. California (Berkeley).
- James C. Akins, French Policy in Afrique Noire: 1956-60. Harvard.
- Gayle Avant, Venezuelan Land Reform: A Case Study. North Carolina.
- Andrew Baggs, Phenomena Common to Creation of Popular Front Coalitions: The French Election of November, 1962. North Carolina.
- Krishna Bahadoorsing, Trinidad Electoral Politics. Indiana.
- Clinton Bailey, The Palestine Arabs in The Politics of Jordan. Columbia.
- Thomas Bastedo, The Cultural Community as a Political Interest Group in Selected Areas of North India. Duke.
- Lawrence Beer, The Public Welfare and Freedom of Expression in the Constitution of Japan. Washington (Seattle).
- Thomas J. Bellows, Political Parties in Singapore with Special Emphasis on the First Months of the Malaysian Federation. Yale.
- George W. Benz, Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the U.S., 1945-1947: The Evolution from Cooperation to a Policy of Hostility. Fletcher School.
- Willard Berry, An Administrative Study of Selected Districts in West Pakistan. Duke.
- Howard L. Biddulph, Soviet Interpretations of the Formation of Marxism. Indiana.
- James A. Bill, The Politics of Modernization in Iran—A Group-Class Analysis. Princeton.
- Ervin Birnbaum, State and Religion in Israel: The Politics of Compromise. Columbia.
- Michael J. Brenner, Technocratic and Political Leadership in a Mature Industrial Society: Their Implications for European Integration. California (Berkeley).
- Wilson B. Brown, Governmental Measures Concerning Exportation in Peru: A Study of Policy and Its Making, 1945-1962. Fletcher School.
- Josef Burger, Indian Students and American Education. Wisconsin.

- David Butler, Assumptions about Political Development in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America, 1961-65. Harvard.
- Douglas P. Bwy, A Comparative Study of Governmental Instability in Latin America. Northwestern.
- Barbara Calloway, A Study of Urban Politics in Enugu, Nigeria. Boston University.
- H. Carl Camp, Caudillismo: The Dynamics of Power. Washington (St. Louis).
- Paul Cassidy, West German Political Culture.
 North Carolina.
- Woodley L. Chapman, The Politics of British Education Since 1944. Columbia.
- Everett Chard, The System of Local Government in Kenya, with Special Attention to Integration and Economic Development in the Local Areas. California (Berkeley).
- Pi-chao Chen, The Developments of the Population Policy in Communist China: A Case Study in Decision-Making in Communist China. Princeton.
- Don Chenoweth, Civil Procedure in the USSR. Saint Louis.
- John N. Collins, Xenophobia in Ghanian Foreign Relations. Northwestern.
- Richard E. Combs, Jr., The Role of Ideology in Postwar Soviet Policy Determination. California (Berkeley).
- Thomas Cooke, The Contemporary Foreign Policy of Venezuela. American.
- Joseph Crowley, The Kenya Independence Movement: 1960-1963. Washington (Seattle).
- Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Groups Politics and Language Policy in India. California (Berkeley).
- Martinus R. Doornbos, Primordial Groups in National Politics. California (Berkeley).
- Sara Jo Edelstein, The British Labour Party and Unilateralism—1956-1961. California (Los Angeles).
- David D. Edwards, A Theory of Arms Control. Harvard.
- Carolyn M. Elliott, Group Politics in Andhra Pradesh, India. Harvard.
- Paul S. Ello, The Peasant and the Commissar: The Politics of Agricultural Development in the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of North Korea. Iowa.
- Victor L. Emanuel, The Chilean Christian Democratic Party—an Ecological Analysis of Its Development. Harvard.
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- Benjamin G. Ruckberg; B.A., Oberlin College, 1953; D.S.S., Syracuse, 1964. The Foreign Policy Roles of Recent Soviet Doctrines on the "Fight for Peace". Syracuse.
- Jerome N. Slater; B.A., Alfred University, 1956;
 M.A., Yale, 1958; Ph.D., Princeton, 1965. The Role of the Organization of American States in United States Foreign Policy, 1947-1963. Princeton.
- Zdenek Slouka; PH.D., Columbia, 1965. International Custom and the Continental Shelf. Columbia.
- Jean E. Smith; B.A., Princeton, 1954; Ph.D., Columbia, 1964. Defense of Berlin. Columbia.
- William Spencer; B.A., Princeton, 1948; M.A., Duke, 1950; Ph.D., American, 1965. The Mosul

- Question in International Relations. American.
- Arthur Stein; B.A., Penn State, 1957; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1962; Ph.D., ibid., 1965. India's Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1953-62. Pennsylvania.
- Stanley M. Stein; M.A., American, 1961; Ph.D., ibid., 1964. German-Polish Relations from Munich Conference to the Fourth Partition of Poland. American.
- John D. Stempel; B.A., Princeton, 1960; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1963; Ph.D., ibid., 1965. Policy and Decision Making in the Department of State: The Vietnamese Problem. California (Berkeley).
- Yasushi Sugiyama; B.A., Florida, 1956; M.A., ibid., 1957; Ph.D., Maryland, 1964. Japan's Relations with Communist China, 1949-1963. Maryland.
- Raymond Tanter; B.A., Roosevelt University, 1961; M.A., Indiana, 1964; Ph.D., ibid.,1964. Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-60. Indiana.
- Ronald J. Terchek; B.A., Chicago, 1958; M.A., ibid., 1960; Ph.D., Maryland, 1965. The making of the Test Ban Treaty in the United States. Maryland.
- Robert D. Tice; B.S., Memphis State College, 1957; M.A., Saint Louis, 1959; Ph.D., ibid., 1965. Geopolitics and the Ladakh Boundary. Saint Louis.
- Maung Ye Tut; B.A., University of Rangoon, 1956; M.A., Georgetown, 1960; Ph.D., ibid., 1965. The Afro-Asian Group in the United Nations, 1955-1962. Georgetown.
- Robert Weiner; B.A., Brandeis University, 1960;
 M.A., New York University, 1961; Ph.D., ibid.,
 1965. Polycentrism in the United Nations: A
 Case Study of the United Nations Operations in the Congo. New York University.
- Theodore D. Wyly; A.B., Florida, 1951; A.M., Florida State, 1956; A.M., Fletcher School, 1958; M.A.L.D., ibid., 1958; Ph.D., ibid., 1964. Foreign Relations of the United States with France from 1919 to 1929. Fletcher School.
- Oran R. Young; B.A., Harvard, 1962; M.A., Yale, 1964; PhD., ibid., 1965. Third Party Intervention in International Crises. Yale.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1966 ANNUAL MEETING

The deadline for papers to be submitted to section chairmen is November 1, 1965. (The June issue announcement of a December 1 deadline was incorrect.)

Commencing with Volume 60 (March 1966), Austin Ranney, of the University of Wisconsin, will become Managing Editor of this Review, succeeding Harvey C. Mansfield, who will relinquish the post upon the issuance of the December 1965 number. At the same time, James W. Prothro, of the University of North Carolina, will succeed Austin Ranney as Book Review Editor.

Editorial correspondence relating to the September and December issues should be addressed to the Columbus office, as hitherto. After September 15, address such correspondence, touching later issues, to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wişconsin, Madison, Wis.; and send books intended for review to James W. Prothro, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Southern Political Science Association at its annual meeting in San Diego in April, elected the following officers for 1965-66: president, George S. Blair, Claremont Graduate School; vice-president, Thomas McEnroe, California State College at Los Angeles; secretary, Richard Gripp, San Diego State College; treasurer, Richard Harvey, Whittier. Named to the executive council were: Frank Way, University of California at Riverside; Gerald Rigby, University of Southern California; Tom Trombetus, Long Beach State College; James Lare, Occidental College; Richard Longaker, UCLA; Gordon Baker, University of California at Santa Barbara; and John L. Groom, Redlands.

The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy held its annual meeting in Washington, D.C., on April 24-25, 1965. Richard B. Brandt, chairman of the department of philosophy at the University of Michigan, was chosen president-elect. J. Roland Pennock of Swarthmore College and John W. Chapman of the University of Pittsburgh were named editor and associate editor, respectively, of *Nomos*, the annual publication of the Society.

It has been the practice of the Society to meet with philosophers, political scientists and lawyers. In the future, depending upon the topic selected for consideration at the annual meeting, the Society will meet in conjunction with the annual meetings of other social science disciplines.

Forthcoming volumes of *Nomos* will deal with equality, which was the topic of the Washington meeting, and with representation, the topic of the joint meeting with the American Political Science Association in September.

The department of government at the University of Texas sponsored a conference on the "Role of the Intellectual in Politics" in April. Papers were read by: Gunnar Heckscher, professor of political science at the University of Stockholm and parliamentary leader of the Swedish Conservative Party; Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Minnesota; Klaus Mehnert, professor of political science at the Institute of Technology, Aachen; Francisco Miro Quesada, Peruvian Ambassador to the United Nations; Representative John Brademas, Indiana; Sir Denis Brogan, professor of political science and philosophy at Peterhouse, Cambridge University; Daniel Cosio Villegas, Mexican delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council; and Merle Fainsod, professor of government at Harvard.

The first of a series of Socialist Scholars Conferences took place on the campus of Rutgers—the

State University, on September 11 and 12. Persons interested in future conferences should write to Professor Marvin Gettleman, Department of History and Economics, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, 333 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York 11201.

At its twenty-third annual meeting in April, the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists elected the following new officers: Clara Penniman, University of Wisconsin, president; Orville Alexander,

Southern Illinois University, vice-president; Stephen T. Early, Jr., DePauw University, secretary-treasurer; Merle Kling, Washington University, editor of *Midwest Journal of Political Science*; and as members of the executive council, Willard N. Hogan, University of Nebraska and William H. Flanigan, University of Minnesota.

The 1966 meeting of the Conference will be held at the University of Chicago April 28 to 30. The program chairman is S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi, has received a grant from the Field Foundation to support an Oral History of Contemporary Mississippi Life. This project will be under the direction of Gordon G. Henderson, chairman of the department of political science. Transcripts of the interviews collected, including interviews of major figures in Mississippi politics, will be available on inter-library loan.

The first issue of the New York State Political Review will appear in September. It will include most of the papers presented at the meeting of the N.Y. State Political Science Association meeting in April.

Arizona State College will become Northern Arizona University in 1966.

New York University and the Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council sponsored a conference on "Social Growth and Democracy" in New York from May 27 to May 29. The conference brought together scholars and men immediately familiar with Turkish affairs to study the impact of social growth on politics. Kemal Karpat, New York University, was the director of the conference.

The Overseas Educational Service has received a \$300,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The grant will enable OES to broaden its contacts with American faculty and administrators and to work with more institutions abroad. Although OES recruits educators for all the developing areas, the initial emphasis has been on Africa, where many new institutions are now being built and the need for expatriate staff is still the most urgent.

To develop its roster of potential candidates, OES works with many professional organizations and with other national and international groups of similar purpose, in addition to making contact with faculty members who register directly with OES.

OES is sponsored jointly by the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council on Education, and Education and World Affairs, with the cooperation of the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the Institute of International Education, and the Canadian Universities Foundation.

Qualified persons who are interested in serving abroad are invited to write to Overseas Educational Service, 522 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10036.

The Society for Religion in Higher Education is offering a number of post-doctoral fellowships to encourage the growing interest in the relation of scholarship in religion to scholarship in other fields of study. These fellowships are made possible through a grant from The Danforth Foundation.

Grants are available to: (1) scholars in the humanities, social and natural sciences for a year of study in religion and (2) scholars in religion for a year of study in another discipline.

These fellowships are open to scholars in any institution of higher learning in the United States or Canada without respect to discipline, religious affiliation or non-affiliation. Scholars applying for the grants must have a Ph.D. degree or its equivalent plus at least three years of teaching experience. Preference will be given to scholars under 50 years of age.

The maximum stipend is \$8,500. Stipends will be based on experience, present salary and availability of other resources.

Completed applications must be received by the Society by December 1, 1965. Application forms and additional information may be secured from: Lawrence P. DeBoer, Executive Director, The Society for Religion in Higher Education, 400 Prospect Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511.

Under the direction of Gerard J. Mangone, professor of political science and associate dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University, twenty members of the Second Maxwell Institute on the United Nations met at the Villa Serbelloni at Bellagio, Italy in August, 1965. Representing ten countries, the participants discussed the conduct of foreign policy through the United Nations.

Opportunities for overseas research by three scholars in the humanities and social sciences will be offered annually by the International Honors Program beginning in 1966-67. The program will field a small select group of American honor students and three preceptors for an academic year of comparative foreign study. The countries visited will be chosen by the preceptors. A division of responsibility among preceptors will enable each scholar to devote approximately two-thirds of his time to his own research. Interested scholars may contact Dr. Paul Conner, 401-1903 Hall, Princeton, N.J.

The University of Virginia Library and the Stettinius Fund, Inc., announce the microfilm publication of the State Department scrapbooks of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under-Secretary (1943-44) and Secretary of State (1944-45). These scrapbooks comprise more than 1500 pages of clippings from magazines and newspapers throughout the United States and encompass the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the transition in the State Department from Cordell Hull to Stettinius, the events of January and February 1945, the Yalta Conference, the Mexico City Conference, and the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Together these scrapbooks provide a unique source for the study of public attitudes toward American diplomacy 1944-45. The two microfilm reels are available for \$15.00 each or \$25.00 for the set. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to: Stettinius Fellow, Manuscripts Division, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia.

The 1965 Legislature of the State of New York has established 90 fellowships in honor of former Governor Herbert H. Lehman. The annual awards are to be known as the New York State Herbert H. Lehman Fellowships in Social Sciences and Public and International Affairs. Applicants for the awards must be citizens of the United States, but need not be residents of the State of New York. The fellowships carry annual stipends of \$5,000 if the recipient is matriculated for a doctoral degree and has completed at least one year of graduate study, otherwise the award will be for \$4,000. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1965. Winners will be announced on March 15, 1966. For further information and application forms write to the Regents

Scholarships and Examination Center, The State Education Department, Albany, New York 12224.

MORLEY AYEARST, New York University, visited Cairo in February for two weeks as a member of a team of university professors from the State of New York to investigate possibilities for student and teacher exchange and opportunities in Middle Eastern affairs.

PETER BACHRACH has returned to his position at Bryn Mawr College after a sabbatical leave in England.

HANS H. BAERWALD will be director of the University of California Overseas Study Center, Tokyo, Japan, September 1965-July, 1966.

ERWIN W. BARD, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, has returned from eighteen months as senior adviser to the Institute of Public Administration (New York) at the National Office of Organization and Training of the Peruvian government in Lima. He also lectured at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Buenos Aires in the program for public administration assisted by Columbia University.

HENRY BIENEN has returned to the University of Chicago following a year of teaching and research at Makerere University College in Kampala, Uganda, under the auspices of the University of Chicago.

BERNARD E. BROWN, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York spent 1964-65 on research in Senegal and other West African countries.

EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, Indiana University, will be on leave during 1965-66. He has received an SSRC grant and will spend five months at UNRWA headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, conducting research.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, University of Maryland, has been elected chairman of the board of editors of World Affairs.

James Busey, University of Colorado, will be on leave from the University during 1965-1966. He will assume teaching responsibilities at the University of Colorado-Colorado Springs Center.

George A. Codding, Jr., University of Colorado, has been awarded a university faculty research fellowship for the academic year 1965-66.

RITA W. COOLEY, New York University, has been awarded a Fulbright Lectureship at the Amerika Institut, University of Innsbruck, Austria, for 1965-66.

FRANK DARLING, University of Colorado, will be on leave 1965-66 under the Fulbright-Hayes Educational Exchange Act as a lecturer at the Lyceum of the Philippines.

James C. Davies, University of Oregon, attended a seminar on the formation of Latin American elites at the University of Montevideo, Uruguay, June 6-12, 1965.

DAVID DERGE, Indiana University, spent some time in Sierra Leone studying the effectiveness of Peace Corp training.

ROLAND H. EBEL, Newcomb College, Tulane University, will be on leave 1965-66 to conduct research in Guatemala under an SSRC grant.

PRESTON W. EDSALL, North Carolina State University at Raleigh, attended the internship evaluation conference held in Puerto Rico in April.

HERBERT EMMERICH, University of Virginia, presided at the XIII International Congress of Administrative Sciences in Paris, France, July 19-24.

JOSEPH R. FISZMAN, University of Oregon, will be on leave during 1965-66 to do research in Czechoslovakia and Poland on a grant from the Inter-University Travel Grant Committee.

GISBERT H. FLANZ, New York University, will continue to serve as advisor to the Administrative Improvement Research Commission of the Republic of Korea. He spent the summer in Seoul.

WILLIAM J. FOLTZ, Yale University, has received a Yale junior faculty fellowship, and will be on leave during the calendar year 1966.

ELLEN FREY-WOUTERS, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York was on an SSRC research leave in Europe during the spring term.

WALTER GOLDSTEIN, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, spent the summer in Europe under a research fellowship from the Mershon Center at Ohio State University.

ALBERT GORVINE, director of the Research Center for Comparative Politics and Administration of Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, served as delegate from the U. S. A. to a CENTRO Conference on The Role of Local Government in National Development in Ankara, Turkey, in February, 1965. He delivered a paper on "Local Government in National Development: a New Role and National Responsibility." In June-July, 1965 he served as consultant to the Philippine Executive Academy at Baguio.

DARRELL P. HAMMER, Indiana University, has

been awarded an SSRC grant that will allow him to do research in the Russian area during 1965-66.

Gordon G. Henderson, Millsaps College, has received a post-doctoral fellowship from the National Center for Education in Politics which will enable him to serve on the staff of Governor Samuel Goddard of Arizona for a twelve-month period beginning September 1965.

JERRY HOUGH, University of Illinois, has received a research grant from the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. He will spend the year in Cambridge and later visit the Soviet Union.

MICHAEL HUDSON, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, will be on leave during 1965-66, as a research associate of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

JOHN HUTCHINSON, UCLA, spent the summer doing research in Washington, D. C., under grants from the University.

PHILIP E. Jacob, University of Pennsylvania, participated in conferences held in India with other collaborators in the International Studies of Values in Politics, a program of cross-cultural behavioral research being conducted jointly by the University of Pennsylvania and social research insitutions in India, Yugoslavia and Poland.

JACK T. JOHNSON, Indiana State University, has been granted a one-year leave of absence to serve as special assistant to Earl McGrath at the Institute of Higher Education, Columbia University.

ROBERT N. KEARNEY, Duke University, has received an award from the American Council of Learned Societies for his study of "Communalism and the Language Problem in Ceylon."

MELVILLE T. KENNEDY, Jn., has returned to Bryn Mawr College after a sabbatical leave.

MALCOLM KERR is on leave from UCLA and is spending the academic year in Egypt.

James D. Kitchen has a year's leave of absence from San Diego State College and will teach at Forman Christian College in Lahore, Pakistan.

EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ, University of Virginia, has been awarded an autumn semester research grant by the Rockefeller Foundation.

SAMUEL KONEFSKY, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, pursued field study in Great Britain during the 1965 spring semester under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Wolfgang H. Kraus, The George Washington University, was elected vice-president for political science by the American Society of Political and of Legal Philosophy at its annual meeting. He also participated in the Fifth International Conference on World Politics which was held at the Hague in September, 1965. The conference was devoted to Eastern European developments.

VUKAN KUIC, University of Alabama, is on leave with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, during the academic year 1965-66.

WLADYSLAW W. KULSKI, Duke University, conducted research in France during the summer.

MARTIN LANDAU, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, will be senior specialist in public administration at the Institute of Advanced Projects at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the academic year 1965-66.

CARL H. LANDÉ, visiting professor, Ateneo de Manila, Philippines, has received an award from the American Council of Learned Societies, for his study, "A Study of Philippine Politics."

ROBERT E. LANE, Yale University, has received a senior faculty fellowship from the University, and will be on leave during the 1965-66 academic year.

CHONG-SIK LEE, University of Pennsylvania, will be on research leave during 1965-66 under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Gertrude Leighton, Bryn Mawr College, who has been combining with her regular duties at Bryn Mawr a research appointment in law and psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania Law School during the years 1959-65, will be on sabbatical leave in 1965-66.

WILLIAM F. LEVANTROSSER, Rutgers—The State University, has been awarded a post-doctoral fellowship by the Mershon Center for Education in National Security at Ohio State University for the academic year 1965-65.

J. Gus Liebenow, Indiana University, visited Sierra Leone to investigate the effectiveness of the training given Peace Corps personnel. He also conducted field work in Ghana, Nigeria and East Africa under a summer grant from Indiana University.

CHARLES S. LIEBMAN has been awarded a crossdisciplinary fellowship from the Society for Religion in Higher Education. He will be on leave from Yeshiva University (1965-66) and will serve as a visiting scholar in the Department of Religion at Columbia University. JOHN P. LOVELL, Indiana University, did field work in Korea this past summer.

SERIF ARIF MARDIN, University of Ankara, will spend 1965-66 at the Institute of Turkish Studies at Columbia University.

LUCIAN C. MARQUIS, University of Oregon, has been awarded a Fulbright lectureship at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Turin, Italy, for 1965-66.

MARTIN MEADOWS, American University, served at the University of the Philippines during 1964-65 as the recipient of a Fulbright award.

PHILIP MONYPENNY will be on sabbatical leave from the University of Illinois during the year 1965-66. He will spend most of the year in Urbana in research and writing.

GEORGE E. VON DER MUHL, University of Chicago, is spending the current academic year in research and instruction at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda.

STUART NAGEL returned to the University of Illinois in September after a year divided between the Center for Advanced Study in California and the East-West Center in Hawaii.

HAROLD NIEBURG is on research leave from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for the academic year 1965-66.

GERHART NIEMEYER, University of Notre Dame, taught at the Institute on Communism and Constitutional Democracy at Vanderbilt University.

DAVID M. OLSON, University of Texas, will be on leave during the 1965-66 academic year and will participate in the APSA's study of Congress, as well as conduct other research. He spent the 1965 summer in Sweden doing field work.

NORMAN J. PADELFORD, University of Pennsylvania, edited the special United Nations anniversary issue of *International Organization* which commemorated the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U. N. Charter. The issue carried 25 articles by scholars and authorities from the U. S. and abroad appraising the accomplishments and prospects of the United Nations.

NORMAN D. PALMER, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed a member of the Committee on International Education of the College Entrance Examination Board. He also participated in the annual Institute of World Affairs sponsored by the Cincinnati Council on World Affairs.

KENNETH PREWITT, University of Chicago, will conduct research and teach at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda.

R. K. RAMAZANI, University of Virginia, won the 1964 prize for the best book manuscript in the competition held by the Association of Middle East Studies.

DAVID C. RAPAPORT will be on leave from UCLA during the fall and spring semesters and will engage in research in England during the latter.

DONALD R. REICH, Oberlin College, will be on research leave during 1965-66.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR., University of Washington, was on leave during the spring.

F. W. Riggs, Indiana University, read a paper at a conference on problems of modernization in Asia at Korea University at Seoul.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, University of Bridgeport, has been elected president of Delta Tau Kappa, the International Social Science Honorary Society.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, University of Pennsylvania, was awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship for 1965-66 which permits him to undertake research in Yugoslavia.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT, Yale University, has received a Yale junior faculty fellowship and will be on leave for the 1965-66 academic year.

JAMES R. SCARRITT, University of Colorado, will be on leave during 1965-66. He has been awarded a faculty research fellowship for research in Zambia and Rhodesia.

LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, UCLA, will conduct research in Europe during 1965-66 under an SSRC grant.

KARL M. SCHMITT, University of Texas, will be on leave during 1965-66. He will participate in and coordinate a study for the Department of State on political forces in Latin America.

ROBERT E. Scott, University of Illinois, attended a conference on Social Science in Latin America held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in March, 1965. The conference was sponsored by the SSRC.

PRESSLEY S. SIKES, Indiana University, having reached the retirement age for administrative duties, has returned to full time duties with the department of government.

RICHARD G. SMOLKA, the American University, has accepted a faculty fellowship in state and local politics from NCEP and will be on leave for academic year 1965-66.

RICHARD F. STAAR, Emory University, presented a paper at the International Symposium held at Munich, West Germany, on October 20-22, 1964. The subject was "The Impact of the Modern Military Resolution on Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy."

George Stambuk, The George Washington University, has been granted leave of absence to conduct research under an SSRC grant.

RICHARD N. SWIFT, New York University, attended an institute on "Nuclear Science and World Politics," sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Science at Oak Ridge, Tennessee in April. He also attended a conference on the United Nations at Bellagio, Italy, in August.

HENRY TEUNE, University of Pennsylvania is spending the fall term in Yugoslavia, Poland and India under the auspices of the University's International Cooperative Studies of Values in Politics.

TANG TSOU, The University of Chicago, was awarded the 1965 Gordon J. Laing Prize for his book, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950.

RICHARD L. WALKER, University of South Carolina, will spend the academic year 1965-66 doing research at the Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan, on a Fulbright research grant and an SSRC grant.

FREDERICK M. WATKINS, Yale University, has received a senior faculty fellowship from the University and will be on leave during 1965-66.

FREDERIC A. WEED, San Jose State College, will return to full-time teaching after six years in the post of department chairman.

H. Bradford Westerfield, Yale University, will do research during 1965-66 at the Washington Foreign Policy Center in Washington, D. C.

DAVID WILSON, UCLA, spent the 1965 spring semester in Thailand.

BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, University of Texas, has resigned his position as director of special programs in the College of Arts and Sciences and has returned to full-time teaching duties in the department.

QUINCY WRIGHT, consultant at the University of Virginia, attended the meeting of the Legal Committee of the World Federation of the United Nations Associations in Amsterdam, and the Institute of International Law Conference in Warsaw.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, University of South Carolina, spent the summer doing research in Belgium, Morocco and Senegal on an SSRC grant.

Correction

The June issue incorrectly announced the appointment of Franz Michael as director of the Sino-Soviet Institute at Georgetown University. Professor Michael is the associate director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at the George Washington University. Kurt L. London is the director of the Institute.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

David W. Abbott, assistant professor, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

ROBERT ABRAMS, instructor, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

ABID A. AL-MARAYATI, assistant professor, Arizona State University; fermerly with the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard.

WILLIAM C. BAUM, assistant professor, Grand Valley State College, Michigan, September 1965; formerly of Creighton University.

HENRY BIENEN, instructor, University of Chicago.

RICHARD N. BLUE, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

Paul N. Brass, assistant professor, University of Washington, September 1965.

BERNARD E. BROWN, professor, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

ALLEN W. CAMERON, instructor, Bates College.

WILLIAM R. CAMPBELL, instructor, University of Rhode Island.

ROBERT K. CARLEY, assistant professor, Grand Valley State College.

DWIGHT M. CARPENCER, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

EVERETT CATALDO, assistant professor, State University of New York at Buffalo; formerly of the Ohio State University.

SHIRLEY CHAPMAN, assistant professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of Vassar College.

Mary Cisar, assistant professor, California State College at San Bernardino.

RICHARD P. CLAUDE, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

ROBERT E. CLEARY, associate professor, American University; formerly of George Peabody College.

HARRY CLOR, instructor, Kenyon College.

MICHAEL COHEN, instructor, State University of New York at Binghamton.

STEPHEN COHEN, University of Illinois.

JULES COHN, assistant professor, New York University.

Frank Colon, assistant professor, Lehigh University; formerly of Villanova University.

MIRIAM CONANT, assistant professor, Columbia.

JAMES E. CONNER, instructor, Columbia College.

James L. Cox, lecturer, University of Maryland.

JOHN P. CRECINE, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

JOHN CRITTENDEN, associate professor, Indiana State University; formerly of the University of Buffalo.

Morris Davis, associate professor, University of Illinois; formerly of Tulane University.

LYLE A. DOWNING, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of University of California.

DON W. DRIGGS, associate professor, University of Nevada; formerly of Stanislaus State College.

MARTIN D. DUBIN, associate professor, Northern Illinois University; formerly of Roosevelt University.

MARTIN EDELMAN, assistant professor, UCLA.

EUGENE EIDENBERG, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

CHARLES F. ELLIOTT, assistant professor, George Washington University; formerly of the University of California.

ROBERT H. EVANS, assistant professor, University of Notre Dame, February 1966.

KUANG-HUAN FAN, assistant professor, University of Idaho.

A. Belden Fields, University of Illinois.

George Fischer, associate professor of sociology, Columbia University; formerly of Cornell University.

MICHAEL GEHLEN, assistant professor, Purdue University; formerly of Oregon State University.

EDWARD B. GLICK, associate professor, Temple University; formerly of Bendix Corporation's Arms Control Projects office.

Paul Godwin, assistant professor, Washington University.

MARSHALL N. GOLDSTEIN, associate professor, University of Hawaii.

George Goodwin, Jr., professor, University of Massachusetts, Boston Campus.

LAWRENCE GRAHAM, assistant professor, University of Texas.

RODERICK T. GROVES, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

JOHN E. GUENDLING, assistant professor, Arkansas Polytechnic College; formerly of Purdue University.

DAVID A. GUGIN, University of Georgia.

JOHN G. GUNNELL, assistant professor, State University of New York at Albany.

Donald L. Herman, assistant professor, Grand Valley State college.

KLAUS J. HERRMANN, associate professor, Sir George Williams University, Montreal; formerly of American University.

S. Kenneth Howard, assistant professor and assistant director of the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina.

CHUN-TU HSEUH, associate professor, University of Maryland.

John Hutchinson, associate professor, UCLA, July 1964.

BERNARD K. JOHNPOLL, University of Saskatchewan, Regina campus; formerly of Hartwick College.

WILLIAM C. JOHNSON, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

RALPH G. Jones, professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of the University of Arkansas.

DAVID JOHDAN, assistant professor, University of Virginia; formerly of Pennsylvania State University.

SUNGJOOK JUNN, assistant professor, Grand Valley State College; formerly of Mercer College.

MARK KESSELMAN, assistant professor, Columbia.

WILLIAM J. KIRSCH, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

ALLAN KORNBERG, assistant professor, Duke University; formerly of Hiram College.

RICHARD KRAEMER, instructor, University of Texas.

YASUMASA KURODA, instructor, University of Southern California; formerly of Montana State College.

Sanford A. Lakoff, associate professor, State

University of New York at Stony Brook; formerly of Harvard University.

WILIAM W. LAMMERS, instructor, University of Southern California.

Paul Leary, assistant professor, Dartmouth College; formerly of Rutgers.

EDWARD A. LEONARD, assistant professor, Texas Western College of the University of Texas; formerly of Emory University.

TILDEN J. LEMELLE, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

THEODORE J. LOWI, associate professor, University of Chicago; formerly of Cornell University.

JACK LEWIS, instructor, Duke University.

ALDEN LIND, assistant professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of the University of Oregon.

EDGAR LITT, associate professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; formerly of Boston College.

JOHN H. LUNDE, instructor, Valparaiso University.

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WILLIAM R. MARTY, assistant professor, Memphis State University.

JOHN D. MAY, assistant professor, University of Chicago; formerly of Yale University.

JAMES P. McClellan, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of the University of Alabama.

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R. Stephen Milne, professor and chairman of the department, University of British Columbia; formerly of the University of Singapore.

R. Stephen Milne, University of British Columbia: professor and chairman of the department.

RAY MOREY, assistant professor, Denison University.

George E. von der Muhl, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

FRANK MUNK, professor, Portland State College; formerly of Reed College.

NORMAN K. NICHOLSON, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

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A. F. K. Organski, professor, University of Michigan; formerly of Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

GORDON PLATT, University of Iowa, February 1966; formerly of the University of South Dakota.

SANDRA S. POWELL, instructor, American University.

Kenneth Prewitt, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

DONALD J. PUCHALA, associate professor and research associate in the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia; formerly of the University of New York at Buffalo.

THEODORE PUTTERMAN, assistant professor, University of Washington.

RICHARD S. RANDELL, assistant professor, University of Nebraska.

ROBERT F. RANDLE, instructor, Columbia.

JOHN C. RIES, JR., assistant professor, University of California.

ROBERT S. ROBINS, assistant professor, Tulane University.

IRA S. Rohter, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

FRED ROUCH, associate professor, Arizona State University; formerly of Claremont Graduate School.

WILLIAM SAFRAN, assistant professor, University of Colorado; formerly of Brooklyn College.

BURTON M. SAPIN, associate professor, University of Minnesota; formerly Foreign Affairs Officer on the Politico-Military Affairs Staff of the Office of the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

EDWARD V. SCHNEIER, assistant professor, Princeton University; formerly of Johns Hopkins University.

JOEL SCHWARTZ, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

WALTER A. E. SKURNIK, assistant professor, University of Colorado, Denver Center; formerly of Pennsylvania Military College.

ALLAN P. SINDLER, professor, Cornell; formerly of Duke University.

BHEKPATI SINKA, assistant professor, Indiana State University.

DUANE SMITH, assistant professor, University of California.

Paul A. Smith, associate professor, State University of New York at Binghamton; formerly of Grinnell College.

LEO M. Snowiss, assistant professor, UCLA.

ALLAN A. SPITZ, assistant professor, Washington State University; formerly of the University of Hawaii.

DONALD SPRENGEL, University of Iowa.

ARTHUR B. STEIN, assistant professor, University of Rhode Island.

GLENN E. TINDER, professor, University of Massachusetts, Boston campus.

RICHARD H. ULLMAN, associate professor, Princeton University; formerly of Harvard University.

John Washburn, instructor, Lehigh University.

MARVIN WEINBAUM, assistant professor, University of Illinois; formerly of Colby College.

HERBERT WEISS, assistant professor, New York University.

G. Robert Wills, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

DESMOND P. WILSON, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of M.I.T.

John C. Withey, assistant professor, Whittier College.

ALBERT WOHLSTETTER, professor, University of Chicago; formerly of the University of California.

James H. Wolfe, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

E. VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN, assistant professor, UCLA.

ROY YOUNG, assistant professor, San Jose State College.

GEORGE T. Yu, associate professor, University of Illinois; formerly of the University of North Carolina.

TEMPORARY AND VISITING APPOINTMENTS

RICHARD E. ASHCRAFT, acting assistant professor, UCLA.

RICHARD D. BAKER, University of Oklahoma: visiting assistant professor, Newcomb College, Tulane University.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY, visiting professor, Berea College (Kentucky), 1965-66.

HENRY BRETTON, University of Michigan: visiting professor, University College, Nairobi, Kenya.

ELLIS O. BRIGGS, San Francisco State College; visiting professor, University of South Carolina, spring 1965.

DAVID BUTLER, Nuffield College, Oxford, England: visiting professor, University of Michigan, summer 1965.

Mary U. Carlson, instructor, Valparaiso University.

Wallace F. Caldwell, Kansas State University: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

Milton Colvin, Washington and Lee University: visiting professor, National War College.

PERCY E. CORBETT, visiting professor, Columbia University.

JOHN A. CRAMPTON, Lewis and Clark College: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

JEAN DANIELSON, visiting assistant professor, Newcomb College, Tulane University.

PAUL T. DAVID, University of Virginia: visiting scholar, Brookings Institution, summer 1965.

Carlos A. Echanove T., Mexico City: San Diego State College.

RUPERT EMERSON, Harvard: visiting professor, UCLA, spring 1965.

LEON D. EPSTEIN, University of Wisconsin: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

Peter G. Fish, instructor, Oberlin College.

AHMAD GHOREICHI, visiting assistant professor, University of Colorado.

MAURE GOLDSCHMIDT, Reed College: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

CHARLES R. GREEN, Oregon State University: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

MILTON HOBBS, Indiana University: visiting lecturer, University of Illinois.

PAUL W. HOWERTON, visiting professor, American University.

ROBERT S. JORDAN, George Washington Uni-

versity: visiting professor, University of Sierra Leone.

Majib Khadduri, Johns Hopkins University: visiting professor, Columbia.

WILLIAM LEWIS, Department of State: visiting professor, University of Michigan.

Louis S. Loeb, American University: visiting associate professor, University of California at Davis, summer 1965.

Gordon Means, Gustavus Adolphus College: University of Iowa.

LYNN MILLER, acting assistant professor, University of California.

DEAN MEYERS, acting instructor, Indiana State University.

WILLIAM C. OLSON, Library of Congress: visiting professor, and research associate in the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia.

Benjamin Rivlin, Brooklyn College: visiting professor, Columbia.

C. NEALE RONNING, visiting associate professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Kenneth S. Sherrill, instructor, Oberlin College.

LELAND STAUBER, Indiana University: visiting lecturer, University of Illinois.

WILLIAM P. TUCKER, University of Puerto Rico: visiting professor, University of Colorado.

URBAN WHITAKER, San Francisco State College: visiting professor, University of South Carolina.

RENE DE VISME WILLIAMSON, Louisiana State University: visiting professor, Duke University, summer 1965.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, University of South Carolina: visiting associate professor, New York University.

DINA ZINNES, Indiana University: research associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

Peter Bachrach, Bryn Mawr: chairman of the department, 1965-66.

HANS H. BAERWALD, UCLA: vice chairman of the department.

Burron R. Brazil, San Jose State College: chairman of the department.

JOHN C. BUECHNER, University of Colorado: assistant director, Bureau of Governmental Research and Services.

DWIGHT M. CARPENTER, Arizona State University: assistant director, Bureau of Government Research.

Murray Edelman, University of Illinois: chairman of the department, to replace Charles B. Hagan who will be on sabbatical leave.

PRESTON W. EDSALL, North Carolina State University at Raleigh: chairman of the new department of politics.

RUSSELL H. FIFIELD, University of Michigan: acting director, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies.

HARRY J. FRIEDMAN, University of Hawaii: chairman of the department.

LEONARD GOODALL, Arizona State University: director of the Bureau of Government Research.

ROBERT HORWITZ, Kenyon College: professor and chairman of the department.

PAUL H. Howerton, American University: director, Center for Technology and Administration.

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, University of Texas: acting chairman, fall semester, 1965-66.

RAYMOND A. MOORE, University of South Carolina: acting head of the department.

DONALD C. MUNDINGER, Valparaiso University: dean, College of Arts and Sciences.

FRED MUNK, Portland State College: associate director, Central European Studies Center.

JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, Skidmore College: president of the College.

JAMES R. ROACH, University of Texas: director of special programs in the College of Arts and Sciences.

ROBERT C. SPENCER, University of Rhode Island: professor and chairman of the department.

JOSEPH L. SUTTON, Indiana University: dean, College of Arts and Sciences.

C. S. WHITAKER, JR., UCLA: associate dean, Graduate Division.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

RONALD F. HOWELL, associate professor, resigned from Emory University.

FRANK MUNK retired as professor at Reed College.

R. W. van Wagenen, professor, resigned from American University to become Chief of Training for the World Bank.

PROMOTIONS (WITH NEW RANK)

JABIR A. ABBAS, Marshall University: assistant professor.

PAUL W. CONNER, Princeton University: assistant professor.

PHILIP E. CONVERSE, University of Michigan: professor.

L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia: professor.

DAVID DANELSKI, Yale University: associate professor.

REV. RAYMOND DERRIG, St. Louis University: associate professor.

H. Sydney Duncombe, University of Idaho: associate professor.

RALPH EISENBERG, University of Virginia: associate professor.

DARYL R. FAIR, Rider College: assistant professor.

RICHARD A. FALK, ALBERT G. MILBANK, Professor of International Law and Practices, Princeton University.

GISBERT H. FLANZ, New York University: professor.

THOMAS A. FLINN, Oberlin: professor.

A. LEE FRITSCHLER, American University: assistant professor.

IRWIN N. GERTZOG, Yale University: assistant professor.

Myron Q. Hale, Ohio State University: associate professor.

Joseph Hamburger, Yale University: professor.

RICHARD B. HARVEY, Whittier College: associate professor.

MURRAY C. HAVENS, University of Texas: associate professor.

CHARLES F. HERMANN, Princeton University: assistant professor.

WALTER D. JACOBS, University of Maryland: associate professor.

HAROLD K. JACOBSON, University of Michigan: professor.

ELIJAH BEN-ZION KAMINSKY, Arizona State University: associate professor.

W. MARVIN KENDRICK, Yale University: assistant professor.

DAVID KETTLER, Ohio State University: associate professor.

JACOB LANDYNSKI, New School for Social Research: associate professor.

CHONG-SIK LEE, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

W. DUANE LOCKARD, Princeton University: professor.

Leo B. Lott, Ohio State University: associate professor.

MARTIN D. MEADOWS, American University: associate professor.

ROBERT J. MORGAN, University of Virginia: professor.

WALTER F. MURPHY, Princeton University: professor.

STUART NAGEL, University of Illinois: associate professor.

Benjamin Nimer, George Washington University: professor.

GLENN D. PAIGE, Princeton University: associate professor.

SIMON D. PERRY, Marshall University: associate professor.

James R. Roach, University of Texas: professor.

J. DAVID SINGER, University of Michigan: professor.

Roy D. Sloan, University of Nebraska: associate professor.

George Stambuk, George Washington University: associate professor.

W. J. STANKIEWICZ, University of British Columbia: professor.

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JOHN H. STRANGE, Princeton University: lecturer.

HENRY TEUNE, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

NORMAN C. THOMAS, University of Michigan: associate professor.

MYRON WEINER, MIT: professor.

H. Bradford Westerfield, Yale University: professor.

IN MEMORIAM

WILLIAM M. GRIFFIN, associate professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, died on May 24, 1965 after a long illness. He was graduated from the Jacksonville, Texas, High School in 1942, entered the Marine Corps in the same year and served until 1946. He received a B.A. degree in government from Sam Houston State College in 1949, the M.A. from the same institution the following year, and the Ph.D. from the University of Texas in 1951.

Griffin's professional experience included two years of teaching in high school, a year as instructor in political science and research associate in the Bureau of Governmental Research and Service at Florida State University, and three years at the University of South Dakota where he was Assistant Professor of Government and Research Associate in the Governmental Research Bureau. He joined the staff of the University of Virginia in July 1960 and, in addition to his Associate Professorship, served as Assistant Director of the Institute of Government, and Assistant Editor of the University of Virginia News Letter.—Weldon Cooper

MIGUEL JORRIN, professor of government and director of the Division of Foreign Studies at the University of New Mexico died suddenly of a heart attack, May 7, 1965.

EUGENE D. OVERSTREET, associate professor of International Affairs and a member of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at the George Washington University, died of cancer in Washington, D.C. on May 17, 1965, at the age of forty. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and was a co-author with Marshall Windmiller of Communism in India. At the time of his untimely death, Dr. Overstreet was working on a new book, Communism in the New States, and a book of documents on Communism in the developing countries.

Before joining The George Washington University in 1963, he had taught at Swarthmore College, at the University of California, and at Michigan State University. From 1953 to 1955, he had held a Ford Foundation Research Fellowship to India. In the summer of 1960, and during the academic year of 1961-62, he was in the Soviet Union on a research grant to study Soviet Trade Unions under the auspices of the State Department's US-USSR Cultural Exchange Program.

The profession has suffered a serious loss through the early death of this able scholar.—The Political Science Department, The George Washington University

REUBEN G. STEINMEYER, who, for most of his lifetime, dedicated himself wholeheartedly to the

profession of teaching, died suddenly of a heart attack on April 25, 1965.

He was born in Bridgewater, South Dakota, on January 22, 1899. After attending public schools in Chicago, he graduated from Capital University and Theological Seminary in Columbus, Ohio, and became an ordained Lutheran minister. In 1929 he took the B.A. degree at The American University, and received his Ph.D. in international relations also there in 1935.

He was appointed at the University of Maryland in February, 1935. Since that time, except for a short period of service with the War Production Board during World War II, he devoted three decades to the development of its Department of Government and Politics. On two occasions—when that Department first was established, and again late in World War II—he was the University's sole Professor of Political Science.

He not only witnessed, but also contributed substantially to, the growth of the University of Maryland for more than a quarter of a century. He served it in many ways in addition to his classroom teaching. He participated in the responsibilities of many University, College, and Departmental Committees, including the Faculty Senate for five years. He became one of the major purveyors of good will by delivering more than 2,000 special lectures to professional, educational, civic, fraternal, and other associations, averaging nearly seventy such lectures a year. Finally, during the past decade and a half he directed to completion the studies of some thirty-five graduate students. Also, he was a member of the National Council of Pi Sigma Alpha and held office as well in the District of Columbia Political Science Association. His wife-the late Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, who preceded him in death by exactly two years-was equally well known in the profession.—Elmer PLISCHKE

WILLIAM H. VATCHER, JR., professor of Political Science at San Jose State College, died May 18, 1965 of injuries received early in January during a visit to San Francisco. Professor Vatcher received his academic training at Stanford University, from which he received his Ph.D. in international relations in 1950. His interests in that field were widespread. His first book, Pannunjom, was concerned with the Korean truce negotiations. More recently, Praeger published his study of Afrikaner nationalism. At the time of his death he had completed another manuscript for a text on public opinion.

Dr. Vatcher was a congenial colleague and an influential teacher as well as a serious scholar. His loss will be felt deeply by the profession.—FRED-ERIC A. WEED

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
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
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
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
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
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DECEMBER, 1965

NO. 4

DISILLUSION AND REGENERATION: THE QUEST FOR A DISCIPLINE*

DAVID B. TRUMAN Columbia University

A discipline, at least to the initiated, is rnown more by the questions it asks than by he answers that it provides. For questions ndicate goals or aspirations that answers may tot reach. At certain periods, however, a field of knowledge may be more conspicuously charcterized by the controversies that occur mong those who work in it. When these take he form of debates over the adequacy of paricular answers, as determined by agreed, even hough sometimes imprecise, criteria of assessnent, they are unlikely to be highly prominent, except for the immediate participants. When, on the other hand, such controversies extend to he standing of the questions asked and place n dispute the means of appraising answers, it becomes obvious to all that something is hapening that has implications for the entire field. Clearly the discipline is undergoing redefiniion or at least an attempt at redefinition that nay sharply alter its meaning. If the criteria or admitting questions and for validating inswers are changed, the discipline is changed. inescapably, therefore, controversies of this ort involve participants and observers in onsiderable numbers.

The pertinence of these observations to the ield of political science in the past decade or so needs no elaboration, I am sure. It may be less obvious, however, that this situation in the ield has a history that extends back a good nany years. A view of that history may both hed useful light on our current controversies and perhaps help us to assess their implications.

At the very outset I am willfully going to commit the sin of parochialism by confining my emarks primarily to the discipline in the Jnited States. In justification I would argue

* Presidential address delivered at the annual neeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 8, 1965.

that the problems of political science are, if only because of the number of practitioners involved, chiefly problems of American political science. In the period on which I shall focus, beginning roughly two decades before the turn of the century, the influences upon the men who were developing the American discipline did not have their origin solely in the United States, but their responses to these influences were highly distinctive. These responses, moreover, set the stage for the controversies that have had their center in the United States, though their margins have extended far beyond this country.

In thinking about the contemporary development of political science I find particularly suggestive the notion of the paradigm, which is one of the two key concepts in Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By this term he means a common set of beliefs, constituting a kind of open-ended model that more or less explicitly defines the legitimate problems and methods of a research field, the working elements of what he calls "normal science." The developmental pattern of a mature science, he argues, is a movement from one generally accepted view of a research field to a successor. Prior to the emergence of such a research consensus, a field—such as physical optics before Newton—is characterized rather by a number of competing schools, not necessarily "unscientific" but bearing at most a loose resemblance to one another.

Kuhn is concerned, of course, with the physical sciences, but he explicitly does not rule out the possibility that comparable patterns of development characterize the social sciences. He leaves open the question of whether any parts of the social sciences have yet acquired para-

¹ Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962.

digms or ever will. He would not, however, deny that many, if not all, of those fields display most of the features of the pre- or nonparadigmatic stage of inquiry.

In the formative years of political science in the United States, in the decades around the turn of the century, the field did not have a paradigm, nor has it acquired one since. Unquestionably the absence of such an agreed model has influenced the pace and pattern of change in the field, for a crucial feature of a true paradigm is its precision. This gives form and direction to "normal science." More important for the birth of scientific revolutions. precision in the paradigm permits the investigator to know when something is wrong, i.e., contrary to what should be expected, and to see the need for paradigm change. In the absence of a paradigm and hence of a relatively precise means of knowing where, if not why, an existing conception is deficient, dissatisfactions with existing formulations in a field are not eliminated. Rather they may be multiplied. But they are likely to lack the coherence and the sharpness of focus that can be provided by a true paradigm.

I think it is accurate to argue, nevertheless, that something loosely analogous to a paradigm characterized American political science for at least the half-century running from sometime in the 1880s into the 1930s. In order not to distort Kuhn's provocative conception, this should be thought of as simply an implicit though fairly general agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field. Because the matters in agreement were vague and the terms applicable to them loose and imprecise, they permitted a product diverse both in quality and in intent. Despite this diversity, however, the works of most political scientists had a number of qualities in common that serve to identify the nature of the general agreement and the form and character of the discipline.

The political science that emerged about the turn of the century gradually displaced and was in considerable part a revolt against an older tradition of preceptive and scholastic formalism. The new trend was toward contemporaneity and "facts," in the name of "realism" and of "science." Its early stirrings can be illustrated by Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government (1885) but interestingly not by his later treatise on The State, which was clearly of the older mold. More than by Wilson or by any American, the note of change was struck by James Bryce in his American Commonwealth (1888). The trend that it signified lasted well into the 1930s, but it reached something of a peak about the turn of the century as part of the general pursuit of "realism" that was characteristic of the Progressive Movement in literature, in journalism, and in most of the emerging social sciences.

At the risk of distortion and over-simplification, I shall propose six closely related features of this predominant agreement that profoundly marked the discipline. That mark helps to put our current quandaries and controversies in instructive context. These six features, stated for the moment without elaboration, were: (1) an unconcern with political systems as such, including $_{
m the}$ American system. amounted in most cases to taking their properties and requirements for granted; (2) an unexamined and mostly implicit conception of political change and development that was blandoptimistic and unreflectively reformist; (3) an almost total neglect of theory in any meaningful sense of the term; (4) a consequent enthusiasm for a conception of "science" that rarely went beyond raw empiricism; (5) a strongly parochial preoccupation with things American that stunted the development of an effective comparative method: and (6) the establishment of a confining commitment to concrete description.

Lack of concern for the political system as such meant, first of all, that the discipline worked within implicit and common-sense assumptions about the requirements of the system, its boundaries, and the articulation of its elements. Yet these assumptions essentially fixed many of the questions that the discipline could ask and set the limits on the answers that could be supplied, whether in analytical or in prescriptive terms. This in turn meant that particular segments of the system could be described and prescribed for without reference to implications for or effects upon the system as a whole. This tendency, it seems to me, is at the heart of the negative connotations recently attached to the label "institutionalist." The target of such criticism can hardly be the study of institutions, since one can scarcely imagine a political science in which institutions, as persistent patterns of political action, would not be a proper and central focus of concern. Criticism rather bears on treating an institution in its own terms, at face value, and without reference to other portions of the inclusive scheme or to the functions of a particular pattern within the system.

Unconcern with the system as such meant that political scientists, and commentators generally, assumed in effect a kind of atomistic non-system. Preoccupation with isolated particulars and a commitment to the concrete and the "practical" led so far away from concern

with the political system as a whole that it was virtually assumed out of existence. The field in consequence was condemned to working within the conventional, legalistic conceptions of the system, since it lacked the means of dealing with it, conceptually and empirically, in any other terms.

Closely and quite logically associated with this unconcern for the characteristics of the system was a view of political change or development that optimistically and uncritically assumed an inevitable progress toward democracy and the rule of law, provided only that enlightenment through education and the public channels of communication was sensibly provided for. The apparent facts of the relevant political world-Western Europe, the Americas except for some trouble spots south of the border, the self-governing British Dominions. China, and Japan—did not, at least until the 1920s, sharply contradict this bland view. In any case, the conception was essentially taken for granted. This did not inhibit, rather it encouraged, an enthusiasm for particularistic reform. Unconcern about the political system permitted championing proposals such as the direct primary without attention to their ramifying effects, and the assumption of democratic progress confidently justified the effort. An uncritical preoccupation with reform relied upon a conception of linear democratic development that seemed likely to terminate in a withering away of politics and the realization of an immanent harmony among enlightened and right-minded men.

It is not remarkable that this unconcern with the political system and with a critical view of political change should have carried with it, especially among American political scientists, an indifference to theory as an element having anything but a conventional, ornamental utility for the field. Theory in any systematic sense was for the most part peripheral, not in the main stream of the discipline. Albert Bushnell Hart was not much exaggerating the temper of his profession when he observed in 1907, "The most distinctive American theory of government is not to theorize."2 This attitude was in part an over-reaction to the abstract formalism of an earlier day, but it also followed logically from the unexamined assumption that the system provided its own theory and that the task before the profession was to facilitate the inevitable flowering of democracy. Small wonder if the textbooks

² Albert Bushnell Hart, "The Growth of American Theories of Popular Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 1 (August, 1907), p. 560.

through which students in this period were introduced to political science (via American government) changed their implicit conceptual positions from chapter to chapter, from page to page, and even from paragraph to paragraph. A less obvious consequence of this indifference to theory was that the sub-fields of political science tended to develop in increasing isolation. They had nothing in common except that many of them dealt with American phenomena and that all of them talked about government in some way. Without theory, politics tended to become defined as itself an isolated sub-field, rather than as the process permeating every phenomenon studied by the discipline.

The discipline in these years also tended to take its "science" seriously, but the type of science, almost inevitably, was a rank, nontheoretical empiricism. The dominant commitment was to the collection of facts, in mary cases almost for their own sake. This preoccapation may have been one influence toward developing, especially in the 1920s, new devices for the collection and analysis of dataprimitive population samples, interviews, word-association tests, and so on. But the climate of the field was such that the facts normally were assumed to speak for themselves. Empirical description, usually in association with uncritical reformist inferences, was a hallmark of the field.

An understandable consequence of the new realism was that political science became increasingly parochial, primarily engrossed in things American and, almost inescapably, in the minutiae of American phenomena. A natural result of this and related commitments was that the discipline did little to develop comparison as a basic component of investigation. One of the saving features of the older formalist persuasion was that it had displayed at least a rudimentary interest in comparative analysis. After the succession of the new realism, however, what was known as "comparative government" largely involved a description of the institutions and structures of particular European governmental schemes. The comparative element rarely went beyond legalistic distinctions and literary gestures.

Finally and ironically, all five of these factors combined to insure that, in rejecting confinement by the abstract formalism of the earlier period, the new realism adopted instead an equally confining and in some ways even more rigid mode of concrete description. Without an explicit concern for political systems as such, without an interest in the patterns and directions of political change, without some com-

mitment to theory, and with a compulsion to raw empiricism and parochial concerns, the narrowness of this political science was virtually inescapable.

This brief and perhaps unfairly simplified sketch is not presented in a spirit of condescension. If it emphasizes shortcomings, moreover, that is not because I assume that the period produced no gains. Given the temper of the American scene in the Age of Reform, the state of the means of communication, the paucity of data, and the limited manpower available to the discipline, the emergence of these characteristics was natural if not inevitable. Within the limits that it accepted, the gains that the field made were not triffing ones.

This summary is offered rather to indicate that once the experiences of political scientists, whether as professionals or as citizens, began to raise questions that fell outside the implicit general agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field, none of the features of this largely implicit consensus could long go unquestioned. As such non-congruent experiences multiplied, the positions assumed by the discipline became successively untenable and a search for alternatives inescapable.

No purpose would be served by attempting to pinpoint a time at which experiences inconsistent with the general agreement began to occur with disturbing frequency; the choice would be arbitrary and the effort meaningless. The process in any case was one of cumulation. Thus the immediate results of World War I probably were mixed in their impact. The dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy, the formal institutions of the successor states, the establishment of the Weimar Republic, and the launching of the League of Nations presented no immediate inconsistencies. Many political scientists, in fact, found it easy to attach to the League and to other international organizations both the uncritical optimism of the professional consensus and the analytical assumptions associated with it. On the other hand, the Bolshevik Revolution, with its apparent and apparently successful rejection of these assumptions, may have had a more disturbing effect. Also the retrospective views of the politics of the War, illustrated in a rash of semi-popular books on propaganda and reflected in Walter Lippmann's essays on public opinion, indicated some degree of disillusion. Probably more disturbing were the Fascist coup in Italy and the later Nazi take-over in Germany, with their open and effective repudiation of the expectations and practices that underlay the implicit agreements of the profession. The associated political instabilities and counter-currents of change throughout Europe, especially in Spain and France, and the bankruptcy of the Third Republic in 1940, liquidated the intellectual utility of the rootless, untheoretic concern for descriptive detail that hobbled what was known as "comparative government," but they almost as obviously undermined the assumptions and the conventional imperatives of much of the rest of the field.

An order of experience different but of comparable consequence for the profession occurred during the New Deal and World War II periods as academic political scientists in unprecedented numbers were transplanted to Washington. The impact of such first-hand experience with problems and processes at the level of the national government cannot be calculated, of course, but one cannot doubt that it was substantial. This re-shuffling, moreover, probably was important not merely for the element of direct confrontation with national government but also for a confrontation of a different sort—with the practitioners of other social science disciplines. As political scientists found themselves in mutually instructive collaboration with men from other fields, they were almost compelled to reckon with the utilities that these disciplines offered, not only for coming to grips with questions of immediate urgency but also for dealing with questions more strictly professional in character. These influences undoubtedly were reciprocal, but the political scientists' side of the transaction is the one that concerns us here.

Finally, at least two sorts of development in the decades since World War II have contributed to the dissolution of the established professional consensus. One was the drastically altered character of world politics after Potsdam. As "over there" moved here, the need for a systematic concern with the processes of international relations and with political and national security strategy became compelling. The reality of nuclear weapons and the politicomilitary implications of operations in space could not be grasped, if they were to be understood at all, by the assumptions and concepts that had appeared viable in a world based on Geneva. A second such development was the break-up of the colonial system, the emergence of new nations or national entities, and the awakening of older ones, which revealed the inadequacy of a disciplinary posture that was essentially parochial, that took the nature of the political system for granted, and that lacked an adequate and explicit view of political change. The appearance of the new nations demanded not only some sophistication on these counts but also tools of analysis equal to the task of a genuine comparative method. The conventional descriptive language of "comparative government" was weak enough in dealing with the relatively homogeneous and generally stable institutions of the Western European tradition; it was for the most part less than useless for coming to grips with the differences, the novelties, and the fluidities of the new national systems.

Although it took experiences such as these and their cumulative effects to bring the discipline as a whole to perceive the inadequacies of the prevailing consensus, a succession of individual dissents antedated all or all but the most recent of them, and these were the seeds of counter-tendency. One thinks, for example, of Graham Wallas, whose Human Nature in Politics (1908), for all its over-enthusiasm about psychology's potential for political science, was an eloquent and, at least on this side of the Atlantic, influential rejection of institutional description for its own sake. You will expect me to mention the almost unclassifiable Arthur F. Bentley, who was in but not wholly of the Age of Reform. If Bentley has been misunderstood in the 1950s and 1960s, his work at least has emerged from forty years of almost complete neglect. The Bentley revival, moreover, was itself symptomatic of the widespread readiness within the profession—largely absent in 1908—to question the conventional guiding agreements. Comparable, if less explicit and less radical dissent can be seen in at least some of the work of other scholars in the same generation, including Beard, Goodnow, and Lowell.

One must certainly include, moreover, the work and the career of Charles E. Merriam, who for more than twenty years was the prophet of reconstruction in political science. The "Chicago school" that he created in the vears before World War II was not strictly a school. It had no dogmas and no orthodoxy except a restless skepticism concerning the adequacy of prevailing conceptions of the discipline and a corresponding receptivity to the unconventional. Among the most distinctive products of those years, however, were several that demonstrated a reach for the coherence of political phenomena. For example, political systems, their properties and conditions of change, were, then as now, a central focus of Harold Lasswell's work. Of the same order was Frederick L. Schuman's International Politics, which, when it appeared in 1933, broke dramatically with the rootless moralizing and mechanical description then prevailing and foreshadowed new patterns of analysis in that growing sub-field.

There were individual stirrings elsewhere in

the 1930s, as in the work of Pendleton Herring, then and since a pacemaker for his students and colleagues. But restlessness within the field as a whole did not develop until after 1945, when the effects of the full range of inconsistent experiences began to appear.

Given the looseness and especially the lack of precision in the prevailing implicit agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field, its weakening and gradual dissolution were bound to be followed by a confusion of competing and divergent, if not incompatible, views of the appropriate questions to be asked and the proper methods to be used. How long that state of affairs is likely to exist is anyone's guess. At least three possibilities suggest themselves. First, it may be that the discipline is so uninsulated from its environment that it will have to wait for a broad intellectual or social movement to give it implicit coherence, as the Progressive Movement seems to have done in the formative years. If this should be so, the wait, I suspect, will be a long one. A second possibility is that segments, at least, of the discipline have grown self-conscious enough to supply their own momentum and their own modes of coherence. These may then develop as increasingly divergent and separate schools, with little in common except some raw data and possibly, but not necessarily, a departmental label. Or, third, most of the discipline may have acquired a degree of self-awareness sufficient to permit it to set the outlines of what to do, if not altogether how to proceed, without total dependence on dominant currents of thought in the environment and without the widening cleavages in both conception and procedure that the second possibility would involve.

A case can be made for each of these, and at this stage it is impossible to say with confidence which of them, or of a number of variant patterns, will in fact develop. As an inveterate optimist, however, I am disposed to bet on something like the third possibility, and I should indicate my reasons for the wager as well as for my preference.

The first and most basic reason is the emergence—perhaps more accurately re-emergence of an explicit interest in the political system. I do not refer here to a particular kind of conception but much more broadly to a renewed awareness of the simple but important assumption that the phenomena of politics in any sphere are interrelated in persistent or recurrent patterns. More important than the awareness itself is that it has involved explicit examination of the relations among things political—efforts to specify forms or types of systems, the

elements involved in them, the factors associated with alterations in systems, and probable implications of these forms and mutations for the strength of specified values. This constitutes, of course, a revival of interest in one of the classic problems in the study of politics, and it is significant for just that reason. For, if a new agreement is to emerge on what political science is about, it will not come, I am certain, from a conception that does not permit the discipline, at least in principle, to deal with such large, important, and classic problems.

This revival thus seems to point in the right direction, but its implications go beyond that advantage. As the political system becomes a central focus of inquiry, guided by careful theory—of which more in a moment—the isolation of sub-fields within the discipline should begin to break down. National and international systems are not identical, of course, but the questions they invite are not wholly dissimilar, nor are the terms in which they may be analyzed. Explorations at each level may be expected to have increasing relevance for the other. And the same may be said of subnational systems, the area last and least directly affected by the experiences that disrupted the once-prevailing agreement within the discipline. The centrality of system considerations also will make less permissible the analysis of an institutional segment or process without reference to an explicit conception of the system to which it relates. Finally, an attempt to deal seriously with the problem of the political system necessarily involves reconceptualizing, re-casting the language of inter-system comparison. This reconceptualization was clearly anticipated a dozen years ago when the Social Science Résearch Council set up the Committee on Comparative Politics. The committee was expected to concentrate on the developing nations, but the larger objective was to contrive ways of looking comparatively at whole systems in terms of variations in attributes common in some degree to all political systems, whatever their stage of development.

A second reason for betting on the possibility of a new disciplinary consensus is the revival of interest in theory. This development fundamentally was a predictable consequence of the break-up of the discipline's nontheoretical consensus. But it has been aided in significant measure in recent years by the increased accessibility of data in a number of sub-fields. No discipline, especially among the social sciences, has good data readily available in sufficient amounts. But when data are not easily secured, even in modest quantities, it is likely that an enormous proportion of research time will go

into mere collection. In such circumstances, moreover, it is not astonishing that much professional work, even in the absence of an antitheoretical bias, is reportorial, journalistic, and non-theoretical. Thus one has the impression that the specialties that today are least engaged in renewed theoretical concerns are those that must scramble the hardest for data. "Kremlinology" as an alternative to theory is in part traceable, I suspect, to scarcity of data.

However this may be, a renewed emphasis on theory of all kinds seems to have occurred in recent years. I emphasize "all kinds" because, as might have been expected, it seems evident that the theory chorus is less polyphonous than cacophonous. Discord seems more prominent than harmony even within what some see as the solid ranks of "the new political science." Nevertheless, the renewed concern for theory seems clear, and I cite as illustration an impression that the majority of textbooks in all parts of the field today show a degree of care, at least about consistency of assumption and coherence of expository framework, that was rare thirty years ago. This care indicates nothing about the theoretical adequacy of these efforts, but it does suggest a more sophisticated level of expectation.

In noting a revived interest in theory I refer to the creation, development, or application of theory and to "theorizing," or the readiness to draw inferences from a set of data to the class of events to which they belong. I am not here discussing the analysis and explication of documents in the history of political thought, on which I want to comment in another connection. What I want to emphasize at this point is a growing self-consciousness and fruitful awareness of the necessary conjunction of theory and empirical investigation. Such awareness involves accepting the elementary point that an investigator never has a choice of whether to use theory or not, that the facts never speak for themselves but only through the assumptions and concepts that control their selection and analysis, and that in consequence the choice is only between implicit, internally inconsistent. and hopelessly inadequate theory, on the one hand, and explicit, logically defensible, and reasonably adequate theory, on the other.

I do not anticipate that an awakened respect for theory will eliminate a division of labor in the field based on differences of disposition, training, and aptitude. Nor do I suggest that every reported research will or should display its theoretical structure prominently. We shall continue to have and should wish to have more political scientists whose talents and sense of strategy lead them to work on and from conceptual schemes and formal models of broad reach.

We shall also continue to have and to need those who, like our great colleague V. O. Key, in full awareness of their broad assumptions, prefer to work more inductively. The goodhumored skepticism that helped to make Key so creative also made him brilliantly at home with his data and healthily uneasy when his sentences got much beyond them. He denied that he was a theorist, but he was one, though he was indisposed to work with higher abstractions or to embrace formal systems for which he saw no early possiblity of empirical test. His Southern Politics, for example, represented and probably more than any other single work encouraged the restless searching that has marked the field since 1945. The South he wrote about has all but disappeared less than two decades after the book was published. What is left? An indispensable record for the historian, but for the political scientist much more: a structure of propositions and inferences -many of them tucked away in footnotesthat have theoretical pertinence well beyond the South or the United States. One day, perhaps, someone will do what Key would have been too modest to do, namely, extract that structure from its contemporary setting and show the strength that sensitive empirical inquiry can bring to theory.

For the predictable future both modes of theorizing will be needed, and from time to time both may be profitably cultivated by the same man. In practice, though not in principle, it may not be possible to develop general models, to say nothing of hypothetico-deductive theories, with much systematizing or predictive power. Should that be the case, we should be compelled to rely upon more restricted theories of inferential origin. But even if the obstacles to general theory can be surmounted, the more restricted type is likely still to be necessary, at least to stimulate and in part to test the more inclusive. Theory of both sorts, moreover, like the revived awareness of political systems, should contribute to reducing the insulation of sub-fields and perhaps to their re-casting. It may even be possible at some future point for a sub-field to be known by the problems it addresses itself to rather than by the piece of real estate it focuses upon or the institution it investigates.

Finally, my third reason for counting on a new consensus within the discipline is what I would call a recommitment to the goal of science. Although it is at least partially implied by a revived concern for the political system and for theory, I am less confident of this tendency than of the other two and I can hardly be unaware that it is considerably more controversial. No topic in the last two decades has provoked more fruitless discussion or has more consistently produced false, or at least wholly unnecessary, oppositions. I would not touch the issue but for a desire to bury it rather than to raise it, although I probably cannot expect that a death certificate will be widely recognized or that my mortuary services will be generally welcomed.

Close to the heart of the matter, however particular issues may be phrased, is the question of definition. It is possible to define the requirements of "science" and "scientific method" in such categoric terms that nothing in the study of politics now or at any projected future time is or is likely to be eligible for the label. But, to quote from an essay by Ernest Nagel on which I shall rely heavily, such an effort also leads "... to the unenlightening result that apparently none but a few branches of physical inquiry merit the honorific designation."3 Thus, to specify that "science" requires the hypothetico-deductive procedures and the integrated form of systematic explanation exemplified by the science of mechanics or that it necessitates the use of a particular set of techniques regardless of the type of inquiry is probably to deny that the discipline can be scientific or at best to confine it to problems of the most trivial character.

It is not necessary, however, so to restrict the definition or even to espouse that form of science as a goal or an ideal, and I do not see the recommitment to which I refer as involving such a definition or necessarily such an espousal. If one accepts Nagel's characterization that "... the sciences seek to discover and to formulate in general terms the conditions under which events of various sorts occur, the statements of such determining conditions being the explanations of the corresponding happenings";4 and if one further agrees that "The practice of scientific method is the persistent critique of arguments, in the light of tried canons for judging the reliability of the procedures by which evidential data are obtained. and for assessing the probative force of the evidence on which the conclusions are based";5 then the recommitment in the discipline becomes sensible and, at least presumptively, manageable.

³ Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), p. 449.

⁴ Ibid., p. 4.

⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

Science so conceived requires generality of statement but not in a specified degree, nor does it require a particular level of precision, or a limited set of techniques. It does not assure the truth of every conclusion that it reaches or the absence of bias deriving, for example, from the value commitments of the investigator. It does not suggest that a precise line divides knowledge or beliefs that can be labeled "common sense" from knowledge that claims to be "scientific," and it does not, finally, assert that only knowledge so derived can or should be admissible as part of the discipline—a point to which I shall return. Any science does aspire to explanations of classes of events, explanations subject to the controls of empirical evidence and with sufficient systematic power at least to place its findings beyond complete invalidation by the day's events. These are aspirations, as I see it, that lie close to the heart of the restlessness that has characterized the field for at least two decades.

It is recommitment to science in this broad sense that I see as an essential part of a new consensus in the discipline. A more restricted conception, corresponding to the rigorous requirements of mechanics, for example, almost certainly cannot be fruitful in any foreseeable future and will certainly have the consequence of fostering increasingly divergent schools. Without, however, a commitment to a science somewhat more openly conceived, the empirical work of the discipline will not progress, will not move cumulatively toward explanation, toward establishing relations of dependence between events and conditions. If the empirical work of the discipline does not move, moreover, the discipline will not.

A new agreement on what the discipline is up to, resting on a broad conception of the scientific enterprise, as well as on the two tendencies previously identified, is likely to permit movement and the expectation of progress in the field. As Kuhn has argued in a somewhat different connection, the absence of such movement and of the associated expectation probably lies behind the recurrent definitional debates about the "science" of the contemporary social sciences. "What would permit X field to move ahead?" is a question more fundamental than "Is it a science?" He suggests, and I think soundly, that such debates are less frequent among economists, not because they know what science is, but because they have achieved "consensus about their past and present accomplishments"; hence it is economics rather than "science" on which they agree.6

6 Kuhn, op. cit. pp. 159-60.

But why be concerned about a fresh consensus in the field, especially one that derives from the three elements discussed here? Why not welcome a diversity of competing and increasingly separated schools? Surely the temper of the times and the state of the technology are such that someone will exploit the potentialities of science in the analysis of political events and actions; if not "political scientists," then a school, or perhaps a set of scholars who do not carry the label "political science" at all. What difference would that make? Perhaps none at all, but I suggest we should not concede the point without reflection.

Even one who may be committed to the potential of the scientific enterprise in this field must grant that he cannot know how far that effort in practice will be able to go and must seriously entertain the possibility that in fact the distance may be fairly short. If "... it is any man's guess whether a comprehensive social theory of . . . [a scientific sort] is destined to remain permanently as a logical but unrealized possibility,"7 as much probably must be granted concerning such a political theory. Only a bigot would perhaps deny that significant progress recently has been made in explaining and developing a theory of electoral behavior, and only the most skeptical would reject the likelihood that other sub-areasperhaps the comparative analysis of public policy-could make similar gains. But one would be imprudent to project these accomplishments indefinitely. The practical obstacles may be too great. For example, it may not be possible to secure enough cases, enough standardized and precise observations, to make any reasonably reliable scientific statements about political systems, though the discipline must talk about systems.

From these cautionary observations I would draw two inferences. First, if the prospect of a comprehensive social theory lies so far in the future as to be a matter of guessing, then theory in the political realm, however comprehensive, for at least that long is likely to remain distinctively political. It will work primarily from data and concepts rooted in its more restricted area, and it will not appear merely as a special case of a more comprehensive theory of society. Second, if the reach of reasonably reliable science in the area of politics may for a long time and perhaps indefinitely be shorter than many might hope, then for so long the discipline will have to place some reliance upon knowledge that is less scientific or even nonscientific in character. The alternative for a dis-

⁷ Nagel, op. cit. p. 462.

cipline based upon consensus about itself is consistently to sacrifice relevance to rigor.

This position seems to me to contain two additional implications. First, it implies the need to include under relevance the function of assessing the probable consequences of proposals and events for the system and for the values implicit in it. I cannot accept the counsel of those who would have political scientists say, "Let George do it" when the question arises of assessing matters that fall within the subject-matter that they claim as their province. That seems to me defaulting on an obligation, and further, I do not believe any responsible fraternity of social scientists gives that answer, whatever its protestations to the contrary. This does not mean that we should run up the flag for the latest panacea, that our highest aspirations should be as political actors. or that we can fail to distinguish responsibly between what we know with some degree of reliability and what we merely judge to be valid. But it does mean that as political scientists we may have something to say. It means, further, that we cannot escape the obligation to predict, and a function of prediction is to sharpen and to broaden moral choice.

Second, if a fresh consensus about the discipline must include, for an indefinite future, a less or non-scientific component and if a continued assessing or evaluating function must rest fundamentally upon that component, then it seems to me clearly to follow that the classics in this field of thought, especially perhaps the more speculative documents, must be a central part of the training for and the practice of political science. I am aware of Whitehead's epigram, that "A science that hesitates to forget its founders is lost." But one may add that perhaps a discipline that does indeed forget its founders may also be lost. Remembering them does not, however, require that their writings be treated as scripture; revision is not equivalent to neglect.

Neglect amounting to forgetting would not be new to the field. The non-theoretical bias of the earlier agreement within the discipline thrust the study of political thought out of the mainstream and retained it largely as a gesture toward polite learning. Something akin to this attitude persists, it seems to me, in the contemporary Philistinism that regards everything in the classic literature as having only an ethical or normative revelance. Small wonder if in consequence of this sort of attitude, the study of the history of politicial thought appears to be the most isolated segment of the field, if a reciprocally fruitful dialogue between that segment and the more empirically oriented areas has been rare, or if younger political scientists committed to the empirical side of the discipline may see little in the classics that is relevant to their concerns. Such isolation, though understandable, seems neither necessary nor designable

The study of politics is old, but political science as a self-conscious discipline has not come a long road. On that way the discipline has inevitably been marked by the intellectual. moral and political influences-often contradictory and fruitless-that have dominated the days of its growth. From such influences, as much as from its own substance, have come the conflicts and disputes we have known for at least a decade. In attempting to trace these controversies I have had no thought of urging an end to disputation, an outcome whose undesirability would be exceeded only by its improbability. Rather I have tried to argue that if we can see the sources of our disagreements. we may be able to redefine some of them and to choose for a further investment of energy those most likely to encourage the growth of our collective capabilities.

Redefinition and redirection will depend upon the emergence of a new and broadly based consensus about the discipline. That may not occur; a persistent sectarianism may be inescapable. Continued and growing dissensus, however, can have unfortunate implications. It would encourage an indiscriminate rejection of much that is valuable both in our inheritance and in our contemporary efforts. It would be likely to restrict the range and power of our inquiries. It would be likely, finally, to reduce the relevance of those inquiries in days that ask for the maximum in trained intelligence. Should a new agreement emerge, it may take a long time and may be clearly recognizable only by hindsight. The challenge, I submit, is worthy.

THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUS IN AN AGE OF AFFLUENCE

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Marx is surely right when he says that the way men earn their living shapes their relations to each other and to the state; but this is, of course, only the beginning. Aside from all the other non-economic factors which also have these effects, there is the matter of the source of income, the level of income, and, especially, the security of income. Moreover, each of these factors has both an individual effect, a set of influences apparent in the study of individual enrichment or immiseration, and a social effect, the influences which appear when whole societies become richer or more secure economically. So I am led to inquire into what is happening to men's political interests, behavior, and attitudes toward politics and government in an Age of Affluence, a period when men's economic security and income have increased and when. for the first time in history, it appears likely that the business cycle can now be controlled. Like Marx's, my interest is in change over time.

Quite candidly, this is a descriptive account of attitudinal change in recent years, portrayed against a background of economic change. Only argument supports the inference that it is the economic change-implied in the term "Age of Affluence" shortly to be explicated—that is accountable for much of the attitudinal change. It would take another paper with closer attention to subsections of the population and specific economic conditions to establish this argument on a firmer footing. In the meantime, perhaps these findings can help illuminate the more general problem of the relationship between economic development and stable and effective politics, as well as to help us to see where American politics is heading.

The elements of the economy which are most relevant to such an investigation are five-fold, and the term "affluent society" or "Age of Affluence" refers here to more than higher per capita national income, though it includes that. The term embraces:

- (1) a relatively high per capita national income:
- (2) a relatively equalitarian distribution of income:
- (3) a "favorable" rate of growth of per capita Gross National Product (GNP);
- (4) provisions against the hazards of life-
- ¹ John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston, 1958).

- that is, against sickness, penury, unemployment, dependence in old age, squalor—the features now associated with the term "welfare state"; and
- (5) a "managed economy" in the sense of conscious and more or less successful governmental use of fiscal and monetary powers to smooth out the business cycle and avoid depressions, as well as to provide for the economic growth mentioned in (3) above.

These five points include both economic conditions and governmental policies.

The appropriateness of the term "affluent society" or "Age of Affluence" rests upon intercultural and chronological comparisons; but in making these comparisons it is important to remember that an affluent society may still include a large number of very poor people: the average income of the poorest fifth of the families (consumer units) in the United States in 1962 was \$1,662 and this had to provide for a little over three people, on the average. The term "affluence," however, is clearly relative both to other societies and previous periods. On the first point, comparison with other societies:

- (1) The United States ranked second (out of 122 countries) in GNP per capita (Kuwait was the first) in 1957, with no other country even a close competitor.³
- (2) According to one measure of "inequality of income distribution before taxes," the United States ranks about 7th in equality of income distribution. (Four British Commonwealth countries and India, for different reasons, are somewhat more equalitarian).4
- (3) Although until the last few years the
- ² These data and the economic and social statistics to follow are taken (or derived) from three main sources all by the U.S. Bureau of the Census: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), and its Continuation to 1962 and Revisions (1965); Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964 (85th ed., Washington, D.C., 1964).
- ³ Bruce M. Russett and associates, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964), p. 155.
 - 4 Ibid., p. 245.

annual increase of GNP was lower in the United States than in most developed and many developing countries (in Russett's volume, the United States is about 45th out of 68 countries), recently this has changed and the rate in the United States 1962-65 is about the same as in the Common Market countries.

- (4) Although relatively less extensive than in most European countries, the American welfare programs, now that medicare has been enacted, compare favorably in coverage and especially in absolute level of support with contemporary European programs.
- (5) With the possible exception of Italy, no European or developed Commonwealth country has suffered a recession (after the postwar reconstruction period) with anything like the depth or duration of the depressions of the twenties and thirties. This is also true of the United States, as we shall see below.

But our main interest here lies, not in comparative economics and politics, but in changing patterns in the United States. Were we not always an Affluent Society, a People of Plenty,6 bothered by the question "Abundance for What?" Relative to other nations, perhaps! But the modern era is different from previous eras in several important and relevant ways. It will be convenient to designate four economic time periods in the United States, of which only the last three are of current interest to us (and only the latter part of the earliest of these). The periods are: Agricultural State of Nature (1789-1869), Industrial State of Nature (1870-1929), Period of Economic Crisis (1930-1941), and Age of Affluence (marked by a preliminary uncertain period, 1946-50, and beginning to take on its central characteristics in 1951 and then continuing through the present). Inevitably, since we are dealing with more or less continuous change, the margins of the periods blur into each other. Each leaves its historical "deposit" in the milieu of the next, so that—as with countries still struggling with the remnants of the feudal order in the modern period-we have with us today substantial economic characteristics of the Agricultural State of Nature (not to mention the political and cultural residues of that period).

But since periods must have boundaries, let us mention our reasons for selecting these. The Industrial State of Nature began in 1870 when the society became more than half industrial and commercial, as indicated by the decline below the fifty per cent mark in value added to the national product by agriculture. During this industrial period, and prior to the great economic crisis of the 1930s, we find a decelerating rate of development, as indicated by the number of years required for the GNP to double (in constant prices): 13 years, then 13 years, then 21 years—taking us up to the midtwenties. But we are concerned with more than economic performances; we are interested in government policy as well. "Reform" during this period focused upon the regulation of "natural monopolies," such as railroads, grain elevators, and the like; pure food and drugs laws; and policing certain trade practices. There was no concept of a welfare state, and the nearest thing to an argument over a "managed economy" was the chronic debate over "easy" versus "hard" money.

The period of Economic Crisis (1930-1941) was, of course, marked by economic depression. the most extended and severe in our history. In this period GNP (in constant dollars) remained below the 1929 figure until 1939; investment fell off drastically, and widespread unemployment and suffering ensued. The period defines itself by these facts of economic life plus two things: first, the advent of welfare state policies (especially social security, unemployment insurance, extended home and work relief, and a variety of agricultural policies designed to relieve the insecurities and penury of farm life); and second, the early beginnings of a fiscal and monetary policy (pump priming, inflationary monetary policies) designed to eliminate the troughs of the business cycle. These policies, of course, were extremely controversial, but-if we omit the war years—one might say that the passage of the Employment Act of 1946 represented a turning point in governmental (but not business) acceptance of responsibility for a "managed economy" in this special moderate sense. Specific policies to implement this concept remained controversial in many circles for a long time thereafter.

The 1940s represent an anomalous period, partly because of the war, and partly because per capita GNP (hovering around \$2,000 in constant 1954 dollars) scarcely changed during the reconversion period, with its widespread shortages and rapidly rising prices, from 1946 into 1950. People were much better off than in

⁶ Ibid., pp. 160-61; also First National City Bank, Monthly Economic Letter, August 1965, p. 89.

[•] David M. Potter (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954).

⁷ David Riesman (Garden City, N.Y., 1964).

the 1930s, but civilians generally were not much better off (economically) than they had been in the first half of the decade. Although there were no recessions as serious as the 1920-21 recession, yet both 1947 and 1949 were difficult years. As a consequence the annual rate of growth of GNP was low (1.8 per cent from 1946 to 1950), and, moreover, this period, like all postwar periods, was marked by high industrial strife. Yet there was an important difference, compared to 1929, and also compared to 1935-36; the share of income going to the very rich, the top 5 per cent, declined substantially (1929 = 30 per cent, 1935-36 = 26.5 percent, 1946-50=c.21 per cent). From 1950 on, this proportion going to the richest 5 per cent scarcely changed, drifting down a percentage point or two, for the next fifteen years. Aside from this last feature, however, the period of the forties seems to have been characterized by some of the economic elements of earlier periods; but at the same time, the basic welfare state measures provided assistance for the very poor, the economically insecure, and for the unemployed—rapidly increasing in 1949 and 1950.

The Age of Affluence, after its poor beginning in the 1940s, may be said (for analytical purposes) to commence in the 1950s, especially after the Korean fighting had stopped. From that time on, although three recessions have occurred, only the one in 1957–58 involved any decline at all in per capita GNP in real terms. The rate of growth improved substantially: from 1950 to 1961 the annual rate of growth was 3.1 per cent in constant dollars. Industrial strife declined; prices were more stable, and in this decade available spending money rose dramatically (50 per cent increase in disposable income—current dollars) with goods to spend it on

While the 1950s began to resemble a period appropriately termed an "Age of Affluence" (except for the unemployment), the 1960s look even better. From early 1961 into 1966 there have been no recessions, the longest continuous period of prosperity in our history. The annual rate of increase of GNP in constant dollars is about 4.2 per cent in real terms. Unemployment has declined somewhat, though it remains a "spot" on the affluent portrait. Equally important, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations make an explicit point of their use of fiscal policies, especially tax policies, to reduce or eliminate depressions and to encourage growth. Finally, in 1964 certain anti-poverty programs were instituted to attack unemployment, poverty and squalor with more precise instruments; and in 1965, for the first time in 20 years, major new advances were scored toward the realization of the welfare state, especially, medicare, extension of social security coverage; and a "break-through" was made on federal aid to education.

This long (but too brief) review of the economic and policy characteristics of recent times shows, then, a profile of increasing per capita income but decreasing economic effectiveness in the period of Industrial State of Nature (1870-1929); a period of Economic Crisis (1930-1941) with low income and no growth; an anomalous decade in the Forties; and then an accelerating economy in the Age of Affluence. No doubt the implications as drawn seem overly optimistic, but I see no reason to anticipate a reversal of any of the major trends (unless there is a war), though a slowing down of growth may take place. The question, then, is how these changes relate to political behavior and attitudes, especially in the contemporary period.

I. POLITICS AND CIVICS IN AN AGE OF AFFLUENCE

The relationships between individual affluence and political attitudes are comparatively well known, but the relationships between communal affluence and political behavior are somewhat obscure. Even more obscure are the relationships between *change* in affluence and *change* in politics. Consider the following plausible hypotheses:

One might expect an increased conservatism in the Age of Affluence, on the ground that as people become more prosperous they take on the known attitudes of prosperous individuals in an earlier period. Or, to the contrary, one might expect increasing support for the kinds of measures which have worked successfully in the past in helping to bring about the Age of Affluence, *i.e.*, support for an extension of the welfare state.

One might expect a declining urgency of political concern, on the ground that when men are more satisfied with their lot in life they become less desperate for political help. Or, one might expect increased political interest and concern because these attitudes are generally related to higher income and an improved capacity to take an interest in matters other than immediate day-to-day breadwinning problems.

One might expect a shift in political cleavage from social class to religious and ethnic bases on the ground that economic issues would become less important, thereby releasing men's attention for other submerged conflicts. Or, one might argue that because religious and ethnic cleavages are nourished by economic insecurity and poverty, growing affluence and security would weaken the intensity of these conflicts too.

Finally, one might expect a decline in political partisanship, i.e., the extent and intensity of identification with a political party, on the ground that both parties are likely to accept the policies of the welfare state and the managed economy, thus depriving party differerences of much of their meaning. Or, one might argue that since social class is likely to lose its cuing function in elections, parties will remain important, or even become stronger, as intellectual and emotional "props" in electoral decisions.

The fact is that, as usual, both "theory" and common sense lead in diverse incompatible directions, and only evidence will help. The evidence to be presented here suggests a lessening of hostility between parties and religious groups, and a rapprochement between men and their government—a combination of changes which I cover in the term "politics of consensus." This does not imply that there are no sharp, intensely felt, hostile cleavages in society, but rather that these have (1) lost most of their political and emotional impact for most people (but not for Civil Rights workers), and (2) changed from cleavages in which the public was more or less evenly divided, to cleavages where the division is between a main body of opinion and a small and dwindling group. Specifically, the thesis has six themes. In the Age of Affluence:

- (a) people will come increasingly to trust each other, to feel less at the mercy of chance and more in control of their lives, and so to be more optimistic regarding the future. These changes, in turn will help to promote others:
- (b) people will slowly lose their sense of high national, personal, and group stakes in elections; political partisanship, while not changing on the surface, will change its meaning.
- (c) people will slowly change their class awareness and consciousness, so that the relationship between ideology and class status will change; but occupation and class will continue to influence electoral choice—even as the electoral "pivot" shifts.
- (d) religious institutions and dogmas will slowly lose their influence over men's secular thought, inter-faith hostility will decline, but religious community identification may retain a constant political "cuing" function.
- (e) the struggle for racial equality will be facilitated by affluence and its associated attitudes, but the sense of crisis and strife in this arena will continue or grow for an indefinite period.
- (f) there will be a rapprochement between men and their government and a decline of political alienation.

We cannot explore (for want of time and survey data) these changes in the earlier periods, so we will focus upon recent changes. The reader will understand the difficulties of relying on survey materials, with their different questions, eclectic timing, and, hence, ambiguous inserence. He will, I hope, further understand that the nature of the changes we are considering are glacial in their slow movements, interrupted by dramatic events abroad and influenced by changing leadership appeals at home. One can, moreover, write interpretative historical essays without data, or more closely controlled and specific studies well documented by data, and both seem equally immune from criticism. This paper lies in between; it is a speculative historical study making use of such data as come to hand.8

II. TRUST, OPTIMISM AND ALIENATION

(a) In an Age of Affluence, people will come increasingly to trust each other more, to feel more in control of their lives, and to be more hopeful regarding the future. Social alienation will decline.

Greater economic security and protection against life's hazards should, one would imagine, increase people's sense of well-being or happiness, and occasion a decline in various kinds of anxiety. In some ways, this seems to be the case, while in other respects it is not. Over the years, both in the United States and abroad, survey organizations have asked people "In general, how happy would you say you

8 The difficulties of showing change through survey data are substantial. Sampling error may often account for the differences (though it should be recalled that most comparisons are between a proportion in one survey, with a sample usually around 1600, and a proportion in another; not, as is more familiar, proportions of sub-groups in only one survey). Great differences such as one hopes for in correlational analysis, would here imply some rather unstable attitudes and hence indicate the influence of transient events rather than historical change. The most solid evidence is provided, rather rarely, by many observed changes in the same direction over a long period. Unfortunately, the data for this paper often come from sources which do not give the size of the sample, eliminating the possibility of significance tests or correlational tests. Wherever possible [Tables I(d), I(e), IV(a), VI(a), and IX(b)], I have tested the significance of the distributions by the method of difference of proportions (Z). The dichotomized differences are all significant beyond the .01 level. I wish to thank Mary Frase for these computations.

are—very happy, fairly happy, or not very happy?" (AIPO). The question, in spite of its superficial naiveté, has been found to be related to many concrete symptoms of adjustment and happiness and thus to have a promise of some validity.9 Comparatively speaking, by this test, the United States was in 1949 the third happiest nation (this statement sometimes amuses one's friends), with Australia by far the happiest and France the unhappiest.10 But over time, it would be impossible to conclude that the evidence suggests that Americans have become "happier" in the Age of Affluence. In the three-year period 1946 to 1949 there seemed to be a drift in this direction (from 39 per cent "very happy" to 43 per cent), but, when in 1957 the Survey Research Center asked an almost identical question of a national sample ("Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days—would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days?"), only 35 per cent reported themselves to be "very happy." Since happiness, as the reader might suspect, is strongly related to education and income and since both education and income have been increasing, the findings are puzzling and suggest further inquiry.

But there is other evidence to suggest the kind of basic changes in orientation predicted in the Age of Affluence. One of the fundamental attitudinal ingredients of successful democracies is a relatively widespread sense of interpersonal trust.¹² It is a correlate of several important democratic attitudes¹³ and, I believe, an ingredient in economic development itself, since this requires cooperation, responsibility and integrity to facilitate the working out of informal agreements.¹⁴ Comparatively, the

- ⁹ See Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, Reports of Happiness (Chicago, Aldine, 1965).
- ¹⁰ See compilation of survey material by Hazel Gaudet Erskine in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 28 (1964), p. 519. Future reference to these compilations will be as follows: Erskine, *POQ*.
- ¹¹ Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and Sheila Feld, Americans View Their Mental Health (New York, Basic Books, 1960), p. 22.
- ¹² See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 266-68.
- ¹⁸ Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 690-5.
- ¹⁴ This is the implication in David McCelland's discussion of other-directedness. See his *The Achieving Society* (New York, 1961), pp. 190-203.

United States is a "trusting" nation, perhaps the most trusting; but we may not always have been that way. In Table I(a) there is some suggestion that inter-personal trust has increased since the war and the immediate postwar period. If this is true it would provide the strongest attitudinal foundation for some of the political changes we shall examine shortly.

While the sense of current happiness does not seem to have grown in the Age of Affluence, nevertheless an important change has occurred in attitudes about the past, present, and future chances for happiness or life satisfaction. In Table I(b) we see a very strong suggestion that, compared to people in the later phases of the Period of Economic Crisis, people today believe that their lives provide greater satisfaction than their parents or grandparents had. The nostalgia of the Thirties for an earlier, possibly "village" America, seems to have declined, in spite of the resurgence of these attitudes said to be characteristic of the Goldwater campaign. If this is a measure of an emotional traditionalism, this change, too, is important.

Looking toward the future as a period offering greater promise of a happier life, could imply some dissatisfaction with the current state of things; but, on the contrary, it seems to me to imply exactly the opposite view, namely, that the present is full of hope, carrying within it the seeds of fruitful change. In any event, the increase in the past ten years of faith in the future compared to a plateau of relatively lower hope during the previous 13 years (Table I(c) seems to me to reflect exactly that sense of security in the future which one might expect from the protective arm of the welfare state and newly acquired control over the ravages of the business cycle. 15

This theme is further reflected and more directly stated in a question on the carrying out of plans, shown in Table I(d). Here, unfortunately, the time span between measures is short (1958 to 1964), and the change in attitudes relatively small. Moreover, the first measure is taken in a period of recovery from the only important recession in the Age of Affluence. Nevertheless it is suggestive that a growing sense of mastery over fate emerges—the very antithesis of the traditionalist orientation suggesting that one is the helpless object of forces beyond human control.

15 Candor compels me to note here that between 1937 and 1964 there was virtually no change in the belief that we will never do away with poverty in this country: in both 1937 and 1964 some 83 per cent said "no," we will never do it. Erskine, *POQ*, p. 526.

Finally, we must note in Table I(e) a somewhat larger increase in the belief that one is, in some sense, the child of fortune, blessed with better than the average share of good luck. Again we are dealing with "late" (for us) changes in the Age of Affluence, but the halving of the proportion of those who think of themselves as dogged by bad luck is surely significant. The implication is twofold: men feel more in control of their lives, as we said before, and

TABLE I. TRUST IN OTHERS; PERCEPTIONS OF LIFE NOW, EARLIER, AND LATER; CONTROL OVER ONE'S OWN LIFE, AND SHARE OF GOOD LUCK

(a) "Do you think most people can be trusted?" (OPOR, March 26, 1942; NORC, Aug. 1, 1948; Jan. 1964)^a

·	1942	1948	1964
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Yes	66	66	77
No '	25	30	21
No opinion	9*	4	2
* includes 5%	qualified	answers	

(b) "Do you think Americans were happier and more contented thirty years ago than they are now?" (AIPO, Mar. 8, 1939).* "Do you think the average man gets more satisfaction out of life these days or do you think he got more out of life 50 years ago?" (SRC, Nov. 1964)b

1964) ^b	1939	1964
	(%)	(%)
In earlier period people were happier; got more satisfaction out of life	61	34
Not happier in earlier period; get more satisfaction out of life these days	23	59

(e) "Ten years from now, do you believe Americans will generally be happier than they are today?" (AIPO, May 18, 1939). "As you look to the future, do you think life for people generally will get better—or will it get worse?" (AIPO, March 15, 1952; Aug. 29, 1962)^a

16

7

Other, it depends, no opinion

	1939	1952	1962	
			· · · · · ·	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Better (happier)	42	42	55	
Worse (not happier)	35	34	23	
No difference		13	12	
No opinion	23	11	10	

TABLE I (continued)

(d) "When you make plans ahead, do you usually get to carry out things the way you expected, or do things usually come up to make you change your plans?" (SRC, Nov. 1958; Nov. 1964)^b

	1958	1964
	(%)	(%)
Things work out as expected	52	59
Depends, other	1	4
Have to change plans	42	36
Don't know and NA	4	1
No. of cases	(1822)	(1450)

(e) "Do you feel that you are the kind of person that gets his share of bad luck, or do you feel that you have mostly good luck?" (SRC, Nov. 1958, Nov. 1964).

•	1998	1904
	(%)	· (%)
Mostly good luck	63	75
Pro-con; it depends	5	10
Bad luck	29	14
Don't know and NA	4	1
No. of cases	(1822)	(1450)

• Erskine, POQ, pp. 517, 523, 525. AIPO refers to American Institute of Public Opinion; OPOR to Office of Public Opinion Research; and NORC to National Opinion Research Corp.

b Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, Codebook for 1964 Survey Research Center Election Study. These sources will hereafter be abbreviated as "Consortium Codebook" and the initials SRC will be used for the Survey Research Center (University of Michigan).

"nature" or "the fates" or even "society" is less malevolent—perhaps even benign.

In review, in spite of the findings on "happiness," one can only conclude that during this period the direction of changing personal orientation has been toward a sense that life is better than it was, and will get still better; that people are more trustworthy; that events are more under control and fate is kinder. There is a group of intellectuals who have, in one sense, inherited the place once held by the proponents of Marx's immiseration theory of capitalism. With tongue in cheek, we may refer to them as "alienists," for their apostle is a psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm, and their theme is the increasing alienation of men from work, society and government. I have long suspected that they reflected their own discontent with society rather

more than any mass discontent—some, like C. Wright Mills, have said as much. Partly too, I think, their views reflect their own alienation from the field of endeavor where there is a true elan, the field of science. Whatever the reason, and somewhat apart from the main argument of this piece, I suggest that the above data cast doubt upon the principal themes of these alienist thinkers.

III. POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

(b) In an Age of Affluence, the sense of crisis and of high national, personal, and group stakes in national elections declines; political partisanship takes on a new meaning.

This change in "sense of crisis" is, perhaps, the most important attitudinal change from the Period of Economic Crisis to the Age of Affluence, and it is the most difficult to substantiate with really good evidence. The argument, however, is straightforward.

In an Age of Affluence an increasing proportion of the working class achieve sufficient income and security to adopt middle class social and political patterns—but they nevertheless are likely to remain Democrats. At the same time, the middle class will associate its own increasing welfare and security with the policies of the welfare state, including flexible fiscal policies, and will be in no mood for change. Many will become Democrats; others will be liberal Republicans. Many industrialists and businessmen will come increasingly to perceive that the fight against a limited management of the economy is not in their interests because these "liberal" policies provide the basis for the prosperity and growth in which they share. It is certainly not true that the more prosperous a person becomes, the less likely he is to be alarmed about political events. But, generally, I think it is true that the more secure he is about his income, and the more it appears to him that the government will not jeopardize that income, the less intense he is likely to feel about political decisions in the realm of economic affairs.

Before turning to time comparisons in the United States, something may be learned from cross-cultural comparisons of attitudes toward victory by opposition parties. From the data in Table II, one learns that the sense of electoral crisis is lower in the United States than elsewhere. This is enormously significant for the smooth functioning of democratic institutions,

¹⁶ See Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955); C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1959), esp. pp. 165-76.

not only because it makes transition easier from one administration to another, but also because it reduces antagonism and hostility in electoral campaigns. The data also show a sensitivity in these foreign nations to real dangers; but for our purposes, let us note only one other point. In every country except Mexico the more conservative party is in power, but only in the United States—and there only in a minor way -is a larger proportion fearful of the conservative party policies than of the more liberal party. So much has the welfare state been accepted here that its mild opponents, even when in power, were considered more threatening than its apostles. This was true in 1960—perhaps the 1964 election may be interpreted as further confirmation of this point.

Not infrequently the American experience is taken by (American) scholars to represent a kind of prototype for modernizing societies, a model of what is to become of them. If that interpretation is true, it implies that we have passed through some of the phases of economics and politics which these other nations are now experiencing—a hypothesis which runs counter to the notion of American uniqueness, and runs counter to much common sense as well. Nevertheless, the implication of Table II is in line with our major theme: the decline of a sense of high stakes involved in national electoral decisions.

These stakes might be national stakes, where the welfare of the country is somehow "risked," as implied by the question eliciting the Almond-Verba data; or the stakes might be more personal, turning on one's own economic condition; or they might refer to the welfare of the group to which one belongs. Changing attitudes toward these three kinds of stakes are reflected in Tables III and IV.

The argument for a declining sense of national urgency in electoral outcomes must rest on two comparisons over time, the only comparable ones I could find (Tables III(a) and (b)). One of them compares the responses to two similar questions: how much difference it makes which party wins, in 1946, and how much difference it makes which party runs the country, nineteen years later in May 1965. Note that the latter time follows by only several months an election in which the candidates were thought to have sharply different views on domestic and foreign policy. The decline in those believing partisan victory or partisan government of one kind or another makes "a great deal of difference" is suggestive of the process of consensus revealed in Table II and anticipated in our argument. The other comparison is between attitudes directly mention-

Per Cent

"The Republican Party now controls the administration in Washington. Do you think that its policies and activities would ever seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this probably would happen, that it might happen, or that it probably wouldn't happen?"*

"If the Democratic Party were to take control of the government, how likely is it that it would seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this would *probably* happen, that it *might* happen, or that it *probably wouldn't* happen?*"

Country Response "Prob		"Probably Would Happen," of total sample
United States		(%)
Republicans probably	y endanger welfare	5
Democrats probably	endanger welfare	3
Great Britain		
Conservatives probab	oly endanger welfare	7
Labour probably end	angers welfare	17
Germany		
Christian Democrats	probably endanger welfare	7
Socialists (SPD) prob	pably endanger welfare	12
Right wing (DRP) p	robably endangers welfare	35
Italy		
Christian Democrats	probably endanger welfare	10
Communists (PCI) p	robably endanger welfare	60
Socialists (PSI) prob	ably endanger welfare	43
Socialists (PSDI) pro	bably endanger welfare	23
Right Wing party lik	te MSI probably endangers welfare	41
Mexico		
Party of Revolutions	ary Institutions (PRI) probably endangers welfs	re 13
PAN (minor party)]	probably endangers welfare	18
PP (minor party) pro	obably endangers welfare	37

^{*} Appropriate changes in wording, of course, for each nation.

Source: Almond-Verba five-nation study; Consortium codebooks. The major report on these surveys is made in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, op. cit. The number of cases for each country is about a thousand; U. S. survey was made in March 1960, others in June and July 1959.

ing "difference to the country" or "important to the country" in 1944 and in 1952—the beginning of the politics of consensus. Fortunately, in 1952 the question was asked twice, once before the election-mentioning only partiesand again after the election, mentioning the candidates' names. The lack of difference between these two times and wordings gives us a sense of the reliability of the attitudes involved. And the magnitude of the apparent change in attitude over this 8-year period suggests that chance or sampling error or minor differences in wording could not account for the change. But perhaps it is the difference between a war election and a peacetime election, rather than any between an election colored by the politics of the Period of Economic Crisis compared to the politics of consensus in the Age of Affluence? This would be a more plausible construct were it not for a previous (AIPO) poll in (August)

1942 asking people whether they thought the outcome of the election would "make any difference in the war effort"; only 30 per cent thought—correctly, as the election consequences for domestic mobilization programs showed-that it would make any difference in this particular respect, compared to 88 per cent seeing some unspecified difference in 1944. The implication is clear: people were carrying into the 1944 election—when postwar reconversion anxieties loomed—their sense of partisan alarm learned in the 1930s. In 1952, with a war in the Far East still unresolved, and the cold war in full swing, the sense that the country's welfare hinged on the election nevertheless dwindled drastically and the conditions were prepared for the very low sense of partisan alarmism seen in the 1960 Almond-Verba data presented above.

Part of the political style of the period of

(a) "Do you think it makes much difference or only a little difference which party wins the elections for Congress this fall?" (AIPO, Sept. 1946).

"Do you think it makes a great deal of difference or just a little difference which political party runs the country?" (AIPO, May 1965)^b

1946	1965
***************	•
(%)	(%)
49	39
31	40
11	14
9	6
	49 31 11

⁽b) "Which one of these ideas comes closest to the way you feel about this election: It is very important to the country that Roosevelt be elected; the country will be better off if Roosevelt is elected; the country will be better off if Dewey is elected; it is very important to the country that Dewey be elected?" (NORC, Oct. 2, 1944)²

"Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the election this November or that it won't make much difference which side wins?" (SRC, Oct. 1952).

"Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country that Eisenhower won instead of Stevenson, or don't you think it will make much difference?" (SRC, Nov. 1952)°

	40	19	952
Very important to the country; good deal of difference	1944 (%) 54	October (%) 21	November (%)
Country will be better off; some difference; it depends	34	40	42
Won't make much difference; no difference	9	32	31

[•] Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion, 1936-1945 (Princeton University Press, 1951).

transition to the welfare state—and, we must add, its brief resurgence in 1964—is the hostile posture of each partisan toward his opponents, something which follows naturally from the view that a great deal is at stake in the political contest. Not infrequently, in such a strained atmosphere, the election seems more of an effort to keep the other man out, rather than to elect one's own candidate. The evidence (not presented here) suggests that the intensity of opposition—except on the extreme fringes—is greater among the defenders of the liberal established order; the threat of deprivation of the welfare state is apparently felt more intensely than the threat which the welfare state, once established, implies to its opponents. In any

event, it is our thesis that the politics of consensus is also the politics of support, rather than the politics of opposition. There is some evidence for this in the responses of three national samples to questions almost identically worded asking "would you say you are voting mostly to get one man into office (for 'R's candidate'), or mostly to keep the other man out (against 'opposing candidate')?" In 1944 the oppositional vote was 25 per cent, and in 1964, with the return of anti-welfare state politics, it was 21 per cent. By contrast, in the 1960 election-marked by some anti-Catholic voting, but not by threats to the welfare state and a managed economy, and basically in the consensual style—oppositional voting was only 10 per

b AIPO release, May 1965.

[·] Consortium Codebook.

TABLE IV. DOES IT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO A PERSON'S OR A GROUP'S WELFARE WHICH PARTY WINS?

(a) "Do you think it will make any important difference in how you and your family get along financially whether the Democrats or the Republicans win? How is that?" (SRC, Oct. or Nov. of years indicated)^a

Per Cent saying "no difference" or unable to think of any difference (don't know).

,	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1964
Presidential elections	(%) 53	(%)	(%) 66	(%)	(%) 66	(%) 66
Congressional ("off year") elections No. of cases	(1799)	65 (1139)	(1762)	72 (1822)	(1954)	(1571)

(b) "As of today, which political party—the Democratic or the Republican—do you think serves the interests of the following groups best: Business and professional people? White collar workers? Farmers? Skilled workers? Unskilled workers?" (AIPO, months uncertain, years as indicated)

Per Cent saying "No Difference"

	1952	1960	1964
Responses referring to own group (business and professional people referring to the interests of	(%)	(%)	(%)
business and professional people, etc.)	(70)	(70)	(70)
Middle groups (less class conscious)			
White collar	12	15	17
Skilled workers	13	14	16
Farmers	10	16	17
Extreme groups (more class conscious)			
Business and professional	11	15	12
Unskilled workers	11	13	12

[·] Consortium Codebooks for election studies of years indicated.

cent, less than half as large.17

These findings and arguments deal essentially with the question of national stakes and concerns, but one might well argue that political life more directly reflects a person's own perceived self interest—at least Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes do seem to take this position. This is a fundamental question, for the heart of my argument rests on the view that the Age of Affluence produces, with occasional regression, political contests which do not jeopardize a person's income or economic security. Unfortunately, here, the time series only goes back to 1952 and hence the comparison must rely upon trends within the later era. My thesis, as it turns out, is only partially sup-

ported by the evidence, as may be seen in Table IV(a). Where, according to the argument, a slowly growing number of persons should emerge who do not believe that their own income will be greatly affected by the outcome of an election, we find instead, for the presidential years, a marked increase in this sense of "indifference" only between 1952 and 1956-followed by no change at all, a plateau. For the congressional years, a crucial datum is missing for 1962, but the change from 1954 to 1958 is in the expected direction. There are, of course, natural limits to the rise of this "indifference curve" and a counter tendency in the increased level of education in the population, for the more educated are more likely to see the links between their economic well-being and governmental policy. Nevertheless, if one might project these figures backward into time, one would infer, albeit somewhat hesitantly, a lower sense of indifference in the politics of the Period of Economic Crisis to correspond to the

^b AIPO release, Feb. 28, 1965.

¹⁷ Consortium codebooks, NORC 1944 election study and SRC 1960 and 1964 studies.

¹⁸ Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), pp. 205-7.

greater sense of national stakes we discovered in the earlier data.

Finally, there is the question of perceived group or class stakes in a national election. As has often been said, politics is a group process, men often take their cue for party identification by some simple phrase such as "party of the business man" or "party of the working man." Where issues are obscure, categoric group tradition and alignment, mediated through primary groups, is central. The measure for this perception of group stakes in politics, as seen in Table IV(b), is the response to a question on the party which best serves the interests of each of five groups, classified by the group membership of the respondent. Here I have omitted some data on 1962 since congressional years are different in most series from presidential years (these data suggest an acceleration of the indifference effect prior to the 1964 election) and I have grouped the socio-economic classes in two divisions: the more flexible middle group and the more extreme and usually more class conscious group. The evidence, again rather tenuous, suggests that within the middle groups whose class identifications are likely to be less clear, there is a slowly growing sense that neither party will jeopardize the interests of one's own particular class. Even among the unskilled workers who have been the most partisan of any of these groups, this sense of indifference seemed waxing in 1962 (when the "no difference" responses were 19 per cent, a gain of 6 points in two years), only to be sharply cut back in 1964. Since the 1964 election was, as I have mentioned, a return to welfare state issues, the fact that the sense of "no difference" continued to grow at all, compared to 1956, for these three middle groups is a tribute to the strength of this attitude.

The importance of this measure of sense of indifference is, I think, much greater than is indicated by the small size of the groups involved. For if, at this extreme, the group is slowly growing which claims that there are no important group stakes in an election, then, for a much larger group, there must be doubts, inarticulate mood changes, and declining intensity of conviction.

Before closing this section on the declining sense of crisis, declining perception of threat-ened policies that might endanger the country, and declining belief that personal or group welfare is involved in an electoral decision, let us note two implied consequences which do not, in fact, take place. One implication is that people are becoming less interested in politics. Two extensive series of questions have been asked over time, inquiring into people's interest in the

elections, and neither of them shows any decline; indeed, the SRC series catching every national election from 1952 to 1964 (except 1954) shows with some variation over the years, a peak interest in 1964 (41 per cent "very much interested") and a marked increase from 1958 to 1962 (from 26 per cent to 36 per cent "very much interested")—suggesting, if anything, an increased interest in this time period.

Moreover, rather paradoxically, no decline has been reported in the strength of party identification. That is, the proportion reporting that they are "strong Democrats" and "strong Republicans" has remained remarkably constant (with a slight increase in "strong Democrats" in 1964). Furthermore, although the proportion of people reporting themselves "independent" has increased slightly—from around 20 per cent in the 1930s and 1940s, to between 21 and 24 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s—the change is very moderate indeed.¹⁹

The consequent pattern emerging, therefore, is of the interested, party-identified citizen, following politics at least as closely as he did in the days of the great intense clashes when the welfare state was first launched and when men were harassed by insecurity and poverty; voting more regularly, and, indeed "personally caring" about the outcome as before; but believing that the national and personal stakes involved were not so great. People need their party identification as cues for voting decisions. For most voters, these identifications are the most significant means of orientation in politics. Hence, people will not give them up easily, and if they did, they would have to find others, such as race, or class, or religion, or charismatic leadership. But people are changing the meanings assigned to their party membership, and increasingly believe that the opposition is not so dangerous after all.

We can apply one test to this theory of the politics of consensus. If partisanship has lost some of its "bite" and acrimony, one would expect the views of partisans of both parties on the way in which the president is conducting his business to vary more or less together. Approval of the way the president is "handling his job as president" has usually been higher than the partisan vote for the president, in any case. But if we could show that the difference between the approval of members of his own and of the opposition party (Republicans for Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson; Democrats for Eisenhower) was less in the Age of Affluence

¹⁹ These findings on "interest," "personal caring" and partisanship are from the *Consortium codebooks* of the relevant years.

TABLE V. POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP AND APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE

"Do you	approve	\mathbf{or}	disapprove	\mathbf{of}	the	way	(name	of President)	is	handling his	job	as .	President?'	,
(ATPO)														

Time President		% Support by Pres.' own party	% Support by opposition party	Partisanship of support: Pres. party less opp. party	Average partisanship difference
A. Presidents A	ssociated with Confl	ict over Welfare S	tate		
		(%)	(%)		
Feb. 1941	Roosevelt	90	40	50	
Feb. 1947	Truman	59	41	18	36.3
Oct. 1952	Truman	50	9	41	
B. Presidents in	n the Age of Affluenc	e (post-transition)	ì		
Jan. 1953	Eisenhower	90	70	20	
Jan. 1957	Eisenhower	95	66	29	
Feb. 1960	Kennedy	84	55	29	27.5
Jan. 1964	Johnson	85	74	11	
May 1965	Johnson	77	51	26	

than in the Period of Economic Crisis (including the ambiguous 1940s), our case for historical change would be that much stronger. Since approval and disapproval fluctuate within presidential terms, an ideal measure would take each president at the beginning of his term; but we are forced here to employ the time periods in which the data are given by party breakdown as shown in Table V. By subtracting the per cent of the opposition party approving the president's handling of his job from the per cent of his own party so approving, we have a measure of partisanship.

As may be observed (Table V) from the average figures for the two periods, a substantial decline occurred in the partisanship of judgment, the degree to which the judgments reflect partisan divisions. Moreover, except for the special tragic circumstances bringing Johnson into power—circumstances which produced a burst of sympathetic good will toward the new incumbent—the variation in partisanship in this period is rather slight. It seems to have stabilized (to the extent that any set of attitudes at the mercy of historical events may be so described) in a modest 20 to 29 per cent range. In short, our expectations of the consequences of a consensual politics are generally confirmed.

IV. SOCIAL CLASS

(c) In an Age of Affluence, (1) people slowly lose (or relax) their class awareness, (2) the link between social class and ideology changes; but, (3) in spite of their security and prosperity, people do not increasingly think of themselves as middle

class, and (4) social class does not (after a transition period) lose its link to partisan political choice, although the changing political "pivot" diminishes the importance of class voting in many electoral districts.

The absence, in American history, of a feudal structure or a landed class—and therefore of a peasant class-has given it a unique lack of class consciousness, as so many observers have noted. Yet American society has always been stratified and important differences in life chances, honor, and distribution of rewards inevitably enter into the experience of Americans, like others, and have been historically associated with political choice as well as many other attitudes toward society. Different social strata have always been the vehicles or milieux for different social movements, social ideas, and political parties. In the Age of Affluence, we would expect a continuation of past behavior and opinion modified very slowly by new feelings of security, life styles, and perspectives. I stress the slowness because social class, unlike political party, refers to the basic pattern of life experiences, learned early, reinforced daily, and inevitably loaded with emotion.

First, one wants to know both the nature of objective social change and the nature of subjective responses. Briefly, the proportion of white-collar workers has increased by an average of a little less than five percentage points in every decade for fifty years, with a much smaller increase during the Period of Economic Crisis and a larger increase in subsequent years (1940 to 1960). In 1960 43.2 per cent of

the employed persons were in white-collar occupations (professional, technical, managerial, clerical and sales).

But, of course, there is a great deal of slippage between objective and subjective class identifications (some estimates indicate that self-misclassification is as large as 25 per cent). and, hence the objective occupational change is not a very good immediate indication of how people will see themselves over time. Measures on this go back to 194520 and 194621 and, after 1952 continue in rather orderly fashion to 1964.22 Any expectation that the increasing proportion of workers engaged in white-collar jobs, and the general levelling up of economic security and income, would produce an increased middle class identification, would turn out to have been wrong; about 40 per cent thought of themselves as middle or upper in 1946, and about 40 per cent again in 1964. In between, the decline in middle class identification noted by Converse in his comparison of 1945 data with 1952 and 1956 data has subsequently been reversed23 and, without finer examination of special groups, one can only conclude in 1965 that this aspect of "bourgeoisification" of society has not taken place. Men appear to be as willing today as they were about twenty years ago to see themselves as members of "the working class." As a nation we are certainly not "putting on airs."

But, as with party identification, it may be that class identification is slowly assuming a new meaning, a lack of intensity, a different reference. Here the SRC series shown in Table VI(a) gives us some clues, though rather slight ones. We would not—particularly just before the 1964 election—have expected much change, in any event; but we would expect a drifting decline in class awareness or consciousness in the sense of "thinking of oneself as belonging to a social class," partly because of the erosion of the intense feelings evoked by the experience of

²⁰ Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton University Press, 1949).

the 1930s, and partly through a change in age cohorts (in 1956 people in their fifties were the most class conscious age group). The time period is short, one of the figures is anomalous and is omitted from the table (in 1960 the comparable figure was 25 per cent), but after grouping contiguous years and thus doubling the sample sizes, a slow increase does appear in the proportion of people for whom social class is not a conscious reference. And if this is overtly true of this third of the population or so, one suspects that the meaning of class is changing for the other two-thirds, as well.

Converse, in neat analysis, has already given a strong indication that this is probably the case. He relates, for each of the two periods, class identification and certain social opinions dealing with the government's responsibility for employment, medical care, and housing and electricity; and finds that the correlations between class and opinions decline markedly in each case. Moreover, this is true of both objective status and subjective class identification. This is strong evidence for a changed meaning of class identification so far as government policy is concerned. After all, government is increasingly seen as the agent for improving everyone's prosperity.

But would this also be true of attitudes toward unions, organizations which do not have this trans-class role and which, indeed, are often seen as (and are) the agents of class conflict? From 1936 to 1963 the Gallup polls have asked national samples about their attitudes toward unions: "Are you in favor of labor unions?" and "In general do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?" (Responses in contiguous years to these different questions indicate no difference in response patterns.) Three things are most notable about these responses. First, in this 26-year period, some fluctuation has occurred (from 58 per cent approve in 1938 to 76 per cent in February, 1957), with increased disapproval following severe strikes or critical investigations (like McCellan's in 1957), but no long term decline or increase in public criticism or support. Second, at no time has a majority of any group, including the business and professional group, failed to approve of unions. And third, and most important for our purposes, the discrepancy between working class and middle class support of unions seems to be growing, as may be seen in Table VI(b). Moreover, in the eleven years

²¹ Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, op. cit., p. 116 (AIPO).

²² Consortium codebooks (SRC).

²³ Philip Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class in Political Attitudes and Behavior," in E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. Hartley, Readings in Social Psychology (New York, 1958), pp. 388-99. The consortium codebooks show the following proportions of national samples reporting themselves as "middle class": 1952: 37 per cent; 1956: 36 per cent; 1960: 31 per cent; 1964: 40 per cent. The 1952 figure includes "upper class."

²⁴ Campbell and associates, The American Voter, p. 357.

²⁵ P. Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class," op. cit., pp. 391-93.

TABLE VI. CHANGING PATTERNS OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND CLASS IDEOLOGY

(a) "There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes?" (SRC, Oct., Nov. years indicated)^a

	, ,	(average for 1956 and 1958)		The early 1960s (average for 1962 and 1964)	
	Per cent	(N)	Per cent	(N)	
No, never thinks of self as being in a social class	34.6	(1241)	37.6	(1078)	
Yes, thinks of self as being in a social class	64.2	(2302)	60.8	(1744)	
Don't know and other	1.1	(41)	1.6	(46)	
Total	99.9	(3584)	100.0	(2868)	

(b) "Are you in favor of labor unions?" (AIPO, Oct. 26, 1941). "In general do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?" (AIPO, Feb. 19, 1949; Nov. 11, 1953; Feb. 8, May 1, 1957; Feb. 8, 1959; Feb. 15, May 26, 1961; Jan. 30, 1963)

	F	Per Cent Approve		Index of	Unlikeness	
	Manual workers	Business & professional	White collar		Manual wkrs. minus White collar	
	(%)	(%)	(%)			
1941 (October)	73	******	. 69		4	
1949 (February)	67	65	63	2	4	
1953 (November)	81	70	75	11	6	
1957 (February)	83	73	77	10	6	
1961 (February)	77	64	65	13	12	
1963 (January	75	61	67	14	8	

(c) "As things stand today, do you think the laws governing labor unions are too strict or not strict enough?" (AIPO, Jan. 15, 1960). "Do you think the laws regulating labor unions are too strict, or not strict enough?" (AIPO, Oct. 22, 1961)^b

1950	1961
(%)	(%)
54	60
43	48
34	35
	(%) 54

[·] Consortium codebooks.

between 1950 and 1961, a modest increase has occurred in the proportion of business and professional and of white collar workers—but not of manual workers—who believe that the laws regulating labor unions are "not strict enough" (Table VI(c)). Such evidence, running contrary to my main thesis (the weakening effect of socioeconomic status upon "ideology") suggests that there may be two themes here instead of one. Social class (objective and subjective) may

have a weakening relationship to opinions about welfare state policies but not to opinions about labor unions. Perhaps, in a period when attention turns to questions of productivity and growth, rather than social justice and equality, and when the government, rather than unions, is the main agent of economic protection—especially for the underdog—unions will seem somewhat different to middle class and working class people. If this were the case, it

^b Erskine, POQ, Vol. 26 (1962), pp. 284, 288 (and AIPO release, Jan. 30, 1963).

would give us a better understanding of why it is that just at the time when the relationship between class and opinion on the welfare state is (in Converse's measure) weakening, the relationship between class and attitudes toward unions is growing stronger.

But political choices, as we know, are only loosely related to ideology. The facts seem to be as follows: the relationship between social status or class membership and political choice ("status polarization" or "class voting") tended to become closer, as one might expect in presidential elections during the Period of Economic Crisis, at least from 1936 to 1940; then, after a depressed relationship in 1944 due to attention to war issues, the correlation reached a peak in 1948, whereupon it declined in 1952 and again in 1956. At this point it reached a plateau and remained at about the 1956 level in 1960 and, surprisingly, in 1964.26 By Alford's measure (a variation of Rice's "index of likeness")27 this 1956-64 plateau is at about the same level as the starting point of the series in 1936, suggesting that class voting has a kind of "natural level" for a given country in a given period, altered only occasionally by certain "critical elections."

But, while the measure of likeness (or, actually, "unlikeness") which Alford uses and which I have employed elsewhere in this paper, is useful in indicating some elements of similarity, it does not taken into account the level at which these similarities and discrepancies occur. For example, a situation where 60 per cent of the manual workers and 40 per cent of the non-manual workers vote Democratic (index=20), and another situation where 80 per cent of the manual workers and 60 per cent of the non-manual workers vote Democratic, (index = 20) are scored alike. Yet in the first instance, a majority of the manual workers is on one side of the political division, and a majority of the white collar and business and professional workers is on the other, whereas in the second case, a majority of both groups is on the same side.

Let us suppose that the party responsible for innovative institution of welfare state measures, and fiscal and monetary measures de-

²⁶ The 1944-1956 changes are documented in Converse, *ibid.*; these, and the 1936, 1940 and 1960 data are reported in the most extensive available study of "class voting," Robert R. Alford's *Party and Society* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 103, 352-53. The 1964 figures are based upon AIPO release, December 13, 1964.

²⁷ See Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in*

²⁷ See Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York, 1928), pp. 210-11.

signed to level out the business cycle and promote growth, gradually extends its following in the Age of Affluence so that it becomes overwhelmingly the dominant party. This is done partly by a gradual shift in the middle "white collar" groups so that they see the more liberal party as appropriately "their own," and by some defection of business and professional groups, especially among Catholic and Jewish communicants. Our measure of political likeness does not change, but the pivot changes and we have a situation where class voting differences, with their winner-take-all payoff, become less important.

The evidence that this is the case is strong. A majority of the skilled and unskilled workers have been Democrats at least since 1928 and probably before,²⁸ with a variable minority occasionally voting outside the party (especially in 1952 and 1956). Even these defectors, however, tended to identify with the Democratic party throughout. On the other hand, historically the business and professional groups, the white collar groups, and usually the farmers, have identified with the Republican party, occasionally voting for Democratic candidates, but then returning to the fold-though returning in decreasing numbers. The consequence was that in terms of party identification at the end of the Period of Economic Crisis both parties started about even: in 1940 some 42 per cent of the population said they were Democrats, 38 per cent Republicans, and 20 per cent claimed to be Independents. By July 1964, just prior to the nomination of Barry Goldwater, the count was 53 per cent Democrats, 25 per cent Republicans, and 22 per cent Independents. And the shift seemed to be accelerating: between 1960 and 1964 all major groups became more Democratic, with the business and professional group moving a little faster than average (7 per cent shift compared to an average of 6 per cent) and thus becoming more Democratic than Republican for the first time.29 Thus, as far as party identification goes, all groups have Democratic pluralities, and although proportions differ between social classes, majorities tend to agree.

The difference between the kind of situation where majorities of all major social groups (business and professional, farmers, manual workers, etc.) agree, compared to a situation where the majority of one group is for one party and the majority of an opposing group is for another, is illustrated by the 1964 election.

²⁸ See Alford, Party and Society, pp. 225-31.

²⁹ AIPO releases, Feb. 21, 1960 and July 5, 1964.

In such an election business and union spokesmen (like Henry Ford and Walter Reuther), support the same candidate; the candidate of the dominant coalition assumes a moderating "national unity" tone and his opponent sounds "shrill"; references to class-linked slogans such as "union bosses," and "economic royalists" are muted in the dominant party. In short, the shifting "pivot" of class allegiance implies a very different kind of "democratic class conflict"-even though the index of unlikeness or of "class voting" may remain constant. Within the dominant party, the politics of consensus takes over, while the minority party occasionally reverts to the older politics of economic crisis.

V. RELIGION

(d) In the Age of Affluence, religious institutions slowly lose their influence over men's thought and behavior; religious prejudices and hostilities decline; but the influence of religious identification upon partisan political choice is among the slowest influences to change.

It may be argued that class divisions in politics, and the influence of status upon social and political opinion, are "healthier" for a society than are religious divisions and influences. They are less likely to be "moralized," therefore less likely to be intransigent; conflicts are more easily solved by economic growth and economic change; compromise is easier because the stakes are often divisible and allocable by small units; the controversies are increasingly subject to empirical proof, referring, as they do, to cause and effect in this world. Therefore, whatever one's feelings about religion in its own sphere, a declining influence of dogmatic religion (as contrasted to some Judeo-Christian ethics) on social thought, and of religious affiliation on political choice, might be seen as a step toward a more healthy polity.

Since the space is brief, let us, for the record, summarize some evidence pointing generally, with some exceptions, in this direction. The basic facts on religious affiliation and church attendance are these; the proportion of the population with some kind of religious affiliation increased in the 1920s, remained constant in the 1930s, increased substantially in the 1940s, increased very moderately in the 1950s, and from 1959 to 1962 (the latest date on which I have figures) increased not at all. Church attendance (as contrasted to affiliation) increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s to a peak average attendance of 49 per cent in 1958, and from that time decreased slowly but steadily to 45 per cent in 1964, with Protestants and Catholics moving in the same direction. 30 Since affiliation and church attendance have been higher among while collar than blue collar, and among better educated than less well educated groups, this levelling off and decline are, so to speak, "bucking" the educational and occupational trend. Some perception of this tendency seems to have entered the public consciousness. Asked whether religion is "increasing or losing its influence on American life," the proportion seeing religion losing its influence has recently grown: 1957: 14 per cent; 1962: 31 per cent; 1965: 45 per cent. These changes are late in the Age of Affluence; their political and ideological effects would not be expected to appear for some time.

Such observations refer to the theological or institutional aspects of religion, but the community effect, the identification with co-religionists, is something else.32 This can take a variety of forms, but, briefly, identification with co-religionists in recent years seems to include a declining element of suspicion and declining ideological component. The evidence for this is partly in the changes among Catholics (but not so much among Protestants) indicating greater hope for rapprochement of the Christian religions—ecumenicism.33 Among Protestants, on the other hand, there is increasing support for federal aid to religious schools, thus almost eliminating one of the major bones of contention between communicants of the two religions. National resistance to voting for "a well qualified man who happened to be a Catholic," decreasing over the years, collapsed with Kennedy's term in office (Table VII (a)). Attitudes toward Jews, as measured by the same question, willingness to vote for a "well qualified person who happens to be Jewish." have continuously been more accepting (Table VII (b)). And Jews themselves, a declining proportion of the population, indicate, in a brief series (1956, 1958, 1960) a modestly declining sense of greater "feelings of closeness" to other Jews, compared to closeness to non-Jews.34 The evidence is strong that ideolog-

³⁰ The U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics*, give the basic data on affiliation; The American Institute of Public Opinion conducts surveys every year on church attendance. The percentages given above are averages based on several surveys a year. Erskine, *POQ*, Vol. 28 (1964), pp. 671-75.

31 AIPO release, April 18, 1965.

32 See, for example, Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City, 1963).

33 AIPO release, April 21, 1965.

³⁴ Consortium Codebooks; SRC data from election studies for years indicated.

ical divisions, suspicion, prejudice, and sense of difference, especially as these relate to political matters, are declining.

But not, apparently, the influence of religious identification on political choice. Employing, once again, the "index of unlikeness" (per cent of Catholics voting Democratic, less the per cent of all Protestants so voting), the series is as follows: 1948: 19; 1952: 19; 1956: 14; 1960: 40; 1964: 21.35 The decline of the relationship between religion and vote, predicted by Berelson on the basis of age-group differences in 1948, has not materialized, at least at this gross level. But, as the above attitudinal evidence indicates, the meaning has changed; and as the above trends in affiliation and attendance portend, the institutional reinforcement is likely to decline.

VI. RACE

(e) In an Age of Affluence, the struggle for equality by a deprived racial group will be facilitated by the expanding economy, the availability of governmental resources for special assistance, and the relative security of otherwise challenged and more hostile "opposition" groups. These conflicts will be expressed by the increased militance of the deprived minority group, and the vacillating, often reluctant, sometimes idealistic acceptance of these claims by the more affluent majority.

Racial cleavage, strife and politics are different from class politics in the United States, and, indeed, everywhere. Mobility ("passing"), inter-marriage, ecological scattering, and intergroup communication are much more difficult across race (caste) lines than across class lines; the middle groups identifying now with one side, now with the other are smaller; the role of property and relations of the different groups to the means of production are different; visibility and, hence, treatment by the dominant group are different. Changing group proportions are not induced by technology and the demand for new and different services; rather they are a matter of birth and mortality rates. And, most important, in the United States

³⁵ The 1948 data are computed from Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 71; the data for the other dates are based on AIPO release, Dec. 13, 1964,

³⁶ See Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 70. On the cognate matter of ethnic influences, see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," in this issue of this Review, below, pp. 806-908.

TABLE VII. INDICATIONS OF DECLINING RELIGIOUS
HOSTILITY IN POLITICS

(a)	"If your party nominated a generally well-
	qualified man for President, and he happened
	to be a Catholic, would you vote for him?"
	(AIPO, Oct. 4, 1963)

Year	Yes	No	Undecided
Contraction of the Contraction	(%)	(%)	(%)
1940	62	31	7
1958	68	25	7
1959	69	20	11
1960	71	20	9
1961	82	13	5
1963	84	13	3

(b) "Would you vote for a Jew for President?" (AIPO, Feb. 8, 1937). "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President, and he happened to be a Jew, would you vote for him?" (AIPO, Oct. 23, 1963)

Year	Yes	No	No Opinion
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1937*	49	51	(excluded)
1958	62	28	10
1960	72	22	6
1963	77	17	6

* Data for this year are from Cantril and Strunk, Public Opinion.

there are only 22 million Negroes, about half of them still in the South. As a consequence, there cannot be a Negro party and a white party, except in some Southern communities; but for a national or a state contest, current trends suggest a division between one party regarded as more friendly to the Negro, made up of Negroes and whites pitted against a predominantly allwhite party. These trends rest in large measure on the wholesale northward migration of Negroes, stemming initially from wartime conditions of extreme manpower shortages and consequent job opportunities; and the repercussions of the migration in the South as well as the North. Under these circumstances, how have the Age of Affluence and the politics of consensus affected the situation?

In the first place, one needs to know whether or not the non-white population has shared in the affluent society. The answer, of course, is that they are still faring very badly, economically, educationally, and socially:

The median income of the non-white popula-

tion is about half the median income of the white population (1962).

The median school years completed for non-whites is 8.2; for whites it is 10.9 (1960). This understates the difference, for the caliber of education in most non-white schools is notoriously poorer.

The proportion of non-whites in white collar jobs is 17.7 per cent; for whites it is 46.9 per cent (1963).

When, however, we turn to recent rates of change, the picture is a little better, for the Negro rate of increase in median income is about half again as high as for whites in recent years (1959-1962) and also in the war period. Similarly, in the past decade and a half, the proportion of workers in white collar jobs has increased about three and a half times as fast among Negroes as among whites. But in terms of education, there is little difference in rate of change; indeed, most recently it seems the white rate of increase has been greater than the Negro rate. On balance, the Negro has participated increasingly in some of the rewarding aspects of affluence, but for him the term "affluence," comparatively speaking, is anomalous: aspirations are running much beyond achievement, and the current level seems to belie the hopes for full equality.

I know of no available series of questions asked of Negroes over time to indicate whether or not they experience a greater or lesser sense of deprivation today compared to some previous time; whether their anger at the white community is greater or less; whether the frustration expressed in recent riots is greater or less than it was when anger and frustration may have been differently expressed; whether a sense of special community among Negroes is growing or declining and whether or not whites are more easily embraced in this community than they once were.³⁷ But, perhaps these are straws in the wind:

(1) Electoral participation in the South has been increasing for the past 15 years and will now (1965 and 1966) increase dramatically in certain places with federal voting registrars. It has always been high (education and income held constant) in the Northern cities. Where non-voting indicates coercion, the lifting of this co-

³⁷ Some of these data are available and are increasingly accessible both at the Roper Center, Williamstown, Mass., and Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Further exploration of these data is needed.

ercive force may remove some sources of hostility; where it indicates apathy and withdrawal, the change may mean a decline of these symptoms.

(2) In 1960 a set of extended interviews (by a Negro) of working class Negroes in New Haven revealed, in the midst of hostility and frustration, a kind of non-alienated faith in "Washington" as a reliable (indeed, almost omnipotent) source of help.

(3) Two AIPO surveys in August 1963 and May 1965 revealed in the South (but not in the North) an increase of about 20 percentage points in the Negro group believing that Negroes were treated "the same as whites." 38

I put little stock in these indicators. I suspect the fact that about the same proportion of Negroes in 1946 and 1965 (roughly 70 per cent) believed that the Negro was "unfairly treated" or "treated less well than whites" in his community is a better measure of resentment.39 At the same time, I would expect a substantial change in the quality of this resentment: fear, apathy, self-hatred, and latent hostility in the 1940s and earlier; disappointment, frustration, manifest hostility, ambivalence, and qualified hope, in the later period. One indication of this last quality, hope, lies in the growing support among Southern Negroes for integrated schools, and the high proportion (70 per cent in 1956) of Southern Negroes who believe that "the day will come in the South when whites and Negroes will be going to the same schools. eating in the same restaurants, and generally sharing the same public accommodations."40

The survey evidence is substantial that for the white community, nationally, there is a growing sense that integration in schools (without bussing), residential neighborhoods, and in public accommodations is inevitable, socially desirable, and, with many reservations, personally acceptable. These data are presented in Table VIII. The rate of change is slow, and there are setbacks, now and then; but the series reveals a growing willingness to accommodate to the demands for change of a deprived group. At the same time, variable tensions emerge over the actual implementation of these demands by governmental action (or, probably, over any action by any agency). Thus, when asked "Do you think the Kennedy (Johnson)

³⁸ AIPO release, May 5, 1965.

³⁹ NORC, May 1946, reported in Erskine, POQ, Vol. 26 (1962), p. 139; AIPO release, May 5, 1965.

⁴⁰ AIPO release, March 1, 1956.

TABLE VIII. CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION

(a) "Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are colored? Where half of the children are colored?" (AIPO)

Per Cent "Yes"

Childre	n are	Children	n are
Outside South	South	Outside South	South
(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
13	72	39	81
7	72	34	83
10	61	33	78
7	37	28	68
	Children Colo Outside South (%) 13 7	South South (%) (%) 13 72 7 72 10 61	Children are Colored Children Colored Colored Colored Outside South Outside South (%) (%) 13 72 39 7 7 72 34 33

(b) "Do you think the day will ever come in the South when whites and Negroes will be going to the same schools, eating in the same restaurants, and generally sharing the same public accommodations?" (AIPO)

South Only

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1957 (August)	45	33	22
1958 (October)	53	31	16
1961 (January)	76	19	5
1963 (July)	83	13	4

Sources: Erskine, POQ, Vol. 26 (1962), pp. 138, 141; AIPO releases, July 19, 1963 and May 23, 1965.

administration is pushing integration too fast, or not fast enough?" from 36 to 50 per cent have said "too fast." This is a measure of resistance to change, a measure of the lack of strength or salience of the ideal and of the discrepancy between verbal and behavioral support. Perhaps, too, it indicates a response to style or manner of "pushing"—consensual or argumentative and coercive; Johson has fared better than Kennedy in this respect. In any event, this apparent ambivalence and reluctant acceptance indicates exactly those attitudes which, in an insecure, depression-ridden, stagnant society might easily become violent hostility and implacable opposition. The lower income and less well educated people are more resistant than others to integration. What would their responses be if they were fearful of unemployment, less hopeful of the future, more suspicious of people generally and feeling victimized by fate; if, in short, they had the attitudes which we saw had changed with growing

affluence in recent years?

How then has the Age of Affluence, shaped for the Negro by a partially sympathetic dominant white majority, affected his politics? In one sense "consensus" describes two aspects of the situation. First, Negroes have, ever since the New Deal, become partisan advocates of welfare state policies. Ideologically, in this sense, they are in tune with the dominant political theme of the times. Second, their partisan party preference has gradually, and with some reversals of direction in the 1950s, shifted toward the Democratic camp so that they are now more partisan than any other major group. In 1964, only 6 per cent voted Republican; nine months later only 9 per cent identified with the Republican party.41 Since there are about twice as many Democrats as Republicans in the United States, again, it seems, the Negro community has adopted the "in" party; in this respect they are in agreement with majorities in almost all other major demographic groups.

On the other hand, this dramatic increase (and it might be viewed with caution since, in the past, the Negro vote has been more volatile than others-more volatile than the manual worker vote, for example), has meant, according to the index of unlikeness, an increase in racial voting and partisanship, at least in 1964 and 1965. In one sense, this is a measure of hostile cleavage, since it reflects the partisan politics and policies of recent years. Moreover, the Republican party, having lost almost all of its Negro following, may come to believe that it is in its interest to stress "states rights," "law and order in the streets," and "voluntarism in school assignments," and other themes with barely disguised white racial appeal; in which case there will be a re-sorting, not of the Negroes, but of some village traditionalists, many Southerners, and some alienated and marginal Northern and Western urban dwellers. The Goldwater trial run for these themes was not encouraging in the North, but feelings on such matters run deep for an uncertain number of people, and the search for a winning theme may lead the Republican leadership in this direction. Then, racial voting, unlike class voting,

41 AIPO releases, Dec. 13, 1964 and Aug. 15, 1965.

will take on a new intensity and move away from the politics of consensus.

But, probably, for most white people, neither the Negro's problem nor the "threat" of integration in their own communities (and certainly not elsewhere), is sufficiently important to determine partisan choice. The politics of consensus can go on around this "American dilemma," within sound of the battle but relatively undisturbed by it.

VII. POLITICAL ALIENATION

(f) In the Age of Affluence, there will be a rapprochement between men and their government and a decline in political alienation.

It is easier to make the argument that political alienation should decline than to find the evidence to support this view. The argument, again, is simple: the declining intensity of partisanship implies a decline in hostility toward government on the part of the "out" groupwith, perhaps, a reverse effect and embitter-ment on the "far out" right. Politics, then, deals less with moral absolutes and becomes more a discussion of means than ends;—its ideological component declines. Since everyone is "doing better" year by year, though with different rates of improvement, the stakes are not so much in terms of gain or loss, but in terms of size of gain-giving government more clearly the image of a rewarding rather than a punishing instrument. Taxes, while primarily the instrument for financing government, now also may be seen as instruments for maintaining prosperity and financing benefits for all rather than for redistributing income.

The difficulty with the use of some evidence supporting this is that I seem to have adopted a "heads I win, tails you lose" strategy with respect to the main source of recent data, the 1964 surveys. If these data show a decline in symptoms of alienation, they seem to support the argument that historical trends are thus revealing themselves. If they show an increase in alienation symptoms, they support the argument that the 1964 election was a regression to the politics of crisis. If we had a long enough time series, this dilemma of ambivalence could be avoided by showing a decline in alienation symptoms up to 1964, with a rise at that time.

In one series we do have exactly this pattern. Figure 1 shows a decline from 1952 to 1960 and then a rise in the proportion of (1) people who feel that public officials are indifferent to what "people like me think," and (2) those who believe "people like me don't have any say about what the government does," and (3) those for whom politics and government are "too com-




FIGURE 1. Decline and Rise of Political Alienation

- Q. 1. "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."
- Q. 2. "I don't think public officials care what people like me think."
- Q. 3. "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

Source: SRC questions in election studies of years indicated, reported in Consortium code-books.

plicated" to understand. The trouble is that I can see no very plausible reason why the themes or personalities of the 1964 election should occasion these particular changes. That particular election might well have increased the crisis atmosphere; it might (and apparently did) increase the salience of "corruption in politics" themes; 2 it might have created new cleavages

⁴² This evidence, based on a comparison between SRC 1958 and 1964 findings, runs contrary to my main argument regarding the increasingly favorable view of men toward government in the Age of Affluence, but supports the minor theme: 1964 as a return to the politics of crisis and alienation. Actually, I think it is a more or less ephemeral response to discussion about corruption in the Bobby Baker case and the Johnson administration more generally. Compare reasons for not wanting one's son to enter politics, reported below.

TABLE IX. RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN MEN AND POLITICS: POLITICS AS A CAREER, ELECTIONS AS A DUTY, AND TAXES AS A BURDEN

(a) "If you had a son just getting out of school would you like to see him go into politics as a lifework?" (NORC, Nov. '43, Nov. '45). "If you had a son would you like to see him go into politics as a life's work when he gets out of school?" (AIPO, Dec. 28, 1944). "If you had a son, would you like to see him go into politics as a life's work?" (AIPO, July 20, 1953; March 5, 1955; March 3, 1965).

	Yes	No	No Opinion
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1943 (Nov.)	18	69	13
1944 (Dec.)	21	68	11
1945 (Nov.)	24	65	11
1953 (July)	20	70	10
1955 (March)	27	60	13
1965 (March)	36	54	10

(b) The duty to vote in elections: 1952, 1956, 1960.

	Per Cent Agree		:ee
	1952	1956	1960
(/7)	(%)	(%)	(%)
"If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it."	53	45	43
"A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with."	17	13	12
"It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win."	11	9	7
"So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter to me whether I vote or not."	12	10	8
No. of cases	(1799)	(1762)	(1954)

(c) "Do you consider the amount of income tax which you (your husband) (had, have) to pay as too high, too low, or about right?" (AIPO)°

Per Cent Saying "Too High"

Year	Prof. & Bus.	White Collar	Farmers	Manual Workers
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1952 (March 12)	74	73	63	72
1953 (March 8)	61	61	55	59
1957 (April 24)	63	69	51	62*
1959 (April 15)	50	51	51	51*
1961 (March 8)	42	50	47	49
1962 (March 11)	50	49	36	51

- * Skilled workers only; in 1957 unskilled workers were 65%, in 1959, 58% saying "too high."
- ^a Cantril and Strunk, Public Opinion, p. 534; AIPO releases as indicated for 1953, 1955, 1965.
- b Consortium codebooks; SRC election studies, October or November of years indicated. These questions were not asked in 1964.
 - Erskine, POQ, Vol. 28 (1964), p. 161.

in society and thus have disrupted the politics of consensus. But why this campaign, at least compared to 1956 and 1960, should encourage a sense of ineffectiveness and lack of responsiveness in government, is obscure. Therefore, in spite of the appearance of a confirming pattern, we must leave this evidence as anomalous.

Nevertheless, as may be seen in Table IX, some evidence exists for believing that in certain ways there has been a rapprochement between men and their government and a decline in political alienation. In the first place, the increase in the proportion of the public who would like to see their sons (if they had any) enter politics as a career, is, I think symptomatic of a growing attitude that political life is both rewarding and honorable. One reason for interpreting this series in this way is the sharp decline in the proportion of arguments against such a career which refer to corruption: from 30 per cent in 1946 to 17 per cent in 1965.⁴³

On the other side of politics, the voter side, note the marked increase in the sense that one "ought" to vote under various more or less discouraging circumstances. These items, taken together, have been called a "citizen duty" scale and one may interpret these data as indicating a reinforced or growing belief that good citizenship means a politically more active citizen. From 1952 to 1960, in the eight possible comparisons over time in Table IX(b), each shows a growth of the sense of citizen duty.

In the argument set forth above, I suggested that attitudes toward taxation should change. The AIPO question, "Do you consider the amount of income tax which you (your husband) (had, have) to pay as too high, too low, or about right?" has been asked many times since 1947. The earlier years are non-comparable for several reasons, and show great variability, but we have data from 1952 to 1962 not only by national totals, but also by major occupational groups (Table IX(c)). The data reveal two things, especially: first, the lack of any substantial association between occupational status and attitudes toward taxation. We have

⁴³ AIPO release, March 3, 1965.

known for some time that working class attitudes toward taxation did not fit into conventional concepts of "liberalism" (high taxes and high welfare payments); this is only further illumination of that point. And second—the point to be made here—is the general decline in a sense of taxation as too burdensome. (These findings, it will be observed, do not include the period of great discussion and final legislative action on tax reduction to improve the state of the economy.) Since opposition to "tax-eaters" and the burdens of taxation have traditionally been symptomatic of alienation from government, I think we may quite appropriately see this set of changing attitudes as a part of the rapprochement between men and their governments.

In spite of certain anomalies associated with 1964 data, including a constant state of "trust in government" from 1958 to 1964,44 I am persuaded that there has been a growing state of confidence between men and government, perhaps especially men and politics, during the Age of Affluence. This argument takes on weight when it is placed against the increased life satisfactions and self-confidence examined earlier, the decline in sense of crisis in elections, the changed meaning of class cleavages, the slow drift toward religious harmony, and even the reluctant yielding to the demands for racial equality. The headlines will not show this consensus, nor will the demonstrations at city hall or on the campus, but the ordinary man in the Age of Affluence is beginning to find some greater sense of hope and peace and self-assurance expressed in a less acrimonious political

44 The SRC 1958 and 1964 election studies asked, "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time." Proportions in each category are nearly constant. I interpret this as a long run increase in trust equalized by an election which stirred up (short term) doubts on the matter. But perhaps it is better to leave it uninterpreted for now.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC VOTING*

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Mass immigration ended fifty years ago, but national origins continue to be a salient dimension in many people's perceptions of themselves and of others.1 Where this salience is widespread, ethnicity plays a major role in politics.2 Ethnicity is often an important independent variable in voting behavior. "Ethnic voting," as I shall call it, has two manifestations. (1) Members of an ethnic group show an affinity for one party or the other which cannot be explained solely as a result of other demographic characteristics. Voters of Irish descent, to take a familiar example, are more likely than other voters of similar economic status to be Democrats. (2) Members of an ethnic group will cross party lines to vote for-or against-a candidate belonging to a particular ethnic group.3

* This article is part of a paper delivered at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Excelsior Springs, Missouri. I am indebted to Martha Derthick, Heinz Eulau, Joan Heifetz, and my wife, Barbara Kaye Wolfinger, for help in formulating my argument, and to more friends than I can mention for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

¹ For a recent statement of this theme see Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (Cambridge, MIT Press and Harvard University Press, 1963). "Ethnic consciousness" or "ethnic salience" exists when: (1) many people think of themselves, and are regarded by others, as members of a particular nationality group; and (2) such classification is salient. The two aspects of ethnic consciousness reinforce each other.

- ² Conflict among ethnic groups is a central topic in descriptions of politics in the Northeast; see, for example, Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959). For treatments of ethnicity in personnel appointments see Theodore J. Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (New York, 1964); and Daniel Patrick Moynihan and James Q. Wilson, "Patronage in New York State, 1955–1959," this Review, Vol. 58 (June, 1964), pp. 296–301. For a discussion of the social and political consequences of ethnic politics see Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Politics," in Harmon Zeigler and Kent Jennings, eds., The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966).
- ³ A good deal of data to support these propositions will be found in this article. For additional evidence see Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and

This article deals with the development and persistence of ethnic voting. The customary theory holds that ethnic voting is strongest during an ethnic group's earliest residence in this country and subsequently declines from this peak as the group's members make their way out of the working class.4 This might be called an "assimilation theory." It sees a direct relationship between the proportion of a nationality group in the working class and that group's political homogeneity. As more and more of the group join the middle class, its political unity is progressively eroded. Along with middle-class status, these group members are said to acquire different political interests and to identify more with the majority society and less with their nationality group: in short, they become assimilated. Presumably the end of the process is reached when group members are as occupationally differentiated as the whole population. At this point they are politically indistinguishable from the general population, or from a control group with similar non-ethnic characteristics, and ethnicity is no longer a factor in their voting behavior.5

This is a plausible argument, but it is not consistent with voting patterns in New Haven, Connecticut. People of Italian descent there

Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 1954), pp. 77-79; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 230-231; and Lucy S. Davidowicz and Leon J. Goldstein, Politics in a Pluralist Democracy (New York, Institute of Human Relations Press, 1963). Ethnicity is only one variable in voting behavior. This article concerns secular trends in its importance. Many short-term influences on voting decisions that also affect its importance are not discussed here; this omission should not be interpreted as an implicit assertion that these short-range factors are not relevant.

- ⁴ I will use the terms "ethnic group" and "nationality group" interchangeably to refer to individuals whose national origins set them apart from the predominantly Protestant old American society.
- ⁵ The assimilation theory is most clearly and explicitly stated in Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 34-36.
- ⁶ Data on New Haven are from an intensive study of that city's politics conducted primarily by Dahl, William H. Flanigan, Nelson W. Polsby,

comprise about one-third of the city's population. Although the Italians are the poorest segment of the white population, they are also one of the strongest Republican voting blocs. If the assimilation theory held in New Haven, this Italian Republicanism would have been strongest some generations ago when Italians first settled there in numbers, and would have declined with the passage of time. But the overwhelming support that New Haven Italians give to the Republican party is a development of the past 25 years. It began when the first New Haven Italian candidate for a major city office won the Republican mayoralty nomination. Since then Italians have been the mainstay of Republican voting strength in New Haven, even in elections with no Italian candidates.

These events may not be as anomalous as they seem. They can be explained by a theory that may also be pertinent to many other places. I will discuss this alternate theory after a detailed description of the development of ethnic voting in New Haven. Finally, I will consider available evidence on the persistence of ethnic voting.

I. THE CONDITIONS OF ETHNIC POLITICS

The history of nationality group relations in New Haven is from all accounts typical of many industrial cities in the Northeastern states. In the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries the descendants of New Haven's original Anglo-Saxon Protestant settlers were outnumbered by waves of immigrants from Ireland and later from Southern and Eastern Europe. By 1910, according to the census data, twothirds of the population were first- or secondgeneration Americans; in 1960 some 42 per cent of the population were in these categories. More detailed information on the ethnic composition of the population comes from a sample survey of 525 registered voters conducted in the summer of 1959.7 White Protestants comprised less than 20 per cent of this sample; 31 per cent of the respondents were born in Italy or were in the second or third generation of Italian immigrants. Eleven per cent were of similarly recent Irish origin, 8 9 per cent were Negroes; and 15 per cent were Jews.

Beginning with the first mass Irish immigration the old settlers met the non-Protestant newcomers with hostility, economic exploitation, and religious discrimination. The immigrants were usually penniless and could get only the least desirable jobs. The affronts of everyday life enhanced their ethnic consciousness; so did the obvious gap in well-being between them and the old settlers.

In addition to Yankee hostility, other forces tended to maintain ethnic solidarity. For European peasants trying to live in an American city, a familiar language, religion and culture were comforting when so much else was different. Members of any given nationality group usually settled in the same neighborhoods, lived together and married among their kind and not with Yankees or other immigrants, formed nationality associations, and worshipped in national churches.

Needless to say, the ethnics often responded to the Yankees with a hatred that has not yet vanished, while many Yankees continue to look down on the ethnics. Members of each of the major ethnic groups still regard the others with varying amounts of good will, of jealousy and suspicion. As the years have passed, the immigrants and their descendants have moved, in varying numbers, into the middle class. This economic mobility did not result in equivalent geographical dispersion, in part because some of the new prosperity came from neighborhood enterprises such as groceries and mortuaries, in part because of the continuing comforts of ethnic proximity.

One consequence of this history is a persistent emphasis on ethnic differences, which continue to be a major organizing principle in the city's social structure. There are, for example, no less than six Junior Leagues in New Haven, including one each for the not very numerous local young ladies of Swedish and Danish extraction. There are also Jewish organizations with similar functions but different names. The

and Raymond E. Wolfinger. It is reported ibid.; and in Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963), ch. 4; and Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (New Haven, Yale University Press, forthcoming).

⁷ The sample was randomly chosen from voting lists. Sampling procedures are described in greater detail in Dahl, pp. 338-339. The survey was directed by William H. Flanigan.

⁸ This figure undoubtedly underrepresents the number of Irish in New Haven, since 83% of all Irish immigrants came to the United States before 1900; see U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1955 (Washington, 1955), p. 95.

⁹ August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness (New York, 1958), pp. 64-65. These authors report that ethnic identification divides New Haven's social structure "horizontally" just as economic distinctions organize it "vertically."

major Catholic ethnic groups have their own national churches.

Ethnic consciousness is an important and pronounced regional characteristic. It is difficult to suggest an objective measure for comparing ethnic salience, much less to find data on this subject, but on the basis of impressionistic evidence it appears that concern with national origins is much greater in the Northeast than in some other parts of the country. The reasons for this regional difference are not immediately apparent. The numerical prevalence of ethnics does not account for it, for the major cities of the West Coast have sizable ethnic populations.10 San Francisco has about the same proportion of first- and second-generation Americans as New Haven (43 as against 42 per cent) but there is no comparison between the two cities with respect to ethnic salience.11

This regional difference may be due to the fact that in the Northeast the non-British immigrants came to settled communities with relatively stable class structures and systems of status ascription. Only menial jobs were open to them. The distribution of economic rewards and opportunities reinforced the unambiguous class system. On the other hand, immigrants came to the West at the same time as the Yankees, or on their heels. "The Forty-Niners came from all parts of the world, and foreign accents

¹⁰ This table, taken from Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., p. 39, shows the proportion of first- and second-generation Americans in cities with more than 500,000 population in 1960:

Rank	City	%	Rank	City	%
1	New York	48.6	12	Philadelphia	29.1
2	Boston	45.5	13	San Antonio	24.0
3	San Francisco	43.5	14	San Diego	21.5
4	Chicago	35.9	15	Baltimore	14.8
5	Buffalo	35.4	16	St. Louis	14.1
6	Los Angeles	32.6	17	Washington	12.6
7	Detroit	32.2	18	Cincinnati	12.0
8	Seattle	31.4	19	Houston	9.7
9	Cleveland	30.9	20	New Orleans	8.6
10	Pittsburgh	30.3	21	Dallas	6.9
11	Milwaukee	30.0			

There are some regional differences in the national origins of these ethnic populations; the Western cities tend to have more Scandinavians, for example. On the other hand, San Francisco, for one, has sizable Irish and Italian groups.

¹¹ For similar observations about regional differences see Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 10, 250. They mention an alternate explanation: residents of western cities moved there after living in the East, hence they are less conscious of their European origins.

This point about regional differences applies only to concern about national origins among whites and does not deal with racial prejudice. were as common in the mining camps as American ones."¹² The two groups shared the same pioneering experiences¹³ and lived in communities with wildly fluctuating economies and unsettled social systems. Economic advantage was not so closely associated with ethnicity, and class distinctions were not so rigid.

The immigrants in New England were equal to the older settlers in only one relevant respect: they could vote. Little in their previous experience suggested that their opinions had much to do with government, and so their votes had no abstract value to them. But these votes mattered to American politicians, who solicited them with advice, favors, petty gifts, and jobs.

Two typical loci of immigrant politicization were the bosses of casual labor gangs on public works, who owed their positions to their ability to deliver their gangs' votes and their vote-delivering ability to their command of jobs; and the leaders of nationality associations, usually men who were the first to achieve some economic success. Such relationships set the pattern for ethnic politics. Each nationality group in a city had leaders who bargained with politicians, trading their followers' votes for money, favors, and jobs. For their part the politicians found it convenient and efficient to classify the electorate by ethnicity and to dispense rewards on this basis.

The tangible political rewards were limited. Not everyone could be given a job or a Christmas basket. Nor did everyone want such things; or need to get a son out of jail, or a relative into the United States, or a pushcart license from City Hall. But when one Italian was appointed to a public position his success was enjoyed vicariously by other Italians; it was "recognition" of the worth of the Italians. Ethnic solidarity let politicians economize on the indulgences they bestowed. It was unnecessary to do a favor for every individual to win his vote. Rewards given to the few were appreciated by the many. Money or jobs given to a few leaders

¹² Louis Berg, "Peddlers in Eldorado," Commentary, July, 1965, p. 64.

¹³ This shared experience is thought to be the reason for the inclusion of Jews in San Francisco high society: "the early Jews in the West could boast that they were pioneers among pioneers" (*ibid.*, p. 65).

¹⁴ For a description of these social patterns see Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston, 1952), chs. 7, 8.

¹⁵ An excellent description of ethnic politics that expresses the style and flavor of these negotiations may be found in William F. Whyte, Street Corner Society, enlarged edition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955).

earned political returns in two ways: (1) through the votes that the recipient could deliver directly; and (2) through appreciation of the "recognition" he had earned. Public office was much the most effective such reward, for it was most visible and hence conveyed most glory.¹⁶

Certain of New Haven's other political characteristics were (and are) conducive to ethnic politics. In particular, the city's wards were small enough to be ethnically homogeneous. Politicians need schemes for classifying voters and they tend to look for such taxonomies in election returns. In New Haven the ward is the politicians' unit of electoral analysis, which facilitates explaining the outcome of elections on the basis of ethnic preferences.17 Since results were understood in ethnic terms, strategies were developed in the same terms. Politicians appealed to the electorate on the basis of ethnic rather than class differences. Moreover, many local political issues concerned the allocation of governmental services and facilities among different neighborhoods, and so contests for these rewards could also be interpreted as competition among ethnic groups.

For many years the urban immigrants were mostly Irish and the "outside" politicians were Yankees. In addition to minor rewards for many people, politics offered a few immigrants a path to real wealth and power, a path that was all the more important because prejudice and lack of education drastically narrowed the chances of a lucrative career in legitimate business or the professions. By the time later waves of immigrants arrived, the Irish had attained considerable political influence, largely in the Democratic party. Where this happened they replaced or joined the "outside" politicians with whom the leaders of newer ethnic groups bargained.

II. ETHNIC POLITICS IN NEW HAVEN

The first Irishman was elected to the New Haven Board of Aldermen in 1857. Henceforth

16 Lowi suggests that, unlike success in other fields, political eminence has a strong impact on ethnic perspectives: "Success in economic fields is highly individualized; . . . there is relatively little group symbolization of success. In contrast, political success, particularly in the big cities, is symbolized very highly in group terms" (op. cit., p. 46).

¹⁷ The present Mayor of New Haven was one of the first politicians to make use of professional sample surveys of the electorate. Data from the surveys he commissions are analyzed by ethnic group, rather than income, occupation, or education.

Irishmen and other ethnics held municipal office in increasing numbers. Democratic mayoralty candidates continued for a while to be Yankee businessmen, demographically indistinguishable from their Republican opponents. The election of 1899 marked the end of Yankee dominance in local politics. Cornelius Driscoll, born in County Cork, was elected mayor on the Democratic ticket. As the Irish subsequently strengthened their hold on the party, some Yankee Democrats defected to the Republicans.

The Irish were not reluctant to take the spoils of victory. In the early 1930s firstand second-generation Irishmen comprised 13 per cent of a sample of 1600 family heads in New Haven, but they accounted for 49 per cent of all governmental jobs. The Italians suffered most of all from Irish chauvinism: there were zo government employees among the 27 per cent of the sample who were Italian.18 These survey data exaggerate the Italians' exclusion from political rewards, but not by very much. In 1930 the proportion of Italians in low-paying municipal jobs was only a quarter of the proportion of Italians in the total population, and the ratio for better city jobs was much lower. By 1940 the Italians had attained half their "quota" of the poorer positions, and only about a fifth in white collar posts.19 Subsequently

¹⁸ John W. McConnell, *The Evolution of Social Class* (Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 214. The data are from the Sample Family Survey conducted by the Yale Institute of Human Relations in 1931–33.

19 Jerome K. Myers, "Assimilation in the Political Community," Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 35 (1951), pp. 175–182. Myers estimated the number of Italians in various categories of muncipal jobs from the names in city directories and manuals. The Republicans lost control of City Hall in 1932 to John W. Murphy, a Democrat of the old school. Murphy, who stayed in office until 1946, usually carried the Italian wards, but by somewhat smaller margins than he received in other working-class neighborhoods.

As these findings suggest, there are impediments to a rational strategy of ethnic politics. (1) Party leaders may refrain from cultivating ethnic groups out of prejudice. In much of the East Coast the exclusiveness of Yankee Republican politicians aided the Democrats' proselytizing of immigrants. (2) Party leaders may be reluctant to share political spoils with "outsiders." This seems to have been true of many Irish Democrats. Until a very few years ago, one Democratic ward organization in a New Haven Irish neighborhood would not let Italians participate in any form of campaign activity. (3) There may be principled objections to making appointments on the basis of

their representation in both appointive and elective positions has increased enormously.²⁰

The explanation of the New Haven Italians' Republicanism may then be thought to lie here: shut out of the Democratic party, they had no place to go but to the Republicans. This argument has two crippling limitations. (1) The Italians became more Republican during the period when they finally came closer to getting their "fair share" of municipal jobs. (2) Irish control of the local Democratic party is common in Northeastern industrial cities, but the level of Italian Republicanism found in New Haven is not. Allegations about the Republican inclinations of Italians abound in scholarly and journalistic literature, but concrete and systematic evidence for this general proposition is hard to find. Some Italians will split their ballots to vote for an Italian Republican, but the same is true for an Italian Democratic candidate. The best present source of data on this subject is the series of national election studies conducted over the past dozen years by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. I have compared the party identification of the Italian and Irish respondents in the 1952, 1956 and 1958 studies who lived in the New England and Middle Altantic states. As Table I shows, the Italians are a little more inclined than the Irish to consider themselves Democrats.21

ethnicity rather than other forms of merit. For examples of this attitude see James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 283-288. It is quite possible, however, that such scruples are forgotten when the men who hold them actually attain power. Moynihan and Wilson describe the appointment policy followed by the young, liberal, intellectual staff of the newly elected New York Governor Averell Harriman: "... great efforts were extended to 'recognize' certain groups and careful records were kept of the racial and religious identity of the appointees" (op. cit., p. 296).

²⁰ See Myers; and Dahl, op. cit., pp. 43-44. In the 1950s, during a period of Democratic success, Italians held slightly more than their share of municipal elective offices.

²¹ For other data casting doubt on the notion of Italian Republicanism see Lockard, op. cit., pp. 210, 305-319; Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), pp. 225-226; Davidowicz and Goldstein, pp. 11-12, 30-32; Bernard R. Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 62; and J. Joseph Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics 1919-1932 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 173, 179-184, 252, 260-261.

TABLE I. PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF ITALIANS AND IRISH IN THE NORTHEAST, 1952, 1956, AND 1958

Party Identification	Irish	Italian
	(%)	(%)
Democratic	51	57
Independent	18	13
Republican	32	30

	101a	100
N	152	143

^a Does not sum to 100 because of rounding. Source: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. I am indebted to Ralph Bisco and Richard T. Lane of the Consortium staff for their assistance.

Since the level of Italian Republicanism found in New Haven is not common in the Northeast, local history is more likely to provide an explanation than are more widespread political events. Two such local causes can be identified. The first was the determined courting of the Italian vote by Louis and Isaac Ullman, the leaders of the New Haven Republican party in the first part of the 20th century. The Ullman brothers realized that the large and hitherto passive Italian population was an untapped source of potential Republicans. They set out to capture the Italians, using the familar techniques of ethnic politics. They helped them take out citizenship papers, registered them as voters, found them jobs, used their considerable political influence to smooth over administrative and legal difficulties, subsidized Italian-American fraternal and political clubs, and so on.

It is not too much to say that the Ullman brothers' foresight and political skill kept the Republican party competitive in New Haven. Although the Italians were the poorest part of the population, they were, in the thirty years after 1910, less favorable to Democratic candidates than any other immigrant group, except perhaps the Jews.²² In the 10th Ward, with the city's heaviest concentration of Italians, the Democratic share of the presidential and mayoralty vote fluctuated around 50 per

²² Jews in New Haven, like those elsewhere, tended to vote Republican until the New Deal; see, e.g., Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

cent. In fact, the 10th voted much like the city as a whole, a remarkable similarity in view of its residents' modest economic position.²³ The other wards in which Italians predominated were also less wholeheartedly Democratic than one would expect from their low income levels. It seems likely that this situation was due largely to the extent and intensity of the Ullmans' proselytizing.

III. CRITICAL ELECTIONS

The Ullman brothers' efforts gave the Republicans a certain advantage with Italian voters. Yet for some thirty years the result was no more than a stand-off; the Italians split their votes more or less evenly between the two parties until the end of the 1930s. Since then they have been very strongly Republican. The big shift in Italian voting habits came when William C. Celentano, a self-made mortician and son of a fruit peddler, won the Republican nomination for mayor in 1939. Celentano was the first New Haven Italian to win either party's nomination for a major city office. He cut 10,000 votes from the enormous majority that the incumbent Democrat, John W. Murphy, had won two years earlier, and came close to winning the election. The Second World War kept Celentano from getting the nomination again until 1945, for the city's Republican leaders did not think it prudent to nominate an Italian while Italy was fighting against the United States. But in that year he defeated Murphy by 6,000 votes.

Celentano's candidacy brought thousands of Italians into the Republican party, as the voting history of the heavily Italian 10th Ward illustrates. In 1937 Murphy received 52 per cent of the Tenth's vote. Two years later, running against Celentano for the first time, he got 22 per cent and fared almost as badly in other Italian neighborhoods.²⁴ Matters im-

²³ Except for the 1928 election, when the 10th was 18% ahead of the city in its support of Al Smith, and the 1932 and 1936 elections, when Roosevelt ran about 10% ahead of the city-wide vote there. In other mayoralty and presidential elections prior to 1939, differences were generally minor; see Dahl, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

²⁴ President Roosevelt's 1940 "stab-in-the back" speech and World War II are supposed to have cost him some Italian votes in 1940 and 1944. Whatever the extent of this loss, it seems to have been recouped in the 1948 election; see Lubell, op. cit., 225-226. For differing assessments of the impact of Roosevelt's speech, see Whyte, op. cit., pp. 230-231; and V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1961), pp. 271-272.

proved somewhat for the Democrats during the war, but Celentano's second candidacy produced an even greater Republican swing; in 1945 Murphy won only 17 per cent of the 10th Ward's vote.

In 1947 the Democrats tried to match Celentano's appeal by giving the mayoralty nomination to an obscure Italian dentist. Thereby they recouped most of their losses in Italian neighborhoods-their share of the 10th Ward vote rose from 17 to 42 per cent and was about this high in the other Italian wards-but lost heavily elsewhere in the city. Furthermore, a Socialist candidate won a sixth of the total vote and made his best showing in middle-class neighborhoods. Since this was several times greater than any third-party vote in a generation, anti-Italian sentiment may have motivated many of these Socialist votes.25 The 1947 election was the only one in the city's history in which both major party candidates were Italians.

In every mayoralty election since 1947 the Democratic candidate has been Richard C. Lee, a Catholic of mixed English, Scottish, and Irish descent who, for obvious reasons, emphasizes his Irish side. Lee unseated Celentano in 1953 after two unsuccessful attempts. Celentano did not run for mayor again, preferring to bide his time until Lee left the scene. Since then Lee has defeated a series of Republican candidates, usually by sizable margins.

Although Celentano has not run for office for more than ten years, his impact on the political allegiance of New Haven's Italians appears to have been enduring. In a well known article some years ago the late V. O. Key suggested "the existence of a category of elections . . . in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate. Moreover, ... the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding elections."26 Key called such contests "critical elections." As the following data show, Celentano's several mayoralty campaigns were critical elections with respect to the voting behavior of at least the Italians in New Haven.

Since 1947 the Italian wards have been the

²⁵ The success of the Socialist party in nearby Bridgeport was due to different causes. Capitalizing on public revulsion at corrupt "double machine" collusion between the two major parties, the Socialist leader, Jasper McLevy, won the mayoralty there in 1933 and stayed in office for 24 years.

²⁶ V. O. Key, Jr. "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17 (February, 1955), p. 4.

TABLE II. DEVIATIONS FROM NEW HAVEN CITY-WIDE DEMOCRATIC VOTE BY SELECTED WARDS WITH CONCENTRATIONS OF VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS—MAYORALTY ELECTIONS, 1949-61

Year and ethnicity of Republican mayoralty candidate ^a	City- wide Demo- cratic vote ^b	10th & 11th Wards (Italian) ⁰	16th & 17th Wards (Irish) ^d	19th Ward (Negro) ^e
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1949—Italian	46.6	-21.9	8.5	7.9
1951—Italian	49.9	-24.3	8.0	4.3
1953—Italian	51.9	-27.3	9.0	8.3
1955—Italian	65.3	-21.3	8.1	13.4
1957—Yankee	64.8	-14.4	11.5	14.2
1959—Italian	61.8	-20.2	11.0	16.3
1961—Yankee	53.5	-10.7	15.9	24.3
1950 median family	1110-00000			
income	\$3301	\$2660	83174	\$2117
		\$2318	\$3280	

^a In all these elections the Democratic candidate was Richard C. Lee.

b Percentages are of the total vote cast for mayor.

^d Since about 1958 these wards have had an influx of Negroes.
^e Negroes comprised 72% of the 19th Ward in 1950. Increasing Democratic majorities there may be due *in part* to continued growth of the ward's Negro population.

Sources: Voting returns for 1949-57 are from official sources; for 1959-61, from newspapers. Choice of wards was based on a combination of Census data and political lore. (Census tracts do not coincide with wards. The 1950 Census data were matched with wards, but this was an expensive process and was not repeated for the 1960 Census.) One of the three wards with the highest proportion of Italian-born residents, the 12th, has a dissident Democratic organization and was excluded for this reason. Since the first sizable numbers of Irish came to New Haven 120 years ago, Census data on the birthplace of present ward residents are an unreliable index of Irish predominance. I have followed the advice of New Haven politicians in choosing the 16th and 17th as the most Irish wards.

most Republican ones in the city. Table II shows the city-wide Democratic percentage of the vote in mayoralty elections from 1949 through 1961 and the deviations from this percentage of wards with the heaviest concentrations of Italians, Irish, and Negroes, respectively. As the table indicates, even a Yankee Republican will make his best showing in the Italian wards. In fact, the Tenth is the only ward that Lee has never carried. Since the Italian wards are among the poorest in town, their marked Republican inclinations can be attributed to ethnic voting.

Italian support for Republican candidates has been so lopsided that the customary relationship between Democratic voting and foreign birth is reversed in New Haven. The ward-

TABLE III. DEMOCRATIC VOTE FOR STATE AND NATIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEW HAVEN AND IN SELECTED WARDS

Year and Election	City-wide Vote	10th Ward (Italian)	17th Ward (Irish)
1956 Presidential	45%	34%	51%
1958 Gubernatoriala	69	52	75
1962 Senatorial ^b	65	52	75

^a The candidates were the incumbant Democrat, Abraham A. Ribicoff, and Fred Zeller.

TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE IN WORKING CLASS OCCUPATIONS AND PERCENTAGE DEMOCRATS OF A SAMPLE OF NEW HAVEN VOTERS, BY ETHNIC GROUPS, 1959

	Mr I '. C I	Mar Wor		Demo	cratic
	Number in Sample	Per-	Rank	Per	Rank
47	Negroes	76	1	57	2
157	Italian Catholics	61	2	37	5
53	European Catholics	58	3	48	4
56	European Protestants	35	4	16	6
34	American Protestantsa	27	5	9	7
53	Irish Catholics	20	6	64	1
74	European Jews	15	7	52	3

⁸ "American" here means parents and grandparents born in the U. S.

Source: The table is based on 474 persons (of an original sample of 525 voters) who could be identified by religion and by place of birth of themselves, parents, or grandparents. The percentages Democratic are those who identified themselves as Democrats in response to the question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or what?"

by-ward correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) between percentage of foreign-born residents and percentage of the vote for Democratic mayoralty candidates has been negative for most elections since 1937.27

While Italian Republicanism is a product of local politics, it is also expressed in state and national elections. The ethnic voting that resulted from Italian solidarity in New Haven is now manifested in elections where "recognition" of Italians is not an issue. As Table III shows, the 10th Ward (for example) has been considerably more Republican than the city as a whole in elections where neither candidate was Irish or Italian. For instance, ex-Governor Ribicoff barely carried the Tenth in 1958, while in the Irish 17th Ward, where the median

²⁷ Except for the 1941 and 1943 elections, when Celentano was not a candidate, and 1947, when both candidates were Italians.

On 1960 population shifts caused by an urban renewal project began to change the composition of the 10th and 11th Wards. By 1963 a substantial fraction of the old residents had been replaced by newcomers, most of whom were neither Italians nor Republicans.

b The candidates were Ribicoff and Horace Seely-Brown. Source: Official voting returns.

family income was more than \$600 higher, he won by a three-to-one ratio.

Most Italians not only vote for Republican candidates, but consider themselves Republicans. Their party identification was changed and fixed by Celentano's several campaigns. Table IV shows the percentages of blue-collar workers and of Democrats in various ethnic groups. Little more than a third of the Italians are Democrats, although they are second only to Negroes in proportion of manual workers.

These tables show why New Haven politicians customarily explain the outcome of elections in terms of nationality groups rather than social classes: the most important lines of division in the electorate are ethnic rather than economic. In fact, ethnic cleavages wash out the usual relationships between socio-economic status and partisan preference. When New Haven wards are correlated by median income and Republican vote in the 1959 mayoralty election, the coefficient is -.02.28 Similarly, there is no relationship between the proportion of manual workers in an ethnic group and the percentage of the group's members who consider themselves Democrats, as Table IV shows. The salience of ethnicity explains the apparent anomaly that the Republican party's stronghold is in the poorest parts of town, while the Democrats draw their strongest support from middle-class Jews and Irishmen, as well as lowincome Negroes.29 Since the two best examples of ethnic voting are the Republican inclinations of working-class Italians and the Democratic affiliation of middle-class Irishmen, the political correlates of ethnicity do not merely represent underlying economic differences.

Plainly, the assimilation theory does not fit the development of Italian bloc voting in New Haven. The New Haven case can be explained by a different view of ethnic voting that I will call a "mobilization theory." I will introduce it by reexamining in greater detail the assumptions of the assimilation theory.

IV. THE MOBILIZATION OF ETHNIC POLITICAL RESOURCES

The assimilation theory is based on the assumption that the strength of ethnic voting depends on the intensity of the individual's iden-

²⁸ The 1st Ward was excluded because most of its residents are Yale students.

²⁹ Dahl has an interesting table comparing the Negro 19th Ward to the Italian 11th. The two wards have similarly low occupational, income and educational levels, yet the 19th is overwhelmingly Democratic and the 11th is very Republican. This is the reverse of their partisan affinities in 1930 (Dahl, op. cit., p. 57).

tification with his ethnic group.³⁰ The theory supposes that this identification is never stronger than in the early years of residence in this country³¹ and declines thereafter as the immigrants gain some measure of well being. There is another prerequisite to ethnic voting that the assimilation theory overlooks: no matter how salient an individual's ethnic identification may be, it will not influence his voting behavior unless he sees a connection between this identity and the choice he makes on election day.³² How does the Irishman know which candidate (if any) is friendlier to the Irish? The implications of this problem are worth further exploration.

Established politicians appealed to immigrants with tangible rewards and recognition. While one party may have been more vigorous in its efforts, both parties usually made some attempt to win their votes. These campaign efforts posed a twofold communication problem of pervasiveness and persuasion: how could the party get its message to every ethnic voter, and how could it make the message credible? Only some ethnics would get a job or favor, and only some would know of the recognition given by one party or the other; or, cor-

³⁰ Cf. Berelson et al., op.cit., pp. 67-72; and Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960), ch. 12.

³¹ This may be a dubious assumption, although it is not crucial to my argument. There are indications that the previous identification of many immigrants was not with the old nation, but the old village or old province. In this view, it was not until the immigrants saw that Americans classified them by nationality that they themselves developed some sense of belonging to a nationality group.

One could also argue that, whatever the locale of his previous identity, the immigrant's first impulse was to forget this old identity and become an American, but that he was forced back into ethnic consciousness by old-settler prejudice. Recurring nativist phenomena like Know-Nothingism, the Ku Klux Klan, Prohibition, and the end of mass immigration probably increased many ethnics' self-consciousness. See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York, 1955), p. 297.

³² Cf. the discussion of "political proximity" in Campbell et al.: "Groups as perceived objects may be located according to their proximity to the world of politics... at the individual level: as perception of proximity between the group and the world of politics becomes clearer, the susceptibility of the individual member to group influence in political affairs increases" (op. cit., p. 311; emphasis in original).

fusingly, by both. How did the ethnic know which party was friendlier to his people?

Precinct workers who talk directly to the individual voter are the most effective means of electioneering.33 There are no systematic data on precinct workers' activity at the peak of the immigrant era. Contemporary accounts indicate that, in at least some cities, few prospective voters could escape the attention of the political organizations.34 At present the level of precinct work is much lower. In northern cities with over 100,000 population less than 20 per cent of the adults reported contact with a party worker in a single presidential election.35 In New Haven, where both parties have very strong and active campaign organizations, 40 per cent of the registered voters have never been reached by a precinct worker.36

Let us assume that precinct organizations were able to contact almost every potential voter fifty years ago. What if both parties sent workers around? What if both parties had won—or bought—the support of some ethnic leaders?³⁷ No matter how fervently the ethnic might identify with his group, the appropriate political expression of this identification might not be clear to him.

First-generation ethnic groups seldom had many political resources aside from their votes. Many of their members were illiterate; except for the Irish, many could not speak English. At this stage it was easiest for the parties to compete for ethnic votes, for the enticements least in demand by party activists were most suitable for the immigrants. As time passed children went to school, men prospered, and the ethnic group produced representatives with the organizational and communications

³³ Cf. Handlin, "The immigrant might sometimes read an article on such a matter in his newspaper but was less likely to be persuaded by any intrinsic ideas on the subject than by the character of the persuader" (op. cit., p. 211). Such persuaders included, in addition to overt party workers, priests and the types of immigrant leaders discussed earlier.

³⁴ See, e.g., Robert A. Woods, Americans in Process (Boston, 1903), pp. 155-156.

²⁵ Source: data from the 1956 SRC study reported in Fred I. Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics," *The Annals*, Vol. 353 (May, 1964), pp. 8-9.

³⁵ Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 27 (Fall, 1963), pp. 387–398.

³⁷ Whyte's discussion of bribery indicates that cash can have a powerful, if temporary, distracting effect on ethnic loyalties.

skills necessary for political leadership. There were greater demands on both parties for recognition and the men making the demands were more skilled at pressing their claims. Such demands raised the level of bidding between the parties, for now the ethnics were asking for rewards that were both scarcer and more highly prized by the people already established in the party organizations. The ethnics' ambitions were resisted by those who would be displaced. Because of this resistance and the time it took to develop political skills, a generation or more went by before members of the new nationality group found their way into positions of any visibility and influence.³⁸

Sooner or later some ethnics will occupy party positions. One party will nominate an ethnic for a minor office. Such positions are unimportant, and if the bid seems to pull votes the other party will soon match the offer.30 Most ethnic voters still have the problem of figuring out the "right" ticket to vote for, since it is still not evident which party is friendlier. The ethnic group may be given some unity if it has an unquestioned leader who can deliver its vote to the party with which he has made a deal, but this does not appear to have been a common phenomenon. Customarily, ethnic groups were fragmented, with several leaders, each telling his constituents about his exclusive inside track to the political bigwigs.40

The day will come when an ethnic will win a

³⁸ Cf. Lowi, "The representation of a new minority in places of power occurs long after it has reached considerable size in the population and electorate" (op. cit., p. 39). Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. reports that in Providence, Rhode Island, "Members of a new group are not likely to appear as ward committeemen at all until some three decades after their first arrival in substantial numbers"; see his "Party Absorption of Ethnic Groups: The Case of Providence, Rhode Island," Social Forces, Vol. 38 (March, 1960), p. 208.

See also Lubell: "The key to the political progress of any minority element in this country would seem to lie in just this success in developing its own middle class" (op. cit., p. 79). Lubell does not discuss specifically the importance of candidacy for major office, which is the key point in any group's mobilization.

³⁹ Huthmacher has an interesting description of this competitive bidding process in Massachusetts (op. cit., pp. 119-126). His discussion makes clear the dangers of such strategies because of the jealousies aroused when newer groups are recognized.

⁴⁰ Prior to Celentano's nomination the Italian community in New Haven was reported to be fragmented; see McConnell, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

party nomination for a major elective office.41 When this happens the problems of pervasiveness and persuasion will be solved for many of his fellow ethnics. They will all see his name on the ballot, and many will take this as proof that the party that nominated him is the right party for them because it has given the most recognition to their group. The bigotry that often accompanies a "first" candidacy is likely to enhance the political relevance of ethnicity for the members of the candidate's group.

It seems plausible that an ethnic group will get such a major nomination when adversity forces one party or the other to appeal to new sources of support. This seems to have been the case with Celentano's nomination. In the late 1930s the New Haven Republicans were in dire straits. Some of the state party's leading figures had been implicated in the spectacular "Waterbury scandals." In 1937 the local party had suffered its most crushing loss in any mayoralty election in a century. Coming on the heels of Roosevelt's overwhelming re-election victory, Murphy's 1937 landslide must have suggested the need for a new campaign strategy to the city's Republicans; they had little more to lose. It was in this desperate situation that a member of New Haven's most numerous voting bloc was first nominated for mayor.

Celentano was chosen for the 1939 nomination by leaders of the Republican organization. In 1941 and 1943 the party had come close to beating Murphy with non-Italian candidates and by the summer of 1945 the city administration had suffered such a decline in popularity that Republican leaders were confident of winning the election that fall. They did not then want to give the nomination to Celentano, preferring a non-Italian who would be more dependent on their support. Celentano had to wage a hard fight in ward primaries to win the nomination.

The Democrats had nominated Driscoll, their first Irish mayoralty candidate, under similar circumstances a half century earlier. The great controversy over free coinage of sil-

a For present purposes "major office" may be loosely but serviceably defined as any public elective office which is the central prize in a political system: mayor, governor, perhaps U.S. senator, and, of course, the presidency. Candidacy for minor office does not seem to produce so much ethnic impact, at least where candidates for such positions appear on the ballot below more important ones. This is particularly true in states like Connecticut where one can vote for an entire party slate with one choice. Such arrangements discourage split-ticket voting; see Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 275-276.

ver had split the party and given the 1897 mayoralty election to the Republicans. The defection of Gold Democrats may well have driven the Democratic leaders of that day to adopt a strategy of maximizing their party's

appeal to the Irish.42

The mobilization theory of ethnic voting states that: The strength of ethnic voting depends on both the intensity of ethnic identification and the level of ethnic relevance in the election. The most powerful and visible sign of ethnic political relevance is a fellow-ethnic's name at the head of the ticket, evident to everyone who enters the voting booth. Middle-class status is a virtual prerequisite for candidacy for major office; an ethnic group's development of sufficient political skill and influence to secure such a nomination also requires the development of a middle class. Therefore ethnic voting will be greatest when the ethnic group has produced a middle class, i.e., in the second and third generations, not in the first. Furthermore, the shifts in party identification resulting from this first major candidacy will persist beyond the election in which they occurred.

This is not to say that the growth of a middle class past the point of mobilization will necessarily produce increasing ethnic voting. Nor does the theory state that the resulting alignment is impervious to other political and social developments, or that more than one such shift cannot take place. But it does say that, in a given political arena and for a given nationality group, the development of voting solidarity is a product of leadership; that such leadership requires a middle class; and that such alignments are more durable than the political candidacies that produce them.

The mobilization theory seems to be more useful than the assimilation theory in explaining ethnic voting at the national level. Most members of ethnic groups in big cities are, by and large, strongly Democratic. It is often forgotten that this is a rather recent development. In the early part of the 20th century, when the foreign population of many big cities was predominantly first and second generation, these cities were carried by Republican presidential candidates as often as not. In 1920, shortly after the ending of unrestricted immigration,

42 Lowi, who has analyzed top-level mayoral appointments in New York City from 1898 to 1958, reports similar findings: "It has been the role of the minority party in New York to provice a channel of mobility for new ethnic groups. . . . The dominant Democratic organizations of the twentieth century have made efforts to attract the immigrants, but the minority Republicans made greater use of top patronage for these purposes" (op. cit., pp. 37-39).

the Republicans carried most cities with big immigrant populations. Harding swept New York, Cleveland, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Detroit by an aggregate plurality of 1,330,000 votes. The Republicans did almost as well in 1924. But in 1928 the aggregate Democratic margin in these seven cities was 307,000, and since then they have gone Democratic in every election, usually by substantial margins.⁴³

Smith's candidacy seems to have been particularly important in its impact on partisan alignments in Southern New England. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. with the highest ethnic populations in the country, were also, until 1928, stoutly Republican in state and national elections. Since then they have been in the Democratic column as often as not. Key's article on critical elections demonstrates this point more precisely. Cities which underwent a sharp and durable pro-Democratic change in 1928 had large Catholic, foreign-born populations; cities which reacted in the opposite way were largely Protestant and native-born. In short, the ethnic population of Southern New England has become more Democratic as the duration of its residence in this country has increased.

V. THE PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC VOTING

I have argued that the importance of ethnicity in voting decisions does not steadily diminish from an initial peak, but instead increases during at least the first two generations. What next? While the assimilation theory may be inadequate for the first development of ethnic voting, what about succeeding generations? Does the importance of ethnicity diminish rapidly with more general acculturation and occupational differentiation?44 Or does it persist as a major independent variable, although perhaps declining somewhat in importance? It is commonly thought that the first alternative is more correct. I shall argue here for the second proposition and suggest some factors that seem to be associated with the persistence of ethnic

Useful trend data on this subject are scarce. Data on Catholic voting patterns are suggestive since Catholicism is analogous to ethnicity as a variable in voting behavior. Catholics, too, tend to be more Democratic then Protestants, and this difference persists when income, occu-

⁴³ Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Party Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920: A Study of Twelve Cities," this Review, Vol. 43 (December, 1949), p. 1196.

44 For a statement of this point of view see Dahl, op. cit., pp. 34-36, 59-62.

pation, or education is controlled—it is not simply an artifact of Protestants' higher status. 45

The passage of time by itself does not reduce ethnic salience: witness Quebec. Nationality groups seem to vary in their rates of assimilation. Few Irishmen have ancestors who came to the United States after the turn of the century. yet from all indications there are many places where Irish self-consciousness is still very strong—notably in New York City, for instance. But the Germans, who immigrated there in considerable numbers at about the same time as the Irish, no longer seem to be a self-conscious nationality group.46 Catholic preference for the Democratic party does not seem to be a result of the disproportionately heavy representation of Catholics among more recent arrivals to this country. When generation of American residence is controlled. Catholic-Protestant differences do not disappear nor even diminish significantly.47

The passage of time is thought to be associated with weakening ethnic consciousness not just through attenuation of immigrant memories, but because members of any given ethnic group will get better jobs and, after two or three generations, be represented among all occupational levels, more or less in proportion to their numbers.⁴⁸ Occupational mobility is believed to reduce the importance of ethnicity in voting decisions for two reasons: (1) it will produce economic interests inconsistent with ethnic voting; and (2) the mobile individuals will come into contact with a broader, socially

⁴⁵ Berelson et al., op. cit., pp. 61-71; Campbell, Gurin and Miller, op. cit., p. 71; Campbell et al., op. cit., ch. 12; and Scott Greer, "Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 25 (Winter, 1961), pp. 611-625. Berelson's study found that Catholicism was a stronger independent variable than socio-economic status in voting behavior. Like ethnicity, its importance is subject to much short-term variation. For example, Catholicism was much more important in the 1960 presidential election than in 1956; see Philip E. Converse et al., "Stability and Change in 1960; a Reinstating Election," this Review, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 269-280.

⁴⁶ On the "disappearance" of the Germans see Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., p. 311; and Moynihan and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

⁴⁷ Greer, op. cit., p. 621; and Campbell, Gurin and Miller, op. cit., p. 79. The latter study found that the partisan difference between Catholics and Protestants was as great in the fourth generation as in the first.

⁴⁸ All ethnic groups are not, of course, equally represented in various occupations; see, e. g., Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 317-324.

heterogeneous environment that will dilute ethnic salience. 49

The extent to which social mobility alters the political expression of ethnic feelings undoubtedly varies with a number of other circumstances. The voting behavior of the New Haven Irish seems to have been relatively impervious to their changed social status. Although they are almost all in the middle class, their support of the Democratic party is so pronounced that it could not have declined very much as they went from manual labor to white collar jobs. Even when mobility does produce changes in political perspectives, these changes do not obliterate all hitherto existing predispositions. Social change begins from a "base point" of previous habits. Occupational mobility will change the politics of many of the immigrants' children, but it will do the same for old Americans. The net political difference between the two groups may be as great in the middle class as in the working class. This proposition is supported by the Elmira study, which found that differences between Catholics and Protestants in their support of the Republican presidential candidate were actually greater in the middle and upper than in the lower class.50 If anything, social mobility had heightened the importance of religion as an independent variable.

Upward-mobile members of the middle class have political characteristics intermediate between those typical of their old and their new status positions. While more Republican than their parents, they are considerably more likely to be Democrats than are status-stable members of their class. The voting behavior studies have established that as many as four-fifths of all voters identify with the same party as their parents. This is not just a reflection of similar life conditions; the authors of *Voting* report that most of their respondents whose vote was "inconsistent" with their social class were following parental political preferences.

- ⁶⁹ This assumes that the direction of ethnic influences will favor the Democratic party. When ethnic pressures are pro-Republican, as in the case of New Haven Italians, the problem of predicting the political consequences of social mobility becomes more complicated.
 - 50 Berelson, et al., op. cit., p. 65.
- ⁵¹ James A. Barber, Jr., "Social Mobility and Political Behavior," unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, 1965. See also Berelson et al., op. cit., p. 91.
 - ⁵² Ibid., p. 89; Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 147.
- 53 Berelson et al., op. cit., p. 90. For discussion of the varying strength and characteristics of the relationships between social class and voting behavior, see Campbell et al., op. cit., ch. 13; and

The data in Table II indicate that ethnic voting has not declined in New Haven in the postwar period. Deviation from the city-wide vote by Italian and Irish wards was as great in 1959 as in the 1940s. The smaller Italian deviation in 1961 may be a sign of declining ethnic salience, but it may also reflect Italian coolness to a Yankee Republican candidate, or the first wave of population changes resulting from the Wooster Square Renewal Project. At least in New Haven, all the social changes of the 1940s and 1950s do not seem to have reduced the political importance of national origins.

One contemporary trend that may be relevant to ethnic voting has not been mentioned. Most of the data in this paper describe only those ethnics who have chosen to remain in the old core cities. Their neighborhoods tend to be ethnically homogeneous but economically diverse, with working-class and middle-class families intermingled. It is plausible that those ethnics who have decided to stay in such neighborhoods despite their financial ability to move to the suburbs have stronger ethnic identifications, whether as a consequence or as a cause of continued proximity. What about the ethnics who have moved to the suburbs? They should be less ethnically conscious. Suburbs tend to be economically homogeneous and ethnically diverse; in these respects they are the reverse of the old city neighborhoods. It seems likely that these new suburbanites break off the interpersonal and institutional relationships that sustain and transmit ethnic consciousness. Since group solidarity is maintained by personal contact,54 it is probable that geographical disper-

Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years (New York, 1962). As these books make clear, associations between class and party are mediated by a number of other personal and historical variables. One such is the difference between social class as measured by objective indicators like income, and subjective class, i.e., what the individual considers his class position to be. When middle-class people identify with the working class their political attitudes and behavior tend to resemble those of members of the working class. Possibly middle-class ethnics are more likely to consider themselves working class than are middle-class Yankees. This suggests one mechanism that would modify the political impact of social mobility.

op. cit., p. 74; and is supported by data in their

Ethnic groups may differ in their willingness to move from old urban habitats. Glazer and Moynihan report that Italians in New York, unlike some other groups, seem to remain, generation sion will dilute ethnic salience. At the same time, however, it will help to maintain the solidarity of the urban survivors by draining off those with the weakest ethnic identifications.⁵⁵

There are not many data relevant to these speculations. The American Voter's discussion of suburbanization is tentative and inconclusive, while an earlier analysis of some of the same data produced findings consistent with the line of argument in the preceding paragraph. 56 The most useful evidence comes from Scott Greer's study of Catholic voting behavior in and around St. Louis. He found that, with education and generation of American residence controlled, suburban Catholics were more likely than urban Catholics to defect to the Republicans. 57

Several political circumstances are also associated with the strength of ethnic voting. In general, it appears that ethnicity will be more important in the absence of other plain cues to guide voters' decisions. It is likely to play a greater role in non-partisan elections, where voters cannot rely on the party label.58 But, while party identification may impede the free play of ethnic salience, it also stabilizes and prolongs ethnic voting by providing a vehicle for continuing perception of ethnic relevance. Celentano's candidacy won Italian support not only for him, but also for the Republican party in subsequent elections because his association with the party led Italians to think that it gave them more recognition. Ethnic voting also seems to be less important when some great issue dominates political perspectives, as the

after generation, in the same areas where they first settled. The areas of Italian concentration in 1920 and 1960 are substantially the same except where land clearance has displaced people (op. cit., pp. 186–187).

55 Immigration continues to provide a diminished but by no means negligible fresh supply of ethnics. Most of the 2,500,000 people who entered the United States as immigrants from 1950 to 1959 probably settled in neighborhoods inhabited by earlier arrivals from their respective countries.

⁶⁶ Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 457-460; Fred I. Greenstein and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Suburbs and Shifting Party Loyalties," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 22 (Winter, 1958), pp. 473-482).

⁵⁷ Greer, op. cit. p. 621. Even in the suburbs, however, Catholicism is a potent independent variable in voting behavior.

⁵⁸ Cf. James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (New York, 1960), p. 43.

Depression did in the 1930s.⁵⁹ This may explain the unusually pro-Democratic voting of New Haven Italians in the 1932 and 1936 presidential elections.

The major proposition of this section is that ethnicity is still an important factor in voting behavior and is not eliminated by changes in the economic characteristics of the individuals affected. This is not to say that perspectives formed in the first generations of American residence will persist forever. Ethnic consciousness is fading; it is already faint in some parts of the country and for some ethnic groups. Continuing increases in education, geographical dispersion, intermarriage and inter-group contacts are all likely to reduce ethnic consciousness.

Even when ethnic salience has faded, however, its political effects will remain. One of the most remarkable tendencies in political behavior is the persistence of partisan affiliations for generations after the reasons for their formation have become irrelevant to contemporary society. Key and Munger's article on county voting patterns in Indiana is one of the best-known demonstrations of this proposition. Some Indiana counties were consistently Democratic while others, apparently identical in demographic characteristics, were consistently Republican. The roots of these variations seemed to be the origins of the counties' first settlers-New England or the South: "If one plots on the map of Indiana clusters of underground railroad stations and points at which Union authorities had difficulties in drafting troops, he separates, on the whole, Republican and Democratic counties."60 Key and Munger conclude that for many voters elections are merely "a reaffirmation of past decisions." It seems plausible that this will be the legacy of ethnic politics: when national origins are forgotten, the political allegiances formed in the old days of ethnic salience will be reflected in the partisan choices of totally assimilated descendants of the old immigrants.

⁵⁹ See Dahl, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

co V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 281-299, at p. 457 n. Similar findings for Ohio are reported in V. O. Key, Jr., "Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio," this Review, Vol. 47 (June, 1953), pp. 529-531; and Thomas A. Flinn, "The Outline of Ohio Politics," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 13 (September, 1960), pp. 702-721.

A METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING ISSUES AND FACTIONS FROM LEGISLATIVE VOTES*

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Roll-call votes are being used increasingly to throw light on various aspects of the legislative process. As long as these votes are neither simply unanimous nor cast purely on party lines, they contain information that can often be rendered more intelligible by the simplification or condensation of many votes into fewer variables or dimensions. The researcher interested in a particular legislative decision can thus profit by seeing whether it exemplifies a more general and repeated type of occurrence. The techniques of analysis used in studying legislative votes are broadly applicable to collegial bodies of many sorts, including municipal, state, and national legislative bodies; party congresses and conventions; the U.S. Supreme Court; and the United Nations General Assembly.1

Two major questions have been asked which lead to the search for different kinds of simplifying variables in this analysis. One concerns the issues that divide a given group of legislators at a given time, i.e., what general matters are being argued about? The second concerns the subgroups of legislators within the group selected for study: what are the blocs, factions, cliques, and the like, whose more persistent existence is reflected by the division on a given vote?

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¹ Representative articles are S. C. Patterson, "Legislative Leadership and Political Ideology," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 27 (1963), pp. 399-410; L. N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," this Review, Vol. 58 (1964), pp. 577-588; G. R. Schubert, "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court—A Psychological Analysis," ibid., Vol. 56 (1962), pp. 90-107; H. R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," ibid., Vol. 58 (1964), pp. 642-657; F. Munger and J. Blackhurst, "Factionalism in the National Conventions, 1940-1964; An Analysis of Ideological Consistency in State Delegation Voting," Journal of Politics, Vol. 27 (1965), pp. 375-394.

These two questions are closely related. In factor or cluster analysis, they correspond to the analysis of roll calls and of legislators,2 respectively, with the aim of finding clusters of related roll calls or of legislators who vote similarly. Alternatively, they correspond to the study of factor loadings of roll calls as opposed to the factor scores of legislators. The Beyle-Rice bloc analysis of legislative votes, more recently used by Truman,3 is one approach to the second question. In cumulative (Guttman) scaling, the end-product is a simultaneous ordering of roll calls and of legislators; roll calls constitute cutting points between ordered categories, and legislators are distinguished by their placement in these categories.

The purpose of this paper is to present a method of analysis that throws light on both these questions. This method starts from cumulative scaling, but modifies it so as to make its results less dependent on preliminary hypotheses and more comparable with those of factor and cluster analysis. Other modifications of conventional scaling procedures are then introduced to reveal certain types of blocs or factions more clearly. Illustrative data are presented to show the types of inference that can be made.

Let us first reconsider the aims of roll-call analysis. To say that we are looking for issue dimensions, or for subgroups of legislators, does not specify the task accurately enough. It is crucial, in the first place, that the issue dimensions not be forced to be orthogonal, i.e., independent of one another. A central problem in the delineation of issue dimensions is that of comparing one issue-structure with another. These comparisons rest partly on the discovery of different issues in roll calls that took place at different times; but they also depend in an important degree on our opportunity to observe

² The term "roll call" will be used to refer to any division of legislators into two opposing groups on a political issue—including, for example, whip polls and discharge petitions. "Legislators" will refer to members of bodies (or groupings such as state delegations) analyzable in the ways proposed.

³ H. C. Beyle, *Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster Blocs* (Chicago, 1931); S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), ch. 16; D. B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959).

differences in the degree of association of given issues with one another, in contrast with that between either different subgroups (e.g., parties) or different times. Thus the increasing use of computer programs for principal component analysis and orthogonal rotation of factors, though it has some advantages, has the great disadvantage of obscuring these contrasts. Oblique rotation of factors, when it becomes more generally available to political scientists, will avoid this particular problem; but the method proposed here is a simpler means to the same end.

To say that we are looking for blocs is also an insufficient statement of the problem. Blocs may vote together on particular issues, e.g., the "farm bloc." There are of course general divisions within legislatures, such as inter-party divisions, or within parties, such as the North-South split in the Democratic party; but not all blocs or factions have this character. To avoid prejudging this question, and to reveal issueoriented blocs more clearly, we propose to identify the sets of roll calls on which similar divisions occur, and only then to look for blocs as they may exist on each such set.5 This procedure also makes the resulting picture less dependent on the number of roll calls that take place on a given issue; for if a given division is repeated many times (e.g., in tactical struggles over civil rights), the apparent bloc structure may give undue weight to this division if all roll calls are counted alike.

I. CUMULATIVE SCALING AND COEFFICIENTS OF ASSOCIATION

We begin with procedures for cumulative scaling, which have been used extensively for the analysis of legislative votes. This method

- Most analyses of political data published so far, using analytic rotation by computers, to the author's knowledge, have used orthogonal rotation. Schubert's study (op. cit., pp. 96-97) is an important exception; he rotates to oblique axes based on Guttman scales, and avoids orthogonal rotation on grounds similar to those presented here. Another exception is J. G. Grumm, "A Factor Analysis of Legislative Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7 (1963), pp. 336-356.
- ⁵ In so doing, we no longer assume that such a set of roll calls must be restricted to a single issue. This meets to some extent the criticism of A. Lijphart in "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," this Review, Vol. 57 (1963), pp. 904–905.
- ⁶ For a recent example, see Rieselbach, op. cit.; for a more detailed exposition of reasoning and

was originally developed by Guttman for the analysis of answers to attitude questions designed by the researcher. Compared with factor analysis, it has the advantage of making fewer assumptions about linearity, cardinality, and (as we shall use it) the homogeneity of attitude continua; its underlying logic can be explained in non-quantitative terms.

The cumulative scaling model we shall use may be described first in the "perfect scale" case. For this initial exposition, we make the following simplifying assumptions and definitions:

- On every roll call, all legislators of the group being studied cast votes in which they choose between two alternatives.⁸ Unanimous votes of the group are omitted from the analysis.
- On each roll call, votes are classified as "+" or "-" in such a way that "+" on every roll call is positively associated with "+" on every other.
- The proportion of "+" votes on a given roll call, among all "+" and "-" votes on that roll call, will be called p₊.
- 4. We arrange the roll calls in descending sequence of p₊ and assume that there are no ties. Each legislator's "response pattern" is defined as his sequence of votes, classified as "+" or "-" and ordered in this sequence of roll calls.
- 5. A perfect scale pattern may then be defined as a response pattern in which no "-" response is ever followed by a "+". A perfect scale is a set of items for which the legislators under study all have perfect scale patterns.

For example, if four roll calls formed a perfect scale, then every response pattern would fall into one of five types: ----, +---, ++--, or ++++. These response patterns may be designated by the "scale scores" 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, corresponding to their numbers of "+" votes. If the legislators

procedures, see D. MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting, University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol. 1 #3 (1958), pp. 203-333.

- ⁷ L. Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," ch. 3 in S. A. Stouffer et al., Measurement and Prediction (Princeton, 1950).
- ⁸ Voting systems with three alternatives (e.g., abstention) may often be analyzed by converting a trichotomy into two dichotomies. Votes for a multiplicity of unordered alternatives (as in a Presidential nominating convention) are less easily treated in this way.

who vote in these five patterns are placed in five categories in the order shown, the divisions ("cutting points") between the categories are the four roll calls, in descending order of p₊. Thus the scale ranks roll calls and legislators together. The value of p₊ for each roll call gives the proportion of all legislators who are to the right of that roll call.

So far we have said nothing about absences, "error" votes, or the meaning of the votes and scales in conceptual terms. These questions will be dealt with next.

We first consider certain limited problems of missing data and "errors," to illustrate ways in which cumulative scaling differs from other types of multivariate analysis, particularly factor analysis. When missing data (e.g., absences) occur in what otherwise would be a perfect scale type, and when they do not introduce ambiguity into the decision as to what that scale type would be, they may be replaced by hypothetical votes that "would have been cast"; for example, the response pattern +-000 (0 = non-response) would become +--- and OOO+- would become ++++-. And when a response (+ or -)differing from that in a perfect scale type could be altered in only one way to produce a perfect scale type, this change is conventionally made; if the response pattern was -+++, this would become +++++, and if it was ---+this would become ---.

These observations show that in the treatment of departures from perfect scale types, cumulative scaling does not treat all responses as interchangeable. A "+" vote on a roll call on which the +'s are a small minority (one with low p_+) is not treated the same as a "+" vote when they are a large majority. This distinction between items in different places on the scale will be important to us in interpreting scales.

The fact that not all roll calls need be treated alike is further illustrated by a finding that sometimes occurs in the scale analysis of legislative votes: the issue involved in roll calls at one end of the continuum is sometimes recognizably different from that at the other. For example, a "liberalism-conservatism" scale for

⁹ In factor analysis it is conventional to form factor scores by adding the weighted contributions of items loaded on a given factor; this procedure treats items as interchangeable, in the sense considered here. Schubert, in assigning scores on cumulative scales, also uses an additive procedure (op. cit.); this may be appropriate for matching scales with factors, but it is not the procedure that we propose here.

the Democrats in the 31st Congress had several roll calls at one end (on which only a small liberal minority dissented), dealing with communism and civil liberties; items of this sort did not appear elsewhere on the scale. 10 This sort of divergence in content between roll calls in different ranges of p₊ can reveal the fusion of special issues into more general ones, the legislative tactics and strategy of the period being studied, or the relations among blocs or groups.

This possible heterogeneity of content within a scale points to a modification of conventional scaling procedures that will make them more appropriate to legislative analysis. Guttman scaling was initially devised to weed out badly chosen items in a set of attitude questions designed by an investigator to reflect a single underlying continuum or concept. The set of "all possible questions of the same content" that might exemplify this concept, was designated by Guttman as the "universe of attributes."11 When cumulative scaling has been applied to legislative votes, the procedure has usually begun with the selection of a set of roll calls judged to deal with a given general issue. Scaling has been viewed as a procedure for selecting within this set. But the investigator is more liable to errors of judgment with roll calls than with questionnaire items; he may fail to group issues as the legislators did, or even ignore certain issues. Moreover, in searching for issues or attitudes he may overlook certain bloc divisions that were not easily identifiable by common issue content, but which could nevertheless be revealed by the same procedures.

The method proposed here—to search for clusters of similar votes regardless of content—is therefore more empirical and less dependent on preliminary hypotheses or conceptual considerations than Guttman's approach. In making this change, we contend that the structure of legislative votes is a datum for the investigator to discover, not to create. Differences in content of scales at different values of p₊ are important legislative facts that should not be be obscured by method.

Our empiricism cannot be unbounded, however; otherwise it might lead to such absurdities as the selection of an arbitrary group of legislators simply in order to eliminate "error" votes, or the assemblage of a meaningless collection of roll calls for which the legislators in question had scalable votes. The aim of our research is to make general statements about legislative processes. These statements involve concepts and relations between them. Concepts acquire sig-

¹⁰ MacRae, Dimensions . . . , op. cit., p. 228.

¹¹ Guttman, op. cit., pp. 80ff.




Fig. 1. Fourfold Table

nificance by virtue of entering into multiple relations or multiple, empirically concordant, definitions. ¹² Thus the reduction of a concept to a single operational definition would negate our central aim.

For this reason one must provide additional definitions of "issue" and "bloc," to test whether an empirical cluster of roll calls, or the divisions of legislators on it, represents either of these concepts. Issues will be recognized here from the content of the roll calls involved; a cluster of roll calls may include more than one issue, and an issue may appear in more than one cluster. Blocs will be recognized from characteristics of the groups of legislators separated by a cluster of roll calls-in this paper, chiefly the state and region of their districts. Either of these definitions could easily be extended, while remaining consistent with the concept in question, if other types of information were included in the study.

If bases of legislative division are to be sought through empirical search of a heterogeneous collection of roll calls, the study of overall response patterns (long sequences of +'s and -'s) is an inefficient way to do this. It is easier to compare each roll call with each other. This procedure was presented (for questionnaire items) by Toby and Toby.13 Each item is considered as a dichotomy, and each pair of items yields a fourfold table, such as that in Figure 1. When the two roll calls in question have the relationship of two items in a perfect scale, one cell of the fourfold table will be empty. Suppose that, in Figure 1, roll call #1 has the higher value of p₊. It will then precede roll call #2 in the sequence of descending p+ described above. But from the definition of a

¹² For further treatment of the last two points see A. Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco, 1964), pp. 41, 50.

¹³ J. Toby and M. L. Toby, "A Method of Selecting Dichotomous Items by Cross-Tabulation," ch. 15 in M. W. Riley, J. W. Riley, Jr., and J. Toby, Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis (New Brunswick, 1954).

perfect scale pattern, given above, no "-" is ever followed by a "+". Therefore no "-" on roll call #1 will be followed by a "+" on roll call #2, and cell b of the table will be empty. This cell is conventionally known as the "zero box."

We then examine all the fourfold tables generated by comparing each roll call under study with each other. As long as the scale criterion is met perfectly, only the presence of zeroes in the appropriate cells need be noted; but in actuality, some degree of "error" or departure from the scale model is usually considered acceptable. We then use some criterion to assess the adequacy or scalability of each fourfold table, and define a scale cluster as a set of roll calls, all pairs of which meet this criterion. This procedure was followed by Toby and Toby, with the criterion that the proportion of cases (legislators) in the "zero box" not exceed ten per cent of the total number of cases in the table.14 This criterion was consistent with the original rationale of error assessment in Guttman scaling, according to which each "error" or vote which departed from the scale model, was to be counted equally in assessing the adequacy of the scale. This notion has been embodied in the coefficient of reproducibility and in other proposed indices for measuring the adequacy of scales.15

One may argue, however, that "errors" between two items far apart in p_+ should be given particular weight; these would correspond to a legislator's voting first with a group at one extreme, and then with one on the opposite extreme. One would then wish to substitute for the equal counting of errors an unequal counting, depending on the distance between the items (c-b)/N.¹⁶ The author has pre-

¹⁴ Op. cit., p. 343. It was also required that the numbers of cases in cells a and d each be at least twice that in the "zero box."

¹⁵ See, for example, H. Menzel, "A New Coefficient for Scale Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (1953), pp. 268–280; E. F. Borgatta, "An Error Ratio for Scalogram Analysis," *ibid.*, Vol. 19 (1955), pp. 96–100.

viously done this by means of an exponential model based on latent-structure analysis.¹⁷

This unequal counting, as well as other advantages, can be obtained by the use of Yule's Q-coefficient. For a fourfold table as shown in Figure 1, Q=(ad-bc)/(ad+bc). This coefficient has several desirable properties:

- a. For a perfect scale relationship between the two items in question, it attains the value +1.0.
- b. If the two categories (+ and -) of one of the items are reversed, Q changes only its sign.
- c. As the table departs from a perfect scale relationship, the error is effectively measured by the product bc. The use of Q weights the number of errors, b, in approximate proportion to the difference in values of p₊ between the two items, (c-b)/N,¹⁹ in relation to the product ad.
- d. The use of Q does not presuppose quantitative attitude continua, either manifest or latent, but can be justified in terms of pairwise rankings of legislators and the probability that these rankings will be consistent between two items.²⁰

¹⁶ It can be seen from Figure 1 that for roll call #1, $p_+=(a+c)/N$, and for roll call #2, $p_+=(a+b)/N$. The difference is (c-b)/N. If roll call #1 has the higher p_+ , this difference will be positive.

¹⁷ See D. MacRae, Jr., "An Exponential Model for Assessing Fourfold Tables," Sociometry, Vol. 19 (1956), pp. 84-94. This method was used in Dimensions..., op. cit.

¹⁸ See G. U. Yule, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (London, 1911), p. 38.

¹⁹ This approximation is good as long as c is much larger than b.

²⁰ See L. A. Goodman and W. H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 49 (1954), pp. 723-764. An alternative line of reasoning which leads to similar formulations is put forward in M. G. Kendall, Rank Correlation Methods (London, 3d ed., 1962), pp. 3-5. In comparing two rankings, Kendall counts the number of pairs of elements that are ranked consistently, and the number ranked inconsistently, out of all possible such pairs. With either of these approaches, it would be possible to assess a fourfold table not only in terms of the proportional consistency of the rankings it provides (as measured by Q), but also in terms of the proportion of rankings about which a judgment of consistency may be made. If this latter proportion is low (i.e., the proportion of ties is high), as in tables with extreme values of p+, the table may be given less emphasis in interpretation.

Each fourfold table may then be classified as "scalable" or not "scalable," depending on whether the corresponding value of Q attains a specified minimum value. This classification is analogous to similar procedures based on the proportion of cases in the zero box, or on a constant in the exponential model. A dichotomous set of relations of this kind can then be examined for clusters, such that within each cluster all pairs of items are mutually scalable, and no further items can be added.21 The task of searching for such clusters is greatly simplified if they are required to be mutually exclusive; this also avoids some artifactual relations between clusters. The particular procedures used will be described in the next section.

The procedure described so far does not depend on the minimum value of Q which is chosen as necessary for scalability. But because we are interested in placing legislators in relation to response patterns that fit the cumulative-scale model, we normally set a relatively high threshold value. If the incidence of error is too high, the assignment of scale scores to response patterns becomes difficult. The simplest way to realize the advantages of the scale model is to consider only data that have relatively little error. This choice concentrates our attention on certain types of roll calls at the expense of others; in factor-analytic terms, we concentrate on those with pure loadings on the oblique rotated axes, and with high communalities.22 It is of course possible (though not conventional) to set one value of the error threshold in identifying bases of division, and another in choosing subsets of roll calls for placing legislators on scales.

²¹ Computer programs for carrying out this operation are discussed in R. E. Bonner, "On Some Clustering Techniques," *IBM Journal of Research and Development*, Vol. 8 (1964), pp. 22–32. A related program was written by F. K. Bamberger for the Univac I, and used in exploratory research by the author. A similar program was written for the IBM 7094 at Chicago by R. Axelrod. These programs were costly in computer time, however; the clusters reported here therefore were obtained from the Q-matrix by paper-and-pencil methods, which are believed reliable up to a matrix size of about 150 items.

²² In the House of Representatives, the votes ignored by this choice tend to include a disproportionate number of questions affecting particular areas of the country, such as the appointment of judges for a particular district, the movement of an Army installation from one place to another, or the treatment of an industry whose production and markets are highly localized.

Table I. q-matrix for republicans, u. s. house of representatives, 84th congress*

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II. LOCATING CLUSTERS IN THE Q-MATRIX

The basic tool for this analysis is a matrix of Q-coefficients between pairs of roll calls, produced by a computer program.²³ Because we are concerned only with values of Q that exceed a specified minimum value, we omit from the matrix all lower values, and thus facilitate the visual search for clusters. Table I shows an illustrative Q-matrix for Republicans in the House of Representatives in the 84th Congress (1955-56).

Each row, and the corresponding column, corresponds to a roll call, identified by the year (1955 or 1956) and the sequence number used by the Congressional Quarterly.24 Originally all the 102 roll calls on which the Republicans had at least seven per cent dissidence were analyzed in this fashion; but for reasons of space, only the 31 that fell into scale clusters are shown in Table I.25 Values of Q in the table are multiplied by 10. The "positive" vote on each roll call was provisionally chosen as that vote associated with the Republican party, as contrasted with the Democrats; the one roll call in the table for which this polarity was reversed is marked with a dagger (†). The threshold value of Q chosen for this study is 0.8; this value was chosen as high enough to separate distinct issues, but low enough to include a sufficient number of roll calls in the scale clusters to permit inferences about them.

We define a scalable cluster as a set of roll calls, all of whose pairs have associations of at least .8. Such clusters may be found in the matrix by search for symmetrical patterns such as those shown in Table I. When such a cluster exists, the roll calls in it may be indicated by enclosing their diagonal elements in boxes which mark the corresponding rows and columns. Wherever one of these rows intersects another column belonging to the same cluster, the value of Q at the intersection must be at least .8; these intersections are also enclosed in rectangular boxes in Table I. Since the matrix is symmetrical, we need examine only the

²³ See D. MacRae, Jr., "IBM 1401 Q-Matrix and Editing Programs for Legislative Votes," Behavioral Science, Vol. 10 (1965), p. 324. For each pair of roll calls, only those legislators voting on both are counted in the calculation.

²⁴ These numbers are used to identify the roll calls in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vols. 11, 12 (Washington, 1955, 1956).

²⁵ The actual computer printout also indicates the value of p₊, and the provisional "positive" vote (yea or nay), on each roll call. This preserves all the information in the individual fourfold tables except for the distribution of non-voting.

upper triangular part. The largest cluster in Table I is marked "I"; of the eight items in the cluster, seven dealt with foreign aid and one with the debt limit. The debate on the last item included reference to foreign aid.

After the identification of the first cluster, two general procedures are available for finding further distinct clusters. One is to proceed as in factor analysis, and to compute residual associations before repeating the procedure; this method has been used in a set of computer programs designed by Tryon.26 A second procedure involves treating each association in the matrix simply as a dichotomous variable; a special case of this type, which is the procedure used here, involves deleting the roll calls in the first cluster from the matrix, and repeating the procedure on the reduced matrix.27 This decision assigns each roll call to no more than one cluster. It also insures that the actual votes, rather than some mathematical function of them, will meet the same tests for scalability in all clusters and thus permit comparable placements of legislators.

The two next largest clusters among the remaining roll calls in Table I (including seven each) are labeled 2 and 3. All the roll calls in cluster 2 dealt with agricultural issues. Cluster 3 dealt with reciprocal trade; one item in the group (5-43)28 almost entered cluster 1, but 5-52 was preferred to it as completing an eightitem cluster with higher average Q. Cluster 4 (5 items) dealt with the pay of postal employees. Cluster 5 included four items dealing with housing and atomic power. Item 5-22 could have entered cluster 5 as well as 4, but the five-item cluster 4 as shown had higher average Q and was preferred on this basis. We terminate the search for clusters with groups of four roll calls.29

²⁶ See R. C. Tryon and D. E. Bailey, Cluster and Factor Analysis (in preparation). Reference is made to this method in D. MacRae, Jr., "Cluster Analysis of Congressional Votes with the BC TRY System," Western Political Quarterly (in press). See also Tryon and Bailey, "The BC TRY Computer System of Cluster and Factor Analysis," Multivariate Behavioral Research (in press).

²⁷ More elaborate procedures of the second type are presented in Bonner, op. cit. In the procedure used here, ties between clusters of equal size are resolved in favor of the cluster with highest average Q.

²⁸ To designate roll calls by number, we precede the *Congressional Quarterly* number by the last digit of the year (5 or 6).

29 In general, we terminate after the first six

Of these clusters, numbers 1-4 dealt with clearly recognizable issues, of greater or lesser generality. Cluster 5 may have dealt with the more general "welfare state" issue. None, according to criteria we shall specify below, corresponded to a major bloc division in the Republican party.

Clusters enable us to identify recurrent bases of division in a legislature, and to list the legislators who occupied particular places in such divisions. In looking for clusters we ask general questions and get general answers. The method of cluster analysis that we have described sometimes leads to close decisions in allocating roll calls to clusters. But the identification of the basis of division, and the placement of legislators, are not usually greatly altered by moving a few roll calls into or out of a major cluster.

If we wish to trace roll calls on particular bills and to find what more general divisions they exemplify, another approach is available. We may build initial scales from roll calls related to the bills in question. These scales, or individual roll calls of interest, may then be examined in relation to the more general scales, or to other roll calls in the Q-matrix. In this way the particular bills may be placed in a wider context.

III. THE PLACEMENT OF LEGISLATORS ON SCALES

Once a cluster of roll calls is found, the legislators under study may be located according to their relative favorableness or unfavorableness to the positions considered positive on those roll calls. They may be assigned scores in terms of the conformity of their response patterns with perfect scale patterns. These scores give further information about the meanings of the scales, by identifying extreme legislators on a single scale or deviants in the relation between two scales. Distinctions between bases of division may then be studied with the aid of these legislators' views, as expressed in debates, other communications, or (for contemporary studies) interviews. Legislators' positions on scales may also be related to other relevant variables, such as constituency or career characteristics.

We shall sketch the procedure for placement of legislators briefly, since their positions will be used here only to clarify the relations between scales. It is assumed that positive polarities have been chosen consistently for the roll calls in the cluster. The next step in the procedure is to arrange the roll calls in the cluster

scales and ties, if all possible scales containing as few as six roll calls have been found.

in descending order of p+, and to group them into sets marking off approximately equal intervals in the range of p+ from 1 to 0. Not every roll call will become a separate cutting point on the scale, since we permit considerable non-scale response between two items with values of p+ close together. Instead, we use "contrived items," each consisting of two or more actual roll calls; the legislator's "vote" on such an item is considered to correspond to the preponderant vote on the component roll calls.30 An objective procedure is followed for assigning each roll call to a contrived (or ordinary) scale item.31 Legislators' response patterns on these contrived items are then assigned scale scores in terms of their resemblance to perfect scale patterns.32

The associations between legislators' scores on pairs of scales measure the associations between the scales. From the Q-matrix one can estimate these associations by noting whether there are many high Q's between roll calls in one cluster and those in another. But a more precise answer to this question is possible in terms of the associations between legislators' positions on pairs of scales. The index of association we shall use is Goodman and Kruskal's gamma.33 This index includes Q as a special case, if applied to a fourfold table. Gamma (or Q) measures the probability that a pair of individuals in the table will be ranked consistently on the two variables. In a fourfold table. for example, each dichotomy (horizontal or vertical) may be considered as a ranking of all legislators, though with a great many ties. The only pairs of legislators about whom we can clearly say that the information in the two

³⁰ This procedure was proposed in S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, "A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (1952), pp. 273-291.

 31 In the descending sequence of values of p_+ , any interval of .10 or greater is first marked off as a division point. Then each sequence of values of p_+ between these division points, or at the end of the overall sequence, is further divided if it spans a range of p_+ greater than .15. This division is made by specifying further division points, equally spaced, with intervals as near to .10 as possible. The roll calls falling between each pair of division points then constitute a contrived (or if only one, an ordinary) item. This procedure, while useful for placing legislators, discards information provided by the distribution of p_+ .

³² The detailed procedures are essentially the same as those specified in MacRae, *Dimensions*..., pp. 321-322.

33 Goodman and Kruskal, op. cit., pp. 749-751.

rankings is consistent or inconsistent, are those who occupy different rows and different columns in the table. If their places in the table are to the upper left and lower right, respectively, these two rankings are consistent; the number of ways in which such a pair might be drawn (in the fourfold table in Figure 1) is ad. If their places are on the upper right and lower left relative to one another, their rankings are inconsistent, and the number of possible inconsistent pairs is bc. Thus the coefficient Q =(ad-bc)/(ad+bc) measures the number of consistent pairs minus inconsistent pairs divided by the total number of pairs about which a judgment of consistency might be made. The same expression may be obtained by reasoning in probability terms.

The index gamma is obtained by a straightforward extension of this reasoning to any larger table comparing two sets of ranked categories. The terms in gamma corresponding to ad and bc are simply the sums of a number of such products of cell entries.³⁴

The associations between scale positions for Republicans in the 84th Congress, corresponding to the scales discussed above, will be shown below in Table III. It will be seen there that foreign and domestic issues arrayed the Republicans quite differently at that time, and that agricultural issues were separate from both.

IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF SCALE CLUSTERS

The example we have presented involves a set of relatively clear and distinct issues, easily recognizable from inspection of the substance of the legislation involved in the corresponding roll calls. Not all sets of clusters are quite so clear, however, and additional principles of interpretation must be introduced before we can proceed to compare the divisions of the two parties in various Congresses.

Our aim in interpreting clusters, as suggested above, is to center attention on bases of legislative division that can each be recognized by a variety of approaches—whether by various statistical methods, classification of issues or blocs by informed observers, or relations with outside variables. The procedure that we propose for defining clusters can in fact yield two clusters that deal with much the same issue, or it can combine two apparently different issues in the same cluster. The ways in which this can happen, and procedures for interpretation, may

³⁴ For an elementary discussion of gamma, how to calculate it, and its relation to Q, see M. Zelditch, A Basic Course in Sociological Statistics (New York, 1959), pp. 180-186.

be indicated by reference to a previous analysis of the 81st Congress.³⁵

This previous analysis differed from the present one in three principal respects: it started from conceptual definition of issue clusters, rather than purely empirical definition; it used a different model for assessing the scalability of a pair of items from the corresponding fourfold table; and it set a more stringent error threshold for accepting a pair of items as mutually scalable. In spite of these differences, the broad lines of interpretation resulting from that study are sustained by re-analysis following the method proposed here. Table II presents the relations between the scales identified in the former study and those found in the reanalysis.

The main similarity between the results of the two analyses is that certain issues are represented by very similar scales, completely distinct from others, in both studies. Foreign aid is completely distinct from domestic issues for both Republicans and Democrats; no roll call that appeared in a foreign-aid scale in one analysis appeared in a domestic scale in the other. For the Republicans the re-analysis produces two foreign-aid scales (columns 3 and 7) rather than one, apparently involving a distinction between economic and military aid. For the Democrats there is only a single foreign-aid scale. Agricultural issues also form a completely distinct scale for the Republicans in both analyses (though they do not, in the re-analysis, for the Democrats³⁶). This distinctness of issues is thus a clear and consistent finding with respect to variations of method, if not (as we shall see) with respect to time.

A second similarity is that for the Republicans, domestic issues other than agriculture tend to be divided into two types, which we shall call urban and non-urban. Urban issues are those with a special appeal, on the liberal side, to representatives with urban constituencies—primarily housing and civil rights. Non-urban issues are ones on which a Republican might experience district pressure to vote on the liberal side without representing an urban district; principal examples are labor relations, social security, taxation, natural resources, and civil servants' pay.³⁷

- 35 MacRae, Dimensions . . . , op. cit.
- ²⁶ This finding is consistent with the high associations between the former agriculture scale and the former welfare-state and race-relations scales $(\gamma = +.70, +.79 \text{ resp.})$.
- ²⁷ This distinction was shown to be related to the rural or urban character of constituencies in *Dimensions*..., op. cit., pp. 266-268.

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF FORMER SCALES AND NEW SCALES, 81st CONGRESS

		Distribution		A. Republi oll Calls in		Vew Scales				
			Ne	w Scale No	. and Subj	ect				
	1 Urban	2 Non- F urban	3 oreign aid	4 (Patron- age)	5 Urban	6 Agricul- ture	7 Foreign aid	8 D.C. revenue	None	Tota
Old Scale										
Welfare state	5	_		1	2				6	14
Race relations	9	4		·	2	******			6	21
Labor relations	1	7		1	-				2	11
Foreign aid	-		. 8			*****	3	_	3	14
Cotton-peanuts		_				4			1	5
Parity-oleo	_	_						_	4	4
None	7	6	1	6	4	3	3	6		•
Total†	22	17	9	8	8	7	6	6		
•		Associ	ations	(γ) Betwee	n Old and	New Scale	5*			
Welfare state	77	77	54	46	81	-12	47	52		
Race relations	80	71	41	40	83	-08	35	56		
Labor relations	59	83	10	59	57	18	08	69		
Foreign aid	61	31	97	10	51	19	82	09		
Cotton-peanuts	06	11	15	07	09	89	12	-16		
Parity-oleo	37	09	63	20	38	44	38	02		
				B. Democ	rats					
		Distribution	on of R	oll Calls in	Old and l	New Scales				
			New	Scale No. s	nd Subject	t				
	1	2 Foreig	n (3 Commu-	4	5	6	N	one	Total
	Domestic			nism)	(Rural)	Pricin	g Hou	sing		
Old Scale										
Welfare state	. 23			3		-	3	:	5	34
Race relations	24			1	1		1		3	30
Foreign aid		9			*****				2	11
Agriculture	2			1	1			-	3 .	7
Oleo				-	******	-			3	3
None	23	5		4	6	5	1			
Total†	70	14		9	8	5	5	.		
		Associat	ions (γ) Between	Old and N	ew Scales*				
Welfare state	89	56		84	70	39	80			
Race relations	95	57		86	75	32	83			
Foreign aid	48	96		44	36	24	33			
Agriculture	85	71		88	79	27	70			

[†] Including a few roll calls assigned to more than one scale in the previous study (op. cit., pp. 324-331).

* With polarity of former scales reversed. Decimal point is omitted.

In analyzing this distinction, however, we observe that the scales in question are no longer perfectly separate in the two analyses. Among the roll calls in the "welfare state" scale of the earlier analysis, five fell in new scale 1, none in new 2; and for the earlier "labor relations" scale, almost the converse was true (one and seven respectively). But roll calls from the former "race relations" scale fell more evenly in both. Moreover, roll calls in these three old scales were also found in new scales 4 and 5. We must therefore reconcile disparities between conceptual and empirical definition of clusters.

For the Republicans, Scale 5 ranked the members of the party in a way that was associated highly with that of Scale 1 ($\gamma = +.86$; see Table III). Moreover, seven of its eight roll calls dealt with bills that were also involved (at other legislative stages) in Scale 1.38 In addi-

38 Further evidence of this overlap arose in the process of cluster identification. A number of roll

tion, its associations with other scales of the former analysis (Table II) and of the re-analysis (Table III) were nearly identical with those of Scale 1. We therefore regard Scale 5 as an artifact of the method of clustering used, and not distinct in issue content from Scale 1. We shall refer to such a scale as a "shadow" scale. This is not to deny the possibility of discovering meaningful (though small) differences in legislators' rankings on the two scales, by detailed analysis; but since we have not discovered them, we consider these scales to measure essentially the same thing. A similar problem also arises for the two foreign-aid scales (3 and 7) found for the Republicans in the re-analysis.

The converse problem arises for the Democrats: two conceptually distinct areas of legislation, corresponding to the "welfare state" (Fair Deal) and "race relations" scales, merge in one dominant scale in the re-analysis. This new combined scale ("domestic") is highly associated with both old scales ($\gamma = +.89$ and +.95, Table III). The two former scales were highly associated with one another as well $(\gamma = +.84)^{39}$ and had similar patterns of association with the other new scales. One might ask, then, whether these two areas of legislation should be considered the same or different for the Democrats at that time. This question may be answered in two ways. First, the issues are clearly distinct, and it should be regarded as an empirical statement, not a definition of a new "issue," that they elicited similar voting patterns in that Congress. If they did not do so at other times (and this sort of change did occur for foreign aid), then we need not change our definitions of issues from one period to another in order to describe this change. For this purpose, conceptual definition clearly assumes primacy.40

On the other hand, it is equally clear that similar groups of Democratic congressmen were opposing one another on the Fair Deal and on civil rights or race relations. Basic to this opposition was the North-South split in the

calls in Scale 1 could equally well have been placed in Cluster 5; they were simply assigned to Cluster 1 by the preference which our rules give to larger clusters. Moreover, a change in the minimum Q also transferred items from one cluster to another.

³⁹ This was also pointed out in *Dimensions* . . . , op. cit., pp. 251-252.

⁴⁰ This position was taken by Guttman when he introduced the scaling technique. See *Measurement and Prediction*, op. cit., pp. 72, 84, 85.

⁴¹ The two issues were *not* similar in this sense for the two parties combined, however; the Republicans were generally more favorable to civil rights than the Democrats.

party. For analysis of blocs or factions, then, we must recognize that these two major issues were in a sense "the same." This reasoning will be elaborated below when we discuss the relations between scales and factions.

In spite of the problems that result from the application of rigid statistical rules for cluster identification, these rules have definite advantages. In the first place, an empirical search reveals issues that might not have been hypothesized by the researchers. Not only are unexpected issues seen (e.g., clusters have been found dealing with veterans' affairs, with public power in the West, and with public lands), but different bases of division are found for different parties and periods. Some of these issues could have been found, to be sure, by empirical search within narrower "preliminary universes of content," such as that of domestic nationwide issues. But the conceptual procedure risks a lack of objectivity in relation to various investigators' notions of how issues should be classified. This may bias any conclusions reached about the change of issues over time, if the researcher identifies the issues at each period on the basis of a preliminary subjective selection of roll calls.

A second advantage of empirical search is that it is well suited to discovery of bases of legislative division that are *not* centered about issues. One such example is the distinction between divisions, in a parliamentary system, that center about issues and those that center about the fate of the cabinet.⁴² Another such example is the use of clusters of roll calls to delineate blocs and factions.

V. POSTWAR ISSUES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


We may now apply the method to a substantive problem: the tracing of issues in the House of Representatives in the two postwar decades. We choose for analysis five Congresses, involving four combinations of party control of the Presidency and Congress: the 80th (D,R control respectively), the 81st (D,D), the 83d (R,R), the 84th (R,D), and the 87th (D,D). The 87th Congress (D,D) is added to permit examination of temporal trends. Associations between the scales found in these Congresses, for each party separately, are shown in Table III.

Consider first the table of associations for the Republicans in the 84th Congress (next to last table in the left-hand column). The five scales

⁴² See D. MacRae, Jr., "Intraparty Divisions and Cabinet Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 5 (1963), pp. 164-211.

Table III. Association between scales in five congresses*

2	- 11	Republicans			Democrats	rats		
X		1 6 5 2 7	4		2	ı	7.0	က
X		x 86 56 60 04 -42 -49 (Draft) x 73 67 01 -42 -45 Foreign aid x 56 -29 -58 -52 Taxes x 66 -29 -56 Domestic x 61 42 Public lands x 70 Rural & communism x 70 Rural & communism	×	17 ×	37 ×			64 62 77 73 ×
1 3 2 5 4		3 7 1 5 2 8 6 4 x 83 64 52 27 05 -16 -09 Foreign aid x 58 47 24 11 -21 00 Domestic x 77 48 -05 -41 (Communism) x 77 44 -18 -60 Pricing x 17 -42 (Rural) x 17 -42 (Rural)	N ×	x 83 x	3 x x	6 42 88 88 × ×		4 48 81 81 x x
Republicans Democratis Democratis 4 x 57 -12 -18 -03 General 1 x 86 79 73 19 x 50 -28 Domestic 3 x 74 61 22 x x 6 x 74 61 22 x x Foreign trade 4 x 59 16 Agriculture 2 Agriculture 2 x x		1 3 2 5 4 Poreign aid 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	7 62 81 8 x	68 69 7 89	3 49 70 57 55 x x	6 14 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32	4 111 052 112 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	8 -76 -83 -70 -76 -65 -65 -65 -65 -65 -65 -70 -70 -70 -70 -70 -70 -70 -70 -70 -70
x 57 -12 -18 -03 General 1 x 86 79 73 19 x 32 -28 Domestic 3 x 74 61 22 x x 62 -01 Contracts 5 x 74 61 22 x x -05 Regional 6 x 59 16 x x Foreign trade 4 x x x		Republicans	က	d ^{ro}		4	, ==1	67
		x 57 -12 -18 -03 General 1	88 ×	79 74 x	73 61 59 x		- 21 20 X	- 40 - 17 - 17 - 22 - 22



* Associations are gammas with decimal point omitted. "General" scales include both foreign and domestic issues; "domestic" include both urban and non-urban. Parentheses enclosing a title indicate that fewer than 80% of the items in the scale in question conform to the title category.

for which associations are shown in Table III are the same ones that were identified in the Q-matrix of Table I. Scale 1, dealing with foreign aid, has relatively low associations with all the other scales except that for foreign trade (Scale 3); this association was foreshadowed by several high values of Q between roll calls in the two scales in Table I. The two other scales that form a separate grouping deal with domestic matters: Scales 4 (postal pay) and 5 (welfare state; here classed as "urban"). Scale 2 (agriculture) is relatively independent of the other four.

The table of associations we have just discussed illustrates several general principles of presentation in Table III. First, groups of scales, all of which have values of gamma of at least .5 with one another, are enclosed in rectangles to indicate their membership in "higher-order clusters." Second, the "positive" votes chosen for each scale are those on which the Republicans proportionally exceeded the Democrats in the majority of the roll calls in the scale in question.43 Thus the "agriculture" scale for the Republicans in the 84th Congress has small negative associations with all the other scales, because the segment of the party voting with the Democrats (in favor of price supports) tended to be the most conservative (i.e., to oppose the Democrats most) on other issues. Third, the various scales (rows and columns) are arranged in such an order as to bring their highest positive associations near the diagonal, rather than according to size of cluster (which their serial numbers indicate).

These last two principles throw into relief four scales on which inter-party alignments—often relating to the President's position—were reversed in relation to intra-party divisions. In each case the reversal is revealed by a set of high negative associations between the scale in question and others, placing the scale in a higher-order cluster. First is the Democrats' scale on the draft in the 80th Congress (#4), which we shall discuss below. Second was their "rural" scale in the 81st Congress (#4), on which urban liberals joined Republicans to oppose the Southerners' acreage allotments for

⁴³ The principal exception to this rule concerns votes on civil rights, on which the Democrats generally voted more conservatively. The polarities on civil rights roll calls were reversed before application of the rule. Scale #5 for the Republicans in the 80th Congress was assigned a polarity consistent with its higher-order cluster; the two of its four roll calls whose polarities were thus reversed were on Republican bills opposed by Democrats and conservative Republicans.

cotton and peanuts, as well as the Truman Administration's cutback in postal services. This latter economy move by the Administration also led to polarity reversal on the Republicans' scale #4, though with lower negative associations. 44 In the 83d Congress two more reversals occurred, as one such scale appeared for each party (#4 for the Republicans and #8 for the Democrats) when the Eisenhower administration took liberal stands backed by most of the Republicans, drawing liberal support but conservative opposition.

By placing closely associated scales near one another in each table, we arrange issues in a sequence that is broadly similar across parties and Congresses. The issue of foreign aid can usually be placed at one end of such a sequence. and we place it first (top row and left column) where possible. The first scale in nearly every case either deals primarily with foreign aid or combines foreign and domestic issues ("general"). At the other end of the sequence is usually a scale dealing with agriculture or agricultural interests. Between are scales dealing with a variety of domestic issues. When the issue of foreign trade appears, it is sometimes quite independent of the rest, as for Democrats under Eisenhower; sometimes closely related to foreign aid, as for the Republicans in the 84th Congress; and sometimes merged in a general scale, as for the Republicans in the 87th Congress.

In every table for the Republicans, two or more scales involving domestic issues can be found that differ in their degree of association with both foreign aid and agricultural or rural issues; domestic issues more closely associated with foreign aid tend to be less closely associated with aid to agriculture. In most cases, the former scales are recognizably concentrated on urban issues and the latter on non-urban issues (as defined above). Thus the diversity of division we observed for the Republicans in the 81st Congress is a more general characteristic of that Congressional party.

Throughout the Congresses studied, the Democrats in the House tended to be divided in a more unitary way than the Republicans.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ The polarity of Scales #4 for the Republicans and #4 for the Democrats is reversed in Table III relative to Table II. This is because in the previous study, polarities were chosen for intra-party consistency, while they are chosen here to show the relations between internal divisions and interparty differences.

⁴⁶ For domestic issues, this difference between the parties has also been observed in another study of this period: David R. Mayhew, "Democrats and Republicans in the U. S. House of

Agricultural issues never merged with others in the principal higher-order cluster for the Republicans, while they merged for the Democrats in the 80th and 87th Congresses, and were so closely related to other domestic issues in the 81st and 83d Congresses that no separate agriculture scale appeared. Similarly, foreign aid twice failed by wide margins to fit into a domestic higher-order cluster for the Republicans (81st and 84th Congresses), while for the Democrats the two failures (81st and 83d Congresses) were by much narrower margins. Finally, the proportion of roll calls in the Qmatrix which entered the leading scale cluster was always higher for the Democrats than for the Republicans, as will be shown in Table IV

Comparing Congresses, we can see evidence of a greater consistency of division within the Democratic party on various issues in the 87th Congress than in the previous ones. Among the Democrats there was a steady trend toward consistency, which can be traced in the relation between foreign and domestic issues. In retrospect, the voting patterns of the 80th Congress appear particularly inconsistent. At that time American foreign policy was taking a new direction, as exemplified by Truman's program of aid to Greece and Turkey, and the continuation of the draft in peace time; the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was being reversed. Support for Truman's policy was stronger, proportionately, from his own party than from the Republicans; yet, within the Democratic party, factional alignments were reversed. The small group of Democrats who opposed these policies tended to come from the left of the political spectrum, while the Republicans who opposed were from the right. This alignment explains the fact that for the Democrats at that time, all the associations of the "draft" scale (#4; including the vote on passage of Greek-Turkish aid) with domestic issues were negative. This scale did enter into a higher-order cluster that reflected an underlying constancy of division within the party; but it was not consistent with the other scales in relation to inter-party alignments, or to the President's position. The associations between foreign aid and domestic issues were also low.46

This state of affairs did not last long. Foreign

Representatives: A Study of Intra-Party Coalition Patterns in the Postwar Period," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1963, esp. ch. 6.

⁴⁶ This low association is partly due to the inclusion of Marcantonio and Isacson (ALP, NY) together with the Democrats; on Scale 6, they joined a small group of conservatives in opposing foreign aid.

TARLE IV	. INCLUSIVENESS	OF LEADING	SCALE CLUSTER.	2

		Republicans		Democrats				
Congress	Subject of first cluster	Per cent of all roll calls in this cluster	Total roll calls in matrix	Subject of first cluster	Per cent of all roll calls in this cluster	Total roll calls in matrix		
.,		(%)			(%)			
79	Domestic	10	136	Domestic	36	139		
80	Foreign aid	14	73	Domestic	29	103		
81	Urban	12	181	Domestic	38	176		
82	Domestic	26	138	Domestic	28	139		
83	Foreign aid	14	77	General	19	104		
84	Foreign aid	8	102	General	22	85		
85	Non-urban	11	144	Domestic	32	136		
86	Domestic	13	130	Domestic	37	127		
87	Foreign aid	12	159	General	41	150		
88	General	13	150	General	51	144		

aid was still distinct from domestic issues in the 81st Congress, but the left wings of both parties then tended to support it more consistently. And with the succeeding years, the convergence between the alignments on foreign and domestic issues became such that by the 87th Congress the Democrats revealed a "general" scale, combining foreign and domestic issues. The Republicans had such a scale as well, but it was less dominant and the coalescence of issues over time was less pronounced for them.

In this transition, party control of Presidency and Congress does not seem to have played the dominant role. The particular policies that Presidents urged on Congress, from Greek-Turkish aid to trade and agricultural policies, may well account for important changes in the configuration of issues. But the general degree of organization of issues seems to have been more a constant difference between the legislative parties in the House, and for the Democrats to have shown a trend over time toward consistency, than to have been altered and reversed by changes in party control. The differences shown in Table III do not easily fit the latter hypothesis.

VI. THE VOTING PATTERNS OF BLOCS AND PARTIES

In addition to the identification of issues, our procedure can also aid in the identification of certain types of blocs or factions. The Q-matrix provides two sorts of relevant evidence: the allocation of roll calls among clusters and the distribution of p_+ in these clusters. While a uniform distribution of p_+ was considered best in Guttman's initial procedure, the actual non-uniform distributions observed in legislative

analysis provide useful information about bloc divisions. If a group of legislators is regularly divided into two opposing blocs, this will be revealed by a corresponding scale cluster in which the cutting points (p+) are concentrated in a narrow range. The same phenomenon will result if a minority bloc repeatedly splits off from the remainder of the larger group; in this case the values of p+ will be concentrated nearer the extremes (0 or 1), and we shall be more likely to say that a single "bloc" was involved than that there were two opposing blocs. If two mutually exclusive minority blocs (e.g., small left and right wings) split repeatedly from the main segment of a party, but not at the same time, this fact will be revealed by a single scale cluster with two concentrations of values of p+ near the two extremes.

If concentrations of p+ of this kind are observed in scale clusters that are general in content, we infer that if blocs exist they are effective over a wide range of legislative subjectmatter; if they are observed in clusters that are narrowly restricted in subject matter, we infer that the blocs are issue-specific. Clearly this distinction is one that should be allowed to arise out of the data, rather than being imposed by restrictive assumptions or models. Presumably the deepest cleavages within a party, or the divisions between parties that tend to set one whole party against another, will be characterized both by very general scale clusters (containing roll calls on a great variety of topics), and by a narrow concentration of cutting points (p_+) .

In the House of Representatives in recent years, a bloc division of this sort has been more prevalent among the Democrats than among the Republicans. One way to show this is to compute the proportion of all roll calls in a Qmatrix which enter the first or largest cluster: Table IV shows this proportion for each party in ten recent Congresses. In every case the proportion is higher for the Democrats than for the Republicans. The subjects of the leading clusters also help to explain the difference between the parties; in four Congresses the leading cluster for the Republicans concerned foreign aid, while the leading cluster for the Democrats always included domestic issues. This difference in subject-matter is due to the greater diversity of cleavages in the Republican party, not to its being divided on fewer domestic issues. Not only were various domestic issues, including agricultural issues, more distinct for the Republicans in terms of relations among scales; but, as another manifestation of the same variety of division, roll calls were less concentrated in any particular cluster.

Some effects of party control of the presidency and congress can be seen in Table IV, for the Democrats but not for the Republicans. The Democrats' most inclusive leading scale clusters were observed in the 88th, 87th, 81st, 86th, and 79th Congresses, and their least in the 83d, 84th, 82d, 80th, and 85th. Of the first five, four were Congresses in which the Democrats controlled both congress and the presidency; of the last five, the lowest (83d) was the one instance in which the Republicans controlled both, while three others involved "truncated majorities" in which the party controlling congress did not control the presidency. Thus Democratic control of both branches seems to have made the Democrats' divisions more consistent. The two exceptions can also be explained plausibly. The 86th Congress was the third of a series of truncated Democratic majorities, and one preceding a presidential election which the Democrats had hopes of winning; the Democratic leadership in congress was putting forward its own policies and not merely opposing the president. Conversely, in the 82d Congress, in spite of nominal Democratic control, the coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had asserted its control from the opening of the first session47; of all the Congresses in this series with nominal Democratic control, this was the one with least Democratic strength. Moreover, a presidential election was approaching and Republican prospects seemed favorable. Some Democratic congressmen may

⁴⁷ See F. M. Riddick, "The Eighty-Second Congress: First Session," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5 (1952), pp. 106, 108; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 8 (Washington, 1952), pp. 58-59.

have decided to vote in terms of the particular appeals of legislation for their districts, rather than the general appeals of President Truman, who was having difficulty with his programs. In this sense the political configuration of the 82d Congress may have resembled that of the 80th.

The proportion of roll calls in the leading scale for the Republicans shows far less clear association with party control. The unusually high figure for the 82d Congress may be attributed to repeated divisions of the party on a series of roll calls on amendments to the Defense Production Act, which constituted nearly half of the roll calls in their leading scale. Bills on this subject were introduced in 1951 and 1952, each time with an open rule permitting numerous amendments. These amendments were used to embarrass the Truman Administration; and possibly the prospects of electoral victory in 1952 induced most Republicans to join forces in support of the diverse amendments opposing governmental controls.

The dominant scales found for the Democrats are such as might have resulted from division of the party into blocs; and their greater dominance, when the Northern Democrats controlled the legislative program, suggests that the bloc division within the party was heightened at those times. But before reaching such a conclusion, we must ask whether the division was a deep one or merely set off a few dissidents at one extreme. For this reason, as well as others, we must study the distribution of p₊ among the roll calls in each leading scale cluster.

The distribution of p₊ within a scale is a useful datum concerning the repeated divisions of the set of legislators being studied. The Democrats' leading scales do show the concentration of values of p₊ that might have resulted from division of the party into two blocs; the dispersion of p₊ in these scales (semi-interquartile range) varied from .07 to .12 in the ten Congresses studied. If cutting points had been uniformly distributed over the permitted range (from .07 to .93), the corresponding dispersion would have been .22, about twice as great.

Not surprisingly, the Democrats' dominant scale invariably arrayed Northern urban congressmen at one end and Southerners at the other. But the median value of p₊ did not always divide the party precisely into Northern and Southern wings; for while the proportion of Southerners⁴⁸ varied between .36 and .55 over the period studied (86th and 80th Congresses respectively), the median value of p₊ varied from .18 to .68. When the South was propor-

⁴⁸ Representatives from the eleven former Confederate states.

tionally strong within the party, it tended to gain the votes of some middle-of-the-road Democrats as well; while in recent Congresses (85th through 88th) the South was not only proportionally weaker but also tended to lose votes from within its own group. Whether this change corresponds to a change in the boundaries of social groupings in the party-i.e., of blocs as revealed by evidence other than similarity of voting—requires further testing. If our identification of blocs is correct, we should expect Border-state Democrats, and some Southerners, to have interacted more in recent years with their Northern party colleagues. It is also possible, however, that the inclusion of foreign aid in the dominant scale in recent years has moved the dividing point farther toward the conservative, or Southern, end.

While the Republicans' leading scales were less dominant than the Democrats', they too showed concentrations of p₊. Most often their divisions tended to set off a small liberal faction, as the Democrats' set off a conservative minority. But in the 79th and 81st Congresses the Republicans' leading scale revealed minority factions at both extremes. ⁴⁹ The properties of the Republicans' leading scales are harder to describe with assurance, however, because for that party one or more scale clusters were often close rivals of the largest; and depending on whether domestic or foreign issues were involved, the distributions of p₊ were quite different.

The observed concentrations of p+ might be thought to result from legislative strategists' decisions to bring certain bills to the floor, or the willingness of committees to allow them to come up, or the insistence of interested minorities on the yeas and nays. But these factors still permit minorities at either extreme of a party to vote separately on roll calls; votes on passage and on conference reports characteristically set off small minorities of the opposition, and in the 79th, 80th, and 81st Congresses, minorities on the side controlling the House were also frequently set off on roll calls. Until further analysis yields alternative explanations for the observed concentrations of p+, we shall regard them as reflecting actual social groupings within the parties, i.e., blocs.

The division between the parties themselves also constitutes a useful test of our method of bloc identification. If the same procedure we have described is applied to the entire member-

⁴⁹ Bloc analysis of the parties in the 81st Congress also showed the Republicans to be divided into more and smaller subgroups than the Democrats. See D. B. Truman, *The Congressional Party*, op. cit.

ship of the House, the proportion of roll calls in the leading cluster is higher than for either party alone in the 83d Congress, but lower in the 87th.⁵⁰ Thus in a legislature where the parties have relatively weak internal discipline, as they do in the United States Congress, the divisions within the parties can be considered as apparently comparable with the divisions between them. If we wish to speak of a "multiparty system" in Congress, we should make the necessary quantitative distinctions between the "parties."

It is also possible, conversely, for a deep legislative cleavage to cut across party lines. This possibility is illustrated in the votes of the French Radicals from 1956 to 1958. By late 1956, after the fall of the Mollet cabinet and the investiture of Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, a deep split had developed in the parlimentary party, centering about support for, and opposition to, Pierre Mendès-France. This division existed in the UDSR as well. When these two parties were scaled together, the main cluster reflected this division.51 Of 22 roll calls under the Mollet cabinet, only one fell in the main cluster; of those under the subsequent cabinets, 58 per cent did. Within this cluster, the semiinterquartile range of p+ was only .10. Thus this division into two blocs, while it crossed party lines and was not itself reflected in a formal division between parties, was deeper and more consistent than that between the two major parties in the U.S. House of Representatives.

We can now evaluate the propriety of scaling two or more parties together. If the investigator wishes to reveal a major bi-factional cleavage, he should study the votes of both factions together and examine the major scale cluster as an indication of the cleavage. If more than two factions combine in shifting patterns of coalition, like those of the Fourth French Republic, this method will best reveal cleavages if only two major factions or parties are studied at one time. On the other hand, if one wishes to reveal the diversity of issues that divide a legislative body, there may be advantages in studying the

 50 The proportions of roll calls in the leading scale, if the parties are combined and the same procedures followed as for a single party, are .27 for the 83d Congress and .35 for the 87th. The division between the parties at the median p_+ appears, however, only when the dominant scale is a domestic one.

 51 Details of sampling are reported in MacRae, "Intraparty Divisions . . .," op. cit. The results given here differ from those in that reference in that a minimum level of Q=.8 was used for comparability with the Congressional data presented here.

individual factions separately and examining their internal divisions. This might entail separate studies of individual parties or of major factions within a party. The method we have presented may make it possible to identify such factions empirically without the need of assumptions such as a geographical or historical definition of the "South." 52

VII. SUMMARY

The method proposed here for identifying issues and factions modifies the customary procedures of cumulative (Guttman) scaling in several ways:

- It searches for clusters of similar roll calls by empirical examination of pairwise relationships.
- (2) Each possible pair of roll calls is evaluated for scalability in relation to a threshold value of Yule's Q-coefficient, and "errors" or departures from the scale model are thus weighted unequally. Because Q is a coefficient of association, the results are more comparable with those of factor and cluster analysis.
- (3) It is no longer assumed that each scale need correspond to a single issue-continuum. Instead, the possibility of combination of issues by factional opposition is considered, and variations of issues among different ranges of p₊ may be interpreted.
- (4) A non-uniform distribution of p₊ in a scale cluster is taken as a useful datum revealing factional structure, rather than simply an inconvenience in the selection of scale items.

These modifications, though not altering the scaling procedure fundamentally, serve an important purpose: to adapt it to the particular needs of legislative analysis, as against questionnaire analysis. Modification (2), which relates scale analysis more closely to other methods, may also have value in other applications.

Results from this relatively empirical method agree fairly well with those of a previous study of the 81st Congress based on an initial conceptual grouping of roll calls.

Substantive results for postwar issues in the U. S. House of Representatives, and other selected data, are presented to illustrate the

52 This is of course an aim of the Beyle-Rice method, as pointed out by D. B. Truman, op. cit.

utility of the method. During this period the Democratic party in the House was more consistently divided than the Republican. The degree of organization of the internal cleavages of the Democratic party increased from the 80th to the 87th Congress. Party control of the presidency and congress was related to the degree of dominance of the Democrats' major scale, but not to the Republicans', and not clearly to the general degree of organization of intra-party divisions. Particular legislative programs of individual presidents did, however, find their counterparts in the relations between scales.

In terms of the dominance of a major scale cluster, the degree of bi-factional division of a legislative body, a group of parties, or a single party may be regarded as a continuous variable. Inter-party divisions find their place on this continuum. In the House of Representatives, the inter-party division is not always dominant, as the North-South cleavage among the Democrats approaches it in degree of dominance. The division within the French Radical party and UDSR in 1956–58, however, was more completely dominant in the votes of that period than the division between the parties in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Although this empirical method gives rise to artifactual "shadow" scales duplicating others in content, additional information permits the identification of such scales. In particular, all scales or higher-order clusters found in this study, which have associations (γ) no greater than .5 with outside scales, have clearly recognizable and distinct issue content.

The Q-matrix can be analyzed without resort to the particular clustering techniques presented here. The data it contains are very close to the fourfold tables themselves. The relation between individual roll calls of interest to the investigator and major issues or bloc divisions can thus be revealed, and those that have little such relation can be studied separately.

This method has the great advantage of simplicity. It requires little more for its understanding than a knowledge of the properties of Q and γ . No knowledge of matrix algebra or multidimensional geometry is required. The method uses computers, but it is relatively easy for the user to understand completely the operations that the computer performs on the data. Some of the disadavantages of the method could undoubtedly be reduced by greater technical sophistication; however, it is presented as a useful step toward the fuller exploitation of legislative voting records.

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE*

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The House Committee on Ways and Means, according to its members, is assigned the responsibility of resolving some of the most partisan issues coming before Congress: questions of taxation, social welfare legislation, foreign trade policy, and management of a national debt which exceeds \$300 billion.1 Yet members of the Committee also contend, at the same time, that they handle most of these problems in a "responsible" way. A Republican member of Ways and Means echoed the views of his fellow Committee members when he said "it's the issues that are partisan, not the members." A Democratic member went so far as to claim that Ways and Means is "as bipartisan a committee as you have in the House." And a Treasury Department official who has worked closely with Ways and Means for several years believes that it is a

partisan committee in the sense that you get a lot of partisan voting. But while you get a lot of party votes the members discuss the bills in a nonpartisan way. It's a very harmonious committee, the members work very well and harmoniously together. Sure there is partisanship but they discuss the issues in a nonpartisan way.

The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe and analyze some of the factors which

- * I want to thank several scholars who commented on an early version of this paper: H. Douglas Price, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Randall B. Ripley, Robert L. Peabody, Nelson W. Polsby, Frederic N. Cleaveland, James D. Barber, Leo Snowiss, Charles O. Jones, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr. I owe a special debt to David W. West, a perceptive friend and adviser who recently left the Committee's staff.
- ¹ This article is based on interviews conducted during 1964 with twenty of the twenty-five members of the Committee. The average interview ran 80 minutes. Questions were open-ended, no notes were taken during the interview, and all quotations are derived from notes made immediately after each interview. In addition, staff members, lobbyists, and executive department personnel were interviewed, some at great length. As a 1963–1964 Congressional Fellow I worked with Congressmen Thomas B. Curtis (R., Mo.) and Dante B. Fascell (D., Fla.), and was able to observe the Committee directly.

affect the Ways and Means Committee's ability to process, in a bipartisan manner, political demands which its members regard as highly partisan issues. Ways and Means is neither racked by partisanship nor dominated by non-partisanship; conflict and consensus coexist within the Committee and the balance between them varies chiefly with the nature and intensity of the external demands which are made on the Committee. Second, an attempt is made to contribute to the development of an analytical framework, based on Fenno's study of the House Appropriations Committee, which may prove useful for the comparative analysis of congressional committees generally.²

For analytical purposes, the Ways and Means Committee is here conceived as a politcal subsystem of the House of Representatives, charged by the House with a number of tasks, but in the normal course of events enjoying a

² Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), pp. 310-24. Fenno's approach has been applied to two other committees. See Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Congressional Subcommittee," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6 (November, 1962), pp. 327-44; Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom (New York, 1963), ch. 2. Other committee studies which may serve as a basis for comparisons include Charles O. Jones, "Representation in Congress: The Case of The House Agriculture Committee," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 358-67; Robert L. Peabody, "The Enlarged Rules Committee," in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., (Chicago, 1963), pp. 129-64; James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (Indianapolis, 1963); George Goodwir, "Subcommittees: The Miniature Legislatures cf Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (September, 1962), pp. 596-604; Ralph K. Huitt, "The Corgressional Committee: A Case Study" this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June, 1954), pp. 340-65. See also Fenno's forthcoming book on the House Appropriations Committee, and his study of the House Education and Labor Committee, in Frank J. Munger and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., National Politics and Federal Aid to Education (Syracuse, 1962), ch. 5.

high degree of operational autonomy.³ Its primary task vis-à-vis the House is the resolution of political demands, many of which involve high stakes in money, power or dogma. To perform this function the Committee must solve certain problems of internal organization and interaction, and these internal problems are inextricably linked to the nature of the environmental demands which the Committee is set up to process. The Ways and Means Committee, in other words, receives from its environment, and it generates internally, demands with which it must cope if it is to maintain itself as a viable subsystem of the House.

These internal and external demands give rise to a set of decision-making norms and roles which govern intra-Committee behavior and regularize its relations with outside actors. Committee norms and roles enable it to manage three distinct but related problems: (1) problems associated with tasks (instrumental interaction); (2) problems of personal gratifications and interpersonal relations (affective interaction); and (3) problems of integration.⁴

³ For the general theory behind this paper see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (New York, 1962), pp. 3-44, 190-233; Talcott Parsons, "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action," in Roland Young, ed., Approaches to the Study of Politics, (Evanston, 1958), pp. 282-301; and Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (rev. ed., Glencoe, 1957), pp. 19-84. For discussions of functionalism see Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," American Sociological Review, Vol. 24 (December, 1959), pp. 757-72; Irving Louis Horowitz, "Sociology and Politics: The Myth of Functionalism Revisited," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 248-64; Don Martindale, ed., Functionalism in the Social Sciences (Philadelphia, 1965).

⁴ Parsons and Shils, op. cit., pp. 208-09. These problems are also dealt with in the literature on small groups. See Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton, 1961), pp. 117-43; Josephine Klein, The Study of Groups (London, 1956), pp. 115-33; George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York, 1950), pp. 319-20; Michael S. Olmstead, The Small Group (New York, 1959), chs. 4, 5, 6; Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making (New York, 1964), chs. 3, 10; Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander. eds., Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (Evanston, 1953); A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, eds., Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction (New York, 1955).

All three are affected by the type of subject matter and the external demands placed on the Committee; the internal operations of the Committee cannot be fully understood apart from the tasks which the Committee is expected to perform for the House.

The need for internal organization of a heterogeneous group poses integrative problems for the Way and Means Committee. Integration, as defined by Fenno, is

the degree to which there is a working together or a meshing together or mutual support among roles and subgroups. Conversely, it is also defined as the degree to which a committee is able to minimize conflict among its roles and its subgroups, by heading off or resolving the conflicts that arise.⁵

Put in a somewhat different way, as Parsons notes,⁶ the integration of roles depends on motivating individual personalities in the requisite ways. In order to stimulate the members of a group to contribute to the group's well-being and to the realization of its goals, they must be induced to share certain values and to behave in prescribed ways, either through the distribution of incentives or the application of sanctions, or both.⁷ Members must, in a word, be socialized if the group is to be well integrated, and in congressional committees socialization depends on inducements.

Part I, below, deals with three interrelated variables and their relationship to Committee integration: the norm of restrained partisanship, the nature of the subject matter, and the external demands of the House. Part II considers the role of the chairman as an independent variable, describes how Chairman Mills directs the Ways and Means Committee, and offers some reasons why he operates as he does. Part III discusses the socialization processthe Committee's attractiveness, which predisposes the members to respond to socialization, and its ability to satisfy members' personal and political needs. The integration of four key roles, chairman-ranking minority member and newcomer-experienced member, is considered in Part IV. A final section offers some suggestions for comparative committee studies.

I

Minority reports by Republican members of the Ways and Means Committee and motions

- ⁵ Fenno, op. cit., p. 310.
- ⁶ Parsons and Shils, eds., op. cit., pp. 24-25.
- ⁷ Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 139-60. Frank J. Sorauf has recently analyzed political parties from an inducement-contribution perspective;

to recommit on the House floor frequently accompany the major bills reported by the Committee. In addition, the Committee members are clearly split along general ideological lines: the Democrats now overrepresent and the Republicans underrepresent their party's support for a larger federal role. These indices of partisanship do not, however, reflect a critical integrative norm which governs the behavior of members in executive session: the norm of restrained partisanship. In the words of one experienced staff member,

I think you will find that Ways and Means is a partisan committee, there are usually minority views. But partisanship is not that high when they discuss the bill and legislate. About 95 percent of the time the members deliberate the bill in a nonpartisan way, discussing the facts calmly. Then toward the end Byrnes [the ranking Republican] and the Republicans may go partisan. The things the Committee deals with are big Administration issues, so you are bound to get minority views and partisanship. But Byrnes likes to take a nonpartisan attitude toward things and it gets partisan only toward the end. On some votes they go party line but on others they don't. It all depends on the issue.

see his Political Parties in the American System (Boston, 1964), pp. 81-97.

⁸ E.g., U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. No. 1761, Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, pp. 55-87. Congressional Record, June 11, 1958, Vol. 104, pp. 10881-82. Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. No. 1818, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, pp. 83-104. Congressional Record, June 28, 1962, Vol. 108, pp. 12089-90. Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. No. 1447, Revenue Act of 1962, pp. B1-B28. Congressional Record, March 29, 1962, Vol. 108, pp. 5431-32. Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. No. 749, Revenue Act of 1963, pp. C1-C28. Congressional Record, September 25, 1963, Vol. 109, pp. 18118-19.

⁹ During the 87th Congress the Democratic members of the Committee averaged 81 percent on Congressional Quarterly's index of support for a larger federal role; the Republicans averaged 17 percent. A comparable disparity, 85 percent to 27 percent, shows up during the 88th Congress. Moreover, in both congresses the Democrats and Republicans on Ways and Means now appear to be more "liberal" and less "liberal," respectively, than the rest of their party colleagues. Data compiled from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, December 28, 1962, pp. 2290–95; October 23, 1964, pp. 2549–53. This may not have been true in earlier years.

A couple of Committee members feel that Ways and Means decides most issues on a partisan basis, but the preponderant view is that of a Democrat who declared that "most of the time we go along up to a certain point and then a sharp party vote will come. On the tax bill [Revenue Act of 1964] we went along for a long time without party votes, working very well, then the Republicans lined up at the end against it. There's very little partisanship up to a point, when the political factors come in. and then a partisan vote comes."10 Or a Republican who said "we try to write the best legislation we can in a nonpartisan way—more so than any other committee. We work in a nonpartisan way. Sure there are philosophical differences but they never become the partisan legislative fighting that they do on other committees."

The norm of restrained partisanship means that members should not allow partisanship to interfere with a thorough study and complete understanding of the technical complexities of the bills they consider. Members have a bipartisan responsibility to the House and to the nation to write sound legislation. They may disagree over what decisions the Committee ought finally to make but there is a firmly rooted consensus on how they ought to go about making them. Several variables affect the norm of restrained partisanship but two of them are of prime importance: (1) the nature of the Committee's subject matter; (2) the relationship between the House and the Committee.

(1) Working in a "responsible" way is valued highly by members of the Ways and Means Committee, and by "responsible" they mean being "conscientious," "thorough," "careful," and "studious." They emphasize the extreme complexity and national significance of the Committee's subject matter and this realiza-

10 This was confirmed by the Committee's ranking Republican member, John Byrnes, in the debate over the 1964 Revenue Act: "We tried to come up with as good a bill as we could. And I say to the Speaker it was not done on a partisan basis -and that has been confirmed by the chairman. It was done on a bipartisan basis, up until the last few days. When they had almost all the drafting completed and perfected, then they said, 'Now we don't need your help any more, boys; we will put the steamroller to work.' But up until then it was on a bipartisan basis." Congressional Record, September 25, 1963, Vol. 109, p. 18113. Contrast this with E. E. Schattschneider's account. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York, 1935), of the making of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1929-

tion inclines them to constrain partisanship. "We deal with the most complicated, technical subject in the Congress, in the country for that matter, we have to be thorough on Ways and Means," according to a Democrat; a Republican said simply "you just don't mess around with taxes, it can create millionaires or paupers." All the members realize that they have to be responsible, another Democrat contended, and "this means that we don't do things on the basis of partisan or political advantage. We can reach a general consensus. Sometimes what a Republican will offer will be accepted by unanimous consent." A Republican who described the ideal GOP member in terms which made him certain to be in conflict with the Democratic members of the Committee paradoxically added that "partisanship is not too high on Ways and Means taxes, trade, and social security should not be settled on a partisan basis."

Both partisan and nonpartisan tendencies permeate the Ways and Means Committee and are reflected in the Committee's operating style.

Those members who attend the protracted meetings go through a laborious process of illuminating the implications of arcane tax, tariff, debt and social security proposals. They are assisted by experts from the executive agencies, the House Legislative Counsel's Office, the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, and at times by employees of the Library of Congress. Legislation is pondered line by line. When the Committee makes a decision it is translated into technical language by the experts ("technicians") and brought back to the Committee for final approval. The decision-making style varies somewhat from issue to issue but in general it is marked by caution, methodical repetition, and, most important, restrained partisanship.11 "We get together and go through things as twenty five Americans all trying to do what's for the public good. It's even rare for a bill to be reported out by a 15-10 vote."

But the internal relations of the Ways and Means Committee are not devoid of partisan political or personal disputes. Restrained partisanship is the widely accepted norm govern-

¹¹ Protests about the Committee's procedure are quite rare, but see the minority views on a 1955 bill extending corporate and excise tax rates in which the Republicans complained about the way a tax credit was "rammed" through the Committee. Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. No. 69, Revenue Act of 1955, pp. 36-38.

ing the Committee's day-to-day operations and it does dampen partisanship and promote integration. It also, on occasion, breaks down. Not all Committee decisions are made in the full Committee meetings. Republican members frequently caucus in order to develop a united front on key pieces of legislation and party line splits are not as rare as some members imply.12 The norm of restrained partisanship does not stifle all dissension. A Democrat, for example, complained that the "Republicans sit there in Committee, vote for things, let things go by without saying anything, and then come out on the floor with motions to recommit, simply to surprise the Democrats." Personal feuds also erupt from time to time. On the whole, however, the Committee feels that the complex political demands which it must settle are of national importance and should be handled so far as possible on their merits.13

(2) Virtually all the major bills reported to the House by the Ways and Means Committee are considered under a closed rule which precludes all floor amendments unless they are first accepted by the Committee. There is no lack of protest against this so-called "gag" rule but many members of the Committee and of the House argue that it saves the members from themselves. 14 Tax and tariff bills are so

¹² For a discussion of recent party battles fought on the floor over Ways and Means bills see Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this Review, Vol. 58 (September, 1964), pp. 570-74.

13 The subject matter of Ways and Means appears to be essentially different from that of the House Education and Labor Committee, at least during recent years. Education and Labor must resolve basic ideological issues whose emotional content has been higher than the issues coming before Ways and Means. For a discussion of the influence of jurisdiction on Education and Labor, see Munger and Fenno, op. cit., pp. 109-12.

14 From 1955-1965, forty-seven bills were debated under closed rules, nine under open or modified open rules, and the rest (over 350 bills) under unanimous consent or suspension of the rules. A typical statement was made by Representative Howard W. Smith in the 1955 fight over a closed rule for the Trade Act: "Mr. Speaker, I recognize the difficulty of many Members of the House on this bill; we all have our own problems in our own districts, but this is a question that affects the whole country.... It has been recognized ever since I have been on the Rules Committee that bills of this type should be

"sensitive" and "complex" that the House insulates itself from the demands of pressure groups by channeling the pressure into the committee stage of the process. On the few occasions when Ways and Means bills have been considered under open rules, one veteran Democrat claimed, "you had chaos." ¹⁵

Members of the Ways and Means Committee are induced to follow the norm of restrained partisanship when they mark up a bill because of the autonomy which the closed rule gives to the Committee. A Republican, for example, expressed the common view that,

On our Committee we have a responsibility to the House, we have to do the best job we can... The closed rule prevents amendments and changes so we have to perfect the bill. Other committees can bring a bill to the floor with provisions in it they know will be taken out on the floor. Ways and Means doesn't do this, we can't do this.

considered, as a practical matter, under a closed rule. The original bill setting up this program, as I recall, and the extensions in 1953 and 1954 were considered under closed rules. Nobody seemed to object at that time; as a matter of fact, both the majority and minority members of the Ways and Means Committee came before the Rules Committee and joined in the usual request that that committee makes of the Rules Committee for a closed rule." Congressional Record, February 17, 1955, Vol. 101, p. 1676. On this occasion the closed rule was almost defeated; it was adopted by one vote only after Rayburn took the floor and told his colleagues that "the House on this last vote has done a most unusual and under the circumstances a very dangerous thing....Only once in the history of the House in 42 years in my memory has a bill of this kind and character been considered except under a closed rule. How long it is going to take, how far afield you will go, I do not know. . . . So as an old friend to all of you, as a lover of the House of Representatives and its procedures, I ask you to vote down this amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown]." p. 1678.

15 Closed rules do not mean that the House has no influence over the substance of bills reported by Ways and Means. Chairman Mills has a reputation for keeping his ear close to the ground and for gauging House sentiment. House demands, if they are strong enough to attract wide support, are reflected in Ways and Means bills even though no floor amendments are allowed. In order to ease passage of the 1962 Revenue Act, for example, Mills reduced the amount of the controversial investment credit from 8 percent to 7 percent. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 30, 1962, p. 492.

One Committee member explained that "there are congressmen who have been here for years and can't understand social security. The average congressman can't understand what we deal with and you just can't open it up on the floor. We try to report well-rounded packages of legislation, the best bills we can. We compromise a lot to get a good bill we can report out. You don't report controversies just for the sake of controversy."

A House vote on whether or not to debate Ways and Means bills under a closed rule is in a sense a vote of confidence in the Committee. The Committee is widely thought to be the master of its esoteric subject matter and almost every member has a stake in maintaining this reputation. The House expects the Committee to polish its bills to near perfection technically and, perhaps more important, to make a satisfactory adjustment of the competing demands which surround Ways and Means bills. This expectation partly explains why Ways and Means is noted for time-consuming diligence, and it also buttresses the Committee's adherence to the norm of restrained partisanship. The distinctiveness of Ways and Means was expressed by one member when he said "the House is jealous of the Committee. Many members say our bills can't be amended because we know it all, we're the experts. They are jealous." One of his colleagues sounded the same note when he observed that "the House says here are a bunch of smart guys, we won't tamper too much with what they do. The Ways and Means Committee has a reputation of being a well-balanced, level-headed group and the House respects this. . . . You just can't open a tax bill on the floor. The House knows we won't pull any fast ones."

II

If the Ways and Means Committee has been able to manage internal partisan conflict more successfully than the House Education and Labor Committee—and apparently it has—this is due in no small way to the leadership style of the chairman, Wilbur D. Mills (D., Ark.). With the exception of one member who denied that there is a leadership structure within Ways and Means (it is, he claimed, an "amalgamated mess"), members agree that Mills runs the Committee and runs it well.

¹⁶ Compare this description of Mills with that of Graham Barden (D., N.C.), former chairman of Education and Labor, whose leadership tended to create rather than resolve internal conflicts. Munger and Fenno, op. cit., pp. 122–24.

Mills's fellow Democrats consider him "powerful," "prestigeful," "quite a guy," "clever," "fine," "subtle," "smart," "patient," "expert," "best mind on the Committee," "leader," "key man." Perhaps of greater significance for purposes of integration is that these views are shared by the Republican members. They say Mills is "very effective," "a good synthesizer," "leader," "real student," "master of tax affairs," "fair," "calm," "intelligent," "impartial," "able," "well educated," and "not arbitrary."

Mills promotes integration by treating everyone fairly. He is careful to protect the rights of the Republican members and he gives the Republicans, a former staff member claimed, "pride of authorship" in bills even though the minority members may ultimately oppose them on the floor. Constraints on participation, both in public hearings and in executive sessions, are very loose. One high ranking Republican said of Mills,

We deal with things on which Republicans and Democrats are in basic, fundamental disagreement and when you have something like this you are bound to get disagreement and minority reports. I think the major reason things don't disintegrate is Mills. Chairman Mills is very fair and reasonable. I can visualize disintegration and bickering if some of the members now ever become chairman, quite frankly, but all the time I've been on the Committee the chairmen have been reasonable men.

Mills recalls that as a boy he used to hear his father talk about the Ways and Means Committee with William A. Oldfield, an Ark-

17 During the hearings on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, for example, Keogh (D., N. Y.) complained about the amount of time consumed by Curtis (R., Mo.). Mills replied that the Committee would sit until Curtis was through with his interrógation. Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings on H.R. 9900, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, II, 740. On another occasion, Mills moderated an interchange between Representative Bruce Alger (R., Texas) and James B. Carey of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. over whether or not Carey had implied that Ways and Means, by failing to pass the King-Anderson health care bill, was responsible for the death or discomfort of the aged. Mills ruled that Carev did not have to answer Alger's question but he defended Alger's right to propound such a query. Alger took pride in Mills's defense of his rights. Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings on H.R. 3920, Medical Care for the Aged, IV, 1880-83.

ansas congressman who was a member of the Committee during the 64th-70th congresses. When Mills was elected to the House he knew that Ways and Means was a choice assignment and he made an early attempt to get on it. His first try failed largely because he did not lay the proper foundation with the House leadership, but he tried again and with the leadership's support succeeded. Mills's attitude toward the Committee helps explain why he leads it as he does, always sensitive to threats to the Committee's status and prestige; but it is also a source of pride for some of the members. "You hear some criticism of Wilbur," said a Republican, "but he has a high regard for the Committee. He takes care of it, respects it, and acts to insure its effectiveness on the floor." This commitment to the good of the Committee is a subtle factor in Committee integration but its presence is undeniable, even if there is no precise way to measure its importance.

For Mills, the Committee's reputation is dependent upon House acceptance of its bills. He does not like to lose and he usually avoids becoming so committed to an issue that he risks losing a bill on the floor. After waiting sixteen years to become chairman he lost part of the first major bill he brought to the floor; because of his bargaining skill and willingness to compromise, members feel, he has been beaten only once since then on a bill of any consequence.

Part of the reason why Millstries to accommodate different and sometimes conflicting political demands is the internal composition of the Committee. Two or three of the Democratic members are more conservative than the rest and—before the Committee's party ratio was changed from 15–10 to 17–8 they could determine outcomes by voting with a solid Republican bloc. Conversely, one or two Republicans have been known to "go off the reservation"

¹⁸ The most dramatic recent example of how a committee's subject matter can affect its behavior and success in the House was the issue of federal aid to education. See H. Douglas Price, "Schools, Scholarships, and Congressmen: The Kennedy Aid-to-Education Program," The Centers of Power, ed. Alan F. Westin (New York, 1964), pp. 53-105.

¹⁹ The first bill Mills lost was a temporary unemployment compensation measure. Congressional Record, May 1, 1958, Vol. 104, pp. 7910-11. The second was a conference report to carry out the International Coffee Agreement, Congressional Record, August 18, 1964 (daily edition), pp. 19501-07.

and vote with the Democrats.20 Depending on the issue, Mills may have to contain Democratic defections or lure a Republican vote. His base on the Democratic side is large and firm on most issues: even if some Democrats do not attend he can get their proxies. Neither party, however, is completely monolithic on all issues. Levels of commitment vary and in a delicately balanced situation Mills proceeds cautiously to make sure that he has the votes when he needs them. Two staff members commented: "Mills really likes to get a consensus if he can and this is one of the reasons partisanship is relatively low. He lets things settle and tries for agreement. He's just like that." "It's surprising how much Mills gets his own way. He'll sit back very quiet and let the boys thrash it out, let them go at it with their paper swords. Then he'll say we ought to do this and usually that's the way it's done." Committee integration may be positively or negatively affected by the style, ability and personality of committee chairmen.

The influence of the chairman on integration may also vary with committee structure. For example, the chairman may be a crucial factor in a committee, such as Ways and Means, that does its work in full committee rather than in subcommittees; but he may be less important or have different effects in a committee that operates through relatively autonomous subcommittees (Appropriations).

TTT

Political socialization is a dynamic and continuous process by which a group perpetuates its norms, values and roles.²¹ It is dynamic in that the content of what is passed on changes with new problems and demands; it is continuous in that it affects both newcomers and ex-

²⁰ See the votes reported in Elizabeth J. Brenner, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congressional Quarterly Special Report, pp. 29-30; also the close votes on key sections of the Revenue Act of 1964, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 23, 1963, pp. 1473-83.

²¹ Compare this definition with that of Gabriel Almond who says by political socialization "we mean that all political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, and that they do this mainly by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation. . . . Political socialization is the process of induction into the political culture." Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), p. 27.

perienced members. To the new member socialization involves exposure to and inculcation with the norms of the group. To the experienced member it consists of the maintenance of his conformity to group norms or, if he resists, tension between his values and behavior and those of the group.

Socialization depends upon the attractiveness of the group and upon its ability to regulate behavior through the allocation of positive and negative incentives.²² Objectively measured, Ways and Means is the most attractive committee assignment in the House. John C. Eberhart compared House committees from 1914 to 1941 and found that Ways and Means had the highest prestige.²³ Similarly, Warren Miller has compared committee assignments between the 80th and 88th Congresses and Ways and Means places first.²⁴

Members are attracted to Wavs and Means for a variety of reasons. Most frequently mentioned are its power and prestige. Ways and Means is "tops," "the guts of government," a "real blue-ribbon committee," a "choice one." One member, who was neither especially attracted to Ways and Means nor happy with the detailed nature of the Committee's work, said you just don't leave a "blue-ribbon" committee like Ways and Means. "You just go up from Ways and Means," a Democrat said, "you don't go to another committee-Appropriations, Rules, or Interstate. You go to Senator, Governor, that sort of thing. It's a springboard and many members have gone on from it." When asked if he ever tried to shift to a different committee another Democrat replied, "are you kidding! Why leave heaven to go to hell? There's no committee in Congress, including Appropriations, that's as important as Ways and Means. Why step downward once you have reached the top?"

Group identification is high on the Ways and Means Committee and the members usually refrain from behavior that is likely to weaken the Committee's position in the House. The Committee's attractiveness buttresses the norm that outlaws such behavior. Members

22 Barnard, op. cit.

²³ Cited in George B. Galloway, Congress at the Crossroads (New York, 1946), p. 90. For some critical comments on Eberhart's methodology see James A. Robinson, "Organizational and Constituency Backgrounds of the House Rules Committee," The American Political Arena, ed. Joseph R. Fiszman (Boston, 1962), p. 214.

²⁴ Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes in a forthcoming volume on representation and Congress, to be published by Prentice-Hall in 1966.

may disagree and they may even quarrel among themselves but, as one Democrat said, "we fight our battles in executive session and not in public." A conservative Republican member who almost never agreed with anything supported by the Democrats declared that "we keep personal things to ourselves and we stick together when someone attacks the Committee." The Committee has been criticized by its own members but this happens very rarely.25 Every member derives satisfaction from the Committee's reputation: they are predisposed by the Committee's attractiveness to follow the ground rules of partisan battle which place rigid constraints on the ways in which disagreement is manifested.

Socialization is also affected by the group's ability to offer the members positive incentives in return for approved modes of behavior. The Ways and Means Committee serves as the source of positive incentives in at least three important ways:²⁶ (1) affective relations inside the Committee, (2) influence in the House; and (3) relations with constituents.

(1) Unlike most other congressional committees (Senate Finance is another example), the Ways and Means Committee functions in executive sessions of the full committee, and not through subcommittees. Members meet in direct face-to-face contact for weeks at a time and this style of deliberation is accompanied by a fairly well defined set of interpersonal norms. Committee meetings are not supposed to be partisan battles; some acrimony does develop but on the whole the members feel that to be effective they must maintain decorum and act in a gentlemanly way. Bitter personal disputes erupt infrequently and even public conflicts which appear to be disruptive of interpersonal relations are often played out in a benign spirit. A Republican who found

²⁵ The Committee was reluctantly criticized by a Republican member in 1955 for rushing through H.R. 1, the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act, without giving the members time to study it or propose amendments. *Congressional Record*, February 18, 1955, Vol. 101, pp. 1743-44.

²⁶ March and Simon contend that the stronger the individual's identification with a group, the more likely his goals will conform to his perception of group norms. They identify five factors which affect group identification: (1) prestige; (2) perception of shared goals; (3) satisfaction of individual needs; (4) frequency of interaction; and (5) degree of competition between group and individual. In this paper I deal with the first three of these. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958), pp. 65-66.

it difficult to follow these norms was "talked to" by a senior Republican and told that he was losing his effectiveness by being so adamant. If a member starts to berate another member his colleagues will try to restrain him. You "don't attack one man continually" on Ways and Means; "we spar a lot but it never gets serious." "We don't have knock-outs, maybe we are a little more clubby, more closely knit than others." Members believe that they are "responsible" men who "respect the other fellow" and who "get along pretty well with others."

These attitudes and norms help make the Committee a satisfying group to belong to. A Republican said,

Relations with the Democrats are usually harmonious. It's like a fraternity where you have different clubs with different symbols and minor disagreements. There's a spirit of camaraderie that prevails. Oh, we have our differences now and then, and we jab back and forth, but it never really gets too serious. We are all concerned with how the Committee looks to outsiders and if there's a lot of bickering the Committee doesn't look good. Take Banking and Currency for example after Patman took over. He's arbitrary and the Committee's prestige has sunk way down. We know that to be an effective committee we must be reasonable.

In the words of a Democrat "everyone's a moderate . . . they screen out those members who would play for publicity and make a lot of noise. . . . "Two Democrats attributed their appointments to Ways and Means to personal characteristics of their rivals as aspirants, One of these "went off half-cocked," was "controversial" and not "well-liked"; the other was "compulsive" and he would not be right for Ways and Means where members have to "contain" themselves. Another member said plainly, "we don't want any screwballs and since I've been a member we haven't had any screwballs. These men are pretty carefully selected, you know, so you don't get radicals."27 "Comparing Ways and Means with my former committees, and with other committees I know of, there is a spirit of cooperation be-

²⁷ The same man, a Democrat, explained his election to Ways and Means in these words: "No one wanted to go much farther north... for fear of running into a radical liberal, and no one wanted to go much further south for fear of running into an extreme conservative, so they picked me. They wanted a moderate liberal and a liberal moderate and I fit the bill."

tween Republicans and Democrats. We are members of the 'club' now."

Personal traits are not the only consideration in the recruitment process to Ways and Means. Seniority, region, and policy orientation are important and, in many cases, decisive. When these criteria are not of overriding importance, or when more than one contestant meets them, a popular man who is "responsible" has an edge over someone who has made enemies, especially on the Democratic side where Ways and Means members are elected by a vote of all Democratic members of the House; and objective reasons can usually be found to rationalize affective predilections. These informal recruitment criteria and norms of behavior combine with the Committee's attractiveness to produce men who are inclined to follow group norms, to value harmony, and to promote integration. Members prefer to disagree amicably if they can; they feel more comfortable in a low-tension environment and they realize that to protect the Committee's status as the "queen committee" they must manage partisan dissension in a non-destructive way.

As indicated above, partisan considerations and policy orientation are important factors in determining contests over seats on the Ways and Means Committee. In 1963, for example, Phil Landrum of Georgia was denied a seat on Ways and Means largely because he was considered to be too conservative by his Democratic colleagues in the House. Landrum was elected to Ways and Means in 1965 after demonstrating more liberal inclinations by, among other things, guiding the poverty bill through the House.28 Republicans, on the other hand, want men on Ways and Means who "all fall within pretty much the same general philosophical area" and who will "go down the line" for the party.

(2) Membership on the Ways and Means Committee makes one a member of the House elite. Ways and Means members share in the Committee's prestige and, at a more practical level, they are in a good position to accumulate political credits with their colleagues. All congressmen, at one time or another, are concerned with problems that relate to taxes, social security or trade. On swapping favors one Committee member explained,

²⁸ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 18, 1963, p. 46. Landrum's growing liberal tendencies are reflected in his scores on the federal role index: 86th Congress, 33 percent support for a larger role; 87th Congress, 61 percent; 88th Congress, 80 percent. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVI, 1960, p. 136; footnote 9, supra.

Hell, I'm always being approached by members. It's important, you know. I might go to a member of Public Works once in ten years but they seek my assistance all of the time. Same with all the members of Ways and Means. . . . When I need a favor I can always call on Republicans whom I have helped on Ways and Means bills.

Democrats on Ways and Means have a unique source of influence because of their control over assignments to other committees.29 Committee assignments in a political system whose life revolves around committees are of major concern to every member of the House. The Ways and Means members normally enjoy—with the exception of assignments to the Rules Committee, which are of special interest to party leaders—a high degree of influence in making appointments. The committee-oncommittees function increases their contacts with members from their zone. Newly elected congressmen are indebted to them from the first day they arrive and, as a member moves up the committee hierarchy, he is continually dependent on his representative on Ways and Means.30 "They call you 'Mr.' and 'Sir' when you are on the committee on committees," one member said. House members "look up to me"; a third member said "they come to you and that's very important. Members are always coming to me for things and when I go to them, boy they remember.'

In short, the members of Ways and Means stand above many of their peers in the House and they associate this preeminence with the Committee. They are, therefore, induced to follow the norms which insure the continuation

²⁹ On the Committee on Committees see Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (Washington, 1963), pp. 183-212; also Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," this Review, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 345-57.

committees was evident on the 1963 tax bill, when Mills used the 15 members to help get the bill through the House. Ripley, op. cit., p. 570. Members sometimes take soundings for Mills and act as an informal whip system of their own. As one member remarked, "If I can support it in Committee and on the floor then they [members from his zone] can support it too." When asked what he could do if they did not vote as he did on a Ways and Means bill he added, "Well, I suppose if it were [a senior member] I couldn't do very much, but if it were some new member who didn't have a prime committee yet I could do something."

of the Committee's stature: restrained partisanship, responsible law making, and reasonable behavior.

(3) Most members of the Ways and Means Committee find the Committee a good place from which to satisfy constituent demands. Not every member believes that he can serve his constituents better from Ways and Means than he could from any other House committee, but several do. Moreover, no member's district is so intimately dependent on a committee other than Ways and Means that he risks electoral defeat simply because of his committee assignment. Few members would disagree with a newly appointed member, Dan Rostenkowski (D., Ill.), who told his constituents in a newsletter,

This has been a wonderful year for me. In May I was selected to fill a vacancy on the House Ways and Means Committee. As this is the Committee on Committees, appointment must be made by a vote of the Democratic members of the House, and I am proud to say that I was unanimously chosen by my colleagues... This is the most important committee in the House.... It is a most interesting assignment, but more important, it places me in a position whereby I can be more effective in assisting you with your needs, both personal and legislative.²²

Intensive bargaining surrounds the myriad parts of a major Ways and Means bill and it is often possible for a member to promote or protect constituent interests by letting it be known that he will support a position unfavor-

³¹ Joel Broyhill, appointed to the Committee in 1964, was thought to be running a grave risk in leaving the District of Columbia Committee and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee because many of his Virginia constituents are government employees who work in the District. Broyhill met the issue head-on by stressing the importance and prestige of Ways and Means and he was re-elected, albeit with a somewhat smaller percentage of the vote than he received in 1962. Washington Post, October 3, 1964, p. B2. He was reappointed to the District Committee in 1965 without having to yield his seat on Ways and Means, notwithstanding the general rule that membership on the latter is "exclusive."

³² Dan Rostenkowski, "Washington Report," July 20, 1964, p. 2. Congressman George M. Rhodes (D., Pa.), shortly after he was elected to Ways and Means, could take credit for two amendments to a social security bill which were of interest to his constituents. "A Report from Congressman George M. Rhodes," July 16, 1964, p. 1.

able to the Administration. Executive department representatives may even try to lure Republican support, as evidenced by the late Howard Baker's success in getting one of his favorite proposals included in the Revenue Act of 1964.³³ "You know, you can really do things for your constituents on the Committee. Boy, if you are a horse-trader you can really move. Exports, imports, that sort of thing."

Major legislation is not the only opportunity for serving one's constituents and friends. Ways and Means also processes so-called "members' bills," which are perhaps the best examples of bipartisan cooperation on the Committee. A member's bill is supposed to be a minor piece of legislation that ameliorates the impact of some small feature in the tax laws or makes some "technical" improvement in other laws that come under the Committee's jurisdiction; it is regarded as a "little" thing, of no special interest to anyone other than the Committee member who introduced it.³⁴

From time to time during the course of a Congress, Committee members are asked to list in the order of their preference (or chance of passage) those bills which they would like the Committee to consider during "members' bill time." Every member is given the opportunity to call up a bill or bills, depending on how many times they go around the table. If he can get the unanimous consent of his colleagues, his bill will be reported to the House, called up on the House floor by unanimous consent or suspension of the rules, and usually passed without objection.

From On April 30, 1964, Chairman Mills stood on the floor of the House and asked unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of twelve members' bills. Eleven of these bills

³⁵ For an explanation of this provision see Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. No. 749, *Revenue Act of 1963*, pp. 45–47. It allowed the exclusion from gross income of a limited amount of capital gain received from the sale or exchange of a personal residence by a person 65 years old or over.

³⁴ Typical members' bills alter the tariff on brooms made of broom corn, provide a credit or refund of self-employment taxes in certain cases, allow the free importation of spectrometers for universities, provide tax-exempt status for non-profit nurses' professional registries, continue the suspension of duties for metal scrap, etc.

²⁵ Congressional Record, April 30, 1964 (daily ed.), pp. 9397-9410. Mills also tried to get S. Con. Res. 19 which expressed the sense of Congress that bourbon whiskey is a distinctive product of the United States and that no imported whiskey

were passed by voice vote and one, H.R. 4198 introduced by Representative Shelley (D., Calif.), was defeated when another non-Ways and Means member, Matsunaga (D., Hawaii), objected. H.R. 4198 provided for the free importation of soluble and instant coffee and Matsunaga thought that before it was passed the Hawaiian coffee industry should be consulted. Mills had also intended to call up a bill introduced by Hale Boggs (D., La.), the third ranking Democrat on Ways and Means, but another member of the Committee, Thomas B. Curtis (R., Mo.), prevented it by indicating to Mills that he would object.

Of the eleven bills passed at this time, four were introduced by non-members of Ways and Means. The Committee reported these bills as favors to them. Two of the remaining seven were introduced by Republican members of Ways and Means, and five by Democratic members.³⁶ All twelve were reported unanimously by the Committee and most were supported actively on the floor by the ranking Republican member, John Byrnes (Wis.).

A member's bill may be killed by another member of the Committee, as in the case of the Boggs bill, or it may be killed or postponed by other members of the House, as illustrated by Matsunaga's objection to H.R. 4198. Not every member's bill becomes law. But many do. If influence in the House is defined as the ability to accumulate credits and dispense them with skill then the members of the Ways and Means Committee, if they stick together, are in a good position to exert influence and satisfy the demands of their constituents and friends. Favors that are "little" in the sum total

should be labeled "bourbon" passed at this time, but John Lindsay (R., N.Y.) objected on behalf of two female constituents whose income came from a small distillery in Mexico. Sober heads prevailed and the resolution passed the House later.

³⁶ On December 18, 1963, the Committee similarly announced its intention to report 32 members' bills. Seven of them were introduced by non-members, 17 by Democratic members, and 8 by Republican members.

³⁷ For discussions of bargaining see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1963), chs. 12, 13; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *People and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, 1962), pp. 53-58; Robert L. Peabody, "Organization Theory and Legislative Behavior: Bargaining, Hierarchy and Change in the U. S. House of Representatives," a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Po-

of things are often large to individual congressmen, and when small favors like these are dispensed over a period of years they amount to a considerable fund of credit on which the Committee (and its Chairman) may draw if the need arises. Ways and Means reports and passes a relative handful of major bills; it processes dozens of noncontroversial members' bills. When the Committee "cashes in its chips" to pass a major bill the chips are members' bills and other favors which it performs for members of the House.

Members' bills are important benefits which members of both parties enjoy by virtue of their membership on the Committee. They help satisfy the members' need to meet some of demands of their constituents; and they induce the members to cooperate with one another to this end. The continued success of members' bills depends on the Committee's relations with the House. Members' bills are positive incentives which emanate from the Committee and by helping to promote the members' interests they promote integration.

TV

Committee integration is also affected by the hierarchy of status and role which exists within the group. Members of the Ways and Means Committee play different roles and if the Committee is to be well integrated these roles must be legitimized and ordered.³⁸ Two sets of roles are of special significance: chairman and ranking minority member, and experienced member-newcomer.

The relationship between the chairman and the ranking minority member is a potential source of conflict in the Committee. Mills, who was elected to the Committee in 1942, has been chairman since 1958. John Byrnes of Wisconsin has 18 years' experience on Ways and Means and has been the ranking Republican member since 1963.³³ Their roles set limits to the degree of cooperation between them and they frequently oppose one another on key policy matters, both within the Committee and on the House floor. There is, however, a good deal of cooperation and mutual respect between them.

litical Science Association, New York City, September 4-7, 1963.

²⁸ Parsons and Shils, eds., op. cit., p. 203; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962), pp. 7-28.

³⁹ Several people associated with the Committee stated that Mills and Byrnes played prominent leadership roles even before they formally became chairman and ranking minority member.

Both men realize that their positions may be reversed some day and they therefore cooperate on most procedural and some substantive matters.

When the Ways and Means Committee comes to the House floor with a major bill it is often the quintessence of party conflict in the House. But the easy fraternization between Mills and Byrnes even at the height of floor battles is indicative of the spirit within which the Committee has performed its day-to-day labors.

Mills and Byrnes have jointly sponsored legislation which is referred to Ways and Means and they have collaborated on certain kinds of bills on the floor. 40 One staff member described the two men in these words,

Mills calls the shots, he runs the show. If a member would like a Committee meeting next Monday, for example, he'd have to get Mills to call it. Every once in a while Mills is questioned about hearings and witnesses but he's very good about it. He discusses these things with Byrnes. The hearings last fall [1963] on beer concentrate were Byrnes's doing. He wanted them, so he and Mills arranged a date. It's quite informal. Mills and Byrnes are good friends. In many ways they are very similar. Both are dedicated and have no outside life-no hobbies, never take vacations. The Committee is their life. They take work home. They remind me of guys working in a factory who punch in and out, go home and wait for the next work day to begin.

Members of both parties are "safe" on critical issues and they are, therefore, bound to be opposed on some things. The disintegrative effect of this built-in partisanship is tempered, however, by the tendency of newly elected partisans to accept subordinate roles within the Committee until they become familiar with the subject matter and are accustomed to Committee procedure.

The apprentice role is firmly established on Ways and Means and the new member who wants to be effective does not (even if he could) try to match wits with his more experienced colleagues. This is due in part to the Committee's complex subject matter. One veteran member said that "when I first went on the Committee I used to leave the meetings

⁴⁰ See H.R. 12545 and 12546, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964. These bills concern the relative priority of federal tax liens over the interests of other creditors. In addition to their cooperation on members' bills see the debate on H.R. 11865, the 1964 Social Security Amendments, Congressional Record, July 29, 1964 (daily ed.), p. 16680.

with a headache, truly a headache! The stuff was just over my head. I just kept plugging along and gradually you catch on. The things we deal with are so complex!" "Detail and technical, oh there's so much detail and it's so technical! You have to take work home and study. Everything is complicated now. Social security has become complicated, tax and tariff too." A junior Democrat added,

Leadership is pretty constant. The men who sit at the head of the table naturally lead the Committee. They are knowledgeable and have been around a long time. . . . Now that doesn't mean that if I have a question I can't get my oar in. There's no problem about that. But leadership is as you go up the ladder. Neither ______ nor I will ever be fire-balls on the Committee; we are too old.

Or a junior Republican,

Byrnes and Curtis are real students, are experienced, and know more about it. They should lead the Committee. Yesterday, for example, I could have spoken on the Renegotiation Act but I am quite content to let Byrnes and Curtis handle it. They are the experts. I'd tell a new member to get familiar with the four or five major things the Committee deals with. To study hard.

"Jennings is a smart member and Martha Griffiths shows a lot of potential. But we are all learners and beginners, the older members are the ones we listen to." "You have to learn," a Republican said, "and I want to learn. It would be resented if I tried to talk too much or overdid it. . . . So keep your damn big mouth shut a while. If I tried to talk a lot it would be resented, while it wouldn't for an older member."

Newcomers to Ways and Means are expected to "attend religiously, study hard, and pay attention to what the experts are saying." And the "experts" are the experienced members. A new member may participate right away but it is a fundamentally different kind of activity from that of the senior members. In Junior members are neither muzzled nor immobilized; they exist in a state of animated quiescence until they have absorbed enough information to make meaningful contributions to the policy discussion.

Friendly and cooperative relations between the chairman and the ranking minority member, plus well established norms of deference

⁴¹ The role of apprentice on the Ways and Means Committee contrasts sharply with the Education and Labor Committee, where newcomers are expected to play a major part immediately. Munger and Fenno, op. cit., p. 119.

governing the degree and kind of participation by senior and junior members, constitute a system of decision-making which is marked by restrained partisanship. During their apprentice period the behavior of new partisans is controlled by the impossibility of rapidly accumulating expertise in the Committee's subject matter. They are exposed to the norms of the group; they soon detect the Committee's leaders; and they learn how to become effective members.

The socialization process is not perfect on Ways and Means but in terms of its ability to negate the influence of divisive partisan factors it compares favorably in recent years⁴² with some other committees, most notably the House Education and Labor Committee. It is doubtful if any amount of incentives derived from the Committee, or any number of years experience on the Committee, could result in

The importance of time and chairmen becomes clear when one compares the conflict-ridden way the Committee handled the excess profits tax in 1950 with its relatively pacific handling of both the 1962 and 1964 Revenue Acts. For the 1950 bill see Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel, Congress at Work (New York, 1952), pp. 350-52.

the total integration of dedicated conservatives like James Utt or committed liberals like George Rhodes, but not even the most ideologically oriented members are immune from the group pressures to restrain partisanship, to articulate dissension in certain ways and not in others, and to contribute to the perpetuation of the Committee as the number one committee in the House.

* * *

The major differences in emphasis between Fenno's approach and the one adopted here are that I have stressed the influence of external House demands on the internal operations of the Committee, taken the role of chairman as an independent variable of prime importance to the Ways and Means Committee, considered socialization as a blend of attractiveness and inducements, and attempted a linkage between Parsons's focus on integration and Barnard's stress on inducements. Whatever the approach. it is clear that the inner life of congressional committees, a hitherto little explored part of of the workings of Congress, deserves the attention of political scientists as a way of increasing our knowledge about legislative behavior and explaining why Congress accepts or rejects the recommendations of its "little legislatures."

JACKSON'S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: AN EXPLORATION IN VALUE ANALYSIS*

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Robert H. Jackson died more than a decade ago, and his departure from the Supreme Court marked the end of an era in American judicial politics, since he left behind as a minority those remaining of the colleagues who had joined with him to compose the so-called Roosevelt Court. He was still very much alive when I interviewed him shortly after the Steel Seizure decision in 1952, and subsequently when the initial stages of the present research were designed and carried out. His unanticipated and fatal heart attack had two incidental consequences that are relevant here: it fixed an unavoidable natural closure for the data—his activities-that I was studying, and at the same time imposed an insurmountable foreclosure upon one of my research ambitions. For the best way to validate generalizations about a man's attitudinal predispositions and belief systems is to check them as predictions against his future behavior; social scientists understandably repose lesser confidence in findings about hypotheses that can be validated only statistically, and then only by retrospective testing. Perhaps it was an error, therefore, not to have switched from Jackson to some other justice as a subject; but even one who chose a younger justice (such as Arthur Goldberg) might have guessed wrongly about his tenure, and Jackson's career did offer several unusual advantages-for reasons that will be explained

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¹ C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947 (New York, 1948).

shortly—which it seemed important to exploit. This is a sector of political research in which relatively little has been done, and it is possible that the theory and methods employed here may be useful to others in the study of political values. The substantive findings are confined to a single individual; but nothing in the theory and methodology bears any unique relationship to Jackson—or to judges, for that matter. They can be used to analyze the attitudes of other types of political decision-makers who make observable choices with which are associated verbal rationales that are or can be systematically recorded in a reproducible form.

The data for this study include all the three-hundred-odd opinions that Robert Jackson wrote as a Supreme Court justice, and all his votes in the more than a thousand formal non-unanimous decisions in which he participated. His opinions have been classified by type and analyzed for their value content, using correlational, cluster, and factorial methods; and his votes studied by cumulative scaling. These materials, so analyzed, make it possible to test several hypotheses, primarily by intercorrelating his values, and by correlating his values with his votes and the types of opinions in which they were articulated.

There is no dearth of what evidently is impressionistic literature on the subject of judicial attitudes. The law reviews, and to a lesser extent the political science journals, frequently carry discussions of the imputed attitudes of individual judges—and especially, of justices of the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, these discussions customarily are based upon an analysis of judicial opinions; and Jackson has not been neglected by the legal commentators or the judicial biographers.² Some of

² E.g., Vincent L. Barnett, "Mr. Justice Jackson and the Supreme Court," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1948), pp. 233-242; Charles Fairman, "Robert H. Jackson: Associate Justice of the Supreme Court," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 55 (1955), pp. 445-487; Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Jackson," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 68 (1955), pp. 937-939; Eugene C. Gerhart, "A Decade of Mr. Justice Jackson," New York University Law Review, Vol. 28 (1953), pp. 927-974, and America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson (Indianapolis, Ind., 1958); Louis L. Jaffe, "Mr.

them—notably Jaffe and Nielson—have purported to discuss the essence of Jackson's philosophy as a judge; but the essences they find are not in agreement. The typical conclusion has been that it is futile to attempt to discover any systematic structuring of attitudes for Jackson. Weidner, for instance, warns:

The most striking feature of Justice Jackson's judicial philosophy is that it can only with great difficulty be made to conform to any of the neat and currently-popular classifications of Supreme Court justices... The way out is to abandon attempts to squeeze the justices into these deceptively precise categories... The classification of Supreme Court justices as advocates of either judicial activism or judicial restraint, and the use of statistical devices to facilitate the process, can be a helpful approach to some problems of constitutional law. But it is inadequate to the task of determining the judicial philosophy of a particular justice. Jackson, for one, cannot be so readily pigeonholed.³

In similar although less dogmatic vein, Barnett remarks that "in striving to associate Jackson's views with some doctrine or set of doctrines which will neatly explain them all, one is beset with difficulties." And even Pritchett-whom Weidner evidently had in mind as the only previous commentator who attempted to make some use of quantification in guiding his appraisal of Jackson-concludes that his own "figures, however, average out a certain unpredictability in Jackson's votes."5 In a subsequent attempt at a summing up, Pritchett adds that "the rather erratic nature of his opinions ma[kes] it difficult to catalogue him.... The unpredictability of Jackson's performance leads one to question whether he has developed any systematic theories about civil liberties or the judicial function."6

Justice Jackson," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 68 (1955), pp. 940-948; James A. Nielson, "Robert H. Jackson: the Middle Ground," Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 6 (1945), pp. 381-405; Robert J. Steamer, The Constitutional Doctrines of Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson (Cornell University, Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science, 1954; University Microfilms No. 9802); Symposium, "Justice Robert H. Jackson," Stanford Law Review, Vol. 8 (1955), pp. 1-59; and Paul A. Weidner, "Justice Jackson and the Judicial Function," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 53 (1955), pp. 567-594.

- ³ Weidner, op. cit., pp. 593-594.
- 4 Barnett, op. cit., p. 241.
- ⁵ Pritchett, op. cit., p. 261.
- 6 C. Herman Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the

In this state of our knowledge, Jackson appears to be a particularly appropriate subject for a study by behavioral methods. Perhaps at least in this instance any substantive findings that emerge will not be open to the usual rhetorical charge that all the elaborate paraphernalia serve only to confirm what already is known by prudent men of common sense.

I. THE DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

Jackson participated in the decisions of the Supreme Court for a total of twelve terms: 1941-44 and 1946-53.7 During this period, he wrote 138 institutional opinions (for the Court), 51 concurring opinions, and 113 dissenting opinions. He also wrote 4 opinions, consisting either of jurisdictional dissents, or of memorandum opinions in his ex officio capacity of supervising Justice for the Second Circuit, that are included for some purposes in the analysis below. In addition, he wrote 16 opinions that are here scored as nulls, since his discussion is limited to statements of facts without value-preferences indicated. Eight other opinions were jointly written by Jackson and various other justices. These 24 opinions have been excluded completely from analysis in the present study.8 My principal data for present purposes consist, therefore, of the decisions in the cases to which 306 opinions authored by Jackson relate;9 and my primary focus is upon his opinions and votes in these decisions.

The Variables. The data were analyzed in terms of four sets of variables, which I shall call "content variables," "opinion variables," "voting variables," and "chronological variables."

The identification of the content variables¹⁰

Vinson Court (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 18, 228-229.

- ⁷ Jackson was on leave of absence from the Court throughout the 1945 Term, acting in the role of United States Chief Counsel in the Nuremberg war crimes trials. See Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial (Dallas, Tex., Southern Methodist University, 1954). Only six months before his death, in his introduction to this book, Jackson wrote that "the hard months at Nuremberg were well spent in the most important, enduring and constructive work of my life."
- ⁸ For a list of Jackson's opinions, which contains some omissions and duplications but which corresponds closely to the independently compiled list used in the present study, see the *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 8 (1955), pp. 60-71.
- ⁹ Jackson wrote both the majority opinion and a separate concurring opinion in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 574 (1949).
 - 10 For other recent discussions and examples of

was based on an analysis of all of Jackson's opinions. A panel of three judges-two graduate students and myself-read and scored independently each opinion for the presence of any of a set of 33 substantive categories. I had first constructed a code which defined these content categories on the basis of a preliminary examination of about 20 per cent of the total of Jackson's opinions. This code was to some extent modified in the process of analyzing the complete array of cases—which required. of course. reevaluation of some opinions. Any instances of disagreement in scoring were discussed among the panel of judges until a consensual judgment was reached. Subsequent research in political attitudes and ideologies11 indicates that the attitudinal dimensions relevant to Supreme Court behavior are considerably broader and more heterogeneous-and consequently fewer in number—than I had assumed at the time the present project was begun.

Conceptually, each of these variables represented a continuous attitudinal dimension for Jackson, but the method of classifying the data had the effect of treating each variable as though it were dichotomous. Each variable was directionally defined, and Jackson might make a statement either in affirmation or in negation of the variable; henceforth I shall use the term "value" to refer to either of the two directional meanings (positive or negative) that are associated with each variable.12 The coding rules required that such statements be in normative form, and not merely factual assertions. (For example, if Jackson said that a defendant in a state criminal case had confessed during a period of extended interrogation while he was being held incommunicado by the police,

content analysis, see Robert C. North et al., Content Analysis (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1963); and Fred Kort, "Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law," and Glendon Schubert, "Civilian Control and Stare Decisis in the Warren Court," both in G. Schubert, ed., Judicial Decision-Making (New York, 1963), pp. 133-197, and 55-77.

¹¹ E.g., Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," this Review, Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 27-45; Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York, 1962); Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963 (Evanston, Ill., 1965).

12 "Variable" denotes the content category; the name (or symbol, or short title) of the variable in apposition with a valence symbol (+ or -) or phrase ("positive value" or "negative value") denotes the affective meaning of a particular stimulus or response set.

the content analyst left such a remark unscored, as a factual assertion; but if Jackson said that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to convict a defendant on the basis of a coerced confession—and irrespective of whether he thought that this had happened on the facts in that particular case such a statement was scored as agreement with the positive value of the second variable: "freedom from state restraint of civil liberty." It was also possible, and not uncommon, for Jackson to agree with both the affirmative and the negative value of the same variable in a single opinion; in such cases, the variable was scored as ambivalent for that opinion.) Since most variables were not discussed (at least, normatively) in most opinions, scoring as "absent" was most common. It is the joint occurrence of content values (scored as either affirmative or negative) that is of interest in the analysis below.

Some of the initial set of 33 content categories turned out to be univalued, and therefore of little help in making correlational analyses; others appeared to have neither a logical nor a psychological bearing upon Jackson's voting behavior. An example of one of the original categories which was both univalued (in effect, with marginals of 67 pro and 4 con) and nonfunctional (in relationship to voting) was judicial Candor, a subject upon which Jackson often exhorted his colleagues in normative terms and criticized them in factual propositions of which the following are typical:

Justice "X" [frequently Murphy or Black] is not (but should be) candid; the majority in this case are not candid; etc.

The Supreme Court should not overrule precedents *sub silentio*, but should come right out and say what it is doing.

The Supreme Court should not proceed by indirection.

The Supreme Court should not indulge in legal fictions; the Court ought not to sponsor myths concerning judicial behavior.

Supreme Court justices should articulate their major premises; the Court should practice what it preaches.

The Court has [deliberately] sublimated the conflict underlying the instant case.

The lower court in this case was more candid than is the Supreme Court [by pointing out that ghost writing flourishes in official circles in Washington].

Accordingly, the original list of 33 categories was later reduced to 13, in part by eliminating from further consideration the merely verbal (as I came to deem them) ones such as candor.

Other categories were combined; for example, among the six initial categories ultimately combined to form the variable "Supreme Court policy-making," is STARE DECISIS, which for Jackson was markedly bivalent. The positive value characteristically would take this form of utterance:

A justice should follow a precedent with which he disagrees until a majority of the Court will forthrightly agree to overrule it.

The Supreme Court does not appear to (but should) follow its precedents.

The Court should give "full faith and credit" to its own prior decisions.

The Court should follow stare decisis, even when it leads to a wrong result, when Congress has acquiesced in the decision.

The Court should follow stare decisis, except when the proposed new policy clearly is preferable to the old one.

The Court should not make new constitutional law unless the old law is unsound and "works badly in our present day and society."

Jackson affirmed his belief in stare decisis in 74 opinions. On the other hand, in 22 other opinions he expressed quite opposing views:

Throughout its history, the Court has been required from time to time to reconsider a precedent decision (and should do so now.)

The Court should not follow precedents that clearly are blunders.

The Court should not follow precedents that are not acceptable to a majority of the sitting Court.

The Court should not follow stare decisis when to do so would lead to a wrong decision.

It is better to create confusion by overruling a precedent than for the Court to adhere to a rule that it cannot and will not respect in application.

The reduced set of content variables consists of the following:

- National restraint of political (civil) liberty.
- 2. State restraint of political (civil) liberty.
- 3. National restraint of economic liberty.
- 4. State restraint of economic liberty.
- 5. Monopolistic control of enterprise.
- Federal (national-state) relationships.
 Executive or congressional policy-making, or both.
- 8. Lower court policy-making.
- 9. Lawyers.
- 10. Litigants.
- 11. The public interest.
- 12. Colleagues (other Supreme Court justices).
- 13. Supreme Court policy-making.

The opinion variables fell into four categories: institutional, concurring, dissenting, and jurisdictional or memorandum.

There are only two voting variables: C (political liberalism/conservatism, née civil liberty) and E (economic liberalism/conservatism). Most of the data for these variables are available in the recent report of another research project, which analyzes the votes of all justices of the Supreme Court in all decisions on the merits for the period of the 1946-1962 Terms, on the basis of the political and economic policy variables.13 The coding of Jackson's votes for the cases in which he wrote opinions, beginning with the 1946 Term, was taken directly from this larger pool of voting data. In order to include similar voting data for his first four terms, the relevant decisions of this earlier period were evaluated in relation to the political and economic variables. Each decision was scored as an outcome for the set of participating justices in that case, and Jackson's vote was then scored (just as that of each other justice) in relationship thereto. This voting analysis of the 1941-44 Terms was carried out half a dozen years after the content analysis of opinions was completed, which no doubt tended to minimize further the possibility of analyst bias, and to confirm the independence of the two sets of observations.

Like the content variables, the two voting variables were scored dichotomously, but with the differences that no ambivalent category was recognized for either, and the two voting variables could not jointly occur in the same decision. Although Jackson might (and often did) discuss many values in an opinion, or the same value more than once (and perhaps inconsistently), he could vote only once, and in only one way, in any single decision. Consequently, his vote in each decision was coded in one of the following five categories: (a) politically liberal (C+); (b) politically conservative (C-); (c) economically liberal (E+); (d) economically conservative (E-); or (e) other.

The major chronological variable was derived by partitioning all Jackson's opinions (and their associated votes) into three equal periods of time: the 1941-44, 1946-49, and 1950-53 Terms. In order to test certain of my hypotheses it was also necessary to compare the first period with the latter two combined; or, the last period with the first two combined; and in one instance to use a slightly different breakdown, in order to compare the 1941-44 and 1946-48 with the 1949-53 Terms.

¹³ The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, esp. ch. 5, "Liberalism, Political and Economic."

The primary method of analysis consists of a cross-tabulation of the joint occurrences of variables within and between the four sets. Generally speaking, four-fold tables, phi coefficients, and chi squares (or Fisher's exact probability test) were computed for each cross-tabulation of a pair of variables.

The Reduced Content Matrix. In order to define the political and economic content variables consistently with the two corresponding voting variables, the set of content variables was further reduced by combining the first and second variables "freedom from national restraint of civil liberty" and "freedom from state restraint of civil liberty" into paravariable #14 (political liberalism/conservatism); and by combining the third, fourth, and fifth variables, "freedom from national restraint of economic liberty" and "freedom from state restraint of economic liberty" and "monopolistic control of enterprise" all with reversed polarity,14 into paravariable #15 (economic liberalism/conservatism). At one time I planned to study the phi correlation matrix for this revised set of ten variables (#6-15), using cluster and factor analysis in order to isolate the more fundamental latent dimensions of Jackson's attitudes as a judge. For technical reasons, however, it was necessary to eliminate three more variables from the correlation matrix before undertaking these further analyses. The frequency for the ninth variable (lawyers) was so low (18), and the marginal distributions for variables #11 (public interest) and #12 (colleagues) were so extreme (56-1 and 7-154) that useful correlations between these three and the remaining variables could not be obtained. Therefore, the cluster and factor analyses were based upon a sevenvariable matrix. Henceforth, short titles for particular values, or symbols as indicated, will be used instead of numbers to designate these variables: N (#6), A (#7), J (#8), X (#10), P (#13), C (#14), and E (#15).

The correlation matrix for the content variables was cluster analyzed by the elementary linkage, hierarchical syndrome, and rank-order

¹⁴ Sign reversals were necessary for the economic variables, in order to maintain continuity with other recently published research in judicial attitudes toward economic policy. See *idem*; and Harold J. Spaeth, "An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes in the Labor Relations Decisions of the Warren Court," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (1963), pp. 290–311, and "Warren Court Attitudes toward Business: The 'B' Scale," in Judicial Decision-Making, op. cit. fn. 10, supra, pp. 79–108.

typal methods.¹⁵ It was factor analyzed by the principal axes method, followed by varimax rotation.¹⁶ The phi coefficients and associated chi squares, and the factor analysis and rotation, were calculated on computers.

II. THE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

The hypotheses to be tested will be stated, together with the supporting considerations for each.

1. The values articulated by Jackson in his opinions correlate in clusters that correspond to meaningful attitudinal concepts.

Particularly during the period since Jackson's death, a body of cumulative knowledge about the social psychology of judicial attitudes has begun to be developed. I assume that my cluster findings ought to articulate with these data; but the clusters of content values will not necessarily coincide with the impressions that a reader sophisticated in the general subject-matter field-viz., the traditionally trained constitutional law scholar-might gain from having read all or a substantial portion of Jackson's opinions. Findings based on the cluster analysis should be more valid, more reliable, and more precise than those based upon purely qualitative opinion analysis. For few subjective opinion-analysts attempt to base their findings upon a reading of all of a judge's opinions; and fewer still could claim to make consistent observations, and retain adequate recall to keep them in mind and to make the millions of associations and comparisons involved, when the universe of data comprises over three hundred opinions, many of which are dozens of pages in length. For such a task, computers have inherent advantages, whatever their other limitations. From a statistical point of view, the cluster analysis findings might be thought of as the mean, from which subjective opinion-analyses could be expected to deviate.

The clusters ought also to be "meaningful" in the sense that we should not expect to find patent inconsistency in the relationships denoted. The training of a lawyer and the voca-

¹⁵ Louis L. McQuitty, "Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 17 (1957), pp. 207-229; McQuitty, "Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis," ibid., Vol. 20 (1960), pp. 293-304; and McQuitty, "Rank-Order Typal Analysis," ibid., Vol. 23 (1963), pp. 55-61.

¹⁶ Harry H. Harman, Modern Factor Analysis (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 154-191, 301-308.

tion of a writer of judicial opinions are to articulate arguments characterized by at least *prima* facie rationality.

The test by which we shall measure this hypothesis is whether the cluster analysis findings: (a) define attitudes which are consistent with other behavioral research findings about judicial attitudes; and (b) are internally consistent.

2. The latent attitudinal dimensions revealed by factor analysis of Jackson's opinions will correspond to the latent attitudinal dimensions attributed to the Court as a whole, during the same period, on the basis of scaling and factor analysis of voting data.

Since cluster analysis deals only with the manifest or surface relationships of the correlation matrix, the attitudinal dimensions vielded by factor analysis can be expected to uncover more complex and subtle interrelationships. The requirement that Jackson's attitudinal factors correspond to those that previous research has identified as common to the decisionmaking group of which Jackson was a member is premised upon two assumptions: (a) that opinion writing and voting are alternative behavioral modes of response, both of which are determined by a judge's attitudes toward the stimuli presented by cases for decision; and (b) that the variables that Jackson recognized as most important in his judicial decisions-not necessarily his valuation of those variablesdid not significantly differ from the consensus of his colleagues concerning which were the most relevant and important content variables. Black and Jackson, for instance, might agree that the political liberalism/conservatism variable (viz., a civil liberties issue) represented the most important question for decision in a case relating to a Communist's claim of the violation of his constitutional right to freedom of speech: but their respective valuations might be very different: Black might argue in his opinion and vote in favor of political liberalism, while Jackson might affirm the negative value of political conservatism.

The confirmation of this hypothesis will depend upon a comparison of the findings from the factor analysis of the content-variable correlation matrix, with findings from scaling and factor analysis of voting data for the whole Court.

3. Jackson's votes, in relation to the political liberalism value, will correlate positively and significantly with his affirmations of the same value in his opinions; a similar proposition is asserted to obtain between his votes for and against economic liberalism, and the economic liberalism content-value.

The assumption here is the same as the first advanced in support of Hypothesis 2, above: that opinion writing and voting are alternative behavioral modes of response, both of which are determined by a judge's attitudes toward the stimuli presented by cases for decision. If this is true, then Jackson should affirm the political liberalism value in opinions which he wrote to justify pro-civil liberty votes, and he ought consistently to affirm the political liberalism value more than any other content-value in such cases; moreover, there should be few (if any) cases in which his opinion negates the civil liberty value although he votes in favor of it. Of course, this assumption is in accordance with intuitive expectations premised upon the presumed relatively high degree of rationality in judicial behavior: but so far as I have been able to discover, no one thus far has attempted to design an experiment which might make possible either proof or disproof of this basic assumption about judicial decision-making.

The test of this hypothesis will be statistical: the stipulated correlation must be positive and significant, at a level of confidence of not less than .05 (one-tailed).

4. There are no significant differences between Jackson's value assertions in concurring, and in dissenting opinions; but there are significant differences between his value assertions in institutional opinions, and in either concurring or dissenting opinions, or both.

It is usually assumed that there are differences between the values a judge asserts when he speaks for the Court, and what he says in dissent. As Cardozo put it:

Comparatively speaking at least, the dissenter is irresponsible. The spokesman of the court is cautious, timid, fearful of the vivid word, the heightened phrase. He dreams of an unworthy brood of scions, the spawn of careless dicta, disowned by the ratio decidendi, to which all legitimate offspring must be able to trace their lineage. The result is to cramp and paralyze. One fears to say anything when the peril of misunderstanding puts a warning finger to the lips. Not so, however, the dissenter. . . . For the moment he is the gladiator making a last stand against the lions. The poor man must be forgiven a freedom of expression, tinged at rare moments with a touch of bitterness, which magnanimity as well as caution would reject for one triumphant.17

Little or no consideration appears to have been given, however, to the content-value relationship between concurring and other opinions. One might reasonably speculate that a con-

¹⁷ Benjamin N. Cardozo, "Law and Literature," Yale Review, Vol. 14 (1925), p. 715.

curring justice should feel no greater sense of responsibility than a dissenting justice. Therefore, one ought to expect to find significant differences between institutional and separate (concurring or dissenting) opinions, but not between concurring and dissenting opinions.

A supporting argument might be drawn from small group theory. Since four justices constitute the minimum number necessary to support an institutional opinion,18 while it is the maximum for either a concurring or a dissenting opinion, Jackson clearly had to compromise his views with a much larger group when he wrote for the Court than otherwise. The extent to which a judicial opinion represents the personal views and language of the author presumably varies inversely with the size of the group which accepts the opinion; and so institutional opinions should tend to be more depersonalized than concurring or dissenting opinions. On both psychological and sociological grounds, therefore, we should expect that if any significant differences in the value-content of opinions emerge, they will be in accord with the stated hypothesis, which can be verified statistically in the same manner as Hypothesis 3, except that the test for Hypothesis 4 is twotailed.

5. There were significant changes, reflecting certain critical events that occurred on and off the Court, in both Jackson's opinion and voting behavior.

Let us examine this hypothesis by testing a set of more specific but independent subhypotheses:

5.1. The longer Jackson remained on the Court, the more conservative he became.

It frequently has been assumed that judges (like other people) become more conservative as they grow older, and remain longer on the bench. Certainly this assumption was the explicit premise of President Roosevelt's charges against the Court, in the "Court-packing" episode of 1937; and evidently, Jackson himself agreed with it.19 In order to test this hypothesis, we can compare the marginal totals for the voting and content-variables of civil liberty and economic policy, for the three four-year periods. In order to accept this hypothesis, it is required that changes occur in the stipulated direction, that these changes be progressive from period to period, and that they should be statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence (one-tailed).

¹⁸ In the relatively rare occasion (for the Court) when only six or seven justices participate in a decision.

¹⁹ Robert H. Jackson, *The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy* (New York, 1941), pp. 184-188.

5.2. There was a significant increase in Jackson's dissenting behavior after his failure to succeed Stone as Chief Justice.

Jackson's presidential ambitions had been cut short by Roosevelt's third-term decision; and his apparently good chance of succeeding Chief Justice Hughes was foreclosed by the outbreak of World War II.20 Evidently, despite Roosevelt's death in 1945, he then had expected to return from his triumph at Nuremberg and assume the center chair on the Supreme Court bench in place of Stone, who died on April 22, 1946 as the war crimes tribunal's work drew to a close. Soon afterward Jackson was told that Hugo Black was lobbying with Truman against his promotion; the upshot was Jackson's long cable from Germany to the judiciary committees of both houses of Congress,21 exposing to public view (in confirmation of long-standing Washington gossip) his version of the "feud" between Black and himself which had split the Court.²² Since Truman already had submitted Fred Vinson's name to the Senate for confirmation, the almost certain effect of Jackson's pronunciamento would be to serve as an epitaph to his political ambitions.

If it is true that Jackson returned to the Court in 1946, bitterly disappointed at the frustration of his ambition to achieve an honor that he (and many others) thought he had earned and deserved—and more specifically, a frustration due to the political chicanery (as he saw it) of his colleague Black, the leader of a "bloc of libertarian judicial activists" with whom Jackson differed in a struggle for leader-

²⁰ "Robert H. Jackson," Fortune, Vol. 26 (March, 1938), pp. 78-80; Marquis W. Childs, "The Man Who Has Always Been a New Dealer," Forum, Vol. 103 (March, 1940), pp. 148-154; Herbert Corey, "A Man with a Flexible Future," Nation's Business, Vol. 25 (September, 1937), pp. 75-76, 78, 119; Wesley McCune, The Nine Young Men (New York, 1947), pp. 180-181, 186; Gerhart, America's Advocate, op. cit. fn. 2, supra, pp. 229-231.

²¹ The New York Times, June 11, 1946, p. 2, col. 3-6; United States News, Vol. 20 (June 21, 1946), pp. 81-82.

²² Gerhart, America's Advocate, op. cit. fn. 2, supra, pp. 258-265; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Supreme Court: 1947," Fortune, Vol. 35 (January, 1947), pp. 73-79, 201-212. Gerhart's pro-Jackson account should be compared with John P. Frank, Mr. Justice Black: The Man and His Opinions (New York, 1949), pp. 124-131, which offers a countervailing bias.

²³ Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 57.

ship on the Court—then we might reasonably expect Jackson to articulate his disappointment and disagreement by writing more dissenting opinions than he had felt to be necessary or appropriate during his first four terms on the Court. Such behavior would provide an appropriate dénouement for the act of political suicide he had committed at Nuremberg; and Jackson was by no means insensitive to the implications of an increase in a judge's propensity to dissent, for he wrote in his valedictory, the undelivered and posthumously published Godkin Lectures,²⁴ that:

... there is nothing good, for either the Court or the dissenter, in dissenting per se. Each dissenting opinion is a confession of failure to convince the writer's colleagues, and the true test of a judge is his influence in leading, not in opposing, his court.

A statistical test of this hypothesis would consist of a comparison of the totals for Jackson's majority and dissenting opinions, for the periods before and after his absence from the Court during the 1945 Term. Since an increase in the proportion of Jackson's dissents is predicted, the test will be one-tailed, and as before the confidence level of .05 is posited as the criterion for acceptance or rejection.

5.3. After his return from his experience as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, Jackson became more conservative toward civil liberty, in both his opinion and voting behavior.

A subjective reading of Jackson's opinions which discuss civil liberty issues leaves one with the impression that his intimate familiarity with the rise of the Nazi movement under the Weimar Republic—a subject which he frequently found occasion to discuss in his extra-judicial writings subsequent to 1946had convinced him that it was suicidal for a democracy to permit conspiratorial, revolutionary groups to organize, to advocate openly their seditious doctrines, and to contest with rival groups for the control of the streets. Many persons, including many judges, would agree with such a position, without having had the very exceptional sensitization to the threat of fascism that Jackson must have experienced in his role as chief prosecutor. But the hypothesis here is that Jackson's attitude toward "ordered liberty" became more conservative as a consequence of his having had the unique experience that Nuremberg afforded; and that this change in his attitude had a significant effect upon his subsequent behavior as a judge.

A statistical test of this hypothesis is provided by comparing the marginals for the political liberalism/conservatism content and voting variables, for the periods before and after his absence from the Court during the 1945 Term. The test should be one-tailed, since the direction of change is predicted; and the .05 level of confidence is the criterion for decision.

5.4. After the end of World War II, Jackson became more conservative toward economic policy, in both his opinion and his voting behavior.

This hypothesis rests upon the assumption that Jackson's fundamental economic orientation was that of a conservative: he was a selfmade man and the leading lawyer in a small city, located in an area where traditional and business values were decidedly dominant; and his life-long friend and early client was the head of a local utility corporation.25 Jackson liked and lived the life of the upper middle-class gentleman; and most of his friends enjoyed similar socio-economic status. The fact that he himself was a Democrat, while the community in which he lived and most of his friends (during the first four decades of his life) were staunchly Republican, presents no real contradiction; to the contrary, the traditional basis for Jackson's choice of party is in strict accord with the findings of many investigations of political socialization.26 His great-grandfather, Elijah Jackson, was described as a "stiff Democrat" and was identified with a group who "were generally intense partisans of General Andrew Jackson"; his grandfather, Robert R. Jackson, "was a Democrat throughout his life, [who] boasted to young Robert of having voted for Franklin Pierce and for every Democratic candidate for President from that time down to Woodrow Wilson"; and his father, William Eldred Jackson, "remained an outspoken Democrat," in "a community that was intensely and sometimes bitterly Republican."27

Jackson's conversion to the economic liberalism of the New Deal was a necessary function of his career in national politics, but there is no need to assume that his enthusiastic support of the New Deal's economic programs was not perfectly "sincere." Similarly, his attack upon the economic conservatism of the Hughes Court²⁸ is in the style, and has all of the ear-

24 Ibid., p. 19.

²⁵ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 1, 94, 100; McClosky, op. cit.

²⁵ Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 74; Eleanor E. Maccoby et al., "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (1954-55), pp. 23-29.

²⁷ Gerhart, America's Advocate, op. cit. fn. 2, supra, pp. 26-28.

²⁸ Op. cit. fn. 19, supra, passim.

marks, of the partisan advocacy of a brief filed by the President's counsel before the bar of public opinion, Jackson's disclaimer of "dispassionate.... consider[ation]"29 to the contrary notwithstanding. Both the necessity of preserving the image of a "typical New Dealer"—as he was called by journalists in the late 1930s—so long as hope of the Chief Justiceship (or even of the Presidency) remained, and the pressures to uphold the successful prosecution of World War II, provide reinforcing explanations for the assumption that Jackson would write and vote as an economic liberal during his first four terms on the Court. None of these considerations survived after Jackson returned to the Court in 1946, and we might well expect that his acceptance of the end of his political career would be accompanied by an apparent shift to the right that would bring his decision-making behavior in regard to economic issues in closer accord with his personal ideology.

This hypothesis, it should be noted, is not the same as Hypothesis 5.1, to which it might be thought to bear some superficial resemblance. To test it we require that there be a sharp differentiation between the periods before and after the 1945 Term, and-to the contrary of what we stipulated for 5.1—that there be no significant difference between the second and third periods (i.e., 1946-49 and 1950-53). Moreover, 5.4 applies only to the economic conservatism value, while 5.1 requires conjoint change for political conservatism as well. Our test for 5.4 will be: (a) that a change takes place in the direction of Jackson's support for both the content and the voting economic variables, from liberalism to conservatism; and (b) that the difference between the sets of marginals be statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence (one-tailed).

5.5. Jackson's decision-making behavior became more liberal after Murphy and Rutledge left the Court.

Both Murphy and Rutledge, who frequently voted with Black and Douglas in support of liberal values, ³⁰ died during the summer vacation between the end of the 1948 Term and the opening of the 1949 Term. I have demonstrated elsewhere the influence that a bloc of four justices can have in forcing the consideration of an issue by the rest of the Court, under the Court's rule that jurisdictional decisions can be made by a minority of four justices.³¹ I have also

shown that the effect of the reduction in size of the libertarian bloc to two justices-actually, to only one justice during the 1949 Term, in view of Douglas's absence during most of this term due to a horseback-riding injury-was a drastic change in the character of the stimuli to which the justices were expected to respond. with an almost total elimination of the more extreme libertarian claims that Murphy and Rutledge frequently favored having the Court consider and decide in behalf of the claimants.32 From a psychological point of view, then. Jackson's responses ought to appear to be relatively more liberal during a period when he was asked to uphold less extreme libertarian claims -claims that he could more readily accept; or. as Guttman might put it, when he was being asked "easier questions."

We require, under this hypothesis, that Jackson give proportionately greater support to the liberal values in both his voting and opinion-writing during the later period. The test will be to compare the marginals for the content and voting variables for both the political and economic variables, for the terms before and after the summer of 1949. The direction of change is predicted, so a one-tailed chi square test at a confidence level of .05 provides an appropriate criterion.

III. A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FINDINGS

The voting and content variables can be initially described, in a general way, by the observation of their marginal frequencies.33 For the political variable, Jackson voted 45-40 and for the economic variable 46-71. The slight positive leaning in his civil liberties votes is of course not statistically significant, but his voting preference for economic conservatism is significant at the .03 level.34 The joint total for both voting variables, 202, indicates that twothirds of our 306 cases involved what were for the Court decisions relating to these two major attitudinal variables. Analysis of the much larger sample (1643) of all non-unanimous decisions on the merits during the seventeen terms 1946–62 shows that a third of these deci-

²⁹ Ibid., p. v.

³⁰ The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, pp. 103-105, 129-131.

³¹ "Policy without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game," Stanford Law Review, Vol. 14 (1962), pp. 284-327.

³² The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, p. 226.

³³ In the discussion that follows, the first of each pair of frequencies will be that for the positive value and the second will be for the negative; for the content variables, the frequency for ambivalent scores appears in parentheses between the marginals.

²⁴ This and the subsequent findings in the text at this point are based on the chi square onesample test (two-tailed).

sions (572) involved the political variable and another third (551) the economic variable.³⁵ Comparison of these two samples suggests that although the present sample is quite typical of the period in which Jackson was a member of the Court, in the relative importance of liberalism and conservatism to other attitudinal dimensions, Jackson showed a marked affinity for writing opinions in cases raising the economic issue: the difference between the total of 85 political votes and 117 economic votes is significant at the .001 level.

His verbal behavior is in sharp contrast to his voting behavior, however. He favored the liberal political value significantly 35-(30)-16, while apportioning his support for the economic content variable with seeming impartiality 42-(24)-38. One might well conclude that Jackson gave verbal support to civil liberty while giving his voting support to economic conservatism.

For Jackson it made a difference, however, whether the civil liberties claimant opposed the national or a state government. The overall marginals for the political content variable disguise the fact that his support for civil liberty claims against the national government, 30-(13)-7, was accompanied by a negative deference toward state civil liberty claimants, 6-(20)-11. If the 2:1 ratio of national to state cases had been reversed, Jackson's verbal support for political liberalism might have appeared to be just as impartial as his support for the economic content variable. In regard to economic content, however, the differences in his support of national [19-(6)-10] and of state [21-(14)-5] regulation of business seem less important—although the latter is statistically significant and the former is not-than the opposite direction of his remarks concerning the anti-monopoly component of the economic variable: Jackson favored the negative value (pro-monopoly) 14-(7)-30, and some of the most incisive language in his opinions upholds the virtues of free enterprise and denounces the vices of organized labor. So the fact that the most proximate prelude to his Nuremberg manifesto was his thinly veiled public attack upon Black in a labor relations case is doubtless no accident.36 And the seeming balance of Jackson's verbal support regarding the economic content variable results from the admixture of his generally liberal remarks about both national and state government regulation of business, and his generally conservative views toward labor-management relationships.

On issues of federalism, Jackson tended to favor states rights (decentralization: N—), but not significantly so, 23-(9)-30. In regard to the three variables which involve the Court's participation in policy-making, however, he gave quite one-sided and significant verbal support to the negative values, favoring restraint in Supreme Court policy-making (P—) 33-(80)-117; deference to lower-court policy-making (J—) 19-(38)-80; and deference to policy-making by the Executive and Congress (A—) 18-(16)-35. He also manifested significantly negative deference toward litigants (X—) 39-(15)-65.

The remaining three variables could not be included in the correlational analysis, for the technical reasons mentioned earlier. Although most of his remarks about lawyers and their role were favorable 13-(2)-5, he discussed this subject so infrequently that the difference between his favorable and unfavorable statements is of only marginal statistical significance. His sympathy for the public interest 56-(1)-1 and his antipathy for his colleagues 7-(6)-154, to the contrary, are both highly significant statistically. Indeed, the extremity of the division of the marginals for the public interest variable suggests that the phrase "the public interest" had no substantive attitudinal content for Jackson, and that, instead, he employed it as a benediction or malediction for any other subject about which he wanted to speak with favor or disfavor.37 This view finds support in an examination of the four-fold tables for the public interest and other variables, which reveals that his most frequent affirmations of the public interest occurred in opinions in which he urged judicial restraint cr was deferential to lower court judges, or nondeferential to litigants or to his colleagues. His zeal for the public interest was most articulate in relationship to his discussion of ideas that he favored and of the behavior of other people with whom he disagreed: ideas that he approved were identified with the public interest, and persons whom he criticized were stigmatized as behaving contrary to the public interest.

Jackson's favorite subjects for discussion in all of his opinions were judicial restraint and his colleagues. This is hardly surprising; we might well expect Supreme Court justices to be introspective about their role, and sensitive to their inter-personal relationships, especially in

³⁵ The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, p. 148.

³⁶ Jewell Ridge Coal Co. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U. S. 897-898 (June 18, 1945); Gerhart, *America's Advocate*, op. cil. fn. 2, supra, pp. 247-253.

²⁷ Cf. Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (New York, 1960).

the context of essays whose function is to establish the rectitude of one's own ideas and the erroneous thinking of one's associates. However, it is customary, for this very reason, for Supreme Court justices (like congressmen) to bend over backwards to observe the formal marks of courtesy; the usual form of address of a justice who is about to impale a colleague is to refer to him as "brother," and to express extreme respect for his views. Jackson rarely bothered to observe such amenities. As we noted earlier, he was a very candid man; and indeed, "candor" and "rationality" were the words he mentioned most frequently when showing negative deference to his colleagues. He combined remarks critical of his colleagues with advocacy of policy restraint in over a fourth of his opinions; this was the highest association for any pair of variables. He also frequently associated anti-colleague remarks with affirmations of the public interest and with deference to lower courts.

The Correlation Matrix. Table I shows the four-fold tables and the correlation matrix for the content variables. One weakness that is probably inherent in the use of the method of content analysis, at least with this type of data, is evident in the four-fold tables: the size of the observed frequencies often is small (the numbers in the cells are low), notwithstanding the

fact that the observations were based upon a set of over three hundred opinions. This reflects, of course, the circumstance that judicial opinions are written selectively, and the issues raised by discrete cases are so delimited by the screening processes of lower appellate court review and Supreme Court jurisdictional decision-making that no justice finds it necessary or appropriate to discuss all of his attitudes in all of his opinions. In effect, each opinion of a justice defines a subset which includes a sample drawn from the universal set of all his attitudes.

As already noted, the marginal distributions for the variables show that Jackson favored the negative (or deference) value for all except the political and economic variables. Hence it might seem convenient to identify these other five variables by short titles which would emphasize their negative values. It happens, however, that almost all of their intercorrelations are negative or zero—of course, the correlation between (A-, J-) is identical to that between (A+, J+)—and the correlation between (C+, E+) also is negative. It seems more important, therefore, to maximize (as Table II does) the positive correlations in the matrix in order to facilitate the cluster analysis. That is best accomplished by reversing the polarity of E and N only. And questions of format aside,

TABLE I. FOUR-FOLD TABLES AND PHI CORRELATION MATRIX

Variable Name	\{\bar{Number}{Symbol}	6 N+	7 A+	8 J+	10 X+	13 P+	14 C+	15 E+
	W	AL PARAMETERS	- +	- +	- +	- +	- +	- +
Federal Cen- tralization	N+	+	3 0 3 3	4 3 7 5	3 0 7 5	11 2 8 3	$\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 \\ 2 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$	1 5 2 4
Judicial Review	A +	50	+	7 0 7 0	6 5 11 4	3 0 13 0	1 5 3 3	2 4 4 6
Judicial Cen- tralization	J+	.01	.00	+	3 3 21 6	8 1 27 9	0 2 3 3	1 2 9 7
Pro Litigants	X+	35	.20	.24	+ -	20 4 21 5	1 7 8 6	$\begin{bmatrix} 7 & 2 \\ 4 & 9 \end{bmatrix}$
Judicial Activism	P+	15	.00	13	03	+	1 4 7 16	4 3 16 15
Political Liberalism	C+	58	.35	.45	.44	.09	+	3 1 0 4
Economic Liberalism	E+	.19	.07	.17	46	04	78	

TABLE II. THE TRANSFORMED CORRELATION MATRIX

Value	Short titles	JUDCEN	PROLIT	ECONS	POLIB	FEDECEN	JUDREV	JUDACT
Name	Symbol	J+	X +	E-	C+	N -	A +	P+
Judicial Cen- tralization	J+		.24	17	.45	*	*	*
Pro Litigants	X+	. 24		.46	.44	.35	.20	*
Economic Conservation	sm E-	17	.46		.78	. 19	*	*
Political Liberalism	C+	.45	.44	.78		.58	.35	*
Federal Dece tralization	n- N	*	.35	. 19	.58		.50	*
Judicial Review	A +	*	.20	*	.35	. 50	•	*
Judicial Activism	P+	*	*	*	*	*	*	
* ≤±.15								

all the statistical relationships remain unaffected by such a transformation.

The relationships shown by the correlation coefficients are quite compatible with intuitive expectations. Using the short titles given in Table II, JUDCEN, for instance, is associated with POLIB (support for civil liberties) and PROLIT (sympathy for litigants)-in the latter instance, for the perfectly sensible reason that in most opinions in which he discussed both subjects, Jackson combined deference to the lower court with remarks hostile to the litigant who was seeking to upset its decision. The zero correlation between JUDCEN and JUDREV demonstrates that Jackson's attitude toward judicial review of the decisionmaking of lower courts was perfectly independent of his attitude toward judicial review of the decision-making of Congress and the Administration. Similarly, his attitude toward federalism was independent of his attitude toward lower courts, which shows that he discriminated sharply between what were for him the disparate policy issues of centralization in the government generally, and within the judicial hierarchy; otherwise, we should expect to find a high positive correlation between J+ and N+.

Table II shows that the other two content values most closely related to judicial policy-making (A+ and P+) are independent of each other and (like J+) not very closely associated with the remaining four variables, among which intercorrelation tends to be highest. We might well infer from this that Jackson's attitude toward activism and restraint in policy-making by the Supreme Court, although often articulated with intensity and fervor, had very little to do with his attitudes toward the other content variables. This inference suggests that the Supreme Court policy-making variable functioned for him like the public interest and colleagues variables: all of these were useful as verbal symbols that he could manipulate in support of other values to which he attached greater substantive significance, and which were probably much more important in shaping his decision-making.

JUDREV has its highest correlations with FEDECEN and POLIB. Both of these are intuitively sensible relationships. Jackson never argued in favor of judicial review of presiden-




FIGURE 1. Primary and secondary elementary linkage among content values

tial or congressional action (or spoke favorably of a litigant) in an opinion in which he also centralization of governmental defended power; and in the civil liberties cases, he urged judicial review most often when upholding the rights of claimants. His attitude toward the constitutional autonomy of the other two branches was substantially independent of his views on economic policy, however, and the very low or zero correlations with the remaining variables suggest that for Jackson the only legitimate justifications for judicial supremacy were in defense of states' rights and civil liberties. POLIB itself correlates at .35 or better with all except one of the other variables; while the economic variable correlates as highly as this only with one other variable (PROLIT) besides POLIB.

cluster analysis confirm what seems obvious from an examination of the face of the correlation matrix.38 The simplest of these methods, which focuses upon the primary and secondary levels of interrelationships, is McQuitty's Elementary Linkage Analysis.39 ELA shows, for each variable, which other is most highly correlated with it, as signified by a solid directional arrow in the paradigm above; second

highest relationships are depicted by broken directional arrows: and reciprocal relationships are portrayed by pairs of apposite halfarrows.

FIGURE 1 shows that the closest association is between POLIB and ECONS; and that PROLIT is most closely related to ECONS, JUDCEN with POLIB; while JUDREV and JUDACT both are functions of FEDECEN, which in turn is most closely related to POLIB.

Observation of the secondary linkages brings out more clearly the principal cluster relationships. There are three important and interlocking clusters: (X+, E-, C+), (E-, C+, N-), and (C+, N-, A+). PROLIT and JUDREV are linked through the (E-, C+) and (C+, N-) pairs, respectively; and the (E-, C+, N-) triple is the central element in the structure. All the other values have either primary or secondary links with POLIB, which serves as the cornerstone. The two least well integrated values are J+ and P+: judicial review of lower courts is advocated most frequently in conjunction with support for civil liberty and litigant deference, while JUDACT is oriented toward POLIB and FEDECEN.

What the above analysis fails adequately to emphasize is the low level of association between economic conservatism and federal decentralization, which is, however, made quite evident by the alternative methods of Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis (HSA) and Rank Order Typal Analysis (ROTA).40 HSA defines

The Cluster Analysis. Various methods of

³⁸ See Edgar F. Borgatta, "On Analyzing Correlation Matrices: Some New Emphases," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 22 (1958-59), pp. 516-528.

⁸⁹ See fn. 15, supra.

⁴⁰ Idem.

Factors	I*	\mathbf{II}	III*	IV*	I'*	II
Values						
JUDCEN	.28	56	.63	.47	.00	.00
PROLIT	.69	24	.00	11	.26	.09
ECONS	.68	27	66	18	.97	10
POLIB	.94	17	03	.14	.82	.24
FEDECEN	.71	.49	.15	04	.17	.27
JUDREV	.47	.58	.48	23	.01	.97
JUDACT	.10	.47	38	.77	.03	01

TABLE III. PRINCIPAL AXES AND VARIMAX FACTORS

(X+, E-, C+, N-) as the only important quadruple.

ROTA, which is the method most sensitive to intransitivity of relationships, suggests first the (E-, C+) double; next the (X+, E-, C+) triple; and then the (X+, E-, C+, N-) quadruple. The only intransitivity for the triple is a function of the trivial difference between POLIB's correlation of .45 with J+, as compared to its .44 correlation with X+; the only other intransitivity is the previously mentioned low .19 between E- and N-. ROTA confirms that the three policy-making values (J+, A+, and P+) are poorly associated, either with the cluster of four or with each other.

Cluster analysis directs attention to the integrative role of political liberalism in the structure of Jackson's attitudes. The most general finding would be that there is one primary cluster, composed of litigant deference, economic conservatism, political liberalism, and federal decentralization. There are also two overlapping subclusters: JUDREV with POLIB and FEDECEN; and JUDCEN with POLIB and PROLIT. ECONS has important associations only with POLIB and PROLIT. The intercorrelations among E-, C+, and X+ are the only ones statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence.

The Factor Analysis. I have assumed that factor analysis might reveal certain latent relationships among the content variables, but that the latent structure ought, of course, to be consistent with the manifest structure developed by cluster analysis. Six factors were extracted, and 85 per cent of the variance was accounted for by the first four axes. Varimax rotation loaded most of the variance on the first two rotated axes, and upon a sixth factor which emphasized the same three variables as did the second. In Table III the four principal axes are designated by roman numerals, and the two rotated factors by roman numerals with prime (') marks; reversed factors are designated by asterisks.

Table III shows the first principal axis to be clearly one of political liberalism, and the third to be predominately one of economic conservatism joined with deference to lower courts. The second and fourth axes focus more upon the policy-making values: the second pairs judicial review with judicial decentralization, and federal decentralization with judicial activism; while the fourth is mostly concerned with judicial activism and judicial centralization. None of these relationships appear to be illogical or inconsistent. Jackson's attitude toward civil liberty appears strongly related to his states' rights sentiments, his attitude toward civil liberties claimants, and his economic conservatism; the three policy-making values are much less important to his political liberalism. Certainly, as the third axis suggests, it is sensible that at the time when Jackson was on the Court, he should associate economic conservatism with deference to lower court decisionmaking. Similarly, it is plausible for the third axis to associate judicial review of executivelegislative policy-making with both judicial activism and the decentralization of judicial policy-making (since the lower federal and state courts then were probably more conservative than the Supreme Court); but of course judicial centralization is also a sensible adjunct to activism in Supreme Court policy-making.

Only two relationships worth mentioning are shown by the fifth and sixth axes (which are not reproduced here). PROLIT correlates — .67, and POLIB .33, with V*, indicating that Jackson by no means sympathized with all claimants even when he wrote and voted in support of their civil liberty claims—and names such as Rosenberg, Beauharnais, and Guy W. Ballard ("alias Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King") come readily to mind as examples. On VI, FEDECEN is .49 and JUDREV — .40, suggesting that Jackson frequently advocated judicial restraint toward state executive-legislative policy-making.

The varimax factors denote the same two

clusters of triples that we observed through cluster analysis: the first (X+, E-, C+) on I', and the second (C+, N-, A+) on II'. Factor I' shows that Jackson's extremely high degree of economic conservatism was associated with a favorable attitude toward civil liberty, a moderate amount of sympathy for litigants, and a lesser degree of states' rights sentiment. Stated otherwise, his liberal attitude toward personal rights was in contradiction to his conservative attitude toward property rights. The inconsistency may lie, however, in contemporary notions of liberalism rather than in Jackson's thinking. To favor civil liberty means to oppose governmental control of personal rights, while to favor economic liberalism means to support governmental control of property rights. Jackson, therefore, was consistent in his support of both the personal and the property rights of the individual, in opposition to governmental control. He was, in short, more a classic Nineteenth Century than a modern Twentieth Century liberal.41

It may seem surprising, at least at first blush, to discover that the author of a book entitled The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy,42 in which he vigorously attacked his immediate predecessors on the Court for their economic conservatism and defense of an out-moded ideology, should become a judge whose most pronounced attitude was one of empathy with John Stuart Mill rather than with John Maynard Keynes. But Jackson the judge did not hesitate to dissociate himself from what he once characterized as "earlier partisan advocacy"; as he remarked in the Steel Seizure Case, à propos a policy statement he had issued as Attorney General, "a judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested parties [i.e., the previous, not the then occupant of the office of President of the United States! as authority in answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself."43 Of course, the correctness of this appraisal rests upon the assumption that Jackson did change, in his official behavior, from an economic liberal to an economic conservative, a proposition that we shall test below.

The close correspondence between the cluster and factorial findings is further demonstrated by Figure 2, which depicts the three most important planes in which we can observe the relationships among the content values and between their major clusters.

In the liberalism plane, the first cluster is a

prominent substructure in the configuration; and although this cluster includes what clearly appear to be a majority of the values that were most important to him, these are not the values that Jackson seems to emphasize in his valedictory, the Godkin Lectures. 44 There Jackson advocates, instead, primarily political liberalism and the three values aligned with it in the first quadrant of the liberalism plane: federal decentralization, judicial review, and judicial centralization.

Judicial activism is the most extremely positioned value in the policy-making plane, in which the second cluster appears prominently. If JUDCEN were replaced by the negative value for that variable, it (JUDECEN) would appear in the fourth quadrant of the plane, immediately below JUDREV, confirming our earlier observation that in deferring to states rights, Jackson argued that judicial review of state policy-making should be left to the lower courts. But both major clusters are centered around and not far from the origin of the space, which confirms graphically our previous observation that Jackson's advocacy of judicial activism-or restraint-was virtually independent of the crux of his system of values.

In the plane defined by the two rotated factors, both major clusters appear in the first quadrant, with the first cluster loaded primarily on the first rotated axis, and the second cluster loaded primarily on the second axis. Here, judicial review is independent of economic conservatism, and political liberalism is the most important correlate for both of them. From this perspective, neither judicial centralization nor judicial activism has any bearing upon the values in the two clusters.

It was anticipated that factor analysis would reveal latent relationships more subtle than those made manifest by cluster analysis. Clearly, the factorial analysis confirms very strongly the cluster findings, while at the same time adding detail, depth, and clarity to the perception of the interrelationships among the values. One additional finding, that cluster analysis did not denote, is most apparent in FIGURE 2. FEDECEN and PROLIT appear closely associated with each other, as well as with POLIB, in both liberalism planes; and this is also true of the policy-making plane, but with the difference that in the latter perspective, they constitute (with ECONS) the values that are least associated with the function of judicial policy-making.

VI. THE TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES
We turn now to an examination of the sub-

⁴¹ Cf. The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, p. 201.

⁴² Op. cit. fn. 19, supra.

⁴⁵ Concurring in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 647 (1952).

⁴⁴ Op. cit. fn. 23, supra.




FIGURE 2. Three perspectives of the value configuration

stantive findings in relation to the set of hypotheses stated earlier.

(1) The cluster analysis findings denoted two overlapping clusters: (X+, E-, C+) and (C+, N-, A+). Other research in Supreme Court voting behavior has identified attitudes toward C and E as the two most basic attitudinal dimensions for the justices as a group.45 Voting data for the Court as a whole, collected by terms, do not provide sufficient depth to make possible cumulative scaling of all the content variables discussed in the present study, based as it is upon the pooling of opinion data for a dozen terms. However, other evidence suggests that N, A, and J are scalable variables.46 The only cluster element that shows up more importantly in Jackson's opinion-writing behavior than in the voting of the justices as a group is the litigant variable.

There is nothing irrational or illogical about the cluster associations. Traditional scholarship discusses and finds much ambiguity in Jackson's views on issues of economic policy, civil liberty, and centralization; but traditional scholarship has little to say about Jackson's views toward judicial review of lower courts, since the usual concern is with "substantive" rather than jurisdictional decision-making; and it has nothing whatever to say about Jackson's attitudes toward litigants, since there is no relevant legal category to encompass this ("bias" means something quite different, in legal parlance)—the fiction being that judges' decisions are not affected by their attitudes toward the parties litigant. Our clusters, therefore, seem meaningful; they are internally consistent; and they reveal relationships that transcend the accepted lore about Jackson's "philosophy as a judge." No basis appears for rejecting Hypothesis 1.

(2) Hypothesis 2 states that the latent attitudinal dimensions revealed by factor analysis will correspond to the scaling and factorial attitudinal dimensions that independent research has identified as common for the Court during the period in which Jackson served. The scaling and factor research in the attitudes of the whole Court covers the period of the 1946-62 Terms, which includes the last eight terms of Jackson's tenure. These data show that Jackson's average rank was between fourth and fifth on C and between eighth and ninth on E.47 In relation to the seventeen other justices who were on the Court during the period 1946-63, Jackson ranked 10th on political liberalism, and 17th on economic liberalism. 48 Evidently he was a political moderate but an economic conservative in his attitudes, as one would infer from his voting behavior in relation to his colleagues. Moreover, in that behavior and during that period, Jackson was a moderate on a Court that became more conservative, as a group, toward civil liberty; and he was a conservative on a Court that became more liberal, as a group, toward economic policy.

The political and the economic variables were the two most important attitudinal scales for the justices as a group, throughout the 1946-63 period. Many justices are liberals, and some are conservatives, on both scales; but it is precisely because other justices are (like Jackson) more liberal toward political than economic issues—or, like Tom Clark, politically conservative but economically moderate—that two scales are necessary in order adequately to measure the similarities and differences among the justices with regard to the major components of modern liberalism.

Once comparisons are made between his voting in the political and economic cases in which he wrote opinions, and his rank position on the general C and E voting scales, it becomes relevant to inquire whether the votes with opinions constitute a representative sample of the universes of political and economic voting data. Although, as we noted earlier, the sample is representative to the extent that it includes the same ratio of C and E votes, to total votes, as does the universe of voting data, this finding does not inform us concerning the correspondence between the direction of those votes, in the sample and in the universe.49 For the political variables, the ratios of liberal to total votes are .67 for the sample and .34 for the universe, during the period before the 1945 Term; and .50 (sample) and .34 (universe) thereafter. The ratios for the entire period of twelve terms are .53 and .34. For the economic variable, the corresponding ratios are .57 and .43 (before the 1945 Term), .26 and .13 (afterward), and .39 and .26 (overall). Taking into consideration the different frequency sums to which these ratios relate, and using a two-tailed test, the difference is significant (at < .05) between all pairs of ratios except for economic voting during the earlier subperiod—and even that difference is

⁴⁹ The data for voting in decisions with opinion are reported in Table V; for the marginal distributions for all Jackson's votes in decisions on the merits of the political and economic scale variables, see fn. 56 and 57. A comparison of these two sources shows that for those (non-sample) cases in which he wrote no opinion, the voting marginals (before and after the 1945 Term) are: for C, 11-36 and 37-104; and for E, 40-66 and 8-127.

⁴⁵ The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, ch. 5.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 146-157.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 104–107, 130–133.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 125, 145.

significant, if we compare Jackson's voting in cases with opinion with his voting in cases in which he wrote no opinion. Evidently, Jackson voted consistently more liberally on both political and economic issues, in the cases in which he wrote opinions, than when he voted without opinion. This (one might infer) may have been for the very good reason that he chose to write separate opinions, or was assigned the opinion of the Court, in those cases in which he was prepared to take what was for him a relatively liberal position.⁵⁰ But we must likewise conclude that in his overall decisional behavior, Jackson was even more conservative than he appears to be on the basis of the present analysis of the cases in which he wrote opinions. Jackson also tended to be more liberal in his opinion-writing than in his voting toward either C or E, although these differences are only marginally significant at about .10 (two-tailed). The data are suggestive, therefore, of a consistent scalar relationship for both variables: that Jackson was most liberal in his opinions; that he was relatively moderate in his voting in cases in which he wrote opinions, and that he was most conservative in his voting in the cases in which he wrote no opinions.

Since Jackson's verbal support for civil liberty was more extreme than his voting support, while his verbal support for economic conservatism was less extreme than his voting support. we should interpret Factor I of Table III as indicating for Jackson a more favorable attitude to political liberalism, and a less extreme attitude of economic conservatism, than are suggested by scaling and factor analysis based on observations of his voting behavior. There is certainly nothing inconsistent, however, between the two sets of data; to the contrary they reinforce each other strongly, and the more so once we recognize the apparently consistent differentials between his verbal and his voting behavior.

Both factors I and I' show Jackson's political and economic attitudes to be functions of a single factor of liberalism. Factor analysis of voting data for the Court shows precisely the same thing, with the difference that observations for a set of nine justices make it possible to relate cumulative scales, representing the C and E variables, to the reference axes in factorial space. Typically, the C and E scales are highly correlated with the first centroid axis, which appears as the mean between the scales.⁵¹ As

noted above. Jackson in relation to his colleagues was a moderate on civil liberties but the most extreme conservative on the Court on economic issues (although Whittaker, who joined the Court after Jackson's death, was even more extreme in economic conservatism). This attitudinal combination of political moderation and economic conservatism has been identified with the ideological type Pragmatic Conservatism; and among the eighteen justices who served during the seventeen-term period 1946-1963, Jackson ranked 13th on liberalism but second on the pragmatism dimension-on which he was exceeded only by Goldberg (for whom only the data of a single term were available).52 Pragmatism was there defined as a function of the component ideologies of individualism and libertarianism; and on the individualism factor, Jackson typically ranked very high-in five of the eight terms, 1946-1953, he ranked first.53

Jackson can best be characterized, on the basis of his voting in relationship to his colleagues, as ideologically a pragmatic, individualistic conservative; and attitudinally as a political moderate and economic conservative. Nothing revealed by the present study is inconsistent with calling him a conservative judge with a high regard for individualism and pragmatism. These are all qualities which have been stressed as typical of him, by previous commentators upon his philosophy. Barnett concludes that "His general position has been individualistic, pragmatic, hard to predict, middle-of-the-road, and, on balance, conservative."54 Weidner characterizes his approach to civil liberties as "pragmatic." Jackson himself, incidentally, cited William James in a pro civil liberty opinion55—and James is hardly an authority frequently invoked by Supreme Court iustices.

It is true that the latent voting-factor ideologies are different from the second, third, and fourth opinion-content factors, which relate to manifest attitudes. On the other hand, we have found significant differences between his verbal behavior and his voting behavior in general; and this destroys any empirical basis for the essumption (underlying Hypothesis 2) that the attitudes revealed by Jackson's opinions neces-

⁵⁰ Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941) [concurring opinion]; and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). [opinion of the Court]

⁵¹ The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, pp. 209-217.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 262, 266, 271.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 204, 224.

⁵⁴ Barnett, op. cit. fn. 2, supra, p. 241. Cf. the works, all there cited, of the following authors: Fairman at p. 487; Gerhart, "A Decade of Mr. Justice Jackson," at pp. 969, 971; Jaffe at pp. 992-993; Nielson at pp. 384, 401-403; and Weidner at p. 593.

⁵⁵ United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 93 (1944).

sarily would correspond to the attitudes inferred from his general voting behavior. The manifest opinion factors are a function of the means he employed to proffer a formal rationalization for a small portion of his total votes, and frequently, in direct relationship with small groups (and often, with none) of his colleagues: the latent voting factors are a function of his conjoint relaship with all his colleagues. Neither the strategies nor the tactics nor the processes that govern opinion-writing and voting are the same. The opinion-factors tell us what was most common in the relationships among Jackson's manifest attitudes in what he chose to write "for the record"; while the voting factors inform us what was most common among the latent ideologies of all the justices-Jackson plus eight colleagues. What we ought reasonably to have expected, in comparing two such sets of factors, was not congruence, but the absence of inconsistency.

The first factor—liberalism—is the same for both sets. The subsequent opinion factors represent attitudes that were important for Jackson in the cases in which he wrote opinions, and which were fundamental components of his personal system of values; but these were not values accepted as the most important criteria for decision by enough of his colleagues, so as to appear as important components of the first three (at least) factors common to the justices as a group in their voting over the period of the past two decades.

We conclude that there is certainly no basis for the complete rejection of Hypothesis 2. It cannot be confirmed in its entirety in the form stated, but the reason lies in the ineptitude of our formulation of the hypothesis rather than in any basic inconsistency in the two sets of factor data. Hypothesis 2 must therefore be partially rejected, but our test of it has not been unfruitful. The present intensive study of the opinions of a single justice, and the related extensive studies of the voting behavior of the Court as a group differ in many respects methodologically; yet, to the extent that they may

TABLE IV. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG VALUES
AND VOTES FOR THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
VARIABLES

		Va	lues	===
		<i>E</i> .	c .	
		- +	<u> </u>	
	c +	3 2 0 3	2 23 10 4	
V o t	$ \phi = X^2 = p $	600	.659 16.95 <.005	
e 8	$E \stackrel{+}{-}$	$\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 23 \\ 23 & 6 \end{array}$	1 1 1 1	
	$ \phi = X^2 = p $.751 29.92 <.0005	.000 [Fisher's] = .833	

appropriately be compared, they are in very substantial agreement.

(3) Hypothesis 3 assumes a significantly high positive correlation between Jackson's opinions and votes, in support of the political and the economic content-variables. Table IV shows that the correlation between values and votes (1) for political liberalism is positive and moderately high, and (2) for economic liberalism also is positive and slightly higher. Conversely, the cross correlation between political values and economic votes is zero, and between economic values and political votes it is negative and moderately high.

These correlations were calculated from only that part of the complete data in which the voting and the content variables were observed to occur together in the same decisions. Table V reports the sets of marginals for all votes and content-values for both C and E, for each of the three major time periods.

On the basis of the demonstrated relationships between content-values and votes, for

TABLE V. MARGINAL FREQUENCIES OF VALUES AND VOTES FOR THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES, BY MAJOR PERIODS

		194	L-44			194	6-49			195	0-53	
	. ()]	3	(2]	E	(2]	E
	+		+	***	+	-	+	_	+		+	
Values Votes	5 10	2 5	19 28	10 21	13 13	6 15	11 8	14 25	17 22	8 20	12 10	14 25

~			······································	~~		~		T3 (0)	T (4)	77./2
Content	N	A	J	X	Р	С	E	E(3) (National)	E(4) (State)	E(5) (Monopoly)
Opinion	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -
Institutional	12 13	5 14	8 44	13 34	17 48	9 7	25 8	10 0	13 0	10 9
Concurring	6 3	2 7	4 12	2 8	7 14	10 5	4 2	3 2	1 0	0 0
Dissenting	5 14	10 13	7 23	23 21	8 54	15 4	13 28	68	7 5	4 2

TABLE VI. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CONTENT AND OPINION VARIABLES

both variables, I conclude that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.

(4) Hypothesis 4 supposes no significant differences between Jackson's content-values as articulated in concurring and in dissenting opinions, but expects them as between institutional and separate opinions. For purposes of the analysis below, "majority opinions" include both institutional and concurring opinions; "separate opinions" include both concurring and dissenting opinions; and institutional opinions continue to mean opinions for the Court. The data to be discussed are reported in Table VI.

We shall also examine an alternative Hypothesis 4', which states the orthodox view: that there will be significant differences between majority and dissenting opinions (and, by implication, not otherwise).

In general, the first part of Hypothesis 4that concurring and dissenting opinions will show no significant differences in content-values —cannot be disproved statistically by our data. None of the differences is significant at the .05 level of confidence. For content-variable N. the significance level is only slightly greater than .10 (two-tailed), and for P, it is less than .10 but greater than .05; these differences might be considered marginally significant. Jackson distinctly tended to argue for decentralization when he dissented. The difference for P is even more pronounced, however, when majority and dissenting opinions are compared; so the latter interpretation seems the more important one. For none of the variables, then, are differences between concurring and dissenting opinions statistically significant; and one of the two marginal contrasts is less important than another relationship to be considered below.

It is much easier, of course, to fail to find significant differences than to find them; so the test for the second part of the hypothesis is much the more important of the two tests. None of the differences between institutional opinions and concurrences is significant. There are significant differences between institutional opinions and dissents for E (and its component subvariables) and for X, and there are margin-

ally significant differences for P; but most of these differences are even greater when majority opinions are compared with dissents, so as before I shall assume that the latter interpretation should be preferred.

Institutional opinions were also compared with separate opinions, but nothing new was revealed by this examination. The frequencies for concurrences are so much lower than for dissents that practically all of the differences that appear must be attributed to the effect of the latter variable; and the differences observed are of the same order as those discussed immediately above. I find no significant differences that properly can be construed as appertaining to a comparison of institutional opinions with concurring or dissenting opinions, let alone both. Consequently, Hypothesis 4 must be rejected.

Significant differences emerge, however, between majority and dissenting opinions, for economic liberalism and each of its three component variables (freedom from national restraint of economic liberty, freedom from state restraint of economic liberty, and pro business monopoly), at confidence levels ranging from less than .05 to less than .001, two-tailed.

Two other variables also show significant differences. Jackson was anti-litigant in his majority opinions, and ambivalent in dissent; and also significant is his tendency to argue for policy activism in majority more than in dissenting opinions. Thus, almost half of the variables show important differences in Jackson's opinion behavior when he voted with the majority as compared to when he dissented. I conclude that alternative Hypothesis 4' is partially confirmed by these data; to the extent that significant differences appear in Jackson's opinion behavior, they support the traditional view that a dissenting judge articulates his attitudes more outspokenly than one who votes with the majority. My own hypothesis, which was inferred from socio-psychological theory, is not supported by the evidence of this study.

(5) Hypothesis 5 consists of a set of more specific hypotheses about changes in Jackson's opinion and voting behavior, in response to

what are assumed to have been critical events in his career.

5.1. This hypothesis states that Jackson became increasingly more conservative the longer he remained on the Court; and we have stipulated that, in order to confirm it, the data must provide evidence of progressive change through each of three major time periods. The data to test this hypothesis are contained in Table V, supra. Our present interest is in a comparison of the marginal distributions, between periods, for each of the four variables (political content-values, political votes, economic content-values, and economic votes).

For political content-values, no significant differences are evident between periods; while for political votes and economic content-values change occurs, and in the predicted direction, but only between the first and second periods, and even then it is not significant. For economic votes also, change occurs in the predicted direction between the first and second periods, and it is significant at less than .005; but no significant difference is discernible between the second and third periods. Therefore, the data for none of these four variables confirm the hypothesis; if Jackson became more conservative we must seek some other explanation than aging in office to account for it.

5.2. Was there a significant increase in Jackson's dissenting behavior after his failure to obtain the Chief Justiceship? Before the 1946 Term, the ratio of Jackson's majority to dissenting opinions was 69:24; thereafter it was 120:89. The difference between the ratios for the two periods is significant at <.005 (using X² and a one-tailed test). The percentage of his dissents was 26 in the earlier period, and 43 in the later one. Jackson's rate of dissent increased by two-thirds after the 1945 Term, but was quite stable thereafter: 44 per cent for the period of the 1946-1949 Terms, and 42 per cent thereafter. Of course, the causal relationship implied by this hypothesis rests upon inference only; it will be no more persuasive than the reasons adduced to support it. The data confirm the descriptive portion of the hypothesis, however, and we cannot reject the hypothesis on the basis of these findings.

5.3. Did Jackson become more conservative in his attitude toward civil liberties, after his experience as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg? Evidently not: when the data for the 1946-49 and 1950-53 periods (Table V) are combined, the direction of change is right for both content-values and votes, but X^2 is only 0.03 and 1.38, respectively, and neither of these is significant even for a one-tailed test. This hypothesis is not confirmed by these data.⁵⁶

5.4. Did Jackson become more conservative in his attitude toward economic issues after the end of World War II? Again, Table V provides the relevant data. The change is in the right direction, for both the content value and voting and it is significant at <.05 in both instances -for voting, indeed, p < .0005.57 The relative frequency of his expressions of economic conservatism increased by about two-thirds after the 1945 Term: by 62 per cent (from 34 per cent to 55 per cent) for the content value and by 72 per cent (from 43 per cent to 74 per cent) for voting. The percentages of economic conservatism for the second and third periods are 56 and 54 per cent for the content values, and 76 and 71 per cent for voting. This shows that both his opinion and his voting behavior were highly stable, in regard to this variable, after his return to the Court in 1946. Since the direction of both his verbal and his voting support was E+ during the first period and was Ethereafter, it seems warranted to infer that Jackson was an economic liberal during his first four terms on the Court, and an economic conservative thereafter. As in the case of Hypothesis 5.2, the causal portion of the present hypothesis rests upon inference from biographical data but the objective fact of a significant

TABLE VII. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES, BEFORE AND AFTER THE END OF THE 1948 TERM

		(2			3	E	
Period	Val	ues —	Vo	tes	Va +	lues —	Vo +	tes —
1941–44, 1946–48 1949–53	14 21	7 9	20 25	16 24	27 15	19 19	32 14	37 34

⁵⁶ For all Jackson's votes on the merits (including decisions in which he wrote no opinions), the marginals for the political variable are 21-41 for the period before the 1945 Term, and 72-139 thereafter. X² for these two ratios is 0.013, which indicates that the goodness of fit is significant at >.95. Certainly these data confirm the refutation of this hypothesis.

⁵⁷ For all Jackson's votes (including decisions in which he wrote no opinions), the marginals for the economic variable are 68-87 for the period before the 1945 Term, and 26-177 thereafter. X² for these two ratios is 32.5, which indicates that the increase in the conservatism of his voting on economic issues is significant at <.0005, irrespective of whether or not he wrote opinions to rationalize his votes.

shift in Jackson's official behavior in relation to economic policy, which coincided with the World War II period and its aftermath, seems indisputable. The hypothesis cannot be rejected on the basis of these data and findings.

5.5. Our final hypothesis is obviously in contradiction with the preceding hypotheses 5.1, 5.3, and 5.4, each of which assumed that Jackson became more conservative in his attitudes toward either civil liberty or economic issues, or both, during the period following his return to the Court from a year's leave of absence. Hypothesis 5.5 states that Jackson became more liberal, in regard to both civil liberty and economic issues, after the deaths of Murphy and Rutledge. The test for this hypothesis requires the partitioning of the data into two sets: the 1941–44, 1946–48 Terms; and the 1949–53 Terms.

Only the political content-value changes in the predicted direction; and this change is so minimal that the goodness of fit of the two marginal distributions is significant at >.97 (with $X^2 < .003$)! Not only are the changes for the other three variables in the wrong direction; economic voting is significantly more conservative although, as we have seen, this change began earlier, as demonstrated by the even higher X2 for change toward economic conservatism after the 1944 Term. But the fact that this hypothesis must so clearly be rejected is not without interest. Jackson's rank in voting in support of civil liberty shifted abruptly from sixth to fourth, after Murphy and Rutledge left the Court.58 It would be possible for an analyst working only with the C scale data to interpret this shift in rank as evidence that he changed in his attitude, toward increasing sympathy for civil liberty, during his last five terms on the

⁵⁸ The Judicial Mind, op. cit. fn. 11, supra, pp. 105, 113-115.

TABLE VIII. SUMMARY OF TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

Hypot sis	he- Subject	De- cision
1	Clusters	+
2	Factors	0
3	Equivalence of liberalism content- values and votes	+
4	Institutional opinions and sepa- rate opinions	_
4'	Majority and dissenting opinions	0
5.1	Increasing conservatism	_
5.2	Increasing dissent after 1945 Term	+
5.3	Increasing C - after 1945 Term	_
5.4 5.5	Increasing E — after 1945 Term Increasing liberalism after 1948 Term	+

Court. The present data demonstrate the danger of attempting to make anything other than relational inferences, when one is working with ordinal data, for which the underlying metric is unknown and indeed, in terms of such data, incapable of being determined. The appropriate inference from Jackson's rise in scale rank after 1948 would be that, in relation to a cifferent (and generally, more conservative) set of colleagues, Jackson appeared to be more favorable to civil liberty than a majority of his colleagues. But Table VII indicates that his own attitude toward civil liberty did not become more favorable; to the contrary, the changes in his opinion and voting behavior toward civil liberty were quite insignificant, and his voting trend was toward greater conservatism.

(6) Table VIII summarizes the decisions that were reached for each of the hypotheses in the tests discussed above.

Table ix. Economic liberalism and conservatism in majority and dissenting opinions, before and after the 1945 term

Period		194	1-44		1946-53			
E Variable	Values +		Votes +		Values +		Votes	
Opinions			··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
Majority \	3	15	12	28	7	14	23	15
Dissenting	7	4	9	0	21	9	27	3
$\phi =$.48	80	.54	:8	.36	3	.33	2
X^2	4.75	i	11.98	}	5.31		6.05	5
p <	.02	25	.00	05	.02	5	.01	

An examination of Table VIII suggests an additional hypothesis not formulated in advance of the general analysis of the data. The confirmation of Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.4 suggests the question of the relationship between Jackson's economic conservatism and his dissenting behavior. We now know that both his tendency to dissent and his conservatism toward economic policy increased significantly after his return to the Court in 1946; and Tables IV and V both show that his increased economic conservatism during the later period was manifested in both his opinions and his votes. Jackson, in other words, behaved primarily as an economic liberal during the earlier period, and primarily as an economic conservative during the later period; and his switch to conservatism was accompanied by an increasing tendency to dissent. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to infer Hypothesis 6: that there was a significantly high and positive correlation between the economic content-variable and the opinion-variable differences, in that Jackson supported the liberal position in the majority and the conservative position in dissent. To test this hypothesis, let us specify that the stipulated correlation must be observed with both the content and the voting variables during both periods. Thus, the hypothesis would test the relationship between the opinion variable and both the content and voting variables, for Jackson's period of economic liberalism and also for his period of economic conservatism. Confirmation would also establish that the relationship was independent of the direction of his support of the economic variable.

It is clear from viewing Table IX that Hypothesis 6 cannot be rejected. The correlations for both the content value and voting are quite stable, notwithstanding Jackson's metamorphosis from a liberal to a conservative position. Of particular interest are the minor diagonals of the four-fold tables, which show that Jackson argued in support of economic liberalism in dissenting opinions just as often—indeed, a bit more often—than he supported economic conservatism in majority opinions. In his voting, however, he frequently upheld

59 The corresponding correlations between political liberalism/conservatism (in either content-values or voting) and majority/dissenting opinions, are negative, low, and insignificant. Of course for the entire period of twelve terms, the correlations for the economic variables necessarily are positive and significant: .475 between content-values and opinions, and .458 between voting and opinions.

the conservative position in the majority, while dissenting only thrice in support of economic liberalism during his entire period of service on the Court.⁶⁰ The importance of this finding will be apparent presently.

One thing is obvious: the causal parts of Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.4, which were accepted tentatively, must be reconsidered. If Jackson's increasing dissenting behavior and economic conservatism are so highly and consistently correlated, we cannot remain satisfied with independent explanations for each: that his dissenting should be attributed to his disappointment over his failure to become Chief Justice. while his economic conservatism is attributed to the end of the need for judicial support for the war effort, as well as to the collapse of his political ambitions. In the light of Table IX, it seems preferable to rely upon the broader explanation for both his increasing dissidence and his switch to economic conservatism. "Switch" is probably a very poorly chosen word to describe Jackson's behavior, however, if our interest goes beyond the manifest facts to the latent factors.

As we noted above, Jackson was no more prepared to dissent in behalf of economic liberalism in his "liberal" period than during his "conservative" period. Given his own sophisticated sensitivity to the political implications of dissenting behavior, consider that he was unwilling ever to dissent, even once, in support of the position that we can assume would have furthered his political ambitions, during the time when such a display of conspicuous economic liberalism might have done him the most good, politically speaking. I attribute his failure so to behave, with such rationality, to a consistency with his own most strongly rooted attitude; and the evidence of the present study strongly indicates that this was economic conservatism. Therefore, Jackson's change in his opinions to greater support for economic conservatism, and his reinforcing dissenting behavior, reflected not a conversion to a new view of political economy, but rather a reversion—at least, at the behavioral level to the beliefs of his forefathers, his youth, and his manhood prior to his entry into political office.

v. conclusion

A significant positive correlation exists between Jackson's verbal and voting support for political liberalism, although his overall voting record manifested less sympathy for civil

 60 All three economically liberal dissents came in the 1952 Term.

libertarianism than did his opinions; in relation to his colleagues, Jackson consistently was a moderate in his voting on civil liberty issues. He showed a slight but not significant tendency toward greater political conservatism after the end of World War II, which apparently was quite independent of the swings of his colleagues toward greater (1946–48 Terms) and toward lesser (1949–1953 Terms) political liberalism.

The issue to which Jackson was most deeply attached was economic policy, and a very high and significant correlation shows up between his opinion and voting behavior in this regard. Renowned as an economic liberal at the time of his appointment to the Court, he maintained this image, in both his opinions and his voting, only during his first four terms. After the war, his behavior changed sharply and significantly to strong and consistent support of economic conservatism; and throughout his last eight terms on the Court, he vied with Frankfurter

for the bottom position in the cumulative scales of voting in support of economic liberalism. His rate of dissent in behalf of economic conservatism doubled during this later period.

His espousal of economic liberalism and relatively low rate of dissent during the war vears were generalized characteristics of his official behavior, in addition to being specifically related to each other. The same was true of his economic conservatism and much higher rate of dissent after the war. My conclusion is that Jackson's economic liberalism was a necessary function of his political career; and that the collapse of his political ambitions for the Chief Justiceship and even the presidency best explains his reversion to economic conservatism and his increasing dissidence. With life tenure as an associate justice, he had nothing more to lose; and so he wrote and voted in support of the value that was most fundamentally related to his way of life and his career before he went into politics.

CONFINING CONDITIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY BREAKTHROUGHS*

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I want to try to connect the course of several regimes with what, for want of a better name, I shall call "confining conditions"—the particular social and intellectual conditions present at the births of these regimes. Do I prejudice the case by calling the sum total of the prerevolutionary situation confining conditions rather than calling them more neutrally, as Val Lorwin suggested to me, simply antecedent conditions? Yet every situation which a new regime finds at its inception is an antecedent one. I am concerned specifically-and onlywith the conditions that have to be overcome if the new regime is to continue. How the new regime may accomplish this, or may fail to, is the subject of this paper. Therefore I consider the nature of the confining conditions, chiefly those of social structure; the nature of the new regime; and the nature of the methods available to it, as well as those it adopts to overcome the confining conditions.

In discussing political action, we often ask the question: did the man or the group have to act the way he, or they, did? What other options were open, e.g., to Stalin in the late 1920s? Not being satisfied with the answer that, given the character of Stalin, the eventual course of action was really to be expected all along, we might profitably shift the question to a different level. To what extent do the circumstances attendant upon the rise of a new regime determine its subsequent actions? The late Franz Neumann raised such questions in regard to the course of the National Socialist regime. His Behemoth was an impressive attempt to show how the confining conditions under which the regime worked—especially the fact that it came to power with the help of leaders of German heavy industry-not only switched the track for the National Socialists, but explained many of their patterns of actions long after their regime was firmly established.

Yet Neumann's account of the German state organization and its supersession by the movement-type party already foreshadows the problems which increasingly preoccupied his

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† Deceased November 22, 1965.

thoughts (although only in fragmentary publications) in his later years. To what extent can a revolutionary power structure move away from the specific constellation of forces which presided over its origin, and move off in a different direction of its own?

1

Neumann had little difficulty with the negative test. Whoever fails to put his hands on the switch—either because of a lack of the social prerequisites (France in 1848) or because of a lack of will power (Germany in 1918)-cannot deflect the current into new circuits. Neither the leaders of the incipient French labor and Socialist movement of 1848, nor the leaders of the numerically strong but unimaginative organizations of the German Socialists in 1918, ever tried to put their hands on the switches. Crowded from the center of power, they soon could not even hold to the position of initiating incremental changes. Even the modest role of setting into motion long-range changes, with all due anticipatory consideration of other power-holders' reactions, escapes the group which fails to make a political breakthrough. Such a group becomes an object, rather than a subject, of the political process.

The capacity to compress thoroughgoing or revolutionary change—as distinct from incremental change—into a minimum of time, according to the new power-holders' own timetable, is the test of revolutionary victory. What are the possible dimensions, and what are the limits, of such capacity for change? In his later publications, and on the basis of Soviet experience, Neumann held that political power could make itself supreme and thereby make itself the font of economic power.

Π

But what does this supremacy amount to? Let us first look at Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. By the 1930s Germany had become a highly industrialized country. Yet its style of inter-group relations, in spite of formal

¹ See esp. ch. 1, "Approaches to the study of political power," and ch. 10, "Economics and Politics in the 20th century," in Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (Glencoe, 1957).

constitutional change, still reflected the mood and conditions of a bygone era. Perhaps scaling down the politically and economically expensive position of Eastern agrarian elements might have eliminated enough of the anachronism to allow the restructuring of class relations on a more modern, cooperative basis.

Instead of opting for that sort of program, Germany started a course of imperialist conquests in the heart of Europe, with the new political elite lording it over both the domestic scene and the subject countries. This course entailed extraordinary risks, which only a revolutionary group, able to ride roughshod over all opposition, would take.

To put it another way, the industrialists were a specialized functional elite falling in with the deliberate option of a revolutionary political group. Whatever the apparent short-term risks and the factors of long-range instability in this choice, the conquest of Europe, western and eastern, represented one way of producing an entirely new realignment of internal forces, superseding the need to rearrange internal group relations in a manner more common in Western Europe.

Inter-group relations had changed as a consequence of the economic crisis and were certainly overripe for restructuring. The degree of their restructuring was an open question, but not its direction. That restructuring had to take into account the loss of power suffered by the labor groups as a consequence of the economic crisis and of their own continuing fratricidal cleavages.

The brutal imperialism on a neo-populist basis, with its efficient mixture of revolutionary political organization and industrialsociety elements, had its roots in the ideological and material conditions of German society. But this imperialism was at most the contingent, not the necessary outcome. Within the context of an advanced industrial society, an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime that might have tried to overcome the political disequilibrium with the support or incorporation of some sections of a crisis-inflated mass movement, was as much a possibility as the total seizure of power by a revolutionary mass movement itself. In fact, when the Nazis took over power, they operated for some months in a manner intended to leave the population in the dark as to whether their practices would correspond to or amalgamate with the bureaucraticauthoritarian solution. This tactic facilitated the undisturbed take-over of power by the mass movement.2 Between the conditioning factors of its inception and the reality of the Third Reich, were the intervening visions, the organizing genius and the perseverance of the revolutionary political group.

Let us turn to the case of the Soviet Union. In order to obtain a measure of initial acceptance, the leaders of the Petrograd Revolution had to put their stamp of approval on the seizure of the gentry's land by the peasantry. However, this policy aggravated the age-old difficulties which had beset the Russian polity and which Stolypin's dissolution of the Obshina had only started to tackle: the need of accelerating transformation to an industrial society by simultaneously shifting population to the cities and modernizing agricultural methods. Stalin's forced collectivization was an answer to the difficulties caused by the lower rate of industrial growth and reagrarianization of the country in the 1920s, which coincided with the considerable rural exodus to the cities.3 Having at his disposal a strong enough administrative apparatus to reverse the process of Kulakization under the NEP and to collectivize agriculture, Stalin had a range of choices in regard to the methods of collectivization. If he wanted to industrialize rapidly, however, he probably had little choice about the principle of collectivization. Left alone, the peasants would have dictated both the pace and the direction of industrialization by consuming more and delivering less food to the rest of the country.

What matters in this context is the interrelation between socio-economic conditioning and the discretionary element left to the decision of the regime. The setting up of larger agricultural units and the shifting of agricultural surplus population to industrial life were bound to take place under almost any regime. The revolutionary approval of land seizure by the peasantry, plus the conditions of the NEP period, had aggravated the regime's difficulties by creating an important new proprietary interest at a time when the regime was unable to offer enough industrial goods to entice the peasants to part voluntarily with their produce. Yet, at the same time, a coercive apparatus was at hand to collectivize the land, and collect food surpluses. The general problem of the relations between the agricultural sector

tion period in 1933 can now be followed in Bracher-Sauer Schulz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung* (Westdeutscher Verlag, Koeln-Opladen, 1960).

The various expectations during the transi-

³ Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 119-151.

and the industrial sectors of a modernizing society was given, irrespective of whether the country was to be governed by an autocracy, a bourgeois democracy, or the Communist Party. What the supremacy of a revolutionary group entailed was a much wider choice of means and strategies to carry out the transformation. The "whole-hog Stalin" was not necessary, and Stalin's methods were counterproductive, if measured by the yard-stick of what more gradual, part-cooperative collectivization could have obtained in both good will and direct production results. Yet given the need for accelerating the transformation as a condition for survival of the revolutionary group, the internal leadership struggle resulted in the decision that the gain in time would outweigh the costs of forced collectivization. Zigzagging in the course of the great industrialization debate, Stalin used changes in his own position to eliminate actual and potential rivals, and then used his ensuing supremacy over the dominant political group to enforce the most ruthless of the available options. But the need for industrialization created fundamental claims on any regime, as it had even on the Tsarist regime.

The social and economic frame of the par-

4 Alex Nove, Economic Rationality in Soviet Politics (New York, 1964), p. 32. Cf. M. Erlich, The Soviet Industrialisation Debate 1924-1928 (Harvard University Press, 1960): "A policy of moderate tempos would strengthen the position of the upper strata of the villages and would make the adroit balancing between them and the unruly radicals of the cities a necessity which could be adopted only as a temporary expedient. Had such a course been pursued over a long period of time the regime would have stood to lose not only from its possible failures but also from its successes. The alternative to such retreats and maneuvers leading to the gradual erosion of the dictatorial system was clearly a massive counterattack which would have broken once and for all the peasants' power over the basic decisions of economic policy. A high speed industrialisation with a strong emphasis on the capital goods sector which Stalin now favored provided the logical line for such a counterattack." (p. 174)

"The overhang of agricultural excess population permitted the manning of equipment which was physically usable with the surplus peasants of yesterday, which could be removed from the countryside without a notable detriment to agricultural output and be employed at a real wage barely exceeding their wretchedly lower consumption levels of the earlier status." (p. 184)

ticular society, then, lays down a conditioning perimeter within which the original choice has to be made and solutions have to be sought. Hitler, for example, could not-as some of his loyal adherents had dreamt-do for the German retailers and craftsmen what he could afford to do for the German peasant: he could not convert small shops into hereditary entailed estates, protected against hopeless competitive odds. The very progress of accelerated rearmament and the preparations for foreign conquest necessitated the most efficient industrial production units, leaving the small independent with the option of becoming a dependent factory hand. In realigning his norms and expectations with those of the new powerholders, the doomed independent could at least adopt as his own the choice of the regime. perilous and adventurous though it might be. In this way the very exercise of the regime's option might change the social preconditions of his existence, releasing new psychic energies before the regime's long-term options bore visible results. Thus the socio-economic perimeter itself might seem expandable. Was it?

What we might call "expansion of the perimeter" is the alteration of the social structure or economic basis of society or—more slowly, but still visibly, by the processes of modern communications and education—the alteration of intellectual habits by the new masters of the polity. For the new rulers by then have arrived at a stage, which may come very quickly after a revolution, when they are working out the details of their options. They have arrested the acceleration of chaos, as in Soviet Russia, or mastered their new tasks of propaganda and control, as in Nazi Germany. In these cases the rulers were not crushed by what might be called "societal due dates."

Among these societal "due dates," one repeats itself so often as to become a major confining condition: foreign intervention in national revolutions. Usually we would think of confining conditions as factors embedded in the social structure out of which revolutions originate. But the shrinking of the world, both physically and intellectually, the attendant and anticipated impact of revolutionary upheaval on other countries, and the power in-

⁶ Gurland, Kirchheimer, Neumann, The Fate of Small Business in Nazi Germany, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings, Sen. Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, Comm. Print No. 14 (1943), p. 152.

The story and some figures can be found in Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, Ind., 1964), chs. 4 and 5.

crements expected from successful intervention, or the power losses feared from the emergence of a new recruit to revolutionary causes—all these have caused a succession of foreign interventions.

Even with the present-day technique of fighting or forestalling revolution by stage-managing counter-insurgency, foreign intervention often carries its own antidote. It encourages the revolutionary forces to telescope changes into shorter periods and facilitates popular acceptance of those changes; it makes for a degree of unification and acceptance of a new national symbolism otherwise hard to obtain. But the possibility of overcoming this confining condition is aleatory; success or failure may depend on policy shifts in the intervening country, over which the influence of the revolutionary elite is far more limited than it is on domestic conditions.

In the face of all these difficulties, the political group may lose its momentum, return to the incremental pattern, or even cave in completely. Too many checks may have been drawn at the same time against the new regime's limited bank account, and the regime's very weakness may have accelerated the simultaneous presentation of demands. Yet, on the other hand, its interdependent supply of physical force and capital of community confidence may just allow it to scrape through, keeping some commanding positions fairly intact. In this latter case, we want to analyze what happens to the initial conditioning perimeter: have the original confining conditions been changed by a decisive breakthrough? Has the new political system really become supreme and able to develop systematic patterns of its own? If so, we then measure revolutionary change by the new system's ability to extricate itself from the confining conditions of the previous period. The old data may still be present, though absorbed in a new context and thereby deprived of their confining nature.

The leaders of the USSR have achieved such a breakthrough, transforming Russia into a major industrial system. While they still experience difficulties with agrarian organization, and these in turn delay the fulfillment of urgent consumer expectations, such problems can scarcely endanger the subsistence level. Most of the confining conditions have been removed, at whatever cost to those who lived through—or died during—the long decades it took to accomplish that feat.

The German National Socialist experience remained abortive, but no conclusions as to the impossibility of overcoming the initial confining conditions can be drawn from the collapse due to external defeat in a two-front war. Certainly the wholesale program of conquest of Eastern Europe would have allowed a more drastic restructuring of internal group relations in Germany than would a more limited program of hegemony over Western Europe. The existence of a large industrial working class with a tradition of self-organization (even if momentarily without any organization), and of a bureaucratic and officer group only superficially and conditionally loyal to the regime, made the program of maximal conquest of Eastern Europe more attractive to the new rulers than the more restricted takeover of Western Europe. For such a conquest might have led to the pulverizing of existing German social relations for the benefit of the Nazi rulers. A vast imperial apparatus with Germans from all walks of life lording it over the indigenous Eastern Europeans, while German industry expanded into vast new territories, might have accomplished an efficient restructuring of German society. Such an apparatus would have constituted a major guarantee against renewed efforts of surviving splinters of former social and political elites to make come-back attempts-which actually were made at every new turn in the fortunes of the regime as long as its conquests were not consolidated.

In both the Russian case and the German case, the experiment was part of a unique conjunction of circumstances: the disorganization and breakdown of an economic and political system in Russia, and the incapacity and disorganization, although not quite the breakdown, in Germany, and the simultaneous activity and availability for power of a revolutionary group. In Germany the revolutionary group actively promoted the breakdown; in Russia it exploited a pre-existent one. The breakdown thus had the effect of releasing revolutionary energies; it was in a certain sense a counterconfiguration of the confining conditions, and made action possible toward overcoming it. In the one case the group was more opportunistic: in the other more doctrinaire; but, at any rate, both were acting outside the frame of the traditional conceptual apparatus of politicians. They made only short-range compromises, which they revoked as soon as the slightest margin of safety allowed them to do so. In both cases we might ask how the action of the revolutionary group related to the sum-total of confining conditions.

Due to the intervening external conditions, the German case does not carry much probative value either way. As to the USSR, the argument that the major outcome—conversion

into an industrial society—would have taken place in any event does not upset our conclusion. The fact is that a "premature" industrial revolution, compressing various stages of social development into an extremely limited time span determined by its political elite—moreover, with primitive accumulation by the state and not private owners, and with national sovereignty exalted in the process—did take place. This is highly relevant to our original question: here a revolutionary regime did move beyond the confining conditions under which it arose.

III

To illuminate another facet of the problem, I want to discuss the conditions of collaboration of various political forces under a revolutionary regime. Where lies the well-spring of common action? To what extent does the variation in composition and orientation of such forces determine the confines of their actions from the very outset?

I have in mind here the well known episode of the relations between Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety toward the Paris sans-culottes from autumn 1793 to early summer 1794. One might describe the situation after the autumn days of 1793 as an uneasy coalition between the committee and the Paris sans-culottes, ideologically represented and sometimes led by Hébert and Chaumette. Neither group could have acted effectively without the other. Their presence served as a means for Robespierre to keep his hold over

⁶ For literature on the episode see the general discussion in Georges Lefebvre, La Révolution francaise, 3d ed. (Paris, 1963), pp. 354-430, and most interesting in this context his remarks on pp. 407-409; two more specialized works by Daniel Guérin, La Lutte de Classes sous la Première République, Bourgeois et "bras nus" (1793-1797), 2 vols. (Paris, 1946), and Albert Soboul, Les Sans-culottes Parisiens en l'an II, Mouvement Populaire et Gouvernement Révolutionnaire, 2 Juin, 1793-9 Thermidor an II (Paris, 1958), esp. pp. 427-433, 503-504, 1025-1035. Guérin draws explicit conclusions as to the class content of the struggle between Robespierre and the sans-culottes. Soboul analyzes a wealth of hitherto unknown documents, among them papers of district assemblies and district clubs. His conclusions from the assembled material, though more shaded, are in line with those of Guérin as to the sans-culottes-Revolutionary Government relation. For the social composition of the sansculottes see also G. Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution (London, 1959), pp. 178-84.

the Convention, as much as the Committee served as a means for the sans-culottes to push their political and economic demands. The common ground which provided both their dynamics and their larger justification was the unconditional pursuit of the revolutionary war. There was at best a partial meeting of minds and never a complete convergence on social and economic goals. In order to carry on the war and to avoid spiralling inflation, price and wage controls were indicated. Yet-apart from military procurement—farmers and merchants were frequently able to circumvent price controls. The Paris city administration, on the other hand, was lukewarm in enforcing wage controls. Such contradictions were partly solved by the trial and guillotining of Hébert and Chaumette. Although their execution was followed in jeu de bascule fashion within two weeks by the execution of Danton and Desmoulins, the victory of Fleurus in June 1794 lifted. to some extent, the radical mortgage on Robespierre and allowed the dismantling of price controls. The result was to do away with the often uncontrollable district clubs, and to restrict the more egalitarian policies, in an attempt at securing a steady flow of bread at the official price to the urban population. The payoff came on the 9th of Thermidor when the National Guard did not come out for Robespierre, but went home; and when the district assemblies meeting that evening were split wide open between loyalty to the Convention or to the more radical politics of the sans-culottes.

But is this the only, or a sufficient, reason for the turn of events? First, a seemingly more accidental fact: on the decisive afternoon, when the National Guard was assembled on the Place de Grève with all its equipment, there was no leader resolute enough to make them march against the Convention. What about the less obvious links in the chain of causation? There was the matter of sheer physical fatigue of the Paris militants, who had been in the thick of the political struggle for the previous five years; and the fact that many of the younger ones had departed for the war fronts. There was the phenomenon which we now call the circulation of elites: the most vigorous and the most intelligent of them had meanwhile taken government jobs in the central administration and war machine, and had formed new and different bonds of allegiance. This brings us nearer to another, more Protean constellation: sansculottes are a political, not a social, category. Their major ties were common political sympathies: hatred of the aristocracy and support of the new regime and the military program. This motley crew of unemployed, journeymen,

artisans, shopkeepers, lawyers, teachers, government employees, and even a sprinkling of merchants, could scarcely have a unified social outlook. Some of them being independent producers and middlemen, and others being wage earners, they would scarcely see eye-to-eye on economic issues. They remained parcels of various occupational groups. They could join the revolutionary battle all the more easily because their social and occupational distinctions had not always jelled into class-consciousness. They remained accessible to a variety of sometimes contradictory appeals, guiding their behavior in speech and action.

Suppose that Robespierre had saved his neck on the 9th of Thermidor due to a fresh intervention of the National Guard. Could this coalition of the national revolutionary government and its advanced urban clientele have lasted? While trying to find its way through a bedlam of conflicting interests, the Committee of Public Safety was ideologically committed to uphold the sanctity of private property-with exceptions necessitated by the conduct of the war. Moreover, its policy toward the disposal of the agricultural properties of the émigré nobles and the church bears little evidence of a sustained interest in the cause of the small peasant and the landless farmhand. How would it have related itself in the long run to the interests not only of the merchants but of the upper echelons of the peasants? Even if we disregard the discordant interests among the sans-culottesbound to come out more sharply after the most urgent war pressures had receded-could the Robespierre-sans-culotte combination have long outlasted the immediate danger period of the war?

Seventeen hundred ninety-three marks the definitive entry of the urban masses upon the French political scene. But, given the forces present at that particular historical juncture, the 1793-94 episode is a great precursor of problems yet to come. Whenever they were in a position to make their own political contribution in the decades ahead, the peasants would make short shrift of "prematurely" radical political ideas.

If we except exceedingly short periods in 1848 and 1871, and abortive movements remaining below the most provisional governmental level, the people at large did not move into the center of political decision. It is for this reason that the coalition of the Committee of Public Safety and the sans-culottes of 1793-94 still retains such a paradigmatic interest. For here we must raise the question, to what extent the possibility existed—which became so important in the Chinese and Russian revolu-

tions of the 20th century—of jumping stages of societal development and compressing two revolutions into one? To what extent could the 1793-94 combination have possessed the organizational cohesion, the unity of purpose, and the technical means to overcome its confining conditions—i.e., its being surrounded by a sea of peasantry and torn by the discordances between two constituent elements, the bourgeois-governmental wing and the popular Paris-street wing? The attitude of the governmental wing toward economic and social policy issues shows how alien the conscious reshaping of society by governmental fiat remained to them. They tried to keep the backdoor through which such measures entered—war-time necessity and the pressure of their Paris allies—as well guarded as they could under the circumstances of the day. The breakup of the combination and Robespierre's subsequent defeat without serious intervention by his erstwhile radical associates highlight the lack of cohesive social consciousness needed to take the revolution beyond its pristine bourgeois phase.

The heterogeneous nature of the short-lived coalition of the 1793-94 period of the Revolution was in itself the chief confining condition of that Revolution. The Paris avant-garde, with all its revolutionary fervor, was anything but unified and anything but uniformly proletarian (however we define "proletarian" in pre-industrial Paris). The National government, temporary coalition partner of the revolutionary Paris Commune, was riven by personal quarrels and conflicts among the various organs of government. Beyond that, and even more fundamental, the revolutionary government was unwilling to injure the interests of merchants and agricultural property owners beyond what the conduct of the war in its most desperate phase seemed to make necessary. Organizational centralization, the "maximum" for food prices, and the unfulfilled promise of the famous "Ventôse decrees": these were adopted to win the war, not to establish a social millennium or create the cadres to maintain the revolutionary regime.

IV

So far my attention has been directed toward the capacity of revolutionary groups to transcend the confining conditions which surrounded their coming to power. I now want to move on to a discussion of some facets of what Charles Beard called the "Second American Revolution," the Civil War. Must I first justify inclusion of the Civil War in this survey of relations of revolutionary outcomes to preëxistent social structures? The Civil War,

one might assert, was not started by a revolutionary group intent on changing the social structure of society; it only settled a limited argument over permissible forms of national property relations. And yet, the way the conflict was settled indicates an obvious connection between the structure of southern ante-bellum society and the final outcome of the conflict. Should we say that the solution—which gave the Negro only the outward trappings of freedom indicated the absence of such a revolutionary group, and let it go at that? The case is not improved if we amend this statement to read that no revolutionary group was in undisputed control of the state machinery, not even during the reconstruction period. For saying this much is enough to make us realize that, even in the 19th century, revolution and civil war, if not cohabiting in permanent fashion as they do in the 20th, kept close enough quarters to justify simultaneous discussion. What I am looking for here is a key to the peculiar mixture between recessive elements—the reprise of parcels of the ante-bellum structure-and supervening changes in southern society which marked the history of the conflict, of reunion and reaction.

Let me at the outset lay down some theses, mostly borrowed—with his kind permission—from an as-yet-unpublished manuscript of Barrington Moore concerning those features of the original conflict which might have had some bearing on the post-bellum development.⁷

- (1) The two distinct forms of social organization—emergent eastern business society and southern slave-holding agrarian society—contained certain elements favoring coexistence.
- (2) The political marriage of convenience between eastern iron and western grain, between higher tariffs and more land for the present and future farmers of the West, spared the eastern industrialists the need to search for accommodation with the southern planters.
- (3) The outbreak of the war was facilitated by the absence of strong ties between the two sections, East and South, rather than by a head-on collision on economic issues.
- (4) The weakness of the federal enforcement apparatus, tied to the uncertainty of the eventual orientation of the territories, loomed large in the causal chain leading to the war.

By the 1850s the East had become a manufacturing center, with both East and West becoming less dependent on the South and more complementary to each other. All the same, until the 1860s cotton had remained second in

7 It goes without saying that the conclusions I draw from Moore's analysis are entirely my own.

eastern manufacturing and the East continued to provide financial, transportation, and marketing services for the South. Eastern business and western farmers showed little animosity toward the "peculiar institution" of their southern trading partners. Eastern factory hands, fearing the competition of freed slaves, were lukewarm on the slave issue. While the South experienced some shortage in available new slave labor, its production system had not become unworkable from the viewpoint of either discipline or profit.8 Points of conflict between the South and East seemed negotiable. with eastern tariff demands possibly to be compromised against southern wishes for consideration in the settlement of virgin western lands. Such considerations, however, have to be seen against some barriers hard to overcome. In the days before the gigantic public expenditures possible under endlessly expandable defense labels, the East could do little for the South except to buy its cotton, and such trade could not be expanded at will. The resumption of the slave trade remained a nonnegotiable proposition; to that extent a moral issue was of direct political importance. England remained the most important customer of the South, a fact which nourished the expectation of a viable independent South. In the East, labor trouble which would make the industrial community run for aid to the southern planter was not yet on the horizon, leaving the moderates only narrow scope in their search for viable compromises.

In the presence of such weak links between the regions, strictly political factors, the impact of the battle over enforcement procedures for legislative compromises, loomed large. In a society with a simple authority structure, official powers rest largely on the willingness of the respective political clienteles to abide by the terms of the agreements their political representatives reached. The clienteles' unwillingness to do so, coupled with great weakness and irresoluteness of the central authority, spelt uncertainty of expectations and diminished the individual's reliance on official procedures to a vanishing point. In such a situation, legislative compromises predicated on semi-

⁸ Conrad and Meyer, "The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South," in *The Economics of Slavery and Other Econometric Studies* (Chicago, 1964). What is argued in such accounts is the question of profitability of slavery then and there, rather than long term development prospects, which form the basis of Eugene D. Genovese's *The Political Economy of Slavery* (New York, 1965). See esp. p. 204.

automatic enforceability—the Fugitive Slave Act—or, like the Kansas-Nebraska Act, needing the services of an impartial state power able and willing to see things through, must falter in implementation. But somehow the notion of the state power ordering the relations of its citizens by active intervention was something rather alien to the thinking of the West in the 19th century. (We shall come back to this point a little later.) It certainly found little room in the minds of the pre-Civil War generation looking on the respective presidents, judges and governors with their marshals and troops either as useful auxiliaries or as foes. 9

The war thus appears as the product of uncertainty as to how to delineate authoritatively the various claims—especially over the status of slavery in the territories-of two societies resting on different social orders: an emergent democratic business society and an agricultural economy grounded on slave labor. The postwar peace could have had one of two meanings: it could have meant a change in the sum total of southern property relations, destroying the planter aristocracy by the use of northern military power and handing over agricultural property titles to the former slaves. Yet, "Lincoln's war" had not been conducted for that purpose. 10 Nor did eastern business society, balanced on the one hand by labor's capacity to move West and on the other by the inexhaustible replenishment of its labor force from Europe, have such wide-ranging intentions, which would have endangered the basis of all private property relations. Consequently, after the 1866-68 intermezzo, orchestrated by the radical congressional reconstructionists, the narrower peace goals gained ascendancy: only the property titles in slaves and in southern war bonds remained cancelled. The "Thermidor" of 1877 was the inevitable conclusion from the carpetbaggers' and the Negroes' inability to keep themselves going without the aid of the federal government, and from that government's unwillingness to go on supporting them. But it brought out in full all those recessive traits which had their origin in the ante-bellum southern society. It transformed the southern Negro from a sheltered slave into a formally free but unprotected sharecropper. In the same breath it deprived him of the possibility of exercising his political rights as an entrance wedge for full participation in the American society. "Henceforth," as Vann Woodward says, "the nation as a nation will have nothing to do with him."

If the Negro's transfer from his slave to his sharecropper status—including his right to exchange his existence as a southern bondsman for that of an eastern or western unskilled factory hand or a migratory worker—had been the only difference in the social structure as a consequence of the war, we might well conclude that in this particular instance the recessive traits, mirroring the conditioning perimeter, the existence of a slaveholding aristocracy, did indeed prevail. But this is only part of the story.

The fact is that the second American Revolution did take place, and many of its effects did penetrate into the South. To what extent the second revolution as a whole was causally linked to the Civil War, to what extent the war even accelerated the progress of industrial society, is problematic;12 assertions of causal relation have a post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc sound. And the system of enlarged corporate property protection, which came into constitutional interpretation by courtesy of the Fourteenth Amendment, would no doubt have found its way into court practice by some other route. The same may be true of the southern impact on congressional voting patterns, which would probably have established themselves anyhow whenever sufficiently important interests needed an alliance with the South. But the opening up of the South to the influx of eastern industry, accompanied as it was by an enlargement and shift of the social basis of the predominant group through the impoverishment of the planters and the rise of a mercantile southern middle class, is a feature directly resulting from the outcome of the Civil War. Opening the South bridged the separation between the two formerly distinct types of society and so worked toward establishing in the South a modified sub-type of American business society. In this sub-type, narrowed down since the Civil War to a limited district with no chance of enlargement, the Negro remains a disadvan-

⁹ Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Nation, vol. 2 (New York, 1941), ch. 2.

¹⁰ J. G. Randall and D. Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2d ed. (Boston, 1961), ch. 22. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction (New York, 1965), p. 44: "Indeed it may be said that if it was Lincoln's destiny to go down in history as the Great Emancipator, rarely has a man embraced his destiny with greater reluctance than he."

¹¹ C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, 2d ed. (New York, Anchor, 1956), p. 232.

¹² Thomas C. Cochran, "Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization?" in *The Inner Revolu*tion (Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 39-54.

taged sub-species of the least fortunate segment of the population.

The American case is most intriguing because here we have the juxtaposition of recessive conditions going back to the ante-bellum social structure and the general pattern of change taking place within American society in the second half of the 19th century. While the victory of the business society was a universal phenomenon, its particular democratic garb found an inhospitable territory in the South. Surviving in the transfigured form necessitated by the advance of the business society, the confining conditions, from which the war had arisen, left their imprint on southern society. The writ of the federal government and, much more firmly, the writ of business society ran across the whole country. But in the South. these writs were always modified by the survivals of the old caste structure; the political form of southern society remained ambiguously pre-democratic.

V

What separates the "Second Revolution" of mid-19th century America from the pronouncedly political revolutions of the 20th century is the subsidiary part that state power played in the transformation of 19th century society. In this respect there is a certain concordance between theory and practice. Nineteenthcentury ideologists did not think of state power as something to be mobilized at will for the purpose of changing societal relations. Whatever the differences among Hegel's disciples, to this extent his panlogistic state concept had been drastically revised. His conservative disciple, Lorenz von Stein, built his doctrine on the juxtaposition of state and society. The fight for liberty and equality and the determination of the individual's position were to take place within society, with the state coming in only as a regulatory afterthought.13 Stein's state amounted to a mixture of the Rechtsstaat principle—in itself a guarantee of regularity of proceedings rather than of active intervention—and his dreams of a social monarchy which would both assure the integrity of society and even out the inequalities emerging from society's struggle.14

Marx was more interested in discovering the laws governing the development of society. The

¹³ Lorenz von Stein, Geschichte der Socialen Bewegung in Frankreich von 1789 bis auf unsere Tage, vol. I, Der Begriff der Gesellschaft, ed. Dr. Gottfried Salomon (Muenchen, 1921).

¹⁴ Lorenz von Stein, Verwaltungslehre, 2d ed. (1869), vol. I, p. 82 et seq.

reciprocal relations between state and society, which had fascinated his contemporary Stein, had few mysteries for him. He had little doubt about the place of law, state, and intellectual structures and assigned them their roots firmly in the material conditions of society. Interference with the modalities of the social process was rather in the nature of becoming conscious of its inexorable course, at best with a proletarian advance guard as a midwife, but at any rate with no need for an independent directing force.

Against the background of his French experience, Tocqueville took to analyzing the partly chaotic, partly creative political scene of the United States in the early 1830s. Could the political authorities attempt to direct the societal process—that is to say, would individuals acting singly or jointly accept such decisions? He left little doubt that, given the state of mind of the American community, the banding together of freely acting individuals for self-appointed tasks—whatever the degree of administrative efficiency of such a procedure—was the only politically feasible way to make meaningful decisions. 15

The acceptance of a number of amendments, civil rights and enforcement statutes was one of the ways to mark the official victory of the Civil War. But once the battle over enactment was won the documents turned into a series of political propositions; they had to be absorbed and in this process were modified and even turned around by the various authoritative interpreters active in the constitutional system. Nineteenth-century America felt no need for a central organ in charge of transforming a battlefield victory into a system of political legitimacy of universal validity.

VI

Let us now look at the much more traditional western and central European society of the mid-19th century, the era of the Chartists and the repeal of the Corn Laws, Prussian pseudoconstitutionalism and the administrative system of Napoleon III. With all due consideration for differences in upbringing and societal outlook of their respective political elites—including for the European a somewhat greater distance between governing classes and the business community—the European ways of approaching political problems remained as circumscribed as those of their American counterparts. English conservatives might have a somewhat greater sense of urgency about what

¹⁵ De la Démocratie en Amerique, 14th ed. (Paris, 1864), vol. I, p. 149.

might be done for the submerged classes than their liberal brethren; the latter might be more confident in their ability to uphold what we now call civil liberties in the face of threatening lower-class agitation. Bismarck could make a show of demonstrating how a polity might be run, even if the bourgeoisie refrained from giving it budgetary support. But his was a conservative machine running it, scarcely given to innovation beyond the field of military techniques and bounties for promising business men. The differences appear to us today as nuances rather than qualitative distinctions. Neither was bent on pushing sudden social or political change, or remodelling the minds of men and the institutions of the country. Even the men of the Paris Commune, the most radical of the century's children ever to have acceded to government office, made few and cautious moves in the field of social policy.

The problem of diverse expectations based on the operation of free societal forces and the limited trust in the workings of the state machinery bring us nearer an explanation of why the Second American Revolution was accompanied by two seemingly discordant results. This revolution was carried out by independent social components of the polity, supported by, but not dependent on, the political machinery of the day. It succeeded well in transforming most of America; yet it allowed the political transformation of the South via the emancipation of the Negro to fizzle out for nearly a century. It is one thing to watch the destruction of property titles as an inevitable consequence of defeat in a rebellion. It is something entirely different to destroy them as part of a concerted plan to reorganize society by state fiat. Such a measure, though proposed, went beyond the horizon of the radical political leaders who thought in terms of advantageous political combinations rather than consciously engineered social revolutions.16

With the First World War as a watershed, we are able to see the decisive differences between 19th and 20th century revolutions. Masses had been brought together in the 19th century by political organizations on a semi-permanent basis; their minds had been exercised by expectations of economic benefit, social innovation, or patriotic or religious exaltation. But only the First World War showed how the public authorities, first with the joyous and

¹⁶ Stampp, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 130: "In addition confiscation was an attack on property rights—so much so that it is really more surprising that some of the middle class radicals favored it, than that most did not."

later on the increasingly reluctant cooperation of the population, could mobilize huge masses of men and technical forces of hitherto unknown destructiveness and link them in huge organizations for official national goals.

While the official apparatus was everywhere quickly dismantled after the war, the experience was not lost on a new crop of political organizers. If such great results could be reached for the traditional goal of acting on the power structure of other societies, why not use similar methods on the domestic structure? The official state apparatus with its limited vistas, its simultaneous mixture of tradition-bound procedure and immersion in the particular interests of one group or another, with its hesitant and uneasy role of arbitration, was neither intellectually nor technically equipped for such a task. It is the merger of political movement and official state organization, the simultaneous unfolding of the mechanisms of change and the purveying of new loyalties, which mark the differences between the revolutionary dynamics of the 20th and the largely uncontrolled social and economic revolution of the 19th century. The 19th-century government concentrated the energies of its much more slender and haphazard apparatus on emergency periods.

The revolution of the 20th Century obliterates the distinction between emergency and normalcy. Movement plus state can organize the masses because: (a) the technical and intellectual equipment is now at hand to direct them toward major societal programs rather than simply liberating their energies from the bonds of tradition; (b) they have the means at hand to control people's livelihood by means of job assignments and graduated rewards unvailable under the largely agricultural and artisanal structure of the 1790s and still unavailable to the small enterprise and commission-merchant-type economy of the 1850s and 1860s; (c) they have fallen heir to endlessly and technically refined propaganda devices substituting for the uncertain leader-mass relations of the previous periods; and (d) they faced state organizations shaken up by war dislocation and economic crisis. Under these conditions Soviet Russia could carry through simultaneously the job of an economic and a political, a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois revolution in spite of the exceedingly narrow basis of its political elite. On the other hand, the premature revolutionary combination of 1793-94 not only dissolved quickly, but left its most advanced sector, the sans-culottes, with only the melancholy choice between desperate rioting-Germinal 1795-or falling back into a pre-organized stage of utter helplessness and agony.

Do I suggest that confining conditions had their place only in 19th century society, where people looked for autonomous development tendencies in society and when the state was restricted to merely secondary functions? Does that mean that the political and technical innovations of the 20th century have created a capacity for unlimited political change?

The antithesis between state and society is itself not as meaningful as it appeared to theorists of the 19th century.17 If we substitute government for state, as we do as a matter of course in an Anglo-American climate, we perceive that we are looking into the same mirror, only from different angles. The technical equipment at the disposal of the present generation introduces social change as a normal expectation with only the composition of the group in charge of the change a matter of controversy. Yet the government's new equipment may only allow it to catch up with the pressing problems raised by the sheer multiplication of numbers. In this context we recall Marx's famous dictum that society does not raise more problems than it can solve at any given moment.

There is also the fact that those who are making major political decisions are not working from a tabula rasa, merely projecting the most technically feasible solutions. The starting point for their projections, more likely than not, is their own personal experience in their own society, whether in conformism or revolt. Without pushing confining conditions into the area of psychoanalytical interpretations in vogue a decade ago, 18 let us nevertheless look

¹⁷ The dubiousness of the state-society dichotomy is illuminated in Horst Ehmke, "'Staat' und 'Gesellschaft' als Verfassungstheoretisches Problem," in *Staatsverfassung und Kirchenordnung*, Festgabe fuer Rudolf Smend (Tuebingen, 1962).

for a moment at the life experiences of the top leaders of the German National Socialist Party, the difficulties these leaders had in finding places in or accommodation with the German society of the 1920s. These difficulties help explain the twofold direction of their thrust. The leaders had to smash the leadership of the preexisting mass organizations to take power. But they also had a deep-seated desire-beyond rational considerations for the safeguarding of their future—to eradicate the very elements of the independent leadership cadres in the upper strata with which they had had to find accommodation during their initial period. These earlier leaders had committed the unforgiveable sin: they had been the ruling elite whilst their successors were still wandering in the dark.

In making this remark, however, do I enlarge the concept of confining conditions much too much? Do I elevate the shadow of the previous regime to the dignity of a confining condition, rather than restricting this concept, as in the case of the USSR, to those specific conditions whose elimination proved to be a condition sine qua non for the survival of the revolutionary regime?

The wall between shadow and substance may, however, be thin, as the German case has amply shown. And shadows become substance when they affect people's minds. Thus shadows also belong to those pre-existent, given, and traditional circumstances from which human beings, according to the immortal introductory section of the 18th Brumaire, produce their own history. In this sense every revolution is both phenomenon and epiphenomenon; it is both concentrated reaction to yesterday's reality and a mere construct to live by until history turns another page and delivers us from the necessity of breathing yesterday's air, that air both fragrant and pestilential.

¹⁸ Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, 1953).

THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION: THE DEMOCRATIC INCARNATION OF CASTE IN INDIA

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Marx's century-old socio-political analysis of peasant nations and of India's traditional village and caste society, because it captures so much of contemporary social and political analysis, provides a convenient framework for critical discussion and evaluation of the relationship between traditional society and modern politics in India. Peasant nations such as mid-nineteenth century France, Marx observed (in the The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, are formed "by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sackful of potatoes." Objectively, peasants form a class; the mode of life, interests and culture which flow from their productive circumstances separate peasants from other classes and place their class in opposition to other classes. But subjectively and practically, peasants form a vast mass, "the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another." They are isolated from each other by their mode of production, poor communications and poverty. The small holding, because it cannot support division of labor or the application of science, lacks multiplicity of development, diversity of talents and a variety of social relationships. Peasant society consists of self-sufficient peasant families; "... a few score of these make up a village, and a few score villages a Department."2

Peasants do not form a class, Marx argued, because their relations are "strictly local." They know each other only parochially. Because the "identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization," they "cannot represent themselves, they must be represented." "Their representative," he continued, "must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against other classes and sends them the rain and the sunshine from above. The political influence of the small peasants, therefore," he concludes "finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself."3

Many contemporary social scientists would agree with Marx that in the early stages of economic development, social change and political modernization in peasant societies will produce popular authoritarian or revolutionary ideological regimes which subordinate society to themselves. The circumstances of midtwentieth century India bring these possibilities into sharp focus and provide the basis for an assessment of Marx's view of the politics of peasant nations in the course of modernization.

At Independence, Indian society encompassed active but receding feudal classes; a growing, vigorous but divided bourgeoisie; a visible, important but still immature industrial economy; and a massive peasantry. Despite

4 See Howard L. Erdman, "India's Swatantra Party," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36 (Winter, 1963-64), pp. 394-410, for the political role of India's feudal classes. For its business classes see Helen B. Lamb, "Indian Business Communities and the Evolution of an Industrial Class," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28 (June, 1955), pp. 101-116 and D. R. Gadgil, Origins of the Modern Indian Business Class (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959). For India's social and political development see B. B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times (London, Oxford University Press, 1961); Charles Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964) and Bruce T. McCully, English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1940). For industrial development see Vera Anstey, The Economic Development of India (4th ed., London, Longmans, Green, 1952); H. Venkatasubbiah, Indian Economy Since Independence (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1961); and Charles A. Myers, Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958). Myron Weiner's The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962), provides a useful analysis of interest groups in Indian politics.

See the Government of India, Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the Indian Union, 1961 (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1961), for particulars on the distribution of national income among sectors of the economy. Agriculture,

¹ Karl Marx, Selected Works (2 vols., New York, International Publishers, n.d.) II, 415.

² Ibid., pp. 414-415.

⁸ Ibid.

increasing fragmentation and debt, Indian peasants—like peasants elsewhere⁵—have not, as Marx thought they would, parted with their attachment to the small holding nor provided that "chorus without which the solo song [of the urban proletariat] in all peasant nations becomes a swan song." Instead of surrendering themselves to a political master in the hope of protection and benefits or recognizing their "natural ally and leader" in the industrial proletariat, Indian peasants have found the means in traditional social arrangements to represent and rule themselves.

Indian peasants through self-transformation have begun to realize in their consciousness and organization a modern society and a democratic polity. In Britain, aristocracy saved itself by timely reform; in India, caste is doing so. The leading and most pervasive natural association of the old regime—caste—is transforming itself from below and within. From an expression of the hierarchy, privilege and moral parochialism of the old order, caste has become the means to level the order's inequalities by destroying its moral basis and social structure. In doing so, caste, in its new form, the caste association, has served to attach the peasantry to the ideas, processes and institutions of political democracy.

T

India's old regime was—and is—diffuse and decentralized, dominated by micro-rather than macro-institutions. The traditional society of villages, castes and families had been in considerable measure self-regulating; social integration and control were given form and substance by the high culture, by Hindu metaphysics, morals and social organization. But the high culture was widely varied in its practical expression and increasingly dilute as it approached the lower reaches of society and its little traditions. The weakness and failure of

not including Forestry and Fishing, accounted for 46.8 per cent of National Income in 1959-60. See p. 21.

revolution and reaction, the strength and persistence of traditional values and social forms and the fact that social and political change has come from within and below as well as from without and above—all are closely related to the relative weight of micro- as against macroinstitutions in traditional Indian society. The predominance of micro-institutions deflected and contained the extremes of organized change through political action. India's traditional macro-institutions were difficult to attack or defend nationally: Hinduism had no church. no ecclesiastical hierarchy, no doctrinal orthodoxy; the nobility of the sword, like that of the robe, lacked institutional means to give it political standing or effectiveness as an estate of the realm; nor was India's third estate organized or represented as such.8

The strength and importance of macro-institutions in Indian society and government also affected the quality of imperial rule. Imperial rule, like that of a revolutionary ideological regime in a new nation, manufactures and induces change from outside and above.

Imperialism, at least as it was practiced in India, was not so sweeping in its concern to create a modern economy and to realize new values, nor so eager for quick results, nor so coercive and total in its methods as revolutionary ideological regimes like those in Russia or China. Yet it remains true that the imperialism of the British raj in its tasks of destruction and reconstruction was restrained and hindered by the strength and predominance in traditional society of diffuse and decentralized micro-institutions.

"England," Marx wrote in 1853, "has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing." It has, however, "a double mission to fulfill... one destructive, and the other regenerative—the annihilation of old Asiatic society [or despotism]—and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia." It had begun the latter by imposing political unity, now [1853] to be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph; by introducing the first free press in Asia, "a new

- ⁸ For India's modern constitutional history see Reginald Coupland, *The Indian Problem, Report* on the Constitutional Problem in India (London, Oxford University Press, 1944).
- ⁹ Karl Marx, Selected Works, II, "The British Rule in India," p. 652 (underlining mine).
 - 10 Ibid., p. 658.
- "The work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins," he observes. "Nevertheless it has begun." *Ibid.*

⁵ See for example, David Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism (New York, Collier Books, 1961).

⁶ Marx, II, "Brumaire," p. 419.

⁷ For a discussion of the structures, processes and roles which link the society and culture of the locality in India with that of its civilization, see Milton Singer, "The Social Organization of Indian Civilization," *Diogenes*, 45 (Spring, 1964), pp. 84-119. It surveys and integrates the relevant monographic literature, particularly the work of Singer himself, M. N. Srinivas, Bernard S. Cohn and McKim Marriott.

and powerful agent of reconstruction;" by creating private property in land; by educating Indians and thereby producing "a fresh class ... endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science"; by connecting India through steam navigation with itself and the world, thereby breaking the isolation "which was the prime law of its stagnation"; and by gifting India "with the means of irrigation and of internal communication [railroads] which will, when completed, liberate her productive powers by revitalizing agriculture and enabling her to exchange what she produces." 12

The railroads, along with the multiplication of roads, he predicted, would destroy village isolation and its accompanying "self-sufficient inertia" by supplying that intercourse with other villages without which "the desires and efforts indispensable to social advance" are absent. By introducing foreign and domestic manufactured goods, modern transportation and communication would "put the hereditary and stipendiary village artisanship of India to full proof of its capacity, and then supply its defects."13 Because the railway system requires industrial processes for its support and because Indians had the aptitude and were getting the requisite training to man it, the railway system "will become the forerunner of modern industry." Modern industry in turn "will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labour, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress...."14 When the people have appropriated all the English bourgeoisie has created, they will be able to emancipate themselves and mend their social condition by using the material civilization it brought forth. For Marx, the India of tomorrow was both western and socialist.

England's mission of destruction, "the annihilation of old Asiatic society," was not yet complete in 1853. "We know," he wrote, "that the municipal organization [village and caste panchayats or councils] and the economical basis of the village communities have been broken up, but their worst feature, the dissolution of society into stereotype and disconnected atoms [i.e., the India of villages and castes], has survived..." the revolutionary impact of British imperialism. The raj did indeed undermine the "self-sufficient inertia" of village and

caste, and release "the desires and efforts indispensable to social advance."16 Improved communication, particularly the railroads, did further this process. But what form and purpose did these desires and efforts for social advance assume? Marx left this question unanswered because unnoticed, concentrating his attention instead on the development of the material bases for a modern economy and society which he expected would be appropriated by the people for their emancipation and wellbeing. Caste, that most pervasive and, for most students of Indian society-Marxian and non-Marxian alike-most retrograde of India's social institutions, has not only survived the impact of British imperialism but also transformed and transvalued itself. In doing so, it has helped dissolve what Marx called the "village system,"17 including a caste-based social hierarchy, and contributed to the success of political democracy.18 Change in India has come from within and below as well as from above and outside.

II

Kamarai Nadar, formerly the Chief Minister of Madras State, now President of the ruling Congress Party and, along with Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the dominant figure in Indian public life after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, is the descendant of a caste whose recent history illustrates the process of social change and modernization from within and below. At the time Marx wrote, Shanans were toddy tappers, an occupation considered polluting by Brahmanical Hinduism. Over the past century, the caste has transformed itself by creating new units of consciousness, organization and action. Today, by successfully changing its caste culture and getting this change recognized by the state and by Madras society, it-like other castes which have participated in the same process18a—occupies a new and higher place in a changed social order.

¹² Ibid., pp. 658-660.

¹³ Marx quoting Chapman, The Cotton and Commerce of India, ibid. at page 661 (underlining mine).

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 661-662.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 660.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 661.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 654-655.

¹⁸ See Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 33 (March, 1960), pp. 5-22.

¹⁸a See below, section IV, for the Vanniyars. Although the Nadars and the Vanniyars are Madras (southern India) castes, developments similar to those detailed here can be found in other states and regions of India. Some indication of them in Gujarat (western India) is given in the discussion of the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha, also in section IV, below. Nirmal Kumar Bose deals with two

One of the first evidences of Shanan aspirations for greater equality and dignity is found in the homely story of the "bosom" controversy. Shanan women had for a generation clothed themselves above the waist even though caste custom dictated that dressing in such a manner was reserved for higher castes only. Threats and disturbances provoked by this practice culminated in the Travancore Riot of 1858. The question of whether Shanan women would or would not give "... up the practice of going about without an upper cloth"19 had become sufficiently serious to require state intervention. The next year, Sir Charles Trevelyan, the Governor of Madras, granted them permission to wear a cloth over the breasts and shoulders; and the Maharaja of Travancore, in whose princely state the riot had occurred, found no objection to Shanan women putting on a jacket, tying themselves round with coarse

Bengali (eastern India) caste associations, of the Yogi and the Namasudra, in "Some Aspects of Caste in Bengal," in Milton Singer, ed., Traditional India (Philadelphia, 1959), pp. 199-200. William Rowe has explored the history of caste associations among two castes distributed throughout northern India, the Noniya and the Kayastha, in "The New Cauhans: A Caste Mobility Movement in North India," in J. Silverberg, ed., Social Mobility in Caste in India (forthcoming) and "Mobility in the Caste System," a paper delivered at the Conference on Social Structure and Social Change, University of Chicago, June 3-5, 1965. For social and cultural change at the local level among the Chamars, an extensive "untouchable" caste found primarily in Uttar Pradesh, see Bernard S. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste," in McKim Marriott ed., Village India (Chicago, 1955) and "Changing Traditions of a Low Caste," in Milton Singer, op. cit. above. Owen M. Lynch, "The Politics of Untouchable," another paper at the University of Chicago Conference, June 1965, above, describes the origin and changing ideology and functions of Chamar caste association in Uttar Pradesh. Robert J. Miller dealt with the Mahars, a numerous "untouchable" caste of Maharashtra (western India), in "Button, button . . . Great Tradition. Little Tradition, Whose Tradition," mimeo., University of Wisconsin, 1 March 1965.

Returning to the South, two well established and powerful caste associations represent the Nairs and the Ezhavas in Kerala, while in Mysore the Lingyats and the Okaligas are well organized and highly influential.

¹⁹ Edgar Thurston, Castes and Tribes of Southern India (7 vols., Madras, Government Press, 1909), VI, 365.

cloth or "to their covering their bosoms in any manner whatever, but not like the women of higher castes."20

Soon after these events, pamphlets setting out the caste's claims to kshatriya (warriorruler) status appeared. Members began to claim the right to wear the sacred thread, symbol of the spiritually twice-born Brahman, Kshatriya and Vaisya varnas, and to be carried on palanquins at their wedding ceremoniesalso a custom previously confined to the highest castes. "Kshatriya" academies, open to all, but designed particularly for the education of Shanan boys, were started, marriage rules tightened, Brahmans "of a less particular kind" induced to act as priests and "a sort of incomplete parody of the ceremony of investiture with the sacred thread" symbolizing twice-born status practiced.21 "We humbly beg," a group of Shanan petitioners addressed the Census Commissioner in 1901, "that we are the descendants of the Pandya or Dravida Xatra race who . . . first disafforested and colonized this land of South India" and presented him with an historical volume entitled Short Account of the . . . Tamil Xatras, the Original but Downtrodden Royal Race of Southern India."22 Shanans claimed that ancient coins called Shanans proved that they long ago had the authority to strike coinage and that the honorific, Nadar, by which leaders of the caste were addressed, proved they were kshatriyas because it meant ruler of a locality. In 1891 the Census Commissioner observed that the Shanans were "... usually placed a little above the Pallas and Paraiyans, and are considered to be one of the polluting castes, but of late many have put forward the claim to be considered Kshatriyas, and at least 24,000 of them appear [i.e., gave their caste to the census enumerator as Kshatriyas in the caste tables." To the learned commissioner, this was "of course, absurd as there is no such thing as a Dravidian Kshatriya" although he conceded that the Shanans may have been "at one time a war-like tribe. . . . "23

Leading Shanans saw matters differently; through a new associational life²⁴ which organized and gave expression to their changing

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 365-366.

²² Ibid., p. 367.

²³ Ibid., p. 369.

²⁴ There are two Nadar Caste Associations, the Nadar Maha Jana Sangam of Madurai and the Dakshina Mara Nadar Sangam of Tirunelveli. The Nadar Maha Jana Sangam, the larger and more influential of the two, has organized annual Nadar conferences since 1910.

consciousness, culture and identity, they pressed for recognition and legitimation from orthodox Hindu society. At its moral and ritual center lay religion and its most visible and accessible target, the temple. In 1874, the Shanans pressed unsuccessfully to establish their their right to enter the great Minakshi Temple at Madurai.25 In the Kamudi Temple case of 189926 the Shanans through the legal system of the British Raj made a major effort to cross the pollution barrier of orthodox Hindu society and establish their claim within it to be a twice-born caste. They hoped to win through the legal processes and sanctions of the alien and secular political order what they had been denied by the religious macro-institutions of traditional society, sacred legitimacy for their claims to a greater measure of equality.

Their hopes were cruelly dashed by the courts. The District Court at Madura, and, on appeal, the High Court of Madras and the Privy Council agreed, in the face of Nadar claims that it was their immemorial right to enter the temple at Kamudi, that neither custom nor sastras (sacred texts) sanctioned their

doing so.

"There is no sort of proof," the High Court held, "that even suggests a probability that the Shanans are descendants from Kshatriya or warrior castes of Hindus, or from Pandiya, Chola, or Chera race of kings." Nor did the honorific appellation Nadar entitle them to claim higher status or greater rights; it in no way changed their ritual status. From time immemorial, the Shanans had cultivated the Palmyra palm and collected and distilled its juice, an occupation that placed them in general social estimation "just above that of . . . Pariahs . . . who are on all hands regarded as unclean, prohibited from the use of Hindu temples and below that of the . . . Maravans [one of the caste directly concerned] and other classes admittedly free to worship in Hindu temples." Further, the court held, there were no grounds whatsoever for regarding them as of Aryan origin; their worship, said the court, was a form of demonology.

The Court was not unaware of the radical changes in Shanan circumstances:

No doubt many Shanans have abandoned their hereditary occupation, and have won for themselves by education, industry and frugality respectable positions.... In the process of time, many Shanans took to cultivating, trade, and money lending, and today there is a numerous and prosperous body of Shanans who have no immediate concern with the immemorial calling of their caste. In many villages they own much of the land, and monopolize the bulk of trade and wealth.

The Court recognized that these de facto changes created difficulties: the Shanans have "not unnaturally sought for social recognition, and to be treated on an equal footing in religious matters." It was also "natural to feel sympathy for their efforts... but such sympathy," the court warned, "will not be increased by unreasonable and unfounded pretensions, and, in the effort to rise, the Shanans must not invade the established rights of other castes."

The Court invoked Brahman written and edited law and the testimony of Brahman witnesses concerning local custom to sustain its interpretation:

According to the Agama Shastras which are received as authoritative by worshippers of Siva in the Madura district, entry into a temple, where the ritual prescribed by these Shastras is observed, is prohibited to all those whose profession is the manufacture of intoxicating liquor and the climbing of palmyra and cocoanut trees.

Plaintiffs' thirty-four witnesses were unanimous in testifying that Shanans did not enter the temple at Kamudi. "Most of them are Brahmans," the Court observed, "who, being in a position of acknowledged superiority to both contending parties, Shanans and Maravans, are less likely than others to be swayed by personal bias or self-interest."27 Although some among the Shanans' twenty-eight witnesses were Brahmans, they were generally "men of much lower standing and respectability, and are to large extent in the pay or under the control of the Nadars . . . " The Court's allegations were confirmed but seemed to cut both ways when the Rajah of Ramnad, the trustee of the temple and the original plaintiff, agreed -after he had won the case in the district court -to "compromise" in the face of the Shanans' appeal to the High Court, by allowing them to enter the Kamudi temple and worship there.

²⁷ For a discussion of the critiques of the Madras High Court, particularly its Brahmanic bias, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Barristers and Brahmans; Legal Cultures and Social Change," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (December, 1965).

²⁵ Thurston, op. cit., VI, 355.

²⁶ Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswara Dorai, Indian Law Reports, 31 Madras 236 (1908). The quotations below are all drawn from this report of the case.

"A very sordid motive for this surrender," their Lordships of the Privy Council observed, "was specifically asserted and has not been disproved." When the High Court joined other plaintiffs to the original plaintiff so that the suit could be heard on appeal, the Rajah's confidence in the justice of his suit "convalesced."

In the Court's judgment, birth, not achievement, defined social identity. Rights were rooted in Brahmanically defined custom and Brahmanically edited sacred texts, not in treating equals equally or in "right reason." Only Aryans, not Dravidians, could be kshatriyas; the pollution of the fathers followed the sons into commerce, the professions and agriculture. The Court advised the Shanans, in phrases reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson with respect to Negro claims to equality,28 to be separate but equal by using their own temples. Shanans were "numerous and strong enough in wealth and education to rise along their own lines . . . without appropriating the institutions or infringing the rights of others."

A minor civil war in the form of the Tinnevelly Riots of 1899 followed close on the heels of the Kamudi Temple case. "The pretensions of the Shanans to a much higher position in the religio-social scale than the other castes are willing to allow," the Inspector-General of Police wrote in his Administration Report for that year, was the cause of extensive civil disorder and violence.29 High on the list of Shanan "pretensions" was their claim to entry of temples. When the manager of the Visvanatheswara Temple at Sivakasi closed it rather than give in to the pressure of a massive Shanan agitation for entry-an act again reminiscent of American events in the struggle for integration-Shanans and their enemies agreed that they had gained at least a partial victory. Most opposed to Shanan mobility were the Maravans, their near

²⁸ 163 U. S. 537 (1896). "If one race," the Court observed, "be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them on the same plane." "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument [that by enforcing segregation between whites and negroes the states were denying the equal protection of the laws assured by the Fourteenth Amendment] to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." (p. 551).

neighbors in space and status. A "clean" caste, the Maravans could enter the temple at Sivakasi. To share it with the Shanans, a polluting caste according to the ritual definitions of traditional society, seemed intolerable. The Maravans struck back by organized attacks on Shanan villages and sections, burning, looting and sometimes killing. The Shanans violently resisted five thousand Maravans who marched on Sivakasi to enforce their demands. The police summed up the struggle in the following statistics: 23 murders; 102 robberies; many cases of arson; 1958 arrests; and 552 convictions; including seven death sentences.

By 1921, the Shanans had gained sufficient social esteem and political influence so that they alone, among the many castes making the attempt, succeeded in changing their name and shedding officially their traditional occupation. Their metamorphosis was wrought neither by the macro- or micro-institutions of traditional society nor by the legal system of the British state finding in the custom or the sacred texts of traditional society grounds to justify Shanan claims. Instead it was the Government of Madras, responding to the determined representations of the organized "Nadar" community, that did so. "The Shanar of 1911," Census Commissioner G. T. Boag wrote in 1921, "now appears as a Nadar; this is done under orders of the Government of Madras. that the word Shanar should cease to be used in official records."30

The Shanans' secular and official social transformation extended to occupation as well as name when the Government decided to list in the census actual rather than traditional ones. The Census Superintendent observed that neither common names nor common traditional occupations were "safe guides" to the defini-

30 Census of India, 1921, Vol. XIII, Madras (Part I) Report (Madras, Superintendent, Government Press, 1922), p. 153, note. The relevant Government Orders are: Government of Madras, Law (General) Department, G.O. No. 56, dated 8 April 1921 and G. O. 785, 7 July 1921. Circulars No. 4 and No. 5 of the Nadar Maha Jana Sangam contain the instructions of the caste association to its followers concerning the responses to be given to census enumerators. Census Commissioner Boag's description and analysis of changes in caste names generally on pp. 153-155 of Vol. XIII is particularly instructive for the shift from Shanan to Nadar. I wish to thank Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. for his help in obtaining the texts of the relevant G.O.s and the Sangams circulars and the Nadar Maha Jana Sangam for its courtesy in making its archives available to him.

²⁹ Thurston, op. cit., VI, 364.

tion of caste or the identification of a particular caste. The Nadars, for example, who were in earlier censuses shown as toddy-drawers, "... now claim that they are by tradition and inheritance lords of the soil and that toddy-drawing was the occupation only of comparatively few degenerate members of the caste." In deference to the wishes of the representatives of the Nadar community," he continues, "the Madras Government have decided on this occasion not to show traditional occupations in the census tables ..."31

Today only those relatively few who live in more remote villages and engage in toddy tapping know themselves and are known to others as Shanans; for a number of generations Shanans have increasingly shared the public identity, Nadar. The community has breached the polution barrier, changed its rank within traditional society and now occupies an important place in the modern society of Madras and India.³²

³¹ Census of India, 1921, Vol. XIII, Madras, p. 154.

32 See Man in India, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April-June 1959), particularly McKim Marriott's "Interactional and Attributional Theories of Caste Ranking," for discussions of the relationship between caste mobility and caste ranking. Marriott is critical of Srinivas for being too "attributional." For Srinivas' views see his Caste in Modern India and Other Essays (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1962). Milton Singer in his "... Indian Civilization ...," Diogenes, tries to accommodate both views but suggests that Marriott may have overstated the case against attributional ranking. See particularly the sections on "Sanskritization and Cultural Mobility," "... Attributes vs. Interactions in Caste Mobility" and "Westernization and Sanskritization." pp. 99-108.

The case of the Shanans who became Nadars seems to suggest that the study of caste ranking, like the study of social change generally, has not paid enough attention to middle sector analysis, which examines change as it occurs in the social space between village and jati on the one hand and society and varna on the other and takes several generations as its relevant time span. It is less (narrowly) behavioral and philosophical, more historical and sociological, inits ideas and methods.

How much and in what ways the Shanans' changing social standing was reflected over time in village consciousness and behavior is not yet entirely clear. Because their rise was accompanied by increasing wealth and education, decreasing pollution and the emulation and appropriation of high caste behavior and symbols, it seems reason-

The story of the Shanans illustrates in some measure the general processes of social change and political modernization which have affected traditional Indian society. Castes, "the stereotype and disconnected units" which Marx, over a century ago, described as having survived the break-up of the village economy and government, but which were to be dissolved by the effects of industrialization, have not yet been so. Instead, they seem, in good Hindu fashion, to have been reincarnated in a modern form as the caste association.33 This has become a vehicle for internal cultural reform and external social change. It enables middle and lower castes to establish self-esteem under circumstances in which they had begun to feel the inferiority rather than the inevitability of their condition and to win social esteem, first from the state, then from society at large and last and most slowly from the village and locality. A vehicle of consciousness and organization, it enabled lower castes to emulate twice-born castes' norms and practices, and by doing so to appropriate some of their charisma and prestige for themselves. The result has been to level the ritually based social hierarchy of the casteordered society. Uniting similar but dispersed and isolated jatis (subcastes) of village and locality in larger organizations with common identities, the caste association has contributed significantly to the success of political democracy by providing bases for communication, representation and leadership. It taught and enabled illiterate peasants to participate meaningfully and effectively in politics. Lower castes whose large numbers gave them an advantage in competitive democratic politics, gained influence, access and power in state and society. With these at their command, they have changed in their favor the allocation of resources, privilege and honor.

III

If India, a peasant nation, is not what Marx thought such nations must be—a "sackful of potatoes," the result of the "simple addition of homologous magnitudes," a society of stereotype and disconnected atoms—if it does not need a political master to which its peasants may subordinate themselves, as he thought they would, and has not developed revolution-

able to assume that locally the Shanans' change of name and status was in considerable measure recognized over time by appropriate changes in the evaluations and behavior of non-Shanans of all ranks and castes.

²³ See L. Rudolph and S. H. Rudolph, "Caste Associations," op. cit., passim.

ary consciousness, it is because India's peasants can represent and rule themselves; and caste helps them to do so. This is not to underestimate the problems caste poses for the creation of a modern society and the realization of individuality but is to place caste in its incarnation as caste association in an analytic context and there assess its meaning.

The caste association has contributed to the decompression and departochialization of the jati and the locality, particularly the village. which is the jati's historical and natural home. By reaching out toward the state and national legislative constituency, to the Community Development Block and District and their recently created parallel organs of local government, to legislative, administrative and executive arms of the State Government, and even to the government in Delhi and the politics of the nation, the caste association has educated and elevated caste consciousness, interest and purpose and given caste a voice in decisions at these levels. Doing so has helped inform the jati, aroused its imagination along with its ambition, and led it to larger and more inclusive identities and loyalties. As the block and district headquarters, the market town, local school and nearby cinema become increasingly relevant to village lives, as they energize and shape identities, they create alternative environments for prestige and self-esteem. The expansion of horizons and the growth of empathy have reduced the concentration of affect, power and economic dependence at the local level.34 The caste association both indepen-

34 The caste association can be viewed as both an independent and dependent variable in the processes of decompression and deparochialization. A few studies that highlight these processes are F. G. Bailey, who describes how the extension of the economic and political frontier (by which he means primarily the State administration) has liberated several castes, particularly the Boad Outcastes, from the social, cultural and governmental authority of the village of Bisipara: Caste and the Economic Frontier (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1957); T. Scarlett Epstein, who shows how in the "dry" village of Dalena (but not in the wet one of Wangala) in Mysore, radical economic change led to its integration into the regional economy, undermined the principle on which its society was organized (p. 325) and displaced ritual by economic aspects of prestige (p. 334): Economic Development and Social Change in South India (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1962); and William S. Rowe, who has shown how the Noniyas, an aggressively upward mobile caste of Senapur,

dently and as the carrier of other forces and institutions contributes to the reduction of the affect and interest invested in the face-to-face communities of caste and village. A unit of consciousness and organization which transcends both, it leads its members to new symbols, models and reference groups and to contexts of action which are structurally less diffuse but affectively more so. The drift of power, profit and honor away from the locality has not yet made Indian villages into bedroom suburbs but it has broken their ancient monopoly on all aspects of life.

Membership in a caste association is based on both birth and choice. One must be born into a particular jati to qualify, but then one must choose to join the association. The ascriptive element strongly suggests that there is a natural limit to the caste association's capacity to approximate a wholly voluntary association. However far it may lead those who identify with it from the narrow confines of the traditional face-to-face community, it can not, so it is argued, lead them beyond ascriptive boundaries. The individual can never be fully free to define himself, to make his own destiny, and as a consequence he is unable to act politically in ways that are untainted by group parochialism and selfishness.

Several recent developments have challenged this view. First, in so far as it is possible in India to "leave" traditional and "join" modern society by, for example, being educated in the English medium and "western" ideas, being trained in a modern profession and practicing it, marrying out of caste, and associating with people who, at least ostensibly, do not take caste into account in their friendships-and this is possible up to a point in India todaythe modernization of Indian society and politics through the transformation of caste becomes only one of two ways to achieve modernity. But the kind of westernization that Marx was talking about and the kind that Srinivas hypothesizes,34a that is, an alternative process of change that results in the formation of soci-

loosened the hold of the village's dominant caste by building a school with tiles purchased outright from a potter's village adjacent to Banaras twenty-five miles away: "Changing Rural Class Structure and the Jajmani System," Human Organization, Vol. 22 (Spring, 1963.) For the concept of empathy, its role in modernization and its relation to communication, see Daniel Lerner, Modernizing the Middle East; The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, 1958), esp. chs. 1 and 2.

³⁴a M. N. Srinivas, op. cit., chs. 1-3.

ety in western terms, is more an analytic construct than a description of reality. Westernization has created a "shadow" society, like the opposition's cabinet in British politics, ready to take power but for the moment serving as a critic of those in power and an innovator or catalyst of change. Like a shadow cabinet, it can change the existing regime's direction without ever replacing it. Modernity has entered into Indian character and society but it has done so through assimilation not replacement.35 The changes that now appear on the horizon with respect to the further evolution of the caste association and its transcendence of ascription have to do with internal differentiation (fission) and the operation of integrative institutions upon it and federation or consolidation of caste associations into larger groupings (fusion).

IV

In 1952, the Vanniyars, largest single caste in Madras state, capped a history of internal reform (Sanskritization) and organizational modernization not unlike that of the Nadars (formerly Shanans) by contesting the first General Election under the standards of the Tamil Nad Toilers (hereafter TNT) and Commonweal Party, the first strongest in South Arcot District but reaching into Salem and Tiruchirapalli Districts, and the second strongest in North Arcot. The two were virtually caste parties. The TNT captured nineteen and the Commonweal Party six seats in the Madras Assembly, or 13 per cent of the total. After S. S. Ramaswami Padayachi, head of the TNT, in 1954 joined N. A. Manickkavelu Naicker, leader of the Commonweal Party, in the reorganized Congress Government of Kamaraj Nadar, the Vanniyars, who represent ten per cent of the state's population, occupied two of the eight (25 per cent) cabinet seats. Their slogan in the 1952 election had been "Vannivar Vottu Anniyarukku Illai" (Vanniyar votes are not for non-Vanniyars). In 1957, at the time of the second General Election, the Vanniyars, now solidly entrenched in Kamaraj's Congress Party, seemed to have perfected the technique of caste representation. Nominated in large numbers by the Congress, they helped it gain an impressive victory that year.

By 1962, however, radical changes had taken place in the Vanniyars' social and political circumstances. Internal differentiation along eco-

³⁵ The burden of Edward Shils' argument in The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity; The Indian Case (The Hague, Mouton, 1961), seems to me to be consistent with these thoughts.

nomic, cultural and social lines and personal ambition were articulated and reinforced outside the Vanniyar community by parties competing for support. The result shattered Vanniyar corporate power. They were subsumed to an even greater degree than had been the case when they had moved from their own parties into Congress by the leadership and policy of a voluntary association and integrative institution, the political party. This effect is most sharply etched in South Arcot District, over half of whose 2.5 million population are Vanniyars and where the TNT in 1952 had captured thirteen of the District's nineteen MLA seats.36 In 1954, when that party's chief had led his followers into Kamaraj Nadar's Government and he had become a Minister, the first crack in Vannivar solidarity had appeared. A splinter TNT group under A. Govindaswami, MLA, opposed the merger and joined what has come to be Madras's leading opposition party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation, hereafter DMK).37

In 1957, when the Congress Party gave tickets to (nominated) former TNT members in preference to old-time Congressmen, K. S. Venkatakrishna Reddiar, along with other higher caste landowning notables from his own (Reddiar), Naidu, Vellala and Mudaliar castes and with the support of dissident or still dependent sections of the Vanniyars, helped form the Congress Reform Committee (hereafter CRC; later the Indian National Democratic Congress, hereafter INDC). Despite the fact that the leadership of the CRC was drawn from a class which had been and in some measure still was the master and sometimes the oppressor and exploiter of its Vanniyar tenants and laborers, it was able to rally considerable numbers to its electoral cause and gain a modest electoral success. By 1962, however, the INDC, some members having made their peace with the Congress, others having joined the DMK or the Swatantra Party, had evaporated. In 1960,

ss Express (Chittoor), March 7, 1962. I should like to acknowledge the very helpful extensive and detailed articles of the Expresss's Special Correspondent, M. Mohan Ram, on the 1962 election in North Arcot, Salem, Tiruchirapalli, Tanjore and South Arcot Districts; see the Express (Chittoor) for March 7, 15, 17, 20 and 21, 1962, upon which much of the analysis below is based.

²⁷ For an analysis of it and Dravidian politics generally, see Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Urban Life and Populist Radicalism; Dravidian Politics in Madras," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 20 (May, 1961), pp. 283–297.

a year after the Swatantra Party was created, S. S. Ramaswami Padayachi, the creator and leader of the TNT, began to move in its direction; by 1961, he had, joined it and become its head in South Arcot District.

The once monolithic Vanniyar political front in 1962 was "divided into three contending groups—one supporting the Congress under Mr. Srinivasa Padayachi, the second owing allegiance to the DMK, led by Mr. Govindaswami, and the third under Swatantra influence, loyal to Mr. Ramaswami Padayachi."38 The effect was to place all three major parties in South Arcot District under Vanniyar leadership. And of the District's fifteen non-reserved seats (four seats were reserved for Harijan candidates) in the 1962 General Election, thirteen were won by Vanniyars-eight as Congress and five as DMK candidates. S. S. Ramaswami Padayachi and a number of other Swatantra candidates lost, however, some by close margins.

The external boundaries of the caste association began to collapse under pressure from outside as the internal forces and strategic calculations which maintained the caste association's solidarity were weakened by differentiation, the absorption of more modern ideas, and political calculations designed to express both. A modern aggregative and integrative institution, the political party, by capitalizing on internal differences, destroyed its monolithic solidarity, further weakened caste's ascriptive and particularistic hold on social identity and behavior, divided and diffused the association's political power and brought it into closer approximation with the assumptions and behavior of modern society and democratic politics (i.e., more universal and functionally specific norms).

The ascriptive and particularistic qualities of caste associations are being affected by higher levels of integration (fusion) as well as by disintegration (fission). The Kallan, Maravar and Agamudiar castes³⁹ of central and southern

38 Express (Chittoor), March 21, 1962.

²⁹ For the Parumali-nadu Kallans see Louis Dumont's Une Sous-Caste de L'Inde du Sud; Organisation Sociale et Religieuse des Pramalai Kallar (Paris, Mouton, 1957); for Kallans generally see Thurston, Castes, III, 53-91; for Maravans, Thurston, Castes, V, 22-48; and for the Agamudiar, Thurston, Castes, I, 5-16. The link among these castes is older than the present beginnings of political federation. They share common mythological ancestors (see Thurston, Castes, I, 7 for two versions of the Agamudiar creation myth) and a common mobility pattern in tradi-

Madras have been defined and separated historically by ritual rank, social distance and endogamy. Recently their caste associations and leaders, under the interacting influences of democratic institutions and processes and those of traditional society,40 have begun to create new and larger forms of consciousness, organization and action.4 Experience in the Madras Assembly, the lessons of party and electoral politics, a growing sense of common purpose and the importance of numbers for realizing political objectives contributed to this result. The three castes have styled themselves Mukkulator (literally "three castes") and have begun to represent themselves in terms of this common name; and the organization and leadership which brought it into being contribute to its growing importance and strength. The basis of Mukkulator social and political identity remains that of an ascriptive social and cultural group with a given geographic location. But just as the caste association attenuated the importance of these factors by upgrading and extending the jati, so this federation of caste associations has further attenuated them by again diluting birth and particularism with choice. The self and public definition of the Mukkulators and their organization and political role approach even more closely than the caste association the qualities, form and functions of voluntary associations with political objectives. By further blurring the line between natural and voluntary association, the caste federation seems to break down the dichotomy between ascription and choice which helps to distinguish traditional from modern societies. What appeared to be an absolute division in theory if not in practice has

tional society. "There is a Tamil proverb," Thurston writes, "to the effect that a Kallan may become a Maravan. By respectability he may develop into an Agamudiyan, and, by slow degrees, become a Vellala, from which he may rise to be a Mudaliar." *Ibid.* Vellala and Mudaliar are traditionally ranked above Agamudiyan.

⁴⁰ W. H. Morris-Jones' analysis of the "languages of politics" and of the "dialogue" between government and political forces have been very helpful for the formulation and statement of the argument here. See his *The Government and Politics of India* (London, 1964), ch. 2, "Politics and Society" and ch. 6, "The Ordering Framework" for these two ideas.

⁴¹ The discussion below is based in part on an interview with Mr. Ramanchandran, MLA, Chief Whip of the Congress Party in the Madras Assembly. He is in no way responsible for my judgments.

become, in the Indian context, an increasingly relative one suggesting that a continuum which bridges the two rather than a dichotomy may be a more appropriate statement of both the practical and theoretical issues involved.

A recent study by Rajni Kothari and R. M. Maru, "Caste and Secularism in India; A Case Study of the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha,"42 confirms and deepens these observations. The Sabha is a federation of many economically depressed cultivators and landless laborers. Over time it has helped them to become "kshatrivas" in their own and society's eyes, by articulating their "common economic interests and a growing secular identity born partly out of past folk-lore but more out of common resentment against well-to-do castes. . . . "43 The caste federation's break with the ascriptive and particularistic features of traditional societyand its assumption of a modern social and politically democratic character is found, Kothari and Maru argue, in the motivation "that lies behind such a process of group assertion." Caste consciousness plays a part but it is no longer geared, they believe, to the preservation of caste traditions and customs but rather to "the acquisition of power and the transformation of traditional positions." This process, including its accompanying transformation of consciousness, the authors call "secularization." They relate it to the simultaneous sanskritization (the emulation of high caste norms and practice) of lower castes and the westernization (acculturation and social organization based on western values and forms) of higher;44 sanskritization narrows the gap between lower and higher castes and westernization widens it. Secularization, however, joins lower and higher castes in a common experience of social levelling and articulation of group purposes. Although both higher and lower castes are concerned respectively to preserve or improve their status through political action, political consid-

⁴² Journal of Asian Studies (forthcoming). Myron Weiner's excellent study "Segmentation and Political Participation: Kaira District, which came into my hands too late to be taken into account in this text, also deals with the [Gujarat] Kshatriya Sabha. His analysis complements and sharpens that of Kothari and Maru.

⁴³ The new identity and organization brings within its fold a fairly broad social spectrum ranging "from *Rajputs* who are highest in the Kshatriya hierarchy to *Bhils* who are semi-tribal, with Bariyas middle on the way." Kothari and Maru, "Secularism," pp. 7-8.

4 See Srinivas, op cit., ch. 2, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization."

erations fuse them together: the upper castes need numerical strength to sustain their power and status, the lower need access to resources and opportunities which support from the higher can yield. Lower castes may agree to be led and even governed by upper castes but their agreement to do so is "...increasingly conditioned by norms of accountability and notions of 'interest' and 'right.'"45

V

Political man in democratic India has been wrought out of traditional materials; he is not a new man. Acting through caste associations and federations he is capable at various levels and contexts of the pursuit of countervailing power and the calculation of political advantage. Parties seeking to integrate group purposes while differentiating themselves from their competitors have in most instances harnessed and subsumed India's transformed associational life. The result has been to make representative democracy meaningful and effective in a peasant nation and caste society.

The role of caste in Indian politics has nevertheless been subjected to severe and often uncomprehending criticism. Its ascriptive and particularistic features and the parochial selfishness and chauvinism which they support deeply trouble those committed to the progressive realization of a liberal democratic or socialist society and state. The individual must precede the group in time and importance for the contractual civil society or the ideological collective to have meaning and validity. Yet the blurring of the line between natural and voluntary associations in India has placed her associational life in a situation not too different from that of modern western nations. Natural associations based on language, religion, ethnicity and locality have not been assimilated or dissolved and continue to play a crucial, sometimes decisive part, in their politics.46 Nor is it true, despite the cross-cutting pressures of structural, economic and cultural pluralism in a democratic society and state, that formally

45 Kothari and Maru, "Secularism," p. 55.

⁴⁶ For America, see Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Anchor, 1960); Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, M.I.T. and Harvard University Press, 1963); and Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life; The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964).

voluntary associations are free from the characteristics and behavior attributed to natural associations. ⁴⁷ Efforts to distinguish traditional from modern society, in terms of a natural, versus a voluntary basis for their associational life, run the risk of confusing structure and formal requirements with a more indeterminate reality in which one blends into the other and is

⁴⁷ For a recent critical view of social pluralism as it has hardened and subordinated itself to bureaucratic leadership, see Henry Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961). Kariel is so concerned that he "would have us move... from the much celebrated ideal of Tocqueville toward the still unfashionable one of Rousseau."

Milton Gordon in Assimilation in American Life (New York, 1964), mounts an impressive case for the rigid compartmentalization of American communal life at the rank and file level. S. M. Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman in Union Democracy; The Inside Politics of the International Typographical Union (Glencoe, 1956), examine the rigidities and bureaucratic domination of union and professional associations by analysing the exceptional case. Everett C. Hughes in Men and Their Work (Glencoe, 1958), suggests how occupational associations in America, like castes in India, upgrade themselves by changing their names and histories and purify themselves and their rituals by emulating "higher" occupational groups in the matter of educational requirements, licensing standards and ceremonial niceties. John R. Murphy's "Professional and Occupational Licensing: A National Problem with State Control," a term paper in Government 155a, Government Regulation of Industry, Harvard University, 1959-60, along with Hughes' analyses, suggested these comparisons with caste mobility in India.

For social and political statements of the viability and benefits of social pluralism based on individuality, voluntarism and liberty, see William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960) and David B. Truman, The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1951).

Kariel and Lipset, Trow and Coleman emphasize the inability of members of formally voluntary associations, like peasants in Marx's analysis, to represent and rule themselves; therefore they fall victim to the executive power (the bureaucracy). William H. Whyte, Jr., in *The Organization Man* (New York, 1956), while not ignoring structural factors, emphasizes the ways in which formally voluntary organizations absorb and tend to monopolize the affective life and identities of their members and their families.

affected over time by contextual forces. Other ways may have to be found for distinguishing natural associations that find benign ways of merging the concerns for individuality and for achievement in modern society from those which are disruptive.

Massive natural associations based on religion led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947; the tribal associations in Ruanda led the Watusi to bring charges of genocide against the Bahutu;48 and tribal politics in the Congo fuelled chronic political instability and supported rebellion and civil war. When natural associations are too few, when they are socially and morally independent of each other, and when they lack a limited but critical identification with leaders, ideas and institutions capable of sustaining a national politics and modern state, they destroy the possibility or viability of a civil society that transcends them. Natural associations—including caste associations-in India in a few contexts such as Kerala, where society has become divided into five (Ezhavas, Harijans, Nairs, Christians and Muslims) large, roughly equal and relatively rigid groups, have contributed more to political instability than to political modernization. As the state's political parties have become increasingly congruent with these social differences, their integrative capacities have declined. Instead of subsuming, combining or disintegrating social differences based on birth, they have in considerable measure begun to re-enforce them. But the situation in Kerala is more the exception than the rule. The difficulties being experienced in Belgium, and Canada in recent years49 derive from natural associations which have resisted or absorbed strong modern pluralistic forces,

⁴⁸ See Jacques J. Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda (London, Oxford University Press, 1961). For the genocide charge see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963–1964), pp. 20085–86.

49 For Walloon-Flemish differences in Belgium see Ernest Mandel, "The Dialectic of Class and Region in Belgium," New Left Review, No. 20 (Summer, 1963), pp. 2-31; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 13 (1961-1962), pp. 17968, 18391, 18623, and 18941 and Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19601. For the differences in Canada between the French Catholics and English Protestants see the Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, 1965). The Commission warned that Canada was undergoing "the greatest crisis in its history." (p. 13). See also Edmund Wilson, O Canada (New York, 1965).

values antithetical to ascription and particularism, and integrative institutions, particularly the political party. The caste association has created less severe strains in modern Indian politics than have religion and language in these modern societies even while it has contributed to political socialization, modernization and meaningful participation in a society whose economic and social underdevelopment stands in marked contrast to these.⁵⁰

50 See S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March, 1959) for a proposition and supporting evidence which strongly suggest that democracy should be an utter failure in India. On almost every statistical measure of the "requisites of democracy" (per capita income, literacy, industrialization and urbanization) India stands at or near the bottom, yet it is a democracy. Lipset derides those who use a deviant case to challenge the validity of the notion that there are "social conditions which are regularly associated with a given complex political system" (p. 70) such as democracy. Theoretical propositions "must be subject to test by a systematic comparison of all available cases . . . " A deviant case, according to Lipset, is properly treated as one out of many. Only woolly minded and unscientific political philosophers would argue that "a given situation clearly violates [a] thesis . . . " (p. 70). Yet Lipset, in selecting his cases on the basis of "whether a country had had a history of more or less free elections for most of the post-World War I period" (pp. 73-74) does not consider India, although she meets the test. It seems reasonable to question, therefore, whether all available cases have been considered. It also seems reasonable to inquire whether it is valid to treat this deviant case "as one case out of many." In the name of aggregative characteristics of systems and multivariate analysis of causality, we are asked to treat the experience of India's almost 500,000,000 people as equivalent to that of the smallest Latin American "nation."

Lipset himself, drawing upon Weber, suggests an alternative theory of cumulative causation (see below) to explain the existence and persistence of democracy, but unfortunately abandons it in favor of aggregative social characteristics, on the basis of what seems at best a marginal and at worst a meaningless distinction between the "social conditions" which "support" democracy and the "internal mechanisms" which "maintain" it. It would seem that both theories deserve a place in the sun: the theory of cumulative causation explains better the supports for and the continued existence of democracy in India, while the aggregative social conditions theory, which Lipset

Because caste in most instances continues to divide society horizontally and not (like religion and language) vertically, and because the horizontal divisions continue to be many rather than few, it remains primarily an instrument of political representation capable of being aggregated, integrated and led. Its closest functional equivalent now may be the ethnic and religious groups in American politics which, contrary to "official" ideology, retain great influence particularly at the local and state level.

If this is so or is proving to be so, the situation is paradoxical and ironical. Indians, unlike Americans, were not, as Tocqueville put it, born equal. They have had or will have to become so. In so far as they have achieved equality, they have done so by transforming the most rigidly hierarchical and compartmentalized system of social stratification, the caste system. The measure of equality that has been realized is in part the result of a marriage between the transplanted and assimilated liberalism of the British raj and traditional Indian culture. The offspring of this union is a political culture with characteristics that embrace not

advances as a general theory, does not. This suggests that the Indian case may very well be a "universe" unto itself rather than "one case out of many." A general theory would then have to "explain" the Indian case and the cases with which Lipset deals. Instead, Lipset claims to deal with all cases but does not do so and treats, by implication, "universe" differences as "deviant"

The theory of cumulative causation would explain the support and maintenance of democracy by proposing that "... unique events may account for either the persistence or the failure of democracy in any particular society . . . key historical events . . . set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another . . . once established, a democratic political system gathers momentum . . . " (p. 72). Lipset warns us, in the light of this line of analysis, not to "overstress" the high correlations he displays between democracy and his measures for requisites. He also allows that what he calls "premature" democracies which survive will do so by "facilitating the growth of conditions conducive to democracy ..." But his choice of examples here, universal literacy and autonomous private associationspresumably not ones based on caste-highlight his bias toward certain "modern" aggregative social characteristics as the requisites of democracy. The Indian "universe" radically contradicts Lipset's view (as it does Marx's) but supports the abandoned theory of cumulative causation.

government but also caste associations. It is a political culture that includes, in Morris-Jones' terms,51 traditional, modern and "saintly" languages. Those who know and love one parent often ignore or reject the displeasing features of the other. Yet Indian political culture is surely a product of this union, a "genetic" fusion which some may think impossible, others immoral, but which by its vigor and viability over the years is hard to deny or ignore.

Changes in the internal arrangements and public function of caste and in political culture and structure are necessary but not sufficient if caste is to be made compatible with democracy. A profound change in the nature of human sensibility is also required but to a lesser extent realized. Tocqueville contrasted the state of human sensibility in aristocratic and democratic nations by observing that "real sympathy can exist only between those who are alike, and in aristocratic ages men acknowledge none but the members of their own caste to be like themselves. . . . When all the ranks of a community are nearly equal, as all men think and feel in nearly the same manner, each of them may judge in a moment of the sensations of all the others; he casts a rapid glance upon himself and that is enough."52 Yet Indians have been profoundly separated by their traditional social arrangments. "The survival of the caste system," Edward Shils observes, "... cuts human beings off from each other. It inhibits the growth of sensibilities which are required for the perception of the moral quality of other human beings.... It is the caste system which helps deaden the imagination to the state of mind of other human beings."53

Democratic ideas and the equality of conditions, Tocqueville argues, turn superiors and inferiors into "...new beings and place them in new relative positions." In hierarchical societies as yet unaffected by these influences. inferiority does not degrade the character of those who are inferior because they neither know nor imagine any other self-definition.

But while the transition from one social condition to another is going on, there is almost always a time when men's minds fluctuate between the aristocratic notion of subjection and the democratic notion of obedience. Obedience then loses

only political democracy and parliamentary, its moral importance in the eyes of him who obeys...he does not yet view it under its purely human aspect; it has to him neither the character of sanctity or justice. The lines that divide authority from oppression, liberty from license, and right from might are . . . jumbled together and confused [so] that no one knows exactly what he is or what he may be or what he ought to be. Such a condition is not democracy but revolution.54

> India may have been spared such a revolutionary situation by the transformation of caste over more than a century. But because it is still identified with ritual rank and sacred duty rather than social levelling and democratic representation, the degree to which Indians have put aside the aristocratic notion of subjection and accepted as moral and just the democratic one of obedience remains obscure.

> Rajputs who ruled the former princely states which comprise contemporary Rajasthan, for example, saw their Congress opponents in the 1952 General Election as "no-account," no longer guided by duty and loyalty, trouble makers and riff-raff, not so much because they resented them as because their social circumstances prevented them from knowing or imagining what Congressmen were like as human beings. Ten years later their human and highly differentiated view of the Rajasthan Congress leadership was in part the result of the attention that power commands. Those Shanans a century ago who thought they were entitled to be known and treated as Kshatriyas (warrior-rulers) became in time Nadars; one of their descendents now sits on the Congress gaddi (royal cushion). What Edward Shils has called the democratization of charisma⁵⁵ has come about in part from the successful emulation of higher by lower castes and the greater homogeneity of society that it produced, in part through the use of caste in a secular form to achieve influence and power and through them self-esteem and public respect. The Nadar who sits on the Congress gaddi symbolizes a massive historical change. Castes no longer live as races apart, capable of fellow feeling for their caste brothers only. A deepening sense of universal citizenship and a broadly shared political culture may have made Indians, in Locke's phrase, "capable of a majority," and in

⁵¹ Morris-Jones, op cit., ch. 2.

⁵² Democracy in America (Anchor ed.), II, 173, 175-6.

⁵³ Op. cit., note 35 above, p. 70.

⁵⁴ Democracy in America, ibid.

^{55 &}quot;Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma; Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," World Politics, Vol. 11 (October, 1958), pp. 1-19.

Aristotle's, of ruling and being ruled in turn. Tocqueville's tests for the transition from aristocratic subjection to democratic obedience—the capacity to be governed by author-

ity rather than oppression, to practice liberty rather than license and to maintain order through right rather than might—may be passed successfully.⁵⁶

56 This is more apparent at the national and state than at the local level of government. The literature on village factionalism and the failures of panchyati rai suggest that oppression, license and might in some localities are stronger than authority, liberty and right. But much of this literature reflects an administrative not a political view. A recent study by Adrian C. Mayer sees the problem rather differently. He finds that "caste ties help a leader to gain power in the rural committee system; but that his allocation of development funds does not unduly favor supporters of his own caste. . . . His favours may stem from the influence he has with officials and politicians as a leader of the rural system; but the favours do not form part of that system, while his allocation of development funds does. Hence, the rural leader controls the committee system and the attached development allocation as much to attain the external benefits (for which the system provides the springboard) as to hold power within the system.

"Community development is therefore a factor in rural politics; but its role is part of a much wider process, in which rural leaders are asserting themselves in a changing balance of general political power. For rural leaders are using the influence which they are gaining as brokers outside the rural system to compete for power with the incumbent, mainly urban-oriented, politicians of the national parties." "Some Political Implications of Community Development in India," Arch. Europ. Sociol. Vol 4 (1963), p. 106.

This headline from the Statesman of June 19, 1961, CASTE HIERARCHY DECLINES, AS CASTEISM RISES, sums up some of the case for the modernity of tradition through the democratic incarnation of caste.

OBLIGATION AND CONSENT—I

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One might suppose that if political theorists are by now clear about anything at all, they should be clear about the problem of political obligation and the solution to it most commonly offered, the doctrine of consent. The greatest modern political theorists took up this problem and formulated this answer. The resulting theories are deeply imbedded in our American political tradition; as a consequence we are already taught a sort of rudimentary consent theory in high school. And yet I want to suggest that we are not even now clear on what "the problem of political obligation" is, what sorts of "answers" are appropriate to it, what the consent answer really says, or whether it is a satisfactory answer. This essay is designed to point up the extent of our confusion, to explore some of the ground anew as best it can, and to invite further effort by others. That such effort is worthwhile, that such political theory is still worth considering and that it can be made genuinely relevant to our world, are the assumptions on which this essay rests and the larger message it is meant to convey.

I. THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION

The difficulties begin with the formulation of the problem itself. What exactly is the "problem of political obligation"? It is characteristic that we take it for granted there is a single problem to be defined here, and that nevertheless a dozen different formulations clamor for our attention. The classical theorists on the subject have treated it in varying ways; and even within the writings of a Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau it is difficult to say what the theorist's "basic problem" is, or indeed whether he has one. We tend, I think, to suppose that it does not matter very much how you phrase the problem, that the different formulations boil down to the same thing. But my first point will be that this attitude of arbitrariness or indifference should not be trusted. It is not, in fact, true that any formulation of the problem is equivalent to any other. Rather, this supposed single problem is a whole cluster of different questions—questions of quite various kind and scope. And though their answers may turn out to be related, so that an answer to one provides answers to the others also, it is by no means obvious that this must be so. Specifically, I suggest that most of the familiar answers to the problem are satisfactory responses to some of

its questions but not to others, and that the answer adopted depends a good deal on the question stressed.

For the purposes of this essay it will be useful to distinguish four questions, or rather, four clusters of questions, all of which are part of what bothers theorists about political obligation. They range from a relatively concrete and practical political concern with what is to be done, through increasing theoretical abstractness, to a philosophical concern with the meanings of concepts and the paradoxes that arise out of them. Because we are used to treating them all as different versions of one problem, the reader may not at first see any significant differences among them; but the differences should emerge in the course of the discussion.

We are told often enough that the theorists of political obligation were not merely philosophers, but also practical men writing about the political needs of their times. They produced "not simply academic treatises, but essays in advocacy, adapted to the urgencies of a particular situation. Men rarely question the legitimacy of established authority when all is going well; the problem of political obligation is urgent when the state is sick, when someone is seriously contemplating disobedience or revolt on principle."2 Thus we may begin with a cluster of questions centered around the limits of political obligation, the more or less practical concern with when, under what circumstances, resistance or revolution is justified. The theorist wants to promote or prevent a revolution, or he lives in a time when one is taking place, or he contemplates one in the recent past. So he seeks some fairly general, but still practically applicable principles to guide a man in deciding when (if ever) political obligation ends or ceases to bind. They must have a certain degree of generality in order to be principles rather than ad hoc considerations in one particular situation, in order to be recognized by us as theory. But they are also fairly directly tied to

- ¹ No doubt the problem encompasses more than these four questions, and could be divided up in a number of different ways. Indeed, some aspects of it not covered by these four questions will emerge in the course of this discussion.
- ² S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, *Social Principles* and the Democratic State (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959), pp. 299-300.

what Tussman has called the question "what should I do?" They are guidelines to action.

At other times the same practical concern tends to take a slightly different form: "Whom am I obligated to obey? Which of the persons (or groups) claiming to command me actually has authority to do so?" Put this second way, the problem seems to be one of rival authorities, sometimes identified in political theory as the problem of the locus of sovereignty. The former question tends to arise in situations of potential civil disobedience or nascent revolution, where the individual is relatively alone in his confrontation of a government. The latter question is more likely to come up in situations of civil war or when a revolution is more advanced, when the individual is already confronted by two "sides" between which he must choose.

But as the theorist tries to formulate general principles to guide such a choice, he may be led to a more abstract version of his problem. He may be struck by the seeming arbitrariness or conventionality of human authority: how is it that some men have the right to command, and others are obligated to obey? And so the theorist looks for the general difference between legitimate authority on the one hand, and illegitimate, naked coercive force on the other. He begins to wonder whether there is really any difference in principle between a legitimate government and a highway robber, pirate, or slave-owner. He begins to suspect that terms like "legitimate," "authority," "obligation" may be parts of an elaborate social swindle, used to clothe those highway robbers who have the approval of society with a deceptive mantle of moralistic sanctity. Essentially, he begins to ask whether men are ever truly obligated to obey, or only coerced. "Strength is a physical attribute," says Rousseau, "and I fail to see how any moral sanction can attach to its effects. To yield to the strong is an act of necessity, not of will. At most it is the result of a dictate of prudence. How, then, can it become a duty?"⁴ Such questions are no longer merely guides to action; they are attempts to describe and classify parts of the social world. Instead of focussing on the individual's "what should I do?" they focus outward, on the (real or alleged) authority: "what is legitimate authority like?"

Finally, behind even this more abstract ques-

tion, lies what is essentially a philosophical problem, a cluster of questions centering around the justification of obligation: why are you obligated to obey even a legitimate government? Why is anyone ever obligated to obey any authority at all? How can such a thing be rationalized, explained, defended, justified? What can account for the binding nature of valid law and legitimate authority? I call these questions philosophical problems because they no longer seek distinctions or guides to action, but arise out of puzzlement over the nature of law, government, obligation as such. They are categorical questions to which the theorist is led, characteristically, after an extended abstract contemplation of the concepts he has been using. They are reminiscent of other philosophical puzzles, like "do we ever really know anything?" or "do other people really exist?"

We have, then, four clusters of questions, any or all of which are sometimes taken to define the problem of political obligation:

- (1) The limits of obligation ("When are you obligated to obey, and when not?")
- (2) The locus of sovereignty ("Whom are you obligated to obey?")(3) The difference between legitimate au-
- The difference between legitimate authority and mere coercion ("Is there really any difference; are you ever really obligated?")
- (4) The justification of obligation ("Why are you ever obligated to obey even a legitimate authority?")

Obviously the answers to these questions may be connected. If, for example, one answers question three in terms of the reductionist realism of a Thrasymachus or of vulgar Marxism: "there is no difference," then the other questions become essentially irrelevant. But we should not take it for granted that any answer to one of these questions will automatically provide consistent answers to the rest; we should look to see how familiar answers in fact perform. Our prime interest is, of course, the consent answer, but before examining it, we might look briefly at very abstract, idealtypicalized versions of some of its major rivals. Their brief treatment here would not allow, and is not meant to be a balanced assessment of their merits. It is meant only to explore a little of the complexity of political obligation, and the difficulty of providing a consistent treatment of it.

Theories of Divine Right or the will of God, for example, seem much better designed to cope with some of our questions than with others. Saying, with St. Paul, that "the powers that be are ordained of God," seems a decisive

³ Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 12.

⁴ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, in Sir Ernest Barker, ed., *The Social Contract* (New York, Oxford, 1960), Bk. I, iii.

answer (at least for a believer) to our question four. Granted only that there is a God (in the full sense of the word), the fact that he commands certain actions is surely a decisive justification for our obligation to perform them. But applied to our other questions the doctrine is ambiguous. Taken one way, it seems to imply that there is no difference between mere coercive force and legitimate authority, since all power comes from God. Then resistance is never justified, even against a heretical ruler who attacks religion. For times when power is in flux, as in cases of civil war, this version of the theory seems to provide very little guidance for action. Taking the doctrine a different way, some divine right theorists have wanted to argue that there is nevertheless a distinction to be made between divinely ordained power and illegitimate power, and that there are times when certain kinds of power must be resisted.

Prescription, another familiar response to the problem of obligation, seems more directly designed to give an unequivocal answer to questions one and perhaps three. It teaches that old, established power is legitimate in every case, and there are no limits on our obligation to obey it. But this again is no guide in times of successful revolution; is it obedience or counterrevolution that is then required? And what of occasions when an old, established government begins to act in new and tyrannical ways? Even Burke was sympathetic to the American Revolution. Further, this doctrine has real difficulties with our question four; a government's age, and our habitual obedience to it, do not seem to justify an obligation to obey. At most the connection can only be made through a number of additional assumptions concerning human reason and the nature of society, and adding up to the thesis that old, accepted government is most likely to be good government.

A third, equally well known response to our problem, that of Utilitarianism, is perhaps an even better illustration of the complexities involved. The utilitarian theorist argues that you are obligated to obey if and only if the consequences of obedience will be best on the whole, in terms of a calculus of pains and pleasures. There are, of course, familiar difficulties over the manner of calculation and whether all pains and pleasures are to count equally. But even beyond these, there is a fundamental question left unclear, namely, whose pains and pleasures are to count: your own personal ones, or those of the (majority of) people in your society. Bentham himself says that it is

allowable to, if not incumbent on every man... to enter into measures of resistance... when the

probable mischiefs of resistance (speaking with respect to the community in general) appear less to him than the probable mischiefs of obedience.

But the phrase in the parentheses is, of course, the crux of the matter. The Utilitarians are notoriously inconsistent on precisely this point, saying one thing when they speak of personal ethics and personal decision, and quite another on the subject of legislation and public policy. So it will be well for us to consider both possibilities.

First, there is what might be called individualistic utilitarianism. Such a theory argues that you are obligated when the consequences of obedience are best on the whole in terms of your personal pleasure and pain. As a response to our question four, this argument has a certain appeal: you are obligated because it is best for you in terms of your own pleasure and pain. But the implications for the other questions are more strange. For they are that each individual is obligated to obey only while it is best for him, and becomes obligated to resist when that would promote his personal welfare. Thus the same government will be a legitimate authority for some of its subjects but naked illegitimate power to others. And anyone is free to disobey or resist whenever it benefits him to do so; he can have no obligation to the contrary. Indeed, the sum total of such a doctrine is that you have no obligation at all, or none except the pursuit of your own welfare. If that happens at one point to entail obeying the law, you should do so; if not, not. And in precisely the same way, if it happens at one point to entail obeying a highway robber, you are "obligated" to do that. Thus, as an answer to question three, individualistic utilitarianism essentially denies the existence of authority altogether.

The second alternative is what we might call social utilitarianism. This position argues that you are obligated to obey if and only if the consequences of your doing so will be best on the whole, in terms of the pains and pleasures of the people in your society—in terms of the greatest good for the greatest number. Unlike individualistic utilitarianism, this seems a fairly reasonable, conventional answer to questions one and two. You must obey while that promotes the welfare of society, even if it hurts you; and you must resist when that is socially best, even if it hurts you. The answer to question three is less obvious but not, on the face of it, irrational. A legitimate government is one that promotes the greatest good for the greatest number; and if a highway robber does that,

⁵ Jeremy Bentham, Fragment on Government, ch. IV, par. 21.

then he becomes thereby a legitimate authority entitled to your obedience. A selfish or (on the whole) harmful robber or government may or must be resisted. But as an answer to question four, social utilitarianism seems less successful. For it teaches that you are obligated because your obedience will promote the greatest good for the greatest number. But if you are bothered about political obligation, that is just the problem: why should that criterion mean anything to you? Why should it be any easier to accept that obligation than to accept the obligation to obey law and authority?

Sometimes, of course, the utilitarians assume that there is no problem about individualistic versus social utilitarianism, that the two criteria are essentially the same because of the invisible hand, because individual welfare is (in sum) social welfare. When they write about economics, particularly, this solution tempts them. But in political life, concerning legislation or concerning political obligation, they are fairly well aware that this is not the case. Private interest must be made to coincide with public interest by wise legislation. And instructions to resist when it is best for society will often produce quite different results than instructions to resist when it is best for you personally. There are bound to be occasions when the public welfare requires serious sacrifices (perhaps even of life) by some individuals. To suppose otherwise seems incredibly unrealistic.

The theorist founding political obligation in consent responds to our four questions in this way: you are obligated to obey if and only if you have consented. Thus your consent defines the limits of your obligation as well as the person or persons to whom it is owed. Legitimate authority is distinguished from mere coercive power precisely by the consent of those subject to it. And the justification for your obligation to obey is your own consent to it; because you have agreed, it is right for you to have an obligation. But the seeming harmonious simplicity of these answers is deceptive; when consent theory is worked out in detail, its answers to some of our questions begin to interfere with its answers to others.

In the first place, there is the problem of exactly whose consent is to count. We have all known, at least since Hume—if it was not already obvious before him—that the historical origins of society are essentially irrelevant to the consent argument. The consent of our ancestors does not settle the problem about our obligation today. Or rather, someone who seriously argues that the consent of our ancestors does settle this problem, is arguing more from prescription than from consent, and is probably

not very troubled about political obligation anyway.

But even if it is the consent of those now subject to power (or authority) that matters, there are still several alternatives: is it to be the individual's personal consent that determines his obligation, or the consent of all (or most) of those subject to the government? And is it to be his or their present consent, or consent given in the past? Let us consider the possibilities.

- (1) You are obligated only insofar as you personally consent right now. Where your consenting ends, there ends also your obligation. What this presumably means is that as long as you accept the government it is wrong for you to disobey it, and right for it to punish any disobedience by you. But as soon as you withdraw your consent, you become free to disobey, and no attempt to punish you can be justified. This doctrine would have the peculiar consequence that you can never violate your obligation; for as soon as you decide the time has come for revolution (withdraw your consent), your obligation disappears. It also means that you can never be mistaken about your obligation, for what you think defines it. This answer comes to much the same thing as individualistic utilitarianism, except that it demands no rational calculation, looking to your will rather than to your welfare.
- (2) You are obligated only insofar as you personally have in the past consented. This is closer to traditional contract theory. You gave your word, and so you are bound for the future, unless (of course) the government changes and becomes tyrannical. But this position seems to allow the possibility of becoming obligated to a tyrannical government, if you expressly consent to one that was already corrupt. One can avoid that problem by saying such promises are invalid, that you cannot expressly consent to become a slave; but then the argument is already moving away from a consent theory. Then your obligation is no longer merely a matter of your having consented (tried to consent, intended to consent).

Further, there seems to be a real problem about why and whether your past promise should bind you now. The classical contract theorists provide a law of nature to take care of this difficulty: it is a law of nature that promises oblige. But why should it seem so obvious and "natural" and self-evident that your promises oblige you, when it is so doubtful and problematic and un-"natural" that law and authority oblige you?

(3) You are obligated only insofar as your fellow-subjects consent. One consequence of

this position is that the matter is no longer left up to you; you can sometimes be obligated to obey even against your will and your private judgment, and without ever having consented or been consulted. But, if so, how many of your fellow-subjects must consent? All? That is surely impossible. A majority? But that implies that the way to decide whether you are obligated, or whether you should start a revolution, is to take a public opinion poll. And can majorities never be wrong? Are there no occasions in the history of mankind when it was right for a dedicated minority to begin agitating for a revolution, or even to lead or make a revolution? And finally, why should what the majority (or any other proportion) of your fellow-subjects think be binding on you? What justification is there for that? Why should that obligation seem more basic or natural or self-evident than the obligation to obey laws and authority? Because you have consented to majority rule? But then the whole cycle of difficulties begins again.

Besides the matter of whose consent is to count, consent theory is also much troubled by the difficulty of showing that you, or a majority of your fellow-citizens (as the case may be) have in fact consented. Most of us have not signed any contract with our government or our society or our fellow-citizens. There is no such contract for us to sign. And while we political theorists may be enlightened about our obligations, we realize that the largest proportion of our fellow-citizens has never contemplated this sort of question at all. If they have consented, it comes as news to most of them. Of course, these facts need not invalidate the consent argument. Perhaps most of us are not really obligated in modern, apathetic mass society; perhaps our government is not really legitimate. But such conclusions seem to fly in the face of common sense. Surely, one feels, if the present government of the United States is not a legitimate authority, no government has ever been. And surely it is absurd to adopt a theory according to which only those people who are most educated and aware of their obligations, most moral and sensitive, are obligated to obey the law. Surely it is absurd to suppose that all the rest are free to do whatever they please, whatever they can get away with. A more common move at this stage in the argument is the introduction of some notion of "tacit consent", demonstrating that even the unaware masses have consented after all. But it appears to be extremely difficult to formulate a notion of tacit consent strong enough to create the required obligation, yet not so strong as to destroy the very substance and meaning of consent.

Let us now examine in more detail how these difficulties are encountered and treated in two consent arguments: the most famous one of the tradition, made by John Locke, and a recent attempt at revision by Joseph Tussman. What should emerge from a review of their arguments is a somewhat unexpected and different doctrine of political obligation: perhaps a new interpretation of consent theory, perhaps a new rival to it.

II. LOCKE ON CONSENT

Locke tells us in the preface to his Two Treatises that he wants both to "make good" the title of William III to the English throne "in the consent of the People" and also "to justifie to the World, the people of England, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine."6 Apart from the exegetic problems of how much of the Treatises may have been written before the Glorious Revolution and for quite other purposes, the thrust of Locke's argument makes clear enough that this dual orientation does pervade the work.7 He seeks both to defend the obligation to obey legitimate authority (which is authority based on consent), and to defend the right to resist coercive force in the absence of authority. But Locke moves easily, and seemingly without awareness, from one to another of our four questions about obligation and back again. Often when the going gets difficult on one, he switches to another.

Legitimate authority, for Locke, comes from the consent of those subject to it, never from mere conquest (force); and even a consent extracted by coercion is invalid. Thus the limits of a government's authority are defined by the social contract on which it is based. Strictly speaking, of course, Locke's contract sets up society and government is established by society as a trust. There is no contract with the government. But the government gets its powers (in trust) from "the society", acting by majority vote. And "the society" has only such powers to give, as it has itself received from the separate contracting individuals. Thus, even for Locke, it is the contract which ultimately

- ⁶ Peter Laslett, ed., John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1960) p. 155.
- ⁷ For a discussion of the evidence on when the *Treatises* were written, see *ibid.*, Introduction, esp. part III.
- ⁸ John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, in Barker, op. cit., par. 176.
 - ⁹ Ibid., pars. 132, 149, 199 211.

determines what powers the government can have. He himself makes this assumption and I shall follow suit, since it simplifies the argument.¹⁰

Although Locke sometimes seems to take contract seriously as an account of the historical origins of society, he is nevertheless quite explicit about the requirement that no person is obligated to obey today unless he has himself consented.11 Most of us have not consented expressly? Ah. but there is tacit consent. and its scope turns out to be very wide indeed. Although a father may not consent for his son, he can make consent to the community a condition on inheritance of the property he leaves behind; then in accepting the property the son tacitly consents to obey the government.12 But the final definition of tacit consent is even wider, for land is not the only form of property, and property not the only form of right that men enjoy:

Every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely traveling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territories of that government.¹³

Just as Locke maintained earlier in the *Treatise* that men have tacitly consented to all inequalities in property, simply by accepting and using money as a medium of exchange; so in the political realm he argues that men have tacitly consented to obey a government, simply by remaining within its territory. He but now there no longer seems to be much power in the concept of consent, nor any difference between legitimate government and mere coercion. Being within the territory of the worst tyranny in

10 For example, *ibid.*, par. 171: "political power" is spoken of as that power which every man has "in the state of Nature given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over it self...."

- 11 Ibid., par. 116.
- 12 Ibid., and also par. 73.
- 13 Ibid., par. 119.

¹⁴ "But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man, in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes in great part the measure, it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth. . . . " *Ibid.*, par. 50.

the world seems to constitute tacit consent to it and create an obligation to obey it. Only physical withdrawal —emigration— and the abandoning of all property frees you from that obligation; there is no such thing as tacit dissent.

At this point we are likely to feel cheated by Locke's argument: why all the stress on consent if it is to include everything we do; why go through the whole social contract argument if it turns out in the end that everyone is automatically obligated? It seems that in his eagerness to save the consent answer to our question four (because only your own consent can justify your obligation), Locke has been forced so to widen the definition of consent as to make it almost unrecognizable. He has been forced to abandon his answers to our other questions as well as one of his own initial purposes: the justification of an (occasional) right of revolution.

But clearly this is not Locke's real position. I have developed it this way only because the corrections we must now make are so revealing about consent theory. For despite his doctrine of tacit consent, Locke does not want to abandon either the right of revolution or the distinction between legitimate authority and coercive power. His position is not, in fact, that living within the territory of a tyrannical government or holding property under it constitutes tacit consent to it.

Suppose that we ask: to what have you consented when you live in a country and use its highways? Unfortunately, Locke is less than clear on this question. What he says explicitly in the crucial section on tacit consent is that you have "consented," period; he does not say to what. 15 But apparently, what you consent to is a kind of associate membership in the commonwealth. Full membership, achieved only by express consent, is an indissoluble bond for life. The obligation of a tacit consenter, however, terminates if he leaves the country and gives up his property there. 16 Locke also variously describes tacit consent as a joining oneself to a society, putting oneself under a commonwealth and submitting to a government. Sometimes he simply equates its "joining up" aspects with submission to a government; at other times he regards submission as an immediate consequence of joining.17

But in the context of the problems we have encountered, a better interpretation of Locke's intention here would be this: what you consent to tacitly is the terms of the original contract which the founders of the commonwealth made, no more and no less. You append your "signature,"

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, par. 119.

¹⁶ Ibid., par. 121.

¹⁷ Ibid., pars. 73, 119, 120.

as it were, to the original "document." Then if you live or use the roads or hold property under a government which is violating its trust, exceeding its authority, taking property without due compensation, "altering the legislative," or generally acting in a tyrannical manner, you have consented to none of these things. You are not obligated to obey one inch beyond the limits of the original contract, any more than its original signatories were. You retain the right of revolution, as they did, in case the government oversteps the limits of its authority.

So we seem to be led to the position that you are obligated to obey not really because you have consented; your consent is virtually automatic. Rather, you are obligated to obey because of certain characteristics of the government—that it is acting within the bounds of a trusteeship based on an original contract. And here it seems to me that interpreters of Locke have given far too little attention to the degree to which he regards the terms of the original contract as inevitably determined. In truth, the original contract could not have read any otherwise than it did, and the powers it gave and limits it placed can be logically deduced from the laws of nature and conditions in the state of nature. Not only does Locke himself confidently deduce them in this way, sure that he can tell us what the terms of that original contract were, must have been; but he says explicitly that hey could not have been otherwise. For men had to give up sufficient of their rights to make an effective government possible, to allow a government to remedy the "inconveniences" of the state of nature. Nothing short of this would create a society, a government. "There, and there only, is political society, where every one of the members" has given up the powers necessary to a society:18

Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the needs for which they unite into society....¹⁹

More power than this, on the other hand, men cannot be supposed to have given; and, indeed, they are forbidden by the law of nature to give more. When the limits of authority are to be defined, Locke invokes the purpose for which the contract was made, the intention which those making it must have had:

But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty and executive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in everyone the better to preserve himself, his liberty and his property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to the worse), the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure everyone's property by providing against those three defects above-mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.²⁰

Thus men cannot sell themselves into slavery "for nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself" to give to another; he "cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another." Arbitrary or absolute power can never be legitimate, consented to, because "God and Nature" do not allow "a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation." "Thus," says Locke, "the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others." 23

If the terms of the original contract are, as I am arguing, "self-evident" truths to Locke, which could not be or have been otherwise, then the historical veracity of the contract theory becomes in a new and more profound sense irrelevant. For now the Lockean doctrine becomes this: your personal consent is essentially irrelevant to your obligation to obey, or its absence. Your obligation to obey depends on the character of the government—whether it is acting within the bounds of the (only possible) contract. If it is, and you are in its territory, you must obey. If it is not, then no amount of personal consent from you, no matter how explicit, can create an obligation to obey it. No matter how often you pledge allegiance to a tyranny, those pledges cannot constitute a valid obligation, because they violate the law of nature. So, not only is your personal consent irrelevant, but it actually no longer matters whether this government or any government was really founded by a group of men deciding to leave the state of nature by means of a contract. As long as a government's actions are within the bounds of what such a contract hypothetically would have provided, would have had to provide. those living within its territory must obey. This is the true significance of what we have all learned to say in political theory: that the historical accuracy of the contract doctrine is

¹⁸ Ibid., par. 87.

¹⁹ Ibid., par. 99.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, par. 131, italics mine. See also pars. 90, 135, 137, 149, 164.

²¹ Ibid., pars. 135, 23.

²² Ibid., pars. 90, 168.

²³ Ibid., par. 135; see also par. 142.

basically irrelevant—that the contract is a logical construct. The only "consent" that is relevant is the hypothetical consent imputed to hypothetical, timeless, abstract, rational men.

III. TUSSMAN ON CONSENT

A more modern version of the story is told by Joseph Tussman in his excellent and provocative book, Obligation and the Body Politic. Tussman, too, seeks to found political obligation in the consent of the governed. Only on that basis, he maintains, is political obligation "distinguishable from captivity," for "obligations are, or even must be voluntarily assumed."24 Tussman acknowledges the rarity of express consent except in the case of naturalized citizens who take an oath of citizenship. But, like Locke, he introduces a notion of tacit consent. Unlike Locke's, however, Tussman's tacit consent does not include merely walking on a country's highway; he insists that even tacit consent must be "knowing," made with awareness of what one is doing and of its significance.25 A great many different actions, done with awareness and intent, can constitute such tacit consent: pledging allegiance to the flag, voting in an election, and so on. But even this doctrine, as Tussman admits, produces only a relatively small number of persons who can be said to have consented. Reluctantly he accepts this conclusion, which he calls the notion of "shrinkage."

If it is insisted that only those who have consented are members of the body politic then the body politic may shrink alarmingly.... [But] any description of a body politic, like the United States, would have to recognize that there are some, or many, "citizens" who could not be described as having consented. There is no point to resorting to fiction to conceal this fact.²⁶

Thus it is Tussman's position that only those who have consented (perhaps tacitly, but knowingly) are truly members, and that these may be relatively small proportion of the population.²⁷ But, of course, he is not willing to conclude that only those few consenting members are bound to obey the laws and accept the actions of the government as authoritative. He takes it for granted that everyone must obey, is obligated to obey, ought to be punished for disobeying—even the man who has never given

government or obligation a single thought. Tussman allows for the possibility of withdrawal, emigration, as an express refusal to consent; but (as with Locke) there is no such thing as tacit dissent. The clods who merely live in a country without ever being sufficiently aware of public life to consent even tacitly, are not members of the body politic, but they are nevertheless bound to obey the law. The clods are obligated, Tussman says, like children. "Non-consenting-adult citizens are, in effect, like minors who are governed without their own consent. The period of tutelage and dependence is unduly prolonged."²⁸

The interesting thing is that this doctrine does not seem to bother Tussman; he sees no inconsistency in it. He is not disturbed by saying on the one hand that membership in a body politic can only be distinguished from mere captivity if it is voluntary, and on the other hand that large masses of people must obey though they have not consented and are consequently not members. He does not seem to be bothered by saying that great masses of adults are obligated like children; he does not discuss why or how children are obligated, how their obligation-let alone its continuation into adult lifecan be justified. To be sure, he obviously regrets the state of affairs that makes so large a proportion of our population clods who are not truly members. In a sense his whole book is written to advocate a more adequate system of political education, which would make more people aware of morality and public life, so that they would truly consent.

This is his ideal; but we have a right to ask what happens in the meantime, and how satisfactorily Tussman's account explains political obligation in the meantime. And when we do, we have the same feeling of betrayal as with Locke: why all the liberal protestations at the outset about the need for voluntary consent, if the net result in the end is that everyone has to obey anyway? In Locke the betrayal seems to center in the way he stretches the notion of tacit consent; Tussman avoids this, but instead introduces a second, childlike kind of obligation.

Now, there are good reasons why Tussman's argument proceeds as it does, why he does not seem to see these difficulties. For, although his book purports to be about obligation (as the title indeed indicates) the primary thrust of its argument, the question Tussman really seems to have asked himself, is about membership in a body politic. He takes it for granted that exploring the nature of membership will also pro-

²⁴ Op. cit., pp. 24, 8. I hope it is clear, in spite of all the criticisms I make of Tussman's argument, how greatly this essay is indebted to his work.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 36.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 37.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 127.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 37, 39-41.

duce answers about political obligation. At the outset of the book, confronting the question of what membership in a body politic is like, Tussman suggests three alternative possibilities: that membership be construed as subordination to a single coercive power; or as sharing in a common set of habits or customs; or as being party to (consenting to) a system of agreements on the model of a voluntary association. Given these three alternatives, he opts for the last one, because only if membership rests on consent can it be related to concepts like legitimacy and obligation. "I have a duty to . . .' seems to follow from 'I have agreed to' in a way that it does not follow from 'I am forced to' or 'I am in the habit of.'"29

In terms of our classification, Tussman directs his inquiry at question three, the difference between legitimate authority and coercive power. As an answer to that question, as an account of membership, his theory surely is very compelling. Confronted with unaware, nonconsenting clods, it seems reasonable then to say that not everyone is truly a member; that no body politic is entirely legitimate, based on the consent of every single subject; that political education might make our nation a better, truer political association in the future. But approached from our question four, for instance, the theory seems arbitrary and inadequate. If "obligations are, or even must be voluntarily assumed," then how can one consistently maintain that children or the non-consenting clods are obligated to obey the law? How is their situation different from captivity, and how can it be justified? Tussman is not interested in our question four. Or perhaps that statement is not strong enough; he refuses to consider the question, because he regards it as "a symptom of moral disorder."30

Tussman is right to be suspicious of the question; there is something strange about it, as we shall later see. But it is a symptom less of moral disorder than of philosophical disorder; and it needs to be considered, not rejected. For although Tussman explicitly rejects the question, he is already profoundly committed to one particular answer to it: that only consent can justify obligation, distinguish it from captivity. And this commitment conflicts with his treatment of the clods in society. As a result, Tussman's theory also has difficulties with our questions one and two, concerning the limits and location of authority.

For Tussman wants to maintain that all persons in a country—consenting members and

clods alike-are obligated to obey law and government, except when occasions for revolution arise. He recognizes that there are occasions and situations when revolution is justified, that there is a right of revolution. He talks about the need to "exhaust the remedies" available within a system, about what happens when there are only "corrupt tribunals" left to appeal to; and he says "where government is based on force, forceful opposition needs no special permit."31 Thus we may legitimately ask him, who has the right to revolt when the occasion for revolution arises. The members presumably do. Surely they never consented to tyranny, and a tyrannical government is acting ultra vires, beyond any consent they have given. But surely, too, the clods, who have never consented, ought also to be morally free to resist a "government" that has become a tyranny. Though they may ordinarily be obligated to obey as children are, yet surely Tussman cannot mean that they continue to be obligated no matter what the government does or how it degenerates. Surely a clod who suddenly awakens to moral awareness under a Hitler government is right to resist it.

But why, when, how does their childlike obligation come to an end? Tussman does not tell us, because he does not consider the question. He seems, thus, to be saying: you are obligated to obey a government that is legitimate authority, whether you personally consented to it or not. If you have consented, you are obligated as a member; if not, as a child. In either case your obligation ends if the government abuses its power or ceases to be a legitimate authority. And what defines a legitimate authority? Why, consent, of course. Then we are all of us obligated to obey a government based on our consent, whether or not we have consented to it.

Though he never makes it explicit, the position that Tussman really seems to want to take is that we are all obligated to obey a government based on the consent of the aware elite, the true members, whether or not we ourselves have consented. A government is legitimate when those who are aware consent to it, and it then becomes legitimate for all its subjects; a government is tyrannical if it lacks this consent of the aware ones, or oversteps the limits of it. And then all its former subjects are released from their obligation. Some evidence for the contention that this is what Tussman means to say may be drawn from his treatment of the child's obligation. For he says "Non-consenting adult citizens are, in effect, like minors who are gov-

²⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

erned without their own consent."32

But again Tussman fails to tell us who does consent for minors, how and why the consent of some can legitimately be taken to bind others. Thus saving that the aware few consent for the rest is by no means a satisfactory answer, but from it I believe a more satisfactory answer can be reached by one further step. We must ask Tussman whether the aware few could conceivably consent to a tyranny, whether such consent would count, would be binding on them or the clods. I think clearly Tussman would want to say no, that such an action would not be a genuine consent, that an attempt to consent to tyranny does not create valid obligation either for the aware few or for the many clods for whom they are said to act. Thus a different doctrine begins to emerge between the lines of Tussman's book, as it did with Locke. It is not so much your consent nor even the consent of a majority of the aware few in your society that obligates you. You do not consent to be obligated, but rather are obligated to consent, if the government is just. Your obligation has something to do with the objective characteristics of the government -whether, for example, its "tribunals" are or are not "corrupt." Again the relevant consent seems to be best interpreted as hypothetical or constructive—the abstract consent that would be given by rational men. Like Locke, Tussman can be pushed back to this position: you are obligated neither by your own consent nor by that of the majority, but by the consent rational men in a hypothetical "state of nature" would have to give. A government acting within the bounds of such a hypothetical consent is legitimate and we are all obligated to obey it. A government systematically violating those limits is tyrannical, and we are free to resist it.

32 Ibid., p. 37, italics mine.

Both Locke's and Tussman's argument, then lead us to a somewhat surprising new doctrine: that your obligation to obey depends not on any special relationship (consent) between you and your government, but on the nature of that government itself. If it is a good, just government doing what a government should, then you must obey it; if it is a tyrannical, unjust government trying to do what no government should, then you have no such obligation. In one sense this "nature of the government" theory is thus a substitute for the doctrine of consent. But it may also be regarded as a new interpretation of consent theory, what we may call the doctrine of hypothetical consent. For a legitimate government, a true authority, one whose subjects are obligated to obey it, emerges as being one to which they ought to consent,33 quite apart from whether they have done so. Legitimate government acts within the limits of the authority rational men would, abstractly and hypothetically, have to give a government they are founding. Legitimate government is government which deserves consent.

I do not mean to suggest that the "nature of the government" theory which thus emerges is really Locke's and Tussman's secret doctrine, which they hide from the casual reader and which has only now been unearthed. Probably neither of them saw that his argument was moving in this direction. Rather I suggest that this theory is a better-response to the problem of political obligation-from-their-own-premises—that it is the truth toward which they were striving, but which they saw only indistinctly. Only in that sense is it "what they really meant to say," and of course both of them also say other things incompatible with it.

(Part I of a two-part article)

33 Cf. Benn and Peters, op. cit., pp. 323, 329.

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BOOK REVIEWS

A Framework for Political Analysis. By DAVID EASTON. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. Pp. xiv, 143. \$4.95.)

The remarkable capacity of the life processes of politics to persist amid endless social and political stress provides the central theme from which David Easton builds A Framework for Political Analysis. This important theoretical contribution is designed as the second volume in a projected tetralogy. The first was the author's influential treatise on The Political System (1953), which called for political theorists to divert some of their attention from purely historical to empirical theory, while urging empirical workers to recognize the critical role that general theory must play in the conduct of inquiry. The current volume lays out the essentials of that theoretical framework which The Political System only adumbrated, and does so while striving in Easton's words to maintain a "strong empirical relevance." At the same time, the reader is cautioned against expecting to see the framework drawn to an operational level, for this is a task reserved for the third volume in the sequence.

If the mood of *The Political System* was hortatory, and in its own way gloomy about the paths which political theory had been pursuing in preceding decades, the new book fairly brims with exuberance at the progress the author feels has marked the discipline in the interim. The title of the book is well-chosen, for while the discussion is clearly at the level of general theory, the effort is less toward the sketching in of such a theory in any full-blown sense, than toward the development of a conceptual orientation—a basic vocabulary, a selection of "essential variables," a statement of the prime point of departure—to serve as an agenda for research.

In keeping with the expectations developed in *The Political System*, the framework is developed from modern systems analysis, retaining the customary admixture of insights first associated with functionalism in social anthropology. Political life is seen as an "adaptive, self-regulating, and self-transforming system of behavior," responding on the basis of feedback to stresses of an internal nature as well as those from the social and physical environment in which it is imbedded. The units of the system are neither the traditional structures and institutions such as parties and legislatures, nor persons as biological entities, but rather the set of relevant interactions among system members.

In the measure that it is at all important to set analytic bounds for the system so defined, the relevant interactions are those that are political by virtue of some orientation toward "the authoritative allocation of values" at a societal level. From these definitions are drawn the "essential variables" for investigation: those which reflect the capacity of the system to allocate values, on one hand, and to ensure their acceptance on the other. Taken in sum, the political system may be seen as a "vast conversion process," within which inputs of demands and system support are typically processed, and outputs produced making it possible for the system to persist in its most fundamental characteristics.

It is this persistence in the face of stressful change that Easton highlights as a miracle of the commonplace, warranting attention as the primary goal of political analysis. "Persistence" here is not to be read as stability, maintenance of specific structures, or even "equilibrium" as commonly construed. The reference is to a more fundamental capacity of political systems to allocate values authoritatively. This capacity may endure through all sorts of change in specific structures or even basic forms of government, as in the case of a democracy turned into a dictatorship. Transformations at these more specific levels are seen as either irrelevant to the question of persistence in the form that Easton intends to pursue it, or as indicative of ways in which the system copes with adversity in order to preserve the vital processes of its political life.

By moving to this level of abstraction, the author outflanks the most familiar criticisms of other general theories with similar intellectual roots in functionalism. Change, be it even of broad and dramatic dimensions, secular as well as compensatory, is in no sense alien to the Easton conception. To remain viable, societies must preserve the fundamental life processes of politics, but this may be as well accomplished at some junctures through sweeping change in political forms as by any strain toward the status quo.

This hospitality to change opens the way to the possibility of a dynamic analysis, and represents for me one of the most exciting aspects of the book. At the same stroke, the necessary shift in level of abstraction threatens to rob the question of persistence of its savor for me, although it clearly does not do so for the author. The nub of the problem is the negative case, or what it means for the political system in this most overarching sense to fail to persist.

At this point, the "general systems" analogy is at its weakest. Biological organisms brush with the limits of survival upon more or less frequent occasion; and the gravity of these approaches is certified by the fact that in Lord Keynes' long run, the survival probability of the organism is an unrelenting zero. But what do we have in mind when we speak of a political system "succumbing," once we have set aside any question of the life and death of particular modes of value-allocation? If the political system is constituted by interactions oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values within whatever geographic scope the society can be said to function, and is considered to persist as long as such interactions persist, then it is hard for me to see what will stop them short of the catastrophe that wipes out the population engaging in them. Indeed, earthquake and epidemic are cited first in these passages wherein Easton sets out to describe negative cases, although these scarcely strike me as theoretically exciting. Once again in vivid contrast to the case of the organism, failure to survive through such causes is extremely rare and hinges on variables exogenous to almost any study of political process.

The few other negative cases hinted at are of much greater potential interest, although they fail to satisfy my curiosity because either there was no real failure to persist, or else the instances seem rather to involve changes in more specific forms of authoritative allocation. Thus, for example, the author considers the Congo to have come as close as any state in the twentieth century to the brink of survival, although he also deems that its political system managed to persist. Now the brush with survival at a certain level in this instance would be plain to all, whatever the theoretical viewpoint. Yet attempting to assess the world from within the Easton framework, I would have seen the Congo as representing more the kind of transition or near-transition between types of government (centralized, decentralized) that the author in every other context sets apart from his abstract concerns with the underlying, "life processes" of politics. Surely if violence is but one variant on the generic processes whereby authoritative allocation occurs, as was argued in The Political System, then the sense in which such vital processes were near extinction even in the Congo would escape me.

Although the sheer capacity to persist at all is made the center of inquiry, then, more modest questions of variations in relative success in coping with stress seem to me to enjoy much more realistic referents. Indeed, much

of the latter portion of the book strikes me as highly stimulating precisely because this is the level at which the discussion is going forth. Yet at the same time, were Easton to have cast questions explicitly in these terms, the theory would have been drawn within target range of another familiar set of siege guns, since to talk directly of gradations of success or failure is to deal with concepts of eufunction and dysfunction, notions that the author seems anxious to avoid, at least for the moment.

In sum, aside from the emphasis on the wonder of sheer persistence, the theoretical structure is thoroughly provocative and compelling. The properties of political systems singled out for more specific attack in the future are surely fundamental ones, and their treatment here is replete with useful insights developed from the severe yet rich concepts of systems theory. What remains therefore is the problem of establishing some empirical purchase on these essential variables. This is the problem, as it seems to me, that continues to rank as the most recalcitrant one. Hence among other things this volume accomplishes, it serves as well to whet one's appetite for its sequel.

PHILIP E. CONVERSE

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Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics, vol. II, no. 3 (December, 1964) of the Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan (11 Wakagi-cho, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo; \$5.00 per year).

Although Japanese scholarship in the social sciences has made enormous advances in the past twenty years, these are but dimly apprehended abroad. Japanese representatives attend and present papers to the major international conferences and occasionally publish articles or précis of their work in English, German, French, or Russian that appear in periodicals of international circulation. Two or three English-language professional journals of specialized appeal and limited circulation attempt reviews of a tiny segment of the huge corpus of social science writing in Japan, and—very infrequently-someone will translate more extensive selections from or do a serious study of the work of an outstanding Japanese scholar. But in general the language barrier stands as a massive and unbreached wall between Western social scientists and their Japanese colleagues.

This is a pity because Japanese social scientists today represent one of the most vital, lively, and enterprising academic traditions to be encountered anywhere in the world. Where political science is concerned, for example—in numbers, in organization, in output, and in pro-

fessional enterprise in the sense of a willingness to experiment with and adopt new theories, approaches, and methodologies, they stand far in advance of their colleagues in any continental European tradition. England would have difficulty in matching them. Qualitative judgments are, of course, more difficult and controversial, but the very dimensions and vitality of the professional scene in Japan are enormously impressive to the comparatively minded observer. In support of this judgment one can cite the above-noted issue of the Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan entitled "Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics."

The Journal itself represents an ambitious and systematic attempt on the part of a small group of Japanese scholars, with some American assistance, to breach the language barrier and introduce their Western colleagues to the range and vitality of current social science scholarship in Japan. Three issues are published a year, two of which are devoted to a particular subject or field of intellectual activity (to date, there have been issues on international affairs, education in Japan, Japanese intellectuals, and postwar leftwing movements), and one to a review of selected articles of major importance in a variety of areas appearing during the previous calendar year. In all cases a broad scatter of writers and views is sought. Articles are condensed and average from four to ten printed pages in length. Both the quality of the English and the accuracy of the translations will prove remarkable to anyone familiar with former endeavors of this sort. The Journal has no political stand or bias of its own.

The present issue was edited by Sannosuke Matsumoto, one of Japan's outstanding younger political scientists, who teaches at Tokyo Kyoiku University. His aim is to convey to the reader an understanding of the subjects that have most concerned Japanese political scientists during the years from 1958 to 1964, of the approaches and methods they bring to their work, and some insight into their findings. Professor Matsumoto provides a brief introductory account of the development of political science as a discipline in Japan as well as useful explanatory notes prefaced to each of the four parts into which the issue is divided. These parts are devoted to: the postwar political structure of Japan, political parties, local autonomy and the bureaucracy, and pressure groups and political consciousness. Together they contain a total of twenty-two articles that admirably serve the editor's purposes.

In general the authors represented in this issue have been selected partially because their writings focus upon problems of major interest to the Japanese scholarly community and par-

tially because of their own professional status and attainments. Most of them are younger men; in fact all but five are under forty-five years of age. Not all are political scientists. The issue includes very interesting selections from the writings of several sociologists, an economist, and a statistician relating to problems of political consequence. All are, however, among the more innovative and outstanding members of their profession. In this sense the issue does not purport to represent an average selection of Japanese scholarship in the field of political science.

The general impression that emerges from a reading of these selections is one of a discipline very much in ferment. There is evident in a number of cases a deep interest in increasing the certitude and scientific quality of political knowledge in terms quite familiar to us in the United States. This is still far from the unchallenged mode in Japanese political science, however, and the average Western reader will probably also be struck by the degree to which some of the selections embody explicit or implicit statements of the author's own political persuasions and aspirations. Japanese political scientists in general tend to be a distinctly "engaged" group with strongly melioristic views about their personal and professional roles in society. They rate very highly their function as social critics in an immediate day-to-day sense. The tenor of some of their writing, therefore, seems not infrequently to border on the polemical—especially to Americans more accustomed to at least the pretense of political objectivity where professional writings are concerned. In the present case this impression is doubtless enhanced by the fact that a number of the selections were originally written for publication in the major Japanese journals of opinion rather than in professional journals. However, these are the normal outlets for much of the most stimulating thinking and writing in Japan. Their inclusion here in no wise distorts the selection.

These elements of subjectivism and meliorism are by no means characteristic of all the selections in this issue, however, and, where they do occur, they do not necessarily derogate seriously from the interest of what the author has to say. Given the number and richness of the offerings, it would be both difficult and invidious to pick out particular pieces for more specific comment. Suffice it to say that there does not exist in English any better means of gaining an insight into the discipline of political science in Japan and into the interests and skills of some of its most eminent practitioners than this issue of the Journal of Political and Social Ideas in Japan. Its publishers should

be commended. It is to be hoped that their enterprise will flourish and provide further insights of equal value into this largely unknown and unappreciated scene.

ROBERT E. WARD

The University of Michigan

Political Power and Educational Decision-Making. By RALPH B. KIMBROUGH. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964. Pp. ix, 307. \$5.00.)

Ralph B. Kimbrough, Professor of Education at the University of Florida, promises in his preface to use "what is currently known about the policy-making process as it exists at the level of the local school district" in order to determine "who really holds the power to make political decisions favorable to the school improvement." His data consists principally of Floyd Hunter's Community Power Structure (Atlanta), Gladys Kammerer's studies of Florida cities, and several doctoral dissertations: including the author's own, two others dealing with educational decisions in three Tennessee counties, and three completed at the University of Florida. All of these doctoral dissertations employ, with some variations, Hunter's reputational technique, and all discover another version of Hunter's power elite. Although other studies of urban power structures, like Robert Dahl's Who Governs? (New Haven), Edward Banfield's Political Influence (Chicago), and Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman's Governing New York City, are breifly cited, Professor Kimbrough is unconvinced by their method of focusing on decisions or their findings of a pluralistic policy-making process. Nelson Polsby's incisive critiques of the reputational technique are brushed aside on the circular reasoning that no other method can get at the behind-the-scenes maneuvers.

What Professor Kimbrough has produced, though it is not evident in the title or clear that the author himself realizes it, is a regional study of the politics of education based on data almost entirely from Southeastern states. Consequently this is a book on educational politics that contains almost no references to party politics, labor unions, teachers' unions, civil rights organizations and integration, churches with parochial school establishments, or any of the other factors which commonly influence education in other sections of the country.

The monopolistic, conservative, businessdominated educational politics that Kimbrough describes is probably accurate for the Southeast. But his mobilization of evidence is hampered by his adoption of Hunter's technique of using fictitious names for the locations and participants in the case studies. Even the issues discussed are sometimes made purposefully vague. In one instance, the author tells of a mayor who tries to involve the schools in what is only described as an "off-base project" which the school administrators reject with support from the power elite. In a book that raises the question of the legitimacy of public as opposed to private leadership, such ambiguity impedes critical thinking. Furthermore, awareness of the real location of a case study enables the reader to employ his general knowledge of the history and demography of the site as a check on the methodology and conclusions. Everyone knows, of course, that Hunter's Regional City was Atlanta, and this fact leads to acceptance of his finding of a power elite in that one-party, Protestant, "Old South" city. But few readers will recognize River City or Midway County. After more than one hundred pages of fictitious names, cloudy identities and vague issues, the evidence the author wishes to present is blurred and the reading monotonous. Wouldn't it be possible for social scientists, (giving due consideration to ethics, privacy and research realities), to work out some commonly accepted system of using real or fictitious identifications?

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For Professor Kimbrough, the critical question is whether a school administrator will find major educational decisions being made in the public or private sectors of his constituency. The author's conclusion is that the wielders of power are most likely to be cliques of businessmen and professionals rather than formal interest groups or public officials. Some political scientists will not be convinced by the author's evidence for this generalization, and others will wish he had explored some obvious variables, such as the nature of party competition, school district size, and the degree of bureaucratization of the educational and political system. More interesting to laymen are the implications of the private clique hypothesis for democratic theory. Early in the book, Kimbrough equates democratic objectives with quality schools and high educational expenditures and suggests that either the monopolistic or pluralistic patterns would be adequate. Later he seems to realize that democracy implies certain procedures which are lacking in a monopolistic clique system. How, then, should the educational administrator be advised? For the sake of here-and-now school buildings and salary increases, should the administrator cooperate with and thus perpetuate the power elite, or should he attempt to build up counter forces among parents, liberals, and minority groups and thus risk his job and all possibility of short term gain? Such questions, of course, can not be answered abstractly. On the basis of his findings, Kimbrough recommends cooperating with the power elite, co-opting them into citizens' advisory committees, if possible, and eventually developing a diversified power base. If the power elite, however, is as generally conservative, anti-government, and anti-spending as Kimbrough suggests, then even short-term cooperation with them may produce only Pyrrhic victories and may delay the building of a sound political base for public education. The author particularly laments the disorganization and consequent powerlessness of teachers in politics, something the elite would doubtless approve and seek to perpetuate.

In evaluating Political Power and Educational Decision-Making, it is only fair to emphasize the difficult and complex problems Professor Kimbrough attempted to explore. In most cases, adequate data simply does not now exist. Nevertheless, the attempt to employ the research techniques and to apply the findings of the power structure studies to the problems school administrators face is to be commended. Like most first steps the attempted project, despite its flaws, was worthwhile.

George R. La Noue Teachers College, Columbia University

State Politics and the Public Schools. By Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. Pp. 319, \$4.85.)

As the authors note, this is an "exploratory analysis" of the ways in which public policy in education is made these days in three states (Missouri, Illinois, and Michigan). They have described the organization and representation of interests, the relationships between interest representers and public officials, the ways in which consensus on policy is achieved, and the policy roles of public officials in this one area of policy-making. The book is not, the reader should be clear, a series of case studies in policy-making, nor is it devoted to the substance or wisdom of educational policies. Nor is it a political manual, although educators seeking practical political wisdom can find plenty here. It is a survey of the dynamics and mechanics of policy-making, and because it is, it deserves a wide audience among political scientists.

Even in these three rather similar states the authors find significant differences in the formation of educational policy. Chiefly they note the greater fragmentation of interests and absence of consensus-producing machinery in Michigan than in the other two states. Both in Missouri and Illinois there is some mechanism for moderating educational demands and

for achieving consensus on policy before matters ever reach the legislature. In these two states, the educational groups and interests have accepted a heavy burden of self-control as a means to success in legislative relations. Indeed, the story of educational politics in Illinois and Missouri emerges as a story of the flight from political conflict (even though the vehicles of flight are different in each).

As they describe these processes the authors are always alive to questions touching basic. theoretical issues in the political process. In fact, the concluding chapter states some tentative, but stimulating, hypotheses which emerge from the study. To cite only the one on group goals and strategy (p. 272): "Based largely on the mythology that education and politics should be kept apart, a major goal of education interests is to have governmental decisions affecting public schools made in a routine manner; that is, they desire a process in which all decisions are highly predictable as to their outcome, even if this means the sacrifice of certain policy alternatives or acceptance of less desirable results." Such a proposition, of course, challenges the rationalist, "maximalist" assumptions we make so confidently about interest group strategies. It also incidentally suggests how little we know of the political strategies and tactics of interest groups.

This, then, is a fine scholarly work. The three state studies are analytical and perceptive, and they all profit from being set in a sophisticated understanding of the political process. The long chapter on Michigan is especially acute in its observations. The authors also properly recognize the limits of their work—especially that their three states are no sample of the 50 and that educational policy-making (especially in its "non-political" mythology) may not be typical of policy-making in general. If I were to offer any criticism it would be of the absence of a systematic framework of analysis for the three state studies. At times the authors work in that direction-as, for example, in the distinction between interest groups with a "direct" interest and what the authors call "supportive groups." But the analysis and the concluding hypotheses might have been enriched by a fuller preliminary structure for analysis.

Beyond its own intrinsic value the book also offers a worthy example of a fruitful, but surprisingly neglected, scholarly path. Its virtue is that it looks at all the influences and actors shaping public policy and that it examines more than the single case. It suggests, in fact, that scholars of American government have too often segmented the whole of policy-making into the single components which are their specialties—parties, interest groups, legisla-

tures, for example. Its "wholistic" approach should also be an especially apt strategy for a comparative analysis of the American states. (Are we ever going to exploit their comparative possibilities?) It is directed toward basic questions: what produces different patterns of interest organization, different systems of policy initiation, different apparatuses for achieving consensus, or different legislative role patterns in one policy area in different states? Finally, this book adds further weight to the growing conclusion that the "policy area" is an important variable in political analysis. Along with other works such as Dahl's study of New Haven and Cater's description of "sub-governments" in national policy-making, it suggests that patterns of political influence are particularized within and relevant only to specific areas of public policy.

It remains only to be said that this book is written in straight-forward and lucid prose and that its typography and format meet the high standards we take for granted from its publisher. In addition to the usual index there are five assorted appendices and a valuable bibliographical essay on the governmental relationships with public education.

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The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies. By William McCord. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 330. \$6.00.)

For a number of years a great debate concerning what in the remote past were called backward countries and peoples has occupied the attention of social scientists as well as of national and international authorities everywhere. Welcome new realms of inquiry and controversy have been opened up, bringing with them an unexpected bonus in the fresh light which has been thrown on the history of the familiar "old" countries as the problems of the new ones have been explored. Although the labels commonly used have changed—the once "backward" have gone through various euphemistic rebaptisms, of which perhaps the most recent are "underdeveloped" and now "developing"-we have achieved very little in the way of agreement as to how development has come about in the past, how it should (or will) now proceed, and what the prospects are for the future. The changing labels themselves, however, indicate an acceptance of the commitment to pursue development and an optimistic assumption that it is in fact under way.

In The Springtime of Freedom, William McCord, an Associate Professor of Sociology

at Stanford whose previous writings have been in quite different spheres, has made a brave attack on many of the central issues, and particulary those related to political development. The main hazard which he poses for the reviewer is that, although one may disagree with this point or that, he is indisputably on the side of the angels, and who wants to pick a fight with angels? And yet, despite a wellargued case and a presentation of a wide array of significant material, historical, contemporary, and analytical, his book leaves this reviewer with an unhappy sense that it takes too cheerfully hopeful a view of the world and what can be done with it. Is the present season really the springtime of freedom?

Writing, as he puts it, "for the thoughtful uncommitted person in developing regions," the heart of Professor McCord's thesis is that there has been, on the part both of the developed and the developing, far too ready an acceptance of the necessity and utility of centralized authoritarian regimes, whereas what is needed if freedom is to be won and held is a pluralism which diffuses economic and political power as widely as possible throughout the society. As a matter of basic belief he repudiates the notion that any path, such as a oneparty or dictatorial system, is pre-ordained for the new countries and assumes that their leaders have a wide range of choice. He urges upon them the choice of a pluralistic approach which in the long run will bring them and their people a larger measure of freedom and of bread as well. In implementation of this approach he urges that development should start where gains can be achieved most cheaply and swiftly, with rural reform and a transformation of agriculture which produces the food and raw materials on which other aspects of development must rest. He sees it as critically important for a developing nation to undertake the creation of a small-scale, village-based decentralized economy. These specifics of his proposals are obviously open, as he is well aware, to very serious challenge, but it is eminently worth while to have the case against authoritarianism and for a pluralism which sustains freedom through the dispersion of power persuasively set forth. His plea for an expansion of foreign aid programs covers more familiar ground.

In a brief historical survey the author examines the way in which Western Europe, Russia, and Japan developed, rightly concluding on the strength of these and other examples that no clear moral can be drawn as to the relation of different political systems to economic development. Presumably no one would dis-

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agree with his modest assertion that neither the crushing of dissent nor the centralization of government will necessarily produce more efficient use of a country's resources. He acknowledges the sovereignty of politics in the drive for development, but he calls upon the wielders of power to build a plural social structure and "most of all plan consciously for a devolution, rather than a concentration, of economic power." The contradiction between the democratic rights of the opposition, guaranteed by "all the majestic liberties first created in the West," and the economic demands of modernization is a problem to which he devotes considerable attention, but he is confident that it is one which can be solved by application of intelligent good will, and surely he is right that the silencing of the opposition itself involves great costs to the society.

It is good that the angels should be heard. Coupled with much realistic discussion and examination both of the actual state of affairs and of the voluminous literature which has appeared, Professor McCord presents something of a counsel of perfection. Two gnawing doubts remain. Has he taken adequate measure of the forces which counter his pluralistic freedom and which in country after country have led to a consolidation of single-party or military oneman rule? One need cherish no illusion that such regimes are the proper embodiment of the good life to conclude that they have a rationale which comes close to establishing their inevitability in the present world. Secondly, do the developing peoples themselves share in the image of perfection which he presents, or do they perhaps look elsewhere to other models embracing different means and goals? The creed of the Western liberal democrat is a most appealing one, but the evidence is far from all in as to whether it appeals to other peoples or not.

RUPERT EMERSON

Harvard University

Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960. By Dennis Austin. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 459. \$10.10.)

Amid more profound consequences of the debate of the past two decades among professional students of politics about "scientific" research is something resembling agreement on what constitutes a political study of, for instance, a nation's politics, in contradistinction to works that merely discuss political matters inside a particular country. If a student were forced to articulate the distinction—for a book review, if for no other reason—the issue could be defined in terms of the scope of a political study. Surely

it must focus on power structures, patterns of decision-making, interest "group" activity and their interrelationships.

By these criteria Dennis Austin has not produced a political study. Instead, he has written a prodigiously well-informed history of some aspects of politics in Ghana: the emergence of political parties within the changing constitutional frameworks of the final decade of colonial rule, the party struggle in the few years it was permitted and the decline of party opposition. But even if Austin re-titled his effort "Political Parties in Ghana," it would not be political analysis; politics in his view are circumscribed by party affairs and revealed by elections. (Elections, in turn, are described by investigating polling procedure and party activities.) By marshaling the arguments of party pamphlets and debates in parliament, by excerpting the findings of official hearings and commissions and by reporting rallies and political meetings Austin captures the heady, volatile atmosphere of Ghanaian politics. By writing unadorned yet graceful prose he can deploy masses of detail that manage to convey a sense of unfolding drama. And by examining electoral results he can show that Ghana's one-party system was not "voted in." This would still be a limited view of politics, even for a country like Britain—Austin's present home after more than ten years in Ghana. But in a place like Ghana, where the political system during the period of Austin's observations was going through turbulent transformations, such a view may be marginal to achieving a sense of political understanding.

Suppose, then, we heed Austin's warning on page one: "the account . . . should be seen as no more than an extended essay in Ghanaian history." But essays usually deal with problems, not merely places. As the author states it, the problem of his study is, "... why did a colony so well endowed in its national life as the Gold Coast, for whose future every prediction in 1946 was cast in the most favorable terms, suddenly enter a period of violent conflictfirst between the colonial government and local nationalist leaders, and then between rival political groups—until by 1960 (after three years of independence) the new republic was ruled by a single-party regime whose leaders turned increasingly to harsh measures of control 'of a totalitarian kind.' " Although the last phrase is from Kwame Nkrumah, it seems to summarize Austin's own opinion of the situation in Ghana today. Despite the fact that the question reflects important concerns and serves to formulate the opinions that numerous people bring to their understanding of African affairs,

it boils down to asking "what went wrong in Ghana?" or "why don't African politicians behave like British liberal democrats?" Perhaps such questions are better suited to honors examinations than research monographs. In any case Austin's answer avoids what most political scientists want to know more about. Although the social and cultural dimensions of power are noted in the course of the narrative of the rise of the Convention People's Party or in the midst of the discussion of the selection of candidates, they are not related to overall patterns of political action. Similarly, there is virtually no discussion of policy-making. The demands of numerous groups-trade unions, peasants, civil servants, party bureaucrats-are recounted at various stages of the party battle, but they too do not contribute to basic decisions that shape the political system. Finally, there is no overt appreciation of the possible effects of fundamental policies, such as economic development, on the choices left open and the area of maneuver for political leaders.

What is the answer that Austin suggests? Briefly, it is that the top people in politics, especially Nkrumah, have the wrong attitudes and the bottom people have gone along—until recently-because they are inexperienced and unsophisticated. Why has Ghana disappointed its well-wishers? Because Nkrumah believes in and has a "taste for autocratic rule." Because the CPP rank and file were willing "to accept such a lead." ("A more sophisticated movement might then [after 1961] have insisted on retaining a share of power with the leader.") Because the opposition displayed "rash behavior." Because the CPP leaders would not "admit the legitimacy" of political rivals. To these four "forces at work" Austin adds "the uncertainties of the political scene," but such a catch-all category can hardly balance the weight of what can only be described as popular psychology. At the end of the book, as Ghana moves closer to authoritarian dictatorship, Nkrumah's personal shortcomings grow even more significant.

It is very difficult to accept such an answer because it is barely an explanation. If Ghana has become something of an autocracy because Nkrumah willed it and the CPP accepted it, then why so? How come such a party and such leadership swept on to the scene? Austin's case rests on the bad tendencies of the politically powerful, when the more interesting question—politically—focuses on the conditions which permitted the implementation of these tendencies.

All this is not meant to deny the importance of Nkrumah's leadership or the nationalist movement in the fashioning of Ghana's politics.

The social and cultural background to the emergence of nationalism and charismatic leadership in Ghana has been laid out by other scholars, notably Apter and Wallerstein. For some reason, however, Austin chose to ignore their hypotheses. The result is a mine of information, but for some future political study of authority and decision-making in contemporary Ghana.

HARVEY GLICKMAN

Haverford College

Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. By ROBERT R. ALFORD. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963. Pp. xxiii, 396. \$6.50.)

Despite the exotic appeal of developing and little-known areas, this book is an important reminder that much remains to be gained from genuinely comparative studies of the politics of advanced and relatively familiar nations. In Party and Society, Professor Alford examines the importance of class, regionalism, and religion in the voting preferences of citizens in Great Britain, Australia, the United States, and Canada. His simple but efficient index of "class voting" demonstrates that class voting exists in its purest form in Great Britain, is somewhat less pronounced but still overriding in importance in Australia, is considerably less common in the United States, and is at its lowest in Canada. The basic similarities in the political systems of these highly developed democracies permit the author to draw penetrating inferences as to the causes and consequences of the differences he discovers.

In briefest summary, a politics organized around class is presented as highly functional for adaptation to modern problems. Many political sociologists and political scientists have assumed that a politics of pure class would be highly unstable. Hence the wide belief that the more cross-cutting cleavages-ethnic, religious, or regional—in society, the greater the chance for compromise and stability. Alford persuasively argues to the contrary: "Under conditions of highly developed industrialism, class cleavages may actually be the cleavages which are most easily compromised and the ones most likely to retain national unity and political consensus. . . . " (p. 339) The argument that overriding sectional, religious, or ethnic sentiments are more disintegrative and inflexible than class sentiments has received strong support from events in Canada since the publication of this book.

In addition to its contribution to our understanding of the role of party in the Anglo-American democracies, Alford's work is significant as a demonstration of expanding research opportunities made possible by the current state of technology in the discipline. The establishment in recent years of data repositories housing a multitude of opinion surveys from all over the world gives the student access to information that no single scholar could afford to collect. These institutional developments also open the possibility of recapturing data from earlier points in time, permitting the introduction of a historical dimension that has been sorely missed in much survey research. Alford took advantage of these developments to secure the data from 53 surveys of the electorates in the four Anglo-American democracies, covering the period from 1936 to 1962.

This type of secondary analysis necessarily suffers from the fact that the researcher must accept the interview schedules and sampling procedures developed for someone else's purposes. In the present case, the theoretical concerns of the study were well served by the available data. Questionable sampling procedures in many of the studies pose a more serious problem. As the author says, "... no particular figure has any great significance." But he immediately adds: "It is probable, however, that the over-all patterns of differences from country to country override any possibility of sampling error." (p. 102) The strength of this probability of accurate information is not spelled out.

For the most part, the cross-national patterns of differences have a great deal of surface validity. This reader is more inclined to discount the probability of accuracy in reference to more detailed discussion of intra-national differences. The author feels obliged, for example, to account for apparently inexplicable variations in party preference of Catholics along sex lines in Great Britain from 1957 to 1962. He quite properly notes the small number of respondents involved and the lack of strict probability methods in the sampling. Why, then, waste time accounting for an aboutface on the part of Catholic women when only 21 were included in the first survey and 18 in the second?

The author takes exception to Philip Converse's conclusion that a short-run decline in class voting has occurred in the United States since 1948 and, presumably, since the 1930's. He argues that 1948 was the exceptional year, with a much higher level of class voting than occurred either in the 1930's or the 1950's. The evidential base of this conclusion appears most shaky. Alford accepts the Survey Research Center findings (employed by Converse and his colleagues) as much more reliable than those of the American Institute of Public Opinion. Hence he relies on SRC data for his 1948 find-

ings, rejecting those of the AIPO. But if the AIPO findings in earlier surveys were as far in error as those of 1948, then a massive decline in class voting since the 1930's has occurred.

The danger of grand ecological fallacies is present in the attempt to relate findings on varying levels of class voting to general attributes of political systems. In describing federalism as "more characteristic of the less classpolarized political systems," for example, Alford notes the greater dedication of Canadians than of Australians to the concept of a unified national broadcasting system. (pp. 315-316) He suggests that this stems from "the greater need to have symbols of national unity in Canada as against Australia." But suppose the opposite condition existed? Then one could as easily argue that the greater national unity of Australia was expressed through a unified broadcasting system, and the less successful integration of Canada through a less unified system. Findings that can, whatever their outcome, be used to support a proposition are not very helpful. Or, more accurately, a proposition is not successfully operationalized if it can be supported by opposite findings.

Despite these occasional problems, the author does as well with the subject as his data permit. And he is scrupulous in pointing out the limitations of the data. The massive analysis undertaken by the author produces a valuable mine of descriptive detail on the politics of these four western democracies. But he goes beyond this to the theoretical implications of his findings. The discussion of the consequences of class polarization is a keen and imaginative exercise in political theory.

ercise in political theory.

JAMES W. PROTHRO

University of North Carolina

Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. By Bruce M. Russett. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:M.I.T Press, 1963. Pp. 252. \$7.00.)

This study is different from conventional books exuding goodwill about Anglo-American relations because Bruce Russett attempts to use ideas derived from Karl Deutsch to trace quantitative trends in the links between the two nations. While the volume is about the "special" relationship, the methods of analysis are potentially of general interest.

The basic logic of the book is sensible and straightforward. First the author discusses the general theory of political community or integration, and the specific history of Anglo-American diplomacy since 1890. A series of chapters demonstrate how various aspects of Anglo-American relations may be studied over

time by the use of a variety of sources and indices. The conclusion draws implications from this case study for American policy and, to a lesser extent, for theories of integration.

The approach is eclectic. Chapters on diplomacy and military links are virtually free from quantitative analysis; the latter chapter is particularly succinct and pointed. The author disclaims any pretension of producing a definitive work, while not using the excuse that because it is exploratory he can be absolved from digging for evidence. Neither data nor theory are developed exhaustively, yet the book is better because both are employed. The methodology of the study is its most striking feature.

The variable that Russett examines is responsiveness: "the probability that the demands of one party will be met with indulgence rather than with deprivation by the other party." The probability increases as the ratio of capabilities to demands rises. Capabilities include attention, communication and mutual identification among other things; demands, or loads, are distinguished in terms of number, importance and whether they are complementary or contradictory as between the two partners. In order to allow for random relationships, an index of relative acceptance is calculated; it is the ratio of actual capabilities to what would be expected to occur randomly between two nations of the importance of Britain and America.

The use of ratios has one obvious short-coming: it does not allow for changes in the absolute level of capabilities and demands. Two countries will be more "responsive" to each other if they have little contact than if they interact frequently but make demands upon each other even more frequently. In studying scholarly scientific attention, Russett's attempt to control for the great number of American scientists by "controlling" for scientific Nobel prizewinners produces a downward trend in interaction. But comparison of Figure 6.1 with Tables 6.1 and 6.2. in the appendix shows that conclusions of very different significance might also be drawn from the data.

No single type of data or type of relationship is regarded as of central importance for political responsiveness. Russett mines economic, communications, educational and legislative records in order to construct tables approaching the problem from related but different aspects. The author shows sufficient ingenuity and consistency to make future academic writers in this field think carefully before making loose, literary generalizations about Anglo-American relationships.

The author interprets his data as showing a steady decline in responsiveness. For example,

nine indices of capability measuring relations in six years between 1890 and 1958 all show that the peak of capability was reached by 1928 or earlier, and the low point in 1954 or 1958, Russett rightly claims that the indices he has constructed should not be expected to substantiate more precise conclusions than this. However, it is possible to suggest that since 1958 trends may have altered, e.g., in respect to foreign travel by tourists, and summer travel by students independent of educational exchange schemes. It is curious that Russett does not tabulate travels of important government officials between London and Washington, for in the jet age, this has certainly shown an increase since 1890 or 1938.

Russett concludes that because responsiveness is diminishing on four of seven major indices, Anglo-American political relations are less secure than superficial comment assumes. Special attention is given to the criticisms of nuclear disarmers, without equivalent emphasis being given to the persisting political weakness of this type of left-wing anti-American group. A much lengthier and more comprehensive discussion of world affairs (including in particular the decline of the Empire and Commonwealth) would be required to substantiate the author's thesis.

In the concluding chapters Russett's ingenuity lapses and the author fails to consider the possibility that Anglo-American interests ought to conflict at times-e.g., in Asia-or that it might be in the interest of one or both nations if ties weakened, e.g., by Britain joining more closely with European nations in supranational organizations. The author implies that what is right for Anglo-American responsiveness must be right for America (or Britain). Little consideration is given to the fact that in theory, and sometimes in practice, conflicting views on foreign policy within one country mirror differences of opinion in the other. For example, while British and American public officials have publicly supported each other on American intervention in Viet Nam, British and American intellectuals have shown some public accord in criticizing the nature and consequences of this intervention.

RICHARD ROSE

University of Manchester

China and the Bomb. By Morton H. Halperin. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. x, 166. \$4.95.)

Nothing much happened to the Chinese on the way to nuclearization. They had a few setbacks when the Russians cut off technical assistance in 1960 and the world concluded a test ban treaty in 1963. But they pushed ahead anyway, seemingly unhesitating in their conviction, apparently unaware of the potential dangers, and plainly unshaken in the view that nuclearization was needed as a deterrent against the United States, as a source of increased Chinese influence in the Communist world as well as Asia, and as an additional means of supporting wars of national liberation. So, in October, 1964, they detonated an atomic device and now move unerringly toward what will probably be a "moderate" nuclear capability (though it might be a "major" one). This development will create a variety of strategic problems for the U.S., but there are certain steps that can and should be taken now. Such is the gist of this book, with far more attention devoted to what the United States should do than to what the Chinese are likely to do.

The "shoulds" (I counted 64 appearances of the word, plus 13 "musts," in the last three chapters alone) are derivatives of what is, in effect, a simple zero-sum game theoretical approach to Chinese-American relations, although it is not identified as such. In order to prevent the evolution of a collision course, in the near future the U.S. "should (p. 102) call attention to the growing strength of the continental Strike Command" (so as to emphasize that there is more to American power than meets the Asian eye); it "should (p. 114) take care to avoid . . . stressing the value of nuclear weapons for defense" (so as to prevent lassitude on the part of Asian friends); it "should (p. 118) refrain from initiating proposals" for a nuclear-free zone in Asia (since this would suggest fear of "China's development of a nuclear capability and would make it more difficult to station nuclear weapons on Asian territory" in the absence of agreement on such a zone); it "must" (p. 119) make the Chinese realize "that their development of a nuclear capability will increase the likelihood of the United States using nuclear weapons against them"; it "should (pp. 121-23) give the impression [of not being] convinced that the Soviet Union will intervene" if the U.S. uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese aggression (so as to "reduce China's expectations of what she can gain from nuclearization); it "should (p. 136) reaffirm any specific commitment she has made with an Asian nation to respond, if requested, to China's use of nuclear weapons by an attack of equal or greater force" (for the same reason); and so on through a variety of particular situations to which Taiwan, India, Japan, and Indochina are, respectively, third parties (italics added).

While there is compelling logic to such rea-

soning when viewed in a game theoretical context, one does not need to be among those who shudder at the thought of game theory to question whether the context is appropriate. Game theory is theory in the narrow sense. It takes into account a very selected range of values and behavioral responses, and it makes no allowance for changing motives or circumstances on the part of the actors. As such, as a set of predictions about highly abstract actors, game theory is an incisive and useful tool of analysis. But the Chinese of the 1960s are neither narrow-gauged nor abstract. They are, among other things, an aging leadership, a bursting population, a sluggish economy, an authoritarian polity, an evolving and complex community.

Unfortunately Professor Halperin's analysis does not also treat them in this broad-gauged context. For him China is not a dynamic society, but a composite of its past pronouncements and its present commitments. The possibility that it may undergo all kinds of change is not conceded, and thus there is no probing of how change might affect the nuclearization program. Is it not possible that the very forces which facilitate success of that program will also precipitate changing postures toward the external world and the relevance of nuclear weapons thereto? And, if so, is it not conceivable that all the positions to which the U.S. "should" adhere are precisely those that are most likely to inhibit the pace of change in Chinese policy? Further, even if negative answers to such questions seem warranted, and even if the recommended American policy toward Chinese nuclearization does serve as a deterrent, may not this benefit prove inconsequential in comparison to the harm that may be caused by the policy elsewhere in Asia?

I do not pretend to know the answers to these questions. I do not even mean to imply that Professor Halperin's analysis is faulty. It may well prove sound and certainly it should be considered. I am only saying that an attempt to provide answers should have accompanied and informed the recommendations. The problem is too crucial and the dangers too horrendous for narrow-gauged treatment. It may be that nothing has happened to the Chinese on the way to nuclearization, but something still might. At least we ought to estimate the probabilities before taking the steps urged by the author.

JAMES N. ROSENAU
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Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. By Ernst B. HAAS. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 595. \$11.50.)

Professor Haas, who has earned and enjoys a wide reputation as an exceptionally imaginative and sophisticated analyst of the processes operative within and around international organizations, has set out in this study to develop the concept of international integration, to examine the means by which such integration may be brought about, and, in particular, to assess the contribution of the International Labor Organization to that end. From the author's own viewpoint, he has written a book less about the ILO as such than about the process of international integration. Nevertheless, it is open to the reader to exploit the book for his own profit—if not to the reviewer to treat it for purposes of assessment—as a case study of the development and functioning of the ILO. However, if the reader makes this choice, he must be prepared to find the meaty ILO material sandwiched between a thick slice of theoretical bread and a thinner, but still substantial, one. His reaction may well be that the sandwich includes an unnecessarily large amount of bread for his purposes.

The reviewer must emphasize that the author's purposes are clearly not those of our hypothetical reader who is intent upon chewing into a study of the ILO. Haas' Part I, on "Functionalism and the Theory of Integration," is not conceived as an introduction to his treatment of the ILO, nor is his final section, "The Utility of Functionalism," designed merely to provide a conclusion for that treatment. Reverting to the metaphor of the sandwich, one might suggest that Haas regards the outer layers of the volume as the real meat of the dish—and, considering their toughness, one would be inclined to agree. Those parts demand strenuous intellectual molar activity.

Haas' central concept of international integration does not lend itself easily to clear definition. In his most elaborate attempt at definition, the author puts it this way: "If the present international scene is conceived of as a series of interacting and mingling national environments, and in terms of their participation in international organizations, then integration would describe the process of increasing the interaction and the mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the system of international organizations and the environment provided by their nation-state members." (p. 29) At other points, Haas refers to the "process of growing mutual deference and institutional mingling," (p. vii), to "social transformation leading to system-dominance," (p. 83), or simply to "transformation of the international

system." (p. 126) Whatever may be the inadequacies of these definitional statements, the book as a whole indicates that Haas conceives integration as involving the progressive diminution of the separateness of states, the linking of interest groups across political boundaries, and the growth of effective international institutions, capable of harmonizing and coordinating national policies. This introduces the notion of functionalism, which figures as importantly in the study as does the concept of integration. Essentially, Haas is asking whether the theory of functionalism points to the means by which the end of integration can be achieved. He selects the ILO, a notable institutional expression of functionalism, as a test case.

Hitherto, the functional theory of international organization, most closely associated with David Mitrany, has occupied a prominent niche in the gallery inhabited by international organization specialists, but has been kept there in a state of theoretical isolation. What Haas has undertaken to do is to bring this theory out and set it into the broader context of social science theory, examining its relationship with, and exposing it to refinement in the light of, systems theory, organization theory, the functional theory of law, functional sociology, conflict resolution theory, etc. This accounts for the heavily abstract character of major sections of the book. Among international organization specialists, Haas was perhaps uniquely qualified for the task, and he has performed it with admirable industry and intelligence. From the viewpoint of this reviewer, it was a task that very much needed doing, if only to find out whether it was worth doing. From the same viewpoint, the result is not significantly rewarding. Haas would presumably disagree. At the beginning of Part III, he notes that the middle section represented a sharp descent from "the lofty level of general inquiry" with which the book began, and announces a new takeoff "to recapture that initial loftiness" (p. 429); he apparently enjoys the higher altitudes of theorizing. So be it; I can only reply that I prefer Haas Debased to Haas Exalted. Going into orbit produces exhilaration—but also weightlessness. Haas is a weighty man when he has his feet on the ground.

During the period of the author's grounding, in Part II, he develops a sophisticated analysis and appraisal of the functioning of the ILO, valuable not only as a case study but as a contribution to the general undertanding of the possibilities and limitations of international institutions. Here, his concept of integration becomes more meaningful as he makes it clear that he is concerned with such issues as the

growth of institutional autonomy, the expansion of the tasks of the ILO, the acceptance by members of unintended consequences of policies and decisions, and the evolution of the ILO's effectiveness in influencing the behavior of its members. Haas distinguishes between the "authority" of the organization-its capacity to persuade states to perform their obligations unwillingly-and its "legitimacy"the capacity to convince states that they should perform their obligations. He employs a set of statistical devices for measuring the development of those capacities, which, despite the inevitable imperfections of such gadgets, serve as useful indicators. He develops important insights into the means available to international organizations for influencing the policies and behavior of states, the factors affecting the sensitivity of states to pressures emanating from international bodies, the positive as well as the negative impacts of political conflict upon the evolution of the powers and the programs of such agencies as the ILO, and the possibilities of bureaucratic leadership in international organizations. In short, one finds here an impressive contribution to the theory of international integration—a contribution that appears to derive from the author's thorough investigation and imaginative utilization and interpretation of his data, without substantial indebtedness to the body of theoretical material that occupies a prominent place in the volume.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

The University of Michigan

The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. By Anthony Trawick Bouscaren. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965. Pp. 174. \$3.95).

This book simply cannot be taken seriously as a work of scholarship, even though it surely purports to be one. Sometimes it is comical, sometimes pathetic, sometimes merely banal; but it is never scholarly. However, it may have other uses. It has some passing interest as an event in the developing public debate over our role in Vietnam. Students of public opinion may find it useful as an instance of propagandaby-monograph; instructors of English may use it as an example of how not to write. Its professional utility, however, would seem to be seriously limited.

These judgments require some explanation. To read this little volume is to experience two distinct sensations which, although disconcerting, are familiar enough to college professors when they are confronted with a certain type of student paper. The first is the feeling that the

style is shifting abruptly and unaccountably from place to place in the text. The second is the clear impression of having encountered this material before, in some more original setting. Neither space nor inclination permits identification of all the facts which help to explain these impressions, but some important details may deserve mention.

Apart from a handful of quite trivial differences, the portion of the Bouscaren text which is contained between the fourth line from the top of page 46 and the fifth line from the bottom of page 48 has previously appeared in Donald Lancaster's The Emancipation of French Indochina (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), pages 385-387. Lancaster's footnotes reappear, suitably renumbered, as Bouscaren's own. Nowhere is Lancaster's prose enclosed within quotation marks. A comic touch is added when, at the very end of this three-page section, and so placed that it can refer only to the dozen or so lines which immediately precede it, there is a footnote citing one page of Lancaster's book. This sort of thing begins, at least, to explain the feeling of déjà vu, and especially the sense of shifting styles, which the Bouscaren text inspires. The writing on either side of Lancaster's contribution was composed, after all, not by Lancaster but by someone else.

Several others have made important, even if unwitting, contributions to the volume, Ellen J. Hammer's The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1954) is occasionally quoted and properly cited, but it is more often paraphrased, and, in at least one instance, is simply and quietly reprinted. Bernard B. Fall's The Two Vietnams (New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) supplies much material. Very occasionally Fall is actually quoted, sometimes epithetically as, for instance, "the anti-Catholic Fall." Sometimes he is merely paraphrased. Just as often, however, he is simply reproduced without ado, either verbatim, or verbatim except for small, yet entertaining, alterations, e.g., when, in an otherwise nearly verbatim transcription, Fall's image of Diem's "religious fierceness bordering on fanaticism" becomes, for Bouscaren, Diem's "deep religious faith."

But surely the strangest case is that of Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah. The entire Appendix on "The Philosophy of President Ngo Dinh Diem" which is featured in the Bouscaren text, appeared previously as Chapter VIII in Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah's Viet Nam (London, Octagon Press, 1960). Bouscaren's seventh chapter is similarly related to the last half of the seventh chapter of Shah's book, but the Appendix is far

the more interesting phenomenon. It begins with a short indented quotation from Shah's book, which is properly cited in a footnote. From there it continues for two pages to follow the Shah text, this time without acknowledgment, and then once again there is a short and properly acknowledged quotation. This pattern of alternation continues through the entire text of the Appendix. There are, to be sure, a few modest differences between the two texts. Shah's book was written when Diem was still living but the Bouscaren volume is chiefly a rueful account of Diem's downfall and death. with the result that the tense of many of Shah's verbs must be changed from present to past if they are to suit Bouscaren's needs. They are fairly consistently so changed, but with occasional interesting lapses, such that on pages 166-169 Diem is very clearly a thing of the past but suddenly, on page 170, Diem and Nehru "are fully alive" to something or other and on page 171 Diem actually "speaks." Perhaps this is only wishful thinking on Bouscaren's part?

This sort of thing is all the more curious when one considers that at least twice Bouscaren reveals a commendable concern for the responsibilities of scholarship. For example, Chapter Ten is explicitly acknowledged to be nothing more than a sequence of excerpts from an article written by Marguerite Higgins, published originally in the magazine America, and now "reprinted with permission." Furthermore, Bouscaren draws quite heavily on Suzanne Labin's Vietnam: An Eye-Witness Account (Springfield, Virginia: Crestwood Books, 1964), and whenever he does so he is exceedingly careful to identify each word that is original with Miss Labin. However, instances of such scrupulous extremes are few and scattered, and seem to be reserved, by and large, for authors with whose views of Diem and Vietnam Bouscaren is enthusiastically sympa-

The book does indeed contain a substantive argument, but this is hardly the context in which to restate it or pass on its merits.

As scholarship, in short, this little reader-indisguise has some rather serious weaknesses. Yet, precisely by virtue of the tantalizing artlessness of its scholarly disguise, as comedy it holds up rather well. Indeed, only as a joke can it be taken at all seriously.

ROBERT S. CAHILL

University of Hawaii

TO THE EDITOR:

I appreciate the opportunity to respond to Mr. Cahill's "review." As I told you previously, there were some errors in the first printing, mostly due to the fact that at a critical time in reading proofs, an illness in the family forced me to put the project in the hands of an assistant. Thus quotes are missing on pages 19 (Fall) and 48 (Lancaster); "as cited in Lancaster" is missing for notes 19–25 (pages 47, 48), and the excerpts from Ali Shah in the appendix were inexcusably edited.

Mr. Cahill not only fails to review my book, he limits his criticism to portions of chapters 2-5 and the appendix. He fails to touch on the substantive issues developed in chapters 6 and 8-12. In chapters 2-5, covering much of the historical background, I cite Fall eight times, Hammer four times, and Lancaster twice. In addition I refer to Fall and Hammer and their ideas in the text itself five times. But in these same chapters there are 51 other citations, especially Devillers, Mus, Shaplen, Buttinger, Lindholm, and Fifield.

The Last of the Mandarins is based on a trip to Vietnam, interviews with U.S. and Vietnamese government officials, missionaries and newsmen, in addition to the writings of experts in the field. In her new book on Vietnam, Marguerite Higgins fully supports my thesis; many of the news people and government officials who once thought Diem was a crook and the Buddhists saints, have revised their views.

Men far better qualified than Mr. Cahill have seen merit in this book, including former Ambassador Nolting and former Assistant Secretary of State John Allison. Writing in Saturday Review (May 22), Mr. Allison says: "... the author does succeed in persuading the reader that Diem was a personally honest, intelligent, and dedicated Vietnamese patriot. It is not claimed that he was a true democrat but instead that he knew enough about his country and his people to realize that what the author calls 'the little-comprehended idea of democracy' was too weak a weapon with which to beat Communism. . . . He is not completely convincing but his book is worth reading for what it tells about the dangers of letting emotion and prejudices take the place of understanding, sympathy, and firmness in dealing with people in Southeast Asia."

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Teaching Political Science. Edited by Robert H. Connery (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 284. \$5.95.)

Taken together, the twelve essays collected in this book constitute the kind of "shop talk" that is often witty and humorous, and is always informed, reflective, provocative, responsible and interesting. The quality of these papers should enhance the professional pride of those who have chosen to spend most of their lives teaching political science.

For the purpose of illustrating the variety of topics and diversity of views presented in this collection, and at the risk of offending the contributors by oversimplifications and omissions, summations and excerpts follow:

Professor Robert H. Connery, the editor, takes note of various criticisms of higher education and sets forth the purposes for which the Duke University Conference (at which these essays were first presented) was called.

Professor Lindsay Rogers asserts that reading is the principal avenue to literacy, but that many books published these days are not real books because they cannot be read, that most course prerequisites are indefensible, that segmentation in political science has been extreme, if not idiotic, that many of our abstractions have a dehydrating, dehumanizing effect, that skepticism is the proper response to quantitative approaches to the study of judicial behavior, and that the old fashioned classical education is conducive to furthering political imagination.

Professor Avery Leiserson believes that the behavioral approach is coextensive with the scientific outlook, which in turn is probably crucial to the survival of our civilization, but that enthusiasm for science, taken alone, is no substitute for intuitive speculation, logical brilliance, historical insight, legal reasoning and trained experience. that the classical theorists are important teachers of politics because their questions about the structure and functioning of political systems produced meaningful concepts and principles necessary to understanding political behavior, that Wilson, Merriam and others live today because of their commitment to political comprehension rather than because of their adherence to a fixed set of moral absolutes, and that "it is the great teacher indeed who, given the state of the discipline in his time, can formulate in his mind, exhibit in his life, and transmit through his students a sense of the

vital balance between political philosophy, a scientific theory of politics, and personal participation."

Professor Edgar Brookes (an Englishman) observes that the Ph.D. is here to stay, but that degree requirements should be re-examined (Shakespeare would not have received a Ph.D. for writing King Lear), that compulsory attendance of students at lectures should be eliminated, that fewer lectures should be given at the upper division level, and that, on balance, it is desirable for teachers and students to become involved in practical politics.

Professor William Anderson adds historical perspective to the volume by contributing, for example, an analysis of the differences between Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum.

Professor William Livingston suggests that curbing admissions is not a solution to the problem of burgeoning enrollments, that we must find ways of improving methods and freeing faculty from functions which impair their ability to teach, and that state universities are best equipped to handle the increasing numbers of students.

Professor Earl Latham begins by jousting with the fallacies that "Svengali-like teachers dominate narcoleptic students," that "students come to the college as empty vessels," that it is dangerous to read books and that what teachers are remembered for is what makes them good teachers, and ends by exploring the question of student motivation.

Professor Margaret Ball responds to the question, should women be taught political science, by saying: "Of course, but not because of any spurious specialization of function which divides the human race into those who support the family (men) and those who are responsible... for the preservation of the nation's culture..."

Professor John Gaus testifies to, and illustrates, the value of John Dewey's *The Public and Its* Problems in elucidating the nature of government.

Professor Charles Hyneman believes that "we need to strive more consciously for the realization of certain learning experiences that tend to be made incidental to other worthy teaching objectives, or left to realization by chance, or ignored altogether."

Two criticisms: (1) The inclusion of a bibliographical essay at the end by J. Peter Meekison, however comprehensive, points up the misleading promise of the Preface that this book will help

bridge the gap between education professors and political scientists; (2) Professor Robert Presthus should have been invited to contribute his critique of the bureaucratic structure of American universities today. This topic is relevant because the way power is organized within a university may bear upon the quality of its teaching staff.—Marvin A. Harder, Wichita State University.

Benjamin Constant. Seine Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz. Lother Gall. (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1963. Pp. xii, 433.)

From Sainte-Beuve in 1862 to Henri Guillemin in 1958 Jeremy Bentham's estimate of Benjamin Constant as "inconstant" has been repeated countless times by biographers, who have concentrated on his vacillating personal and political conduct. Few either in Europe or America have taken him seriously as a political theorist but at long last he is beginning to receive the attention he deserves in that respect.

Lothar Gall in this excellent study shows that there is interest in Constant's political thinking in contemporary Germany, while Antonio Zanfarino illustrates the Italian concern with his book entitled, La Libertà dei Moderni nel Constituzionalismo di Benjamin Constant, which was published in 1961 but is not cited in the bibliography of the volume under review.

Gall deals, of course, in large part with Constant's influence and reception in Germany in the period of the *Vormärz*. By extensively examining the political literature of the time—the *Staatslexicon* of Karl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor Welcher and the writings of Robert Mohl, Paul Pfizer, Ignaz Rudhart, Friedrich Murhard, and Friedrich Julius Stahl, he indicates "what authority" Constant exerted in "all questions of constitutionalism." It is Gall's elucidation of Constant's ideas on this subject that is the most interesting part of the book for historians of political thought.

He rightly places Constant in that "line of great liberals in the Nineteenth Century, who foresaw more or less clearly the decline of libertarian forms of life" and the threat of authoritarianism in modern society. In fact, "long before Tocqueville, Constant had described the connection between the principle of equality and the extension of state power, even to totalitarian dictatorship." Gall is perceptive in his scrutiny of Constant's views on Jacobinism and Bonapartism but in his own reflections on the roots of totalitarianism he would have profited from a reading of J. L. Talmon's studies of The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy and Political Messianism.

It was Constant, who, along with Madame de Staël, epitomized the liberal reaction to the French Revolution, which has never been studied as much as the conservative. "There are two dogmas," he said, "equally dangerous—the one, divine right and the other, unlimited popular sovereignty." He thought that in the Revolution arbitrary power was simply transferred from the Bourbons to the people. The evils, resulting from what Joseph de Maistre called le monarque peuple, were due in Constant's opinion to the influence of Rousseau, whose "Contrat Social, so often invoked in favor of liberty, was the most vicious auxiliary of every kind of despotism."

Constant believed that Rousseau was also to blame for introducing the concept of ancient liberty. Gall points out that, long before Fustel de Coulanges, Constant claimed that the ancients had no notion of individual rights, since to them liberty consisted in "participation in the collective power." For Constant, modern liberty, on the contrary, includes the "peaceful enjoyment of private independence." The excesses of the French Revolutionists followed from the confusion of ancient with modern liberty, or, in the words of Madame de Staël, "they wanted political liberty at the expense of civil liberty." To Constant, political liberty can only serve to guarantee individual liberty. Gall would have added another dimension to his discussion here, if he had been familiar with Sir Isaiah Berlin's lecture on Two Concepts of Liberty, where Constant's idea of individual or private rights is identified with negative and public authority with positive freedom.

Constant specifically defined liberty at one point as "the triumph of individuality as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods as over the masses who seek to render the minority a slave to the majority." When he discussed freedom and rights he rejected Benthamite utilitarianism in favor of the natural law tradition of the Enlightenment. However, under the influence of German philosophy Constant, before Tocqueville, repudiated the Eighteenth Century view that religion is the enemy of liberty and concluded that only a religious people ever remained free.

It was in concrete political institutions, however, rather than in religion that Constant saw the strongest basis of freedom. Although he does not have the idea of intermediate powers in the traditional sense of the Ancien Regime, he does emphasize counter weights to the state, such as the peerage, juridical forms, and local self-government, all of which he found exemplified in the English constitution. In fact, his respect and veneration for precedents and customs is not only an illustration of his Anglophilism but also of the counter-revolutionary influences on his thought, which are not sufficiently stressed by Gall.

In his theory of constitutional monarchy Constant recognized a balance of five rather than three powers—the king, the ministers, the hered-

itary assembly, the elective house, and the judiciary. The unique feature of this distribution was the role played by the non-political king, whom Constant regarded as le pouvoir neutre, separated from the ministers and armed with the right of veto and dissolution to prevent parliamentary omnipotence. If he exaggerated the arbitral role of the monarch in harmonizing the executive and legislative powers, it must be remembered that he was writing before cabinet government was completely developed in England, to say nothing of Restoration France.

Gall sees Constant's political thinking as marking the transition between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. We are in his debt for helping to restore him to his rightful place beside the other luminaries of European Liberalism—Mill, Tocqueville, and Acton.—Guy H. Dodge, Brown University.

Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies. By Rollo Handy. (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1964. Pp. 182, \$6.75.)

Rollo Handy is, in his terms, a transactionalist of sorts. His approach is contextual and empirical. He seeks to investigate the actual methodological problems arising among researchers in each social science discipline, rather than debate issues as formulated by fellow philosophers of science. He is disappointed, however, to find that "practitioners" are often unaware of issues, naive when reconstructing their logic of inquiry, inarticulate about the steps involved, or dogmatic about what canons must be followed. Looking about for exponents of distinctive views with whom to conduct a dialogue, he often tends to settle for the polemical excesses of irate book reviewers, the copybook formulae of textbooks about methods, pseudo-philosophical pronouncements found in presidential addresses, and other marginalia. It can fairly be said that he does not do what he sets out to do. He writes a series of rambling essays that make few significant new points, and that often leave the reader frustrated. One learns that anthropologists tend to describe cultural forms meticulously while disagreeing about the frame of reference to adopt, that economists tend to adumbrate complicated rationalist schema for explaining market or firm behavior while disagreeing about the value of studying institutional arrangements or behavioral patterns, that psychologists tend to accept scientific standards as appropriate only to argue about which techniques meet the test, that sociologists disagree about the importance of subjective data as a source of ideas about behavioral determinants but also tend to accept the view that scientific methods—systemic, empirical, tentative—are de rigeur, that

political scientists (and students of jurisprudence plus policy scientists as well) are addicted to propounding solutions to complex problems in government and public affairs but have been slowly acquiring an appreciation for newer canons of field research as well as documentary scholarship, that historians disclaim the intent to formulate generalizations rather than explain particular time-and-place developments, but nevertheless often adduce (and even invent) general propositions about philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, and/or psychology, both mass and individual, to help the argument along—these are the kinds of "findings" to be gleaned.

Handy's position can perhaps be summed up as orthodox eclecticism. He accepts science as a historically emerging discipline, its canons constantly changing, and necessarily at different "stages" in sister disciplines, not only because of historical peculiarities and habits, but also because of career and institutional considerations. It is possible to give tentative encouragement to a transactionalist approach, although various styles of interactional inquiry remain viable.

The net effect of his tour through the social science provinces is, unfortunately, to encourage one to think of each discipline as possessing a substantial solidarity concerning scientific practices, albeit no unanimity. Perhaps his most useful chapters deal with ad hoc analytical distinctions, terminology, questions of verifiability and predictability, measurability, and alleged differences between physical and behavioral inquiries. In these he largely abandons the effort to characterize the scientific preoccupations of each discipline and instead considers the views of individual scholars-R. M. MacIver, George Lundberg, Leslie White, Michael Scriven, Peter Winch, Theodore Mischel, Karl Popper, Maurice Cranston-many of whom discourse in familiar philosophical style.

There are some crucial problems confronting modern intellectuals whose subject matter lies within the behavioral science orbit and whose disciplinary paraphernalia derive from an amalgam of work in various fields therein. To suggest why Handy's work is disappointing, perhaps it will help to pose three problems, noting that Handy has nothing to say about any of them.

- 1. What are the operational ethical constraints on behavioral inquiry field by field—both as they arise from a "value-free" abdication of responsibility for the social-political-psychological consequences of one's findings—and as they encourage a "conscience-free" invasion of privacy for the sake of knowing?
 - 2. What are the developmental patterns implicit in the world's population growth, the

diffusion of nuclear warfare capabilities, and the prospects of mass leisure—to cite three indubitable trends—on the research priorities, use of scarce resources, and similar dederminants of behavioral methodology?

3. What are the prospects for creativity—for visions of how human enterprises and associations work and for ingenuity in contriving techniques for testing the empirical warrant for such imaginative constructs-in an academic future full of pedestrian contributions to knowledge, each meeting the extant criteria for disciplinary excellence, each bent on making a modest contribution to an ineluctably incrementing pile of knowledge? It is a sad fact today that much of the effort of those who prefer "wisdom" to "evidence"and who enforce the requirement that a choice be made—goes into a tiresome denigration of the efforts of behavioralists. At the same time it is an equally sad fact that conceptions of social and/or behavioral science tend to downgrade brains in favor of discipline, eccentricity in favor of balance, geniuses in favor of journeymen. Something is wrong with formulations of intellectual desiderata which leave out sensitivity (not doctrinaire beliefs, but sensitivity of any kind) to ethical overtones, to emerging forces, and to imaginative efforts.—DWAINE MARVICK, University of California (Los Angeles).

Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics. By Harry V. Jaffa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 229. \$5.75.)

This volume is a collection of Professor Jaffa's essays, described in his Preface as "for the most part chips from a much-interrupted work-in-progress on the American Civil War." Nine of the ten essays have been published before, in books or journals. The sixth, which gives its name to the subtitle of the present volume, was presented at a panel at a meeting of the American Political Science Association. Several of the essays are critical reviews of books and articles, and so is a nine-page appendix to the thirty-page first essay.

The Preface states that "the theme that runs through nearly all" of the essays is "the supreme importance of the Declaration of Independence as a statement of principles which not only did justify, but must ever justify our existence as an independent people." The emphasis is expectedly upon the American Civil War and Lincoln's appreciation, shared with Jefferson and Madison, that a free people under a democratic government must understand and abide by the principle that all men are created equal. This historical example is generalized to the proposition that only those

people who accept the principle are qualified to participate in the democratic process. As I understand it, this proposition is meant to explain the popular solidarity or "consensus" necessary for the successful operation of democratic government, including "rule by the majority" and organized partisanship. Although it is certainly not a full explanation, it does emphasize that a respect for one another's opinions is a necessary element in the cohesiveness of a democratic people.

The principle of equality is treated in two different ways. It is described as the operative principle that has held the American people together and that, especially, was a major determinant in Lincoln's reaction to the possible spread of slavery and to secession, and it is analyzed in an attempt to state its philosophical meaning. The first treatment is adequate, as noted above, but it does not appear unfair to the author to point out that the most important question is how the American or any other democratic people can believe, as they obviously do believe, that "men are created equal." Regarding Lincoln, there seems to be little doubt of his full awareness that a belief in racial inequality is inconsistent with the maintenance of democratic government.

When the author attempts a philosophical analysis of the concept of equality, the results are less satisfactory. "All men are created equal" means that they are equal in certain "rights." This is explained by saying that no man is the master of another man as he is "by nature" the master of dogs, horses, cows, and monkeys. As a consequence, government arises from consent and not from nature. This natural human superiority over animals and this lack of natural superiority within mankind cannot, however, be demonstrated. They are "self-evident" truths, that is, the evidence for them is contained within them, and they are admitted to be true by everyone who already grasps the meaning of their terms (pp. 176-177). Hence, the argument from the "nature" of men and beasts is declared irrelevant. We are reminded, in short, that if we wish to preserve democracy as we know it, we must continue to believe that men are equal, even if we do not know the reasons for or even the meaning of this belief.

The essays dealing with the problem of equality are very repetitive: one gets the impression he has read the same essay four or five times. The essays seem untouched by editing: the fifth, a hitherto unpublished panel-paper, begins "Our subject is a broad one," and the fourth begins, "The topic set for this panel is . . ." (This fourth essay was published in the September, 1958—not 1959, as the Acknowledgments inform us—issue of this REVIEW and there it began in the same way. It was also incorporated in Jaffa's book, Crisis of the

House Divided.) The first essay has attached to it an appendix one-third its length; the ninth essay has three pages of small-type substantive notes following it; and some of the other essays have a few footnotes. For these reasons, it is difficult to see why this volume, dedicated to Leo Strauss and with a Foreword by Charles H. Percy, was put together.—C. W. Cassinelli, The University of Washington.

John Randolph of Roancke: a Study in American Politics with Selected Speeches and Letters. By RUSSELL KIRK. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Pp. 485. \$5.95.)

In this book Russell Kirk has combined an analytic study of the political ideas of John Randolph, first published in 1951, with selections from Randolph's speeches and letters. Some of the source documents have until now been relatively inaccessible, and their appearance here is a welcome addition to the growing body of readily available primary literature on American political ideas. Well over half of the volume is given over to the source materials. These, of course, have been selected from a much larger corpus, and while particular choices may inevitably be open to question, the pieces offered here seem well selected to reflect Randolph's political perspectives and personal style. The book also includes a short "Randolph Chronology" and a quite exhaustive bibliography of relevant primary and secondary materials.

John Randolph has been a neglected figure in recent histories and political analyses of the American tradition; Mr. Kirk believes quite unjustly so. There is no question that Randolph was an interesting and rather enigmatic actor on the political scene. His influence and force of character were great, and they were particularly felt through his long tenure in the House of Representatives, where he served intermittently from 1799 to 1829. During this time he worked with and against nearly all the principal national leaders: Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Jackson, Clay, Webster, Calhoun. In his second term in the House he was the Jeffersonian Republicans' majority leader, but later he broke with Jefferson over the Florida purchase and the Yazoo land claims. Near the close of his public life he supported Jackson for the Presidency, but later was to denounce Jackson in the nullification controversy. While it may be doubted that Randolph was a major figure in the development of political theory, his career illustrated, perhaps as well as any, the convolutions of the rapidly changing American political society during its first fifty years of independence. He participated in a central (and highly vocal) way in debate over all the main public issues of this developmental period.

Mr. Kirk is, to put it mildly, a Randolph enthusiast. "Clay and Webster are only textbook names, now"; he writes, "Madison and Monroe are not much more; but John Randolph, even in his torment, lives for us still." (p. 9) In his commentary he has undertaken two principal tasks, construction of a coherent political theory out of Randolph's ideas, and demonstration of the relevance of these ideas to the politics of our time. Neither task is an easy one.

Kirk's approach to the business of making a theorist out of Randolph revolves around two central points. One, relying heavily on insistent assertion, is that Randolph succeeded better than most men of his time, and particularly better than Jefferson, in maintaining consistency in the face of changing conditions. The other is that Randolph was unwavering in his adherence to the political beliefs of Edmund Burke. Indeed, in a major way the book is an attempt to show that Randolph was an American Burke and that the American political tradition is an unfortunate repudiation of both.

There is ample evidence that Randolph was strongly influenced by his reading of Burke. Whether he contributed a relevant and constructive conservatism to the American tradition is another question. While Kirk associates Randolph with Burke's rejection of abstractions as guides to political action, his account of Randolph's devotion to strict construction, to the liberty of privilege, and to agrarianism, for example, fails to explain how these are absolutes not held by absolute natural conviction. To assert (even citing Burke) a difference between principle and abstract law does not solve the problem. Randolph, via Kirk, does not convey the depth of the conservative position as one finds it argued in Adams or Calhoun. Indeed, Randolph as treated here had little of the appreciation for community and incremental change that so distinguished Burke's outlook on the social world. His resistance to change was so dogged as to suggest the certitude of the doctrinary.

Perhaps the difficulty is that Kirk attempts to make a theory of what is no more than an ideology. For Randolph is most easily understood as an ideologist, as the defender of a peculiar way of life then pressed by the early glimmers of industrialization and by the rising tide of democracy. Unfortunately, in his insistence on treating this ideology as theory, Mr. Kirk does not apply to it the kind of analysis that makes ideology most relevant to the explanation of politics, the systematic treatment of social causes and policy effects.

Kirk does not devote much of his skill to explaining the relevance to contemporary politics of Randolph's ideas; here again he tends to rely chiefly on assertion. The question of contemporary relevance of the "classics" is of great importance (and difficulty) for students of politics. Perhaps the ideological material with which he works sets his limits. For the contemporary appeal of the ideas of a defender of a particular time and milieu, both long since dead, may be confined to those whose perspectives on today's politics impel them merely to say "Oh, if only our world were like that."—David W. Minar, Northwestern University.

The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law. By Leonard Krieger, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. i-ix, 311. \$6.50.)

Samuel Pufendorf's numerous scholarly tomes on natural law, history and theology are not exactly prominent items on the standard intellectual bill of fare in our day and age. Perhaps that is the inevitable—even the deserved—fate of most old scholarly books. But no matter; the scholarly resurrection of obscure scholarly works is part of the stock-in-trade of scholars. And so Professor Krieger, Professor of History at the University of Chicago, has dusted off Pufendorf's writings and made them the basis of an essay in intellectual history. His book treats, practically simultaneously: (1) Pufendorf's intellectual development; and (2) the general development of political-moral thought in the latter half of the seventeenth century. His book is clearly organized around these themes: the man, the philosopher, the moralist, the political theorist, the jurist, the historian, and the theologian.

When I first read the title of Krieger's book, I was puzzled: Why should a treatment of Pufendorf be called "The Politics of Discretion"? The answer is that the title reflects a specific and a general thesis about "intellectuals" and their relation to "reality." The specific thesis concerns Pufendorf's mode of "accepting" the natural law of his "age," and is as follows: Pufendorf was a second-rank thinker compared to the illustrious ones of his century: Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Leibniz. However, because he was second-rank, his intellectual development reveals more readily and sharply than does that of a firstrank thinker the general intellectual processes, problems and tendencies of his age. But he is also significant in his own right, because he tried more deliberately than did Hobbes et al. to join the new theory of natural law to political, moral and religious reality: "His problem was to validate a doctrine that was essentially universal, egalitarian and anti-authoritarian in a real world that was primarily traditional, hierarchical, and monarchical and that, moreover, he had no intention of reforming." (p. 37). Pufendorf's solution: to "compromise"—that is, continuously to adapt the "theory" to the "reality," even to the point of undermining his own "political logic." Pufendorf thus created an "early model for the conjunction of a libertarian rationale with a conservative reality," and this remains his "most relevant bequest to his twentieth century posterity." (p. 38).

Krieger's more general thesis emerges at this point: Pufendorf is significant less for the content of his thought than for the fact that he "represents the fundamental human type of the mediator," or the "man of discretion," the very model of the "trimmer." He faced, and attempted to resolve, the "tension inherent in man's simultaneous commitment to logical coherence and to a reality that splinters logical coherence." (pp. 3, viii.). Even the fact that Pufendorf's ultimate resolution depended on a return to "Lutheranism," as the foundation of the natural law, is explicable as a mode of "integral compromise." (cf. pp. 243 and pp. 37–38).

The preceding theses give structure to the book and permeate its detailed arguments. But whether it contains an exact historical interpretation of Pufendorf's works remains, for me, an open question. My doubt is based not on any great, independent familiarity with the mass of sources, but on uneasiness about Krieger's general approach to Pufendorf. The approach is that of the "history of ideas"; as such, it seems to require seeing the author through the medium of fairly breathtaking syntheses of enormously complex matters. For example: we are told that "the relationship between the rational and the real" had become. for Pufendorf and his contemporaries, "the problem of the age." (p. 16). For example: in a scant fifteen pages, we are given a summary treatment of "the problem of secularization in the seventeenth century." This includes the contention that "the secularizing intellectuals of the seventeenth century" typically sought to establish the "role of positive religion in anchoring the rational morality that mediated between philosophy and politics." (p. 215). It is hardly surprising, then, to discover that this is precisely what Pufendorf did, along with Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and others, for was he not also-nay, even pre-eminentlya "man of his age"? In short, I have a feeling-no more—that the detailed exposition of Pufendorf's thought may have been filtered through the screen of the dazzling synthesis. But this caveat does not prevent my concluding that the book is a helpful guide to the scope and nature of Pufendorf's works.—RICHARD H. Cox, State University of New York, Buffalo.

The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge. By WILLIAM P. McEwen. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963. Pp. 590. \$12.50.)

"The aim of this book is to contribute toward the formulation of a philosophical theory of knowledge which emerges out of the context of socialscientific inquiry, in order to provide an epistemological perspective for behavioral research and theory." The main problem which such a theory of knowledge must resolve is: "How are the perceptions and ideas which the knower has constructed related to the reality to which they supposedly refer?" The book may be described as an attempt to answer this question and state the consequences of the answer for the methodology of the social sciences. Basic to the answer and highlighting the problem, according to Professor McEwen, is the necessity of adhering to the thesis of "epistemological dualism"—our ideas, the concepts we use, and the statements we make about reality are one thing, reality itself is something else and we can never be sure that the former correctly conform to the latter.

Social scientists can surmount this seemingly insurmountable barrier by adopting the "epistemological perspective" of "situation relativism." Like all such perspectives, this one consists of three related things. First, there is the "value situation"—the dominant motive of a person seeking knowledge. For the social scientist, objectivity requires that his inquiry be primarily motivated by the "desire to know." This permits him, also, to partially adjust to his "value-centric predicament"-he is seeking factual knowledge but his inquiry is necessarily "involved" with values. A full adjustment to or escape from the "predicament" requires recognition of a certain intellectual division of labor. Only the "philosophical axiologist" has the analytical tools needed to acquire "reasonably acceptable" knowledge of intrinsic moral ends. The social scientist should accept the moral ends discovered by the philosopher and seek the knowledge needed to determine the means of achieving them. In the final chapter, the nature of moral inquiry is illustrated in the author's defense of the proposition that the ultimate moral end should be "self realization.'

The second ingredient of the appropriate epistemological perspective for the social scientist is the assumption of five postulates which indicate the kind of knowledge of his subject matter which can be acquired. In summary, these are: (1) "There is an objective reality to... which the subjective constructs [concepts and generalizations] of the particular disciplines refer." (2) "A high degree of probability (reasonable acceptability), rather than absolute certainty, is the most that can be expected in the operational verification of generalizations which never exhaust all that is yet to be known." (3) "Knowledge about the objective physical and behavioral universe re-

quires an orderly system of constructs [i.e., theory].". (4) There are causal relations among physical and behavioral events. (5) Verification requires both logical consistency and empirical adequacy. McEwen calls these postulates the "meaning situation" of social scientific inquiry. He maintains that the social scientist's "value situation" determines his "meaning situation" which influences his "knowledge situation," the third and final part of the epistemological perspective.

A social scientist's "knowledge situation" is the method by which he acquires and verifies his beliefs. Professor McEwen recommends the "hypothetical-deductive method" which he outlines in terms of four stages: (1) observation and classification of relevant factual data; (2) construction of hypotheses; (3) verification by empirical testing of the logical consequences of the hypotheses; (4) conceptual integration of the confirmed hypotheses to form theories. Because of the necessity of considering the "intervening variable of purposive goal seeking" which is accessible "only through the investigator's intuitive insight," the author concludes that "law-like rather than lawful generalizations are all that behavioral sciences can hope to achieve."

The significance and manifestations of the three aspects of the suggested epistemological perspective are considered for psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, and history in separate chapters devoted to the "value situation," each of the five postulates of the "meaning situation," and each of the four stages of the "knowledge situation." Political science is discussed at approximately seventeen different places in the book for a total of approximately forty pages.

In an outline such as that presented above. more of what I consider correct in the book is apparent than what I regard as mistaken, but I have adumbrated some of the mistakes. "Epistemological dualism" which the author regards as a fundamental aspect of the philosophy of social science-more so than I could bring out in this review-has nothing to do with social science or its philosophy. Political scientists, for example, study such things as judges, legislators, and international organizations. There is no question about whether they exist. Nor is there any issue over the assumption that ordinary observation is a source of knowledge about these or any other physical things. These are matters of common sense, not philosophy. With regard to values, McEwen speaks of moral knowledge on a par with factual knowledge without confronting the many arguments for the fact-value distinction. Within his own position, there are no grounds for his claim that only philosophers can achieve moral knowledge; the empathy combined with introspection which enables philosophers to verify normative propositions is essentially the same as the technique which he said social scientists must use to achieve data about human motivation. This brings me to a final and related point. In his identification of all psychological concepts, such as attitudes and motives, with mentalistic phenomena, McEwen shows no awareness of "methodological behaviorism"—the thesis that psychological concepts are definable in terms of objective behavioral and/or physiological characteristics of people and physical features of their environment-which has been implicit in psychology for decades and explicit in the philosophy of psychology at least since Watson's "Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It" published in 1913.-MILTON HOBBS, Indiana University.

The Case for Liberty. By HELEN HILL MILLER. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 254. \$5.95.)

A current and useful fashion in the study of constitutional law is the detailed examination of a single case to provide flesh and blood for dry legal doctrine. De Tocqueville's aphorism that in the United States great social and political questions take the form of legal disputes is clearly demonstrable through such studies which analyze the social order from which a case emerged and provide human dimensions to those whose names are familiar only as keys to legal citations. When a case produces a result of lasting significance, the value of a detailed examination is enhanced. In The Case for Liberty, Helen Hill Miller, a journalist, has selected nine such incidents from American colonial history which gave rise to some of the great constitutional guarantees of liberty found in early state constitutions after the Revolution and which eventually were made part of the federal Bill of Rights. Each incident was a cause célebre in which the participants "took on theatrical proportions as protagonists of human destiny" (p. xvi) and would be apt to lead a citizen of the post-Revolutionary period to recall when looking at his state's declaration of rights, "Well, Article X certainly takes care of the so-and-so case." (p. xii.) Students of early American history and those concerned with the development of civil liberty guarantees will find this book interesting.

Using the Bill of Rights as a frame of reference, Mrs. Miller tells of nine episodes in six colonies to illustrate the birth of rights which elements of the first eight Amendments were designed to secure:

(1) Freedom of religion—the jailing of Baptist preachers in Virginia, 1771; (2) freedom of the press—the Bradford case in Philadelphia, 1692

and the Zenger trial in New York, 1735; (3) the right to bear arms-courts-martial following Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia, 1676; (4) quartering of troops—the indictment of Alexander Mac-Dougall in New York, for seditious libel, 1771; (5) search and seizure-Superior Court hearings on writs of assistance in Massachusetts, 1761; (6) due process-imprisonment of Thomas Powell for contempt of council in South Carolina, 1773; (7) trial in the vicinage—the investigation of the Gaspee burning by a special tribunal in Rhode Island, 1773; (8) right to a jury-the case of Forsey v. Cunningham in New York, 1764; (9) freedom from extortion (excessive bail or fine)mock trials by the Regulators at Hillsborough, North Carolina, 1770.

Readers of this review will quickly discover in the above listing those events which are familiar and, undoubtedly, several which are unknown to them. In each instance, Mrs. Miller recites the drama of each case as it emerges from official documents as well as from comments by witnesses and spectators as revealed in press reports, letters and memoirs. The social setting and the dramatis personae are presented in almost fiction-like style through extensive use of direct quotations. The flavor of colonial America which pervades the book is enhanced by the reproduction of 28 contemporary paintings and engravings. An excellent 23 page note on sources concludes the book.

The format of the book, though entertaining, will prove mildly troublesome to those who, like this reviewer, prefer their history in more direct narrative form. The extensive use of quotations and an occasional overemphasis on personalities or peripheral matters has the effect, at times, of clouding the precise issue under consideration. As a consequence, the book is apt to have more appeal to laymen than to scholars though even those well versed in the history of civil liberties will find something of value. It is useful to be reminded that much of what we find in the Bill of Rights grew out of experience on these shores and not only in the hidden recesses of English history. Furthermore, one is struck by parallels which can be drawn from contemporary experiences as seemingly ancient guarantees meet new challenges. The similarity between current confusion over electronic eaves-dropping and the use of general search warrants in colonial times is manifest. Continuing struggles against religious (and racial) intolerance and renewed controversy over the long ignored guarantee of the right to bear arms assure us that bills of rights are rooted deeply in the experiences of men and that these experiences continue to shape their meaning .-MILTON GREENBERG. Western Michigan University.

Political Authority and Moral Judgment. By GLENN NEGLEY. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965. Pp. 163. \$5.00.)

A studied concern for the relationships between political authority and moral judgment seems especially appropriate to this moment in history. The usual practice of men is to assume the legitimacy of a stable political order if only to avoid the exhaustion of calling it into question. But the recent crisis of conscience in regard to America's positions in international politics, or the role of massive civil disobedience in the current civil rights revolution, incline thoughtful persons to seek guidance on the relation of political to moral systems. At the same time, these problems of immediate judgment provide a practical test of the usefulness of ideas advanced under the present title.

The author's stated purpose "is to attempt some small clarification of what we are talking about" in disputes over the evaluation of laws or systems of law. In fact, these essays seem designed to advance many more and more complex purposes than just that modest intent. Among those several purposes, the more important are to attack claims of a moral basis for any political order, to point up the inadequacy of Anglo-American legal conceptions of the corporation, to insist upon an institutional approach to the understanding of individuals and political systems, and to advance a philosophy of administration. The object of the analysis at any given point is not always clear to the reader, but some of the apparent excursions seem more interesting and rewarding than the main path of inquiry.

Prof. Negley's basic contribution to clarity lies in his emphasis on certain analytic distinctions between fact and value, between politics and administration, and between the actual authority of law and its evaluation in an act of moral judgment. His central point is that a system of law cannot be derived from or justified with reference to moral principles because a system of law is a necessary pre-condition for moral judgment. A stable political order provides an environment in which individuals are able to realize their potential for freedom and moral choice. However, the authority of the law does not derive from such consequences. A large part of the author's argument on authority reduces, in his own terms, to the statement, "The authority of the law is what it is because the disposition to obedience is what it is because the institutional structure is what it is." (p. 102). In a later passage, the institutional structure is what it is-or will be what it will beas a consequence of the work of administrators, and it is this line of reasoning which places the

training of administrators at the climax of the entire analysis.

It is valid and probably useful to note that the authority of law is a matter of fact and that moral judgment is, or should be, a matter of rational analysis of facts empirically established and value premises clearly defined. We may agree with the author that the results of moral judgment on inadequate factual grounds are often unfortunate. But the author appears to go somewhat farther when he says (p. 115), "Disaster is the inevitable result when the witless or the dabblers or the dogmatists make political judgments." His distinctions are useful for his purposes of emphasizing the importance of the administrator's role in a modern society and for identifying some still unsolved legal problems of the administrative state. However, analytic distinctions that are useful for some purposes may not be useful for others or when pressed to the logical extreme. That a distinction be useful in one case is no guarantee that it is universally useful or even approximately true.

As noted above, a discussion of this subject would seem to be of particular value now in view of current issues and demands for judgment. Unfortunately, the present analysis is cast at such an extremely high level of abstraction as to place the burden of application entirely on the reader. The author notes that other conceptions of the authority of law make the reconciliation of differences among nations an impossible judicial problem, but his resolution to rest authority on an institutionally conditioned disposition to obey is no improvement where institutions are incompatible. At one point, the author notes briefly the problem of an individual first conditioned by a segregated society and then exposed to conflicting values through education, but he gives no indication of how that problem is to be solved. Hence, while this book contains some excellent asides on the political philosophies of Hobbes and Kant, it disappoints the reader seeking advice on the problems of judgment that confront him today.-RICHARD H. McCleery, Antioch College.

Power and Human Destiny. By HERBERT ROSIN-SKI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xvi, 206. \$5.95.)

At his death Herbert Rosinski left a number of preliminary drafts and notes dealing with the concept of power in human affairs, a matter that had long concerned him. This material has been used by his friend and colleague, Richard P. Stebbins, as the basis for this book, which is "not so much a transcription as a restatement" of Rosinski's ideas.

The thesis is that human history can be seen as

the development of man's power. Until the rise of industrial civilization at the time of the First World War, this power was a power that more or less successfully integrated the elements of his surroundings, including other men, and since that time it has been a power that enables him to change his surroundings. The post-1914 industrial civilization is a completely new level of existence, where the problem is not the exhaustion or decay of power—or, in terms of power's results, the loss of harmony—but the indefinite creation of new power by the power of rationality. To control this ever-expanding power is now our principal problem.

The book has three major parts: an examination of the concept of power, an interpretation of human history, and a prescription for the resolution of the problem of the industrial era. The intent is to provide a new understanding of the past and the present by ordering the events of human history in terms of the concept of power, but in evaluating the book we need not hold it strictly to its pretensions. The historical sections, comprising three-quarters of the book, can probably be appreciated without reference to the author's concept of power. The significance of Christian individualism may, for example, be better understood by viewing it as a special manifestation of power, no matter what the exact meaning of "power" might be; and the challenge to theories of history that assert the inevitable decay of civilizations is similarly valuable. It is always interesting to follow an author's search for a pattern in history, even though one may doubt that such patterns exist. This doubt is, moreover, usually increased by the reader's recognition of inadequacies in his own narrow field of competence. A case in point is the present volume's at best most unimaginative treatment of political systems such as contemporary democracy and communism.

The analysis of the concept of power itself is less successful. Power is not solely the ability of human beings to engage in a range of activities. "Each bit of reality represents a force that has come to fulfillment, something that has shown itself to be truly power by having asserted its capability of being." This force or power behind the becoming of reality is joined by a "power inherent in the established fact itself" that exerts "its own influence in the endless chain of being." These two types of power are manifested in human affairs in the obvious way: "Inevitably, the things that man creates become objectified as established facts which thereupon begin to exercise a power of their own." Not so obviously, however, once man's creation begins to exercise this power of its own, "it becomes independent of his original intention and also of his endeavors to

maintain control over it." Indeed, this power tends to "turn against man himself." (pp. 19-22) Man's creation of power in his attempt to advance his freedom cannot be terminated because it is a manifestation of his essence. The only way to prevent our search for freedom ending in our enslavement or even destruction is to maintain our understanding and control of the power we have created.

The concept of power has serious explanatory and logical weaknesses. It is so general that using it to explain human history does not accomplish very much: we learn only that this history is part of the whole of existence and that every part of existence has influence on every other part. The concept of control, which can be nothing other than a result of power, is not integrated with the concept of power. The word "power" is used in different ways in different parts of the argument. The theory of power does not explain the tendency of man's creations to have effects that were not anticipated or to be difficult to control: this tendency is better approached by an investigation of the limits of man's understanding or of the complexities of human associations or of both. We know that nuclear energy and bureaucracy can get out of hand; the theory presented by this volume does little to augment this knowledge.

According to Rosinski and Stebbins, the only way to control power is to imbue men and institutions with responsibility, which is a result of the Christian concepts of guilt and humility combined with insight into the fundamentals of current problems, especially the problem of power. This responsibility is to be got by a revision of education to stress a "general perspective over the whole development of mankind" and a "general view of the over-all state of our present systematic knowledge." (p. 201) Again it can be said that this prescription makes sense, but that it has very little theoretical connection with the concept of power presented as the key to human affairs. Responsibility itself is a kind of power, but no attempt is made to show how it can be a power that controls other forms of power.

Despite these criticisms, Power and Human Destiny is a valuable attempt by men who have grasped the realities of the present age to put these realities into historical perspective.—C. W. Cassinelli, The University of Washington.

The Tradition of Natural Law. A Philosopher's Reflections. By Yves R. Simon, Edited by Vukan Kuic. (New York, Fordham University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 194. \$5.00.)

These lectures by the late Professor Simon, who is best known to political scientists through his Philosophy of Democratic Government (1951) and A General Theory of Authority (1962), originated

in a course he gave on "The Problem of Natural Law" at the University of Chicago in 1958. They should be ranked with the lectures delivered at the same university in 1948 by Professor A. P. D'Entrèves, which were published in 1951 under the title, Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy and with the lectures given there in 1949 by Professor Leo Strauss, which came out in book form in 1953 with the title, Natural Right and History. There is one reference to the former volume but none to the latter in the notes of the work under review, which was edited by Vukan Kuic, one of Simon's former students.

Professor Simon was a distinguished Christian philosopher-a Neo-Thomist, writing, like his master, Jacques Maritain, in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, according to which natural law signified primarily "the natural law of the moral world." As Simon points out, "the opposition to natural law is as old as the theory," but the "great revival of interest" in it "in our time is certainly related to the devastations wrought by positivism and existentialism in the intellectual and political life of a considerable part of Western society." He also shows how in the Nineteenth Century "a philosophy of historical right" was opposed to "a philosophy of natural right," but he does not stress, like Strauss, the repudiation of natural right in the "name of the distinction between Facts and Values."

Although Professor Simon believes that "acquaintance with history never fails to improve the statement of philosophical questions," his chapter on the history of natural law is not as complete as the treatment of this subject either by Professor D'Entreves or by Professor Heinrich Rommen in his The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, who both give more attention to the secularization of the concept. However, in dealing with the relationship between natural law and the "profound issues of theoretical philosophy," like the problem of the universals and the unity of human nature, his presentation is excellent.

Simon suggests in several places that "the history of ideas about natural law is crowded with myths," which he sets out to "puncture." He feels that the myth of "scholastic doctrine" is as fallacious as the myth of "contemporary philosophy," for "scholasticism lacks doctrinal unity as certainly as contemporary philosophy does," which he proceeds to demonstrate by contrasting Thomas Aquinas and William of Occam, on the one hand, and Henri Bergson and Bertrand Russell, on the other. If, then, there is no scholastic doctrine of natural law, there is, however, according to Simon, a "scholastic system of problems," like whether "primacy belongs to the intellect or the will." He points out very effectively

that "legal voluntarism, i.e. the theory that law is primarily an act of sovereign will, is historically associated in a remarkably constant fashion with voluntarism as a general philosophic position, i.e. with the theory that the higher faculty is not the intellect but the will." After referring to Hobbes and Rousseau but not to Marsiglio, he concludes that "the notion of natural law is attacked whenever the voluntaristic trend is predominant."

In the last analysis Simon maintains that the "resolution of man-made laws into their foundations is the very way to the position and determination of the question as to whether there exists a law of nature." Following from his Aristotelian-Thomistic approach, "law is a rule of the reason for the common good," concerning which, according to Simon, there are two myths. "The first is the myth of a common good external to man and conceived upon the pattern of a work of art and the second . . . that the common good is merely a useful one, that is, the greatest good of the greatest number." Instead, to a Catholic liberal like Simon, "the common good enjoys primacy over the private good of the individual when both are of the same order" or in other words when "the common good is internal to man."

As Professor John Hallowell says in the foreword to this book, the "natural law" tradition is the basis of constitutional government, a position he expounded in his own lectures at Chicago on The Moral Foundation of Democracy, which were published in 1954. With the same viewpoint, Professor Simon suggests that "pragmatists are at their worst when they contend that the vindication of democracy in terms of natural law is obsolete, ineffective, and uninteresting." It is not surprising to read, after this observation, that "one of the most obvious conclusions of our research" is that "there can be no scientific government," since it is an "ideal found in positivistic schools," in the main.

We should be grateful to Professor Simon for demonstrating that "the difficulties proper to philosophy are present in any discussion involving natural law." This posthumous publication of a "philosopher's reflections" can be read with profit by all political scientists from the behavioralists to the traditionalists, whether or not one accepts his particular orientation.—Guy H. Dodge, Brown University.

Survey Sampling. By Leslie Kish. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. Pp. xvi, 643. \$10.95.)

An authoritative analysis of the theory and practice of sampling by the head of the Sampling Section, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? By Lester W. Mil-Brath. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965. Pp. 195. \$1.75.)

The political science of today stands in great need of synthesis. The proliferation of empirical studies has been unmatched by efforts to show continuity among them. The long-standing habits of jealous concern for originality of problem, concept and method have worked against the development of a cumulative empirical political science. In addition, the lack of well worked out empirical theories—with a few very recent exceptions—has meant general confusion rather than coherence and unity in the discipline. The synthetic function has devolved rather upon the introductory textbook writer, in whom its fulfillment has been fitful at best.

An exception to this prevailing drift is Lester Milbrath's Political Participation. In the genre of the propositional inventory, Milbrath's work is an effort to identify the leading generalizations concerning why people engage in a variety of political activities. It is also an attempt to organize these propositions according to a theoretical matrix which introduces order into what is at present a cacophony of themes and findings. Probably the only thing that unites these researches as they stand is the fact that, with few exceptions, they have been carried out in the Western democracies in the last few decades.

Milbrath's catalog of existing knowledge in part parallels an earlier effort at synthesis in this area—Robert Lane's Political Life—but updates it. Milbrath's treatment (no doubt intentionally) lacks some of the breadth of Lane's coverage. It passes over the historical dimension of political participation, for example, which had been one of the most interesting aspects of Lane's work. Milbrath focuses more exclusively upon survey studies of what has come to be called "the mass public." Lane, in coming to his task at a time when the data were much less rich, extended his view more broadly to the higher and middle levels of involvement. The latter seem underplayed in Political Participation.

Perhaps this difference in emphasis reflects the greater disciplinary specialization which has come about between studies of the elite and of the mass in the last few years. Clearly the situation has improved greatly for students of mass political behavior with the production of such fertile data banks as those resulting in The American Voter or The Civic Culture. The work at the activist and elite levels, particularly in the recruitment studies, has only begun to rival this progress. Thus there is perhaps good reason to underplay the latter in a survey of reliable propositions about political activity and involvement. Mil-

brath has therefore narrowed his view more than Lane. Concomitantly, he has matched this with a stronger urge for clarity and precision and a form of expression somewhat less likely to delight the gournet of imaginative political science writing.

A distinct advance in Milbrath is his more explicit differentiation of the propositions for which the data are cumulative and in which we can therefore put greater confidence. In the text, three levels of confidence are expressed by differences in type-setting: bold face, italic and regular type. The seventy-three "bold-face" propositions are those for which several mutually confirming studies exist. The eighty or so italicized propositions represent a middle level of confidence,where there has been little replication but the evidence available is of good quality. Thirdly, there are a great many interpretive and speculative hypotheses which Milbrath supplies to elaborate and connect the higher confidence propositions. On the whole, this is a valuable effort and points the way toward greater future precision about how reliable is our knowledge.

Another distinguishing feature of Milbrath's synthesis is his theoretical framework. He presents it in an introductory chapter entitled, "Conceptual Problems." This appears to be a wise choice for a title. If there is any part of the book which exhibits a lack of strength, it is this. Milbrath actually identifies a series of organizing categories which have appeared at one place or another in the literature. From these "islands of theory" he attempts to build a micro-theoretical framework which can be used to order and present the propositions. That these taxonomies have issued from diverse parentage means that the overlap among categories is heavy and the levels are mixed. One finds, for example, that political participation "as a function of stimuli" (Chapter II) and "as a function of social position" (Chapter V) are by no means exclusive. They are rather at different levels of analysis but not clearly specified as such.

One can quarrel as well with what appears to be Milbrath's interpretation of what he is doing in providing his ordering devices. He says, in the Preface: "This model was not arrived at deductively from a set of assumptions and then imposed upon the data; rather it was built up inductively from careful examination of the findings." (p. 3) We can readily agree with the first part of the statement. His effort is by no means an exercise in deductive logic. But neither is it a matter of pure induction. He clearly comes with preconceptions to his task. This is admitted, for example, when he presents one of several paradigms on pages 28 and 29. The model presented is a rather complex version of the venerable S-R paradigm of the learning psychologists, Hull and Skinner. Assuming that this model is included in what he is talking about in the Preface, then one doubts that it has appeared full-grown from "careful examination of the findings."

The more general issue this brings to light is the sheer theoretical intractability of an area of research which has been carried on with quite disparate theoretical concerns, where any have entered the picture at all. Milbrath has struggled manfully with the task of making these efforts cohere, but his success is very mixed. A great deal more theory-making is required, preferably, for the future, prior to actual investigations.

A final problem which the work implicitly presents is our present incapacity in this area to weight various factors relatively to each other in their explanatory or predictive powers. A whole host of factors have been found to be related to political participation. But there is little ranking or weighting possible among them. The analyses which have been done are almost exclusively bivariate. Nor has there been much attention to the question of change in these relationships over time, or according to place. The unordered and static nature of these propositions suggests that considerable gaps remain which must be filled by new generations of scholars.

Milbrath's analysis is heartening, on the other hand, for it demonstrates that progress has been considerable, even in the six or seven years since Lane wrote Political Life.—JACK DENNIS, University of Wisconsin.

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- 10. Acadia University, Wolfville, Nova Scotia
- 11. University of Witwatersrand, South Africa
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- 13. University of Florida
- 14. University of North Carolina
- 15. University of Minnesota
- 16. University of Illinois
- 17. University of California, Berkeley
- 18. State College, Pennsylvania
- 19. Whitman College
- 20. University of Kentucky
- 21. Washington University
- 22. New York University
- 23. University of Maryland
- 24. Rutgers University
- 25. University of Utah

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- 28. Syracuse University
- 29. University of Iowa
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- 33. Opinion Research Corporation
- 34. Emory University
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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Studies in Money in Politics. A Series of Seven Monographs. Edited by Herbert E. Alexander. (Princeton, New Jersey, Citizens' Research Foundation, 1965. Limited to 500 edition.)

Campaign financing continues to be an urgent, persistent and baffling problem. Notwithstanding widely heralded "definitive" studies, the nature of the task continues to haunt concerned political scientists. Herbert E. Alexander has compiled within the hard covers of a single volume, entitled Studies in Money in Politics, seven studies originally published as paperbacks by the Citizens' Research Foundation of which Doctor Alexander is the Director. In fact, he is author or editor of five of the studies most of which are familiar to serious students of campaign finance. Availability of all these publications under one cover should prove useful, especially with an index of fifteen pages, though the absence of consecutive pagination may cause some difficulty.

Alexander's Studies represents a form of research once very widespread but considered outmoded by some contemporary behavioralists. There is no elaborate design of research projects nor any esoteric schema or hypotheses. The purpose of the studies is to clarify and not confuse. The separate monographs range from a compiling of actual data to a brief list of suggestions not very novel by both political scientists and politicians. There are significant aspects for political scientists in this publication aside from its contents. First of all, a full time Foundation with a specialized director of research has replaced the work of such individual scholars as James K. Pollock and Louise Overacker in this area. However valuable the studies may be this represents a loss for the academic political scientists whose Association abandoned this field of study as a collective effort at the instigation of the Establishment in the profession. Now further specialization takes away from the individual political scientist a legitimate area of study unless carried on under the auspices of a foundation. Thus the availability of research money affects the study of money in politics. Perhaps a study of money in political science is next in order as tax evading corporate foundations increasingly dominate the study of politics. This marks one more surrender of scholarship to the cash nexus. Promotion precedes research if it does not dominate it.

None of this detracts from the fact that the reports incorporated in the Studies are valuable contributions. This is the more true since Congress has made no elaborate investigation of 1960 and 1964 campaign expenditures. The reviewer was informed by a prominent Republican Senator that no investigation of 1960 was permitted because Republicans simply had too few votes to override Democratic opposition. The shrine in Arlington Cemetery now precludes any thoroughgoing investigation of 1960, and the politics of consensus thwarts a senatorial inquiry into 1964 campaign funds. Hence private reports are useful as the only available systematic inquiries. These Studies of campaign finance reveal how little impact previous political science research has had upon the practice of politics.

Campaign finance is so vital to political parties under democratic capitalism that something more than statistics, personal confessions, and discreet interviews are essential to a genuine comprehension of the many sides of the subject. Nothing less than a systematic review by an outstanding body of scholars, politicians and economists with full power of subpoena will ever suffice. Something on the order of a British Royal Commission or a Hoover Commission is demanded, not merely an ad hoc committee designed to bring in a set of hurried recommendations to be ignored by Con-

gress. There is room for a complete and detailed investigation to determine the role of parties in the Great Society. The entire profession of political science should be involved in something of the order of the 1952 study of the nominating process except greater in both economic and political detail and further exploration of the theoretical aspects needs to be included.

The most original of the studies in the volume under review is the one by Henry Wells, "Government Financing of Political Parties in Puerto Rico." Wells makes a thoughtful and perceptive analysis of a first genuine attempt to use government subsidy to develop party independence. The result is not too discouraging though the results do not justify rejoicing. The practices of employee assessment and private contributions have not ceased. In other words, government subvention is no panacea.

All of these approaches are really only oblique advances towards the central problem of the mass media, privately owned and operated for huckstering purposes. These daily irritants with their emotional appeals in sloppy jingles to sell deodorants to morons contribute to the difficulty of an adequate approach to the matter of civic education by political parties. A civic culture primarily commercial in nature provides a steady diet of stimuli which produce traditions and norms of fragmented looks at public policy.

Current efforts by agents of the mass media to shorten campaigns are only additional grist in the mills of those who wish public policy to be crowded out of the domain of intelligent dialogue. Another region for fruitful survey is the success or failure of the compulsory vote as a means of increasing citizen participation and civic intelligence. The issues are profound enough to enlist the attention of professional political scientists and their various organs unless the study of politics is to degenerate into a morass of methodical nonsense in which political scientists become an adjunct to computers in a technological society.

It is a cause of regret that only five hundred copies of the Studies will be available.—Jasper B. Shannon, University of Nebraska.

Church and State in Social Welfare. By Bernard J. Coughlin, S.J. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 189. \$6.95).

Public discussion of the Church-State issue rarely focuses on the problem of the relation of government to the thousands of church-owned welfare agencies in the United States. Here is a fertile field for normative as well as descriptive inquiries, and the scope of this book makes it a valuable point of departure for either kind.

Father Coughlin, Dean of the School of Social

Service at St. Louis University, has addressed himself to the theory as well as the practice of church-state relations in this area, as well as to the theories of sectarian practitioners, and to public law. Through a questionnaire survey and other devices, he has found that at least some of the agencies of all denominations receive tax support on a contractual basis (sometimes contrary to the resolutions of denominational governing bodies). Only five percent of the administrators answering his questionnaire reported an explicit policy of refusing public funds. In fact, most responding institutions had no clear policy concerning public funds, but most of these, in turn, did accept them. When we add the agencies reporting a policy of accepting funds to those having a nonpolicy of accepting them, we find that two-thirds of the Protestant and Jewish respondents, and more than 90 of the Catholic, receive public monies. In a great many cases, it seems, the chief effect of the doctrine of separation is that Protestant administrators are notably more anxious than their Jewish or Catholic counterparts about the implications of governmental subsidy for the principle of separation, and for institutional autonomy. But even the Protestants were overwhelmingly unconcerned about a purchase-of-service type of public support. From the standpoints of effective church policy, size and needs of the "private sector," and public law, it appears that state-supported, privately-administered welfare is here to stay.

The survey and public-law data are presented in the context of a theoretical discussion which draws on sociological as well as theological sources. Catholic, Protestant and Jewish doctrines are summarized, and the author's own resolution of the issue is presented. The theoretical discussion is marked by clarity, by wide use of ecclesiastical sources (the bibliography is invaluable)—and by a brevity which is a bit disappointing. Polar theories are stated, and are liberally illustrated with quotations; their policy implications are noted; but the author does not grapple with the values, hazards, basic assumptions or self-serving rationalizations involved.

Coughlin's own preference is for a public policy of reliance whenever possible on private welfare institutions, supported liberally by public funds. He wants the state consciously to promote "a strong voluntary welfare structure," on the ground that such institutions counteract trends toward secularism and state absolutism, and promote "internal unity based on conscience." By the latter he means that "a secular society runs the risk of achieving only a superficial social unity.... Unity that arises from social control must be based on something more meaningful than secular custom and law." (p. 128).

Here is grist for many a mill, and one wishes that Coughlin's mills had ground a bit finer. For example: if we grant the dangers of secularism, state-absolutism, and too-superficial social integration, can we simply assume, with but scanty supporting argument, that church-administered social welfare programs counteract them? A careful inquiry would probably yield a complicated answer. Again: does the author intend to leave the impression that the churches' social concern is congruent with institutional social welfare? He puts, without really examining, the proposition that the churches must be concerned with the world, and therefore must administer social welfare programs. In fact, those who would have the churches advocate comprehensive public institutions are relegated to pietistic individualism. Thus even Reinhold Niebuhr is placed in the company of those whose theology is "overprotected against the world," affording "no principle of social judgment" (pp. 21, 25).

This suggests a hypothesis supported by this reviewer's casual observation: there is a significant difference in typical theological and political outlook between those churchmen (of whatever faith) engaged in ecclesiastical social welfare on the one hand, and those (of whatever faith) engaged in church-sponsored social action on the other. But that would be another study.—Gordon L. Shull, The College of Wooster.

The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Presure Group. By John A. Crampton. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 251. \$5.50.)

In his introduction Dr. Crampton notes that his book is "not a history of the Farmers Union," but rather a "study in ideas and their ramifications." After developing the core of the ideology in the first he shows in subsequent parts how it affects the membership, structure, and policy of the Union.

He accomplishes his end by the use of extensive quotations, which although a trifle too numerous and long to suit a person familiar with the organization, do give the reader in one convenient location a great measure of the flavor of the speechmaking which takes place at typical Union conventions and of the editorializing found in its publications. The research for this study was done primarily by using a series of interviews conducted at the Union's Denver headquarters during the summers of 1956 and 1957, supplemented by the minutes and publications of the national organization.

In Part I we are told that there are four basic strands which serve as the core of the Farmers Union ideology: the sense of disadvantage; pacifism; cooperativism; and the family farm ideal. There are other components of the ideology which are to be found on the periphery and which have undergone changes in the over half-century of the Union's existence. For example, the Union which originated in the South once had a racist ideology, which it lost as its strength weakened in that area and developed in the North.

Part II is perhaps the most valuable section. Here Professor Crampton gives us a look at the social, political, and economic background of the Union's membership and leadership. The author attempts to discover why a "radical" farm organization finds its greatest strength in one of the most conservative areas of the nation-namely the upper Great Plains. He discovers that the Union members come from the middle-income, prosperous sector of the farm economy and that most of them are Republicans. He suggests that the answer to his question may be found in the greater amount of suffering due to a combination of low prices and drought in this section of the nation during the thirties. The memory of this suffering perhaps makes them react faster to potential threats to their economic security than farmers in other areas of the nation. This factor plus the political tradition of dissent as evidenced by such mavericks as Senators Langer and Norris are believed to have developed a core of liberalism in a conservative area.

While the membership votes Republican the state leadership votes Democratic. Sixty of the sixty-seven state leaders who returned their questionnaires reported their pro-Democratic attitude. The leadership of the Union was found to be remarkably homogeneous. With few exceptions they are sons or daughters of farmers, over fifty percent have attended college, and most of them have had previous governmental experience, especially on farm boards.

In Part III the author traces the rise of the Union to 290,000 families in 1956. He notes that maintaining the members is a more difficult problem than recruiting new ones. The major impediments to the Union's growth are federalism, which permits virtual autonomy to chartered state organizations; and liberal ideology, which prevents it from gaining adherents in the South. Finances have always hindered the national educational and organizational activities, though ironically in recent years the Union, through a separate corporation, has gone into business both as a part of the ideology of cooperativism and as a means of raising the national organization's revenue.

The major criticism of this book is the time lag between the research (1956-1957) and publication (1965). This does not, however, make Professor Crampton's study out of date. It is simply

not up to date. The material he offers makes a valuable contribution to knowledge-especially on the domestic and foreign policy stands of the Union and its method of operation, which is described in the last part. It is to be regretted also that the time lag prevents the inclusion of more information on the National Farmers Organization, whose direct action is gaining support in Farmers Union territory. In addition, further research should be done to substantiate some of the conclusions which Professor Crampton has tentatively made, with respect to the background of the Union's membership and its growth in a normally conservative section of the United States.—Henry J. Tomasek, University of North Dakota.

Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis. By Michael N. Danielson. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. 244, \$6.00.)

Read at "face value," Michael Danielson's study of Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis is something more than just another of the numerous "case studies" of metropolitan problems being turned out these days. In this context alone its thoroughness is immediately apparent, but beyond this Professor Danielson's writing has a style not too often encountered in serious, academic work. One almost looks forward to the next page and chapter. It is hoped the "academy" will not look unkindly upon this refreshing quality.

Beyond this, the book should be a "must" for all but the most advanced in the field of metropolitan affairs. It should be required reading in Municipal Government classes and recommended for the urban resident who would seek to understand the emerging metropolitan phenomenon.

While the "commuter problem" as dealt with concerns but the largest of our metropolitan areas, Professor Danielson uses it as a device with which to expose the deeper issues which beset every urban complex that bears the dubious but increasingly inevitable label---"Metropolitan Area." Too, though concentrating upon the federal level of involvement, the political interplay at state, central city and suburban levels is also brought into focus. Fragmentation of governmental responsibilities among a multitude of local jurisdictions is made even more difficult when one encounters the diffusion of urban responsibilities at the national level, both in Congress and in the executive structure.

The very title indicates the book's concern with what many regard as the major issue in today's domestic political arena: the federal government in state and local affairs. While anything but a recent phenomenon on the American scene, the "exploding metropolis" provides an extremely fertile environment for the involvement of Washington in the "Commuter Crisis" giving us an opportunity to view it with rare clarity, and to sharply delineate the actors in the drama.

Prior to the Transportation Act of 1958, the federal government's concern with the commuter problem was little beyond the routine action of the Inter-state Commerce Commission's regulation of trains. The Act of '58 was oriented toward the financial condition of the carriers and gave little or no thought for the commuter or the broader economy dependent upon him. Thus, this Act was a/the prime contributor to the mass transportation crisis that developed in the New York region that year. Demands for relief were loud and proposed lines of action were of such variety as to afford the opportunity for every element in the metropolitan galaxy to pursue courses compatible with their "particular goals and strategies." The Kennedy administration became immediately involved and the labor produced the mass transportation section of the Housing Act of 1961. This legislation, in turn, set in motion political activity that culminated in the Transportation Act of 1964.

Professor Danielson relates this struggle in great but never dull detail. The cast of characters is, in general, well known to even the casual follower of the daily news—it is almost like reading about one's neighbors. The art of politics reveals itself throughout as Dr. Danielson skillfully bares the tactics and objectives of the participants. Also brought in sharp view is the fact that in governmental affairs the problem at hand often is lost in the companion issue of who will have jurisdiction.

Except for the vehicle—the commuter crisis—which is handled, as already suggested, with enviable thoroughness and clarity, Dr. Danielson presents little that isn't already known, in some degree, to anyone who has concerned himself with problems of the metropolis. He has, however, done an exemplary job exposing the nature of the participants, which should do much to help the reader understand the magnitude of the challenge of the Metropolis. For those who like to challenge and argue, there is the concluding chapter, The Pattern of Federal-Metropolitan Politics, in which Professor Danielson ventures his personal conclusions and projections. Some samples are:

"Basic changes in the (fragmented) political system . . . are extremely unlikely in most of urban America."

"One force that might foster more centralized and coordinated decision-making in metropolitan areas . . . is the feedback of the output of federal-urban relations on the metropolitan political system."

"In federal-metropolitan relations . . . 'the central-city mayor (will be) the leading figure'."

"The clash of city and suburban interests will increase as re-

apportionment strengthens them in both the state legislatures and Congress."

All who are concerned with the political and governmental aspects of the metropolis are indebted to Dr. Danielson for this little book and it deserves wide reading.—WILLIAM T. UTLEY, University of Omaha.

From Failing Hands, The Story of Presidential Succession. By John D. Feerick. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1965. Pp. 368. \$6.95.)

Generations of scholars and practitioners of the art of governance in America have wrestled with the problems of Presidential disability and succession. The Founding Fathers, who knew how to dodge insoluble problems when they saw them, provided only partial answers in the fundamental law, and left the rest to posterity. Following Franklin Roosevelt's death, and Harry Truman's sudden trajectory into the Presidency, interest in the succession rose in recent times, and it climbed even more in Eisenhower's several illnesses. It fell with the advent of the youthful, vigorous John Kennedy, but with his assassination, his successor's medical record, and a vacant Vice Presidency, it reappeared. The result is the Bayh amendment, passed by Congress and now circulating among the states for approval.

The development of the Bayh amendment was contributed to importantly by a special committee of the American Bar Association appointed to consider Presidential disability and succession. John Feerick served on this committee, and his book, From Failing Hands, is an outgrowth of that experience. Mr. Feerick's study is the most comprehensive one we have on the combined problems of Presidential disability and succession. It possesses historical depth, exploring as it does our pre-Constitutional approaches to disability and succession, the deliberations of the Founding Fathers, the sweep of our post-Constitutional experience, and the practices of our state governments, and of other nations. The assassination of Garfield, Cleveland's secret operation for cancer, Wilson's severely crippling illness, the declining health of Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower's several crises, and the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination, are presented with faithful attention to vivid historical detail. The issues are treated with first-class Constitutional analysis, and a well-reasoned program for action is pre-

Those who, like Mr. Feerick and others, want to do something about the Constitution's vagueness on disability, take as their point of departure the view expressed by Richard Nixon, "Fifty years ago the country could afford to 'muddle along' until the disabled President got well or died. But today . . . there could be a critical period when 'no finger is on the trigger' because of the illness of the Chief Executive." The author and the American Bar Association consider inadequate the memorandum of understanding Eisenhower arranged with Nixon on the subject of disability, a procedure followed by succeeding Presidents. Although some political scientists have argued that the memorandum, endorsed by a joint resolution of Congress, is preferable to a Constitutional amendment, the Bar Association does not share this view. An amendment would give an unquestionable legal sanction, the A.B.A. feels, and it could, as a memorandum could not do, resolve all doubts that in cases of disability, the Vice President succeeds only temporarily and not permanently to the Presidential office.

The most perplexing questions on disability center upon the President's unwillingness or inability to declare his plight, and the necessity of establishing an alternate source to make a finding. The question reappears in somewhat different form when a disabled President wants to resume his duties while still disabled. The Bar Association and the author prefer a finding by the Vice President and a majority of the cabinet that the President is disabled and does not so declare. If, subsequently, the disabled President's claim that he has recovered is not shared by the cabinet, the dispute would be submitted to Congress. Only a two-third's vote, the A.B.A. recommended, should prevent the President from resuming his duties.

The Bayh amendment, as it has emerged from Congress, both reflects the Bar Association, in providing for a cabinet finding, and departs from it by providing for an alternate body to the cabinet, or "such other body as Congress may provide." Presumably, this "other body" would be a commission of private citizens, doctors, psychiatrists, and others. It is easy to imagine a nightmare of possible future confusion where Congress is of a different party than the President, where the cabinet supports his finding on disability, and the "other body" disputes it. Senator Albert Gore wisely objected to this feature of the Bayh amendment, when he declared in debate that it created the possibility that "this nation could undergo the potentially disastrous spectacle of competing claims to the power of the Presidency."-Louis W. Koenig, New York University.

The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954-1956. By Robbins L. Gates. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 222. \$6.50.)

This admirable book was prepared first as a doctoral dissertation in political science at Columbia University under Prof. Arthur W. Macmahon with Profs. David B. Truman and Wallace S. Sayre as advisers. Such distinguished sponsorship doubtless accounts in part at least for the importance of the subject, for the excellence of the treatment and for the unusual value of the total undertaking. The author, who deserves wide appreciation for his idea and its execution, is academic dean at Fairfax Hall, Waynesboro, Virginia.

As the title indicates, here is a study of what happened in Virginia in the first years after the Supreme Court's public school desegregation decision, handed down by Chief Justice Warren, May 17, 1954. That unanimous decision, it will be remembered, combined four cases arising in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia and South Carolina. A fifth companion case arose in the District of Columbia. Thus Virginia was one of only two states of the Solid South "directly and immediately" affected by the reversal of the "separate but equal" doctrine laid down in race relations by the Supreme Court in the 1896 Jim Crow railway car decision of Plessy v. Ferguson.

The part of Virginia so affected was Prince Edward County, since the complaint of Dorothy E. Davis and her fellow petitioners was brought against the school board of that county. The Virginia Constitution and the state school laws enacted pursuant to the state Constitution had historically decreed that the races should be should be taught in separate public schools. This joined the issue squarely with the result that Virginia quickly became the first major arena "for the politics of public school desegregation."

The author makes clear that white public officials of Virginia had no thought whatever of moving "gradually" toward racially integrated public schools. The policy and practice of segregation had, so he writes, "an air of legitimate permanence." And so Virginia was not even remotely thinking about doing what the decision of that momentous Monday put it up to the Old Dominion eventually to do. The way in which the Supreme Court handled the specific cases indicated that the formulation of decrees was a year or more away. This meant there was at least some time in Virginia for getting down to the serious business of planning what to do and how to do it.

Gov. Thomas B. Stanley made the first move when he invited five Negro leaders to his office only seven days after the decision in Washington. These were the editors of Negro papers in Norfolk and Roanoke, president of the all-Negro state teachers association, the president of the Negro state college and the chairman of the legal staff of Virginia's N.A.A.C.P. Since the latter was

an attorney for the Prince Edward County plaintiffs when their case was before the Supreme Court, there was little prospect that the Governor could prevail when he asked his guests to ignore the Supreme Court decision and to call on fellow Negro citizens to accept continued segregation. The five of course declined. They proposed instead that Virginia "assume southern leadership in moving toward integration, and that it do so without discriminating against Negro teachers in job placement." Some of this information, which was supplied by Oliver W. Hill, the lawyer, is representative of facts that the author obtained through correspondence and interview with the principals in his area of inquiry.

The Governor's next move was to assemble the chief executives of all Southern and border states in Richmond—this less than a month after the decision. Looking back at that meeting and the feelings expressed after it, Gates writes: "It is difficult to say whether this was a wake or a war party." Some 18 months later Virginia, again host, proposed "interposition" as the Byrd organization's answer. But a notion of how the sands were running could be had from the fact that the 12 states represented in 1954 had shrunk to only five in 1956. The hard core, in addition to Virginia, consisted of only South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi.

Special attention properly is paid to Prince Edward County where white citizens, rather than face a court order to desegregate by a certain date, abandoned their public schools. Beginning in September, 1959, white children attended what were said to be private schools. Negro parents were told to establish private schools for their children. From that time on most of the county's Negro children received no more formal education until the Prince Edward Free School Association was established in the fall of 1963. Negro parents went to court and step by step won their way up the judiciary. Finally in the case of Griffin et al v. County School Board of Prince Edward County et al, 317 U.S. 218, decided May 25, 1964, the Supreme Court ordered the entry of a decree guaranteeing public education for Negroes in the county. A month later the County Board of Supervisors in compliance voted, 4 to 2, to"reopen public schools," As Gates says, "massive resistance had met its match in the public policy of the United States of America. . . . "

The author was born and reared in the south and inherited a sympathy for the South's viewpoint. This does not keep him from stating his conviction that "the southern caste system is morally wrong, historically anachronistic, and clearly destructive of the best values of individualism on which this nation was built." He finds that the white race also loses, for he writes: "The

southern caste system does not respect the liberties of individuals in either caste; it merely imposes the racial bias of orthodox southern whites on all individuals in both castes."

Gates is unimpressed by the white southern hint that "Communist agitators" influenced the Supreme Court decision. He puts no more stock in the attempt to discredit the ruling by making much of the footnote that refers "generally" to the work of "that Swedish sociologist." He invites his readers to reflect on these words:

Our individualism differs from all others because it embraces these great ideals: that while we build our society upon the attainment of the individual, we shall safeguard to every individual an equality of opportunity to take that position in the community to which his intelligence, character, ability, and ambition entitle him; that we shall keep the social solution free from the frozen strata of classes; that we shall stimulate effort to each individual to achievement; that through an enlarging sense of responsibility and understanding we shall assist him to this attainment; while he in turn must stand up to the emery wheel of competition.

This all-out endorsement of equal opportunity for all peoples comes not from some "Communist agitator" or "Swedish sociologist." These are words from page 9 of Herbert Hoover's "American Individualism," published in 1922, more than 40 years ago!

The author's own attitude is summed up in this one sentence: "The caste system, which the southern white supremacist is conserving, has no place in a country that presumes to stand for the recognition of individual values." But it should be said that these convictions are stated in the final pages. More than 200 pages of his study are clinically impartial. He sets out to be objective and he is. This book does not cover much territory or a long expanse of time, yet it is a significant piece of research and literature on the major domestic problem of our era.—Invine Dilliard, Princeton University.

Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection. By JOEL B. GROSSMAN. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965. Pp. xii, 228. \$6.75.)

According to Joel Grossman, the best explanation of judicial decision-making behavior lies in the conception of the judicial role which each judge holds. And that conception is largely a product of socialization. Selection systems provide cues to the qualities considered desirable in a judge and serve as reinforcing agents in socialization for the judicial role.

Using this framework as a point of departure, Professor Grossman sets out to examine the role of a "political interest group" (PIG) in altering the policies governing the recruitment of Federal judges. The PIG chosen for analysis is the American Bar Association and in particular its Commit-

tee on Federal Judiciary. Specifically he desires to know: what did the ABA find unsatisfactory in earlier procedures; what is the interest of lawyers in judicial selection; how were the ABA's claims made and received; what changes were effectuated; and what consequences can be associated with the alterations made?

In pursuing answers to these questions, the author's tone is reasoned, he takes no extreme positions, and his writing is consistently of high quality. Moreover, answers are provided in some detail. The ABA has always believed in its right and duty to participate actively in the judicial selection process. Lawyers prefer "good judges" to "bad judges" and bar participation will increase the probability of the former. The claims of the ABA were made through various committees operating with local bar groups prior to 1946; and by the Committee on Federal Judiciary operating through the Attorney General's office from 1946 to the present. The primary change accomplished was the "institutionalization" of the Committee's role in the selection process—a role that assures the Committee of the chance to be heard on most candidates for federal judicial office prior to formal nomination.

As a detailed account of the ABA Committee on Federal Judiciary, its stated aims, its successes and its techniques, Lawyers and Judges constitutes a valuable addition to the literature. The book contains a good deal of useful and interesting information which may not have come to the attention of political scientists in general. This reviewer found Bernie Segal and the New York Times of particular interest in the context of Professor Grossman's investigation. The fact that Segal was chairman of the Committee on Federal Judiciary from 1956-1962 creates a problem for Grossman's analysis. For Segal's tenure coincided with the period in which the Committee's influence reached its zenith. During that time, press references to "Mr. Segal's Committee" were not infrequent. This development resulted from the combination of the chairman's formal power (primarily based on his control of communications between the Committee and the Attorney General) and his personal capabilities. Segal's obvious political "savvy," his ability to establish close and effective relationships with the Attorney General and the most influential segment of the American pressindeed, his effectiveness with all with whom he came in contact, are reasons for caution in accepting some of Grossman's conclusions. The institutionalization of the role of the Committee in selecting federal judges seemed assured under Segal. But given lesser men, as seems almost inevitable, institutionalization could come "unglued" or significantly diminish in importance.

As for the New York Times, the support which

it gave the Committee under Segal is merely illustrative of the support received from the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Herald Tribune, and other influential papers. In abetting the Committee the editorial writers were not merely sounding views that happened to coincide in content and timing with those of the Committee. Grossman presents evidence that Segal not only had direct access to the editorial chiefs and others on the great metropolitan dailies but he also exerted some influence. This is dramatically reflected in his persuading the Times to oppose Irving Ben Cooper for a District Judgeship in New York after Cooper had been "heartily endorsed" on the same paper's editorial pages. These and other episodes suggest that the institutionalization of the Committee's role may depend, in part, on the ability of the Bar and its representatives to mobilize other PIGs in its behalf. Such support is enhanced in importance by the obvious reluctance of many senators to give the organized Bar a larger voice in the recruitment of federal judges.

Having mentioned some of the attractive features of Lawyers and Judges, one may be forgiven a critical comment. I do not intend to chastise Professor Grossman for not writing a different book. I do mean to suggest that Lawyers and Judges might have been a more satisfying and more significant book if it had included a more explicit statement of the theory underlying the author's analysis. A theory of judicial role choice has only an oblique relationship to an analysis of the American Bar Association's role in selecting federal judges.

More attention might also have been given to explaining the "choice behavior" of the Committee on Federal Judiciary. That would have required, among other things, a more penetrating analysis of motivational factors. The author generally neglects to go behind the public statements of the ABA that its goals are "better judges"judges who are "politically non partisan" or judges who possess "prior trial experience." Of course, the ABA and its Committee want judges who can be so characterized. But why? Does the Committee on Federal Judiciary derive some mysterious satisfaction out of enforcing such standards? Or does it and the parent ABA believe that such factors point to future behavior of a desired kind? In short, what is the theory underlying the action of the ABA and its Committee in trying to influence selection processes? The author's brief attention to the apparent policy implications of the ABA position on anti-Supreme Court measures in 1937 and 1958 is too brief and soon forgotten in the avalanche of detail regarding the "better judge" philosophy.

The author's approval of an advisory and con-

sulting role for the ABA is as reasonable as his opposition to allowing the group a veto on federal judicial nominations.—S. Sidney Ulmer, *University of Kentucky*.

Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process. By Herbert Jacob. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965. Pp. vii, 215. \$5.00; \$2.95 paper.)

On a three-point developmental scale (traditional, conventional, behavioral) of approaches to the study of judiciaries, this is a conventional book. As compared to Abraham's The Judicial Process (a traditional work), Jacob's text provides a more realistic and politically oriented discussion of the American system of courts. What Jacob purports to have done is to extend Jack Peltason's analysis of a decade ago (Federal Courts in the Political Process) to state courts and to all the participants in the judicial process. "[M]y purpose," he states, "is to describe the courts, not the law. . . . I have emphasized what traditional scholars often neglect" (p. v). Given this primary objective, it is not surprising that the strength of the book lies in four excellent chapters (4, 5, 7, 9) on private lawyers and their organizations; government lawyers; juries, groups, and the reporting of judicial proceedings; and trials, negotiations, and settlements. In the latter chapter, the discussion dealing with bail and prosecution (pp. 152-7) is exceptionally lucid, creative, and authoritative.

"A secondary purpose of this book," the author continues, "is to integrate the vast body of reresearch available on the courts so that we may better realize what we know and what we still need to learn" (pp. v-vi). But his statement (p. vi) that legal scholars and sociologists have done "most" of the research on the judiciary is true only in a quantitative sense; and his assertion (p. 207) that political scientists have made only legal analyses (and only of the Supreme Court, to boot) comes somewhat too late. It was perfectly fair for Peltason to say this a decade ago; but for Jacob to echo the charge today betokens a singular lack of appreciation on his part for the merits of much of the research upon which is based the writing of substantial portions of his text.

Perhaps Jacob's apparently selective perception of the research literature helps to explain why the remainder of his book (which discusses how judges make decisions: judicial policy-making, judges, court organization, and appeals) lacks the punch of the four chapters that discuss the milieu of judicial decision-making. Given the author's professedly political orientation, it is disappointing to discover passim so much traditional thinking, as well as traditional conceptualism.

Throughout he employs a dichotomy between what he calls policy decisions ("guideposts for future actions") and norm-enforcement decisions ("aimed at the instant case alone"). This same dichotomy was characteristic of the thinking and writing of Ernst Freund; and although Freund was a meticulous craftsman who maintained a very high standard of legal scholarship, the use of this kind of conceptualism by political scientists today does not advance political analysis one whit beyond the understanding of judicial decisionmaking made possible by Freund's work over half a century ago. Equally outmoded is the suggestion (p. 22) that "In human and monetary terms the losses resulting from criminality that remains unchecked by legal action are staggering." How can legal action either prevent or redress the losses from crime?

If factual errors were random, it would be ungenerous for a reviewer to mention them. Here, however, they are symptomatic of this book's basic problem: the author's differential interests in his subject. In Chapter 8 on court organization, we confront the astounding observation that "courts exist for custom and patent appeals and for claims against the federal government . . . [these courts] have original jurisdiction over their matters, and appellate tribunals treat their decisions in the same manner as decisions by district courts" (p. 135). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has, as its very name implies prima facie, exclusively appellate jurisdiction; and the "appellate tribunals" to which Jacob referswhich in context could mean none other than the federal Courts of Appeals—consist of the United States Supreme Court alone; the C.C.P.A. and Court of Claims are at the level not of the U.S. district courts but rather that of the Courts of Appeals. Two pages later the author states that the Supreme Court denies jurisdiction in threequarters of its docketed cases: the correct proportion is over 90%; and this is hardly a trivial difference, because if he were right, the Court would be deciding on the merits almost 600 cases per term, which would be triple the contemporary output. Similarly, there are various instances of what can perhaps best be described as forgetfulness on the author's part. Some of these are possibly trivial, as when he overlooks probate courts, inter alia, in his endeavor to discuss structural specialization in state court organization (p. 142). But other instances are more serious; three pages later one encounters a sweeping generalization, evidently compatible with the historical premises of Thomas Carlyle, that "Almost all administrative reforms that have modernized the American judiciary in the twentieth century can be attributed to the efforts of two men"-Taft and Vanderbilt. For an author whose orientation

is so avowedly political, F.D.R.'s efforts (resulting in the establishment of the Administrative Office of United States Courts, the revised retirement system for federal judges, and related products of the "Court-packing" episode) might have seemed relevant.

The value of this book is not enhanced by the author's penchant for invoking such spooks as "the quality of justice" (e.g., pp. 64, 65) and "the public interest" (p. 166; but cf. p. 199). His style also exhibits both an unusually high level of tolerance for clichés ("the horse-and-buggy past" versus "the contemporary space age": the "labyrinthine" environment in which judges work; the "oracular verdict" of juries) and a predilection for preaching ("left with unremunerative, petty legal jobs, some solo practitioners engage in unethical conduct and thus bring dishonor to the entire judicial process" [p. 66] and "existing court structures are backed by powerful forces who have a high stake in the status quo" [pp. 143-4]). O Bentley, where is thy victory? Realism, where is thy sting?

In his attempts to explain various empirical phenomena, Jacob offers many imputed reasons which might better have been stated (if at all) as hypotheses. "It was undoubtedly not the intention of the writers of the provision [for public trials] that trials provide public entertainment" (p. 126). (How can Jacob know this? The "writers" wrote at a time when public hangings did function as a form of public entertainment.) We are told (p. 136) that litigants who seek appeals do so "believing that the judge made prejudicial errors that robbed them of victory." (This is a most formal reason, strictly in accord with traditional legal theory, which may occasionally coincide with empirical reality; but it is hard to see how Jacob can hope to construct a political analysis of litigant behavior out of fragments of theory such as this.) The chief judge of a federal court of appeals "changes the composition of the panels frequently so that permanent cliques within the court cannot emerge" (p. 170). "In recent years the most spectacular policy decisions have not been made by state supreme courts but by the United States Supreme Court. This is because federal legislation has become more extensive and therefore more cases can be brought to the federal court system" (p. 174; emphasis added). "Many federal district judges in the South enjoy life tenure and should therefore be immune to provincial pressures from their localities" (p. 185; emphasis added). The questions raised by Supreme Court justices at oral argument "seek to clarify difficult problems that bother particular justices in their contemplation of the case" (p. 176)—and as an illustration, Jacob offers (then, Solicitor General) Reed's sandbagging by Sutherland in the Rathbun case as a demonstration of how the intellectual interchange between court and counsel had clarified the legal principle: if the President could remove Federal Trade Commissioners, then the Court would have to concede his right to remove judges of the Court of Claims. Jacob describes this egregious dictum as the point on which the "decision in the case turned."

Oh, my fur and whiskers! Has anyone seen a tardy white rabbit scamper by?—Glendon Schubert, Michigan State University.

The Republican Party in American Politics. By Charles O. Jones (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1965. Pp. 153. \$1.50.)

Professor Jones writes this paperback volume in the Macmillan Government in the Modern World series as a Republican and as a political scientist. Although he has profited from the insights gained by his experiences in the Republican Party, readers may be assured that he has written with a detached objectivity worthy of the best political science.

Jones presents an introductory work, with the most essential facts about the minority party and its characteristics as the opposition, for undergraduate students. He intentionally asks more questions than he answers and thus provides the basis for meaningful discussions in undergraduate classes.

The most significant new contributions in this volume are in the chapter on Republican policy-making in Congress. Those most interested in this subject will want to read Jones' book, published almost simultaneously, Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee, Rutgers University Press.

This book went to press before complete analyses could be made of the 1964 election and before Ray Bliss became Republican National Chairman. However, the facts Jones presents make clear reasons for Goldwater's debacle and the necessity for the reorientation which Bliss has begun.—WILDER CRANE, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy. By Charles O. Lerche, Jr. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. 324, \$6.95.)

The relentless process of change which has unsettled the South and unleashed forces in domestic politics which are familiar to all of us is also drastically altering the South's traditional position on foreign policy issues. That position, at least since Woodrow Wilson, has generally been internationalist. We recall that Franklin Roosevelt looked to Southern conservatives rather than to mid-Western progressives when the time came

to move away from the restrictions of neutrality laws and isolationist doctrine. The traditional pattern of responsible Southern internationalism held firm in the period immediately following World War II. Thus, when the Marshall Plan came to a vote in the House of Representatives in 1948 Southern Congressmen proved twice as favorable toward aid to Western Europe as the House as a whole; there were only 74 negative votes in the House on that occasion and less than 16% of them were cast by Southern representatives, Professor Lerche reports.

Today, by way of contrast, the South has become the only major region whose Congressmen cast a majority of votes in opposition to foreign aid. Southern internationalism, as espoused by Woodrow Wilson, Cordell Hull and Walter George, has lost heavily since 1957 to a brand of neo-isolationism which Professor Lerche labels "unilateralism."

In this book the author seeks to penetrate the myths of Southern politics in order to understand the reasons for this momentous and ominous shift in Southern political behavior. The approach is basically quantitative, empirical and objective; it is, in Lerche's words, a "macro-political" study aimed at an "overview" of the entire South. In the process, the voting records of 126 Congressmen from 14 states are analyzed in depth during the period 1953-1962. (Lerche's South, incidentally, includes West Virginia, Kentucky and Oklahoma, as well as the eleven states of the Confederacy.) The author constructs six distinct positions on foreign policy issues, each with its own patterns of consistency. He also examines relevant economic and social data for each of the 126 Congressional Districts; this is done in great detail. From this emerge "profiles" of several Congressional types.

The assumptions on which the study is made are stated explicitly: first, the foreign policy position of any particular Congressman is determined more by the state of mind he senses among his constituents than by any other factor; second, the way a district stands on foreign policy issues is in some direct or indirect way a function of the socio-economic changes which are at work among its people. When all of the data have been collected, analyzed and correlated, the author faces the central problem of meaning. It is very much to Lerche's credit that he faces the issue squarely. Rigorous application of quantitative techniques had carried him a long way toward a potentially significant interpretation of the changing South. Was there, though, a thread which would link the great changes taking place in the South to the international outlook of Southern Congressmen?

Lerche's answer was for me the most interesting part of a continuously fascinating study. The Southern politician who votes as a unilateralist appears as the spokesman for and a manipulator of a mass unease which permeates the poor white stratum of Southern society. "The new unilateralism of many Southerners is less a judgment on the nature and course of world affairs," the author concludes, "than it is a reflection of their own dismay at what is happening to them at home."

If there was a precise connection between the empirical analysis of 126 Congressional districts and this final all-important generalization, it was not made clear. What is clear is that Lerche has had the courage (and the good judgment) to move beyond the narrow limits of the empirical data in offering his broader thesis concerning the foreign policy implications of the new political activism in the South. His willingness to use intuitive judgment for his most significant finding is equalled by his diligence in hard quantitative analysis. Professor Lerche studied in depth the voting patterns of 126 Southern Congressional Districts. He also lived in the South, read and discussed and observed broadly, and he developed a feeling for "this perplexing region" which, he warns, "remains as mysterious as ever."

I do not agree. Thanks to Professor Lerche's resourcefulness and sound judgment the South is less mysterious than it otherwise would have been. There will be many, along with me, who will find this to be the most illuminating study of Southern politics since V. O. Key's monumental contribution.—John C. Donovan, Bowdoin College.

Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona. By Roy D. Morey. (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1965. Pp. 135. \$4.00.)

One of the most interesting features of this small volume is the successful combination of the historical-comparative analysis methodology with quantitative analysis. As the author notes in his preface, "Lest anyone be misled, it is not my belief that all knowledge about politics can be reduced to a numerical product. Quantitative methods can be valuable, however, if they are used with prudence and moderation." Morey seems to have found a happy combination. In addition, his writing style makes this study easily comprehensible for the intended lay reader.

The format is predicated on a tri-partite division. Part I—"The Setting" succinctly develops the constitutional background of executive-legislative relationships in Arizona as well as the political setting of the forty-eighth state. Part II—"The Evidence" carefully examines the relationships of the Governor of Arizona and the state legislature, including an analysis of those traditional topics such as the veto, messages and special sessions, the impact of administration, the

informal tools and the Governor's role as "chief legislator." Part III presents a detailed case study of the efforts of Governor Fannin to secure the enactment of his program in 1962. This latter section reflects the personal experience of the author who served on Governor Fannin's staff as a Fellow in State Government of the National Center for Education in Politics during 1961–1962.

While the study is limited to a single state, the author's criticism of the tendency of state and local government text books to generalize into error is well substantiated. Morey's discussion of the budgetary process in Arizona demonstrates clearly the inherent danger of generalization from mere comparative analysis of statutory or constitutional provision. In short, the executive budget suggested by the formal provisions of Arizona law fails to materialize in actual practice.

Special problems relating to Arizona and based upon the traditions and growing pains of what Morey calls, the "baby state" are of real interest to outsiders as a contemporary example of historic problems for most of the country. Only occasional references are made to other states but the contrasts and peculiar problems of Arizona are well drawn.

Many traditional political practices which affect executive-legislative relationships in most of the states are not duplicated in Arizona. The assumptions made by many political scientists of both the formal and informal devices which a governor may employ to influence the legislative process become inapplicable in Morey's study.

This analysis includes some predictions for the future of Arizona. Morey makes the interesting point that the Supreme Court decisions on reapportionment will assist in the development of a two-party system in the state by strengthening the Republican metropolitan areas of Tucson and Phoenix, an unusual phenomenon in American politics.

Despite its geographic limitations, this study does suggest that similar efforts in other states will contribute significantly to our comprehension of state and local government.—J. H. BINDLEY, Knox College.

The Federal Government Service, 2nd ed. EDITED BY WALLACE S. SAYRE (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965. Pp. viii, 245. \$5.95 Clothbound, \$2.95 Paperbound).

In 1954 the American Assembly published *The Federal Government Service* under the editorship of Wallace Sayre as a source book for participants in the Sixth American Assembly. The present volume is a revision of that work under the same editorship with the same authors of individual chapters. Included in the volume are essays by

Herbert Kaufman tracing, historically, the growth and development of the federal personnel system, by Herman Somers describing the relationship of the bureaucracy to the President and Congress, by Harvey Mansfield describing and analyzing the impact of patronage on the bureaucracy, by Frederick Mosher explaining some of the "sticky" problems with respect to the maintenance of quality in the system, and by Everett Reimer spelling out some of the problems of maintaining a high quality personnel management system. As a source book the original volume certainly served as valuable background material for Assembly participants particularly insofar as it presented the mature judgment of a group of eminent scholars and practitioners in the field of public administration. The appearance of the second edition is somewhat puzzling. There are no major revisions in empirical data presented by the authors nor are there any significant changes in evaluation of those aspects of the federal service dealt with by the authors. Kaufman has updated his historical section and other authors have drawn upon recent events for illustrative materials, but no major revision has been undertaken.

In part the lack of genuine revision is justifiable in that the growth, relationships and problems of the federal system have not changed drastically in the past ten years nor has our understanding of them changed substantially. On the other hand there are a number of features which might have been seriously reexamined. Professor Somers' essay on relationships between the Executive and Congress is written with a strong commitment to a concept of a monolithic unified Executive and Congress and with the view that the segmented autonomous subunits in both branches of government are deleterious to the maintenance of quality of the government service. However justified Somers may be in wishing for some semblance of order in our political system, professional civil servants are as much a part of the fragmentation which has taken place in our system as their political superiors. The refreshing and otherwise very sophisticated essay by Harvey Mansfield on the impact of patronage on the service is somewhat hampered by his failure to draw distinctions between patronage in connection with high level policy appointments and pockets of patronage in lower levels within the service. Frederick Mosher has raised some really important questions with respect to quality in the service and the image problem. Although he makes some reference to the Kilpatrick, Cummings and Jennings study he might, in fact, have used it as a backdrop for his entire essay in view of the immediacy of the problems suggested in that volume with respect to the federal service.

On the whole this volume is well written as one

would have expected from the group of authors, but neither the authors nor the editor have adequately justified in my mind the need for a second edition.—ROBERT FRIEDMAN, University of Michigan.

Where Science and Politics Meet. By JEROME B. WIESNER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Pp. viii, 302, \$6.95.)

Jerome B. Wiesner, a communications engineer and executive over scientific and technical affairs, became science adviser to President John F. Kennedy in 1961. He served for three years then returned to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as Dean of the School of Science.

By the time he joined the White House staff the position of science adviser—legally the job is Special Assistant for Science and Technology but few ever use this term—had become the most influential post in the government for the shaping of programs in research and development. Two predecessors and the firm demands of presidential responsibility for strategic programs had made the central office strong. The President's Science Advisory Committee and the Office of Science and Technology had gained a say in both large and small decisions of what research should be done and in what scope. The adviser was chairman of the first and director of the second.

In this book Mr. Wiesner published the lectures and statements he uttered during his tenure as presidential adviser. He adds some articles and a report on disarmament, with which he became involved as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee before he became adviser to the President.

One should not expect an Assistant to the President to reveal anything that isn't available in news, journals, and government publications. Although Mr. Wiesner has done his best to introduce each section and to edit out the duplication, one should, indeed, question why such a "nonbook" should be read at all. This one has some nuggets divided widely by the usual official statements. These new items could have been written in a new and small book. Saving a reader's time, however, is hardly the custom in this time of the collected volume.

In pages 34-40, in a lecture delivered at Johns Hopkins, Mr. Wiesner gives a brilliant summary of the development of science and technology which makes the social (and political) consequences so critical. The truly significant bases for social change are not in end-uses but in the "understanding of atomic structure, a theory of the chemical bond, an understanding of atomic nuclei, the major advances in fundamental biological phenomena, particularly at a cellular and sub-cellular level, and the development of in-

formation theory and feedback and control theory." Then he thinks aloud about the proper percentage of the national product that should be spent for research and development. He suggests a budget for more research in some fields that have been neglected relatively, up to now. These fields are education, environmental health, civilian technology, natural resources, desalinization, oceanography, and the technical problems of new nations. He also thinks the United States should spend more on such under-supported fields of basic research as chemistry, social science, communications science, low energy nuclear physics, mathematics, and the engineering sciences.

In the rest of the book Mr. Wiesner rewards a patient reader with an unconscious self-portrait of the best educated, best purposed type of scientist-engineer-political executive who controls federal policy for research and development. A credo for the whole group can almost be constructed from the expression of any one.

Mr. Wiesner, for example, knows that a single department of science, long advocated by the more naive, would be a disadvantage to science as a whole. Science is much too pervasive in too many programs to be isolated. He thinks basic research should be supported for its own value in the increase of knowledge, but development should be started only when there is a clear need for the product. The choice of what to study in basic research must be left to the scientists.

He accepts the present machinery for making grants knowing that it is filled with interlocking persons and institutions. "It is the product of evolution in a permissive atmosphere.... But,

from the point of view of scientific accomplishment, there is great danger that much would be lost if highly structured arrangements were substituted for those we now have." Universities should administer government funds in more detail than now.

He believes that help should be given universities that have a potential for excellence in graduate education and research. But he also believes "that it would be disastrous to the scientific enterprise if standards other than quality were made the primary basis for the allocation of money for support of basic research." So the government should build "centers of research excellence." These centers later might become competitive for grants for basic research.

One can find in these papers a broad, humane, thoughtful public official. One cannot find much revelation of the politics of governmental science. There is no discussion of such big questions as the decision to expand space research and development at what cost to other programs. There is no discussion of the centers of power in federal science and no mention of the small number of "ins" who are said to control. There is no mention of the distortions in education and economy that may have come from the formula that money should go to where the excellence is, and no mention of how excellence is determined. There is no discussion of the question that ought to be closest to the heart of a top political excutive. Is there any better way to get more men with the broad training and the broad social concern that all executives in science should have?-JAMES L. McCAMY, University of Wisconsin.

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FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE University of Maryland

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Democracy in Germany. By FRITZ ERLER (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 139, \$3.75.)

Of the many German politicians who lecture in foreign capitals, Fritz Erler, the SPD's "shadow" foreign minister and chairman of its parliamentary party, has an outstanding knack for leaving ripples of afterthoughts in his wake. Known as the Bundestag's outstanding debater, he has also this year been the first German Socialist to lecture in Franco Spain, where the frankness of his criticism has been as much noticed as it has on other occasions in Paris. In this little volume, based on the Jodidi Lectures at Harvard, Erler has sought to assess certain aspects of evolving German institutions from a perspective in which the criteria of both the German actor and the American audience are joined.

The result is an extremely readable little book in which quite objective assessments are interspersed with the policy preferences to which the author has become committed as a result of his political roles. One of the more interesting chapters is devoted to a discussion of the revived German armed forces. Here Erler seeks to meet residual mistrust by stressing the positive side of the build-up of internal and external control mechanisms on the military, and concludes that these are "now in keeping with a democratic society and are under proper control of a civil government and a freely elected parliament." In another interesting chapter Erler seeks to convey to an American audience just what it is that has happened to the SPD since the Bad Godesberg program, and here the terms and concepts employed come very close to those employed by political scientists. Erler's main aim however is to win wider confidence for the thesis that German democratic institutions are this time here to stay and that they actually operate in the spirit of a pluralistic society.—Arnold J. Heidenheimer, University of Florida.

The French Civil Service. By Roger Gregorre. (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Science, 1964. Pp. xii, 363. \$8.00.)

This work is a revised and enlarged English version of a study originally published in French as La Fonction Publique in 1954. The author, a member of Council of State, was, after the War, a close collaborator of Michel Debré and as such participated in the reform of the Civil Service which led to the creation of the National School of Administration (E.N.A.) in 1946. For eight years he then served as Director of the newly established Civil Service Directorate attached to the Prime Minister's Office. The French Civil Service gives us the observations and prescriptions of a senior civil servant who has devoted much of his career to reforming the French Civil Service, attempting in particular to make it more democratic in its recruitment and less rigid in its regulation of career streams.

In his introduction the author states his intention to break with a purely legal approach but warns that his analysis might still be disappointing to political scientists and to sociologists. To anyone hoping to find here a study in the nature of those by Crozier on French Civil Servants, this

work will indeed be frustrating; it is a detailed catalogue of rules which govern the French administrative system. I admit a certain fondness for the exact presentation of laws and decrees in the full regalia of their serial number, year, month and day of printing; such as . . . "the Decree of 9 August 1953, which took effect on 1 September 1953 and was amended by a decree of 26 December of the same year . . ." or "Decree No. 62-805 of 17 July 1962 and No. 62-114 of 1 October 1962 (obtained) that on the following 1 December the minimum salary, which had been raised to 3.153 francs as from 1 October 1962, would be 3.665 new francs. . ." But this fondness should not be taxed too much.

The author describes the various categories of Civil Servants; presents in one of the better chapters the French conception of the Civil Service, giving proper importance to status, security and formation of closed groups; he presents the system of recruitment at various levels of the service, but, strangely enough, is far too brief on the National School of Administration. I doubt the uninformed reader will realize that there are two separate entrance examinations, one for students and one for civil servants. That the segregation of civil servants from students has not produced the effects desired should have been added reason for presenting more fully the system devised in 1946 and for analyzing the reasons explaining its failure to obtain the desired inservice promotion from middle to upper ranks. The reader is introduced to the complicated French system of promotion and rating; to the rules regarding pay, pension, social benefits, leaves of absence, secondment and right to collective bargaining.

Throughout his analysis the author makes constant and welcome comparisons with British and American legislation and to a lesser but still large extent with the German, Belgian and Swiss systems. These comparisons give some air to an analysis which tends to be suffocating and often help to clarify French regulations by setting them between opposites; for example the comparison between the U.S., the British and the French conceptions of the relationship between civil servant and work-position is very clearly presented.

Regretfully, the author did not draw much on his extensive knowledge of the French Civil Service to describe actual situations and practices. For example it would have been interesting to know how Communists are in fact barred from sensitive positions or from taking civil service examinations notwithstanding laws preventing discrimination on political grounds; or how many and what kind of civil servants take advantage of the rules favoring their running for elections and

sitting in parliament. The serious problems created by civil servants serving on the personal cabinets of ministers are only briefly analyzed and lack illustrations. The disaffection for the Civil Service due to low pay could easily have been documented; the evidence is readily available on the quality of candidates sitting the E.N.A. or Polytechnique examinations, and on the number of them leaving school or the civil service after graduation.

The clear and logical ordering of chapters, sections and subsections in the table of contents compensates, to a limited extent, for the absence of an index.—J. A. LAPONCE, The University of British Columbia.

Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia. By Sidney I. Ploss. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 312. \$6.50.)

This is a disappointing and irritating book. Dr. Ploss, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, is a Kremlinologist whose main thesis here is that one-man decision making is rarely present in the Kremlin, From 1953-1963, Ploss says, one could single out three distinct groupings of political forces: authoritarian centralists (Malenkov, Molotov, Suslov, Kozlov et al.); centrists (Khrushchev and his followers); and reformers (Khrushchev and his followers). To illustrate his point, he attempts to show how these groups clashed over agricultural policy. The book, however, is not about agricultural problems. Professor Ploss states that he has used no specialized agricultural journals or newspapers since his main interest is policy-making among Soviet leaders. In effect, he read all the central party and state organs from 1953-1963, took from them most of the major references to agriculture and then, it seems to me, tried to fit the speeches and proclamations into his master plan.

Even so, one would be grateful if Professor Ploss had indeed proved that the behavior of Soviet leaders is usually consistent with their place in his spectrum of political groupings. He does not do so. Take, for example, the case of Matskevich, presently Minister of Agriculture of the USSR. When we first encounter him in 1955 Matskevich (101) has just become Minister of Agriculture, a victory for the Khrushchev forces. But power apparently corrupted Matskevich so by 1959 (177) we find him an "authoritarian." Thus the liberal reader is pleased when Matskevich is replaced by "M. A. Ol'shanskiy (205), an agricultural scientist, which foreshadowed the ministry's conversion to a scientific research establishment, avowedly on the initiative of Khrushchev." Poor Khrushchev, however, just didn't know how to separate the conservatives from the reformers for in 1962 "Ol'shanskiy of the

(257) generally 'conservative' body of agricultural scientists was replaced . . . by a utilitarian party boss, Pysin," thus marking another blow by Khrushchev against the conservatives. To some observers, these episodes might suggest that other factors, i.e., performance in office, personality clashes, the state of agriculture might have had something to do with the administrative shifts. Professor Ploss, however, steadfastly attributes every change to the clash of reformers with conservatives.

Throughout, one finds faulty logic. Ovechkin, a writer on agriculture, in 1952 praises the practice of raising rank-and-file farmers to the position of kolkhoz chairman. Khrushchev says the same thing, almost ten years later, and this is used as one proof that Ovechkin is Khrushchev's "agent." Izvestiya attacks money scandals in the Ministry of Agriculture four months before a big meeting on agriculture and Ploss assures us (161) that these exposures were part of Khrushchev's plans to discredit the authoritarian centralists. A 1958 party decree (138) condemning Stalinist practices in the regulation of music becomes, in the author's interpretation, a veiled attack against the authoritarian centralists' agricultural views. How, one wishes to shout, does Ploss know these things?

The author's treatment of the problem of the conversion of collective farms into state farms is typical of his whole approach. Khrushchev, we are told, struggled mightily to stop these amalgamations which were (217) a pet project of the authoritarian centralists, Suslov and Kozlov. Nowhere in this whole book is there one quotation from these latter gentlemen to substantiate Ploss' view. Instead, Matskevich (176), we learn, is their spokesman. In a December, 1959 speech, "Indeed Matskevich even advocated the merger of economically weak kolkhozes with strong kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This, of course, was sharply at odds with the viewpoint which Khrushchev had expressed at the 21st party Congress." First, the use of the word "even" indicates that Ploss may not know that party policy from 1954 on had generally approved of the conversion of some weak kolkhozes into sovkhozes. Second, Ploss unaccountably fails to note Matskevich's opening remarks in this very same speech. For Matskevich directly quotes Khrushchev's words at the 21st party Congress and agrees with the former Soviet leader that the two forms of agriculture, sovkhoz and kolkhoz will develop separately, but ultimately will merge into one form of "communist property." Further on, in the same speech, Matskevich (authoritarian centralist that he is) declares that the state farms are too undemocratic in their administrative structure to serve as a model for agricultural organization under communism. Fourth, Leonid I. Brezhnev,

in his March, 1965, speech, without specifically mentioning Khrushchev's name, indicated that one of Khrushchev's main faults was the excessive conversion of collective into state farms. Fifth, Brezhnev and Kosygin, having denounced the Khrushchev policy, have now placed Matskevich, whom Ploss would have us believe strongly favored the conversion policy, in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture.

In short, the book is both a poor example of Kremlinology and an inaccurate guide to Soviet agricultural problems.—Allen B. Ballard, Jr., City University of New York.

Political Succession in the USSR. By Myron Rush. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xv, 223. \$5.95.)

For twentieth century autocracies the problem of transferring the mantle of authority from one leader to another in some kind of orderly fashion has been a peculiarly troublesome one, given the powerful, almost exclusive position of the leader in these systems and their rejection of tradition, their revolutionary attack on legitimacy, the absence of offices of authority, etc. In the case of the Soviet Union the question seemed largely an academic one for the space of nearly three decades, while Stalin exercised his monopoly of political power. In the last dozen years the significance of the question has been brought home to us all, prompting some—and Myron Rush among them-to conclude that, though it may not be the Achilles heel by which the Soviet system is to be destroyed, the succession problem is at least the source of recurrent, inevitable crises.

Rush's brief inquiry into the problem is provocative but also disappointing. He begins in a summary, even casual fashion, sketching some common-sense observations on the nature of successions and relating his observations in an equally summary way to the leadership changes following the deaths of Lenin and Stalin. The conclusion that he draws is that it is the peculiar weakness of the Soviet system that it can function effectively only when headed by a powerful, perhaps autocratic leader, yet the system formally rejects such a role, obliging each new head to win acceptance through a long and probably bitter contest. Though in both successions it was the party secretary who was victorious, it was not the office itself which mattered but simply the opportunities it afforded for competing more effectively. Rush speculates that the party Central Committee might seize the initiative in a succession crisis, naming a single candidate to top posts in both party and government, but he rejects the possibility at once as requiring the Central Committee to place itself in bondage to a new master at the moment when it has been freed from the old.

In like manner he dismisses the possibility of an aging leader designating his successor in a way which might be made effective.

The succession is likely thus to develop as a relatively unregulated conflict among competing interests and among ambitious candidates, a type of conflict, experience indicates, which may continue for a considerable time. It is Rush's principal argument that this conflict introduces a new element in Soviet politics, calling for a new interpretative theory. And the theory Rush suggests is what he terms a "cyclical theory," by which he means that we ought not to expect the Soviet system to function in a stable way or with consistent policies but rather in phases which repeat themselves in the following order: "a stable phase of personal rule in which it is difficult for the disaffection that exists in Soviet society to gain political expression; an unstable phase of succession crisis, in which dissident groups within the regime have an improved opportunity to influence politics; and a final phase, in which either the crisis is resolved, resulting in some modification of the regime and a new stability, or, what is conceivable but improbable, the dissolution of the Soviet regime." The theory is of limited value. Rush agrees, for it suggests no particular strategy for the West but only the urgency of recognizing the "variability of the Soviet regime" and hence the necessity for flexible strategies. If a more direct conclusion can be drawn, it is that the second phase is a paralyzing one during which political energies are devoted chiefly to resolving the succession crisis, leadership is able to perform only an "arbitral function," and the system can do little more than mark time.

Given the modest nature of his interpretative theory, Rush is forced back in his exploration of the Khrushchev succession to the uncertainties of personalities, offices, and policies. Among the questions he examines are: the degree to which Khrushchev manipulated offices beneath him to prepare for the succession, thereby weakening his own position; the effort Khrushchev made to replace Stalin's system of mutual surveillance by competing institutions with his own system of reliance on the party machine exclusively, its loyalty to be assured by deliberate segmentation of the machine and by rotation in office; the roles of figures such as Brezhnev, the "heir-presumptive," Podgorny, the "counter-heir," Kirilenko, the balancing figure in the party's Russian Bureau, etc. The conclusions Rush draws are frankly speculative as well as suggestive.

The study is disappointing in its failure to explore the ongoing features of the Soviet system as they may be affected by the succession problem. To what extent, for example, might we anticipate that the stimulus provided by the

succession crisis to the formation of effective intra-party fractions might cut away at the party's traditional monolithic principle? Or, again, might not the form of collective leadership, characteristic of the leadership succession conflict, move the Soviet Union toward an oligarchic system? Or, more broadly, might it be useful to suggest a "developmental" rather than "cyclical" theory of Soviet politics with the expectation that succession crises may serve as the principal focal points for transformation of the traditional Soviet system, which in turn may modify the pattern of future successions?—Robert S. Sullivant, University of Missouri at St. Louis.

Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries.

By Nils Andrén. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964. Pp. 241. 28 Sw.kr.)

Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits. By Morris Davis. (Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1963. Pp. 136. 28.75 D.kr.)

Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress. By VINCENT H. MALMSTRÖM. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Searchlight, 1965. Pp. 128. \$1.45.)

Iceland: Reluctant Ally. By Donald E. Nuech-Terlein. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961. Pp. xiii, 213. \$4.50.)

When Professor Andrén's Modern Swedish Government was noted in the March, 1962, issue of this REVIEW, it was pointed out (p. 203) that surveys in English of Swedish government and politics were relatively abundant, compared to those on her neighbors. Since then, two good books have come out on Norway-Storing's Norwegian Democracy (see this Review for June, 1964) and Valen and Katz' Political Parties in Norway (see this Review for March, 1965)—and two fascinating case studies have appeared on Iceland, as described below. Still neglected are Denmark and Finland. Andrén has stopped the gap with his Governments and Politics in the Nordic Countries, which covers Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The last English-language multi-nation survey of Scandinavian governments appeared in 1951.

Following a brief introduction, the author takes the five countries in turn, each in a section of several chapters on constitutional history, the franchise, legislative procedure, the executive, the administration, and political parties. Apart from passing reference to public opinion and pressure groups, the approach is institutional. A final section compares the categories of the previous ones and ends with chapters on local government and Scandinavian regionalism, respectively. Ten pages on the institutions of local government in five countries is too much or too little; the chapter either should be expanded or deleted.

Otherwise, the author, who is chairman of the political science department at Stockholm University, has done an excellent job of portraying the salient governmental features of the five Northern countries.

Andrén's book is necessarily contemporaneous. Professor Malmström—geographer at Middlebury College in Vermont—takes a different tack, primarily historical and geopolitical. Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress traces the international relations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, both among themselves and with the rest of the world. Slightly more emphasis is given to modern times. Malmström and Andrén can well be read together as introduction or refresher. The latter would have been improved as a reference work by the addition of a general index.

The two major issues which have dominated Icelandic politics since the end of the second World War have been dissected in a pair of case studies. Each is well written and has the virtue of relating internal political configurations—public, parties, pressure groups, and political institutions—to external relations.

In Iceland: Reluctant Ally, Dr. Donald Nuechterlein portrays Iceland's stance in the Cold War, as reflected in domestic policy toward the United States' NATO airbase at Keflavik. The story centers on the Icelandic parliament's 1956 decision (since rescinded) to demand the expulsion of American armed forces. The author did his research while serving as press officer of the United States Embassy in Reykjavik.

Professor Davis, now of Illinois, spent less time in Iceland than did Nuechterlein, and did not learn the language. He relied judiciously upon interviews in English and upon translations of documents and periodicals. In *Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits*, Davis describes the 1958 extension of exclusive fishing boundaries to twelve miles which culminated in the codfish war between Iceland and Great Britain.

For the intellectual voyager, these books open four more paths to the Northern countries of Europe.—Stanley V. Anderson, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Finland in Crisis 1940-1941: A study in smallpower politics. By Anthony F. Upton. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. 318. \$7.50.)

Aristotle's approach to the fall of the tragic hero can be interpreted in two ways: a fatal flaw, which makes the hero's fall inevitable and removes his actions from the realm of moral judgment, or an error in judgment, which is the result of deliberate choice among real alternatives, and which therefore can be criticized. Tragedy, of course, characterizes the lives of nations as well as fiction. Nowhere in political life is the importance of the meaning of tragedy clearer than in the fate of smaller nations in the Second World War. Finland was perhaps an extreme example. During the Winter War in 1939–1940 the Finns were almost universally acclaimed as heroes, but the military collapse of Finland in 1944 saddened few outside that country.

Whether Finnish leaders had real policy alternatives during the Second World War is still a very important political question. Apologists for wartime Finnish policy argue that Finnish leaders did only what they had to do, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the catastrophe which faced defeated Finland in 1944. These apologists, of whom the most important is Arvi Korhonen, maintain that after the Winter War Finland had no choice but to seek assistance in strengthening its defences wherever such assistance was available. As it turned out, only Germany was willing and able to sell arms to Finland, German assistance was paid for by the granting of transit rights over Finnish territory to German troops en route to occupied Norway. From this transit agreement the road led to Finish participation in Operation Barbarossa, and to Waffenbrüderschaft with Adolf Hitler. Those who argue, on the other hand, that the war of 1941-1944 could have been avoided. judge Finnish political leaders of those years severely indeed. The most vigorous attack upon these leaders came from an American scholar, C. Leonard Lundin, in his important study of Finland in the Second World War.

At long last an objective umpire has appeared. Upton, a young British historian with few axes to grind, has provided an honest and factually detailed picture of the controversial events between the Treaty of Moscow in March, 1940, and the outbreak of war between Germany (and Finland) and the Soviet Union in June, 1941. It is now clear that the possibilities for Finnish neutrality after March, 1940, either in cooperation with Sweden or alone, were substantially greater than apologists for Finnish policy have conceded. There were real alternatives, and most Finnish political leaders did not even bother to explore them. Among these leaders only J. K. Paasikivi, then Ambassador to Moscow, seriously attempted to ensure that the Winter War would be Finland's last war. When it became clear to Paasikivi that his government was willing to initiate a war of revenge to undo the harsh terms of the Treaty of Moscow, he resigned.

The official Finnish policy, of course, could hardly be publicized. The four or five members of the inner circle of the government therefore lied to Parliament, to the less powerful members of the Cabinet, and even to each other. Candor

was reserved for dealings with the Germans, since it was assumed that the new world order would be German. General Halder wrote in his diary in early June, 1941: "The Finnish High Command has squared its plans with ours and seems to be going at it with every ounce of energy." Upton concludes that the inner circle of the Finnish leadership was "guilty of one terrible error of judgement . . . the destiny of nations, even of small nations, is determined by the choices of men, not by impersonal historical forces." Even if this is true, it does not apply to ordinary Finns, who were not permitted to discuss-let alone to decide -their impending fate. When Operation Barbarossa had been implemented, Finland's largest newspaper, the historical voice of Finnish liberalism, proclaimed that Finland must be grateful to Hitler for his protection. Long rows of white crosses in every Finnish village suggest that this expression of gratitude was premature.-Marvin RINTALA, Boston College.

The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation. By Henry Frank Goodnow. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 328. \$6.75.)

The first duty of anyone asked to review this book would seem to be to dispel the ambiguity of its title for readers not familiar with Pakistan's governmental arrangements. In Pakistan there are many "civil services," superior and subordinate, of which "The Civil Service of Pakistan" is only one, an elite corps of a few hundred "generalists" at the top of the heap. It is the Pakistani equivalent of the British "administrative class." The book under review is a study of this power elite, with only tangential references to Pakistan's other "Central Superior Services," such as the Foreign Service, the Audits and Accounts Service, and the Police Service.

Goodnow first became "extremely interested in the Civil Service of Pakistan and in its predecessor, the Indian Civil Service," while serving (1954–57) "as a public administration member" of a University of Pennsylvania team responsible for establishing an Institute of Public and Business Administration at the University of Karachi. (p. vii) In 1959 he completed a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University entitled "The CSP: An Appraisal of the Higher Civil Service in the Governing of Pakistan." The present book is an outgrowth of the dissertation.

Factually, the book seems to me sound and as comprehensive as one could reasonably expect it to be. Gathering the materials for it was in itself no small accomplishment, and no mean contribution to our growing body of data about Asian and African bureaucracies. My own experience in Pakistan during part of the period that Goodnow

was there suggests that he probably had to contend, among other things, with insufficient and fragmented sources of information, distrust of the motives of his research, a tradition of secrecy in governmental affairs, and a very high degree of sensitivity and self-protectiveness on the part of most CSP members. Merely as a source of reliable factual information on one important Asian bureaucratic elite, his book has value.

It is, however, intended to be far more than a "fact-book" on the CSP. Goodnow's real goal is to present his comprehensive personal evaluation of this elite corps "as a Participating Institution in the Governing of Pakistan." (Part of the title of Chapter 10)

In my estimation, he succeeds rather well at this, though I may be led astray by the coincidence of so many of his value judgments with my own. On the other hand, it can be said that they "jibe" also, in all essentials at least, with the findings of Rowland Egger and Bernard Gladieux in studies never released for general circulation outside Pakistan and largely suppressed there. (Egger's study, "The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan," was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and submitted to the Pakistan government in November, 1953; Gladieux's, entitled "Reorientation of Pakistan Government for National Development," was done for the Pakistan Planning Board in 1955.) Less sweepingly critical of the CSP is Ralph Braibanti's "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis" (South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 58 [Spring, 1959], pp. 258-304). However, this interesting and well written essay is not really comparable with Goodnow's work or with the Egger and Gladieux reports. It is not similarly comprehensive in its intended scope; it is an examination of the implications of the CSP's "generalist" and "literary" traditions and biases for Pakistani administration and national development. Goodnow comes much closer to telling "the whole truth" about the CSP, it seems to me.

"The whole truth" is complex. Examined in the book are the origins of CSP attitudes, traditions, and procedures; recruitment and training policies; the multiple roles played by CSP officers at central, provincial, and local levels; CSP relations with the President, politicians, the public, and "other bureaucracies" (civilian and military); the "secretariat system" of administration which has been one of the main safeguards of CSP dominance; the "generalist versus specialist" problem (Braibanti's essential theme); and CSP control over the assignment, promotion, pay, perquisites, and discipline of its own members. The picture that emerges is that of an extremely influential, prestigious, self-conscious, self-protective, and tradition-bound elite. The great question raised by the book (and by other studies of Pakistani public administration) concerns, not the competence, dedication, and integrity of individual CSP members, but the CSP as an institution. Does it not need to be modernized and modified and brought into better balance with the other elements of Pakistan's political system? Egger, Gladieux, Braibanti, Goodnow (and Beckett) think yes.

Though it certainly should be read by anyone interested in Pakistan or in comparative public administration generally, the book is not without some obvious weaknesses. Most importantly, it has been outrun by events, always a major hazard of this type of research. The great bulk of Goodnow's data and insights are pre-1958. He has tried to remedy this situation by adding a chapter on developments under Ayub Khan. Inevitably, this chapter (Chapter 11) is sketchy and incomplete. Whether the new regime will effect any fundamental change in the CSP, and its role in the governance of Pakistan, remains an unknown. The same problem creates a stylistic difficulty (I would in any case describe the book's literary style as competent but not distinguished). Goodnow is hard put to know when to use the present tense and when the past. The result is a good deal of jumbling of tenses which ultimately becomes a minor irritant to the reader, as well as being the source of some ambiguity. Finally, Chapter 1 of the book, in which Goodnow undertakes to provide a conceptual and perceptual matrix for his analysis by generalizing about "Bureaucracy and Political Power in the New States," seems to me rather weak .- PAUL L. BECKETT, Washington State University.

The Civil Service in New African States. By A. L. Adu. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 242. \$6.00.)

The luxury of precision and certainty that Louis XIV demonstrated with his egotistical provocation "L'état, c'est moi" is lost to the contemporary political world. Today the state cannot be packaged so neatly. What is the "moi" of the complex modern state and particularly the developing African states: the leader with exceptional skills and appeal; masses with the vote and veto; nationalist movement with its arsenal of non-violent and violent weapons; dominant political party; powerful economic enterprises and related trade associations and labor unions; government, or civil service? Clearly none by itself is accepted as the state, for in some measure, varying considerably to be sure, all participate in its composition and power structure. In British Africa the Colonial Service locally came close to being the "moi," never completely however, but the civil service in the successor states inherited no such power. The politics of nationalism, as well as the manner in which the British Government handed its responsibilities over to African political leaders, resulted in a diminished though by no means negligible position for the civil service in these new states formerly under British rule. Its influence, if far from supreme, is nonetheless weighty for obvious reasons: traditions of "strong" administration; government direction of programs for economic development and nationbuilding; extensive public sector activities, and wide-spread approbation of African socialism as the public ideology. Hence, there has emerged national civil services deemed critically essential to but not dominating the ships of state in Africa. It is to this version of the civil service in former British African dependencies Mr. Adu addresses his inquiry in this work.

An authority of impeccable credentials and incomparable experience in the civil service field. Mr. Adu, Ghanaian by nationality and an international civil servant, has delineated with sharp clarity his aim in writing this study, an aim that fixes the span of coverage, sets the direction, and imposes certain limitations. Through it, he is endeavoring, as he says, to help Africans "understand the principles which have applied to the establishment and structure of the system of public service we have inherited as well as the policies which governments have adopted for its future development." In as much as British civil service traditions are his point of departure, he makes no attempt to apply his observations to services drawing upon the French or Belgian traditions. Such an approach, it may be noted. stands in considerable contrast to an alternate approach centering around "development administration" as being pertinent to all developing nations regardless of their imperial ties in the colonial period.

The breadth of Mr. Adu's study, brief as it is, is admirable, for he offers comments deliberately or in passing on most aspects of the topic, including the perplexing problems of Africanization and political loyalty. His method is of his own choosing and will not satisfy fully those readers who prefer the evidence of case studies or insights of anecdotes. As he knows thoroughly of what he writes, the author tends to treat issues and situations in a rather abbreviated and abstract manner.

For example, he examines, as of first importance, the relationship between a minister of the government and a permanent secretary. He recounts that in the British tradition the civil servant of this rank must serve his minister loyally but objectively and in turn the minister should refrain from subverting or compromising politically this type of official. In general terms

Mr. Adu indicates that in Africa both have lessons to learn in this connection, not the least of which is the value of respect and confidence. Yet at no point does Mr. Adu relate some of the actual experiences of permanent secretaries in the last few years or assess the dynamics of actual postures in this regard. The practitioner, no less than the student, may acquire a useful perspective from such a review, regrettably absent. Moreover, he leaves virtually unexplored the theory and practice of the minister-permanent secretary relationship in the prevailing African context. with (a) tendencies towards the emergence of oneparty systems in lieu of the bi-party Westminster model with a government and loval opposition: (b) preference for the "strong executive" type of government with the legislature in a reduced role; (c) personalism in even professional relationships; and (d) gaps in education and experience. It should not be thought that Mr. Adu is unaware of this side of the picture, for his sensitivity to the local conditions is notably evident throughout the study.

To sum up Mr. Adu's thesis, the African states stand to progress through the realization of the basic values of the Whitehall model, such as "integrity, impartiality, efficiency of service, loyalty to the government of the day and devotion to duty." The appropriate conditions for their realization, as well as alternatives, he leaves to other authors to ascertain.—Julian R. Friedman, Syracuse University.

From French West Africa to the Mali Federation. By William J. Foltz. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965, Pp. xiv, 235. \$6.50.)

The contours of the political landscape in French-speaking West Africa are now in the process of being filled in with almost the same startling rapidity that these ten sovereign states acquired independence half a decade ago. Almost overnight, the once meager English-language bookshelf has been filled with such valuable contributions as Ruth Schacter-Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa; I. M. Wallerstein, The Road to Independence: Ghana and Ivory Coast; Aristide Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast; and Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence. This group is now enlarged by the appearance of William J. Foltz's excellent anatomy of the Mali Federation.

Foltz has sought insight into the nature of transitional politics in West Africa by selecting a focus of analysis rather different from the others cited; rather than examining political parties, or making a "country study," he has explored the

compressed life cycle of the Mali Federation (1959-1960). This abortive exercise in superterritorial unification was conceived by its supporters as an effort to achieve decolonization without "balkanization" in the former administrative federation of Afrique Occidentale Française. Of the eight former component territories of AOF, only four (Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey) were prepared to consider a joint destiny, and the tentative affiliation of the latter two to the embryonic Mali enterprise lasted only a few weeks. However, Senegal and Soudan did make a serious effort to achieve political unification; they became independent as "Mali" on June 20, 1960, and for two months lived together within the same political framework. Ultimately, the unresolved issue as to whether cohabitation or full union was the goal tore the federation apart; Senegal seceded in August, and Soudan was left with only the new appellation of Mali as a permanent memorial to the stillborn partnership.

Foltz traces the life history of "Mali" as a federation, centering his study primarily upon the Senegal-Soudan relationship; the relationships of the other prospective participants are only peripherally treated. The major part of the work is a political history of the immediate antecedents of the federation, 1956-58, the details of its formation, its functioning, and its rupture. The author describes his objective as the answering of two specific questions: Why was the federation formed? Why did it fail? In providing his answers, he has made excellent use of a wide range of documentary materials, and numerous interviews with key actors during extended field work in 1960-61.

One may detect traces of a determined effort to apply sophisticated methodological techniques to this study. Foltz, however, has been plagued by intractibility of his subject matter, as have many other students of African politics. It proved impossible to utilize a systematic interview schedule, and the political and environmental constraints made interview situations non-comparable, even when comparable questions could be asked. The one offering on the altar of quantification which survived is the weakest chapter in the book, "Economic Integration in French West Africa" (Chapter 3). Based upon Deutschian theory on the relationship between economic transaction flows and integration potential, this section is an opaque analysis of export-import relationships between the ex-AOF territories, with the outcome nothing more than what would be immediately suggested by examination of a railway map. Another mathematical experiment, a content analysis of leading Dakar and Bamako newspapers, has been modestly relegated to the appendices; the latter did yield some interesting data supporting the view that Senegalese politics are more personalized than those in Soudan.

The contribution of this book lies in the discerning, persuasive analysis of the difficulties of knitting together dissimilar political systems. Although both were essentially one-party states, the character of the ruling parties was sharply different. Union Soudanaise was a monolithic, disciplined mass movement, which could be counted on to pursue a single purpose. The Union Progressiste Sénégalaise was an uncertain alliance of radical youths, conservative Muslim marabouts. Lamine Gueye's Dakar patronage net, a highly sophisticated and acculturated elite, and a large mass of peanut farmers. Thus Senegal was always in a fundamentally unequal negotiating position; while the Soudan delegation would be immune to splintering, on any given issue there was likely to be one or more group from the Senegalese side which would defect. The author resists the temptation to impute all misfortune to the former metropole; French influence remains substantial, and Foltz presents a convincing discussion of its means and ends during this period, but without exaggerating its impact on the outcome.

There are points at which the reader's appetite for detail may not be fully satiated. More might have been said, for example, about the short-lived Dahomey and Upper Volta association with the Federation at its early stages. The theoretical discussion of Mali as a case in political integration through federation might have been carried further in drawing more widely from the available body of literature; Deutsch is not the only contributor to this debate.

But to ask all these things perhaps reflects undue greed. There is every cause to be highly pleased with what Foltz has given us: an authoritative, well-written, important contribution to our understanding of African politics.—Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin.

An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa. By Leo Kuper. (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1965. Pp. 452. \$12.50 cloth, \$2.95 paper.)

The political sociology of South Africa cannot escape the calculus of racial conflict, but not many studies go beyond that conclusion. Leo Kuper's skillful and absorbing study starts where others have stopped, illuminating the relationship between differences in the social situations of "the 'upper' occupational strata of African society" and perceptions of political alternatives. The result is a new appreciation of the subtleties of social tension in South Africa and a number of interesting suggestions concerning the signifi-

cance of class—which Kuper candidly limits to the category of "occupational milieu"—in the determination of African political attitudes.

Bourgeoisie is Kuper's shorthand reference to African professionals, traders, and senior government and municipal clerks who comprise the African upper occupational strata. Inside South Africa they are important for their revolutionary potential, as they are rising groups, struggling on the one hand against traditional birthright prerogatives, as well as against racial privilege on the other. Traditional tribal status and racial distinctions converge in the government's avowed aim of restricting the African's civic position to tribal "citizenship." In this way the embourgeoisification of the African is doubly hostile to official policy and the role of the bourgeoisie invested with oppositionist tendencies by its very existence. Given a shift in the pattern of racial domination, the African bourgeoisie would furnish the new men of power, thereby duplicating the political development of the post-colonial states of tropical Africa.

This is a work of massive but unobtrusive scholarship, informed by obvious but controlled passionate opposition to the systematic depersonalization of human life in South Africa. In documenting the ambivalence of roles and the fragile ambiguity in the positions of these Africans, Kuper indicates that patterns of interracial contact are "complex and varied," retaining certain latent possibilities for racial accommodation. Nevertheless he writes under no illusion about the prospects for the African bourgeoisie. He is well aware that official policy pushes slowly toward eliminating the avenues for political co-operation among the races in South Africa.

"The objective core" of research (Kuper's phrase) is confined to Africans, mostly Zulu, in Durban. Research procedures embrace interviews, questionnaires, the analysis of records and observations growing out of the author's "participation in South African society over many years." The discussion swings gracefully back and forth from considerable detail to general conclusions, accounting for gaps in coverage without apparent loss of significance, although it is probably fair to note that not all of Kuper's description of interpersonal relations are relevant to the interests of political scientists.

What makes the work pertinent to political science is Kuper's abiding concern with the problem of political change, his intense interest in political choice and the role of social situations. Against the background of a society "saturated with racialism" (sketched with masterful cogency), Kuper is engaged in investigating measures of class differentiation and the resulting pat-

terns of attitude and behavior which modify the choices that lie between complete acceptance of the present system of suppression and routinized insecurity and absolute opposition to it by force and violence. One of the major hypotheses emerging from such an investigation-which Kuper approaches first from the viewpoint of perspectives, then by occupational group and finally by modal organizations-is that the nature of the Africans' involvement in racial conflict varies with differences in the social situations of particular groups. Within the bourgeoisie, status incongruity and the type of occupational setting especially affect political choice, although the choice, as one might suspect, lies within the limits set by a general rejection of racial subordination.

Kuper carefully lays out the variables possibly interfering with a monolithic racist rejection of the present system. Occupations differ in the opportunity they provide for interracial contact; e.g., African clergymen deal with White clergymen more than African teachers communicate with their White counterparts (perhaps this contributes to the higher intensity of political involvement on the part of African teachers). Occupations differ also in amount of exposure to competition; e.g., African professionals are less exposed than African traders. Indeed African traders are among the most vulnerable groups within the bourgeoisie, since the promotion of African entrepreneurship conflicts with the aim of restoring traditional societies, it collides with the economic interests of the government's Afrikaner supporters and it creates a base for challenging European power. Occupations may exhibit contradictions between practice and doctrine and thus give rise to varying adjustments to other institutions, etc., etc. In consequence the reader is sensitized to several new dimensions in comprehending patterns of political change.

The author's examination of three cases of associational life—an Advisory Board, a sports association and political organizations-permits a glimmer of hope regarding racial "adjustments." "The politics of football" appears to foster nonracial sentiments in relations with White sports associations. A sort of "balance of racial interests" approach obtains. The desire for international approval or affiliation, coupled with the preparedness of international sports tribunals to withhold valued recognition, have compromised the government's aim of eliminating interracial contact in sport. Without equating sports and politics, Kuper suggests that a similar process may be applicable in the potential role of the United Nations in influencing the course of domestic policy in South Africa. The slight movement toward "deracialization," as exemplified in football (and to a lesser extent in the English-speaking churches), a history of interracial contact, continually enlarging areas of economic interdependence of the races and a rather flexible commitment to apartheid on the part of the Afrikaner government all combine, in Kuper's view, as "forces making for accommodation between the races."

An evaluation of the possibilities for UN sanctions falls outside the author's province, but even if the UN could muster the resources and the determination, Kuper's painstakingly honest and balanced assessments do not allow any more optimism than questioning the complete inexorability of racial civil war. Repeatedly, his sharp observations encapsulate the anguish and frustration of groups whose livelihoods are turned into instruments of self-debasement and self-mockery. As he briskly notes, "A numerous and well-armed ruling class, partly fortified by the religious sanctification of apartheid, may be expected to fight for survival with great determination and ruthlessness." Elsewhere he describes the "totalitarian" sweep of controls over the personal lives of the Africans, leading to brutalization of White and Black alike. While the African political organizations struggle to suppress emotions of race hatred with intellectual rejections of racism, the government "deforms many of its subjects to its own infirmity." Many readers may feel that the evidence assembled by the author does not permit even the tentative hopes pressed forward by him for a nonviolent solution .- HARVEY GLICKMAN, Haverford College.

Poor Countries and Authoritarian Rule. By Mau-RICE F. NEUFELD. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1965. Pp. xiv, 240, \$5.00.)

This is a most intriguing book and one which should stimulate thought as well as controversy. The author sets out his theme strikingly in the opening pages: "Astronauts will reach the cold moon long before the nations of the world will lift the curse of poverty from the brow of mankind and secure human dignity as the birthright of all human beings on earth." Of the world's three billion people, two-thirds live at a subsistence level in countries where the per capita national income falls below \$200 and the median rate of annual growth in gross national product is the slowest of the nations of the world—thus widening the disparity of wealth between rich and poor nations. Within the latter, nationalist leaders spring forth espousing utopian answers to the poverty issue. With independence, grandiose and all too often impractical schemes, sold by slogans and buttressed by military coercion, produce falling production and further discontent. Ultimately, force predominates and authoritarian political systems are installed in place of popular government.

Professor Neufeld, already established as a highly knowledgeable specialist of Italian economic and political systems, now endeavors to draw from Italy's experiences parallels to happenings in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and contends that "Italy, of all the countries in Europe with extended experience of industrial change ... even today still resembles most closely the emerging nations of the world in the character of its past and present economic, cultural, political, and social development." This can best be seen through nine major historical propositions which, when taken in broad terms, offer a more or less chronological flow of developments in Italy and similarly in most of the poor countries of the world's developing areas.

Neufeld's analytical approach—and this constitutes most of his book-is to define each of the nine propositions in terms of Italian history and then elaborate their applicability to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He suggests that (1) cultural nationalism usually preceded political nationalism, while foreign rule defined the state's geography and foreign ideas fostered liberation movements; (2) there followed a rejection of these foreign influences and the search for a distinctive national character and mission; (3) but the fulfillment of nationalist goals depended upon international political-economic-social events and, very importantly, changes in world public opinion; (4) the achievement of independence reimplanted awareness of such chronic social maladies as illiteracy and parochialism and caused leaders to extend the central government's authority to counter threats to national solidarity; (5) at the same time, the founding fathers expanded public works and military budgets at the expense of public welfare and entered into relations with other countries that often led to costly adventures in territorial aggrandizement; (6) pre-independence's high expectations were largely nullified with nationhood as economic gulfs widened; (7) repression followed; foreign radical doctrines absorbed early by the intellectuals anticipated effective economic growth by years and froze answers to the challenges of industrial life even before it appeared. (8) These seven historical developments set out certain conditions—an essentially agrarian economy, labor's tie with political groups, and uneven industrial growth that delimited the extent of unionism-which shaped the labor movement and, in turn, societal development. Finally, (9) all of these factors had the cumulative effect of advancing the rise of the authoritarian state, though "that self-proclaimed novel form of government did not advance industrial progress against the backward pull of historical forces any more swiftly than the looser and less involved devices of liberal parliamentary systems." In this regard, Fascism's success lay not in bringing off any economic miracles, but rather in consolidating Party power domestically and upgrading Italy's international prestige—a failure and a feat characteristic of Sukarno, Ne Win, Ayub Khan, Nasser, Ben Bella, Touré, Nkrumah, and Nyerere.

The foregoing list of political leaders implies one of the weaknesses of Neufeld's broad treatment of the historical propositions. For if, as he alleges, they can be applied in general form to all the developing areas (except for his discussion of Proposition 8), only a modest case is made for Latin America. While Sukarno's Indonesia and Nkrumah's Ghana stand at center stage, Castro's Cuba is left outside the stage door. Such an analytical approach will naturally tend to emphasize exemplary models, but if the hypotheses are to possess validity, they must be tested more broadly. Occasionally, too, minor statements of factual interpretation could be challengedthus, why not rank Costa Rica with Uruguay and Chile as enjoying governmental stability? (p.

On the other hand, much remains to be commended in this study. The propositions themselves provoke interest as focal points for further analysis and the genuine effort at comparative evaluation is laudable. Proposition 8, dealing with labor, is strongly augmented with a lengthy appendix which stands by itself as an insightful survey of the labor movements of Japan, Egypt, Latin America, and the former British West Indies. The author's writing is lively in style and lucidly communicative and his argument rests upon rich documentation. This is an exceptional book which deserves the attention of economists as well as political scientists.—Ben G. Burnett, Whittier College.

Self-Government in Modernizing Nations. Edited by J. Roland Pennock. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1964. Pp. viii, 120. \$4.95.)

This small volume of essays, edited by J. Roland Pennock, makes an admirable "first reader" on the problems facing the new nations in their quest for the benefits of modernization. The book is thoughtful and provocative, and it raises many of the significant questions which must be considered in trying to understand the most momentous and dynamic movement of our times. The movement has challenged the world of scholarship; it has also challenged the policy-makers, who have scanty theoretical foundations to support their expensive and sometimes dangerous actions. The title chosen for this volume, while perfectly adequate, shows how difficult it is to find suitable labels to apply to this massive political ferment:

the term "self-government" is too restrictive; "modernizing" does not isolate the subject matter, for the industrial countries are also proceeding with their own "modernization" at breakneck speed; and "nations" seems too precise a word for countries where tribal affinities are strong.

The problem of analyzing and comprehending this development is described by Professor Lucian Pye in a prescient introductory chapter. Professor Pve argues that comparative analysts have reached an impasse, with cultural relativists stressing the unique aspects of the various political systems whereas political modernization assumes the existence of general principles which have not yet been discovered. An escape from this impasse may be found in trying to seek "a clearer understanding of how the contemporary forces at work in the world are likely to affect the particular experiences of currently underdeveloped countries." In this extensive diffusion of culture which we are now witnessing, the "practices, standards, techniques, and values" of the Western industrial world are being "imposited" on the non-Western world and a world culture is developing whose standards are generally recognized as being the essence of modern life. The undeveloped countries are making adjustments to modernity in various ways, reconciling the universals of world culture to the parochial expressions of local culture, and, in Pye's view, this process of blending lies at the heart of the modernization process. It is in this area that the values of democracy can play an important part, and Professor Pye finds a close association between democratization and modernization.

However, in practice, the new countries have not found it easy to adjust the parochial claims of traditional life to the requirements of a Westerntype political and legal system, and some of the difficulties they have encountered are discussed by Francis X. Sutton, who as an officer of the Ford Foundation has been professionally concerned with strengthening African institutions. Self-government for African states was advocated by many Westerners on moral grounds, Mr. Sutton points out, but the countries achieving independence have been "uncertainly equipped" to man their own affairs. The negotiations for independence were carried through under the assumption that Europeans would continue to serve African governments, but in many countries where this trained cadre has been largely replaced by local talent there has been a deterioration in administrative standards.

The chapter contributed by Professor Thomas L. Hodgkin is entitled, "The Relevance of 'Western' Ideas for the New African States," but the placing of quotation marks around the

word Western puts us on our guard that there is doubt in some quarters about the appropriateness of the adjective. And so there is. Professor Hodgkin does not develop the topic, basing his reticence on what he calls the confusion about the meaning of Western ideas, a misunderstanding of the political process of modern African states, and "the lack of an adequate frame of historical reference." He prefers to stress the elements of freshness in African political thinking, thereby dispelling "the illusion that Western democratic ideas have been exported to Africa in the same kind of way as bicycles." However, the Hodgkin explanation of African development seems too particularistic, too contrived, and does not ring true for many parts of Africa.

Professor Hodgkin quotes Tom Paine, "I support your revolutions," and challenges the "British Burkes" who try to frighten him with the reminder that revolutions have a habit of eating their children and their sympathizers. "In that case," he says, "I must be content to be eaten." While Professor Hodgkin is waiting for the faggots to be lit, or the pot to boil, the problems remain. To take one example, a great deal of constructive work is being devoted to "modernizing" African law and building it into a broadly-based legal system, and in this enterprise the applicability of Western concepts is constantly relevant.

In the chapter "Communism and the Emerging Nations, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that we are now living in an age where "nations are being shaped consciously and developed purposely" and that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is "inadequate as a framework for analysis of the complex phenomena of the contemporary world." Many intellectuals of the new nations, he says, have found attractive such theories as that proposed by Walt Whitman Rostow in The Stages of Economic Growth. Whether this is good or bad economic history, "it is an excellent foundation for an ideology of transition," it gives a sense of mission to the elites, and it also gives them some notion of when their mission is concluded. A sense of purpose and ends is necessary "if these countries are to go through a stage of development which is rapid yet does not involve a commitment to totalitarianism."

The volume concludes with a chapter on American policy toward political development, contributed by W. Howard Wriggins, a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. Most of the crises of the past fifteen years have occurred with the emerging countries, Mr. Wriggins says, and he discusses a series of problems which face the policy-makers in Washington. We are now back on square one, to the headlines which we put aside when picking up the book, and we are confronted with problems rang-

ing from guerilla insurgency to the overthrow of long-standing tyranny.—ROLAND YOUNG, Northwestern University.

Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration. By Edward W. Weidner. (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964. Pp. xi, 247. \$8.00.)

No dimension of technical assistance overseas holds greater potential interest for political scientists than the work in public administration. Here, uniquely, as compared with agriculture, public health, education, civil engineering, or community development, knowledge and theory of political science is required, and the field experience gained can contribute to our expanding interest in comparative government and political development. It is ironically disappointing that, nevertheless, the aid administering agencies have made limited use of political scientists, and those who have gone on overseas assignments in public administration have, for their part, contributed little to the growth of theory and knowledge in our discipline.

Among the notable exceptions to this generalization is Edward W. Weidner. Emerging from the main stream of political science, with a primary interest in American local government, he went on to serve as chairman of the political science department at Michigan State University, where he first became involved in technical assistance by helping to establish a contract program of that university in Viet Nam. Subsequently, as director of the Institute of Research on Overseas Programs at Michigan State, from 1957-1961, Weidner carried on extensive overseas interviewing and observation in 23 countries of Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, as well as the headquarters of the United Nations and American private and public agencies sponsoring overseas programs. As vice chancellor of the East-West Center in Hawaii, subsequently, he has continued his interest in this field, and played an active role in the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration.

Weidner himself is one of the first to admit the limited horizons which have handicapped operating programs tackled through public administration assistance as contained within the "triple threat" of personnel, budgeting-finance, and organization and methods. (p. 19) The extent and character of these programs is fully and lucidly described in the first two-thirds of his book: part one dealing with "Programs" and part two with "Results." Under programs, Weidner describes the stated goals of the major operating agencies, which are also characterized as to operating methods. The backgrounds and orientations of

the key personnel involved in the agencies, in the field teams, and in the host governments are also described.

The second part of the book describes the academic impact of the programs on the curricula, students, teaching methods, and research output of the beneficiary institutions, and explains why the impact on the host governments, through inservice and "participant" training, and through consultation and other techniques has been generally modest if not inconsequential. Weidner acknowledges that various defects in the programs—poor techniques, inadequate personnel, organizational weaknesses, shortsighted goals—have been partially responsible. But a deeper explanation, he thinks, lies in the gap between the available theoretical framework and socio-political and administrative realities. He writes:

Public administration's response to the challenge of political, social, and economic development has been one of means unrelated to ends, of enshrining the so-called principles of public administration the world around regardless of the goals or the conditions surrounding a particular administrative system. (p. 159)

The third part of the book, entitled "Significance," gives Weidner's analysis of the political and economic context of administrative reform, stresses the educational system in relation to the preparation of civil servants and the socialization of citizens for participation in governmental processes, and advocates a developmental perspective as the key to effective use of technical assistance in public administration.

Weidner pinpoints the crucial political basis of administrative development. He writes: "... in some cases national development and administrative change will have to await greater political maturity," "Effective leadership and stability at a responsible level greatly facilitate the improvement of administration..." and "The bureaucracies of the less developed countries tend to be both powerful and isolated. Their position of power encourages them in a lack of responsibility. Their isolation contributes to their lack of responsiveness." (pp. 162, 167, 169)

A more effective approach to technical assistance in public administration would evolve, Weidner believes, if it were based on the concept of "development administration." For him,

Development administration is the process of guiding an organization toward the achievement of development objectives. It is action oriented, and it places administration at the center in facilitating the attainment of development objectives. (p. 200)

It is not clear to this reviewer, however, whether the initiative for stating and enforcing developmental goals can be taken by officials in a state bureaucracy, or whether the goals can be attained, if so defined, without the support of powerful organizations including even a mass

movement political party outside the bureaucracy.

Weidner states that the "administrative base" for development administration consists of two elements:

First, the personnel that man the bureaucracy must be sympathetic to, even positively concerned with, national development, in addition to having administrative, professional, and technical capability. Second, administrative organization, procedures, and processes must be adapted to furthering development ends. Both elements are based on the assumption, of course, that development politics has set goals for the nation as a whole. (n. 207)

But this is precisely the most troublesome point. As Weidner's book amply demonstrates, technical assistance has been most effective in those countries where political institutions and leadership have provided a framework for energizing and rewarding officials who dedicate themselves to the tasks of modernization. But where such institutions are lacking or ineffective, where power rests predominantly in rather than outside of the bureaucracy, it is not clear how foreign advisers can help generate them. "The task of technical assistance in public administration," Weidner says, "is to further both of the elements of development administration—as well as to give what assistance it can to furthering development politics." (207)

No doubt it was not within the scope of the volume under review to consider how foreign aid can be used to further "development politics," vet until we have learned more about the processes of political change and how they are, or can be, influenced by conscious design, it is this reviewer's conviction that we may be helping to create, through our technical assistance programs. precisely the opposite results of those we aim at. "If an efficient bureaucracy is developed," Weidner writes, "ahead of a strong political system, the desirable balance between them is lacking." (p. 166) Yet without such a balance, a country may be heading either for a breakdown and stagnation, or for autocracy and tyranny.—Fred W. Riggs, M.I.T., on leave, 1965-66.

The African World, A Survey of Social Research.
Ed. for the African Studies Association by
Robert A. Lystad. (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1965. Pp. 575. \$15.00.)

A comprehensive inventory of accumulated knowledge and research needs and achievements in the African field has been compiled under the sponsorship of the African Studies Association. The majority of the contributors would be generally acknowledged as the ranking Africanists in their respective fields. Although the coverage and focus of the 18 chapters is somewhat uneven, and some were submitted long before publication,

overall this inter-disciplinary inquest into the state of Arican studies has produced a valuable reference volume.—M. C. Y.

Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929-1946. By Theodore Friend. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 312, \$7.50.)

There is a newness and freshness of flavor about this volume which in the reviewer's judgment give it considerable value. The author's readable writing style and his excellent scholarship, in which a number of relatively untapped sources are employed, contribute to this conclusion. Indeed it is clear that unusually good use was made of original materials in this study. These include the Philippines National Library's Quezoniana Collection (where papers of both Quezon and Osmeña are located), the papers of Jose P. Laurel, captured Japanese documents, materials from the National Archives in Washington, the papers of W. Cameron Forbes, J. R. Hayden, and Henry L. Stimson, the archives of the Roosevelt Memorial Library, and several other sources. Also, use is made of a vast assortment of individual interviews, quite a number of which appear to be significant. An excellent final section of the work is devoted to a review of source materials. Being nearly exhaustive, this section is very valuable and should be of great help to scholars in diverse disciplines.

The study is full of details and insights which are significant and interesting. Much of this underscores what was already known, but almost invariably in so doing the author uses some new materials and thus sheds new light. At other places new information emerges.

Friend's commentary on the movement for independence is one of the many interesting sections of the book. The reluctance of many Filipinos to move into the sphere of full independence was of course known. Friend's documentation makes it clear, however, that this sentiment was rather widespread.

The personalities of both Quezon and Osmeña are set in fuller perspective than is usually the case in such studies. The scope of the Quezonian drive, determination, maneuverability, and duplicity are interestingly brought out at various places in the volume. Perhaps in this connection Hare-Hawes Cutting-Tydings-McDuffie controversy is among the most revealing. Through all of this the popularity of Quezon and his tremendous ability show clearly. His political instincts were extremely sharp and they reinforced his almost animalistic affinity for power. Yet in this connection the reader often finds himself immensely sympathetic to Osmeña whose constitutionalism, reserve, detachment, and essential decency gave him weapons, which however, were

inadequate in themselves for conflict with Quezon. Perhaps, nevertheless, they were sufficient to give him a unique moral position in Philippine history.

Among the many important topics discussed in the book is the brief consideration given to the American military policy prior to the second world war. This is a matter which many Americans may prefer to ignore because it does not present a very flattering picture. Neither the glow of Fil-American friendships, nor the glories of Mac-Arthur's return, nor even the unique compliment of consistent Filipino backing for the United States erases the essential fact that the United States was not prepared to defend the Philippines adequately. Since the Philippines was a territory under American sovereignty, the United States had an obligation to be prepared for a real defense. Lacking the ability or determination to do so, this country should have abandoned the archipelago early enough so that the Philippines could make her own adjustment to Japanese power. With a singular disregard for essentials the United States did neither, and for this folly there was needless death and suffering. But this is really part of a more comprehensive international ineptness which was the natural offspring of isolationist philosophy. The Philippines was merely an unintended victim.

In summary, Friend's interesting and readable work represents a real contribution to knowledge about the Philippines. It should be widely read and well received.—H. B. Jacobini, Southern Illinois University.

Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade. Compiled and edited by Stewart Fraser (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 542. \$10.00.)

The relation between education and politics in 20th century totalitarianism is generally regarded as a key to important political questions. The bearing of a refined intellectual tradition on the emergence of modern dictatorships, and vice versa, continues to be the object of probing investigation. Because hard information about this relationship in Communist China is still relatively so inadequate, we are prepared to welcome every serious effort to increase our knowledge and deepen our understanding. We have seen what education's role proved to be in European totalitarianism. We suspect that the subservience of education to politics on the Chinese mainland is similar, but more so. But facts are not easy to

In the volume under review Professor Fraser presents us with a three-tiered study of the topic. One is reminded of insulated tiers because there is little passage back and forth between layers. The first 69 pages present the compiler's

capsule review of principal trends in higher education under the Communists mainly in the decade 1950-60 plus preliminary remarks on the period after 1944. The next 336 pages provide 48 speeches, articles, and documents on-or related to-education within the inclusive dates, February 1944 to October 1960. These, in the words of the subtitle, comprise "Records of the First Decade," The final 84 pages are devoted to a bibliography of English language works under 17 headings dealing mainly with educational matters but including some more general historical background. A preliminary bibliographic essay will be helpful to those outside the China field who are unacquainted with the major translation agencies. These are described in clear detail and identify, at the same time, the sources of documents in this compilation.

First, a word about the compilation. Always, of course, there is an inherent interest in a statement of any kind from someone near the heart of a vast social upheaval like China's. We want especially to hear the voices of shapers of policy. These are indicators of what is going on. But organized indicators are more useful than a random selection, and to this reviewer this collection appears to be little more than random. The only principle of order is chronology: two documents in 1944, one in 1949, the remainder spread over ten years averaging four and a half documents per year. Yet we are promised that "Here . . . are outlined the plans and ideals for all levels of education as a means of reshaping China..." When will the publishing industry be held to account for reasonable standards of truth-in-packaging? Aside from a single document dealing with standards of conduct for middle school students and passing references elsewhere to elementary levels, they deal almost exclusively with higher education and the intelligentsia as a class. Despite the book's title, the compiler himself is obviously preoccupied with higher education in his introductory essay. And instead of an outline of plans and ideals, we encounter this random selection of speeches and articles spread over a decade—all in some way relevant to higher education and the role of intellectuals—but surely not a systematic outline of educational programs and objectives. Readers rightfully expect a meaningful topical arrangement, or a grouping of documents by sources (for domestic as against foreign consumption), or classification by leading spokesmen. At one point we are promised that "the collection . . . will give various illustrations of the different political movements and indicate the development of an educational and political philosophy." (p. 21) One movement is poignantly illustrated by four samples of self-deprecatory confessions by leading intellectuals. If other movements are systematically illustrated, this reviewer failed to get the point.

As for the development of an educational philosophy, one can justifiably ask, on the basis of this presentation, What philosophy? The documents disclose the obvious drive toward linking theory and practice and the combining of education with labor in a variety of institutional forms. But this seems essentially to be a political strategy in Communist China which no amount of verbalizing can elevate to much of an educational philosophy.

The compilation would have been substantially more useful had the compiler's essay been related clearly to each document setting it in a meaningful context. Or the documents might have been grouped topically with the essay addressed to the significance of each topic. Or, at least, each document might have been introduced by a more adequate and precise indication of its significance. Some entries have none at all. Obvious questions are ignored: for instance, the constitution of the All-China Federation of Students is dated February 1960 (p. 341) when it was established in 1949. No explanation. At the conclusion of a Yang Hsiu-feng article, a note (p. 340) says, "For a different set of enrollment figures and goals of education . . . see Yang Hsiu-feng . . . pp. 301-307 in this collection." In making sense of the discrepancy, the reader is left to himself.

The extensive bibliography has been compiled with considerable care and with special attention to unpublished dissertations on education in China. Students especially of comparative education will probably rely on it heavily. Students of Chinese politics will find it less useful. When the bibliography is a major portion of the work, it invites comment on what appear to be lacunae. Under "Bibliography, Reference, and Documentation" (p. 422) the Journal of Asian Studies "Bibliography of Asian Studies, 1962" is listed but not the remaining JAS (and FEQ) annual bibliographic issues. The American Universities Field Staff Select Bibliography (1960) is listed but not its two supplements. T. L. Yuan's Economic and Social Development of Modern China: A Bibliographic Guide is listed but not his massive China in Western Literature. The China Year Books (both missionary and governmental), the Missionary Research Library resources, the American Historical Association Guide to Historical Literature would appear to belong in his compilation. Finally, it must be said that the bibliography would make a stronger bid for attention if it were at least selectively annotated.

One last word. Surely the central fact about Chinese Communist education is simply that the Party controls and exploits education for its own ends. This large volume manages to make this point only by indirection.—MELVILLE T. KENNEDY, JR., Bryn Mawr College.

Local Government in Japan. By Kurt Steiner. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 564. \$10.00.)

Professor Steiner has given us not only his long-awaited study of Japanese local government, but a brilliantly thorough work which will be valuable to all students of comparative government. While admittedly stressing the legal aspects of pre- and postwar governmental relations, the book rises far above the formalistic, descriptive level by keeping the central problem of local autonomy always in sight. Deeply committed to the theory that local autonomy insures against authoritarian national government, Professor Steiner raises a series of provocative questions with relevance far beyond his Japanese case study.

"Local autonomy did not fail in Japan; it was never established." (p. 470) Prewar Japan never tried to decentralize political power, first because of the felt exigencies of Meiji modernization and later because of rising militarism. Dr. Steiner's personal service in the Allied Occupation of Japan (SCAP Legal Section) gave him a unique vantage point to observe Occupation reforms in local government. His sad conclusion cited above reveals his dissatisfaction with the incomplete nature of those reforms which failed to give autonomous functions and tax bases to the local entities. "Only when the local political process itself has become democratic will local government become the training ground for democracy envisioned by de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and Lord Bryce. The democratization of local politics is an important challenge confronting present-day Japan." (p. 469) One may quarrel with this equation of decentralization with democracy, but Professor Steiner's argument is the most complete and well-documented report of this subject available. It deserves wide circulation and careful atudy.

The first part of the book provides background on Japanese local government in the feudal era; under the prewar centralized system; and as affected by the Occupation reforms. Like most developing nations, prewar Japan preferred the French model in educational, police, and local governmental controls. The Home Ministry, pivotal agency to control domestic administration before 1945, was abolished by the Occupation. Local governments were made fully elective and given major control of police and schools, but Occupation second-thoughts, financial weakness of local governments, and the tradition of looking up to Tokyo limited the practical effectiveness of decentralization.

The major portion of the book deals with post-

1952 local government as seen in the legal and operational dynamics of an independent Japan. Successive chapters deal with the constitutional framework; prefectural and municipal organization: neighborhood associations (banned by the Occupation but revived under other names); the "muddle of functions"; the financial dependence of local government: interrelations between levels of government; and two excellent final chapters on citizen participation in local government. He shows how the conservative post-Occupation regime has partially recentralized police, schools, and other functions. The Autonomy Ministry may not be a revival of the old Home Ministry, but it performs many similar duties of advising, supervising, and guiding the local governments. Revisions of 1952 and 1956 brought the pendulum "somewhere in between the centralized system of prewar days and the decentralized system instituted by the Occupation" (p. 255). The press, unions, Socialists, and other groups have deterred conservative projects to appoint governors or combine prefectures into larger units, Professor Steiner might have cited the many government opinion polls to show public disapproval of some of the shelved proposals, proof that Tokyo does listen to mass opinion.

This reviewer especially enjoyed the discussion of the political role played by local Red Cross and P.T.A. associations in such cities as Osaka, confirming 1953 reports of local Osaka politicians. National motivation behind the widespread movement to amalgamate villages and towns into "new cities" which retain rural traditions is also clarified as part of the recentralization trend.

Is stronger local autonomy desirable or practical for Japan? Professor Steiner thinks so, given a genuine popular will. Yet the "progressives" (Socialists) might well drop their hostility to centralization if they came to power. A nation smaller than the state of California, with serious problems at home and abroad, might find it impractical to decentralize. Our own national experience shows that even the wealthiest nation on earth cannot solve many problems on a local basis. Progressive-conservative views of local autonomy differ, as do voting rate patterns, in Japan and the United States. Perhaps the balance of national power in Japan should be tilted further toward the localities, but this is unlikely to occur.

"Local entities must not be simply agents of the state, but must stand between the individual and the state." (p. 474) Ideally, this may be defensible. Professor Steiner shows clearly, however, that the postwar struggle over local autonomy is largely a reflection of the larger national struggle between the conservative majority and the leftwing minority. The opposition fears any conservative restriction on unions, students, teachers, and

other client groups, but is not hostile to central government economic and welfare programs. Yet the psychological and ideological base for the kind of local autonomy urged in this book seems most uncertain. Ironically, efforts of the Tokyo government to create outlying industrial cities may help to build stronger local government. Much of the political success of the quasi-religious Soka Gakkai and its political arm, the Komeito, derives from urban dissatisfaction with the low level of municipal services in Japan. The governing Liberal-Democrats, for their own future, must give more attention to local problems.

The book is enriched by 21 tables, a bibliography of Japanese and English-language works, and the good practice of placing parenthetical footnotes on the page and others at the end of the text. This work shows evidence of years of devoted research and meticulous scholarship. It will long remain the definitive work on Japanese local government, and a valuable source for all students of comparative local government.—Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee.

Communist China's Crusade, Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution. By Guy Wint. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 136, \$4.50.)

The academic world is fortunate to have Professor Guy Wint's new contribution, Communist China's Crusade. It deals in depth with a wide range of problems and interpretations. As a profound scholar of contemporary Asia, he offers new meanings to the widening rift between China and Russia, the future role of Japan in Asia, China's relentless expansionism in the coming decades, and the inherent Soviet hesitation (or reluctance) to get involved in Asia except supporting the domestic anti-Western forces when it was expedient. He explains powerfully Stalin's failure in China in 1927 and the subsequent rise of Mao Tse-tung and his home-made revolution.

In this volume the author contributes many additional interpretations and meanings to the chain of events in Asia since 1920's when Communism became a factor in Asian nationalist movement. He reminds us that it is a mistake to think of Mao's victory as "the result of Russian planning;" nor is it correct to believe that Russia "strove ceaselessly to promote the advance of Communism in Asia." (p.2) Stalin's acceptance of the Kuomintang Government after 1945 proved again his underestimating of Mao's personal ability and the strength of his party organization. It is, however, important to note that Stalin's domination of Chinese Communist party during the pre-Mao era (1921-34) was dictated by his struggle with Trotsky. Blind instruction to the CCP leaders was blindly accepted, without any concern for the particular internal conditions in China. Moscow, for example, ordered the CCP to ally with and eventually to be purged by the Kuomintang in 1927.

The rise of Mao in 1934 put an end to Russia's dogmatism and contained also the future seed in Sino-Soviet conflict. Mao has been a realistic man of action, not "the apostle of his theories, as was the case with most of his predecessors." (p. 29) Mao did not delude his countrymen that "the Chinese could act like a Western people." He, in fact, derived most of his revolutionary strategies from the Chinese popular-romantic novels. Three concepts, according to the author, were responsible for Mao's victory in 1949-the creation of peasant armies, secure guerrilla bases, and encircling the cities from the countryside. He also skillfully made good use of the "United Front" concept to gather several conflicting classes of people in order to isolate the Kuomintang government. As a revolutionary conspirator. he knew how to "turn the smouldering discontent in the rural China into a storm of terror." (p. 40) The Japanese aggression gave Mao the greatest fortune to "Build up Communism as true nationalism." (p. 44) Finally, the victory in 1949, with almost no Russian aid at all, has convinced the Peking leaders today the applicability of the Chinese model of revolution to Asia, Africa and Latin America. This conviction was eloquently expressed by Liu Chiao-chi in as early as 1950 when he said that the victory "road is the road of Mao Tse-tung. It can also be the basic road for liberation of peoples of other colonial and semi-colonial countries, where similar conditions exist." (p. 62) The Soviet Union has never agreed to such a liberation theory.

The author brings out more clearly that the Peking regime is dedicated to two rather conflicting goals-world revolution and traditional Chinese interests in Asia. Such "double aims" create a "double foreign policy" which tolerates neither the Russian co-existence theory, nor the American military presence in Asia-both limit Peking's freedom of action. In practice, however, Peking has preserved, in the reviewer's opinion, its sense of prudence and retained flexibility in policy at home and abroad. Professor Wint demonstrates most effectively the ambivalent but real Sino-Soviet split that is rooted in Stalin's faithlessness and Khrushchev's betrayal of Chinese national interests and aspirations. The two nations appear to remain in "deadly enmity with one another" and the split "may last indefinitely." (p. 103) China may eventually claim those border territories taken by Russia during the past 250 years. Racial feud may become the additional source of "profound mistrust of each

other." The real difference for the non-Communist world is that "Peking has replaced Moscow as the potent source of subversion." (p. 113) The instability of world politics may provide opportunities for China, but Peking has "undone much of its work by acting with a high-handedness and superiority which Africans and Latin Americans interpret as racialism and overweening pride." (p. 121) The world must, however, be alert that the disciplined Chinese leaders with resilience and monopoly of political power, have no real regional enemy except Japan which is capable of resisting Peking but Japan's future role in relation to China is not immediately predictable with any degree of certainty.

In short, Professor Wint has reinforced many of our convictions and interpretations on events in Asia, especially his interpretation of the nature of Communism in China and Mao himself as a product of Chinese history. This volume will aid vastly our observing of events in Asia and Communist behavior elsewhere. This reviewer, on the other hand, cannot avoid regretting that the author does not integrate other significant factors which seemed equally responsible for the rise of Mao and his seizure of power in 1949, such as the Marshall Mission and the self-defeating factionalism within the Kuomintang Party.—David W. Chang, Wisconsin State University—Oshkosh.

Bibliographie retrospective des Publications Officielles de la Belgique, 1794-1914. By D. DE WEERDT. (Louvain, Editions Nauwelaerts; Paris, Beatrice Nauwelaerts, 1963. Pp. 427. Centre Interuniversitaire d'Histoire Contemporaine. Cahiers 30.)

The retrospective bibliography of Belgian official publications has been conceived as a supplement to the Bibliographie de l'histoire de Belgique, 1789-1831, by Paul Gérin, published in 1960 as Cahiers 15, together with its two as yet unpublished supplements covering the period 1831-1914. Mrs. De Weerdt covers the period of the nine departments attached to the French Republic and the following period attached to the Netherlands to 1830, as well as the independent Belgium, 1830-1914. In all, 3,471 entries are included. In each of the three periods, the arrangement is alphabetical, mainly by title, with the fewer numbers having individual authors and editors interspersed. The work has been based on the holdings, not always complete, of the Bibliothèque Royale, Brussels, of the Archives Générales du Royaume, and of the libraries of various ministries. There are two indexes, one by personal authors, and the other by topics, places and agencies. The arrangement alphabetically by title, with frequently no mention of the issuing agency represents a Belgian as well as European

library practice that often makes it difficult to locate all the materials published by a particular agency. Normally the agency has a basic statute, decree, or order regulating its functions and furnishing guidance as regards its responsibility for publication. Thus, Belgium has become the second European country to have a retrospective bibliography of its official publications. The other European country, Italy, in 1924, published a bibliography covering the period 1861 to 1923. Despite the ramifications and changes that had been made during those sixty-odd years, the arrangement there was a grouping as far as possible along the then in 1923 existing arrangement of ministries. Mrs. Denise De Weerdt has preferred an alphabetical arrangement in each period, since "Une classification systematique aurait donné a la bibliographie un aspect déséquilibré, vu la grande quantité d'ouvrages à classer sous une même rubrique." The annual lists of official publications now being published by some European countries invariably are arranged by agency. Even so, as it stands, the contribution of Mrs. De Weerdt is one of considerable merit for the student of governmental institutions and probably the only practical one capable of being carried out under present conditions.—James B. Childs.

Le Suffrage Politique en France. By JEAN-PAUL CHARNAY. (Paris: Mouton, 1965. Pp. 832. 95 F.)

An encyclopedic account of French law regulating nominations, elections, and referenda.

American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead. By John C. Camp-Bell. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. 1965. Pp. xi, 136, \$4.50.)

Mr. Campbell's new book on Eastern Europe is an eminently useful and succinct political guidebook on the limits of American direct influence on events and evolution in the area between West Germany and Soviet Russia. It is a miniature encyclopedia of sorts (the text proper is a mere 104 pages), written in a concise, sophisticated and above all, realistic manner in the best tradition of those associated with the Council on Foreign Relations. The author traces the different phases of American foreign policy in Eastern Europe from the unrealistic hopes at Yalta through Truman's policy of containment, preoccupied with Southern and Western rather than Eastern Europe, and Eisenhower's policy of liberation (mostly by electoral declamation) to Kennedy-Johnson's gradualism, actually initiated during Eisenhower's second term. The book then focuses on the past ten years whose most characteristic trend has been toward autonomy and self-assertion, not because of American policy and action, but often regardless or even despite of it. The last portion of the book examines three possible and realistic alternatives of immediate policy goals: 1) constant pressure by all means short of war or incitement to open rebellion; 2) building economic and cultural bridges with the hope and aim of gradual change; or 3) a detente with the Soviet Union at the cost of shelving the German and Eastern European question for a considerable length of time. For each of the three alternatives the book presents a realistic list of appropriate methods of action in the diplomatic, military, propaganda, trade, and cultural exchange fields. Two policies are deemed by the author to be totally unrealistic and therefore not worth a further analysis: first, the United States' definitive acceptance of the status quo; second, a United States' effort to alter the situation by force, be it war or support of civil wars that could escalate to nuclear confrontation. The book does not plead for any of the alternatives suggested. The author's main plea seems to be that of consistency and awareness of facts. In his words "successful policy is not made in a vacuum, in ignorance or in defiance of the actual conditions that prevail."

The author wisely differentiates between American ultimate objectives, that is the desire of the American people and its government to see free elections in a unified democratic Germany and in "desatellized" Eastern Europe, on one hand, and the American actual policy that must unavoidably relate its immediate as well as ultimate objectives to available means and anticipated opposition, on the other. The Eastern European question, however important and irritating, especially in view of our false hopes at the time of Yalta and subsequent bitter partisan oratory, is an issue, but not the issue in the global context of American commitments and aims. Furthermore, the Eastern European complex problem does not affect only Moscow and Washington, but also Paris, Bonn, London and Rome. And West Europe, so much nearer to the area and its ferment, as the author warns, "cannot be counted on automatically to follow American policies in Eastern Europe which do not take account of their interests as they see them."

The book raises also a disturbing but cardinal point: If the goal of total independence from the Soviet Union and the end of Communist monopoly of power within Eastern European states is presently beyond the reach, then American foreign policy may be confronted with two possible developments; some states may reach a degree of independence in foreign affairs while remaining Communist dictatorships within (as is the case of Yugoslavia); or some nations may conceivably (but this point has so far been reached by none) replace totalitarian communism by some form of democratic socialism (including a two-

Socialist-party system as once suggested by Milovan Djilas) while remaining Soviet satellites in matters of foreign and military policy. In some areas of the world the Soviet Union seems to be satisfied with a non-Communist but pro-Soviet regime. This is, of course, a matter of necessity rather than choice, and therefore hardly applies to the situation in an area under the shadow of Soviet power. At any rate, if such choice were at hand, namely to support either democracy within a loyal Soviet satellite or neutralism of a Communist dictatorship, what line should be taken by the United States?

Campbell's discussion of the desirable in the framework of the possible results in many useful lessons in humility but not necessarily in frustration. As the author points out, "relations within the Communist world have their own dynamics; it was not Western policy that brought about the Tito-Stalin break or the revolt in Hungary." Actually neither was foreseen and both were

scarcely believed when they happened. The same observation applies to the defection of that strange Chinese satellite on the Mediterranean, Albania, in 1960 and the astonishing assertion of economic self-interest on the part of Rumania. In international politics things sometimes go our way not on account of our foresight and action, but as a result of our rivals' errors or simply their incapacity to prevent changes, especially the rise of new and more pragmatic generations.

The book has issued from a scholarly debate in which government officials were involved. It will certainly lead to more debate on both higher and lower levels, including seminar discussions at our colleges and especially at our four war colleges for which the book seems tailored to exact measurement. The book can be recommended as a first-class additional reading for courses on international politics and American foreign policy.—
Ivo D. Duchacek, The City College of the City University of New York.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

RICHARD L. MERRITT Yale University

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

United Nations Forces. By D. W. Bowett. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xxiii, 579. \$15.00.)

Despite the adversity it has known, the United Nations has been more active, more critically involved in international politics, than the League of Nations ever was. The involvement, moreover, has to a remarkable extent been military and quasi-military in character. It is extraordinary that

since 1948, there has never been a time in which, in one or several parts of the world, a group or force comprising military personnel was not operating in the name of the United Nations. Whether in the form of observer groups, or of a military force such as that in Korea, engaged in hostilities indistinguishable from war, or of a 'peace-keeping' force like UNEF in the Middle East or ONUC in the Congo—and whether 200 or 20,000 strong—United Nations Military Forces have in fact played a not insignificant part in maintaining the peace and security of the world.

Professor Bowett, Queens College, Cambridge, undertook the examination of this broad spectrum with the advisory assistance of a study group organized by the David Davies Memorial Institute. Seven collaborators helped him digest the vast amount of documentation. However, the final work, which bears Bowett's imprint throughout, is a unity.

It is a legal study, and it is a most difficult undertaking. In the first place, the use of military forces by the United Nations has in no instance conformed to the pattern envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. In the second place, the resolutions of the Security Council and/or the General Assembly authorizing such use neglect to specify the provisions of the Charter that are being relied upon. The constitutional law of the subject is, then, highly confused. Yet a number of vital issues turn on Charter interpretation, such as finance, the relation of United Nations action to the internal politics of the "host" country, and the question of the consent of the government whose territory is involved. Bowett's is a reasoned and persuasive interpretation. Taking as his guideline the broad purposes of the Organization, he refuses to be rigid. Lauterpacht's characterization of Kelsen's strict interpretation of the Charter is certainly not applicable to Bowett: "the pessimistic tendency to exact the largest possible element of absurdity from an admittedly imperfect document."

Beyond the constitutional questions are numerous and highly novel questions of international law. Many of them are dealt with in the United Nations regulations governing the forces, and in the United Nations agreements with the con-

tributing states and with the "host" countries. These highly interesting documents are, no doubt, the product of the Organization's own lawyers. They are creative acts of unique importance to the legal development of the international community. Bowett's analysis is based to a large extent upon them, upon actual practice, and upon his own perception of still unanswered questions of the future.

Unlike the recent writings of some American scholars. Bowett does not reject as absurd the kind of international force envisaged in the third stage of the disarmament plan projected by the United States Government-a large force, sufficiently equipped, to impose the will of the United Nations on a recalcitrant power. His skepticism is enough, however, to place such a possibility in the distant future. Meanwhile, he sees as urgently necessary, and as within the realm of the practicable, the creation of a permanent force which though incapable of undertaking enforcement measures in the sense of Chapter VII, would be able to perform a "peace-keeping" function after the examples of UNEF and ONUC. The concluding chapter is a proposal for proceeding to that end by carefully prepared stages over a ten-year period. Based upon the already considerable experience of the United Nations, it is a course of action that awaits political consensus, achievable until now only at the moment of crisis, and then only temporarily.

The book is an encyclopedic treatment of the almost bewildering variety of legal problems that surround the United Nations forces. Dire circumstance has created the forces, and out of necessity a new field of international law has followed in train. The book does not tell the story of what has happened, though it is not insensible to the drama of it. It is analytical and thus somewhat disjointed. But this is in the nature of the legal approach. It is a task that very much needed doing. Bowett is to be congratulated on having surmounted the formidable difficulties.—Edward H. Buehrig, Indiana University.

Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System. By DAVID BROOK. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964, Pp. 151. \$3.75.)

There is by now a considerable body of literature on the three most ambitious United Nations peace-keeping operations: the Korean "police action"; the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East; and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). There is, however, a remarkable dearth of literature on the numerous minor UN peace-keeping forces, "UN Presences," and "UN Observer Groups" that have been sent into the field

during the past two decades. For this reason, David Brook's monograph on the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East is particularly welcome.

This reviewer is impressed anew by the sui generis character of each UN peace-keeping operation. Political circumstances, troop composition, and financing patterns have differed from case to case and no easy generalizations are possible. The Brook study demonstrates that there is a lot to learn from the more modest UN operations. After presenting a concise history of the Arab-Israel Armistice System, Dr. Brook proceeds to a careful analysis of UNTSO itself. He discusses the Chief of Staff, the Observer Corps, Local Commanders' Agreements, and the relationship of UNTSO to the Security Council. Perhaps most interesting are the lessons that the author draws from his study.

In the first place, the Brook study demonstrates that UNTSO performed valuable services by keeping lines of communication open between the antagonists during periods of severe political strain. Second, the Observer Corps managed to reduce irritations between military commanders and border populations, and the Chief of Staff became an intermediary between governments that maintained no diplomatic relations. Third. the author describes the ingenious manner in which the Security Council acted as an appeals agency for disputes arising within the local machinery. And finally, the author points out how enemy military officers at times cooperated with one another on matters of infiltration, the apprehension of criminals, and the return of stolen property through the medium of UNTSO.

The general picture of UNTSO that emerges is that of a rather undramatic but extremely useful instrument of peace-keeping. At times, the author states, the observers just "park their jeep, pitch their tents, set up their icebox, and start watching." But this UN vigilance, in the author's judgment, could be profitably applied in other tense areas of the world, especially during periods of transition from active hostility to permanent peace. A UN Observer Group "cannot by itself obtain aims contrary to the wishes of the interested parties. But it is an important tool with which statesmen can help reduce friction if they so desire."

Dr. Brook's careful analytical study is a welcome addition to the body of UN literature and deserves wide attention.—John G. Stoessinger, Hunter College of the City University of New York.

Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965. Pp. xi, 208. \$5.95.)

This small volume by Zbigniew Brzezinski is the second of a series of 12 studies on the Atlantic Community sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, and it is one of two in that series dealing with the external environment of the Atlantic Community. The book deals with the partition of Europe into East and West, but it is focused particularly on Eastern Europe. The discussion is organized into four chapters: the first reviewing the present status of the Eastern bloc in Europe; the second dealing with the political economic and cultural currents undermining the iron curtain; the third analyzing the policies of the USSR, Germany, France and the United States toward Europe's partition. A fourth chapter contains suggestions for future American policy. Sixteen tables and figures at the back of the volume present a good deal of interesting comparative data which illustrates some of the arguments in the body of the text.

This work is to be welcomed as a serious attempt to sort out the tangled patterns of Europe's political life and future and to search for solutions that America might help to reach. The job is done with both skill and knowledge. Thus this book ought to be read by that wide audience concerned with American policy and with the future of Europe.

It is in the first portion of this book, where the author presents an interesting overview of the recent political and economic evolution of Eastern Europe that the reader will find the best this study has to offer. In this portion of the work the author broaches a large number of fascinating subjects: the contradiction between elites and masses in Eastern Europe; the utilization of narrow nationalism by some of the elites for purposes of nationbuilding; the much discussed pattern of liberalization in Eastern Europe; the pattern of change in Russo-Eastern European relations; the occasional role of Stalinism as a force loosening interstate relations behind the iron curtain; the strains that domestic demands on the elites are beginning to place on interstate relations in Eastern Europe. A full list would be long indeed.

On occasion one can pick minor and major quarrels with the author. Let me give one or two examples. Contrasting American relations with Western Europe with those of Russia and Eastern Europe Brzezinski suggests that relations in the West are in better shape (and I agree), but in the explanation proper weight is not given to the fact that Russia's difficulties in dealing with Eastern Europeans are due in some part to the vicissitudes of the industrialization drives. Low standards of living and repression have certainly not endeared Russia to Eastern Europeans. High prosperity, on the other hand, has favored warm relations between Western Europe and America. Brzezinski

makes these points but they seem to get lost in the discussion of other factors.

The conception underlying the discussion of "the ideological neutrality of industrial development" moves me to make a comment. Obviously Communist dogmatists are silly in suggesting that their political system is "better" than ours for industrialization but we should also be careful not to assume at all times that political systems are interchangeable so far as industrialization is concerned.

Some readers may wonder at the realism of the strategic goals suggested throughout this book. The thesis is that America should help build bridges to Eastern Europe, and there can certainly be little disagreement on this point. But the argument suggests that the ultimate goal of the strategy is that Eastern Europeans (with Russian permission) will walk across these bridges into neutrality. But will Russia give permission? Is it really in her interest as she sees that interest to do so? Once Eastern Europe becomes industrial will not Russian control become more sophisticated more invisible, less painful, and therefore more acceptable and secure?

I also have some serious questions as to the central thesis in regard to Germany, i.e. the desirability of German reunification. Is it really prudent to suggest that a reunified Germany is in the interests of Europe and America? Is there not evidence that political moods in Germany and in the rest of Europe have not changed sufficiently from the past to make unification safe? Is it really likely-when one regards the West German elite-that Germany will agree to neutrality, which is rumored to be the Russian price for unification? Granted that Eastern Germany is a political abomination, is it really necessary for greater ties with Eastern Europe that Germany be unified? Is the division of Germany indeed a major source of instability today, and would the instability diminish or increase once Germany were reunified? On many of these questions Mr. Brzezinski has not altogether convinced me.

The reader of this work will be moved—as I have been—to argue. Any good book in this area should stimulate the reader to review his own thinking, to disagree, and to amend—and this is a good book.—A. F. K. Organski, The University of Michigan.

Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War. By Wilfred G. Burchett. (New York: International Publishers, 1965, Pp. 253, \$4.95.)

"The almost vertical watercourses were dry, except for the occasional deep pools, but the stones were greasy with humidity." This sentence appears on the first page of Mr. Burchett's book and represents the last attempt at objectivity in

his treatment of the subject matter. It is to his credit that he makes no attempts to hide his political sympathies or purpose in writing the book, and the reader should be prepared to do a discriminating job of reading. It is unfortunate that one searches the press and literature in vain for an objective evaluation of the activities of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front. The scholarly works on Vietnam have neglected an extensive treatment of the Front as the "experts" have no means of gathering the required information. The treatment given the Front by the news media is highly suspect as western newsmen have consistently claimed that they have been denied access to the facts necessary to file an unslanted story. Their sources of information seem limited to government press releases carefully censored by a bevy of public relations experts. One of the unfortunate facts of contemporary political life is that the goal of having an informed citizenry is sometimes subordinated to what certain elites feel to be the national interest.

For these reasons it seems ludicrous for a person to claim that he is fully informed as to the nature of the Liberation Front, the sources of its support, and the reasons for the war in Vietnam from reading exclusively in conventional western sources. Burchett deals with these issues by questioning the people involved in Front activities and the replies that he reports seem much more plausible in many cases than the more "official" answers. Many of his observations have been largely confirmed by dispatches, that now and then are found on the back pages of newspapers, from "mayerick" correspondents as well as by the huge United States military build-up necessitated by the inability of the South Vietnamese to make any progress in their struggle against the Liberation Front. Burchett's claim that over seventy-five per cent of South Vietnam is under nominal Front control has recently been corroborated by the publication of official maps showing the extent of this control. Similarly, Georges Chaffard, writing for the French magazine "L'Express," has supported Burchett's attack on the myth, generated by the "White Paper," that the Front is largely supplied from the North. Both writers contend from first hand experience that most of the weapons used by the Front are captured from the South Vietnamese or else manufactured by them in their own jungle factories. Finally, his contention that the Front is living integrated with and supported by the peasants is partially attested to by the frustration of American officers who find it necessary to give orders to burn villages to the ground if they offer any resistance whatsoever to troop advances.

Burchett's book also has its bad points. His portrayal of the use of terror in the war as being

completely one-sided is obviously untenable. He can be excused for adopting a clearly partisan point of view in the book, but this does not free him from the obligation to substantiate his allegations and to be discriminating in collecting information. His description of the typical Front controlled village as a small taste of paradise on earth is clearly false. He damages his own purpose by making such naive contentions as well as by using polemical phrases such as "the puppet regime in Saigon" whenever the occasion presents itself.

Mr. Burchett's book is not the most elegant work ever written, but he does present the heretofore unpublished other side of the story in very readable form. After having been subjected to a constant barrage of statements about the necessity and the viability of winning the war in Vietnam from available news sources, the reader is finally faced with the task of critically evaluating both sides of the story. It is the duty of the informed citizen as well as the scholar to weigh the information presented by those at the extremes of political opinion on this issue to seek out what appears to be the most plausible explanation of the events that have transpired in Vietnam in the last six years. When it is found that the channels of information on a complex issue become increasingly constricted, one should worry about having a mind closed to possible alternative policies. Especially for this reason, this book, which contains much revealing and relevant information among the polemics, should be read by anyone who claims that he is qualified to intelligently discuss the merits of current American policy in Vietnam.—Dennis Pirages, Stanford University.

Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe. DAVID S. COLLIER AND KURT GLASER, EDS. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Pp. xii, 207, \$6.00.)

This book of essays, published as volume 9 of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs Series, is the result of an American-German conference held in September 1963 in Wiesbaden. This was the second conference bringing together American and German scholars interested in Eastern Europe, with an added sprinkling of scholars from other European countries and of a few (especially German) politicians. The first conference took place in March 1962 in Chicago (see Berlin and the Future of Eastern Europe by the same two editors). In the meantime a third conference was held in March 1965 also in Chicago (title: Western Policy and Eastern Europe).

The titles of the three conferences suggest clearly the main area of their concern. The current situation in Eastern Europe is questioned. Policy alternatives to the existing (more or less reluctant) acceptance of Soviet control over countries, which have had century long connections with the West, are looked for. Each time about 100 people gathered listening to the major addresses, taking part in vivid discussions, and exchanging views and ideas in private sessions. Whether these discussions are apt to result in policy changes of the West is certainly debatable, especially since some of the participants are political "outs" in their countries. The participating "ins" and the seriousness of the concerns should not be assessed too low, however.

From the volume on Western Integration emerges a series of interesting policy alternatives.

Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University occupies one extreme. He favors a greater share for Western Europe in "the fundamental decisions and responsibilities of strategy" and hopes that NATO with "conventional preponderance" will give the "captive peoples of East Central Europe" more bargaining strength against the Soviets. Increasing flexibility could also be gained by these countries as a result of closer economic ties with the West.

Boris Meissner of Cologne University takes a similar stand. He analyzes Soviet foreign policy in the traditional way as a fusion of nationalistic and ideological elements. History proves to him that the ideological elements will be diluted, as they indeed already are. This dilution suggests to Meissner a policy of contributing "appreciably to the acceleration of the process" so that the West "takes advantage of the opportunities offered by the trend toward a scattering of power in the Eastern bloc."

Wenzel Jaksch, a socialist member of the German Bundestag, becomes more specific in his policy proposals. The West has, as he sees it, proven "the accomplishments of a mixed economic system." And so he notes the necessity of taking up a historical task in the form of a "Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe" to help these people "toward a share in the West European standard of living." This would open for Jaksch "an evolutionary avenue of escape through a great common concept."

Eugene Davidson, the president of the sponsoring Foundation for Foreign Affairs, explores a still more definite stand. The West has to be more active not only in the flow of goods, but also of ideas. Sacrifice may be necessary and is called for to maintain "the first and last line of civilization." The alternative to an active policy of a united West may be an end to Western civilization or its deliverance "to the men who have themselves become machines."

In similar categories operates the argument of another member of the German parliament, Baron Guttenberg of the Christian-Social Union. He observes in the West "indifference, resignation, and not infrequently brutal selfishness." Contrary to other authors he does not notice any major changes in Soviet views and states bluntly "the enemy has not changed his goals." Therefore also the cold war is to continue. And a warning is in place. Do we really have a correct image of the Soviet Union or do we base our present views just on our own wishes?

Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution becomes even more specific. He recognizes our problems as NATO out of joint, American isolationism, and European isolationism. Institutional gadgets cannot solve the situation. Strength of the existing system based on an "ethos of interdependence" is needed, and even more. "Constitutional government" has to be extended eastwards to bring about an "all-European open society."

This is a cross-section of the arguments found in this interesting book. From utilizing changes in the Soviet bloc to replacement of the Soviet system by an open society. The policy-maker will find here materials for challenging explorations. The common element of all the articles is well stated by the editors when they propose more flexibility in Western policy and remark that "such a policy, representing true flexibility, would be best equipped to deal with the alternation of 'peaceful' and violent tactics envisaged by communist strategists."—Jerzy Hauptmann, Park College.

Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy. By Herman Finer. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. xix, 538. \$7.50.)

The intensity of attitudes toward the events of the Suez crisis of 1956 may well be measured by considering the feelings displayed eight years after the event by Professor Finer's work. He has written a highly partisan polemic denouncing John Foster Dulles, and in effect, supporting the British, French and Israeli actions in Egypt.

To understand Finer's evaluation of Dulles, one must realize the type of world in which Finer perceived these events to have taken place. No stranger to controversy, he lets his readers know at all times his attitudes toward all the persons and nations about which he is writing. The work is a mass of obiter dicta on events and people, which a review can but illustrate briefly.

Of the greatest of importance is Finer's view of the underdeveloped world, and in particular, Egypt. Finer, typically, calls Nasser (p. 40) "paranoiac," "juvenile," and "barbarian." Further, (p. 42), "The Soviet Union was now wildly popular with all the Arab peoples...", and (p.43), "... Dulles had before him a Nasser who not only had embraced the Soviet Union, but had

recognized Red China!" The italics are Professor Finer's.

India shares with Egypt Finer's extreme distaste, particularly as personified by Nehru and Krishna Menon. Since Egypt and India took a common position in this situation, they are linked. For example, (p. 56), "Nasser's language is a clear, overt indication of his own personal savagery and despotic temperament." Concluding that paragraph (p. 57), Finer states, "Nehru, some have said, had purposes similar to those of Nasser, but his 'style' was polished and sanctimonious." A favorite Finer device when discussing a nation which ranks low in his opinion is to insert parenthetically one of that nation's sins. Thus India. (e.g., pp. 124, 135) is constantly mentioned as occupying illegally Kashmir, or attacking Portugal (Goa).

On the other hand, those nations which rank high in Finer's favor, that is, Israel, Britain and France, totally escape these pejorative phrases or parenthetical remarks. In contrast, Israel's attack on Egypt is just, and Britain and France are protecting peace and justice in supporting the Israeli attack on Sinai. It remains then, to discuss Mr. Dulles, the American State Department and President Eisenhower against this background of international actors.

Questions concerning the relative degrees of influence of Dulles, Eisenhower, Lodge and the other leading participants; apparent contradictions in American policy during the period; the breakdown in communications and understanding between the United States and Britain; the basic goals of American policy, and the perceptions of the means to attain them—all of these are of the highest interest to political scientists. Finer has performed a vast labor in reviewing the known documents, the journalistic accounts and relevant memoirs. In addition he interviewed a lengthy list of participants on both sides of the Atlantic.

Mr. Finer answers these questions; but in the context of an outspoken argument for one set of actors as opposed to another, his answers are of doubtful validity. His chapter headings indicate the thrust of his thesis: e.g., "Dulles's First Crunch Over Suez"; "The Poisoned Apple: The Users Club"; "Eden Vanquished"; "Dulles Impeaches His Allies"; "Dulles Sanctions His Allies." In short, Finer explains these events in terms of the personalities of the leaders involved; in the United States, that means for him John Foster Dulles, who personifies all American policy.

According to Finer, Dulles dominated the decisions, although Eisenhower's pacific views occasionally enter the picture, and once in a while the Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, and State Department personnel, such as Henry

Cabot Lodge, receive mention. Any inconsistencies in American policy then become facets of Dulles' personality. The question of why he let down his allies, of why he "aided," or "yielded" to, the Soviet Union, helped out Nasser, and was ugly to Israel, all must turn on this one faces.

Finer toys with some of Dulles' basic attitudes, particularly his religious views, his moralism and his anti-communism, but he does not explore them fully. While these get some credit for the final outcome, the significant explanation is Dulles' fear, as Finer sees it, of the Soviet Union. This above all explains American policy concerning Suez in 1956. Any fears Dulles might have had of losing friends among the Afro-Asian countries are interpreted in light of possible relationships with the U.S.S.R. Fears of direct confrontation with Russia, or of Russian participation actively in the Middle East in the form of missiles or "volunteers," these caused Mr. Dulles to waver; vacillate, stall for time, and eventually lead the forces of Russia, Egypt and India to victory over Israel, Britain and France.

Curiously, in Finer's chapter labeled "Dulles Yields to Russia," the events described all took place while Dulles was in the hospital for major surgery. Dulles was operated on November 3rd; the Russian notes threatening Britain, France and the United States, came on November 5th; the cease-fire was on November 6th; and Dulles began receiving documents again, while still in the hospital, on November 8th. But the conclusion, at bottom, remains the same: (p. 512) it was "Dulles's deficiency of nerve in not standing fast at the Suez brink created by Nasser and Moscow;" "... faced with reality in Suez and Sinai, his action was stultified by want of courage."

The adequacy of this explanation can certainly be questioned, especially as Finer is arguing a case, rather than exploring a question. The entire work, with the exception of those pages describing British, French and Israeli actions, is replete with constant Finer interruptions which argue with the actions taken and with the participants, stating wherein they are telling falsehoods, taking incorrect actions, or deviating from Finer's prescribed course of action. The work could be cut by a third if these were removed, or were gathered together in one chapter instead of being repetitiously scattered throughout the text. The fascinating questions posed by this situation are illustrated but not answered. The work, then, is a justification for the British, French and Israeli actions, and a denunciation of Mr. Dulles, bell, book and candle. As such, it is a part of the series of events themselves, rather than an examination of the events .- John H. Millett, Wichita State University.

France and the European Community. EDITED BY SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 176. \$5.00.)

Does De Gaulle really represent France? What is the extent of the "European Community?" Both of these questions became lively after De Gaulle's unilateral rejection of Britain's bid to enter the European Economic Community.

In this publication eight experts from such diverse fields as Romance Literature, International Law, International Economics, History, Agricultural Economics, Foreign Relations, Geography, and Government contribute papers from a three-day conference held in October of 1963. These have been aptly rearranged but there is no commentary or cross-questioning. Only in the first and last essays are De Gaulle and the extent of a future Europe seriously considered. Otherwise this collection fails to treat the European question in the nexus of French politics and eschews discussion of the confines of Europe. Its main focus is the Common Market.

Jean-Jacques Demorest commences the symposium with a witty essay in which he claims that "during the last thirty years French culture has been, if not wholly European, at least the only moving culture in Europe." (p. 13) Because Germany and Italy had abandoned their culture to fascism during the 1930's, it was General De Gaulle who resurrected both France and Europe as he entered Notre Dame in 1944. Demorest links De Gaulle both to key strands of French culture and to Europe's historic mission to serve as intellectual and spiritual leader of the world. Standing between Charles Péguy and Teilhard de Chardin, he safeguards "Europe by promoting France" on the assumption that his is the voice of "the Europe of tomorrow." (p. 14) Nowhere in the six ensuing papers are these propositions taken seriously.

Instead Carl Fulda gives an optimistic legal analysis of the evolution of the Common Market which he calls a "promising teenager" already establishing certain individual rights based on "'federal' law." (pp. 34, 31) Klaus Knorr retorts that EEC must await the test of economic crisis before a really affirmative judgment can be made. He considers De Gaulle's challenge to NATO serious but basically "nationalistic and traditional." (p. 51) In his opinion Western Europe is unlikely to follow De Gaulle's views on confederation.

In a paper misleadingly entitled "French Politicians and the European Communities," Hans Schmidt catalogues the role of individual Frenchmen in formulating the European idea and of staffing European institutions. These heroes of his

presumably represent "something more than political opinion" (p. 63) and he manages to avoid mention of De Gaulle by name (save in one reference to the General's brother-in-law). French battles for a favorable Common Market policy on agriculture and Africa are condemned as expression of narrow French National interest. In his view the present regime in France merely stifles temporarily the continuing European spirit of most Frenchmen.

Paul Minneman's reply is that it is essential that French agriculture be harmonized constructively in EEC if the European idea is to advance. William Diebold reiterates this theme, reminding readers that the monetary reforms of 1958 made France's collaboration in EEC much easier. Critical of De Gaulle's rejection of Britain's bid to enter the Common Market in 1963, he nonetheless recognizes that there is no European Community without France.

Norman Pounds reviews the resources of Western Europe, stressing the role of France in agriculture and evidence of recent modernization. Still far behind the efficiency of America, Western European agriculture is likely to demand at least temporary protection.

In the final essay Zbigniew Brzezinski uses changing Soviet interpretations and policies in response to the Common Market to demonstrate that EEC poses an ideological threat to an increasingly fractured Communist world. He takes seriously De Gaulle's vision of a larger European Community, "Europe to the Urals," considering this a sign that Europe looks ahead. He recommends the use of the ideology of European unity to reunite Europe (accepting the Oder-Neisse line) and to reintegrate Russia in the West.

Ironically the concentration of some contributors on rather rigid views both of De Gaulle and of "the European Community" can have the merit of stimulating greater interest in the subject of De Gaulle, France, and the future of Europe.— LUTHER A. ALLEN, University of Massachusetts.

Law, Politics, and the Security Council—An Inquiry into the Handling of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations.

By TAE JIN KAHNG. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xiv, 252. \$7.80).

In the few instances in which the UN Charter expressly mentions respect for international law as a goal, it refers at the same time to justice: So in the Preamble ("to establish conditions under which justice and respect for...international law can be maintained") and in the provisions concerning the Purposes ("to bring about, by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment

or settlement of international disputes") and Principles of the UN ("all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered"). "Strict" law is thus tempered with justice.

In the same vein, the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it (Article 11(2)), without being bound by international law. And under Article 14 it may "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin . . . " which stipulation is said to be the main Charter provision for the peaceful change of the status quo. In a similar way, the Security Council may "recommend such terms of settlement (of a dispute) as it may consider appropriate" (Article 37(2)), again without having to comply with international law. Of course, UN organs are expected to observe also the Charter provisions other than those authorizing them to make recommendations without regard to international law. However, these provisions permit so many interpretations—as Kelsen has shown in The Law of the United Nations-and there is so little room for the political or judicial review of the constitutionality of action taken under the Charter—as I have tried to show elsewhere—that often the "political" or "legal" character of a given action seems to be a moot question.

The League of Nations Convenant was more emphatic about the observation of the rules of international law: the Preamble speaks of "the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments" and of the "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." However, the Covenant, in the same Preamble provision, also stresses "the maintenance of justice" (how this can be combined with said scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations is another question). Both the League Council and Assembly could make "recommendations which are deemed just and proper" in regard to disputes "likely to lead to a rupture" (Article 15 (4) and (10)), also without being bound by international law. There is, moreover, the famous peaceful change provision of Article 19. And finally, the Covenant, like the Charter, did not provide for judicial review and even less for political review.

Under these conditions which the author of the book under review might have pointed out, it is remarkable that twenty-eight requests for advisory opinions of the Permanent Court were made—all by the League Council which also used committees of jurists. The Security Council, on the contrary, has not asked for a single advisory

opinion of the International Court, has not had recourse to committees of jurists (except for the occasional use of its Committee of Experts), and has recommended only one case for submission by the parties to the International Court while the General Assembly has requested the advisory opinion of the Court in only eleven cases. Why did the Security Council prefer to handle itself legal problems involved in disputes and situations brought before it and how did it handle such problems?

The author of the present work which, originally, was a Ph.D. dissertation at Columbia University, endeavors to answer both questions. He diligently analyses important cases (but not all the cases) which came before the Security Council from the point of view of the competence of the Council, its procedure (meaning, exclusively, voting procedure), and the substantive rights and duties of the parties. His conclusions are quite obvious and so are some of his suggestions (use of rapporteurs, committees of jurists and the Legal Department of the Secretariat) while another (to explore whether the parties would be willing to request the Court to decide the case ex aequo et bono) is less another available "avenue" than a dead end street. This reviewer found Oscar Schachter's recent Hague lectures on The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations which were published after Professor Kahng's book, more enlightening.—Salo Engel, The University of Tennessee.

The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. By Henry A. Kissinger. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Pp. xiv, 266. \$5.95.)

In his classic commentary on American society, de Tocqueville asserted that in the conduct of foreign affairs the United States was not, like the old nations of Europe, "compelled to accept an immense inheritance bequeathed by their forefathers, an inheritance of glory mingled with calamities, and of alliances conflicting with national antipathies." He went on to describe the American propensity for "the gratification of a momentary passion" in its policy, stemming largely from an impatience in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

Henry Kissinger's lucid analysis of the difficulties besetting the Atlantic Alliance can be read from two perspectives. It is, on the one hand, a detailed chronicle of the issues and policies which have brought to an impasse the most successful creation of American foreign policy since World War II. The book may also be read as a measured critique of the American "style" in foreign policy. In this respect, Kissinger stands squarely within the tradition of de Tocqueville; his indictment is

drawn up not so much against specific policymakers or decisions as against a distinctively American attitude toward foreign policy.

Americans live in an environment uniquely suited to a technological approach to policy making. As a result, our society has been characterized by a conviction that any problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise. With such an approach, problems tend to appear as discrete issues without any inner relationship. It is thought that they can be solved "on their merits" as they arise. It is rarely understood that a "solution" to a problem may mortgage the future—especially as there is sufficient optimism to assume that, even should this prove to be the case, it will still be possible to overcome the new problem when it materializes (p. 23).

Kissinger's analysis can be summarized briefly. The cohesive cement of the Soviet threat to invade Western Europe has all but vanished. Concomitantly, American hegemony over Europe has dissolved in the face of other recent events: European recovery from the devastation of World War II; European integration; the end of colonialism; and the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath. Moreover, the end of American nuclear monopoly has called into question traditional assumptions about the function of alliances; faced with the risk of nuclear annihilation, will any partner risk its existence for another? But, owing to "two conflicting conceptions of international order, two different views of the historical process, two variant visions of the future," the lesson of these developments is perceived quite differently in Paris and Washington. In De Gaulle's view, the structure of the alliance has not been modified to reflect these events; many problems of NATO thus stem from the incongruity between the "old structure" and the "new situation." This disparity manifests itself in a series of policy issues which Kissinger examines in detail: force de frappe, the Berlin crisis, the Anglo-American agreement at Nassau, M. L. F., the future of Germany, and others.

While such problems are not American in origin, Kissinger insists that the typical American approach toward their resolution has often aggravated stresses within the alliance. American leaders have tended to impose technical solutions upon political and psychological problems, and to concentrate on the immediate rather than long-term solutions. Moreover, Washington has been remarkably insensitive to the domestic political situations of the allies; changes in policy have often been announced with an almost calculated disregard for political consequences elsewhere in the alliance.

Kissinger's verdict on most issues which divide the alliance is that whereas technical truth resides with the United States, De Gaulle has historical and political truth on his side.

The first seven chapters of this book serve as documentation to refute "the fashionable [Amer-

ican] theory that all problems in the Atlantic Alliance have been caused by one man [De Gaulle]," the solution to which "is to await his disappearance from the scene." The concluding chapter is devoted to some suggestions for revitalizing the alliance. It is in part a tribute to the care with which the author lays bare in detail the multiple roots of the difficulties that his prescriptions—most of which are structural in nature—do not seem wholly adequate.

Occasionally one can take issue with Kissinger's interpretation of recent NATO history. For example, he dates the crucial turning point in the history of the alliance with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. An alternative interpretation, one which seems more tenable, would look back to the Suez fiasco six years earlier. Kissinger indicates that European resistance to American dominance of the Alliance is fed by doubts of genuine support from Washington; fear of a Soviet-American detente at the cost of European vital interests; resentment of the paternalistic self-righteousness with which American policy is presented; and anger with the American propensity to place the governments in London, Paris, and Bonn in political jeopardy with divisive policy pronouncements on which there has been no prior consultation. At no time have such feelings received more substantial empirical support than during the events of July-November 1956.

Such minor criticisms aside, Kissinger's book, prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, stands as the best analysis of present problems—and probable future difficulties—facing the Atlantic Alliance.—Ole R. Holsti, Stanford University.

The European Community and American Trade. By Randall Hinshaw. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 188. 4.95.)

The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe. By Finn B. Jensen and Ingo Walter. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1965. Pp. 278. \$1.95.)

The recent literature on European integration is replete with general analyses which seldom penetrate below the most obvious surface problems, and with normative treatises venting, with greater or lesser amounts of spleen, U.S. outrage at De Gaulle and the frustration of our Grand Design for the future of the Atlantic system. Of these two books, both by economists, Hinshaw's unfortunately falls into both categories, although it is more restrained than most, whereas the work by Jensen and Walter is a notable exception. In spite of being designed as a supplementary text it is a useful contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of integration.

Hinshaw sets out to attempt "a new examina-

tion of the Common Market in terms of American interests." (p. 7) However, there is very little new here. Hinshaw's list of the constituents of America's interests vis-à-vis the EEC is too short and general and too full of unexamined assumptions to serve as a particularly meaningful reference point for analysis. His statements about the policy direction and workings of the EEC betray an unfamiliarity with the complexities and nuances of its internal bargaining pattern. The EEC is judged primarily in terms of its contribution to the solidarity of the West and to the continuation of American leadership of the free world. And we learn that here the community has very mixed credentials, for "apart from being the source of bitter internal disputes which have threatened to paralyze its development (it) has at least temporarily led to an increase in economic and political friction between those Western European countries that are members . . . and those that are not." (p. 10) Furthermore, the community seems almost incvitably destined to become "inward-looking" (although exactly what this means is never made clear). Finally, we learn that most such problems would have been solved had Britain been permitted to join the Community. (This is taken as a basic premise and never examined critically.) But, unfortunately De-Gaulle's protectionist views "have prevailed" (p. 6), and the Community is now "dominated" by "a leader who has a conception of its role very different from that held by its founding fathers . . . or by the many Americans who have placed so much hope in its future." (p. 165) It is "led by a man who has no interest in lowering trade barriers as a means of 'comenting' an Atlantic Partnership" (p. 165)

There are a number of misconceptions here. For example, it is clear that such founding fathers as Monnet and Schuman also have harbored "third force" ideas from the very beginning. One cannot help agreeing with Stanley Hoffman's observation that "the entity to which Europe's nation-states are summoned to transfer their heritage is being duly and pressingly warned not to act as a super power, not to establish any wall around itself, and not to give any preferences, i.e., not to behave as powers have customarily behaved." At the very least, it seems to this reviewer unrealistic to expect the European Community to be the only major trading unit that is not to some degree protectionist and to castigate it so roundly for being as bad as the rest of us. In fact, Hinshaw's own analysis in the very useful substantive chapter comparing tariff rates and tariff structures of nations in the Atlantic area, shows clearly that the EEC's common external tariff is somewhat lower and probably has a less marked incidence on trade than the tariff of either the U.S. or Britain! (It indicates also how much the protectionist French have lowered their tariffs since signing the Rome Treaty.) Similarly, in his interesting chapter on the impact of European integration on U.S. trade, he finds that "trade diversion issuing from the Six and the Seven—if, in balance, it has occurred at all—has been of minor dimensions." (p. 147) In fact American exports of manufactured goods to Europe in 1963 "were exactly twice as high as the \$1.6 billion figure for 1958, the last year before the emergence of Western European tariff discrimination." (p. 156)

Although Hinshaw does not re-examine his premises in the light of these findings, he seemingly has sensed the dissymmetry, for his concluding chapter says very little about the EEC. Its purpose (and perhaps Hinshaw's purpose in writing the book in the first place) is to appeal for a greater measure of free trade on the part of the United States which has even less excuse for being protectionist than the EEC. Here Hinshaw has interesting and controversial proposals to make, namely that we should "re-examine two basic premises of American commercial policy: the premise that trade concessions should be reciprocal and the premise that trade concessions should be nondiscriminatory." (p. 171)

The Jensen and Walter volume sets out to describe and analyze the institutions of the European Common Market, how they work and how they affect people in Europe, America, and underdeveloped countries." (p. v) The introductory chapters on historical background, institutional framework, and basic provisions of the Rome Treaty are clear, compact and informative. Of greatest interest, however, are the subsequent chapters which go beyond an exposition of what the Community is to explore, the basic economic problems it now faces or may soon confront and to begin an examination of how the policy choices here made will affect the future economic and political contours of Europe. Especially valuable are the chapters on agriculture, regional development problems, social policy, labor mobility and the right of establishment, competition, transportation, fiscal and countercyclical policy and problems of monetary condivation.

These areas are indeed the very stuff of the present and future politics of the EEC (as they are of all industrialized nations). Within the confines of space the authors explore in general terms the problem posed in each policy area by the creation of a common market, how like problems have been handled before by the states separately, what alternative solutions have been proposed by Community institutions and the member states, what progress in the direction of common poli-

cies has been made and what progress seems likely. The authors demonstrate a good understanding of the Community's internal dynamics and a more than casual acquaintance with its institutions seen from the inside. The book packs far more useful information into its pages than any other comparable volume this reviewer has seen. It also contains a very good bibliography. Most of the material has not been previously collated or made available to the non-expert, although as with most books on the EEC this one too will date rapidly. Some of the analyses might have been taken farther and economists might quarrel with some of the assertions and projections, but the authors have succeeded in making the book useful for the generalist as well as the specialist.—Leon N. Lindberg, University of Wisconsin.

The Atlantic Union Movement. By ISTVAN SZENT-MIKLOSY. (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, 1965. Pp. xx, 264, \$7.95.)

Professor Szent-Miklosy's work is a handy catalogue of the persons, events, and ideas in the Atlantic Union Movement since the 1930s. It contains a clear chronology of the major steps in the movement and an extensive bibliography. Unfortunately, the presentation suffers from a rather arid, stilted style and a tendency to repetition of fact and personality identification. While the author strives for the contrary, the book is expository rather than analytic, and it frequently labors the obvious—perhaps a virtue for the uninitiated.

Positing that, in the contemporary environment, the major problems confronting the free world are physical survival, avoidance of a nuclear holocaust, preservation of the values of the most advanced civilizations, and aid to the underdeveloped areas, the author proposes to find the most likely assurance of successful solutions to such problems in a unified and powerful Atlantic community. (The query rises, almost unbidden, whether, in the long run, a union motivated by distrust, animated by antagonism, and manifesting its essential nature by a display of power will contribute to peace and freedom as much as it detracts.) From this premise Szent-Miklosy proceeds to examine the movement, its protagonists, and its problems.

As the reader is led through the beliefs of Clarence Streit (the "radical idealist") and others in the movement, the cultural, ethical, and philosophical bases of Atlantic Union, the impact of NATO, the economic objectives and problems of Atlantica, and the influence of the movement in world politics, he must almost inevitably conclude that, in terms of peace and freedom,

Atlantic Union is at once too much and too little to ask of the inhabitants of those units which must merge to form the union. It is too little because, in its realization, the union would be an armed camp competing economically with the opposition to shape the underdeveloped areas in its own image—hardly a heartening atmosphere for the peace dove. It is too much because, despite all the logic and imperative of such union—with whatever advantages might accrue, it simply will not occur presently except on a rather superficial level. (Vive de Gaulle and national sovereignty!)

While one may applaud the movement's ideals of peace and freedom, one has to wonder if the achievement of an Atlantic federation would actually forward their attainment. Surely a union of freedom-oriented societies would likely perpetuate and export this concept. And as long as such a union was viewed as a nucleus for an ultimate globalism, its philosophy and aims were consistent. However, as the shift in thinking occurred—with NATO as the hypnotic bauble—which made of an Atlantic community an exclusive and militant club, the spectre of the ragged ghost of "peace through strength" rose again. Perhaps the United Nations concept has a greater validity.

Obviously, neither the ideology nor the organizational pattern of an Atlantic Union or a United Nations can achieve an earthly Eden so long as the human family remains imperfect as it is, and military preparedness is a must in the face of potential aggression. This truism should not, of course, deter attempts to improve the relations of peoples and nations.

On a more plebian level, the author presents well the case for Atlantic Union in an uneasy world. Somewhat grudgingly, it seems, he also concedes that its creation is not in the offing. The "moderate" (and more realistic?) viewpoint that "cooperation" in NATO, OECD, etc. is the most that can be expected of nation-states enmeshed in the traditions of international anarchy and sovereignty is ascendant.—EMILE B. ADER, Midwestern University.

The Cold War—And After. By CHARLES O. LERCHE, JR. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. Pp. viii, 150. \$4.95 cloth, \$1.95 paper.)

Is the cold war over? The title of the book, the jacket blurb ("The cold war era is over."), and the author's declaration that "the cold war is obsolescent if not yet obsolete" (p. 130) would seem to say so. His modified conclusion, "... the cold war as a system of interaction and as a historic force has almost reached technological

and political obsolescence" (p. 131) places the matter back in the doubtful category. The recommendation that "the United States must in its own self defense build its response to Soviet policy today and in the future upon as generous a measure of caution and realism as it did in the darkest days of Stalinist terror" (p. 51) casts further doubt on the question.

The author has undoubtedly set himself a formidable task. To provide a "strategic analysis" of the cold war in only one hundred and forty-two pages limits his ability to qualify his conclusions, to tie them directly to specific historical situations, or to provide supporting evidence and factual illustrations of his generalizations. Furthermore, by analyzing different facets of the cold war in separate and largely unrelated compartments he frequently seems to be engaged in a running debate with himself as well as the different schools of thought on the cold war.

The conceptual basis of American cold war policy is at first described as inadequate. "Great Britain, it was said . . . , conquered an empire in a fit of absence of mind. The same may be said, and with probably more justice, about the prosecution of American foreign policy since 1945. . . . Never before have so many huge enterprises been launched with so little conceptual unity...." (p. 1) "The American strategic style . . . conceptualizes foreign policy as a series of discrete problems, each to be approached in chronological order on its own terms and on its own merits." (p. 26) Yet, the author firmly rejects the idea that "decisions by great powers are made ad hoc in particular situations without reference to any intellectual or grand-strategic considerations." (p. 20) He does not dissent from the overall American objective of achieving a peaceful world operating under conditions of law and commends the application of the Truman Doctrine to the problem of Soviet expansion. His conclusion that "The conceptual apparatus and the implementing institutions of American strategy in the cold war proved thoroughly adequate to the task to which they were originally applied" (p. 72) is not precisely in accord with his original premise. It turns out that what is needed is a "broader and more sophisticated approach" (p. 75) but the nature of such a new approach is not indicated.

Can Stalin's foreign policy accurately be described as "no more than a minimal outward expansion of the Soviet's security frontier?" (p. 53) Given the author's excellent review of Soviet ideological and strategic motivations is it fair to state that "American strategic self-denial... has permitted—has in fact almost forced—the Soviet Union to adopt a strategy of initiation." (p. 36) If American foreign policy makers are to

be criticized for believing that communists "may change their tactics but never their objectives" (p. 17) what is one to say about the author's judgment that the "Soviet Union still retains its ideology, announces its goal of world communism, and professes a total lack of faith in the intentions of all noncommunists.... The Soviet strategic concept is unswerving across time as well as in theory." (p. 49)

Finally, the strategic quarrel as to whether policy should be made in terms of a potential enemy's capabilities or its intentions is revived. The critics of the Pearl Harbor disaster concluded that because intentions are at best uncertain, easily disguised, and subject to change the the only safe policy was to consider an opponent's capabilities. Such thinkers are regarded scornfully as "possibilists" here. Perhaps "possibilism" has resulted in some inflexibility in American policy but the argument in favor of acting on the basis of intentions would be more convincing if the author showed more faith in the ability of American intelligence analysts to predict Soviet moves accurately.

Despite the foregoing, this book does make a contribution in pointing out that differences do exist between the ideologies and practices of the cold war participants, in emphasizing that tacit agreements have been established on many matters, and in treating the cold war from a broad vantage point.—Hubert S. Gibbs, Boston University.

The Exercise of Sovereignty: Papers on Foreign Policy. By CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 282. \$6.50.)

This collection of previously published essays by a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff reflects a wealth of insights into various important and timely problems obtained through practical experience. Despite the diversity of the subjects discussed and the aphoristic character of some of the essays, the book has a remarkable degree of unity provided by the author's point of view and the coherence of his reasoning. The central theme running through the whole is the persistence of sovereignty as a problem of international relations. The problem, he insists, must be faced; it cannot be explained away. He discusses sovereignty first as the basic condition underlying foreign policy, then its bearing upon the alliances of the United States and upon the United Nations, and finally the role played by it in the relations of the United States with the new nations.

Although the book is interesting and perceptive throughout, the most thought-provoking part is the last. The essays comprising it raise

questions concerning the lack of American success in forming workable alliances with most of the new states and in the realm of conventional warfare. Marshall sees the essential reasons for the former in the American indifference to the new states' need for political progress and the resulting conviction that existing problems can be solved through economic and military aid and administrative reforms. The handicaps encountered in the conduct of unconventional warfare are attributed very largely to what in effect amounts to an ideological bent of American foreign policy, which has committed this country to the universalization of liberal governments while enjoining it from intervening in the internal affairs of other countries.

The practical and moral problems dealt with are of the kind that the statesman at one time or other must face. Written in a lucid and gracious style, the book is free of professional trappings and attempts to conceptualize. Yet it is the work of a thorough going professional. The points made, though frequently common sense propositions, are worthy of the professional's attention. They will guard him against losing sight of the forest for the trees.

The author is objective but not detached. He has no axe to grind nor vested interests to defend. He combines, in admirable proportions, the realist's perceptiveness with the humanist's tolerance. Free of ideological fixations, he cuts through current clichés and avoids providing formulae for solving foreign policy problems. This splendid volume should prove of as much interest to the general reader as to the student.—Peter J. Fliess, Louisiana State University.

The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. The Yearbook of World Polity: volume III. Edited by William V. O'Brien. (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xi, 323. \$7.00.)

This third volume of The Yearbook of World Polity, published under the auspices of The Institute of World Polity of Georgetown University, is concerned with the impact upon international law and organization of the rather sudden entry of a sizable number of new states into the international community. The first three chapters are devoted to an examination of the international legal institutions of state succession, military servitudes, and recognition in the light of the new developments. From the discussions there emerge certain similarities which all these institutions have in common. As far as their origins are traceable, each was tailored to suit conditions which no longer prevail, and the applicability of each to present-day

conditions is doubtful. Although they are intimately related to the most fundamental problems of the existing international order, their substance has become uncertain, and frequently they no longer bear any meaningful relationship to reality.

It is argued that state succession is far too abstract a concept to cope with concrete problems and that the claims made for it suffer from an unrealistic indifference toward the provisions of municipal law. The existing legal rules never imposed very definite obligations in the past and cannot be expected to have greater juridical force in relation to the states that have emerged recently from colonialism. In a similar vein, international military servitudes, through which some states try to maintain troops within the territory of a new state, are condemned as unrealistic and juridically untenable. Derived from the property concepts of Roman law, the principle is ill-suited to solve the political problems with which international law is concerned. It is at best an artificial construct invoked as a legal cloak for intervention and thus a threat to universal peace. A detailed examination of the recognition policy of the United States toward the new nations shows the virtual disappearance of the criteria which in the past were prerequisite to the recognition of new states. Although the increasingly prevalent disregard of ideological factors which has played so eminent a part since the Wilsonian era represents a welcome return to an older and more sensible practice, the authors detect a tendency to destroy "recognition as an institution for factfinding and for assigning legal rights and duties" and justly fear that this will produce a relativism that may subvert the international legal order by driving a wedge between law and reality. The final chapter in concerned with the changes in the nature and power structure of the United Nations following from the indiscriminate admission of an inordinately large number of new states of frequently questionable viability.

This book differs from most recent reexaminations of international legal institutions in that the authors in their search for the roots of existing difficulties are not inhibited by an excessive reverence even for the most fundamental assumptions of international law. There is at least a suggestion that the present inadequacies of international law are ultimately attributable to the inappropriateness of the Grotian system, on which modern international law rests, to the present distribution of power. One can only hope that this suggestion will stimulate further critical examinations of the theoretical foundations of international law and eventually attempts at reconstruction on the basis of concepts that are more in tune with present power realities than

those underlying traditional international law.— Peter J. Fliess, Louisiana State University.

Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International Relations and International Law. By ALEXAN-DER OSTROWER. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965. 2 vols; Pp. 963. \$20.00.)

The role played by language as a uniting and dividing force in international relations is generally acknowledged. Yet it has rarely been the object of detailed scholarly investigation. This neglect is all the more surprising at a time when hopes for the survival of the race are largely staked on the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow to avert disaster resulting from misunderstanding. While the technical problem of transmitting sound has thereby been solved, the linguistic problem remains cause for concern. Ostrower's work is a welcome contribution to our knowledge of the effects of linguistic complexity and diversity upon international relations.

The first part of the book provides the general background. The author discusses in encyclopedic breadth the history of national, international, and diplomatic languages and analyzes linguistic practices in official international relations. His discussion ranges over too many areas to permit a comprehensive review. He takes the reader into the realms of history, philology, archeology, and diplomacy. Particularly impressive are his observations on the need for distinguishing between international and diplomatic language and the role played by national languages as means of international communication. Of equal interest are his attempts to explain why some languages have risen to international and even diplomatic status, while others have played a less illustrious part. Although the ascendancy of a language has often followed the political and military success of the tribe or nation whose possession it was, this has not occurred with sufficient regularity to become a pattern. The author gives a survey of the experiences of numerous empires in the remote as well as the more recent past with reference to the status attained by their languages and explores in each case the cause of linguistic ascendancy and failure. The chapter devoted to an examination of the lack of universality of the Russian language is both timely and illuminating. He sees the reason in the close identification of the language "with the political power of the Soviet Union and the Communist party" which leads us to believe that "we must accept or reject them jointly." And he observes that "what must have been conceived as a means of Russian linguistic advancement by intertwining the language with Russian culture, the Soviet Union, and the Communist doctrine has proved to be a hindering factor to Russian universality in that the future of the language is now dependent on the fortunes of communism in the world community."

Part II is concerned with "Linguistic Provisions in State Constitutions, Treaties, International Engagements, Resolutions and Recommendations of the League of Nations and the United Nations." Part III has to do with "Diplomatic Languages and International Law."

The main weakness of the book is its discursive nature, which gives it a textbookish character. In making his points the author frequently drifts unnecessarily into marginal areas with which the student of history and international relations is well-acquainted. There is, for example, no need to go over the whole ground of rebus sic stantibus in his discussion of the linguistic protection provided for by the minority treaties concluded with the succession states after World War I. On page 713 the reader is finally informed that the many generous digressions are "necessary to any examination of the legal aspect of diplomatic languages," which is contained in the remaining 110 pages.

Aside from the disproportion between the introductory and the main parts of the book, it must regretfully be said that the treatment of the latter does not fulfill its promise. One could only wish that the author had stopped at the end of Part I. Instead of carrying out his professed intention to analyze the difficulties arising in international law from linguistic confusion, he shows little more than the substantive uncertainty of many of the existing principles, which is well-known. Moreover, there is nothing startling in the linguistic uncertainties plaguing international law. That difficulty is germane to all law and for obvious reasons is aggravated in international law.

A word must be added with respect to the footnotes. There are far more than are needed. Many either contribute nothing or document points that are general knowledge. By and large, the footnotes are poorly edited. They are frequently inconsistent and at times fail to conform with generally accepted standards. German citations in particular abound with errors. This does not detract from whatever value the work has, but it is irritating, especially in a book dealing with problems of language.—Peter J. Fliess, Louisiana State University.

Korea: The Limited War. By DAVID REES. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. Pp. xvi+511. \$10.00.)

An uneasy ceasefire along the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea is the symbol of a diplomatic and military stalemate between the East and the West. The partition of Korea itself is part of the East-West struggle and the whole question of war and peace in that area must be examined against the general background of the Cold War. This is the view presented remarkably well by David Rees, a British freelance writer.

Rees contends that Korean conflict was confined to "limited war" not because of the lack of military resources available to the United States in attaining its strategic objective, whether it be a total unification of Korea or total defeat of the Soviet-Red Chinese-North Korean goals, but rather due to political "choice" of the Truman-Eisenhower Administrations (in which "purely military" considerations have been excluded). Such policy decisions were made by the United States because her leaders at the conclusion of the Second World War launched a containment policy against the U.S.S.R. which was not meant to destroy Communism but to halt its expansion, thus practicing realpolitik and waging limited war whenever challenged to do so by the adversary. However, he also points out that the United States has not yet found the answer to how and when the current Communist challenge can best be countered without precipitating nuclear war.

The essential problem of "limited war" is twofold: a) What should be the ends of limited war in an age when total war means annihilation? b) Can the doctrine of limited war be sustained at all? Following the view of Henry Kissinger, that a limited war is a struggle for specific political objectives, Rees equates limited war with political war because "a strategy of limited forces for limited ends . . . is the only one which can conceivably fulfill any rational purpose" if some sort of détente or modus vivendi is ever to be worked out with the Communists. As to the latter question, however, it is doubtful whether the "liberal-puritan" political tradition of all-ornothing outlook in the United States can ever accept force, balance of power and realpolitik as the necessary ingredients of foreign policy. Since the "Korean War was the first important war in American history that was not a crusade," it was immensely difficult to sell to the American people. (A similar analogy can be made about the American involvement in the South Vietnam.)

The author feels that the United States, and the West in general, have not yet fully appreciated the reality that "power and policy, like idealism and Realpolitik, can never be separated and that limited war is the fusion of both..." This was clearly demonstrated by the two incidents—the Truman-MacArthur controversy and the conduct of truce negotiations. The Truman Administration was so preoccupied by von Clausewitz's view of the political nature of war that it

failed to combine its policy with power. This MacArthur felt was the reason for losing the war in Korea; therefore the General proclaimed his belief that the war should be fought to a clear-cut solution as quickly as possible by abolishing all political considerations which restrict the military. As to the conduct of truce negotiations, the United States had curtailed and limited drastically its military operations against the Chinese Communists once the peace talks opened. The Communists had no incentive to make peace until the United States had seriously threatened to use atomic weapons on the Chinese mainland. Meanwhile, the number of casualties on both sides had greatly increased and at the conclusion of the 1953 armistice it was estimated that the West's military casualties had reached 500.000 while the Chinese-North Korean forces had lost one and a half million. Civilian casualties totalled two million, approximately one million on each side during the three-year period.

The Communists, on the other hand, have long realized the inevitable fusion of power and policy and successfully integrated military action, propaganda and political manueuvering, as demonstrated in the year-long peace negotiations at Panmunjom. They are also skillful in using force to advance their long-term objective of world domination because they believe in the absolute supremacy of political considerations in war and peace. Rees, therefore, concludes that the most important lesson of the East-West struggle in the Far Eastern War is that the West must accept that limited war is the fusion of power and policy, irrespective of its moral implications, if we are to "meet the Communist challenge decisively on the most important battleground—our own minds."

Rees is neither an academic political scientist nor specialist in international affairs, and hence his writings are largely historical. Nevertheless. he has successfully incorporated mounting data in the detailed accounts of the military campaigning in Korea-from the initial North Korean invasion to the MacArthur's amphibious landing at Inchon to the subsequent Chinese Communist intervention followed by the latter's mass offensives to the conclusion of the war. The Truman-MacArthur controversy (including the subsequent Congressional inquiry) is thoroughly examined. There are also chapters dealing extensively with topics such as the Maoist theory of war, the Communist "brainwash" of POWs, the role of the United Nations, the Panmunjom peace talks, and the domestic politics in the United States and Great Britain during the war period.

Rees has produced an encyclopedic history of the Korean War at a moment when the United States again is deeply involved in a similar war in South Vietnam. This book is a valuable contribution to the understanding of "limited" wars now going on in other areas of the world. It is well documented and illustrated by photographs and maps. The appendices include the full text of the armistice agreement, the casualties, the various contributions to the United Nations Command, and an extensive bibliography.—John C. H. Oh, The University of Wisconsin, Menasha.

Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals. By Alan H. Schechter. (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xviii, 183. \$10.00.)

Professor Schechter of Wellesley College has put us in his debt by producing a clear and systematic analysis of an important aspect of the jurisprudence of the three tribunals competent to resolve disputes on the basis of law between international organizations and their employees. These are the administrative tribunals of the International Labor Organization (successor at the 1946 demise of the League of Nations to that organization's Administrative Tribunal created in 1927 and now exercising jurisdiction also over certain other specialized agencies as UNESCO and FAO) and of the United Nations (established by General Assembly resolution of November 24, 1949), as well as the Court of Justice of the European Communities (created by the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of April 18, 1951 and renamed and jurisdiction expanded by the March 25, 1957 treaties instituting the European Economic Community and EURATOM). The last named differs from the others in many significant respects, not the least of which is that jurisdiction over disputes between Community organs and their employees is only one aspect of its broad competence.

It is well understood that the proliferation of international organizations having status as subjects of international law, together with the growing importance and size of international secretariats, constitutes important evidence not only of a significant extension of the scope of international law but also of evolution in its nature. No longer can international legal rules be considered applicable solely to the relations of states. International administrative law, concerned with international organizations and their personnel as well as with states, has emerged as an important branch of the subject.

Limited and introductory in its conception, this study examines questions of interpretation of contracts and of staff rules and regulations confronting the three tribunals, as well as the problem of the judicial interpretation of treaties establishing the respective organizations. The author finds the judges of all three tribunals in-

clined to view each problem of interpretation as unique as evidenced by almost total absence of citation of prior relevant decisions by these or other tribunals. This makes for inconsistency as well as for uncertainty concerning future adjudication, Professor Schechter rightly argues, and inevitably retards the development of a more effective legal order.

Comparison indicates that rules of interpretation differ little in the jurisprudence of the three tribunals. In all instances emphasis is placed on ascertaining and giving effect to the intent of the parties, on making effective the right of appeal. and on eschewing restrictive interpretations that would deny equitable relief. The author concludes also that these tribunals, dealing with individuals, are less cautious and more liberal in their construction of the jurisdictional provisions of ambiguous documents than, for example, is the International Court of Justice, confronted with states as parties to litigation. As might be expected from the supranational nature of the European Communities, the European Court of Justice has been especially liberal in the interpretation of treaty provisions granting jurisdiction.

The author suggests but might have examined more fully the essential difference of the communities in which these three tribunals function. This difference in cohesiveness goes far to explain the criticism and controversy surrounding certain decisions of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in the early '50s, for example, in comparison with the favorable reception accorded decisions of the European Court. The author is correct, however, in this reviewer's opinion, in concluding that the law applied by traditional international courts can be significantly enriched by relevant examination of the jurisprudence of international administrative tribunals.—RUTH C. LAWSON, Mount Holyoke College.

Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. By WILLEM F. VAN EEKELEN (The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff, 1964. Pp. ix, 220. Guilders 22.50. Index.)

During the mid-1950's India formulated Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as the basis of her relations with Communist China and also presented them, almost simultaneously, as a new, specifically Asian contribution to world affairs and the conduct of diplomacy. As between India and Communist China these Principles were: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. Nehru thought it difficult to imagine

how anyone could oppose these Principles "unless one thinks that behind them is hidden some evil motive."

There were a few Indian leaders who remained skeptical—especially in view of China's seizure of control over Tibet, an act which extinguished a reassuring buffer state and placed Chinese forces along a common frontier of nearly 1800 miles. But comment in the Indian press and among Indian intellectuals tended to be favorable toward the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954, which enunciated the Principles in its preamble, and toward the Bandung Conference, which expanded upon them in an effort to create a new foundation for Afro-Asian cooperation and solidarity.

Against this optimistic background, how does one account for the Sino-Indian border dispute of the early 1960's and the Chinese Communist invasion of Indian territory in October, 1962? The purpose of the book is to find an answer, and in undertaking this difficult task the author proceeds with admirable detachment and restraint.

The idea for a study of Indian foreign policy originated during the author's posting to New Delhi, between 1957 and 1960, as a member of the Netherlands Foreign Service. These were the years of the Tibetan revolt, the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India, and the first incidents along the Sino-Indian border. "My departure," van Eekelen writes, "coincided precisely with the landing of the aircraft carrying Premier Chou En-lai to the meeting with the Indian Prime Minister which would terminate the preliminary phase of the boundary dispute. The conflict subsequently assumed proportions affecting the entire position of India. It provided the most severe testing ground for Panchsheel . . ."

The author sketches—somewhat briefly—the history of Sino-Indian relations and the status of Tibet, describes the border dispute from early Chinese probes through the Chinese invasion, and discusses both the legal and political aspects of

the conflict. Each step is documented and is analyzed dispassionately. In the end he finds it "almost incredible" that in 1954 India gave up her treaty rights in Tibet without trying to obtain Chinese endorsement of the partially negotiated McMahon Line of an earlier era. But Nehru wholly misjudged Chinese intentions and therefore consented to an agreement which "offered respectability to China while receiving in return only the yague precepts of Panchsheel."

Such errors of judgment underlay many Indian decisions. Time and time again Nehru betrayed insufficient awareness of the traditional Chinese policy of playing down unresolved questions until they could be advanced from a position of strength. "India thus acquired the false conviction that she had been successful in delaying Chinese pressure and in dividing spheres of influence so that China would be content with Tibet and leave the Himalayan states to India. Her main weakness was to ignore the fact that Chinese tactics aimed at expanding influence step by step, carefully consolidating each gain." Rather, Nehru found each step explicable against the background of China's history and legitimate Chinese interests after the revolution.

Not long before the Chinese invasion Nehru declared that India would not maintain independence for long "if we go about seeking military aid from others to defend ourselves." He also thought it quite absurd to talk about China invading India because India was not that weak. The invasion forced a reassessment of India's strength. It also brought about demonstrations that the West would provide aid without demanding alignment and that the Soviet Union would not object to India's receiving such aid. Finally, the invasion showed that, in spite of protestations of Afro-Asian solidarity, India-in a crisis-had more friends in the West than among the many who had professed such depths of solidarity at Bandung.—ROBERT C. NORTH, Stanford University.

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NEWS AND NOTES

With the next number, Volume 60 (March 1966), Austin Ranney of the University of Wisconsin becomes Managing Editor, and James W. Prothro of the University of North Carolina, Book Review Editor, of this Review, as previously announced.

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President-elect, three Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight Council members for two-year terms.

Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Bernard C. Cohen, University of Wisconsin, Chairman; Alfred Diamant, Haverford College; Robert A. Horn, Stanford University; Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina; and Gwendolen M. Carter, Northwestern University.

The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1966.

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

More than 3,000 persons attended the Association's 61st Annual Meeting, held in Washington, D.C., from September 7 to 11. One of the most successful meetings in several years, the highlights included a series of major speeches and general evening sessions, the presentation of research and writing awards, and 48 panel discussions.

The addresses and general sessions were:

Tuesday, September 7,

The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State

Wednesday, September 8,

Dean David B. Truman, President, The American Political Science Association

Thursday, September 9,

"The 1964 Elections: Possibilities for Politi-

cal Analysis"

Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan Donald Stokes, University of Michigan Milton Cummings, Brookings Institution William B. Prendergast, House Republican Conference

Richard Scammon, Governmental Affairs Institute

Friday, September 10,

The Congressional Distinguished Service Awards

Ralph K. Huitt, University of Wisconsin, presiding

The Congressional Distinguished Service Awards-for outstanding service in the 88th Congress-were presented to Reps. William M. Mc-Culloch (R-Ohio), and Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark); and to Sens. John O. Pastore (D-R.I.), and John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky). The award program subsequently was described by Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel of California in a statement in the Congressional Record of October 6. He said, in part:

Mr. President, presentation of the awards was a highlight of the association's 61st annual meeting, which brought some 3,000 political scientists from throughout the Nation to Washington the week of September 6-11. As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, it was an impressive ceremony. All of the 1965 award winners and several from previous years were present, including Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, a recipient of the award in 1959; former Senator Kenneth Keating, also recognized in 1959 when he was a Member of the other body; Senators George Aiken, Paul Douglas, and Leverett Saltonstall; and Representatives Richard Bolling and George Mahon.

Appropriately, the association invited Senator

Everett Dirksen to represent congressional leadership, recognizing at the same time his own contributions to the quality of American life over a long and distinguished career.

While these awards go to the individual Members, it is clear that they have wider implications. They point up the fact that our free elective system produces in Congress public servants of great ability and varied talents. Similarly, Congress offers a wider scope to the capacities of its Members than any other legislative body in the world. And perhaps most significantly, they call attention in a dramatic way to the vital importance of the legislative branch in our democracy.

The recipients of research and writing awards were as follows:

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award: jointly to The Rulers and the Ruled, by Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson; and to Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, by Samuel J. Eldersveld.

The Edward S. Corwin Award: to John D. Sprague, Washington University, "Voting Patterns on the United States Supreme Court: Cases in Federalism, 1889-1959."

Pi Sigma Alpha Award: to James B. Christoph, Ohio State University, "British Political Ideology Today: Consensus and Cleavage." The following awards will be presented at the Association's 1966 Annual Meeting, September 6 to 10, Statler Hilton Hotel, New York City:

Leonard D. White Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation within the general field of public administration, including broadly related problems of policy formation and administrative history. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1965. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department for consideration for the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than April 1, 1966.

Edward S. Corwin Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of public law, broadly defined to include the judicial process, judicial biography, judicial behavior, courts, law, legal systems, the American constitutional system, civil liberties or any other substantive area, or any work which deals in a significant fashion with a topic related to or having substantial impact on the United States Constitution. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1965. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department

for consideration for 'the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than April 1, 1966.

Helen Dwight Reid Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of international relations. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1965. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department for consideration for the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than April 1, 1966.

Pi Sigma Alpha Award: This award is for the best paper presented at the last annual meeting. Established in cooperation with the political science honorary fraternity, the award carries an honorarium of \$250. Nominations for the award are submitted by the annual meeting program section chairmen.

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award: The Association would be pleased to receive recommendations for this award, for the best book published in 1965 on government, politics, or international affairs. Suggestions should be conveyed to the national office prior to February 1, 1966. The award carries an honorarium of \$1,000.

Public Affairs Reporting Awards. In mid-November, thirteen eastern newspaper reporters were honored for excellence in the reporting of public affairs in an Association-sponsored reporting awards competition. The winners attended a four-day conference at Lake Harmony, Pennsylvania. Seminar leaders included political scientists, journalists, and public officials. Winners and their newspapers were:

Paul B. Beers, Harrisburg Patriot-News
Rugledge E. Carter, Albany Knickerbocker
News

Robert De Lazaro, Elizabeth Daily Journal
Philip Feldman, Rochester Times-Union
Stephen B. Goddard, Hartford Times
Joseph V. Gormley, Brockton Enterprise-Times
Robert L. Hassett, Boston Herald
Ronald Kessler, Boston Herald
John D. Husband, Harrisburg Patriot-News
Gloria Landers, Perth Amboy Evening News
Ian E. McNett, Perth Amboy Evening News
James Mahan, Springfield Daily News
Joseph A. Meyers, York Dispatch
Kenneth Schlossberg Washington Daily News
Anthony Speranza, Ridgewood newspapers

Speakers at the seminar were:

Richard Fryklund, Washington Evening Star Earl Mazo, Readers' Digest John Herling, John Herling Labor Letter, Inc. William Prendergast, Republican Policy Committee

Ben Bagdikian, Saturday Evening Post John Stewart, Assistant to the Vice President Neil Peirce, Congressional Quarterly Ralph Huitt, Department of Health, Education and Welfare Warren Miller, Survey Research Center D. B. Hardeman, Trinity College William Rivers, Stanford University

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Sixty-first Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association

Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:20 A.M., September 7, 1965, at the Sheraton-Park Hotel in Washington, D.C., with President David B. Truman presiding. The following members of the Council, nominees for election in 1965, and former presidents of the Association were present: H. Field Haviland, Samuel Hendel, John C. Wahlke, Alex Dragnich, Marian D. Irish, Marver H. Bernstein, John Kautsky, William Riker, Lucian W. Pye, Charles D. Farris, Joseph Tanenhaus, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Emmette S. Redford, Manning J. Dauer, Rupert Emerson, Robert McCloskey, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, Max M. Kampelman, Gabriel A. Almond. Charles S. Hyneman, Lawrence Herson, Byrum Carter, Warren E. Miller, Heinz Eulau, Harvey C. Mansfield, Robert A. Dahl, Karl W. Deutsch, Frederic Cleaveland, James L. McCamy, James K. Pollock, Wallace Mendelson, Victor G. Rosenblum, and William Anderson.

Prior to the meeting the Executive Director had mailed to each Council member an agenda book which included reports of the Executive Director, the Editor of The American Political Science Review, the Treasurer, and the Auditor, as well as the minutes of the Executive Committee meetings during the past year.

The President reported briefly on the activities of the Executive Committee since the last meeting of the Council. He announced that Harvey C. Mansfield was retiring after ten years of service as editor of The American Political Science Review. The Executive Committee had given careful consideration to the difficult task of selecting a new editor and it unanimously recommended the name of Austin Ranney. The Council unanimously approved the selection of Ranney as editor. The Council then unanimously approved the editorial board nominated by Ranney: Robert Lane, Harvey C. Mansfield, Roland Pennock, Warren E. Miller, Vernon Van Dyke, Walter

Murphy, John E. Turner, and Myron Weiner. It was announced that James W. Prothro has been selected as book review editor.

Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, summarized the highlights of his report, which had previously been distributed. The Association staff has been spending an increasing amount of time planning tours and programs for foreign visitors to this country. The Association will make an effort to secure foundation grants to facilitate the travel of political scientists from this country to attend political science conferences abroad and to make it possible for foreign political scientists to participate in panels at the Association meetings. Members of the Council expressed strong approval of this undertaking. A new award, the Helen Dwight Reid Award, will be presented at the next annual meeting for the best Ph.D. dissertation in the field of international relations. Dr. Kirkpatrick announced that the authors contributing to a book edited by Stephen K. Bailey, American Politics and Government, had agreed to contribute their royalties from the book to the American Political Science Association. A vote of thanks was approved by the Council.

The Executive Director raised the problem of misuse of papers presented at meetings of the American Political Science Association. Such papers have, on occasion in the past, been misquoted or used without attribution or without permission. The Council approved the Executive Committee's proposal that the Association copyright all such papers to protect the authors. Permission to use material from such papers would then have to be obtained from the authors. Members of the Council indicated their agreement with the suggestion of the Executive Committee that space be made available in the program of the annual meeting or in the REVIEW to provide information about research in progress. The Executive Director described a proposed new procedure to be followed at annual meetings in arranging talks by Democratic and Republican speakers. The Association will set aside facilities and time on the program to enable each of the two parties to present whatever program it desires. The Association itself will not serve as sponsor of such talks and will not undertake to find appropriate speakers. The Council unanimously approved the proposed procedure.

The Treasurer submitted a report indicating that the financial condition of the Association continues to be strong. He pointed out that a table showing the growth of the Association's income and expenditures at ten-year intervals demonstrates how rapidly the Association has been growing in the scope of its program. The Council approved the budget as submitted for the 1965-66 fiscal year. The Council voted its thanks to those who have donated funds to the Association.

The Editor of the Review, in his final report, noted that the circulation has passed the 12,000 mark and that costs are continuing to rise. He noted an increase in the number of manuscripts received, from 225 to 284, for the first time in several years. A total of 38 were published. He thanked the editorial board and all the others who had assisted him in preparation of the Review during the ten-year period. The Council voted a resolution of thanks to Harvey C. Mansfield for his long and devoted service.

The Program Chairman, H. Field Haviland, reported on the 1965 program and stressed the need of making greater use of volunteered papers, as part of regular panels. The Program Chairman for the 1966 meeting, Ithiel de Sola Pool, announced that there will be a larger number of plenary sessions dealing with broad themes in political science and focused on the theme of unity among the older and newer techniques in political science.

The Council discussed at length the problem of publishing a Directory more efficiently and more frequently, and also discussed the related problem of developing more modern methods of recordkeeping at the Association headquarters. It heard recommendations from Mr. Ed Lehman, of Herner and Co., for using computer techniques to accomplish both of these purposes, and specifically to make possible frequent supplements to the Directory and the publication of subsequent editions at relatively low cost. The Council approved the principle of modernizing the techniques for publishing the Directory and keeping records and instructed the Executive Committee, in consultation with knowledgeable Council members, to take the steps necessary to implement this decision.

The Council discussed and referred to the Executive Committee proposals for defining various categories of membership in the Association. It was the sense of the meeting that a distinction between members and persons or institutions merely subscribing to the Review would be useful but that it was not desirable to create several

categories of members. The Council discussed the question of developing a code of ethics for the profession and possibly creating some machinery to implement such a code or enforce it. It was agreed to refer the question back to the Executive Committee without instruction and without bins

The Council adjourned at 4:30 P.M.

MALCOLM E. JEWELL, Secretary

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President David B. Truman in the Park Ballroom of the Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., at 4:30 P.M., September 8, 1965.

President Truman, in brief introductory remarks, thanked the officers and staff of the Association for their assistance during his term of office.

The Executive Director, Evron Kirkpatrick, outlined the activities and programs of the Association and pointed out that his full report was available for the members, as were the reports of the Treasurer and Editor of the REVIEW. He noted that the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award once again includes a prize of \$1,000. The award is given for the best book published during the preceding year on government, politics, or international affairs. He announced that a new award, the Helen Dwight Reid Award, will be given for the best Ph.D. dissertation in international affairs. He emphasized that the political science profession is playing an increasing role in the National Science Foundation, and that the Foundation has granted a number of fellowships in political science during the first year of this program. He stressed the wide range and scope of activities in which the Association continues to be engaged.

The Treasurer, Max Kampelman, reported that the Association remains in good financial condition and that its assets continue to grow. The operating reserve fund is now \$150,000, the level authorized by the Council. The general endowment and trust fund is now over \$255,000, compared to \$133,000 two years ago. The report of the Treasurer was accepted by the members.

The Editor of The American Political Science Review summarized his written report. He noted that the problems of editorial judgment have been increasing because of the growing proportion of articles and manuscripts submitted that rely heavily on or are devoted primarily to mathematical techniques. Another trend that creates problems is the erosion of distinctions among disciplines.

James W. Prothro, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, announced that the Committee recommended the following slate:

President-Elect: Robert A. Dahl (Yale University)

Vice Presidents: Manning J. Dauer (University of Florida), William T. R. Fox (Columbia University), Rupert Emerson (Harvard University)

Secretary: John H. Kautsky (Washington University, St. Louis)

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D.C.)

Members of the Council (two-year terms): James C. Davies (University of Oregon), Alex N. Dragnich (Vanderbilt University), Heinz Eulau (Stanford University), Samuel Hendel (City College of New York), Wallace Men-

delson (University of Texas), Laurence I. Radway (Dartmouth College), William H. Riker (University of Rochester), Victor G. Rosenblum (Northwestern University)

Mr. Prothro moved approval of the nominations. There were no other nominations and his motion was unanimously approved.

President-Elect Dahl was invited to the platform. President Truman turned the gavel over to the incoming President, Gabriel Almond.

President Almond declared the meeting adjourned at 5:20 P.M.

MALCOLM E. JEWELL, Secretary

The twentieth annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association will be held on the Reno campus of the University of Nevada, March 24–26, 1966.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Institute for Advanced Studies in Contemporary History, founded in 1964 in London, launched its program of research in October, 1965. Established on the basis of and in association with the Wiener Library in London, the Institute devotes its research to the study of 20th century European history. The Library's large collection of books, documents and newspaper clippings on Central European affairs is being systematically extended to cover other parts of Europe as well. The Wiener Library was originally founded in Amsterdam in 1933 and was transferred to London in 1939. It specialized in the study of fascism, anti-semitism etc.

The Institute, inter-disciplinary in character, is not concerned with current political events, nor is it exclusively devoted to the study of Nazism. The independent non-governmental character of the Institute enables it to sponsor and carry out projects which are not usually undertaken by European university departments. One of its aims is to help solve the problems of growing specialization and to close the gap between specialists in different fields and between the specialist and the interested layman.

The Institute hopes to do this by approaching subjects from a broad but concrete and scholarly perspective. The Institute seeks the cooperation of graduates in the United States and on the Continent. It is willing to put its limited, though in some respects unique, resources at the disposal of American scholars working in the field of international affairs and contemporary history and to provide contacts with other research institutions in Europe. The Institute is particularly interested in establishing links with American

academic institutes specializing in contemporary European studies with a view to collaborating on specific research projects, offering facilities on a reciprocal or jointly sponsored basis.

The Institute is preparing a new quarterly journal, the Journal of Contemporary History, the first number of which will be published in January 1966. It is edited by Walter Laqueur, director of the Institute, and G. Mosse, University of Wisconsin. Each issue will normally be devoted to one central topic, but there will also be more general issues.

Enquiries may be addressed to: The Director, The Institute for Advanced Studies in Contemporary History, 4 Devonshire Street, London, W.1. England.

In anticipation of the 50th anniversary of the Russian revolutions of 1917, Radio Liberty and the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich have launched a project entitled "The Past Is Prologue."

The aim of the project is to collect oral memoirs of as many participants in and witnesses of these events as are alive today and would be willing to contribute. It is hoped that the material gathered would present a broad political, social, economic and cultural panorama of the Russian Empire in 1917 and thus contribute to a more complete understanding of those fateful events. This project is intended as a public service to the academic community and press, radio and television writers who might wish to add new factual material and sound actualities to documentaries on the revolutions of 1917. Radio Liberty hopes to be able to use certain portions of these oral

memoirs in its special programming, but only with the express authorization of the contributors. The Institute for the Study of the USSR plans to incorporate some of the material in its publications devoted to the 50th anniversary of the Russian revolutions.

By agreement with Columbia University transcripts of the oral memoirs will be deposited in the University's Oral History Collection.

Anyone willing to contribute to the project, or who knows someone who can, is requested to communicate with Mr. V. N. Rudin, Radio Liberty, Lilienthalstrasse 2, Munich 19, Germany, or Mr. Gene Sosin, Radio Liberty Committee, 30 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New York.

The Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois conducted its 7th annual assembly on public affairs in January 1965. The subject was Private Groups in Illinois Government. Some 35 academicians, newspapermen, public officials and pressure group representatives took part in the conference. The background papers were prepared by James H. Andrews and the findings of the assembly have been published.

T. W. Adams, socio-political specialist in NASA Headquarters Policy Planning Division, has received the Certificate for Achievement from the Department of the Army for his work as author of an area handbook on Cyprus.

JON ALEXANDER will be a Francis Drown Foundation scholar during the 1965-66 academic year at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara.

JOHN ARMSTRONG, University of Wisconsin, has been elected president of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

WILLIAM BALLIS has returned to the University of Michigan after an absence of two years. In 1963-64 he was on research leave in Europe and during 1964-65 he served as the Nimitz professor at the Naval War College.

OLIVER E. BENSON, director of the Bureau of Government Research at the University of Oklahoma, has returned to his position after a year's sabbatical leave. He has been elected president of the International Studies Association for 1965-66.

Thad L. Beyle has been appointed a research associate on the staff of "A Study of American States" at Duke University. The study is under the direction of former Governor of North

Carolina, Terry Sanford, and is financed by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation.

DAVID A. BINGHAM, University of Arizona, will conduct research during a 1965-66 sabbatical leave.

NORMAN BLUME, University of Toledo, is on research leave in Brazil.

ROBERT P. BOYNTON and DEIL S. WRIGHT, University of Iowa, attended the annual conference of the International City Managers Association in Montreal, September 19–23. They presented a progress report on their study of council-manager operations in the United States.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, University of Maryland, has been appointed by the Governor of Maryland to be a member of the Constitutional Convention Commission and will serve as the chairman of the Committee on Style.

MARK W. CANNON, director of the Urban Development Project in Venezuela of the Institute of Public Administration of New York, has become associate director of IPA/NY.

Donald S. Carlisle, University of Wisconsin, is on leave of absence and will spend the 1965-66 year at the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

J. LEO CEFKIN, Colorado State University, is serving as senior visiting lecturer at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland during a fifteen-month leave of absence.

H. D. CHERRY, Baylor University, is serving as an administrative assistant to Senator Ralph W. Yarborough during a year's leave of absence.

Bernard Cohen, University of Wisconsin, is a visiting research scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during 1965-66.

PATRICK J. CONKLIN, University of Missouri, is on leave for a twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1965. He is serving as associate director of the Executive Seminar Center, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Kings Point, New York.

WILLIAM J. CROTTY, University of Georgia, has been awarded a research fellowship by the Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration at the University of Oregon for the 1965-66 year.

JOHN T. DORSEY, Vanderbilt University, has returned to his post after an eighteen-month research leave in São Paulo, Brazil.

CHARLES W. DUNN, The Florida State University, is working as an assistant to the Governor

of Washington during 1985-66, under the auspices of the NCEP.

- G. Homer Durham, president of Arizona State University, is serving a three-year term as a member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. He was appointed by President Johnson on February 15, 1964.
- E. S. Efrat, University of Victoria, B.C., has been elected to the executive council of the Western Political Science Association.

HERBERT EMMERICH, University of Virginia, was re-elected president of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences at the organization's XIII congress held in Paris, July 19, 1965.

JOHN G. ERIKSEN, University of Oklahoma, was elected president of the Southwest Slavic Conference for 1965-66. He was also elected to honorary membership in the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

EDWIN H. FEDDER, Hollins College, is spending the 1965-66 year at the Ohio State University where he is directing the Mershon Western Alliance project. He has served during 1965 as the president of the International Studies Association, Southern Division.

JOSEPH R. FIZMAN, University of Oregon, acted as director of a month-long, interdisciplinary institute of Comparative Communist Systems and Ideology held on the campus of the University from June 21 through July 16, 1965. He has also been selected a second time to participate in the exchange between American and East European institutions of higher learning. He will be in Europe during most of the 1965-66 academic year.

G. James Flemming, Morgan State College, is spending the 1965-66 year in Africa. He will visit fifteen countries.

CONNER FLOWERS, The Citadel, is on leave to Columbia University during 1965-66.

DONALD M. FREEMAN, University of Arizona, will represent the University in the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

THOMAS V. GARCIA, University of Georgia, is now engaged as associate director, Executive Institutes, Office of Career Development, U.S. Civil Service, Washington, D.C.

ELLIOT R. GOODMAN is on leave from Brown University during the current academic year.

Daniel R. Grant, Vanderbilt University, was on research leave during the fall term.

HARRY A. GREEN, The Florida State University, has been named assistant director of Florida's Office of Equal Opportunity. He will serve during 1965-66.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN has returned to his position at Wesleyan University from a year as a fellow in the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

JOEL B. GROSSMAN, University of Wisconsin, is on a study and research leave at the Law School of Harvard University.

EDWARD HANDLER, Babson Institute, has been awarded a research fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies.

WILLIAM JOHN HANNA, formerly of Michigan State University, has accepted the post of research scientist with the Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C.

JOHN S. HARRIS, University of Massachusetts, was on research leave during 1964-65 in Great Britain on a Rockefeller grant.

DAVID K. HART has returned to Brigham Young University after two years as a Danforth fellow at Claremont Graduate School.

HARRY HOLLOWAY has returned to his position at the University of Oklahoma after a year's leave of absence during which he conducted research under a Rockefeller grant.

Franklin W. Houn is on research leave from the University of Massachusetts during 1965-66 and is serving as a research associate at the Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University.

HAROLD K. JACOBSON, University of Michigan, is on a year's sabbatical leave and is engaged in research in Geneva, Switzerland.

Kenneth F. Johnson, Colorado State University, is associated with the Defense Research Corporation during the current academic year.

EARL O. KLINE has resumed the chairmanship of the department at The Citadel after serving as a visiting professor at Duke University during 1964-65.

MARIAN D. IRISH, The Florida State University, has been named editor of the *Journal of Politics*.

WALTER H. C. LAVES, Indiana University, attended a seminar on local government and community development in Honolulu. Representatives of five countries participated.

ARPAD VON LAZAR, Vanderbilt University, lectured for the USIA in West Germany, Austria and Switzerland during the 1965 summer.

EDWARD N. MACCONOMY, formerly Chief of the Stack and Reader Division of the Library of Congress, has been promoted to Assistant Chief of the Library's General Reference and Bibliography Division.

RUTH MINER, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater, spent the 1965 spring term studying at the London School of Economics.

FRANK MUNGER is on leave of absence from Syracuse University during 1965-66.

CARL D. McMurray, The Florida State University, has received an NCEP grant to become the assistant to the Governor of Idaho during 1965-66. He will also act as the staff director for the National Republican Governors' Conference.

FRED W. NEAL, Claremont Graduate School, will be in Trinidad during 1965-66 under a Rockefeller grant and a Swiss Technical grant. He will set up a program of international studies at the University of West Indies and an institute for the training of foreign service personnel.

MARTIN C. NEEDLER has accepted an invitation to be a research associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs during 1965-66 and will be on leave from the University of Michigan. He has also received an H. H. Powers Traveling Fellowship for travel in Latin America.

SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, University of Iowa, spent the 1965 summer in Washington, D.C. conducting research under the auspices of the APSA's Study of Congress.

JOSEPH PLANINSIC, Duquesne University, has been transferred from the political science department to the University's Institute of African Affairs.

Nelson W. Polsey, Wesleyan University, is spending the 1965-66 academic year as a fellow in the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. JOHN ROCHE is on leave from Brandeis University. He will lecture in Europe for part of the year and will devote the rest of his time to a research project for which he has received support from the Rockefeller Foundation.

THOMAS M. SANFORD has returned to his position at Wesleyan University. During 1964-65 he was on sabbatical leave in Berkeley.

WALLACE S. SAYRE, Columbia University, is holding the Ford Foundation Research professorship during 1965-66. He will spend part of the year in England.

KARL N. Snow has returned to Brigham Young University after a year's leave of absence which he spent at the University of Southern California.

ROBERT H. STERN, the State University of New York at Buffalo, is on leave during the current academic year. He will lecture at the Paris Institute of American Studies during part of the time.

James A. Storing, dean of faculty at Colgate University, was in Norway on a Fulbright research grant during the spring term of 1965.

PETER A. Toma, University of Arizona, will be on sabbatical leave from February to July, 1966.

THOMAS L. THORSON, University of Wisconsin, will be on leave with the Rockefeller Foundation during 1965-66.

HARVEY WALKER, The Ohio State University, spent the summer in Europe collecting materials on local government.

JOHN P. WHEELER, JR., has returned to Hollins College after a year as director of studies at the University of Trinidad.

M. Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin, will teach and do research at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, during 1965-66.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

DAVID ADAMANY, instructor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

DAVID BALDWIN, assistant professor, Dartmouth College.

MICHAEL BARKUN, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

JOHN T. BATCHELDER, instructor, University of Iowa.

JOEL BEISER, Kent State University.

Howard Bliss, assistant professor, Dartmouth College.

James Bolner, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts; formerly of the University of Alabama.

ROBERT J. BRESLER, assistant professor, University of Delaware; formerly of the Green Bay Center of the University of Wisconsin.

RICHARD BUTWELL, professor and director of Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky; formerly of the University of Illinois.

ALLEN W. CAMERON, instructor, Bates College.

DWIGHT MARCUS CARPENTER, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

FLORENCE CASEY, instructor, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

JOHN R. CHAMPLIN, instructor, Ohio State University.

SHIRLEY CHAPMAN, assistant professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of Vassar.

PHILLIP C. CHAPMAN, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of Lawrence University.

RONALD I. CHEFFINS, associate professor, University of Victoria.

WILLIAM O. CHITTICK, assistant professor, The Florida State University.

· MARY CLAWSON, assistant professor, Montgomery Junior College.

LEON S. COHEN, assistant professor, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly of the University of North Carolina.

GEORGE COLE, instructor, Allegheny College.

H. RICHARD CORNELL, assistant professor, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Kenneth M. Dolbeare, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin; formerly of Hofstra University.

Wonmo Dong, assistant professor, Kentucky Wesleyan, 1965-66.

Russell Edgerton, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

WILLIAM W. ELLIS, assistant professor, Northwestern University.

EUGENE EVANS, West Kentucky State College; formerly of the University of Kentucky.

EDWARD FEIT, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts; formerly of the University of Michigan.

JOSEPH M. FIRESTONE, lecturer, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

MURRAY FISHEL, assistant professor, University of Denver, 1965-66.

FREDERICK FLERON, instructor, University of Kentucky.

Donald M. Freeman, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of Charlotte College.

Peter French, instructor, Syracuse University.

FRED M. FROHOCK, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

Charles Garrison, instructor, Colorado State University.

MARIANNE GITHENS, assistant professor, Goucher College.

SHELDON GOLDMAN, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts; formerly of Harvard University.

GEORGE J. GORDON, University of Toledo, 1965-66.

H. GAYLON GREENHILL, associate professor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

GEORGE G. GRAHAM, assistant professor, Vanderbilt University.

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH, professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

RAYMOND N. HABIBY, assistant professor, Oklahoma State University.

HOWARD D. HAMILTON, professor, Bowling Green State University; formerly of Indiana University.

JONATHAN P. HAWLEY, assistant professor, University of Tulsa.

KLAUS H. HEBERLE, associate professor, Oklahoma State University.

A. Spencer Hill, associate professor, University of Nevada; formerly of Eastern New Mexico University.

JOHN HODGSON, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

JOHN C. HONEY, professor, Syracuse University; formerly associate director of the Institute of Public Administration.

GARY HOSKIN, lecturer, State University of New York at Buffalo.

IRVING HOWARDS, professor and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Massachusetts; formerly of Southern Illinois University.

RONALD F. HOWELL, professor, Long Island University; formerly of Emory University.

JOHN A. JACOBSOHN, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

Judson L. James, lecturer, Rutgers—The State University.

LLOYD JENSEN, assistant professor, Northwestern University; formerly of the University of Illinois.

Yung-Hwan Jo, assistant professor, Colorado State University.

JOHN P. JONES, lecturer, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

RALPH G. Jones, professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of the University of Arkansas

MELVIN KAHN, associate professor, Southern Illinois University; formerly of Indiana State University.

JOHN KESSEL, Arthur E. Braun professor, Allegheny College; formerly of the University of Washington.

Jung-Gun Kim, assistant professor, East Carolina College.

ILPYONG JOHN KIM, lecturer, Indiana University, 1965-66.

JOHN W. KINGDON, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR., professor, Brown University; formerly Executive Director-Comptroller of the CIA.

BYRON G. LANDER, Kent State University.

Kenneth P. Langton, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

ELDON LANNING, assistant professor, Bowling Green State University; formerly of Louisiana State University.

JERRY LANSDOWNE, instructor, Colorado State University.

WILLIAM LAUX, assistant professor, Colorado State University.

LESLIE LAZLO, assistant professor, Sir George Williams University, Montreal; formerly of the University of Virginia.

PAUL LEARY, instructor, Dartmouth College.

R. WILLIAMS LIDDLE, instructor, Ohio State University.

LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, instructor, Lawrence University.

NORMAN LUTTBEG, assistant professor, Southern Illinois University.

ROY C. MACRIDIS, professor, Brandeis University.

ALVIN MAGID, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, professor, Columbia University; formerly of Ohio State University.

ANDREW MARTIN, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts.

JOHN F. McCamant, assistant professor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

DONALD J. McCrone, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

ERNEST G. MILLER, lecturer, University of Washington.

LEONARD G. MILLER, assistant professor, State University of New York at Albany; formerly of Kenyon College.

Edward L. Miles, instructor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

RICHARD B. MULLER, lecturer, Indiana University, 1965-66.

DAVID A. NICHOLS, instructor, University of Connecticut.

Felix A. Nigro, professor, University of Delaware; formerly of San Diego State College.

ERIC NORDLINGER, assistant professor, Brandeis University.

MICHAEL O'LEARY, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

MICHAEL PARENTI, Sarah Lawrence College.

O. WILLIAM PERLMUTTER, professor, Kent State University.

JEFFREY PHILLIPS, assistant professor, The Citadel, 1965-66.

Daniel Di Piazza, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

GEORGE PLATT, assistant professor, University of Iowa.

PAUL K. POLLOCK, instructor, Beloit College.

ROBERT PRANGER, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

CAROLYN PRATT, instructor, University of Oklahoma.

AMIR RAFAT, Kent State University.

Barbara Reardon, preceptor, Columbia University, 1965-66.

Bradley M. Richardson, assistant professor, Ohio State University.

ALAN I. RITTER, acting assistant professor, University of Virginia.

EARLE B. ROBERTS, Kent State University.

LEON I. SALOMON, instructor, University of Connecticut.

James R. Scales, professor, Oklahoma State University; formerly president, Oklahoma Baptist University.

STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, University of Wisconsin; formerly of the University of California at Davis.

GORDON J. SCHOCHET, lecturer, Rutgers—The State University.

ENID CURTIS BOK SCHOETTLE, lecturer, Swarthmore College.

Donald O. Schoonmaker, instructor, Wake Forest College; formerly of the University of Maryland.

DAVID C. SCHWARTZ, assistant professor, University of Pennsylvania.

DONALD E. SECREST, instructor, University of Oklahoma.

IRA SHARKANSKY, assistant professor, The Florida State University.

JACK SHICK, assistant professor, Lake Forest College.

John D. Shinglar, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin, 1965-66.

RICHARD L. SIEGEL, instructor, University of Nevada.

ZDENEK SLOUKA, lecturer, Columbia University.

MARIO SPALATIN, instructor, The Florida State University.

DONALD SPRENGEL, the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Iowa.

JOHN STANLEY, acting assistant professor, University of California at Riverside.

EDWARD A. STETTNER, instructor, Rutgers—The State University.

NEWELL M. STULTZ, assistant professor, the Center for East Asian Language and Area Studies, Brown University.

RICHARD L. SUTTON, instructor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

JOSEPH SZYLIOWICZ, assistant professor, the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

JOSEPH TANENHAUS, professor, University of Iowa.

C. D. Tarlton, assistant professor, University of Victoria. B.C.

WILLIAM F. TROUTMAN, Jr., professor, East Carolina College.

FREDERICK C. TURNER, assistant professor, University of Connecticut.

PANYOTIS J. VATIKIOTIS, professor, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; formerly of Indiana University.

JOHN VLOYANTES, associate professor, Colorado State University.

MARK WARDEN, instructor, Lake Forest College.

C. R. Watts, assistant professor, The Citadel.

JOHN WENUM, instructor, Lake Forest College.

HERBERT H. WERLIN, instructor, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

Howard Wiarda, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts.

EDWARD WEIDNER, professor and director of the Center for the Study of Developmental Change, University of Kentucky; formerly of the East-West Center.

GARY L. WILHELM, assistant professor, Sacramento State College; formerly of Ohio State University.

THEODORE P. WRIGHT, JR., associate professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly of Bates College.

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, professor, the Graduate

School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly of Worcester Polytechnic Institute.

VICTOR ZITTA, associate professor, Hollins College; formerly of Marquette University.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS, 1965–66

RICHARD D. BAKER, University of Oklahoma: visiting professor, Tulane.

KWAMENA BENTSI-ENTIAL, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University: visiting professor, Northwestern University, fall term.

CLARENCE BERDAHL, visiting professor, Southern Illinois University, winter term.

LOREN P. BETH, University of Massachusetts: visiting professor, Trinity College, Dublin.

Gerard Braunthal, University of Massachusetts: visiting professor, Visva-Bharati University, India.

LAWRENCE L. DURISCH, director of Government and Economics Research Staff, TVA: visiting professor, Vanderbilt University, fall term.

James W. Dyson, visiting assistant professor and research associate, Institute of Governmental Research, The Florida State University.

Denna F. Fleming, The California State College: visiting professor, University of Arizona, spring term.

GEORGE GANT, director of the South and Southeast Asia program, Ford Foundation: visiting professor, University of Wisconsin, fall term.

Dante Germino, Wellesley College: visiting Rockefeller Foundation professor, University of the Philippines.

ARTHUR GILBERT, University of Denver: visiting professor, Haile Selassie University, Ethiopia.

ANDREW GYORGY, Boston University: visiting professor, University of Arizona, spring term.

HENRY HART, University of Wisconsin: visiting professor, Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, University of Hawaii, second term.

RICHARD D. HEFFNER, Rutgers University: visiting professor, University of Arizona, summer, 1965.

NEAL D. HOUGHTON, University of Arizona:

visiting professor, University of Saskatchewan, Canada.

NISH JAMGOTCH, California State College at Long Beach: visiting assistant professor, Scripps College, spring term.

EDGAR LOVE, El Camino College: visiting professor, Montgomery Junior College.

RONALD LOVERIDGE, acting assistant professor, University of California at Riverside, fall term.

H. MALCOLM MACDONALD, William A. John Memorial professor, Pomona College, first term.

GERALD S. MARYANOV, University of Iowa: Fulbright lecturer, University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.

GORDON MEANS, Gustavus Adolphus: visiting assistant professor, University of Iowa.

EUGENE MEEHAN, Rutgers: visiting associate professor, Brandeis University.

RICHARD MILLS, visiting lecturer, Brown University.

RUSSELL MURPHY, visiting instructor, Wesleyan University.

FRED WARNER NEAL, Claremont Graduate School: visiting professor, University of West Indies.

REX NEAVERSON, Trinity College: visiting associate professor, Wesleyan University, spring term.

Felix Oppenheim, University of Massachusetts: visiting professor, Istituto di Scienze Politiche, University of Turin, spring term, 1965.

ELINOR OSTROM, visiting assistant professor, Indiana University.

F. W. RIGGS, Indiana University: Carnegie visiting professor, MIT.

Paul P. Van Riper, Cornell University: visiting professor, University of Michigan, summer term, 1965.

Peter Rowe, Smith College: visiting professor, Weslevan University, fall term, 1964.

RICHARD L. SKLAR, formerly of the University of Ibadan: visiting associate professor, Brandeis University.

ROBERT J. STEAMER, Lake Forest College: visiting professor, University of California at Los Angeles, summer term, 1965.

METIN TAMKOC, Middle East Technical University, Ankara: visiting associate professor, Texas Technological College.

DAVID TITUS, Columbia University: visiting instructor, Wesleyan University, spring term.

REXFORD GUY TUGWELL, research professor, Southern Illinois University, spring (1965) and fall terms; Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, winter term.

ERIC WALDMAN, Marquette University, visiting professor, University of Marburg, summer, 1965.

Deil S. Wright, University of Iowa: visiting associate professor, University of California at Berkeley.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

CHARLES AIKEN, chairman of the department, University of California at Berkeley.

BENJAMIN BAKER, chairman of the department, Rutgers—The State University.

JOSEPH L. BERND, chairman of the department, Southern Methodist University.

JOHN T. BERNHARD, chairman of the department, Brigham Young University.

DONALD G. BISHOP, chairman of the department, Syracuse University.

GEORGE BLANKSTEN, chairman of the department, Northwestern University.

STEVEN J. Brams, research associate, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va.

ALAN L. CLEM, associate director, Governmental Research Bureau, University of South Dakota.

JAMES B. CRAIG, JR., research associate, Institute of Governmental Research, The Florida State University.

WILDER CRANE, chairman of the department, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

ALEX' N. DRAGNICH, chairman of the department, Vanderbilt University.

HENRY W. EHRMANN, reappointed chairman of the department, Dartmouth.

LEE W. FARNSWORTH, director, Asian Research Institute, Brigham Young University.

Webb S. Fisher, vice president for academic affairs, the State University of New York at Albany.

PHILLIP O. Foss, chairman of the department, Colorado State University.

RICHARD B. GRAY, director, Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in International Affairs, The Florida State University.

H. GAYLORD GREENHILL, chairman of the department, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

FRANK M. LEWIS, chairman of the department, University of Toledo.

MELVIN P. MABEY, coordinator, Russian Studies Program, Brigham Young University.

HARVEY MARTENS, director of Public Administration programs, Syracuse University; formerly director, Special Projects, American Society for Public Administration:

C. Peter McGrath, associate dean of the Graduate School, Brown University.

Edwin B. Morell, assistant chairman, Brigham Young University.

Howard D. Hamilton, acting chairman of the department, Bowling Green State University.

JAMES N. MURRAY, chairman of the department, University of Iowa.

O. WILLIAM PERLMUTTER, academic dean of the College of Fine and Professional Arts, Kent State University.

JAMES R. SCALES, dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Oklahoma State University.

DAVID Scorr, chairman of the department, University of Omaha; formerly of Southern Illinois University.

DWIGHT JAMES SIMPSON, president, Roberts College, Istanbul; formerly of Williams College.

IVAN M. STONE, director, Pettibone World

Affairs Center, Beloit College; formerly dean of the College.

VINCENT V. THURSBY, assistant dean of the Graduate School, The Florida State University, 1965-66.

H. ODELL WALDBY, assistant vice president for

Academic Affairs, The Florida State University.

ROBERT S. WALKER, chairman of the department, Trinity University (San Antonio); formerly of Oklahoma State University.

WILLIAM O. WINTER, chairman of the department, University of Colorado; formerly of Southern Illinois University.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

DAVID H. BAYLEY, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver: associate professor.

YAROSLAV BILINSKY, University of Delaware: associate professor.

ROBERT C. BONE, The Florida State University: professor.

ALAN L. CLEM, University of South Dakota: professor.

GEORGE A. CODDING, Jr., University of Colorado: professor.

ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., Brown University: professor.

Brownlee Sands Corrin, Goucher College: professor.

RICHARD H. Cox, State University of New York at Buffalo: professor.

MICHAEL R. CURTIS, Rutgers—The State University: professor.

FRANK C. DARLING, University of Colorado: professor.

I. RIDGWAY DAVIS, University of Connecticut: associate professor.

ROBERT W. GREGG, Syracuse University: associate professor.

HUGH E. KELSO, University of Iowa: professor.

PAUL C. KITCHEN, Kent State University: associate professor.

DAVID KOVENOCK, Dartmouth College: assistant professor.

MARTIN T. KYRE, Texas Technological College: associate professor.

JOHN C. LANE, State University of New York at Buffalo: associate professor.

ROBERT M. LAWRENCE, Texas Technological College: associate professor.

M. HARRY LEASE, JR., University of Minnesota at Duluth: associate professor.

JOAN LOMAX, Montgomery Junior College: assistant professor.

GENE M. LYONS, Dartmouth College: professor.

RAYMOND D. MACK, Texas Technological College: associate professor.

CONRAD L. McBride, University of Colorado: associate professor.

FRANK MUNGER, Syracuse University: professor.

EUGENE J. MEEHAN, Rutgers—The State University: associate professor.

RICHARD MERELMAN, Wesleyan University: assistant professor.

WILLIAM E. ODEN, Texas Technological College: professor.

JOHN M. ORBELL, Ohio State University: assistant professor.

DAISY PARKER, The Florida State University: professor.

RICHARD H. PFAFF, University of Colorado: associate professor.

RUSSELL M. Ross, University of Iowa: professor.

EDWARD J. ROZEK, University of Colorado: professor.

MICHAEL O. SAWYER, Syracuse University: professor.

WALTER F. SCHEFFER, University of Oklahoma: professor.

JEROME N. SLATER, Ohio State University: assistant professor.

GLENN H. SNYDER, State University of New York at Buffalo: professor.

DAVID J. STERN, Colgate University: assistant professor.

RUDOLF TOKES, Wesleyan University: assistant professor.

JOE R. WILKINSON, Graduate School of International Studies. University of Denver: associate professor.

LEA E. WILLIAMS, Brown University: professor.

CLIFTON E. WILSON, University of Arizona: associate professor.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

AMRY VANDENBOSCH, director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky, and chairman of the department there from 1933 to 1958, retired on June 30 after 39 years of service at the University.

JOHN H. FERGUSON resigned the positions of head of the department and director of the Institute of Public Administration at Pennsylvania State University on September 1. He will remain at the University in a teaching capacity.

DONALD E. HAYHURST has resigned his associate professorship at West Virginia University.

STEPHEN O. LESSER resigned from the University of Victoria, B.C., to accept a position with the Department of State.

RODNEY L. MOTT, Charles Evans Hughes professor of government and jurisprudence at Colgate University, retired on June 30 after 30 years of service. For 27 years he was director of the University's Division of Social Sciences.

FRANK MUNGER resigned his post of chairman of the department at Syracuse University on June 30.

ERNEST B. SCHULZ has retired from Lehigh University after 38 years of service on the faculty.

IN MEMORIAM

RICHARD W. BARRON, professor of political science at Longwood College, died July 18, 1965.

The death of Professor Julian Towster, University of California, Berkeley, on April 15, 1965, at the age of 60, has left a significant void in scholarship in the field of Soviet Studies. A native of Poland, he came to the United States in 1926, studied at the University of Chicago, which awarded him the JD and PhD degrees. His services to the Department of Justice, Office of Strategic Services, and the State Department during the War and subsequently, were notable. He joined the Political Science Faculty at the University of California in 1950. He was the recipient of grants from the Social Science Research Council, the Russian Institute of Columbia University, and the Guggenheim Foundation.

By his voluminous and authoritative writings on the subject of politics and government of the Soviet Union, Professor Towster achieved an eminent reputation as a Sovietologist throughout the United States and abroad. His major work, Political Powers in the USSR, first published in 1948, broke new ground. It was extensively studied and cited and was used for teaching purposes in over one hundred colleges and universities. He was continually active in public affairs, was in demand as a lecturer on Soviet subjects in the lecture hall, on radio and television. At the time of his death he was engaged in the writing of two major manuscripts concerned with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and with its con-

duct of foreign relations. He is survived by his wife and two daughters.—The Department of Political Science, University of California.

Professor Eugene Burdick, University of California, Berkeley, died suddenly on July 26, 1965, having just concluded a year's leave of absence from teaching. He was a native of Iowa, and received his higher education at Stanford and Oxford Universities, earning the Doctor's degree from Magdalen College following residence as a Rhodes Scholar. Trained in psychology (M.A.), he carried his graduate studies further in political theory. He joined the Political Science staff of the University of California in 1950.

During the First World War he served in the Navy (Jr.Cmdr.), and during the Korean War was assigned to the Naval War College, Newport, as Academic Consultant.

Although well known as the author of the Ninth Wave, The Ugly American (with William Lederer), Fail Safe, and others, his professional writing is reflected primarily in articles. He was co-author with A. J. Brodbeck of American Voting Behavior (1959). His abiding interest in politics and public affairs led him far afield as a practitioner, lecturer and adviser. He served as consultant to the government on various aspects of foreign policy and as special adviser to the President. He was associated actively with the Dooley Foundation and with HOPE. He is survived by his widow, two daughters and a son.—The Department of Political Science, The University of California.

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(a) Alphabetical Section

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(b) Classified Section*

Here entries concerning the same or related topics are grouped together, or near to each other, to encourage "suggestive browsing" and refer you to the *subject matter* of Articles, Reviews, Notes, and Bibliographies.

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7010	T , (* 1 T TT * 1 TT) .

D610 International Law—United Nations

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
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
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
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
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
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
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